Statement
of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, The Jamestown
Foundation
SUMMARY
While
scholarly assessments disagree, it can be concluded from
numerous open sources that the People's Republic of
China (PRC) is in the midst of an ambitious
modernization program for its People's Liberation Army
(PLA). The current focus of this modernization is to
acquire the space, information, missile, air, naval and
ground forces necessary to subdue Taiwan in the relative
near-term, and to set the basis for achieving military
dominance in the greater Asia-Pacific after Taiwan is
retaken. While
today the PLA does not seriously threaten U.S. forces in
Asia, it is beginning to shift the balance on the Taiwan
Strait in its favor.
This, plus the PLA's high-tech focus, a stress
on acquiring "asymmetrical" capabilities that
exploit U.S. weaknesses, a phenomenal appetite for
foreign military technology, and Beijing's growing
hostility toward the U.S. strategic presence in Asia
should be cause for real concern in Washington. The
PLA's modernization has the following key elements:
High Technology Focus.
In its domestic military research and
development, and in its efforts to acquire foreign
technology, the PLA is stressing a modern high
technology military capability.
Emphasis on Missiles and Space.
The PLA is assembling the space, information, and
missile forces to create a long-range missile-based
information strike complex that will enable the
long-range precision targeting of critical enemy
civil-military nodes.
Focus On Taiwan.
Acquiring
the forces necessary to intimidate or if necessary
subdue Taiwan remains the principle goal of the PLA's
modernization. It
seeks the missile, air and naval forces necessary for
this task.
Future Power Projection.
Forces
being acquired for a possible Taiwan conflict will also
lay the foundation for future PLA regional
power-projection-to eventually include aircraft
carriers. This
will further impact and stress the U.S. led alliance
system in Asia and present new challenges to India and
the Persian Gulf region.
To
continue to deter conflict on the Taiwan Strait it
remains necessary for the U.S. to sell Taiwan the arms
its needs to sustain an effective military balance.
Inasmuch as recent Pentagon assessments make
clear Taiwan is losing its edge to the PLA, it is
critical for the U.S. to sell Taiwan the submarines,
missile defense, naval defense and air defense equipment
it has requested. These
include conventional submarines, the AEGIS air defense
destroyer, plus HARM and AMRAAM missiles.
In the future Taiwan will need laser-based
missile defenses.
Until
the PRC evolves from Communism and changes its strategic
goals, the U.S. should strengthen its alliance system in
Asia, seek a new partnership with India, and prevent
friends and allies from helping PLA modernization. The
U.S. must also invest in the future military
technologies that ensure American military forces remain
decisively superior to those of the PRC.
These include space and airborne information
systems, high-power lasers, supersonic cruise missiles,
Trident/SSGNs, superior SSNs, stealth warships, the F-22
plus superior air-to-air missiles, and naval air power
superior to the emerging PLA air forces.
"The
PRC's long-run geopolitical goals include
incorporating Taiwan into the PRC and becoming the
primary power in Asia."
House
Select Committee On U.S. National Security and
Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's
Republic of China, May 1999
"China
seeks to become the preeminent power among regional
states in East Asia."
Annual
Report On the Military Power of the People's Republic
of China, U.S. Department of Defense, June 2000
INTRODUCTION
It is
clear from numerous open sources that the People's
Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of an ambitious
modernization effort for its People's Liberation Army
(PLA), which incorporates the Second Artillery missile
forces, the PLA Army, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force.
While building from a low base in the late 1980s,
the leadership of the PRC has devoted considerable
resources to building the research and development
infrastructure plus acquiring foreign technologies to
sustain PLA growth. And while in the year 2000 the PLA does not pose a serious
threat to U.S. forces in Asia, it is rapidly acquiring
the systems necessary to shift the military balance on
the Taiwan Strait in its favor.
The PRC government believes that the credible
threat or even the use of force is critical to
recovering "lost territories" such as Taiwan or the
South China Sea. This, plus the PLA's emphasis on seeking "asymmetrical"
capabilities that exploit U.S. military weaknesses, its
willingness to incorporate foreign technology to
establish new capabilities, and its growing hostility to
U.S. missile defenses and to the U.S. military presence
in Asia, should cause concern in Washington.
When the PRC evolves away from Communism it may
become a positive force in its region and beyond. Until
then, it is incumbent upon the United States to continue
to exercise the political and military leadership
necessary to promote peace and stability in Asia.
Varying
Assessments of the PLA
Accurate open sector assessments of the PLA are
difficult as the PRC government does not make available
to its own people or outsiders detailed knowledge of the
budgets, doctrine, research and development, current
equipment or future modernization plans of its
People's Liberation Army.
Concealing one's strength so as to enable
maximum surprise is a key element of ancient Chinese
statecraft that continues to this day.
In three reports requested by the Congress, the
Department of Defense has added some new knowledge about
the direction of PLA modernization.[i]
Last year the House Select Committee on
Military/Commercial Relations with the People's
Republic of China provided the most comprehensive
description of PRC military high-technology goals and
espionage efforts, from a U.S. government source.
The Select Committee demonstrated that the
Administration can and should offer much more detailed
analysis of the PLA to better inform the U.S. policy
process.
Due to incomplete information, and the lack of a
comprehensive U.S. government statement on the PLA,
widely varying assessments of the PLA have been produced
in recent years. In
the 1980s the U.S. and other Western governments were
selling arms to PRC in a tacit alliance against the
former Soviet Union, and had wide access to the PLA.
