Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
U
nit 
IX 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 150 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Building Design Guidance 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast effects 
and transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological agents from exterior and interior 
incidents 
2. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects 
3. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communications system mitigation 
measures, including synergies and conflicts 
4. 4.	Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design 
and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Architectural considerations, including building configuration, space design, 
and special situations 
2. 2.	Building structural and nonstructural considerations with emphasis on 
progressive collapse, loads and stresses, and good engineering practices 
3. 3.	Design issues for the building envelope, including wall design, window 
design, door design, and roof system design with approaches to define levels of protection 
4. 4.	Mechanical system design issues, including interfacing with operational 
procedures, emergency plans, and training 
5. 5.	Other building systems design consideration for electrical, fire protection, 
communications, electronic security, entry control, and physical security that mitigate the 
effects of a threat or hazard 
6. 6.	Do an Activity that encompasses identified high risk pairs (asset � 
threat/hazard) in the threat-vulnerability matrix developed for the Case Study and select 
mitigation measures that reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the building 
perspective 

Unit IX


REFERENCES 
1. 1. FEMA 426, Instructor Guide, and Student Manual. 
2. 2.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist Attacks 
Against Buildings, pages 3-1 to 3-46 and 3-48 to 3-52; Checklist at end of Chapter 1. 
3. 3.	FEMA 427, Primer for Design of Commercial Buildings to Mitigate 
Terrorist Attacks 
4. 4.	 FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components in 
Architectural Design 
5. 5. Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 
6. 6. Unit IX visuals 


REQUIREMENTS 
1. 1. FEMA 426, pages 3-1 to 3-52 
2. 2. Unit IX visuals 
3. 3. Instructor Guide 
4. 4. Student Manual (one per student) 
5. 5. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
6. 6. Chart paper, easel, and markers 

UNIT IX OUTLINE 
Time 
Page 
IX. Building Design Guidance 
150 minutes 
IG IX-1 
1. 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
10 minutes 
IG IX-4 
2. 
Architectural Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-6 
3. 
Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-12 
4. 
Building Envelope Considerations 
15 minutes 
IG IX-16 
5. 
Other Building Systems 
15 minutes 
IG IX-26 
6. 
Walk-through of Building Vulnerability Assessment 
40 minutes 
IG IX-37 

Checklist 


7. 
Activity: Building Design Guidance 
40 minutes 
IG IX-39 

Unit IX


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
. �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity:  The students will continue the familiarization with the Case 
Study materials. The Case Study is a complete risk assessment and analysis of mitigation 
options and strategies for a typical commercial office building located in a mixed urban-
suburban environment business park. The assessment will use the DoD Antiterrorism 
standards and the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine Levels of Protection 
and identify specific vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies will use the 
concepts provided in FEMA 426 and other standard reference materials such as the RS 
Means Building Security: Strategy and Costs, NFPA 5000, and other FEMA publications 
related to emergency planning and disaster recovery. 
. �	Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-1 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Unit IX Building Design Guidance 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit IX Building Design Guidance. Continuing with our understanding of 
vulnerability and mitigation measures, we have looked at site and layout concerns and 
now turn our attention to what considerations are needed in building design to mitigate 
tactics involving explosive blast or CBR agents. 
We will examine design considerations that achieve a balanced building envelope that 
provides a defensive layer against the given terrorist tactic and avoids creating ripple 
effects where one incident may affect more than one building system. 
Catastrophic collapse of any building is a primary concern. Historically, the majority of 
fatalities that occur in terrorist attacks directed against buildings are due to building 
collapse. This was true for the Oklahoma City bombing in 1995 when 87 percent of the 
building occupants who were killed were in the collapsed portion of the Murrah Federal 
Building. But glass causes over 80 percent of injuries during bomb blast and there are 
some low cost techniques to keep CBR agents outside of buildings or to limit their spread 
inside. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-2 
Unit Objectives 
Explain architectural considerations to mitigate impacts from blast effects and transmission of chemical, biological, and 
radiological agents from exterior and interior incidents. 
Identify key elements of building structural and non-
structural systems for mitigation of blast effects.

Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, electrical system, fire protection system, and 
communication system mitigation measures, including synergies and conflicts. 
Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design and identify mitigation measures needed to reduce 
vulnerabilities. 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-2 
VISUAL IX-3 
Overview 
Architectural
Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations
Building Envelope Considerations
Other Building Systems
Building Mitigation Measures
Activity

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-3 
Note that one mitigation measure may reduce the risk of more than one asset � 
threat/hazard pair as illustrated by Table 2-1 of FEMA 426, where a mitigation measure 
may apply to multiple tactics. 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain architectural considerations due to impact from blast effects and 
transmission of chemical, biological, and radiological agents from exterior and interior 
incidents. 
2. 2.	Identify key elements of building structural and nonstructural systems for 
mitigation of blast effects. 
3. 3.	Compare and contrast the benefit of building envelope, mechanical system, 
electrical system, fire protection system, and communication system mitigation measures, 
including synergies and conflicts. 

Apply these concepts to an existing building or building conceptual design and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities. 
Overview 
. �	Architectural 
. �	Building Structural and Nonstructural Considerations 
. �	Building Envelope Considerations 
. �	Other Building Design Issues 
. �	Building Mitigation Measures 
. �	Activity 

IG IX -5 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-4 
Architectural Building Configuration 
Tall, Small Footprint 
Low, Large Footprint 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-4 
Architectural Building Configuration (1) 
Designers should balance a number of relevant considerations to the extent that site, 
economic, and other factors allow. 
Some of the relevant considerations include the following: 
. �	The shape of the building 
. �	Low, large footprint buildings 
. �	Tall, small footprint buildings 

General benefits of the two basic approaches: 
Low, Large Footprint: 
. �	Reduced effect of explosive blast (catches less of the blast wave) 
. �	Reduced effect of progressive collapse (less of the building can fall) 
. �	Reduced surveillance or easier mitigation (lower height allows terrain and 
landscaping options) 
 �	Better energy conservation (green roof potential and earth-sheltered 
design) 
 Tall, Small Footprint: 
. �	Reduced blast effects on upper floors 
. �	Air intakes better protected against CBR events 
. �	Site runoff reduced, reducing culvert size as a covert entry point 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-5 
VISUAL IX-6 
Architectural Building Configuration 
Ground floor elevation 4 feet above grade
Orient glazing perpendicular 
Avoid exposed structural 

elements 
Pitched roofs and pitched 
window sills 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-6 
Architectural Building Configuration (2) 
A lot can be done architecturally to mitigate the effects of a terrorist bombing on a 
facility. These measures often cost nothing or very little if implemented early in the 
design process. Future FEMA 430 will contain an expanded discussion of incorporating 
security components in architectural design. 
�	Further looking at building shapes, certain configurations trap the blast wave 
increasing overall damage to the structure. For example, "U" or "L" shaped buildings, 
overhangs, and re-entrant corners in general should be avoided. 
Architectural -Building Configuration (3): 
. �	Elevating the ground floor makes moving vehicle attack more difficult 
. �	If the glazing looks perpendicular to the direction of travel for the blast 
wave, the glass sees less reflected pressure. 
. �	Do not have structural elements, like columns, easily exposed on the 
outside of the building. This goes for any architectural feature that can become damaged or 
disconnected by a blast wave. 
. �	If armed attack includes Molotov cocktails or home-made grenades, 
pitched roofs and pitched window sills tend to cause the thrown item to roll off and away 
from the building. Air intakes have similar considerations. 

