Statement of Richard D. Fisher, Jr., Senior Fellow, The Jamestown Foundation

SUMMARY

            While scholarly assessments disagree, it can be concluded from numerous open sources that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of an ambitious modernization program for its People's Liberation Army (PLA). The current focus of this modernization is to acquire the space, information, missile, air, naval and ground forces necessary to subdue Taiwan in the relative near-term, and to set the basis for achieving military dominance in the greater Asia-Pacific after Taiwan is retaken.  While today the PLA does not seriously threaten U.S. forces in Asia, it is beginning to shift the balance on the Taiwan Strait in its favor.  This, plus the PLA's high-tech focus, a stress on acquiring "asymmetrical" capabilities that exploit U.S. weaknesses, a phenomenal appetite for foreign military technology, and Beijing's growing hostility toward the U.S. strategic presence in Asia should be cause for real concern in Washington. The PLA's modernization has the following key elements:

High Technology Focus.  In its domestic military research and development, and in its efforts to acquire foreign technology, the PLA is stressing a modern high technology military capability.

Emphasis on Missiles and Space.  The PLA is assembling the space, information, and missile forces to create a long-range missile-based information strike complex that will enable the long-range precision targeting of critical enemy civil-military nodes. 

Focus On Taiwan.  Acquiring the forces necessary to intimidate or if necessary subdue Taiwan remains the principle goal of the PLA's modernization.  It seeks the missile, air and naval forces necessary for this task.

Future Power Projection.  Forces being acquired for a possible Taiwan conflict will also lay the foundation for future PLA regional power-projection-to eventually include aircraft carriers.  This will further impact and stress the U.S. led alliance system in Asia and present new challenges to India and the Persian Gulf region.  

To continue to deter conflict on the Taiwan Strait it remains necessary for the U.S. to sell Taiwan the arms its needs to sustain an effective military balance.  Inasmuch as recent Pentagon assessments make clear Taiwan is losing its edge to the PLA, it is critical for the U.S. to sell Taiwan the submarines, missile defense, naval defense and air defense equipment it has requested.  These include conventional submarines, the AEGIS air defense destroyer, plus HARM and AMRAAM missiles.  In the future Taiwan will need laser-based missile defenses. 

Until the PRC evolves from Communism and changes its strategic goals, the U.S. should strengthen its alliance system in Asia, seek a new partnership with India, and prevent friends and allies from helping PLA modernization. The U.S. must also invest in the future military technologies that ensure American military forces remain decisively superior to those of the PRC.  These include space and airborne information systems, high-power lasers, supersonic cruise missiles, Trident/SSGNs, superior SSNs, stealth warships, the F-22 plus superior air-to-air missiles, and naval air power superior to the emerging PLA air forces.   

"The PRC's long-run geopolitical goals include incorporating Taiwan into the PRC and becoming the primary power in Asia." 

House Select Committee On U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China, May 1999

"China seeks to become the preeminent power among regional states in East Asia."

Annual Report On the Military Power of the People's Republic of China, U.S. Department of Defense, June 2000

INTRODUCTION

               It is clear from numerous open sources that the People's Republic of China (PRC) is in the midst of an ambitious modernization effort for its People's Liberation Army (PLA), which incorporates the Second Artillery missile forces, the PLA Army, PLA Navy and PLA Air Force.  While building from a low base in the late 1980s, the leadership of the PRC has devoted considerable resources to building the research and development infrastructure plus acquiring foreign technologies to sustain PLA growth.  And while in the year 2000 the PLA does not pose a serious threat to U.S. forces in Asia, it is rapidly acquiring the systems necessary to shift the military balance on the Taiwan Strait in its favor.  The PRC government believes that the credible threat or even the use of force is critical to recovering "lost territories" such as Taiwan or the South China Sea.  This, plus the PLA's emphasis on seeking "asymmetrical" capabilities that exploit U.S. military weaknesses, its willingness to incorporate foreign technology to establish new capabilities, and its growing hostility to U.S. missile defenses and to the U.S. military presence in Asia, should cause concern in Washington.  When the PRC evolves away from Communism it may become a positive force in its region and beyond. Until then, it is incumbent upon the United States to continue to exercise the political and military leadership necessary to promote peace and stability in Asia. 

Varying Assessments of the PLA

            Accurate open sector assessments of the PLA are difficult as the PRC government does not make available to its own people or outsiders detailed knowledge of the budgets, doctrine, research and development, current equipment or future modernization plans of its People's Liberation Army.  Concealing one's strength so as to enable maximum surprise is a key element of ancient Chinese statecraft that continues to this day.  In three reports requested by the Congress, the Department of Defense has added some new knowledge about the direction of PLA modernization.[i] Last year the House Select Committee on Military/Commercial Relations with the People's Republic of China provided the most comprehensive description of PRC military high-technology goals and espionage efforts, from a U.S. government source.  The Select Committee demonstrated that the Administration can and should offer much more detailed analysis of the PLA to better inform the U.S. policy process.

