Preuenfing Tobacco Use Among Young Peq+ . m-sage appeal relies on production elemtm& .qwh ,\?; choice of actors, clothing, and music. To &J ?;u,\~~~,~. pro&ztion need not be Costly (Flynn trt al. t-2). In fact, small, independent producers may by luwtu.~t+. if pr&u&on quality is maintained. Campaigns should be intense enough to t'~uuh\ im- pact (Flay, DiTecco, Schlegell980). Tele\iti,>n nlLY?;- Sages should be aired at times when your\< ?~~~l+, are most likely to be watching-and ti,r h-?;t t++ cienq, at times when they are the prim.~rl\, \-ic\\-\.=;. particularly during the reruns of popular ~~rimtLtin,,, shows during after-school hours, since thtw ~h~~,,~ tend to charge relatively low rates for ~~d\-\~~isin+.. Adequate reach and frequency should h\ .lchic\-l,i by using both paid and public-service time (F.tic~.,~,~ McKenna, Roman0 1990). The statewide mt\Ii,\ c,,~,,- paigns in California, Minnesota, and htichis,j1\ ,In, based on paid advertising funded by earn~.~rL\~ t.llt, Paid media appear necessary t0 achieve s;\llvt.lnti,\\ exposure to targeted youth populations .\t L\\\tim,\l ties of the day. Campaigns should havt\ s\ltfi and organized smug- gling (i.e., involving large quantities, generally for resale) of cigarettes from low-tax localities to high-tax localities and create incentives for other tax-evasion activities. The dative ease of transporting cigarettes across lo- calities has encouraged some people to profit from this activity (Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Re- lations [ACIRI 1977,1985). Although casual smuggling Prezwrztion 171 Surgeon General's Report Table 13. State* cigarette taxes, July I,1993 Excise tax rate Sales tax' State (cents per 204garette pack) (cents per pack) Alabama 16.5 7 Alaska 29.0 0 Arizona 18.0 9 Arkansas 31.5 9 California 35.0 15 Colorado 20.0 0 Connecticut 47.0 12 Delaware 24.0 0 District of Columbia 65.0 13 Florida 33.9 12 Georgia 12.0 6 Hawaii 60.0 9 Idaho 18.0 9 Illinois 30.0 13 Indiana 15.5 9 Iowa 36.0 11 Kansas 24.0 9 Kentucky 3.0 9 Louisiana 20.0 8 Maine 37.0 11 Maryland 36.0 IO Massachusetts 51.0 9 Michigan 25.0 7 Minnesota 48.0 14 Mississippi 18.0 11 Missouri 13.0 7 Montana 19.3 0 Nebraska 34.0 9 Nevada 35.0 13 New Hampshire . 25.0 0 New Jersey 40.0 12 New Mexico 21.0 9 New York 56.0 8 North Carolina 5.0 6 North Dakota 44.0 11 Ohio 24.0 8 Oklahoma 23.0 8 Oregon 28.0 0 Pennsylvania 31.0 11 Rhode Island 37.0 14 South Carolina 7.0 8 South Dakota 23.0 7 Tennessee 13.0 14 Texas 41.0 13 Utah 26.5 9 Vermont 20.0 9 Virginia 2.5 7 Washington 54.0 13 West Virginia 17.0 10 Wisconsin 38.0 10 Wyoming 12.0 0 Sources: Tobacco Institute (1992); Action on Smoking and Health (1993). *Includes the District of Columbia. `%es tax information is for November 1,1992. Total state tax (cents per pack) 23.5 29.0 27.0 40.5 50.0 20.0 59.0 24.0 78.0 45.9 18.0 69.0 27.0 43.0 24.5 47.0 33.0 12.0 28.0 48.0 46.0 60.0 32.0 62.0 29.0 20.0 19.3 43.0 48.0 25.0 52.0 30.0 64.0 11.0 55.0 32.0 31.0 28.0 42.0 51.0 15.0 30.0 27.0 54.0 35.5 29.0 9.5 67.0 27.0 48.0 12.0 172 Preumtion Prwenting Tobacco Use Among Young People had long been a problem, states reported that organized smuggling increased significantly after the tax increases of the mid- to late-1960s. Some states were discouraged from adding further taxes that would motivate increased smuggling and result in a net loss of revenues gener- ated by cigarette taxes. In 1978, in response to pressure from states with high cigarette taxes, the Federal Con- traband Cigarette Act (Public Law 95-575) was enacted. This act prohibited the single-transaction transport, re- ceipt, shipment, possession, distribution, or purchase of more than 60,000 cigarettes not bearing the tax indicia of the state in which the cigarettes were initially sold. The act dealt only with the organized smuggling of cigarettes, described by the ACIR as the major problem, and ignored the less problematic casual smuggling (Kleine 1993). The ACIR (1985) suggests, however, that the law was even more effective than its proponents would have predicted. California and Massachusetts recently enacted two large increases in their excise taxes on tobacco. In November 1988, California voters passed Proposition 99, which went into effect in