IG IX -7 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-7 
VISUAL IX-8 
Architectural � Space Design (2) 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-8 
Architectural -Space Design (1) 
Unsecured areas should be physically separated from the main building to the extent 
possible. 
For example, a separate lobby pavilion or loading dock outside the main footprint 
provides enhanced protection against damages and potential building collapse in the event 
of an explosion. Similarly, placing parking areas outside the main footprint of the building 
can be highly effective in reducing the vulnerability to catastrophic collapse. 
The protection of the building interior can be divided into two categories: 
. � Functional layout 
. � Structural layout 

Architectural -Space Design (2) 
In terms of functional layout, public areas such as the lobby, loading dock, mail room, 
garage, and retail areas need to be separated from the more secured areas of the facility. 
This can be done by creating internal "hard lines" or buffer zones, using secondary 
stairwells, elevator shafts, corridors, and storage areas between public and secured 
areas. 
In lobby areas, the architect would be wise to consider the queuing requirements in front 
of the inspection stations so that visitors are not forced to stand outside during bad 
weather conditions or in a congested line inside a small lobby while waiting to enter the 
secured areas. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-9 
Architectural � Space Design (3) 
Eliminate hiding places
Interior barriers 
Offset doorways
Minimize glazing, 

particularly interior glazing 
near high-risk areas

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-9 
VISUAL IX-10 
Architectural � Other Design Elements 
Safe havens
Office locations 
Mixed occupancies
Public toilets and service areas
Retail uses in the lobby 
Stairwells 
Mailroom

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-10 
For additional information on safe havens, see FEMA 428. 
Architectural -Space Design (3) 
In this slide, a range of design measures are presented that � when implemented � can 
increase the safety of the building�s occupants from the effects of blast. 
Architectural - Other Design Elements 
When designing high-risk buildings, engineers and architects should consider the following: 
The innermost layer of protection within a physical security system is the safe 
haven. Safe havens are not intended to withstand a disciplined, paramilitary attack 
featuring explosives and heavy weapons. 
Offices considered to be high risk (more likely to be targeted by terrorists) should be 
placed or glazed so that the occupants cannot be seen from an uncontrolled public area 
such as a street. Whenever possible, these spaces should face courtyards, internal sites, or 
controlled areas. 
Mixed occupancies. High-risk tenants should not be housed with low-risk tenants. 
Terrorists may identify some targets based on their symbology, visibility, ideology, 
political views, potential for publicity, or simply the consequences of their loss. 
Public toilets and service areas, or access to vertical circulation systems should not be


IG IX -9 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-11 
Progressive Collapse Design 
GSA Progressive Collapse Analysis and Design Guidance for New Federal Office Buildings and Major Modernization Projects 
DoD Unified Facilities Criteria -Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for Buildings 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-11 
To minimize the potential for progressive collapse, designers should understand the 
following: 
located in any non-secure areas, including the queuing area before visitor screening at the 
public entrance. 
Retail and other mixed uses, which have been encouraged in public buildings by the 
Public Buildings Cooperative Use Act of 1976, create spaces that are open and inviting. 
Although important to the public nature of the buildings, the presence of retail and other 
mixed uses may present a risk to buildings and their occupants and should be carefully 
considered on a project-specific basis during project design. 
Stairwells required for emergency egress should be located as remotely as possible from 
areas where blast events might occur and, wherever possible, should not discharge into 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Mailroom should be located away from facility main entrances areas containing critical 
services, utilities, distribution systems, and important assets. 
Progressive Collapse Design 
Progressive collapse is a situation where local failure of a primary structural component 
leads to the collapse of adjoining members, which, in turn, leads to additional collapse. 
Hence, the total damage is disproportionate to the original cause. Progressive collapse is 
a chain reaction of structural failures that follows from damage to a relatively small 
portion of a structure. Information on progressive collapse can also be found in FEMA 
427. 
Buildings should be designed with the intent of reducing the potential for progressive 
collapse as a result of an abnormal loading event, regardless of the required level of 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. �	The use of redundant lateral and vertical forces is highly encouraged. 
. �	Ductile materials are needed for both primary and secondary structural 
elements to be capable of deforming well beyond the elastic limit. 
. �	Both the primary and secondary structural elements should be designed to 
resist load reversals. 
. �	Primary structural elements should be able to resist shear failures by 
having flexural capacity greater than shear capacity. 

VISUAL IX-12 protection. 
. �	Primary structural elements are columns girders and roof beams that are 
the first items for design to prevent progressive collapse. 
. �	Secondary structural elements, such as floor beams and slabs, also may 
contribute to progressive collapse, such as by slenderizing a column due to loss of 
connections. 
. �	Primary nonstructural elements, such as ceilings and heavy suspended 
mechanical equipment contribute to casualties but not progressive collapse. 
. �	Secondary nonstructural elements, such as partitions, furniture, and light 
fixtures, like primary nonstructural elements also contribute to casualties, but not 
progressive collapse. 

Progressive Collapse Concept 
The GSA and DoD require that the structural response of a building be analyzed in a 
test that removes a key structural element (e.g., vertical load carrying column, section of 
bearing wall, beam, etc.) to simulate local damage from an explosion. If effective 
alternative load paths are available for redistributing the loads, originally supported by 
the removed structural element, the building has a low potential for progressive collapse. 
. �	If a column is lost, will the rest of the building still stand? 
. �	If an exterior beam is lost, will the rest of the building still stand? 

If the threat can get to an interior column or beam, the same questions apply.


IG IX -11 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-13 
Structural Systems -Collapse 
GSA and DoD criteria do not provide specific guidance for an engineering structural response model. 
Owner and design team should decide how much 
progressive collapse analysis and mitigation to 
incorporate into design.

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-13 
Structural System Collapse 
. �	Although these criteria provide specific guidance on which structural 
elements must be analyzed for removal from the structural design configuration, they do 
not provide specific guidance for choosing an engineering structural response model for 
verifying the effectiveness of alternate load paths. 
. �	Unless a building is being designed to meet the GSA or DOD criteria, it is 
up to the owner and the design team to decide how much progressive collapse analysis 
and mitigation to incorporate into their design. 
. �	Priority should be given to the critical elements that are essential to 
mitigating the extent of collapse. Designs for secondary structural elements should 
minimize injury and damage. 
. �	Consideration should be given to reducing damage and injury from primary 
as well as secondary nonstructural elements. 