The general assessment at the time was that it
was mired in strategic concepts of "People's War"
based on the guerrilla campaign that chased the
Nationalist government to Taiwan, and burdened by
military technology not much improved upon from what the
Soviets sold them in the 1950s.
The twin shocks of the Tiananmen Massacre and
subsequent Western military embargoes, plus the
demonstration of overwhelming U.S. and Allied force
during the Gulf War, have prompted the current PLA
modernization. But
there are today differing assessments of the success of
the PLA's modernization.
Two
respected scholars of the PLA stated last year that
"China's military is simply not very good,"[ii]
Or as two others stated in 1998, the PLA "will not in
the next ten years,.be anything more than a
nuisance,"[iii]
and "in 20 to 30 years China will still be a regional
power." [iv]
This group of scholars tends to focus on the
exiting old equipment of the PLA, its not-yet-completed
effort to formulate modern joint-service doctrine and
operations, and a lack of realistic training and
maintenance problems.
The PLA's acquisition of foreign weapon systems
is seen as compounding training and maintenance
challenges while demonstrating the inability of its
domestic military industrial sector.[v]
To be sure, the PLA faces enormous challenges, not the
least of which is whether the PRC government can afford
a continued comprehensive modernization of the PLA. And
even here, there is great variance in estimates of the
PLA's budget, from the PRC government 1998 figure of
about $11 billion-which few accept-up to $40 billion
a year and higher.
However,
this is also an emerging view that the PRC is devoting
great resources into high technology areas for which
there is only scant information, usually from Chinese
language journals, that could result in a formidable PLA
in the next decade or soon after.[vi]
While the PLA has factions of leaders who stress
obtaining current generation weapons and "readiness"
concerns, there is another faction of officers who
promote the PLA's embrace of the Revolution in
Military Affairs (RMA) to leap into the forefront of
military powers.[vii]
It can also be discerned from the three Pentagon
assessments, in addition to Chinese and journalistic
reports, that the PLA is rapidly gaining the weapon
systems necessary to pose a credible threat to Taiwan.
While there is some danger in overestimating the
future capabilities of the PLA, there is perhaps even an
even greater threat to U.S. security interests in
underestimating the ability of the PLA to modernize.
A closer examination of the impact of the PLA's
access to foreign military technology also produces
greater cause for concern. There is a need for both
government and non-government analysts to question the
seeming orthodoxy that the PLA cannot build a modern
military force capable of meeting near and long-term
goals. The remainder of this statement will expand on
the effort that the PLA is making in the areas of high
technology, missiles and space, preparations for
conflict over Taiwan, and laying the foundation for
greater power projections.
THE PLA'S HIGH
TECHNOLOGY FOCUS
Lasers.
The
PLA's intense interest in laser weapons exemplifies
its quest for next-generation technology that also
exploits the weaknesses of potential enemies.
Lasers were a key area on investment for the
"863-Program." Pro-RMA officers view lasers as a key
weapons technology for the future. The PLA envisions
using lasers for anti-air, satellite tracking,
anti-satellite, and for radar functions.[xiii]
In 1995 the PLA company Norinco marketed its
ZM-87 battlefield laser dazzler.
The 1998 Pentagon PLA report noted that the PLA
might already have a ground-based laser capable of
damaging low-orbit reconnaissance satellites. Last year
the Select Committee suggested that Russia might be a
source of nuclear-pump laser technology for the PRC for
use in space.[xiv]
Last October the PLA revealed for the first time its
Type-98 main battle tank, which has a box on the hull
that may be a low-light camera or a laser dazzler.
According to the Pentagon's PLA report released in
June, China "reportedly is investigating the
feasibility of shipborne laser weapons for air
defense."
Space. The PRC's immanent launching of its first citizens into
space will herald the PRC's emergence not just as a
world-class space power, but as a rapidly developing
military-space power as well. As has been the experience
in the U.S. and Russia, there is in the PRC a direct
linkage between military and commercial missile and
space activities. The
PRC's DF-5 ICBM formed the basis for its family of
commercial space launch vehicles and its first man-rated
launch vehicle, the Long March-2F.
The Shenzhou
manned space capsule, successfully tested in November
last year, is based on the Russian Soyuz
design, and confirms much reporting from Russia on
the PRC's high reliance on Russian manned space
technology and advice.
The PRC plans to launch its own space station
that will likely resemble the early Russian Salyut
designs, and is known to be researching its own
reusable space shuttle. The Pentagon's June report on
the PLA noted China's interest in "manned
reconnaissance from space." More worrisome is the
prospect of Russia selling the PRC plans or technology
for its many space warfare programs that died with the
former Soviet Union.
The Soviets had tested an anti-satellite
interceptor, and had plans for military combat space
stations plus space-based laser and kinetic-kill
anti-ICBM systems.
Likewise,
the China Aerospace Corporation, with some foreign
technical inputs, is building new communication and
earth observation satellites that will aid the
development of future PLA communication and
reconnaissance satellites.
The PRC's DFH-3 communication satellite was
co-developed with Germany's DASA Corporation.
The PRC's first multi-spectral earth the
Ziyuan-1, was co-developed with Brazil but incorporates
ground-station technology from the U.S. company Hughes.
Future PLA imaging and radar satellites benefit
from domestic research, but may also use some Russian
technology. In
May the PRC's Tsinghua University launched the PRC's
first micro-satellite, co-developed with Britain's
University of Surrey was launched, and Tsinghua has just
announced it is developing the THNS-1, a 10-kg nano-satellite
for imaging missions.[xv]
Another RMA technology, micro and nano-satellites
are easier to launch and much harder to counter, as they
are placed in orbit in large numbers.
