1,coo: cw71: 1.601 : l.GO2: PRCIBLERS OF ARMS CCMTRCL AHC CISAB!?ABENT (1388) l.iiO4: Lecture XIX (Lederterg): VaEmergent issues in arms ccntrol: l.CO6: Cheaical and biological weapons: 1" 1,LOH l-C10 1.912 l.ij14 1,616 1,018 I,(;20 1,622 l-C24 /1,C26 1.C28 1,030 1.(;32 l-i;34 1,636 1.C38 1.c40 1.042 1.c44 l,C46 1.C48 l.i;SO l-c52 1.b54 l.C56 1.C58 1.060 1.C62 l-C64 l.b66 1,068 I.(;70 1.072 1.074 l-C76 1.078 l-C80 l-C82 1.C84 1.C86 1,088 1.c90 l*C92 1.094 I.696 l.ti98 1.100 1,102 1.104 The moxe basic facts about chaaical warfare and its control would be easy to summarize in one hour, Having two Beans tying together a werp large number of locse ends that have not yet been successfully tied together in policy or in policy formulation; and I am not sure I'll do a very much better job in my exposition of them to you. For some more or less logical divisicn of the subject I1a going to divide the Froblem of the control of chemical weaponry (CM) intc (a) the core questions: of the lethal agents that might begin to colaFete with nuclear weaponry in a very serious escalation of the level of fatalities in armed conflict between nations, and (b) ether aspects of Cb like tear gas and herbicides, These questions are politically and in putlic ps,ychology very much interwoven, and I must say, often hightly ccnfuscd, For example, Senator Young on the floor of the Senate made a speech a few rconths ago in which he referred to the accumulation of stocks of nerve gals ty the Cepartment of Defense, intended for use in riot control in this ccuntry. Yhat an U?llY* preposterous allegation that would be! He was pcssitly thinking of tear yas and possibly thought there was not much difference between the two, tie need a level of precision in discussing cheaicals which is hard tc manage with a scientifically unsophisticated audience, such as the Congress of the United States. It may be somewhat easier in this particular group, The closer you are to high school, profably the better lettered you will be with respect to some cf these technical ccncepts. The use of koiscns in human hostility has an unmeasured antiquity. The Eible doubtless refers to poisoning of wells and other pestilences. Thucydides reccrds the use of the fumes that can be generated by burning pitch plus sulphur dating back to at least the 5th century E-C, &any so-called Frimitive cultures have discovered very sophisticated chemical ueapons in the form of herl. poisons, Soxe cf them have teccae quite important in aredici ne. (Curare, for example, is a South American a.rrow poison which has been used koth for huntincj game and for armed conflict. It is as Fotent a chemical weapon ds one would care to have, Eowever, it must be introduced into the circulation by breaking the skin which is the main reason it does not appear in the armamentarium of the United States Army at the present time, Its equivalent in modern technclogy is nerve gas.) Hcwever, with the development of the national military state engaged in total warfare, since the lapoleonic era, the rules of war became crystallizea around the customs of the 19th century, There was very little use of chemical weaponry, except incidentally fcr smokes and so on, dtlf ing that time. Nat until the large-scale use of chlorine on the hestern Front by the Germans in 1915 did chemical warfare again aFFear cn a large scale, The Germans started with chlorine gas which was disseminated from cylinders -- gas tanks -- that were brought to the front. They waited several weeks from the time o.f their oriqinal de&loyment until the weather and the uind were appropriate for their use and then they let lose at 5 F-B, cn April 22, 1915. At that time they liberated 180 tons of chlcrine frcm b,GOO cpkinders. Luring that Fer.iod of time there was Flenty of prior intelligence. The French were well aware that something was afcot hut they made no use of the information and the initial attack was in fact suite 2.000; Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -2- 2, GO2 2.004 2, i106 2.CO8 2.ClG 2.G12 2,014 2.Cl6 2*c1a 2.C20 2.022 2.024 2.026 /2.1;28 2. C30 2.032 2. C34 2.L36 2, ii38 2. C40 2.042 2.C44 2. G46 2.L48 2.c;so 2,C52 2, U54 2,G56 2. ti58 2.C60 2.062 2.C64 2,C66 2. C68 Z-C70 2, Ii72 2.1r74 2, C'76 2.C78 2. C80 2.082 2.084 2.686 2.088 2.090 2. C92 2.C94 2.U96 2.698 2,100 2.102 2,104 2,106 devastatinf4, However, its effectiveness went beyond what the Gerran army strategic planners had expected. They did not know hou