Both GSA and DoD take a threat-independent approach to progressive collapse � it does 
not matter how big the explosive weapon is, the building will remain standing if a column 
or beam is removed. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-14 
VISUAL IX-15 
Nonstructural elements 
False ceilings, light fixtures, venetian blinds, ductwork, air conditioners, and other 
equipment may become flying debris in the event of an explosion. 
Wherever possible, it is recommended that the design be simplified to limit these hazards. 
Placing heavy equipment such as air conditioners near the floor rather than the ceiling is 
one idea; using curtains rather than Venetian blinds, and using exposed duct works as an 
architectural device are others. 
Loads and Stresses - Collapse 
Structures should be designed to resist blast loads. The DoD designates the level of blast 
protection a building must meet based on how many occupants it contains and its 
function. The demands on the structure will be equal to the combined effects of dead, live, 
and blast loads. Blast loads or dynamic rebound may occur in directions opposed to 
typical gravity loads. 
Ronan Point had a whole section of the building collapse due to one wall in one 
apartment being lost. That changed the British Code to prevent that occurrence. Khobar 
Towers was designed to the British Code, and only the fa�ade was lost. The Murrah 
Federal Building was not designed to the British Code and the loss of one column then 
affected a transfer girder due to discontinuities in columns across the lobby, resulting in 
load transfers that the building could not handle.


IG IX -13 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-16 
Good Engineering Guidelines (1) 
The following guidelines are commonly used to mitigate the effects of blast on structures 
and to mitigate the potential for progressive collapse. These guidelines are not meant to be 
complete, but are provided to assist the designer in the initial evaluation and selection of 
design approaches. For example: 
. �	Consider incorporating internal damping into the structural system to 
absorb the blast impact.  While mass has been the blast design approach in the past, using 
more ductile materials with damping is being investigated. 
. �	The use of symmetric reinforcement can increase the ultimate load 
capacity of the structure. This is especially true for load reversals on floor slabs. 
. �	Consider wire mesh in plaster to reduce the incidence of flying fragments. 
. �	Recognize that components might act in opposite directions than designed. 
. �	Lap splices must be upgraded from those found in conventional 
construction to handle the forces during a blast event. Consider interlocking "J" splices. 

VISUAL IX-17 
Good Engineering Guidelines (2) 
Additional good engineering practices include: 
. �	A practical upper level for column spacing is 30 feet, 20 feet is better. If 
the column is lost, the remaining beam must span 40 to 60 feet. Above 60 feet, the beam 
becomes unreasonably large. 
. �	In general, floor to floor heights should be minimized. Unless there is an 
overriding architectural requirement, a practical limit 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
is generally less than or equal to 16 feet. Consider bond beams, as used in seismic 
zones, to reduce the effective height of the wall. 
. �	Avoid the use of unreinforced masonry when blast is a threat. Masonry 
walls break up readily and become secondary fragments during blasts. Grout (mass) and 
reinforcement (ductility) are definitely required for blast resistance. 
. �	Using one-way wall elements adds to prevention of progressive collapse. 
Although we are seeking a building envelope with balanced blast resistance, we would like 
the framing to be the last thing to fail. 
. �	In many cases, the ductile detailing requirements for seismic design and the 
alternate load paths provided by progressive collapse design assist in the protection from 
blast. 
. �	By keeping a 6-inch stand-off from vertical load carrying members, a small 
weapons charge is less likely to shear the member. 
 �	The designer must bear in mind, however, that the design approaches are, 
at times, in conflict. These conflicts must be worked out on a case by case basis. 
 Finally, designers should note that: 
. �	Deflections around certain members, such as windows, should be 
controlled to prevent premature failure. Additional reinforcement is generally required. 
Window frame deflection must not cause premature window glazing failure and window 
frame deflection must not differ greatly from the wall deflections. Seismic pinning of 
window frames may be required. 


IG IX -15 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
	CONTENT/ACTIV
ITY 
VISUAL IX-18 
Building Materials: General 
Guidance 
. � All building materials and types acceptable under model building codes are 
allowed. 
. �	Special consideration should be given to materials that have inherent 
flexibility and that are better able to respond to load reversals (i.e., cast in place reinforced 
concrete and steel construction). 
. �	Careful detailing is required for material such as pre-stressed concrete, pre-
cast concrete, and masonry (brick and concrete masonry unit) to adequately respond to 
the design loads. Even calling out seismic connections may not be adequate as the 
workforce may not be familiar with the changes from their norm � thus detailing is very 
important. 
. �	The construction type selected must meet all performance criteria of the 
specified level of protection. 

VISUAL IX-19 
Building Envelope 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-20 
Ideally, the exterior walls need to be able to resist the loads transmitted by the windows 
and doors. It is not uncommon for bullet-resistant windows to have a higher ultimate 
capacity than the walls to which they are attached. 
Beyond ensuring a flexible failure mode, design the exterior wall to resist the pressure 
levels of the defined threat. Special reinforcing and anchors should be provided around 
blast-resistant window and door frames. 
Poured-in-place reinforced concrete will provide the highest level of protection, but 
solutions like pre-cast concrete, reinforced CMU block, and metal studs may also be 
used to achieve lower levels of protection. 
Thus, while the structural framing is the first consideration to prevent progressive 
collapse, the exterior walls are the second consideration to ensure blast pressure and 
fragmentation do not readily enter the building. 
Building Envelope � Walls (1) 
General principles: 
. �	The exterior envelope of the building is the most vulnerable to an exterior 
explosive threat because it is closest to the blast. 
. �	The exterior envelope also impacts the infiltration of CBR agents into the 
structure, but tight building construction must be done in conjunction with other actions 
to ensure some level of protection 
. �	Soil can be highly effective in reducing the impact of a major explosion by 
reducing fragmentation off walls and street furniture or directing a blast wave over a 
building. 
. �	Minimize "ornamentation" that may become flying debris in an explosion. 
This includes street furniture, overhangs, sculptures, etc. 