Information
warfare. PLA literature has revealed in recent years an intense
interest in information warfare, which for the PLA
includes activities ranging from anti-satellite
operations to computer network attack, manipulation of
information for deception and psychological warfare. It is very likely that the PLA is at least preparing to be
able to attack the computer and communication
infrastructure of an opponent as a key element of future
military campaigns.
Radio
frequency weapons.
The 1998 Pentagon report on the PLA notes its interest
in radio frequency and high-power microwave weapons, one
of the few western references regarding the PRC and this
new and dangerous class of weapons. These can be
configured either as blast-bombs or beams that focus
energy so as to neutralize missiles, computers or even
humans.
Stealth,
counter-stealth. A
critical technology for current and future U.S. weapons
systems, the PLA is very interested in both exploiting
and countering stealth.
At the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show the PRC company
Seek-Optics marketed stealth coating and design
technology. At
the same show it also marketed the "J-231" radar,
advertised as having "high anti-stealth capability."
China has revealed the design of a new "F-16"
frigate, intended for export that uses extensive stealth
shaping. The Pentagon report on the PLA released in June
notes China "reportedly is developing new fighter
aircraft which will incorporate LO [Low Observable]
technology."
Unmanned
vehicles. Like the U.S., the PLA has a strong interest in unmanned air
and sea platforms for military missions. The PLA has
long used unmanned reconnaissance drones based on U.S. Firebee
drones captured during the Vietnam War, and revealed
the ASN-206 small battlefield reconnaissance drone that
may incorporate some Israeli technology. In 1997 the PLA
revealed a new submarine-robot developed out of the
"863-Program." It incorporated technologies such as
automatic control, artificial intelligence, computers,
acoustics and optics, and was said to have military
benefits.[xvi]
An important RMA technology for the U.S. Navy is
underwater combat vehicles.
EMPHASIS ON MISSILES
AND SPACE
Missile
and space forces are proving to be an early emphasis in
the PLA's modernization. In the absence of credible
air and naval forces the PLA hopes to compensate by
building its missile forces, which confer an
"asymmetric" advantage over the U.S. and its Asian
allies. The
need to retain this advantage in part explains the
PRC's vicious opposition to U.S. national and theater
missile defense plans. The PLA's Second Artillery
missile force, which controls both strategic ICBMs and
theater intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs)
and short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is now in
the process of fielding new strategic and theater
missiles. Current numbers of PLA ICBMs is thought to
include 20-25 older liquid fueled DF-5, plus about 12
JL-1 SLBMs on one Xia
class SSBN. PRC
strategic missile numbers will increase irrespective of
threats to do so as part of the PRC's attempt to
forestall U.S. strategic and theater missile defense
plans.
New
Strategic Missiles.
After a long
development period, the PLA revealed its new DF-31
5,000-mile range ICBM in the October 1, 1999 military
parade in Beijing. The DF-31 is a modern solid-fueled and mobile ICBM that uses
a new Chinese small nuclear warhead.
Based on revelations made by the House Select
Committee, it is likely that the DF-31 incorporates U.S.
technology in its solid fuel motor and in its new
warhead. This
missile is not thought to have multiple warheads now,
but could in the future.
Its truck-based transporter-erector-launcher
(TEL) indicates that the missile will be hidden in a
network of cave shelters connected by roads.
The DF-31 will also form the basis of the JL-2
SLBM that will arm a new class of SSBN being build with
Russian technical assistance, the Type-094. By the middle of this decade the Second Artillery is also
expected to deploy the new 8,000-mile range DF-41 ICBM,
which is expected to be mobile and armed with multiple
warheads.
The
PRC's current small ICBM force is designed to deter
both nuclear attack, and to deter U.S. intervention on
behalf of Taiwan. It
is reasonable to estimate that the PRC will in this
decade deploy 100 to 200 new ICBMs and SLBMs, which
would allow the PRC to avoid restrictive arms control
agreements, but also give it a hedge to be able overcome
limited U.S. national missile defenses.
Theater
Information-Strike Complex. China's
most profound challenge to the balance of power on the
Taiwan Strait, or in Asia generally, is the PLA's
developing "information-strike complex" of highly
accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, combined with
multiple layers of long-range space and airborne
sensors. China is improving the 1,125-mile range DF-21
ballistic missile, identified in one report as the
DF-21X.[xvii]
This new DF-21 may have a new highly accurate warhead
that uses navigation satellite data from the U.S. GPS or
Russian GLONASS network, or perhaps radar guidance
technology.[xviii]
The DF-15 SRBM, used to intimidate Taiwan in 1995
and 1996, is being improved with GPS/GLONASS guidance
systems, and may be given longer range to increase its
speed and survivability.
Last October the PLA also revealed the M-11 Mod 1
SRBM, which has a shorter range than the DF-15, but a
larger warhead, and will likely incorporate satellite
guidance. The
Pentagon has noted that development of land-attack
cruise missiles (LACM) for theater and strategic
missions has a "relatively high development
priority" for China. The PLA currently has several
LACM programs, reported in the press to carry names like
"Hong Niao" or "Cheng Feng," which have
benefited from Russian and Israeli cruise missile
technology, and even perhaps captured U.S. Tomahawk
LACMs.[xix]
A long-range strategic cruise missile, similar in
capability to early U.S. Tomahawk
cruise missiles, will likely enter service after 2005.
Although
these theater ballistic and cruise missiles could carry
a new small nuclear warhead, China is placing great
emphasis on developing powerful non-nuclear warheads,
thus reducing the prospect of nuclear retaliation.