to exploit this form of attack; and they did not really capitalize on it in any very useful way. They did try agairt once or twice in much the same fashion, but in spite of a large number of casualties and in spite cf a very considerakle psychological iapact and disarray of the troops against which it was used, it was not properly followed UF from the point of view of an important military advantage. However, starting from that time, Yorld War I uas the scene of a very considerable escalation of chemical warfare on toth sides, an astcnishingly sharp and rapid buildup of a technology race involving both offense and defense. The identification of the agents used by the enemy, the development of gas masks and the development of a doctrine for their effective use for defensive purposes, the search for agents that would penetrate the then known gas masks -- all of this uas gcing an on both sides. Ey the end of the ear, gas munitions case to occuy-y 5% cf the total artillery that was expended during world Uar I, The difficulties of using cylinders of gas that then blew downwind toward the enemy has obvious disadvantages; scan thereafter the Prench played a major role in finding wa ys of including chemical agents into artillery shells and this very rapidly became the main vehicle for exchanging these materials. Altogether, (according to the account which is summarized in the volume of the Stockholm Institute for Peace Research which is cn reserve) 113,000 tons of chemical agents were used in World War T. They resulted in 1.3 million casualties. These were aFFroxisatcly 5% of the total casualties in World War I. Rowever, there were cnly 91,COO deaths attributed to gas warfare as compared to a total of about 5 millicn of the total roilitary casualties in World War I, Gas warfare was then very effective in disabling troops in proportion to the level cf effort that was expected in delivering chemical O uni tions, It also resulted in a substantially lower fatality rate than did the other weapons during the war. Rowever, the use of these weapons was still escalating in 1918 and it is impossible to predict uhat the further outcome would have been. The original gases that vere used were chlorine and Fhosgene, The French introduced tear gas on a small scale and this became very prevalent on both sides in artillerg shells. Tear gas is a tempcrarily disabling agent which provokes mostly a psychological incapacity. The main function disrupted by tear gas is visicn due to the Froduction of tears and the irritation of the cornea. There are secondary effects on lung functions, and in very large amounts any of these agents can be fatal, Rut under the usual conditions uf military exposure they are net intended to be and they only very rarely were. Chlorine is a lung irritant in its functions, It is a much more serious agent from the point of view of Fotential fatalities, It can cause lung edema and pneumonia and lony lasting disability with lung irritation and did in a number of cases, It was not cf ten lethal in proportion to the number of disabilities that it caused, but often enough- There yas a very limited use of ancient poisons like hydragea cyanide (or prussic acid) or cyanagen chloride, These are very poisonaus agents in the context of the chemical laboratory but in the open field they are difficult to handle, hostly they are rather light and volatile and they drift away very promptly from the area of arplicaticn and they were not used extensively. Then adamsite and mustard gas uere introduced later into 3.COO; tederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -3- 3.002 3.co4 the itar. Adausite 'uas another harrasing agent probably more serious than 3,G06 tear gas and mustard is a very serious weapon by every count, It is 3*CO8 described a~i a vesicant, that is to say it causes blistering on the skin, 3.GIO When inhaled it can cause internal blistering in the lungs and we now know 3.lI12 -- it was not known at that time -- its action en cells i+ very similar to 3,G14 that of X-radiation. It does cause profound cell damage through the 3,016 treakage of chromosomes at a very fundamental level in cell physiology. It 3.618 is an exttemelv unpleasant agent with very long lasting effects. bustard 3,620 qas wounds often took years to heal properly, They protably account for a 3,C22 siqnificart &art of the total casualties in World War I; and the use of 3,C24 mustard was becoming more and more prevalent by 1918, 3.G26 However, with all that, chemical warfare was not ot any Earticular 3.C28 strategic significance during the war. 1 do not think it influenced the 3.C3C outcome by occ? wbit in any way, There was not the level of cormit@ent ot it 3.C32 as a weapon that could have been expected tc have that outcome, It 3,034 undoubtedly had a very important psychological effect, particularly on 3,C36 civilian populations, and this may have teen its major perceived utility. 