IG IX -17 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-21 
VISUAL IX-22 
Building Envelope � Windows (1) 
Window systems on the exterior fa�ade of a building should be designed to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying glass during an explosion event. Designs should integrate the 
features of the glass, connection of the glass to the frame (bite), and anchoring of the 
frame to the building structure to achieve a "balanced design." This means all the 
components should have compatible capacities and theoretically would all fail at the same 
pressure-pulse levels. In this way, the damage sequence and extent of damage are 
controlled. 
Ultimately, in a "balanced" design, the order of failure should be: 
. � Glass 
. � Window frame 
. � Frame anchoring 
. � Wall 
. � Building structural framing 

The pressure differences should not be large and the Level of Protection for the Design 
Basis Threat should be met. 
Building Envelope � Windows (2) 
Five types of glass are commonly used in window glazing systems: annealed glass, heat 
strengthened glass, fully thermally tempered, laminated glass, and polycarbonate. Other 
types of glass materials exist, but are not commonly used in typical commercial window 
systems. Of the five common types, annealed glass and fully thermally tempered 
glass are the type of windows for most office buildings. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Annealed glass, also known as float, plate, or sheet glass, is the most common glass 
type used in commercial construction. Annealed glass is of relatively low strength and, 
upon failure, fractures into razor sharp, dagger-shaped fragments (see slide -- the right 
photo is annealed glass failing during an actual explosive test and the left photo is a 
closeup of the shards). 
Heat strengthened glass (HS), also known as double strength glass, is used where wind 
loading starts becoming a problem.  It breaks like annealed glass. 
Fully thermally tempered glass (TTG) is typically four to five times stronger than 
annealed glass. Instead of shards, TTG breaks into pellets that can be stopped by a 
regular suit coat. 
Laminated glass is a pane with multiple glass layers and a pliable interlayer material 
(usually made from polyvinyl butyral (PVB)) between the glass layers. 
Thermoplastic polycarbonates are very strong and suitable for blast- and forced entry-
resistant window design. They are usually laminated with glass on the outside to prevent 
environmental degradation of the plastic and aid in cleaning. 
Wire-reinforced glass is a common glazing material. It consists of annealed glass with 
an embedded layer of wire mesh. It is usually used for fire resistance and as a forced 
entry barrier. It is not recommended for blast design. 
IG IX -19 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-23 
GSA Glazing Performance 
Conditions 
Table 3-1 in FEMA 426 presents six GSA glazing protection levels based on how far 
glass fragments would enter a space and potentially injure its occupants (known as a 
flight model). This slide depicts how far glass fragments could enter a structure for each 
GSA performance condition. The divide between performance conditions 3a and 3b can 
be equated to the "threshold of injury." The divide between performance conditions 4 and 
5 can be equated to the "threshold of lethality." A person standing in the room has a 
potential of being hit in the upper body/head area by glass fragments that are traveling 
fast enough to penetrate the body. 
The GSA glazing performance 
conditions shown will correlate with 
the DoD levels of protection 
presented in Table 3-2 in FEMA 
426. 
VISUAL IX-24 
Window Frames (1) 
Window frames need to retain the glass so that the entire pane does not pull out (glass 
flexes and can pull out of frame during the blast) and also should be designed to resist the 
breaking stress of the window glass. 
To retain the glass in the frame, a minimum of a 1/4-inch bead of structural sealant (i.e., 
silicone or polyvinyl butyral) should be used around the inner perimeter of the window. 
This should be done on all four sides of the window. Thus, strip windows with butt 
glazing are not good options as the bite must be large. 
The window bite (i.e., the depth of 
window captured by the frame) needs 
to be at least 1/2 inch. DoD criteria calls 
for a minimum 3/8-
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
inch bite if silicon sealant is applied, but 
calls out a 1-inch bite if no silicone 
sealant is used. Butt glazed windows 
can require even more bite with or 
without sealant. 
VISUAL IX-25 
Window Frames (2) 
The frame must not flex during the blast loading and cause the glass to pop out. 
The blast loading across the glass and frame now transfers to the frame connections to the 
building. These connections must handle the shear and tensile stresses and the bending 
moments of the connection design. 
The frame members connecting adjoining windows are referred to as mullions. These 
members may be designed using a static approach when the breaking strength of the 
window glass is applied to the mullion, or a dynamic load may be applied using the peak 
pressure and impulse values.  Since mullions only connect at the ends to the building 
structure, the mullion must handle the transferred blast loading from both adjacent 
windows. 
Other considerations for windows 
must balance the amount of light, 
energy conservation, noise 
transmission, venting of fumes, and 
emergency egress in addition to blast 
response and CBR protection. 
IG IX -21 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-26 
VISUAL IX-27 
Fragment Retention Film (FRF) (1) 
Another treatment used for mitigating the effects of an explosive attack is security 
window film. The polyester film used in commercial products is commonly referred to as 
fragment retention film (FRF), safety film, security film, protective film, or shatter-
resistant film. These films are adhered to the interior surface of the window to provide 
fragment retention and reduce the overall velocity of the glass fragments at failure. 
Fragment retention film combines a strong pressure sensitive adhesive with a tough 
polyester layer. It should be limited to use in retrofit applications due to degradation of 
the film and adhesive. Do not use for new construction. 
FRF (2) 
Fragment retention film behaves similarly to relatively thin laminated and 
polycarbonate glazing in terms of fragmentation. It is available in common thicknesses 
of 2, 4, 7, and 10 mils. Also found up to 15 mils. 
Fragment retention film improves the performance of the glass under blast loading to 
varying degrees, depending on the thickness, quality, and type of film installation. Note a 
daylight application will leave a 1/16 inch space around the edge of the FRF where water 
used to apply the FRF is squeegeed out. Daylight application of FRF to very thin glass 
can reduce the standoff distance in half for a given level of protection. The best 
performance is achieved when the film is installed into the bite of the glazing or is 
connected to the frame (mechanically or with chemical sealants). 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Fragment retention film can also 
provide solar control benefits. 
VISUAL IX-28 
Blast Curtains 
. �	Invented by the British during WWII 
. �	Can now see out of these curtains as opposed to the "blackout" curtains 
from WWII by using Kevlar or other high strength fibers 
. �	Allow venting of the blast wave while "catching" fragments 
. �	May be augmented with FRF 
. �	Connections of curtains or blast shields to building frame are critical 

VISUAL IX-29 
Catch Bar 
Increased safety for fragment retention can be obtained in the event of catastrophic failure 
from an explosive blast by placing a decorative catchbar or grillwork on the interior of the 
glazing. Note, catchbars must be mounted across the center of mass of each window pane 
(vision area of glass) to be effective. 
Catchbars are usually considered with a retrofit of fragment retention film to not only 
catch the glass, but also catch the existing window frame that may not be adequately 
connected to the wall. They can also be considered for laminated glass. 
IG IX -23 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-30 
Building Envelope � Good Window Practice 
The windows adjacent to doors allow easy access to the locking mechanism on the door. 
Fewer and smaller windows limit cost and reduce damage if failure during bomb blast 
occurs. 
Heavy duty aluminum frames have performed 
well.
VISUAL IX-31

Building Envelope - Doors 
A door system includes the door, frame, and anchorage to the building. As part of a 
balanced design approach, exterior doors in high risk buildings should be designed to 
withstand the maximum dynamic pressure and duration of the load from the design 
threat explosive blast. Other general door considerations are as follows: 
. �	Provide hollow steel doors or steel-clad doors with steel frames. 
. �	Provide blast-resistant doors for high threats and high levels of protection. 
. �	Limit normal entry/egress through one door, if possible. 
. �	Keep exterior doors to a minimum while accommodating emergency egress. 
. �	Ensure that exterior doors open outward from inhabited areas 
. �	Replace externally mounted locks and hasps with internally locking 
devices because the weakest part of a door system is the latching component. 
. �	Install doors, where practical, so that they present a blank, flush surface to 
the outside to reduce their vulnerability to 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-32 
attack. 
. �	Locate hinges on the interior or provide concealed hinges to reduce their 
vulnerability to tampering. 
. �	Install emergency exit doors so that they facilitate only exiting movement. 
. �	Equip any outward-opening double door with protective hinges and key-
operated mortise-type locks. 
. �	Provide solid doors or walls as a backup for glass doors in foyers. 