Missiles armed with Radio Frequency (RF) weapons[xx]
that simulate the electromagnetic pulse created by
nuclear explosion, could disable computers, electric
power grids, or even an aircraft carrier without causing
great casualties. China is also interested in building
cluster munitions for ballistic or cruise missiles that
could disable airbase runways.
Anti-Missile,
Anti-Satellite, and Space Information Systems.
China's government loudly protests U.S.
anti-missile plans, promotes bans on outerspace warfare,
but says almost nothing about its own anti-missile or
anti-satellite programs, or its space warfare plans.
The Pentagon's PLA report released in June
notes the PRC "can be expected to try to develop a
viable ATBM [anti-tactical ballistic missile] and ABM
[anti-ballistic missile] capability by either producing
its own weapons or acquiring them from foreign
sources." The PLA is marketing a new long-range
surface-to-air (SAM) missile called the FT-2000, which
is based on Russian and U.S. technology, and could form
the basis of an ATBM-capable missile. The PLA is aware
of the need to defend against opposing missiles and of
the need to exploit the U.S. military's high
dependence on reconnaissance and communication
satellites.[xxi] The PLA's interest in
laser ASAT systems has already been noted.
As
it seeks the means to deny space to future adversaries,
China is also seeking to better exploit outer space for
military missions.[xxii]
China is developing new military satellites for
high-resolution imaging, radar imaging, signal
intelligence (SIGINT) collection, navigation and
communication. China has recently announced it will
launch eight new reconnaissance satellites: four imaging
satellites and four radar satellites.[xxiii]
When in orbit, this network will give China twice daily
satellite revisits. Radar satellites can penetrate cloud
cover and are very useful for finding naval formations
at sea. As does the U.S. military, China will also
likely seek to integrate access to commercial satellite
imaging into its military operations. For navigation and
targeting, the PLA uses the GPS satellite network, is
negotiating with Russia to invest in its faltering
GLONASS network, and is also developing its own
navigation satellite network.
FOCUS
ON TAIWAN
PLA modernization is being driven to a large
extent by PRC government's objective to build the
military force needed to either intimidate or compel the
government on Taiwan into reunification dictated largely
by Beijing. The
goal is not necessary to invade and conquer Taiwan, but
to defeat its armed forces swiftly and decisively enough
to prevent American intervention-or to even attack
U.S. forces in the event they do come to Taipei's
assistance. Recent advances in doctrine, training, and
the modernization of missile, air and naval forces stem
from this objective.
The PLA faces an immense challenge to net these
forces together in a cohesive whole-but it is working
to do just that. The
danger is that absent requisite U.S. sales of defensive
weaponry to Taiwan, the PRC is likely to obtain a level
of military superiority later in this decade that would
make the use of force tempting to Beijing under some
circumstances.
Assembling
Information-Strike Combine.
The
PLA is currently working to modernize its missile,
information and air forces to assemble an
information-strike combine to form the cutting edge of
any future military campaign against Taiwan.
The goal will be to undertake joint SRBM, LACM,
air and information-strikes in order to deliver a
decisive surprise blow against the airfields, naval
bases, and communications nodes of Taiwan.
According to a recent report, Taiwan estimates
that the PLA now has 400 missiles in the areas opposite
Taiwan, which is said to exceed U.S. estimates.[xxiv]
In February last year a leaked U.S. estimate
stated that China intended to build 650 of the DF-15 and
M-11 missiles by 2005.[xxv]
It is possible that the U.S. estimate may be
conservative. But
when counting expected LACMs, it is reasonable to
estimate that the PLA could have 1,000 or more ballistic
and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan by the end of this
decade. And these will be made deadly accurate with
targeting data from optical and radar satellites slaved
to navigation satellite data.
Modern
Air Power. While
a slow process, the PLA is devoting greater resources to
the purchase of modern Russian and Israeli combat
systems and technology to supplement indigenous air
combat programs. By
2005 to 2010 the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assemble a
significant number of 4th generation
fighters, supported by radar and electronic intelligence
aircraft, that could wrest air superiority away from a
ROCAF that has been severely damaged by massive missile
strikes. It
is telling that this year's Pentagon PLA report warns
that by 2005, "if current trends continue, the balance
of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to in
China's favor."
In June and July of last year, the PLAAF mounted
an unprecedented number of sorties into the Taiwan
Strait as part of the PRC's protest against former
President Lee Teng Hui's comments on Taiwan-Mainland
relations. Air
clashed did not occur but the danger of such was quite
high.
The
PLAAF has about 50-55 Russian Suhkoi Su-27 fighters and
has started co-producing up to 200 more as the J-11.
Last year Russia agreed to sell between 30-40, perhaps a
first installment for the Su-30MKK twin-seat strike
fighter. In
the Su-30 the PLAAF will have its first all-weather
strike fighter comparable to the U.S. F-15E Strike
Eagle. The
PLAAF Su-30s will be equipped with a range of precision
guided bombs and missiles, and the Kh-31 anti-radar
missile.[xxvi]
Older J-8 and J-7 fighters will soon be
supplemented by the J-10, China's first 4th
generation fighter designed with Israeli and Russian
assistance. Having
just been denied the cutting-edge Israeli Phalcon phased-array airborne warning and control radar, the PLAAF
will likely quickly purchase the Russian A-50 AWACS with
a Russian radar. There
are now over 10 H-6D aerial refueling tankers in the
PLAAF, which service the J-8IID fighter.[xxvii]
Russia is trying hard to sell the PLAAF the Il-78
aerial tanker.