January 1989. This law in- creased California's state excise tax on cigarettes from 10 cents per pack to 35 cents per pack. As was mentioned earlier, one of the notable features of Proposition 99 is that 20 percent of the additional revenue raised from the tax increase is earmarked for the state's antismoking activities. Legislation similar to Proposition 99 was passed in Massachusetts in November 1992. This measure, which took effect on January 1,1993, includes a 25-tent increase in the state excise tax and a 25 percent increase in the tax on chewing tobacco. Besides the specific taxes applied to cigarettes, 45 states and Washington, D.C., have general sales-taxes that apply to cigarettes. In all but four of these states, the sales-tax base includes the excise tax. This arrangement adds an additional 5 to 14 cents per pack to the price of cigarettes in these states (see Table 13). State taxes on other tobacco products have also become more widespread. By January 1,1992, a total of 37 states had imposed a tax on at least some tobacco products other than cigarettes; only 14 states were collecting such taxes in 1964. The same time period witnessed similar activity at the local level. By fiscal year 1991, 373 cities had imposed additional taxes on ciga- rettes, and 49 cities were levying taxes on other tobacco products. In addition, 38 counties were charging their own cigarette taxes, and 29 counties were assessing addi- tional taxes on other tobacco products. The largest of these local cigarette taxes are those imposed in New York City (8 additional cents per pack) and in Chicago (24 additional cents per pack, including city and county excise taxes). Cigarette Tax Increases and Cigarette Prices After scientific evidence of the harmful health con- sequences of cigarette smoking appeared in the mid- 1950s states began to increase cigarette excise taxes not only to raise revenues but to discourage people from smoking. Because the combined federal and state taxes accounted for almost half of the average retail price of cigarettes, these state tax increases resulted in increases in the real price of cigarettes (i.e., the price of cigarettes relative to the price of ail goods and services, as mea- sured by the National Consumer Price Index) (Table 14). The relative price of cigarettes also rose as a result of the state tax increases. This trend was accelerated after the 1964 release of the first Surgeon General's report on smoking and health. The resultwas that between 1955 and 1971, the nominal price of cigarettes had risen by over 70 percent (almost half of this increase was attrib- uted to the state tax increases), and the real price of cigarettes had risen by over 13 percent. These increases in real cigarette prices were short- lived. The rapid inflation of the 197Os, coupled with the relative stability of state excise taxes on cigarettes, led to a sharp drop in real cigarette prices between 1971 and 1981. Federal taxes remained fixed at 8 cents per pack during this period. As was discus& earlier, the emer- gence of organized smuggling in response to the grow- ing differences in state and local taxes discouraged states from continuing to increase cigarette taxes. Combined federal and state taxes, as a percentage of retail cigarette prices, fell from 47 percent at the beginning of this period to 33 percent in 1981. The absolute cost of producing cigarettes fell throughout this period, largely because of a decrease in the average quantity of tobacco per ciga- rette as the market share for `low tai" cigarettes in- creased (Harris 1987X The overall result was that between 1971 and 1981, the real price of cigarettes declined by almost 28 percent. Beginning in 1982, this downward trend in real cigarette prices was reversed as state taxes rose in antici- pation of the doubling of the federal excise tax on ciga- rettes that was scheduled for January 1, 1983. These combined taxincreasesled to the largest singlc+year jump in prices (from 1982 to 1983). However, Harris (1987) argues that the main cause of the increase in the real price of cigarettes from 1981 through 1986 was not the increase in either the federal tax or state taxes, but rather the increases in the wholesale prices of