            Due to incomplete information, and the lack of a comprehensive U.S. government statement on the PLA, widely varying assessments of the PLA have been produced in recent years.  In the 1980s the U.S. and other Western governments were selling arms to PRC in a tacit alliance against the former Soviet Union, and had wide access to the PLA.  The general assessment at the time was that it was mired in strategic concepts of "People's War" based on the guerrilla campaign that chased the Nationalist government to Taiwan, and burdened by military technology not much improved upon from what the Soviets sold them in the 1950s.  The twin shocks of the Tiananmen Massacre and subsequent Western military embargoes, plus the demonstration of overwhelming U.S. and Allied force during the Gulf War, have prompted the current PLA modernization.  But there are today differing assessments of the success of the PLA's modernization. 

Two respected scholars of the PLA stated last year that "China's military is simply not very good,"[ii] Or as two others stated in 1998, the PLA "will not in the next ten years,.be anything more than a nuisance,"[iii] and "in 20 to 30 years China will still be a regional power." [iv]  This group of scholars tends to focus on the exiting old equipment of the PLA, its not-yet-completed effort to formulate modern joint-service doctrine and operations, and a lack of realistic training and maintenance problems.  The PLA's acquisition of foreign weapon systems is seen as compounding training and maintenance challenges while demonstrating the inability of its domestic military industrial sector.[v] To be sure, the PLA faces enormous challenges, not the least of which is whether the PRC government can afford a continued comprehensive modernization of the PLA. And even here, there is great variance in estimates of the PLA's budget, from the PRC government 1998 figure of about $11 billion-which few accept-up to $40 billion a year and higher. 

 However, this is also an emerging view that the PRC is devoting great resources into high technology areas for which there is only scant information, usually from Chinese language journals, that could result in a formidable PLA in the next decade or soon after.[vi]  While the PLA has factions of leaders who stress obtaining current generation weapons and "readiness" concerns, there is another faction of officers who promote the PLA's embrace of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to leap into the forefront of military powers.[vii] It can also be discerned from the three Pentagon assessments, in addition to Chinese and journalistic reports, that the PLA is rapidly gaining the weapon systems necessary to pose a credible threat to Taiwan.  While there is some danger in overestimating the future capabilities of the PLA, there is perhaps even an even greater threat to U.S. security interests in underestimating the ability of the PLA to modernize.  A closer examination of the impact of the PLA's access to foreign military technology also produces greater cause for concern. There is a need for both government and non-government analysts to question the seeming orthodoxy that the PLA cannot build a modern military force capable of meeting near and long-term goals. The remainder of this statement will expand on the effort that the PLA is making in the areas of high technology, missiles and space, preparations for conflict over Taiwan, and laying the foundation for greater power projections. 

THE PLA'S HIGH TECHNOLOGY FOCUS

            While one can look at the PLA of today and see immobile liquid-fueled ICBMs, thousands of obsolete tanks, jet fighters, and scores of submarines, all based on ancient Soviet designs, it would be a tragic error to presume that the PLA will remain so backward for much longer.  While the RMA faction does not appear to dominate the current PLA leadership, their influence is apparent in the PLA's emphasis on developing an extensive and competitive military-civil high-technology sector, and the PLA's high priority on future-technology weapons. 

Four days ago the PRC news agency Xinhua reported on PRC President Jiang Zemin's having asked "war industry to closely link itself with other industries," when visiting a demonstration of "war industry achievements."[viii]  This statement is the most recent confirmation of the close linkage between the PRC's military and commercial science and technology sectors, and consistent with the 1997 formally codified "16 Character Policy."[ix]  The effort to transform the PRC's military-dominated research and development sector in a more Western model that seeks to leverage market-driven technical innovation to meet military requirements began in earnest with the 1986 "863 Program" defense technology development campaign. Placed under the leadership of the then Committee on Science, Industry and National Defense (COSTIND), the "863 Program" designated for high investment the area of astronauts, information technology, laser technology, automation, energy, new materials, biological warfare, space technology.  While not as agile as its western counterparts, the PRC research and technology sector is far more innovative and consumer-oriented thanks to the "863-Program."[x]

            Critical to the success of the "863-Program," and to the PLA's short and long-term modernization plans has been greater access to foreign military and dual-use civil technology.  The intensive effort to obtain foreign technology includes the purchase of weapon systems that can be reverse-engineered, to increasingly, the purchase of basic military science.  And as described by the House Select Committee, the PRC harnesses an extensive program of state-sponsored espionage to the acquisition of technology.[xi]  Russia and Israel have been principle sources of both weapons and technology in recent years, though the PRC has also sought to break down the European Community's military embargo.  In addition to billions of dollars worth of weapons purchased from Russia, unconfirmed reports hold that last year Russia agreed to form a "military equipment scientific research cooperation group" that would help the PLA with "a new generation of stealth bombers, conventional strategic missiles, water-surface aircraft, a new generation of submarines, naval vessels, laser weapons, telecommunication systems."[xii] From open sources it is possible to comment on the following PLA high technology efforts.