3.038 That is tc sap that the threat of chemical warfare attack would require the 3.1;40 adversary to invest a good deal in his cwn ccunter measures, issuing gas 3.042 masks to the population, Any air alarm had to also involve the disruption 3,c44 that is connected with maintaining defenses against gas attacks and so 3.046 forth. And those may have been among the major costs, However, as you know, 3.C48 aerial bombardment did not reach any very sophisticated level during World 3,cso War I. Civilian populations were only incidentally involved and then mostly 3.(i52 as a byproduct of infantry and artillarp movement, The ccncept of strategic 3,654 bombardment of cities had not yet been refined, 3,C56 Much of the further history of efforts at chemical warfare control is 3.C58 connected with the fact that the Allies won the war, The use of pcliscn slas 3*C6G h9 the Germans became an important part af the ccncept of German 3.C62 Schrecklichkeit (horror and atrocity) in the conduct of war. The treaty of 3,C64 Versailles, unilaterally imposed on the Central powers, made a specific, 3.C66 rather moralistic stateaent that, poison gas having been condemned by the 3*CG8 civilized world, the Central Powers were bound never again to undertake the 3.c70 production cf or use of these agents, I will come back to that again 3.C72 because the language of the Versailles Treaty was eventually incorporated 3.074 without much further thought into the language of the Geneva Protccol a 3,676 little later on. 3.078 In the volume of hearings for the Souse Committee on Foreign Affairs, 3.L80 there is an excellent suamary by professor Eunn of the University of 3.082 Wisconsin on the history of the Geneva protocol and other arms control 3,084 efforts. He quotes many of the relevant texts. The Persailles Treaty 3,086 included the provision that "the use of asphyxiating paiscncus or other 3.C88 gases and of analogous liquids and materials or devices being prohibited, 3. c90 the-ir manufacture and importation are strictly forbidden in Geraany." This 3.c92 text was not in any real sense negotiated. It was language that was put 3.c94 together with d very larye number of other provisions .in tended to hamper 3.C36 any possibility of German rearmament dfter World War I. There was no one 3.C98 capable of protesting, anafyzinq, trying to understand the inplications, 3.100 trying to di ssect the draftmanship of the language when these phrases were 3.102 Put together. Rad there been, one might have expected to see some 3.104 l'legislative h is tory" connected to the language. Consider ntllc use of 3.106 asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and of andlOgOuS liquids, materials 4.coo: Lcderborg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -4- 4.. co2 4, co4 4,006 4.CO8 4.c10 4.612 4,014 4.016 e . Cl8 C20 4: C22 4.024 4.C26 4.628 4.G30 4.1;32 4.L34 4,036 4.C38 4. C40 4.i42 4,t44 4.C46 4,048 4.C50 4,C52 4.C54 4.C56 4.i58 4.C6i) 4, ti62 4,364 4.C66 4. C68 4.C70 4. C72 4.c74 4.676 4.C7Y 4.c;80 4,062 4,CB4 4,Cd6 4,088 4.C90 4. c92 4,i;94 4.096 4.098 4.100 4.102 4.104 4. IOh or devices,** t8o one really knows what those words mean. They are a kind of general, moral prohibition against doing anything naughty; but a defeated power has nc possibility of complaint. The matter was not carefully analyzed at that tiare. in 1922 as part of the program of attempts at uniwersal disarmasent under the genera1 aegis of the League of Bations the conference in Washington proposed A treaty on submarines and on noxious gases, The submarines part uds an attempt to limit the then burgeoning arms race among -the allied lowers and Japan with respect to naval vessels. It also included language that vas evidently dravn vertatim from the Versailles Peace Treaty, "the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and all analogous liquids, materials or devices having been justly condemned by the general opinion of the civilized world,.,n that the parties of the treaty bind