cigarettes because of markups by manufacturers. He contends that most of these markups were not justified by increases in the cost of production. Instead, he suggests that markups were the result of a coordinated price increase by the six firms that dominate the tobacco industry. More recent data lend support to Harris's argument: although state and Prezwntion 173 Surgeon General's Report Table 14. Cigarette taxes and cigarette prices per pack, 1955-1991 Year Average state tax (cents) Taxes as Real+ Average percent- Real' Real' average Average cigarette age of average average cigarette federal price average state tax* federal price tax (cents) (cents) price' (cents) tax (cents) (cents) 1955 3.5 8.0 22.7 48.7 13.1 29.9 84.7 1956 3.8 8.0 23.2 47.4 14.0 29.9 85.3 1957 3.9 8.0 23.8 48.8 13.9 28.5 84.7 1958 4.0 8.0 25.0 48.0 13.8 27.7 86.5 1959 4.2 8.0 25.6 46.6 14.4 27.5 88.0 1960 4.7 8.0 26.1 48.9 15.9 27.0 88.2 1961 4.7 8.0 26.1 43.6 15.7 26.8 87.3 1962 5.1 8.0 26.9 48.3 16.9 26.5 89.1 1963 5.2 8.0 26.8 49.4 17.0 26.1 87.6 1964 5.6 8.0 27.9 49.3 18.1 25.8 90.0 1965 5.9 8.0 28.2 49.8 18.7 25.4 89.5 1966 6.9 8.0 30.0 51.4 21.3 24.7 92.6 1967 7.1 8.0 30.5 50.8 21.3 24.0 91.3 1968 8.4 8.0 32.3 49.2 24.1 23.0 92.8 1969 9.1 8.0 32.8 48.9 24.8 21.8 89.4 1970 10.2 8.0 37.1 47.7 26.3 20.6 95.6 1971 10.7 8.0 38.9 46.8 26.4 19.8 96.0 1972 11.6 8.0 40.0 47.7 27.8 19.1 95.7 1973 12.1 8.0 40.3 48.4 27.3 18.0 90.8 1974 12.1 8.0 41.8 47.6 24.5 16.2 84.8 1975 12.2 8.0 44.5 44.5 22.7 14.9 82.7 1976 12.4 8.0 47.9 41.4 21.8 14.1 84.2 1977 12.5 8.0 49.2 40.5 20.6 13.2 81.2 1978 12.9 8.0 54.3 37.1 19.8 12.3 83.3 1979 12.9 8.0 56.8 35.5 17.8 11.0 78.2 1980 13.1 8.0 60.0 34.5 15.9 9.7 72.8 1981 13.2 8.0 63.0 33.1 14.5 8.8 69.3 1982 13.5 8.0 69.7 29.9 14.0 8.3 72.2 1983 14.7 12.0 81.9 26.8 14.8 12.0 82.2 1984 15.3 16.0 94.7 33.2 14.7 15.4 91.1 1985 15.9 16.0 97.8 32.3 14.8 14.9 90.9 1986 16.2 16.0 104.5 30.8 14.8 14.6 95.3 1987 16.9 16.0 110.0 29.9 14.9 14.1 96.8 1988 18.2 16.0 122.2 28.1 15.4 13.5 103.3 1989 21.8 16.0 127.5 26.5 17.6 12.9 102.8 1990 24.7 16.0 144.1 26.4 18.9 12.2 110.3 1991 25.9 20.0 153.3 25.6 19.0 11.7 112.6 Source: Tobacco Institute (1992). rercentages cannot be calculated directly from the tax and price information, since taxes are weighted average taxes for the entire fiscal year, whereas prices and percentages are generally as of November 1. `Real taxes and prices are obtained by dividing the actual taxes and prices by the National Consumer Price Index, with the average of 1982-l 984 being the benchmark. AII data are for the fiscal year ending June 20. State taxes are a weighted average of the tax in taxing states, including Washington, D.C. (42 in 1955,51 in 1970 and after). Price refers to the median retail price in aII taxing states. 174 Prewn tion Preventing Tobacco Use Among Young People federal taxes have increased since the late 1980% the percentageoftheretailpriceofcigarettesaccountedforby these taxes actually fell from 33 percent in 1981 to 26 percent in 1991 (Tobacco Institute 1992). The combined effect of increases in federal and state taxes and in manufacturers price resulted in the real price of ciga- rettes increasing by over 60 percent between 1981 and 1991. This upward trend in real cigarette prices is ex- pected to continue at least through 1993, as the federal tax increases to 24 cents per pack as part of the 1990 deficit- reductionagreement. Therefore,althoughtaxesaccounted for a smaller percentage of the increased retail price of cigarettes from 1981 to 1991, the increased taxes, along with manufacturers' price increases, were still passed on to consumers, and the real price of cigarettes increased. Effect of Excise Taxes on Tobacco Use One of the fundamental principles of economics, illustrated by a downward-sloping demand curve, states that as the real price of any commodity rises, consump- tion of that commodity falls. Some researchers have speculated that the consumption of an addictive prod- uct, such as cigarettes, might be an exception to this rule. However, numerous econometric studies, including several recent studies that explicitly model the addic- tive aspects of cigarette smoking, confirm that this fundamental economic principle does indeed apply