Lasers.  The PLA's intense interest in laser weapons exemplifies its quest for next-generation technology that also exploits the weaknesses of potential enemies.  Lasers were a key area on investment for the "863-Program." Pro-RMA officers view lasers as a key weapons technology for the future. The PLA envisions using lasers for anti-air, satellite tracking, anti-satellite, and for radar functions.[xiii]  In 1995 the PLA company Norinco marketed its ZM-87 battlefield laser dazzler.  The 1998 Pentagon PLA report noted that the PLA might already have a ground-based laser capable of damaging low-orbit reconnaissance satellites. Last year the Select Committee suggested that Russia might be a source of nuclear-pump laser technology for the PRC for use in space.[xiv] Last October the PLA revealed for the first time its Type-98 main battle tank, which has a box on the hull that may be a low-light camera or a laser dazzler. According to the Pentagon's PLA report released in June, China "reportedly is investigating the feasibility of shipborne laser weapons for air defense."

Space.  The PRC's immanent launching of its first citizens into space will herald the PRC's emergence not just as a world-class space power, but as a rapidly developing military-space power as well. As has been the experience in the U.S. and Russia, there is in the PRC a direct linkage between military and commercial missile and space activities.  The PRC's DF-5 ICBM formed the basis for its family of commercial space launch vehicles and its first man-rated launch vehicle, the Long March-2F.  The Shenzhou manned space capsule, successfully tested in November last year, is based on the Russian Soyuz design, and confirms much reporting from Russia on the PRC's high reliance on Russian manned space technology and advice.  The PRC plans to launch its own space station that will likely resemble the early Russian Salyut designs, and is known to be researching its own reusable space shuttle. The Pentagon's June report on the PLA noted China's interest in "manned reconnaissance from space." More worrisome is the prospect of Russia selling the PRC plans or technology for its many space warfare programs that died with the former Soviet Union.  The Soviets had tested an anti-satellite interceptor, and had plans for military combat space stations plus space-based laser and kinetic-kill anti-ICBM systems.

Likewise, the China Aerospace Corporation, with some foreign technical inputs, is building new communication and earth observation satellites that will aid the development of future PLA communication and reconnaissance satellites.  The PRC's DFH-3 communication satellite was co-developed with Germany's DASA Corporation.  The PRC's first multi-spectral earth the Ziyuan-1, was co-developed with Brazil but incorporates ground-station technology from the U.S. company Hughes.  Future PLA imaging and radar satellites benefit from domestic research, but may also use some Russian technology.  In May the PRC's Tsinghua University launched the PRC's first micro-satellite, co-developed with Britain's University of Surrey was launched, and Tsinghua has just announced it is developing the THNS-1, a 10-kg nano-satellite for imaging missions.[xv]  Another RMA technology, micro and nano-satellites are easier to launch and much harder to counter, as they are placed in orbit in large numbers.  

Information warfare.  PLA literature has revealed in recent years an intense interest in information warfare, which for the PLA includes activities ranging from anti-satellite operations to computer network attack, manipulation of information for deception and psychological warfare.  It is very likely that the PLA is at least preparing to be able to attack the computer and communication infrastructure of an opponent as a key element of future military campaigns. 

Radio frequency weapons. The 1998 Pentagon report on the PLA notes its interest in radio frequency and high-power microwave weapons, one of the few western references regarding the PRC and this new and dangerous class of weapons. These can be configured either as blast-bombs or beams that focus energy so as to neutralize missiles, computers or even humans. 

Stealth, counter-stealth.  A critical technology for current and future U.S. weapons systems, the PLA is very interested in both exploiting and countering stealth.  At the 1998 Zhuhai Air Show the PRC company Seek-Optics marketed stealth coating and design technology.  At the same show it also marketed the "J-231" radar, advertised as having "high anti-stealth capability." China has revealed the design of a new "F-16" frigate, intended for export that uses extensive stealth shaping. The Pentagon report on the PLA released in June notes China "reportedly is developing new fighter aircraft which will incorporate LO [Low Observable] technology." 

Unmanned vehicles.  Like the U.S., the PLA has a strong interest in unmanned air and sea platforms for military missions. The PLA has long used unmanned reconnaissance drones based on U.S. Firebee drones captured during the Vietnam War, and revealed the ASN-206 small battlefield reconnaissance drone that may incorporate some Israeli technology. In 1997 the PLA revealed a new submarine-robot developed out of the "863-Program." It incorporated technologies such as automatic control, artificial intelligence, computers, acoustics and optics, and was said to have military benefits.[xvi]  An important RMA technology for the U.S. Navy is underwater combat vehicles. 