themselves to that prohibition, The fact that the Allied rowers in World War I had no compunctions about the retaliatory use of these agects and had invested ds much in chemical warfare as the central powers is not directly alluded to, The 1922 treaty was proposed by the United States and the treaty was in fact ratified by thr? United States including this language, It was repudiated ky Prance who at that time was unwilling to limit itself in the naval arms rdce. When they refused to sign, it tecame a nullity and neither the French nor the United States would then be further bound by a contract that had failed or consummation. There uere further peace conferences during that era. The effort at submarine limitation haviny been abandoned, the chemical warfare control was extracted from it in further conferences and a treaty that is knoun historically as the Geneva Protocol was drafted and formulated in 1925, This picked up the fanguaye with respect tc chemical agents that f have just quoted, "the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and cf all analogous liquid araterials or devices.*8 Tt also added a new provision on biological weapons. With the advance of the science of microbiology, kiologisal weapons ought to be niFFed in the bud, lhe Farties thus disavowed B anti CW and specifically "agree to be bound as Letween themselves according to this declaration," The gualifyiag FhraSe is of utmost iEFortance, The protocol was promoted by the Department of State and by the United States delegation. It was approved by all ether ccuntries with insignificant exceptions then involved in the negotiaticns. It was then presented to the United States Senate for ratification. It was generally believed that it would be a pro forma matter since the Senate in 1922 had already ratified a treaty that included identical language, and evidently not very much care was taken to clear it vith the necessary FecFle, Eut this time it ran into very great obstacles. The sources cf cFFosition to the treaty had become crystallized. The United Ltates was heginning to enter intc it much more isolaticnist path, The repudiation cf the League of Nations had already taken place, The further implicaticns of this were beginning to he riyidified in United States policy and in the attitudes of the Senate, It ended up that rather than being a FIO fcrma matter that would be automatically ratified that the Senate refused to ratify the Geneva Protocol, besides the new isolationism, specific cF&osition to the kan on chemical warfare had been mobilized hy the chemical industry, the chemical varfarcl service; the other hawks, even the American Chemical s,(ioo; 5, CO2 5.004 5.CO6 5, CO8 5.ClO 5.012 5.c14 5.Ci6 t 5.C18 5,020 s-c122 5.024 5.C26 5, Li28 5.030 5.1i32 "j-L34 5, C36 5.C38 5. C40 5.G42 5. ii44 5.C46 5.048 5.G50 5.C52 s-c54 5.C56 5.058 5.060 5.1362 5,064 5.666 S.r;68 5.070 5. C72 5. C74 5. G76 5,C78 5. C80 5, G82 5.084 5,086 5, C88 5.G90 5.092 5. c94 5.G96 5,098 5.100 5,102 5.104 5.106 Lederberq lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -se Society, formed a very active lobbying group against the acceptance of the Frotocol. The principal arguments were that it was only a piece of p=w that would be scrapped anyhou in the event cf war, that America WdS retreating to its own fortress and that it did not want tc bave anything to d0 with the rest of the world and it would not rely on international treaties, it would rely on its own strength and force and not get into any entanqling arrangements of any kind. So the Protocol was rrcadiated fy the U.S. However, enough other countries had signed it that it entered into force as among .those countries who signed. In international law the Protocol has a status of a contract. The actual languaqe 0% the Protocol states that the parties are bound as among themselves, that is to say, if T. have joined the treaty, and if you a Is0 joined it, then ve are co-partners in a mutual multilateral agreenent that we will not. use chemical or microbiological methods of warfare against one another. In the treaty is the implicit reservation that it does net Par the use of chemical weaponry against other countries that may have refused to enter the Protocol, That is in the language of tbe treaty. Eut in crder to place even further stress on that, fsance, (among the first of the countries to ratify the Protocol) added a specific reservaticn that said the same thing all over again, very