New
Subs, Missiles. The
PLA also hopes that massive missile attacks will
diminish Taiwan's naval defenses, which will ease the
PLA Navy's attempt to place a naval blockade around
the island. To
do so it has stressed the acquisition of new submarines,
anti-ship missiles and mines.
China could purchase more than the current four
Russian Kilo conventional
submarines-two of which are the ultra-quiet "636"
version. The
indigenous Song-class
conventional sub is experiencing developmental
difficulties and may be discontinued.
Also, the PLAN has about 19 older Ming
conventional subs that could be brought to bear. The
PLAN has five older Han-class nuclear attack subs that will soon be supplemented by the
more modern Type-093.
More modern PLAN missiles are being purchased
from Russia, such as the SS-N-22 supersonic missile that
will equip its two, or four or more Sovremenniy
missile destroyers, two of which will be delivered
this year. Taiwan's Navy has not defense against the SS-N-22 save to
sink the destroyer.
Indigenous PLAN ships are improving through the
adaptation of foreign weapons and engine systems.
The latest Luhai
class destroyer incorporates elementary stealth
shaping and later versions may deploy phased-array radar
and vertical-launched anti-air and cruise missiles. Less often commented upon is the PLAN's large inventory of
modern naval mines.
These include rocket-propelled fast rising mines
that are very dangerous to military and civil shipping.
The PLAN Air Force is also growing with the
addition of J-8IID fighters, JH-7 attack fighters, and
its new Y-8J patrol aircraft equipped with the British Skymaster radar to perform airborne early warning missions.
FOUNDATION
FOR FUTURE POWER PROJECTION
If successfully absorbed, forces being acquired
for possible use against Taiwan can also lay the
foundation for future PLA power projection, on the way
to attaining "preeminence" in the Asian region. This
week the PLAN's first Luhai
destroyer, along with the Ukrainian-build tanker Nancang, are on a naval diplomatic mission to visit Malaysia and
ports in Africa. The
PLAN icebreaker-intelligence ship Haidaio
completed a circuit of the Japanese islands in May.
Beyond mere diplomacy, these exercises mark a small
beginning that the PLA intends to carry the PRC's
influence beyond its Mainland, where its future
interests will be impacted.
Today
the PLA cannot begin to approach the global reach of the
forces of the United States. There is also no guarantee
that the PRC will survive and not suffer the fate of
most other Communist regimes. But if the Chinese
Communist Party remains in power, and if it can dictate
the fate of Taiwan, the PLA will then have resources to
devote to the space, naval and air elements of greater
projection. There is also the question of whether close
political and arms sales/technology relations with
Russia today in the future develops in the direction of
military-operational cooperation. By the next decade the
U.S. should not be surprised to see the PLA Navy being
able to project power into the South China Sea, Indian
Ocean and Persian Gulf.
First
Island Chain. For
Japanese and Southeast Asians, PLA power projection does
not have to extend very far.
PLA Navy planers long ago set the goal to be able
to extend its control to what it terms the "First
Island Chain," which is the chain islands that extends
from the Kurils, to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines down
to Indonesia. To project power in this region the PLA
simply needs to purchase or build more of the systems
currently being procured. More IRBMs and long-range
cruise missiles, guided by new reconnaissance and
navigation satellites, will provide long-range strike or
deterrent capabilities unmatched in the region save by
India. More Su-30 strike fighters, supported by aerial
tankers and long-range AWACS, could extend PLA air
control to the disputed islands in the South China Sea,
or pose a real challenge to the Japanese Air Force. And
with better air support, a PLA Navy with more modern
submarines and warships can undertake bolder operations
in support of its extensive claims to most of the South
China Sea. Today the PLA is interested in the Russian
Beriev Be-200 jet amphibian, which could perform both
patrol and resupply missions for the PRC's far flung
chain of island bases in the South China Sea. While
wealthy Southeast Asian countries like Singapore might
be able to afford missile defenses, it is unlikely that
others will be able to do so.
They will also be hard pressed to maintain the
air and naval forces necessary to blunt a serious PLA
move into the South China Sea.
The
PRC's development of strategic military relations with
Burma, Pakistan and Iran can be seen as part of an
effort to contain India and to build geostrategic points
of influence that ensure growing access to Persian Gulf
oil. More accurate SRBMs and cruise missiles are likely
to be sold to Pakistan, Iran or even Saudi Arabia,
extending PLA influence by proxy.
With these missiles will likely come the sale of
PLA satellite intelligence, which will be of use to
their political leadership and military forces.
Second
Island Chain. Looking
further into the next decade and beyond, PLA navy
planners also have set their sights on the "Second
Island Chain," which extends out to Guam. By this
time, it is likely that PLA planners expect that the
U.S. will be a declining power not in much of a position
to challenge growing PLA might.[xxviii]
It can also be expected that by this time, the PRC's
embryonic civil and military space power will have
developed much further, to include space stations, Moon
missions and much greater military use of outer space,
to possibly include space combat capabilities. These
would then be used to support more advanced naval and
air forces.
New long-range bombers may also be developed for
the post-Taiwan period.
In the mid-1990s the PLA explored purchasing the
Russian Tu-22M-3 Backfire,
but has not done so as has India.
There are occasional hints that there is a
domestic program underway to replace the H-6 medium
bomber, a copy of the 1950s-vintage Soviet Tu-16 Badger.[xxix]
When this new long-range bomber emerges, the
PLA will also likely possess supersonic LACMs and be
following U.S. and Russian efforts to build hypersonic
aircraft.
The PLA Navy has long harbored the ambition to
build conventional aircraft carriers.