EMPHASIS ON MISSILES AND SPACE

Missile and space forces are proving to be an early emphasis in the PLA's modernization. In the absence of credible air and naval forces the PLA hopes to compensate by building its missile forces, which confer an "asymmetric" advantage over the U.S. and its Asian allies.  The need to retain this advantage in part explains the PRC's vicious opposition to U.S. national and theater missile defense plans. The PLA's Second Artillery missile force, which controls both strategic ICBMs and theater intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), is now in the process of fielding new strategic and theater missiles. Current numbers of PLA ICBMs is thought to include 20-25 older liquid fueled DF-5, plus about 12 JL-1 SLBMs on one Xia class SSBN.  PRC strategic missile numbers will increase irrespective of threats to do so as part of the PRC's attempt to forestall U.S. strategic and theater missile defense plans. 

New Strategic Missiles.  After a long development period, the PLA revealed its new DF-31 5,000-mile range ICBM in the October 1, 1999 military parade in Beijing.  The DF-31 is a modern solid-fueled and mobile ICBM that uses a new Chinese small nuclear warhead.  Based on revelations made by the House Select Committee, it is likely that the DF-31 incorporates U.S. technology in its solid fuel motor and in its new warhead.  This missile is not thought to have multiple warheads now, but could in the future.  Its truck-based transporter-erector-launcher (TEL) indicates that the missile will be hidden in a network of cave shelters connected by roads.  The DF-31 will also form the basis of the JL-2 SLBM that will arm a new class of SSBN being build with Russian technical assistance, the Type-094.  By the middle of this decade the Second Artillery is also expected to deploy the new 8,000-mile range DF-41 ICBM, which is expected to be mobile and armed with multiple warheads. 

 The PRC's current small ICBM force is designed to deter both nuclear attack, and to deter U.S. intervention on behalf of Taiwan.  It is reasonable to estimate that the PRC will in this decade deploy 100 to 200 new ICBMs and SLBMs, which would allow the PRC to avoid restrictive arms control agreements, but also give it a hedge to be able overcome limited U.S. national missile defenses. 

Theater Information-Strike Complex. China's most profound challenge to the balance of power on the Taiwan Strait, or in Asia generally, is the PLA's developing "information-strike complex" of highly accurate ballistic and cruise missiles, combined with multiple layers of long-range space and airborne sensors. China is improving the 1,125-mile range DF-21 ballistic missile, identified in one report as the DF-21X.[xvii] This new DF-21 may have a new highly accurate warhead that uses navigation satellite data from the U.S. GPS or Russian GLONASS network, or perhaps radar guidance technology.[xviii]  The DF-15 SRBM, used to intimidate Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, is being improved with GPS/GLONASS guidance systems, and may be given longer range to increase its speed and survivability.  Last October the PLA also revealed the M-11 Mod 1 SRBM, which has a shorter range than the DF-15, but a larger warhead, and will likely incorporate satellite guidance.  The Pentagon has noted that development of land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) for theater and strategic missions has a "relatively high development priority" for China. The PLA currently has several LACM programs, reported in the press to carry names like "Hong Niao" or "Cheng Feng," which have benefited from Russian and Israeli cruise missile technology, and even perhaps captured U.S. Tomahawk LACMs.[xix] A long-range strategic cruise missile, similar in capability to early U.S. Tomahawk cruise missiles, will likely enter service after 2005.

Although these theater ballistic and cruise missiles could carry a new small nuclear warhead, China is placing great emphasis on developing powerful non-nuclear warheads, thus reducing the prospect of nuclear retaliation. Missiles armed with Radio Frequency (RF) weapons[xx] that simulate the electromagnetic pulse created by nuclear explosion, could disable computers, electric power grids, or even an aircraft carrier without causing great casualties. China is also interested in building cluster munitions for ballistic or cruise missiles that could disable airbase runways.

 Anti-Missile, Anti-Satellite, and Space Information Systems.

             China's government loudly protests U.S. anti-missile plans, promotes bans on outerspace warfare, but says almost nothing about its own anti-missile or anti-satellite programs, or its space warfare plans.  The Pentagon's PLA report released in June notes the PRC "can be expected to try to develop a viable ATBM [anti-tactical ballistic missile] and ABM [anti-ballistic missile] capability by either producing its own weapons or acquiring them from foreign sources." The PLA is marketing a new long-range surface-to-air (SAM) missile called the FT-2000, which is based on Russian and U.S. technology, and could form the basis of an ATBM-capable missile. The PLA is aware of the need to defend against opposing missiles and of the need to exploit the U.S. military's high dependence on reconnaissance and communication satellites.[xxi] The PLA's interest in laser ASAT systems has already been noted. 

 As it seeks the means to deny space to future adversaries, China is also seeking to better exploit outer space for military missions.[xxii] China is developing new military satellites for high-resolution imaging, radar imaging, signal intelligence (SIGINT) collection, navigation and communication. China has recently announced it will launch eight new reconnaissance satellites: four imaging satellites and four radar satellites.[xxiii] When in orbit, this network will give China twice daily satellite revisits. Radar satellites can penetrate cloud cover and are very useful for finding naval formations at sea. As does the U.S. military, China will also likely seek to integrate access to commercial satellite imaging into its military operations. For navigation and targeting, the PLA uses the GPS satellite network, is negotiating with Russia to invest in its faltering GLONASS network, and is also developing its own navigation satellite network.