explicitly- As far as France was concerned the treaty uould apply only to those countries whc alsc were bound by the conditions of the Protocol; and furthermore, Erance uotild not consider that it uas commited in respect to any country that troke the treaty or with respect to any country any of whcse allies broke the treaty. This was an explicit KeSerVdtiOn. This reservation was copied hy rrany other countries rho ratified the treaty.. fly we3 1 established FrinciFle of internaticnal law the countries who signed the treaty after these reservations hsld keen stated, and did not otject, were bound ty the reservaticns. Juridically as well as politically, the Geneva Frctocol is then a promise among parties of the treaty not to use these weapons first. And it exFl.ic:itly recites the Frivilege of using these UeaFons if someone else uses them first against you. In fact the Soviet Unicn has taken the official Fosition that the Geneva Fro tocol is the foundation-stcne of deterrence in the area of chemical weaponry kecause it reiterates the rights and the threat of retaliation in the event that it is violated, The Frotocol is a way of announcing to the world that if anycne uses a chemical weapon, there vi.11 be legitimized retaliation uith chemical weaponry aqainst such use, The Protocol says nothing about research, development, production, stockpiles, Froliferation, distribution, sales, acquisiticn, or any other aspect of chemical weaponry. It is d contractual limitation on first use, Tn tfie context that I bave just indicated it is indeed a certain encouragement to maintaining the capability of retaliation and therefore to the development and the stockpiling of chemical weapons in order to be available as a deterrence. Bo cne has stated that yositior Igore clearly and more unamL:.iyuously and perbaps more justifiably than the Soviet Union, Eetuec?r World Wars I and 11 were a few proning incidents in which chemical weapons were probably applied, although the documentation for this is incomplete, (This is recited in much detail in the SILRI vcluxe.) The most credible incidents were -- first that the Italian Fascists USi?d chemical weaEons, r;robafily mustard, in Ethiopia: some 15, cc0 out cf the 50,000 Ethiopian casualties during the Atyssinian kar derived from chemical 6.000; Lederherg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -6- 6,002 6,604 6.CO6 6.008 6,iIlO 6.612 6.Cl4 6.G16 6.C18 '6A20 6,022 6,624 6, cii!b 6,628 6.630 6.C32 6.C34 6.636 6.c138 6,Ii40 6,042 6.644 6.646 6,(;4tJ 6,tiSO 6.C52 6.054 6.C56 6.C58 6.660 6.C62 6,064 6.1366 6.ii68 6.670 6.C72 6.C74 6.076 6.C78 6.C80 6.C82 6.084 6.086 6.088 6.C90 6. C92 6.C94 S-c;96 6.C9.S 6.100 6.102 6.104 6.106 weapons. 4he Ltalian Fosition held that this was perfectly correct despite the prohititions of the Geneva Protocol; because it was in retaliation to inhuman methcas of warfare, including decapitation that had been practiced by the Akyssinians .in that conflict, Furthermore it was net really a war and therefore the protocol was not designed to be applied to it anyhow! The significance of CW here is obviously not that it enhanced the cal;aLility of Imperial Italy to acyuire Akyssinia, It Ctas a lililitary field test of particular kind of chemical technology to give military planners in the Italian Army the opportunity to evaluate the significance of CU. Just as the Spanish Civil War was used to test new air power technology, We also have read many reports of the ose of chemical weapons hy Japan in the invasion ami occupation of China from atout 1432 tc 1945. In 1937 a group of chemists in the Nazi regime in Germany discovered nerve gas, ta;Dun, as a byl;raduct of searches for a chemical Eesticide, (There is a very close connection between the biology and the technology of an important class of insecticides, the organic Fhosphates, and the nerve gas.) In these experiments, molecules kncwa to interfere with the transmission of the nerve impulses are tested for their relative tcxicity on insects and on mamatals. Insecticide research is, of couxse, looking for agents that have a very high degree of safety as far as ranmals, livestock and man are concerned. These agents have improved very ccnsideratly since their early introduction; Yet there are still fatalities in the agricultural use of tbe agents designated as insecticides, ey accident, tabun was stumbled upon and was found to be at least as toxic to mammals as to insects. This was very highly