The PRC has purchased retired carriers from
Australia and Russia, and perhaps even more detailed
technical data from Russia, to support its ambition. It
is reported to have built a practice carrier runway, and
may modify a version of the new J-10 fighter for carrier
operations. The PLAN today has a small helicopter
carrier, the Shichang,
which could today support commando activities
against Taiwan or in the South China Sea. There also
have been reports of plans to build two carriers about
50,000 tons in size, but these cannot be confirmed.
Perhaps after the Taiwan question is settled in
Beijing's favor, it will devote the resources
necessary to build carriers.
Earlier this year a popular mainland naval
magazine carried an illustration for a future carrier
concept that much resembles the U.S. CVNX carrier
concept. It
had five catapults and relied on phased arrays for radar
and communications.
It is not likely that such a design has the
approval of the government.
IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE UNITED STATES
As this
statement has stressed already, the PLA is not today a
match for U.S. power, save in the area of theater
ballistic missile in Asia-which the U.S. has none.
What this statement does convey is that the
People's Republic of China is undertaking a serious
and broad effort to acquire the technical and research
base, the most modern technologies, and when necessary,
actual weapon systems to modernize its armed forces.
The long-term goal of American policy is to live
in peace and prosperity with the Chinese people, and
where possible, to help their evolution toward even
greater freedom and prosperity.
The oft-stated justification made buy the current
and previous U.S. Administrations for policies of
"engagement" is that they hold a far better chance
for positive and pluralistic forces to emerge and to
displace Communist/authoritarian rule.
The
hard truth, however, is that the PRC is still controlled
by a Communist leadership for whom maintaining total
power is its paramount goal.
In addition to its national defense mission, the
PLA plays a key role in sustaining the primary power
position of the Communist Party.
The PLA undertakes to suppress ethnic minorities
who dare to challenge Beijing's rule, as it is also
responsible for intelligence gathering and espionage
that informs Party and PLA leaders. It commands a lions
share of the national budget and it leaders are deeply
suspicious of democracy, most of their Asian neighbors
and the West. Furthermore,
the PLA is standard bearer of the Communist Party's
nationalist credentials, which are increasingly linked
to the recovery of "lost territories," to include
Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, the PRC and
the PLA increasingly oppose and covet America's
leadership role in Asia.
The
United States must seek a peaceful relationship with the
PRC. It is
also necessary to engage the PLA, but to do so in a
manner that assures equal access.
While PLA knowledge of U.S. capabilities
contributes to deterrence, this should not be allowed to
justify continuing a clear imbalance in access to key
information about our respective armed forces.
Engagement with the PLA should also include
making clear U.S. opposition to its sale of nuclear and
missile technology to Pakistan and other countries like
Iran. Finally, engagement should also include a more
vigorous effort by the Department of Defense to explain
the effort that the PRC is making to modernize its
military. Like
the Soviet
Military Power series of the Reagan Administration,
similar candor today about the PLA will also serve to
inform Chinese about the expense of their military
build-up.
However,
the areas where U.S. and PRC interests are likely to
conflict, Taiwan, missile defense, the U.S. alliance
structure in Asia, the South China Sea, and
proliferation, are not going to be resolved soon.
In all of these potential conflict areas the PRC
views a stronger PLA as a key tool for achieving its
ends. Until China changes its Communist-dictated
national priorities it will remain necessary for the
United States to defend its leadership position in Asia
and to ensure that its ability to militarily deter the
PRC remains unquestioned.
The
Importance of Taiwan. The most important near-term area of conflict between the U.S.
and the PRC is over the future of the democratic system
on Taiwan. Long-term
U.S. policy enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act
holds that the U.S. supports a peaceful resolution
between the PRC and Taiwan, and will maintain defensive
arms sales to Taiwan to deter war.
Insuring Taiwan's survival, however, is not
just a matter of principle for the U.S.; it can also
hasten the day when the PRC evolves from Communism.
Taiwan is a Chinese culture that has proven that freedom
and prosperity can co-exist, proving to Chinese on the
Mainland that they do not need dictatorship for economic
development. Sustaining
Taiwan's survival, therefore, will in the long run
strengthen chances for peace in Asia.
Today
Taiwan has sufficient strength to deter PLA attack, but
that may not last for long.
Taiwan has some U.S. Patriot
ATBMs and is developing a domestic version, but
their small number and vulnerability to attack is
insufficient to defend Taiwan from a growing number of
PLA missiles. Taiwan's Air Force currently has 330
F-16, Mirage-2000 and IDF fighters and the E-2 Hawkeye
AWACS. But
its edge will erode if it does not receive advanced
air-to-air missile, anti-radar missiles, and greater
defense against PLA missiles. Taiwan only has two 1970s
designed Dutch submarines that actually work, plus two
World War II U.S. Guppy subs which cannot dive deeper than they are long! The Taiwan
Navy lacks an effective defense against the SS-N-22
supersonic anti-ship missile, now in PLA Navy service.
Given that the PLA is shifting the military
balance on the Taiwan Strait, it is incomprehensible
that the Clinton Administration has decided this year
not to sell Taiwan major weapon systems that it is
reported to have requested.
The White House has refused to sell Taiwan the AEGIS naval air defense system which is possibly the only U.S.
system that can defeat the SS-N-22.
The Administration has also refused to sell
Taiwan the HARM anti-radar missile, in the face of the
PLA deployment of advanced S-300 SAM sites on the Taiwan
Strait that threaten Taiwan's Air Force.
And the Administration refused Taiwan's request
for conventional submarines, which could help Taiwan
thwart the PLA Navy's increasing ability to impose a
blockade.