 FOCUS ON TAIWAN

             PLA modernization is being driven to a large extent by PRC government's objective to build the military force needed to either intimidate or compel the government on Taiwan into reunification dictated largely by Beijing.  The goal is not necessary to invade and conquer Taiwan, but to defeat its armed forces swiftly and decisively enough to prevent American intervention-or to even attack U.S. forces in the event they do come to Taipei's assistance. Recent advances in doctrine, training, and the modernization of missile, air and naval forces stem from this objective.  The PLA faces an immense challenge to net these forces together in a cohesive whole-but it is working to do just that.  The danger is that absent requisite U.S. sales of defensive weaponry to Taiwan, the PRC is likely to obtain a level of military superiority later in this decade that would make the use of force tempting to Beijing under some circumstances. 

Assembling Information-Strike Combine.  The PLA is currently working to modernize its missile, information and air forces to assemble an information-strike combine to form the cutting edge of any future military campaign against Taiwan.  The goal will be to undertake joint SRBM, LACM, air and information-strikes in order to deliver a decisive surprise blow against the airfields, naval bases, and communications nodes of Taiwan.  According to a recent report, Taiwan estimates that the PLA now has 400 missiles in the areas opposite Taiwan, which is said to exceed U.S. estimates.[xxiv]  In February last year a leaked U.S. estimate stated that China intended to build 650 of the DF-15 and M-11 missiles by 2005.[xxv]  It is possible that the U.S. estimate may be conservative.  But when counting expected LACMs, it is reasonable to estimate that the PLA could have 1,000 or more ballistic and cruise missiles aimed at Taiwan by the end of this decade. And these will be made deadly accurate with targeting data from optical and radar satellites slaved to navigation satellite data.

Modern Air Power. While a slow process, the PLA is devoting greater resources to the purchase of modern Russian and Israeli combat systems and technology to supplement indigenous air combat programs.  By 2005 to 2010 the PLA Air Force (PLAAF) assemble a significant number of 4^th generation fighters, supported by radar and electronic intelligence aircraft, that could wrest air superiority away from a ROCAF that has been severely damaged by massive missile strikes.  It is telling that this year's Pentagon PLA report warns that by 2005, "if current trends continue, the balance of air power across the Taiwan Strait could begin to in China's favor."  In June and July of last year, the PLAAF mounted an unprecedented number of sorties into the Taiwan Strait as part of the PRC's protest against former President Lee Teng Hui's comments on Taiwan-Mainland relations.  Air clashed did not occur but the danger of such was quite high. 

The PLAAF has about 50-55 Russian Suhkoi Su-27 fighters and has started co-producing up to 200 more as the J-11. Last year Russia agreed to sell between 30-40, perhaps a first installment for the Su-30MKK twin-seat strike fighter.  In the Su-30 the PLAAF will have its first all-weather strike fighter comparable to the U.S. F-15E Strike Eagle.  The PLAAF Su-30s will be equipped with a range of precision guided bombs and missiles, and the Kh-31 anti-radar missile.[xxvi]  Older J-8 and J-7 fighters will soon be supplemented by the J-10, China's first 4^th generation fighter designed with Israeli and Russian assistance.  Having just been denied the cutting-edge Israeli Phalcon phased-array airborne warning and control radar, the PLAAF will likely quickly purchase the Russian A-50 AWACS with a Russian radar.  There are now over 10 H-6D aerial refueling tankers in the PLAAF, which service the J-8IID fighter.[xxvii]  Russia is trying hard to sell the PLAAF the Il-78 aerial tanker.

New Subs, Missiles. The PLA also hopes that massive missile attacks will diminish Taiwan's naval defenses, which will ease the PLA Navy's attempt to place a naval blockade around the island.  To do so it has stressed the acquisition of new submarines, anti-ship missiles and mines.  China could purchase more than the current four Russian Kilo conventional submarines-two of which are the ultra-quiet "636" version.  The indigenous Song-class conventional sub is experiencing developmental difficulties and may be discontinued.  Also, the PLAN has about 19 older Ming conventional subs that could be brought to bear. The PLAN has five older Han-class nuclear attack subs that will soon be supplemented by the more modern Type-093.

            More modern PLAN missiles are being purchased from Russia, such as the SS-N-22 supersonic missile that will equip its two, or four or more Sovremenniy missile destroyers, two of which will be delivered this year.  Taiwan's Navy has not defense against the SS-N-22 save to sink the destroyer.  Indigenous PLAN ships are improving through the adaptation of foreign weapons and engine systems.  The latest Luhai class destroyer incorporates elementary stealth shaping and later versions may deploy phased-array radar and vertical-launched anti-air and cruise missiles.  Less often commented upon is the PLAN's large inventory of modern naval mines.  These include rocket-propelled fast rising mines that are very dangerous to military and civil shipping.  The PLAN Air Force is also growing with the addition of J-8IID fighters, JH-7 attack fighters, and its new Y-8J patrol aircraft equipped with the British Skymaster radar to perform airborne early warning missions.  