Building Envelope � Roofs 
For an explosive threat, especially for thrown explosives � satchels, hand grenades, and 
even mortars, the primary loading on the roof is downward over-pressure. The stand-off 
to the protected ceiling provides the protection. The sloped roof tends to cause the 
explosive to roll off and away from the building. For explosions at ground level, 
secondary loads include upward pressure due to the blast penetrating through openings 
and upward suction during the negative loading phase. The upward pressures may have 
an increased duration due to multiple reflections of the air blast internally. It is 
conservative to consider the downward and upward loads separately. 
The preferred system is to use poured-in-place reinforced concrete with beams in two 
directions. If this system is used, beams should have stirrups along the entire span 
spaced not greater than one half the beam depths. 
Less desirable systems include metal plate systems without concrete, and precast and 
pre/post tensioned systems. 
Precast panels are problematic because of the tendency to fail at the connections.


IG IX -25 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-33 
Mechanical system design standards address limiting damage to critical infrastructure 
and protecting building occupants against CBR threats. 
. �	Controlling access to building information, including the operation of the 
mechanical systems, should be a security priority. This information could aid a terrorist 
attack. 
. �	Finally, preventive maintenance that ensures the mechanical systems will 
work 

Pre/post tensioned systems tend to fail in a brittle manner if stressed beyond their 
elastic limit and they also are not able to accept upward loads without additional 
reinforcement. 
Many conventional roof designs will provide a suitable blast response for most buildings, 
considering minimum Design Basis Threats. The intent here is to point out what roofs 
may be a problem and why. For higher Design Basis Threats and tactics involving the 
roof, the protected ceiling and sacrificial roof concept applies. 
Mechanical Systems (1) 
The primary goal of a mechanical system after a terrorist attack should be to continue to 
operate key life safety systems. This can be accomplished by locating components in less 
vulnerable areas, limiting access to mechanical systems, and providing a reasonable 
amount of redundancy. 
Designers should consider the following: 
 �	During an interior bombing event, smoke removal and control are of 
paramount importance. The designer should consider the fact that, if window glazing is 
hardened, a blast may not blow out windows, and smoke may be trapped in the building. 
 The following suggestions attempt to protect the mechanical systems during an 
explosive blast event, have backup, or generally prevent access to utilities lines: 
. �	Do not mount plumbing, electrical fixtures, or utility lines on the inside of 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
in all required modes must be done to ensure proper functioning after an event. 
VISUAL IX-34 
Mechanical Systems (2) 
Restrict Access 
. � Rooms 
. � Closets 
. � Roofs 
. � Building information 
. � Also consider for other systems 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-34 
exterior walls, but, when this is unavoidable, mount fixtures on a separate wall at least 
6 inches from the exterior wall face. 
. �	Avoid plumbing on the roof slab. 
. �	Avoid suspending plumbing fixtures and piping from the ceiling. 
. �	Reduce the number of utility openings, manholes, tunnels, air conditioning 
ducts, filters, and access panels into the structure. 
. �	Locate utility systems away from likely areas of potential attack, such as 
loading docks, lobbies, and parking areas. 
. �	Protect building operational control areas and utility feeds to lessen the 
negative effects of a blast. 
. �	Design operational redundancies to survive all kinds of attack. 
. �	Use lockable systems for utility openings and manholes where 
appropriate. Infrequently used utility covers/manholes can be tack-welded as an 
inexpensive alternative to locking tamper-resistant covers. 

Mechanical Systems (2) 
. �	Physical security for mechanical rooms to prevent the direct introduction 
of hazardous materials into the system of ducts that distributes air to the building should 
be maintained. 
. �	Public access to building roofs should be prevented. Access to the roof 
may allow entry to the building and access to air intakes and HVAC equipment (e.g., self-
contained HVAC units, laboratory or bathroom exhausts) located on the roof. 
. �	Access to information on building operations (including mechanical, 
electrical, vertical transport, fire and life safety, security system plans and 


IG IX -27 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
schematics, and emergency 
operations procedures) should be 
strictly controlled. 
. �	To prevent widespread dispersion of a contaminant released within 
lobbies, mailrooms, and loading docks, their HVAC systems should be isolated and the 
areas maintained at a negative pressure relative to the rest of the building, but at positive 
pressure relative to the outdoors. 
. �	Large buildings usually have multiple HVAC zones, with each zone served 
by its own air handling unit and duct system. 
. �	Consider "shelter-in-place" rooms or areas where people can congregate in 
the event of an outdoor release. The goal is to create areas where outdoor air infiltration is 
very low. 

VISUAL IX-35 
Ventilation and Filtration 
Simplest to most complex in approaches to control the HVAC (heating, ventilating, and 
air conditioning) system during or after a terrorist attack. 
. �	HVAC control may not be appropriate in all emergency situations. 
Protection from CBR attacks depends upon the design and operation of the HVAC 
system and the nature of the CBR agent release. 
. �	Ducted returns offer limited access points to introduce a CBR agent. The 
return vents can be placed in conspicuous locations, reducing the risk of an agent being 
secretly introduced into the return system. 
. �	A rapid response, such as shutting down an HVAC system, may involve 
closing various dampers, especially those controlling the flow of outdoor air (in the event 
of an exterior CBR release). 
. �	Consideration should be given to installing low leakage dampers to 

Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
minimize this flow pathway. 
VISUAL IX-36 
Emergency Plans 
All buildings should have current emergency plans to address fire, weather, and other 
types of emergencies. 
In light of past U.S. experiences with anthrax and similar threats, these plans should be 
updated to consider CBR attack scenarios and the associated procedures. Emergency 
plans should have procedures for communicating instructions to building occupants, 
identifying suitable shelter-in-place areas (if they exist), identifying appropriate use and 
selection of personal protective equipment (i.e., clothing, gloves, respirators), and 
directing emergency evacuations. 
Building design should be able to ensure 
the optimal operation of the emergency 
plans. The emergency plans should not 
default to only what can be done after 
the building is constructed. In other 
words, like security and homeland 
defense, emergency planning should be 
an up-front design consideration that 
gets incorporated into the planning, 
budgeting, and design of the building. 
IG IX -29 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-37 
VISUAL IX-38 
VISUAL IX-39 
Maintenance, Administration, and Training (1) 
In all cases, the HVAC Maintenance Staff must receive training in how the upgraded 
mechanical systems are designed to work, how they should be operated, and how they 
should be maintained and tested. 
Maintenance, Administration, and Training (2) 
. �	Training should be conducted 
. �	Plans should be tested 