Taiwan has a clear requirement for all of these
systems, and more.
The possible deployment of 1,000 or more missiles
against Taiwan by the end of the decade makes necessary
new solutions to this threat. Taiwan will need
laser-based defense systems more capable that the
U.S.-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser recently tested
in New Mexico. In
addition, Taiwan will need advanced reconnaissance
systems like those planed for the U.S. Global
Hawk UAV. In
addition, Taiwan will need a standoff attack capability
to be able to go after SAM and SRBM sites that pose a
threat. But
above all, the Taiwan armed forces need an effective
relationship with the U.S. military, which has been
denied since the end of formal relations in 1979. Taiwan needs constant access to U.S. doctrine and operational
methods to be able to effectively use new technology and
to continue to deter war on the Strait.
Why
the PRC opposes U.S. missile defense.
While
the PRC is waging a vociferous campaign against U.S.
national and theater missile defenses, it says nothing
about its own interest in acquiring missile defenses.
Beijing opposes U.S. missile defense plans
because it does undermine its currently small long-range
missile force. But
Beijing's opposition is rooted more in the role that
missile are playing in its future plans to expand its
military power. Inasmuch
as most Asian countries save India are not building
their own nuclear missile deterrent, by preventing
effective missile defenses the PRC retains relative
monopoly in this form of military power.
But preventing missile defenses today, also
serves to undermine the strength of Washington's
long-term leadership in Asia. Should it forego missile
defenses in Asia, then value of U.S. defense guarantees
will diminish, weakening the U.S. led alliance system in
Asia.
Need
to strengthen U.S. alliances. For
these reasons, the U.S. needs to proceed with both
national and theater missile defense plans, as well as
to continuously tend the U.S.-led alliance structure in
Asia. Missile
defense will be a key future U.S. contribution to
stability in Asia, but U.S. allies need to be included
in missile defense activities.
Japan is already an effective U.S. partner in TMD,
but other major allies like South Korea and Australia,
and partners like Singapore should be included in
missile defense activities.
The
U.S. should also consider a significant military aid
package to help the troubled Philippines obtain a
credible self-defense.
The breakdown in U.S.-Philippine defense
relations in the early 1990s created a power vacuum that
was exploited by the PRC when it occupied Mischief reef
in late 1994. President
Joseph Estrada has worked hard to revive defense
relations, and when he visits Washington next week, he
should be given a U.S. commitment to consider a useful
package of excess aircraft and ships that his armed
forces can use.
It is also critical for the U.S. to repair its
military relations with India, which were gradually
improving until sanctions were imposed after its 1998
nuclear tests. It is time to move beyond these sanctions and recognize that
India is going to do what is necessary to deter the PRC,
like build a nuclear deterrent.
As India will emerge soon in this century as a
democratic superpower, it is to America's advantage to
help its emergence so as to create a new strategic
partnership with the world's largest democracy.
And Indian democratic superpower will also prove
to the Chinese people freedom is not inconsistent with
national strength.
Preventing U.S. friends and allies from selling
the PLA new advanced weapons or militarily useful
technology is also a critical element of U.S. alliance
management. As long as there is a possibility that PRC-initiated conflict
against Taiwan could involve U.S. forces, stopping
military technology from getting to the PLA is a matter
of U.S. self-defense. The Clinton Administration
deserves credit for recently convincing Israel to cancel
its deal to sell advanced Phalcon
radar to the PRC.
It is critical for the U.S. to pay even closer
attention to Israel's interest and to growing European
interest in selling military technology to the PLA.
Requirements
for deterrence. For
its own part, the U.S. must maintain its technical
superiority over the China's military, and retain
enough forces in Asia to deter a Taiwan-China conflict.
This will require that the U.S. invest heavily in
space, laser, radio frequency, missile defense, and
communication technologies that will ensure U.S.
military superiority.
Washington should quickly establish an Asia-wide
missile defense network that would become the main
mission for the U.S. military beyond the next decade.
It is also important for the U.S. to build
supersonic land-attack cruise missiles that are more
survivable that current LACMs, and to use them to equip Trident
SSGNs that will be made redundant by arms control
agreements. The
U.S. should now build fighter aircraft like the F-22
plus advanced missiles that sustain a margin of
superiority over China's Sukhois.
The Pacific Command should always have access to
adequate numbers of nuclear attack submarines.
In addition, the U.S. Navy should acquire combat
aircraft that are superior to the PLA Air Force's
Sukhoi fighter and attack aircraft.
CONCLUSION
The PRC is not today the enemy of the United
States, but the PRC's territorial and political
ambitions in Asia, and resources it is devoting to
building its People's Liberation Army into an advanced
fighting force, dictate that the U.S. exercise great
caution. While
there are today widely varying views on the current and
future capabilities of the PLA, there is enough evidence
to conclude that the PLA is rapidly shifting the balance
of power on the Taiwan Strait, and laying the foundation
for greater power projection in the next decade and
beyond. As
long as the PRC remains governed by a Communist Party
there is likely to be growing friction with the U.S.
over Taiwan, missile defense, Washington's leadership
in Asia, and the South China Sea.
However, the U.S. can best sustain peace in Asia
by working to strengthen its leadership role,
strongly defending its interests in all possible
areas of conflict with the PRC, and sustaining its
military superiority in Asia so as to deter conflict.
Richard
D. Fisher, Jr. is
a Senior Fellow with the Jamestown Foundation, a
Washington, D.C. think tank. He has served as a Senior
Analyst with the House Republican Policy Committee
chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), and as the
Director of the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage
Foundation.