FOUNDATION FOR FUTURE POWER PROJECTION

            If successfully absorbed, forces being acquired for possible use against Taiwan can also lay the foundation for future PLA power projection, on the way to attaining "preeminence" in the Asian region. This week the PLAN's first Luhai destroyer, along with the Ukrainian-build tanker Nancang, are on a naval diplomatic mission to visit Malaysia and ports in Africa.  The PLAN icebreaker-intelligence ship Haidaio completed a circuit of the Japanese islands in May. Beyond mere diplomacy, these exercises mark a small beginning that the PLA intends to carry the PRC's influence beyond its Mainland, where its future interests will be impacted.

Today the PLA cannot begin to approach the global reach of the forces of the United States. There is also no guarantee that the PRC will survive and not suffer the fate of most other Communist regimes. But if the Chinese Communist Party remains in power, and if it can dictate the fate of Taiwan, the PLA will then have resources to devote to the space, naval and air elements of greater projection. There is also the question of whether close political and arms sales/technology relations with Russia today in the future develops in the direction of military-operational cooperation. By the next decade the U.S. should not be surprised to see the PLA Navy being able to project power into the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. 

First Island Chain.  For Japanese and Southeast Asians, PLA power projection does not have to extend very far.  PLA Navy planers long ago set the goal to be able to extend its control to what it terms the "First Island Chain," which is the chain islands that extends from the Kurils, to Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines down to Indonesia. To project power in this region the PLA simply needs to purchase or build more of the systems currently being procured. More IRBMs and long-range cruise missiles, guided by new reconnaissance and navigation satellites, will provide long-range strike or deterrent capabilities unmatched in the region save by India. More Su-30 strike fighters, supported by aerial tankers and long-range AWACS, could extend PLA air control to the disputed islands in the South China Sea, or pose a real challenge to the Japanese Air Force. And with better air support, a PLA Navy with more modern submarines and warships can undertake bolder operations in support of its extensive claims to most of the South China Sea. Today the PLA is interested in the Russian Beriev Be-200 jet amphibian, which could perform both patrol and resupply missions for the PRC's far flung chain of island bases in the South China Sea. While wealthy Southeast Asian countries like Singapore might be able to afford missile defenses, it is unlikely that others will be able to do so.  They will also be hard pressed to maintain the air and naval forces necessary to blunt a serious PLA move into the South China Sea.    

The PRC's development of strategic military relations with Burma, Pakistan and Iran can be seen as part of an effort to contain India and to build geostrategic points of influence that ensure growing access to Persian Gulf oil. More accurate SRBMs and cruise missiles are likely to be sold to Pakistan, Iran or even Saudi Arabia, extending PLA influence by proxy.  With these missiles will likely come the sale of PLA satellite intelligence, which will be of use to their political leadership and military forces.

Second Island Chain.  Looking further into the next decade and beyond, PLA navy planners also have set their sights on the "Second Island Chain," which extends out to Guam. By this time, it is likely that PLA planners expect that the U.S. will be a declining power not in much of a position to challenge growing PLA might.[xxviii] It can also be expected that by this time, the PRC's embryonic civil and military space power will have developed much further, to include space stations, Moon missions and much greater military use of outer space, to possibly include space combat capabilities. These would then be used to support more advanced naval and air forces. 

            New long-range bombers may also be developed for the post-Taiwan period.  In the mid-1990s the PLA explored purchasing the Russian Tu-22M-3 Backfire, but has not done so as has India.  There are occasional hints that there is a domestic program underway to replace the H-6 medium bomber, a copy of the 1950s-vintage Soviet Tu-16 Badger.[xxix]  When this new long-range bomber emerges, the PLA will also likely possess supersonic LACMs and be following U.S. and Russian efforts to build hypersonic aircraft. 

            The PLA Navy has long harbored the ambition to build conventional aircraft carriers.  The PRC has purchased retired carriers from Australia and Russia, and perhaps even more detailed technical data from Russia, to support its ambition. It is reported to have built a practice carrier runway, and may modify a version of the new J-10 fighter for carrier operations. The PLAN today has a small helicopter carrier, the Shichang, which could today support commando activities against Taiwan or in the South China Sea. There also have been reports of plans to build two carriers about 50,000 tons in size, but these cannot be confirmed.  Perhaps after the Taiwan question is settled in Beijing's favor, it will devote the resources necessary to build carriers.  Earlier this year a popular mainland naval magazine carried an illustration for a future carrier concept that much resembles the U.S. CVNX carrier concept.  It had five catapults and relied on phased arrays for radar and communications.  It is not likely that such a design has the approval of the government.    