Building Electrical Systems 
The major security functions of the electrical system are to maintain power to essential 
building services, especially those required for life safety and evacuation; provide lighting 
and surveillance to deter criminal activities; and provide emergency communications. 
Designers should consider the following recommendations for buildings requiring high 
security: 
�	Emergency and normal electric panels, conduits, and switchgear should be installed 
separately, at different locations, 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
and as far apart as possible. 
. �	Emergency generators should be located away from loading docks, 
entrances, and parking. 
. �	Fuel tanks should be mounted near the generator, given the same 
protection as the emergency generator, and sized to store an appropriate amount of fuel. 
. �	Conduits and lines should be installed outside to allow a trailer-mounted 
generator to connect to the building�s electrical system. 
. �	Site lighting should be coordinated with the CCTV system. 
. �	Emergency power should be provided for emergency lighting in restrooms. 
. �	Building access points should be illuminated to aid in threat detection. 
. �	Self-contained battery lighting will be in stairwells and for exit signs. 
. �	Suspending electrical conduits from the ceiling should be avoided. 
. �	Adequate lighting of perimeters and parking areas should be provided to 
aid in visual surveillance and to support the use of physical security systems. 

VISUAL IX-40 
Fire Protection Systems 
The fire protection system inside the building should maintain life safety protection after 
an incident and allow for safe evacuation of the building when appropriate. To enhance 
the performance of fire protection systems, especially in the case of an explosive blast, 
the designer should consider the following: 
. �	The fire protection water system should be protected from single-point 
failure in case of a blast event � maintain 50-foot separation from high risk areas (loading 
dock, lobby, etc.) 
. �	To increase the reliability of the fire 


IG IX -31 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-41 
protection system in strategic locations, a 
dual pump arrangement should be 
considered, with one electric pump and 
one diesel pump. 
. �	The pumps should be located away from each other. 
. �	All security locking arrangements on doors used for egress must comply 
with requirements of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 101, Life Safety 
Code. 

Communications Systems 
For buildings requiring greater protection, the designer should consider the following: 
Redundant communications. The facility could have a second telephone service to 
maintain communications in case of an incident. A base radio communication system with 
an antenna should be installed in the stairwell, and portable sets distributed on floors. 
This is the preferred alternative. 
Radio telemetry. Distributed antennas could be located throughout the facility if 
required for emergency communications through wireless transmission of data. 
Alarm and information systems. Alarm and information systems should not be 
collected and mounted in a single conduit, or even collocated. Circuits to various parts of 
the building should be installed in at least two directions and/or risers. 
Empty conduits. Empty conduits and power outlets can be provided for future 
installation of security control equipment. 
Mass notification. All inhabited buildings should have a timely means to notify 
occupants of threats and give instructions as to responses. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-42 
Chapter 3 of FEMA 426 is not a design guide for Electronic Security Systems (ESS). The 
following criteria are only intended to stress those concepts and practices that warrant 
special attention to enhance public safety. Consult design guides pertinent to the specific 
project for detailed information about electronic security. A description of Electronic 
Security Systems is provided in 
Appendix D of FEMA 426. 
For control centers and building management systems, designers should consider the 
following: 
. �	The Operational Control Center (OCC), Fire Command Center (FCC), and 
Security Control Center (SCC) may be collocated. If collocated, the chain of command 
should be carefully preplanned to ensure the most qualified leadership is in control for 
specific types of events. Secure information links should be provided between the OCC, 
FCC, and SCC. 
. �	A Backup Control Center (BCC) should be provided in a different 
location, such 

Electronic Security Systems 
The purpose of electronic security is to improve the reliability and effectiveness of life 
safety systems, security systems, and building functions. When possible, 
accommodations should be made for future developments in security systems. 
Electronic security, including surveillance, intrusion detection, and screening, is a key 
element of facility protection. Many aspects of electronic security and the posting of 
security personnel have been adequately dealt with in other criteria and guideline 
documents. These criteria primarily address access control design, including stair and 
lobby design, because access control must be considered when design concepts for a 
building are first conceived. Although fewer options are available for modernization 
projects, some designs can be altered to consider future access control objectives. 
IG IX -33 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
as a manager's or engineer's office. If feasible, an off-site location should be 
considered. 
. �	A fully redundant BCC should be installed (this is an alternative to the 
above). 
. �	Basic intrusion detection devices should be provided: magnetic reed 
switches for interior doors and openings, glass break sensors for windows up to scalable 
heights, and balanced magnetic contact switch sets for all exterior doors, including 
overhead/roll-up doors. Roof intrusion detection should be reviewed. 
. �	Monitoring should be at an off-site facility. 
. �	An on-site monitoring center should be used during normal business hours 
and be operational 24 hours. 
. �	A Color CCTV surveillance system with recording capability should be 
provided to view and record activity at the perimeter of the building, particularly at 
primary entrances and exits. 

VISUAL IX-43 
Entry Control Stations 
Entry control stations should be provided at main perimeter entrances of the building 
where security personnel are present (see Figure 3-12 of FEMA 426). In addition, entry 
control stations should be located close to the perimeter entrance to permit people inside 
the entry control station to maintain constant surveillance over the entrance and its 
approaches. Note that many of the considerations for entry control stations listed here 
are appropriate for Site and Layout Design as discussed in Chapter 2 of FEMA 426. 
Additional considerations at entry control stations include: 
�	A holding area for unauthorized vehicles 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
or those needing further inspection should be established. A turnaround area should be 
provided so that traffic is not impeded. This area should not be near the building 
(s) being protected. 
. �	Control measures such as displaying a decal on the window or having a 
specially marked vehicle should be established. 
. �	Entry control stations that are manned 24 hours each day should have 
interior and exterior lighting, interior heating (where appropriate), and a sufficient glassed 
area to afford adequate observation for people inside. 
. �	Signs should be erected to assist in controlling authorized entry, to deter 
unauthorized entry, and to preclude accidental entry. 
. �	The size and coloring of a sign, its letters, and the interval of posting must 
be appropriate to each situation. 
. �	Entry control stations should be hardened against attacks according to the 
type of threat. The methods of hardening may include: 
. �	Reinforced concrete or masonry 
. �	Steel plating 
. �	Bullet-resistant glass 
. �	Commercially fabricated, bullet-resistant building components or 
assemblies 