classified informaticn. Further investigation in Germany then uncovered a series of other related and even more effective agents like sarin and one or two ethers, Ihat started a new qeneration of C# aqents. These were from a military point cf view very much more effective than the others: except that they were lethal, which is not d military advantage. But they acted very guickly, they are insidious, they could work if app.lied to the skin as well as if they uere kredthed. If they did not kill they would incapacitate, hut not very long. If you are going to die you'll know it within a few minutes; and if you have not received a dose that kills you fairly promptly then ycu FroEably will recover from it Because the effects on the nerves are reversible, The way in which nerve gas kills -- is paralysis of the respiratory centers and the stcppage of respiration. Herve gas was not known to the outside world during the entire period of World War 11. The Germans, of course, keFt it a secret. As early as 1942 the &;azis began large-scale production cf rerve gas. Ihey ended the war with stockpiles of at least 12,000 tons of nerve gas. There is incomplete documentation of German policy during World Car II about the use of these agents. There is little doubt that a r3ajor element in their initial decision not to use it in the early Fericd of the war was fear of retaliation. German intelligence was just as faulty as the All.ies. They heard -tumors of a considerable treakthrcugh * insecticide-re.lated research that was teing kept highly classiiied; some and they jumped to the conclusion that the Allies had also discovered nerve gas. That material uas not nerve gas, it was CDT, and this nas a military secret because a major devastation in military activity for centuries immemorial has teen typhus fever spread by 1 ice among soldiers in encampments. (on the other hand, we had egually faulty intelligence that exaqaerated the Jananese CW carahilitv. There uds information abaut their 7,coo; Lederberg lecture XIX Chemical Warfare -7- 7.002 7,604 7.CO6 7,CO8 7,ClO 7,012 7.c14 7,016 7tCltl 7.c20 7,022 7,024 7.026 7,028 7*c30 7.032 7,i;34 7,036 7.C38 7.040 7.042 7.c44 7.046 7.048 7.(;50 7.052 7.054 7.056 7.058 7,060 7.062 7.064 7.C66 7.C68 having used chemical weapons in China. Earticularfy had there been an American invasion of Japan, there was considerable fear that the Japanese uere preparing for the use of chemical weaponry, Actually they uere not competent, bath from the paint of view of any new agents and from the point of view of the development of the chemical industry,) In the later part of the war it appears that German military doctrine was starting to lean toward the use of chemical weapons, However, by that tire their chemical industry was so disrupted and there were such acute shortages far synthetic rubber and fuel; their economy was beginning to fall apart. They had a Isa last the air war and they therefore no lcnger had the major instrument for the delivery of these weapons and therefore any significant olpartunity they may have had to take advantage of their unmistakable technological lead had been lost. Curing the war all of the Allied countries made statements to the effect that the Allies would not be the first to use chemical wealicnry but if the Germans used CW against the USSH or any of the Allies, then their retaliation uould be unleashed. The bluff worked! The fact that this strategy saved the Russians from being clot be red with nerve gas during World War II, which could have been a decisive factcr in the German invasion of the Soviet Union, undoubtedly Flays a large part in their present Fcsition with respect to arms control measures. U.S. presidents have repeatedly cclarPitted the U.S. to the general principles of the Geneva protocol, uithout having had the wish or the power to see it formally ratified by the II-S, Senate, Since 1961, the war in Vietnam has raised new issues in this field, The anti-war reaction has focussed a degree of attenticn on curbing CI that was never achievable before despite the grave threats of escalation in lethal CE technclaqy, On the other hand, tear gas and herbicides were introduced in a way that complicates the interpretation of waht CW should mean. It will be difficult to achieve further progress in the control of C or BW until this complex array of issues is disentangled, with inevitable delays in dealing with the issues of most crucial import, END CF LECTUHE I