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

               As this statement has stressed already, the PLA is not today a match for U.S. power, save in the area of theater ballistic missile in Asia-which the U.S. has none.  What this statement does convey is that the People's Republic of China is undertaking a serious and broad effort to acquire the technical and research base, the most modern technologies, and when necessary, actual weapon systems to modernize its armed forces.  The long-term goal of American policy is to live in peace and prosperity with the Chinese people, and where possible, to help their evolution toward even greater freedom and prosperity.  The oft-stated justification made buy the current and previous U.S. Administrations for policies of "engagement" is that they hold a far better chance for positive and pluralistic forces to emerge and to displace Communist/authoritarian rule.

The hard truth, however, is that the PRC is still controlled by a Communist leadership for whom maintaining total power is its paramount goal.  In addition to its national defense mission, the PLA plays a key role in sustaining the primary power position of the Communist Party.  The PLA undertakes to suppress ethnic minorities who dare to challenge Beijing's rule, as it is also responsible for intelligence gathering and espionage that informs Party and PLA leaders. It commands a lions share of the national budget and it leaders are deeply suspicious of democracy, most of their Asian neighbors and the West.  Furthermore, the PLA is standard bearer of the Communist Party's nationalist credentials, which are increasingly linked to the recovery of "lost territories," to include Taiwan and the South China Sea. Furthermore, the PRC and the PLA increasingly oppose and covet America's leadership role in Asia.

 The United States must seek a peaceful relationship with the PRC.  It is also necessary to engage the PLA, but to do so in a manner that assures equal access.  While PLA knowledge of U.S. capabilities contributes to deterrence, this should not be allowed to justify continuing a clear imbalance in access to key information about our respective armed forces.  Engagement with the PLA should also include making clear U.S. opposition to its sale of nuclear and missile technology to Pakistan and other countries like Iran. Finally, engagement should also include a more vigorous effort by the Department of Defense to explain the effort that the PRC is making to modernize its military.  Like the Soviet Military Power series of the Reagan Administration, similar candor today about the PLA will also serve to inform Chinese about the expense of their military build-up.

 However, the areas where U.S. and PRC interests are likely to conflict, Taiwan, missile defense, the U.S. alliance structure in Asia, the South China Sea, and proliferation, are not going to be resolved soon.  In all of these potential conflict areas the PRC views a stronger PLA as a key tool for achieving its ends. Until China changes its Communist-dictated national priorities it will remain necessary for the United States to defend its leadership position in Asia and to ensure that its ability to militarily deter the PRC remains unquestioned. 

 The Importance of Taiwan.  The most important near-term area of conflict between the U.S. and the PRC is over the future of the democratic system on Taiwan.  Long-term U.S. policy enshrined in the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act holds that the U.S. supports a peaceful resolution between the PRC and Taiwan, and will maintain defensive arms sales to Taiwan to deter war.  Insuring Taiwan's survival, however, is not just a matter of principle for the U.S.; it can also hasten the day when the PRC evolves from Communism. Taiwan is a Chinese culture that has proven that freedom and prosperity can co-exist, proving to Chinese on the Mainland that they do not need dictatorship for economic development.  Sustaining Taiwan's survival, therefore, will in the long run strengthen chances for peace in Asia.

Today Taiwan has sufficient strength to deter PLA attack, but that may not last for long.  Taiwan has some U.S. Patriot ATBMs and is developing a domestic version, but their small number and vulnerability to attack is insufficient to defend Taiwan from a growing number of PLA missiles. Taiwan's Air Force currently has 330 F-16, Mirage-2000 and IDF fighters and the E-2 Hawkeye AWACS.  But its edge will erode if it does not receive advanced air-to-air missile, anti-radar missiles, and greater defense against PLA missiles. Taiwan only has two 1970s designed Dutch submarines that actually work, plus two World War II U.S. Guppy subs which cannot dive deeper than they are long! The Taiwan Navy lacks an effective defense against the SS-N-22 supersonic anti-ship missile, now in PLA Navy service. 

            Given that the PLA is shifting the military balance on the Taiwan Strait, it is incomprehensible that the Clinton Administration has decided this year not to sell Taiwan major weapon systems that it is reported to have requested.  The White House has refused to sell Taiwan the AEGIS naval air defense system which is possibly the only U.S. system that can defeat the SS-N-22.  The Administration has also refused to sell Taiwan the HARM anti-radar missile, in the face of the PLA deployment of advanced S-300 SAM sites on the Taiwan Strait that threaten Taiwan's Air Force.  And the Administration refused Taiwan's request for conventional submarines, which could help Taiwan thwart the PLA Navy's increasing ability to impose a blockade. 

            Taiwan has a clear requirement for all of these systems, and more.  The possible deployment of 1,000 or more missiles against Taiwan by the end of the decade makes necessary new solutions to this threat. Taiwan will need laser-based defense systems more capable that the U.S.-Israeli Tactical High Energy Laser recently tested in New Mexico.  In addition, Taiwan will need advanced reconnaissance systems like those planed for the U.S. Global Hawk UAV.  In addition, Taiwan will need a standoff attack capability to be able to go after SAM and SRBM sites that pose a threat.  But above all, the Taiwan armed forces need an effective relationship with the U.S. military, which has been denied since the end of formal relations in 1979.  Taiwan needs constant access to U.S. doctrine and operational methods to be able to effectively use new technology and to continue to deter war on the Strait.  