IG IX -35 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-44 
Direct students to Table 2-1 in FEMA 426. VISUAL IX-45 
Practical Applications 
What can be done with a reasonable level of effort? 
There is a range of FEMA 426 mitigation efforts at a range of cost. Consult Table 2-1 
of FEMA 426 to understand the benefit of various mitigation efforts against a range of 
terrorist tactics. 
Desired Building Protection Level 
The assessment process described to this point should determine the level of protection 
sought for the building structure for the threat/hazard specific to the facility. Explosive 
blast threats usually govern building structural design for high risk buildings. 
Some design approaches are threat independent, such as progressive collapse as we will 
see in the next slides. In every case, seek to include a balance between all the different 
requirements to include in design. 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL IX-46 
VISUAL IX-47 
Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit IX Case Study activity in the Student Manual, 
and the vulnerability portfolio. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 
At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Summary 
To summarize: 
This course will provide a foundation for a systematic approach to assessing the 
vulnerabilities of your facilities to manmade hazards. 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can provide an 
excellent framework for the identification of mitigation options that will � over time � 
significantly reduce the vulnerability of your facility to manmade hazards. 
Student Activity 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment. 
The checklist includes questions that determine if critical systems will continue to 
function to enhance deterrence, detection, denial, and damage limitation, and emergency 
systems function during a threat or hazard situation. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Continue working is small groups. 
. �	Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most 
knowledgeable and qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. 
. �	Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS portfolio to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify 


IG IX -37 
Unit IX: Building Design Guidance 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Many sections of the checklist are annotated "Unknown without a more detailed on-site 
assessment". As students review the Case Study materials and complete the checklist, in 
most cases, the "70 percent" solution is found without having to conduct the on-site 
assessment. 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 
Take 45 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
Unit X will cover Electronic Security Systems. 
UNIT IX CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: BUILDING DESIGN GUIDANCE 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon providing a balanced building envelope that is a 
defensive layer against the terrorist tactic of interest and avoiding situations where one 
incident affects more than one building system. The Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary 
building design vulnerability assessment. 
Requirement 
Assign sections of the checklist to the group member who is most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the HIC Case Study 
and to the vulnerability portfolio to determine answers to the questions.  Then review 
results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist that address building design. 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk 
ratings determined in Unit V Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed 
analysis, decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
building design. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Sectio
n 
Vulnerability 
Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
2.5 
Do entrances avoid 
significant queuing? 
If queuing will occur within the 
building footprint, the area 
should be enclosed in blast-
resistant construction. If queuing 
is expected outside the building, 
a rain cover should be provided. 
For manpower and equipment 
requirements, collocate or 
combine staff and visitor 
entrances. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.6 
Does security screening 
cover all public and 
private areas? Are public 
and private activities 
separated? 
Retail activities should be 
prohibited in non-secured areas. 
However, the Public Building 
Cooperative Use Act of 1976 
encourages retail and mixed uses 
to create open and inviting 
buildings. Consider separating 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


IG IX -39 IG IX -41 IG IX -43 IG IX -45 IG IX -47 IG IX -49 IG IX -51 IG IX -53 IG IX -55 IG IX 
-57 IG IX -59 IG IX -61 IG IX -63 IG IX -65 IG IX -67 IG IX -69 IG IX -71 IG IX -73 IG IX -75 

Are public toilets, service 
spaces, or access to stairs 
or elevators located in any 
non-secure areas, 
including the queuing area 
before screening at the 
public entrance? 
entryways, controlling access, 
hardening shared partitions, and 
special security operational 
countermeasures. References:  
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 

2.7 
Is access control provided 
through main entrance 
points for employees and 
visitors? (lobby 
receptionist, sign-
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Within HIC, access 
control, lobby 
receptionist, sign-in, 
staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, 
checking forms of 

in, staff escorts, issue of 
visitor badges, checking 
forms of personal 
identification, electronic 
access control systems) 

personal 
identification, and 
electronic access 
control systems are 
all present. 



Access control at 



other companies 



within the complex 



is unknown. 
2.8 
Is access to private and 
public space or restricted 
area space clearly defined 
through the design of the 
space, signage, use of 
Finishes and signage should be 
designed for visual simplicity. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The building is 
monitored by door 
and window alarms, 
which connect to 
ADT, the nationwide 
alarm company. 

electronic security 
devices, etc.? 

Unauthorized 
opening of any door 
or window will 



immediately notify 



ADT via telephone. 



ADT will normally 



call the HIC Security 



Office prior to 



contacting the police 



and DPS. HIC 



employees have 



proximity cards to 



allow them to enter 



the front and loading 



dock doors without 



activating the alarm. 



The innermost layer 



of physical security 



involves the 



Computer Data 



Center and the 



Communications 



Center. Equipped 




with locked doors, 
these two rooms 
meet the 
government�s 
requirements for 
handling classified 
material. Only 
authorized employees 
possess the necessary 
proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access 
2.9 
Is access to elevators 
distinguished as to those 
that are designated only 
for employees and 
visitors? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
No elevators in HIC. 
2.10 
Do public and employee 
entrances include space 
for possible future 
installation of access 
control and screening 
equipment? 
These include walk-through metal 
detectors and x-ray devices, 
identification check, electronic 
access card, search stations, and 
turnstiles. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Yes, lobby area 
within HIC facility 
could accommodate 
space-saving 
screening equipment. 
Interior office space 
also has adequate 
room for such 
equipment. 
2.11 
Do foyers have reinforced 
concrete walls and offset 
interior and exterior doors 
from each other? 
Consider for exterior entrances to 
the building or to access critical 
areas within the building if 
explosive blast hazard must be 
mitigated. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. Windows 
are double glazed, 
1/4 inch thick 
annealed glass. The 
construction of 
interior walls is 
unknown. 
2.12 
Do doors and walls along 
the line of security 
screening meet 
requirements of UL752 
"Standard for Safety: 
Bullet-Resisting 
Equipment"? 
If the postulated threat in 
designing entrance access control 
includes rifles, pistols, or 
shotguns, then the screening area 
should have bullet-resistance to 
protect security personnel and 
uninvolved bystanders. Glass, if 
present, should also be bullet-
resistant. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

2.13 
Do circulation routes have 
unobstructed views of 
people approaching 
controlled access points? 
This applies to building entrances 
and to critical areas within the 
building. References: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide and DoD UFC 4-010-01 
Yes. 
2.14 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.15 
Are critical assets 
Critical building components 
Electrical service is 

(people, activities, 
building systems and 
components) located 
close to any main 
include: Emergency generator 
including fuel systems, day tank, 
fire sprinkler, and water supply; 
Normal fuel storage; Main 
switchgear; Telephone 
provided through 
two buried 
transmission lines 
from two separate 
transformers outside 

entrance, vehicle 
circulation, parking, 
maintenance area, loading 
dock, or interior parking? 
distribution and main switchgear; 
Fire pumps; Building control 
centers; Uninterruptible Power 
Supply (UPS) systems 
controlling critical functions; 
Main 
the building. 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single 
diesel generator, 
located in a shed in 


refrigeration and ventilation 
the rear parking lot. 