to cigarettes. Thus, since increases in cigarette excise taxes generally result in increased cigarette prices, these tax increases may be effective in reducing cigarette consumption. Economists use the concept of price `elasticity of demand to describe the sensitivity of consumption to changes in price. The price elasticity of demand is de fined as the percentage change in consumption that results from a 1 percent increase in price. For example, a price elasticity of -0.5 implies that a 10 percent increase in price would reduce consumption by five percent. A brief review of recent U.S. studies of cigarette de mand follows. Aggregate Data Studies One set of recent studies of cigarette demand used aggregate data. Price elasticity estimates obtained from these studies ranged from -0.14 to -1.23; the majority of these estimates fell within the narrower range from -0.20 to -0.50. All but two of the estimates were obtained from econometric studies that besides examining the effect of price, used income, demographic variables, and other policy-related variables to explain differences in ciga- rette consumption. Failing to include such potentially important determinants of demand could lead to biased estimates of the effects of price and other policies on cigarette smoking. Several of these studies made theo- retical and empirical attempts to model the addictive aspects of cigarette consumption. In contrast with the econometric analyses, Peterson et al. (1992) used an epidemiologic approach similar to the quasi- experimental approach of Baltagi and Goel(1987). Both studies obtained estimates of the price elasticity of de- mand that were consistent with those obtained from econometric studies. Differences in the estimates obtained from these studies partly resulted from differences in theoretical and empirical modeling methods. For example, the studies that used a pooled time series of state cross-sections might provide estimates of the price elasticity that exceed the true value of the elasticity if cigarette smuggling is ignored, since studies based on aggregate data use state cigarette sales figures as their measure of consumption. That is, states with relatively low cigarette taxes and prices may sell a substantial number of cigarettes to residents of nearby states where prices are higher. Thus, the sales figures from the states with lower cigarette taxes and prices will overstate cigarette consumption within those states, whereas those with higher taxes and prices will understate consumption. Many of the most recent studies, however, including those by Baltagi and Levin (19861, Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (19921, and Chaloupka and Saffer (1992), have controlled for this problem. Siily, if the addictive aspects of COIISUIYIP tion are ignored, the estimated price elasticity may be biased. Again, many of these recent studies, including Baltagi and Levin (19861, Becker, Grossman, and Murphy (19921, and Keeler et al. (1992) estimated demand equa- tions that explicitly model the addictive aspects of con- sumption. In addition, at the aggregate level, cigarette prices and quantity are simultaneously determined by the interaction of cigarette supply and demand. Ignoring this simultaneity would lead to biased estimates of the effects of cigarette prices on demand. Bishop and Yoo (1985) and Porter (1986) explicitly modeled this relation- ship and estimated price elasticities of demand that fell within the -0.20 to -0.50 range generally found in other studies based on aggregate data. Finally, two of these studies, Keeler et al. (1992) and Flewelling et al. (1992), considered the effects of the relatively large change in the California cigarette excise tax. Their estimated price elasticities suggest that the impact of price on demand is independent of the level of price. Even with the differences in data, theoretical mod- eling, and estimation techniques, one general conclusion can be drawn from these aggregate studies-increases in cigarette prices will reduce cigarette consumption. At least part of this reduction is likely due to adolescents' quitting smoking, reducing the amount they smoke, or not taking up smoking in the first place &JSDIII-IS 1991). Prevention 175