Why the PRC opposes U.S. missile defense.  While the PRC is waging a vociferous campaign against U.S. national and theater missile defenses, it says nothing about its own interest in acquiring missile defenses.  Beijing opposes U.S. missile defense plans because it does undermine its currently small long-range missile force.  But Beijing's opposition is rooted more in the role that missile are playing in its future plans to expand its military power.  Inasmuch as most Asian countries save India are not building their own nuclear missile deterrent, by preventing effective missile defenses the PRC retains relative monopoly in this form of military power.  But preventing missile defenses today, also serves to undermine the strength of Washington's long-term leadership in Asia. Should it forego missile defenses in Asia, then value of U.S. defense guarantees will diminish, weakening the U.S. led alliance system in Asia. 

Need to strengthen U.S. alliances.  For these reasons, the U.S. needs to proceed with both national and theater missile defense plans, as well as to continuously tend the U.S.-led alliance structure in Asia.  Missile defense will be a key future U.S. contribution to stability in Asia, but U.S. allies need to be included in missile defense activities.  Japan is already an effective U.S. partner in TMD, but other major allies like South Korea and Australia, and partners like Singapore should be included in missile defense activities. 

The U.S. should also consider a significant military aid package to help the troubled Philippines obtain a credible self-defense.  The breakdown in U.S.-Philippine defense relations in the early 1990s created a power vacuum that was exploited by the PRC when it occupied Mischief reef in late 1994.  President Joseph Estrada has worked hard to revive defense relations, and when he visits Washington next week, he should be given a U.S. commitment to consider a useful package of excess aircraft and ships that his armed forces can use.      

            It is also critical for the U.S. to repair its military relations with India, which were gradually improving until sanctions were imposed after its 1998 nuclear tests.  It is time to move beyond these sanctions and recognize that India is going to do what is necessary to deter the PRC, like build a nuclear deterrent.  As India will emerge soon in this century as a democratic superpower, it is to America's advantage to help its emergence so as to create a new strategic partnership with the world's largest democracy.  And Indian democratic superpower will also prove to the Chinese people freedom is not inconsistent with national strength. 

            Preventing U.S. friends and allies from selling the PLA new advanced weapons or militarily useful technology is also a critical element of U.S. alliance management.  As long as there is a possibility that PRC-initiated conflict against Taiwan could involve U.S. forces, stopping military technology from getting to the PLA is a matter of U.S. self-defense. The Clinton Administration deserves credit for recently convincing Israel to cancel its deal to sell advanced Phalcon radar to the PRC.  It is critical for the U.S. to pay even closer attention to Israel's interest and to growing European interest in selling military technology to the PLA. 

Requirements for deterrence.  For its own part, the U.S. must maintain its technical superiority over the China's military, and retain enough forces in Asia to deter a Taiwan-China conflict.  This will require that the U.S. invest heavily in space, laser, radio frequency, missile defense, and communication technologies that will ensure U.S. military superiority.  Washington should quickly establish an Asia-wide missile defense network that would become the main mission for the U.S. military beyond the next decade.  It is also important for the U.S. to build supersonic land-attack cruise missiles that are more survivable that current LACMs, and to use them to equip Trident SSGNs that will be made redundant by arms control agreements.   The U.S. should now build fighter aircraft like the F-22 plus advanced missiles that sustain a margin of superiority over China's Sukhois.  The Pacific Command should always have access to adequate numbers of nuclear attack submarines.  In addition, the U.S. Navy should acquire combat aircraft that are superior to the PLA Air Force's Sukhoi fighter and attack aircraft.

CONCLUSION

            The PRC is not today the enemy of the United States, but the PRC's territorial and political ambitions in Asia, and resources it is devoting to building its People's Liberation Army into an advanced fighting force, dictate that the U.S. exercise great caution.  While there are today widely varying views on the current and future capabilities of the PLA, there is enough evidence to conclude that the PLA is rapidly shifting the balance of power on the Taiwan Strait, and laying the foundation for greater power projection in the next decade and beyond.  As long as the PRC remains governed by a Communist Party there is likely to be growing friction with the U.S. over Taiwan, missile defense, Washington's leadership in Asia, and the South China Sea.  However, the U.S. can best sustain peace in Asia by working to strengthen its leadership role,  strongly defending its interests in all possible areas of conflict with the PRC, and sustaining its military superiority in Asia so as to deter conflict.   

Richard D. Fisher, Jr. is a Senior Fellow with the Jamestown Foundation, a Washington, D.C. think tank. He has served as a Senior Analyst with the House Republican Policy Committee chaired by Rep. Christopher Cox (R-CA), and as the Director of the Asian Studies Center of The Heritage Foundation.

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