ENDNOTES
[i]
Department of Defense, Future
Military Capabilities And Strategy of the People's
Republic of China, Report to the Congress
Pursuant to Section 1226 or the FY98 National
Defense Authorization Act (September 1998); The
Military Situation in the Taiwan Strait, Report
to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill
(February 1999); Annual
Report on the Military Power of the People's
Republic of China, Report to Congress Pursuant
to the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act,
(June 2000).
[ii] Bates Gill and Michael
O'Hanlon, "China's Hollow Military," The National Interest, Summer, 1999, p. 62.
[iii] Paul Godwin, commentary,
in Hans Binnendijk and Ronald N. Monteperto, Strategic
Trends In China, Washington, D.C.: Institute for
National Strategic Studies, National Defense
University, 1998, p. 68; also see, Michael Swaine,
"Don't Demonize China; Rhetoric About Its
Military Might Does Not Reflect Reality," The Washington Post, May 18, 1997, p. C1.
[iv] Ronald N. Monteperto,
"Reality Check: Assessing The Chinese Military
Threat," Progressive
Policy Institute Defense Working Paper No. 4, April
1998, p. 5.
[vi] New scholarship based on
previously unknown sources that is challenging
previous negative assessments of the PLA includes
that of Maj. Mark A. Stokes (USAF), China's
Strategic Modernization: Implications for the United
States, (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College,
1999); and Michael Pillsbury, ed. Chinese
Views of Future Warfare, (Washington, D.C.:
National Defense University Press, 1997).
[vii] The debate between the
major schools strategic thought in the PLA, the
"People's War," "Local War" and "RMA"
schools is described their main PLA proponents in
Michael Pillsbury, ed., "Chinese Views Of Future
Warfare," (Washington, D.C.: National Defense
University Press, 1997).
[ix] 16-Character Policy:
Combine the military and civil; Combine Peace and
War; Give priority to military products; Let the
civil support the military.
[x] For an excellent overview
of the impact of the "863 Program" see Evan A.
Feigenbaum, "Who's Behind China's
High-Technology 'Revolution,'" International Security, Summer 1999, pp. 95-126.
[xi] Report
of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security
and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's
Republic of China, Submitted by Mr. Cox of
California, Chairman, Part 1, pp. 19-57.
[xii] Wen Jen, "China and
Russia Step Up Military Cooperation," Tai Yang Pao (Hong Kong), June 28, 1999, in FBIS-China, June 28, 1999.
[xiv] Select Committee Report,
Part 1, p. 209.
[xv] "Tsinghua Develops
Nanosatellite (July 15),"
on Go
Taikonauts web page by Chen Lan, http://www.geocities.com/CapeCanaveral/Launchpad/1921/news.htm
[xvi] Guo Fu and Qian Jiang,
"The Submarine Robot Searches the Dragon's
Palace," Jiefangjun
Bao, December 7, 1997, p. 2, in FBIS,
March 18, 1998.
[xvii]Paul
Beaver, "China Prepares to Field New Missile," Jane's Defence Weekly, February 24, 1999, p. 3.
[xviii]That
China was working on a new, possibly terminally
guided warhead for the DF-21 was first revealed to
the author at the 1996 Zhuhai Airshow by an engineer
from the Beijing Research Institute for Telemetry,
which develops advanced guidance systems. See
Richard D. Fisher, Jr., "China's Missile
Threat," The
Wall Street Journal, December 30, 1996, p. A8.
Chinese interest in a missile with a Pershing
II capability can also be inferred from Chinese
literature, see, Zhu Bao, "Developmental Prospects
for Surface to Surface Missiles," in Xu Daxhe,
ed., Review On
Ballistic Missile Technology, China Aerospace
Corporation, Science and Technology Bureau, 1998,
pp. 9-19.
[xix] "China close to
fielding land-attack missiles," Flight
International, March 28-April 3, 2000, p. 20.
[xx]Future
Military Capabilities, p. 6.
[xxi]A
U.S. Army war game was said to demonstrate the high
vulnerability of U.S. forces in the event of any
loss of satellite capabilities. See Sean D. Naylor,
"U.S. Army War Game Reveals Satellite
Vulnerability," Defense News, March 10-16, 1997, p. 50.
[xxii]Richard
D. Fisher, Jr., "China Rockets Into Military
Space," The Asian Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1998, p. 6.
[xxiv] "Taiwan Counts Chinese
Missiles," Far
Eastern Economic Review, July 13, 2000, p. 8.
[xxv] These numbers were first
revealed in Tony Walker and Stephen Fidler, "US
fears on China missile build-up," The
Financial Times, February 10, 1999, p. 1.
[xxvi]
Andrei Fomin, "SU-30MKK, New Version In Flanker
Family," Air Fleet (Moscow), No. 8, 1999, p. 12.
[xxvii] Robert Sae-Liu,
"Chinese expand aerial refueling capability to
navy," Jane's
Defence Weekly, June 21, 2000, p. 14
[xxviii] For more on how PRC
foreign relations and military scholars see the
future, to include the inevitability of U.S.
decline, see Michael Pillsbury, China
Debates The Future Security Environment, (Washington,
D.C.: National Defense University, 2000), Chapter 2.
[xxix] Reference to a "H-9"
bomber project is sometimes made on PLA-related web
pages by Chinese individuals. The veracity of such
comments cannot be determined. That the PLA is
thinking about new bombers is demonstrated in plans
to build a four-engine version of the H-6.
This plan, like a potential plan for a
successor to the H-6, likely suffers for lack of
political and financial support.
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