Are the critical building 
systems and components 
hardened? 
systems if critical to building 
operation; Elevator machinery and 
controls; Shafts for stairs, 
elevators, and utilities; Critical 
The generator has a 
50 gallon day tank, 
maintained at 80 
percent capacity. The 


distribution feeders for 
2,000-gallon main 


emergency power. Evacuation 
tank is buried under 


and rescue require emergency 
the parking lot, near 


systems to remain operational 
the generator. 


during a disaster and they should 



be located away from attack 
The diesel generator 


locations. Primary and backup 
is configured to 


systems should be separated to 
automatically start 


reduce the risk of both being 
upon loss of 


impacted by a single incident if 
commercial power to 


collocated.  Utility systems 
the Computer Center 


should be located at least 50 feet 
Bus. This happens 


from loading docks, front 
about twice a year 


entrances, and parking areas. 
due to electrical 



storms or utility 


One way to harden critical 
maintenance in the 


building systems and components 
neighborhood. The 


is to enclose them within 
backup diesel 


hardened walls, floors, and 
generator has never 


ceilings. Do not place them near 
had to support HIC�s 


high-risk areas where they can 
power demands for 


receive collateral damage. 
longer than about 2 


Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
hours, and never 
with 



more than one chiller 



operating. It has 



never been tested for 



an extended period 




under heavy load. 



The batteries to 



support the UPS are 



in a small room next 



to the UPS room. 



Heating for the HIC 



building is provided 



by a combination of 



natural gas and 



electricity. This 



provides a regulated 



environment for the 



sensitive computer 



and communications 



equipment, and a 



comfortable 



environment for 



employees. 



Natural gas enters 



the building through 



two meters under the 



loading dock 



staircase and goes 



through the overhead 



to the mechanical 



and electrical 



(M&E) room at the 



building�s southwest 



corner. Branches 



split off for two gas 



powered space 



heaters in the high-



bay area by the 



loading dock. The 



main gas line goes to 



the main heater in 



the M&E room. 
2.16 
Are high-value or critical 
assets located as far into 
the interior of the building 
as possible and separated 
from the public areas of 
the building? 
Critical assets, such as people and 
activities, are more vulnerable to 
hazards when on an exterior 
building wall or adjacent to 
uncontrolled public areas inside 
the building. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
People are located 
along the exterior 
wall at the front of 
the building. The 
secure space has the 
best interior space 
location � not on an 
exterior wall, as does 



the conference room. 



The office space acts 
as the buffer between 



the critical functions 



in the back and the 




public area of the 
building at the main 
entrance. 
2.17 
Is high visitor activity 
away from critical assets? 
High-risk activities should also 
be separated from low-risk 
activities. Also, visitor activities 
should be separated from daily 
activities. Reference: USAF 
Installation Force Protection 
Guide 
All visitors enter 
through a common 
front entrance. Once 
admitted to the site, 
visitor activity is 
n/a. 
2.18 
Are critical assets located 
in spaces that are 
occupied 24 hours per 
day? Are assets located in 
areas where they are 
visible to more than one 
person? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.19 
Are loading docks and 
receiving and shipping 
areas separated in any 
direction from utility 
rooms, utility mains, and 
service entrances, 
including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire 
detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water 
mains, cooling and heating 
mains, etc.? 
Loading docks should be 
designed to keep vehicles from 
driving into or parking under the 
building. If loading docks are in 
close proximity to critical 
equipment, consider hardening 
the equipment and service against 
explosive blast. Consider a 50-
foot separation distance in all 
directions. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 
No, the loading dock 
connects directly into 
interior space, critical 
functions, and 
infrastructure. 
2.20 
Are mailrooms located 
away from building main 
entrances, areas 
containing critical 
services, utilities, 
distribution systems, and 
important assets? Is the 
mailroom located near the 
loading dock? 
The mailroom should be located 
at the perimeter of the building 
with an outside wall or window 
designed for pressure relief. By 
separating the mailroom and the 
loading dock, the collateral 
damage of an incident at one has 
less impact upon the other. 
However, this may be the 
preferred mailroom location. Off-
site screening stations or a 
separate delivery processing 
building on site may be cost-
effective, particularly if several 
buildings may share one 
mailroom. A separate delivery 
processing building reduces risk 
and simplifies protection 
HIC has no mail 
room. Incoming mail 
is normally 
processed by the 
receptionist inside 
the front door. Large 
packages are 
delivered to the 
loading dock. 



measures. Reference: GSA PBS-
P100 

2.21 
Does the mailroom have 
adequate space available 
for equipment to examine 
incoming packages and for 
an explosive disposal 
container? 
Screening of all deliveries to the 
building, including U.S. mail, 
commercial package delivery 
services, delivery of office 
supplies, etc. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
HIC has no mail 
room. 
2.22 
Are areas of refuge 
identified, with special 
consideration given to 
egress? 
Areas of refuge can be safe 
havens, shelters, or protected 
spaces for use during specified 
hazards. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Yes, the Computer 
Data Center and the 
large conference 
room. 
2.23 
Are stairwells required for 
emergency egress located 
as remotely as possible 
from high-risk areas 
where blast events might 
occur? Are stairways 
maintained with positive 
pressure or are there other 
smoke control systems? 
Consider designing stairs so that 
they discharge into other than 
lobbies, parking, or loading areas. 
Maintaining positive pressure 
from a clean source of air (may 
require special filtering) aids in 
egress by keeping smoke, heat, 
toxic fumes, etc. out of the 
stairway. Pressurize exit stairways 
in accordance with the National 
Model Building Code. 
References:  GSA PBS-P100 and 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
Emergency stairwells 
are located far from 
main stairwells. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.24 
Are enclosures for 
emergency egress 
hardened to limit the 
extent of debris that might 
otherwise impede safe 
passage and reduce the 
flow of evacuees? 
Egress pathways should be 
hardened and discharge into safe 
areas. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.25 
Do interior barriers 
differentiate level of 
security within a 
building? 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Electronic controls 
exist in the form of 
alarms, door locks, 
proximity cards, and 
use of PIN numbers 
for room/area access. 
2.26 
Are emergency systems 
located away from high-
risk areas? 
The intent is to keep the 
emergency systems out of harm�s 
way, such that one incident takes 
out all capability � both the 
regular systems and their 
backups. Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Emergency stairwells 
are located far from 
main stairwells. 
Emergency/backup 
generators are located 
away from main 
power supply lines; 
UPS is located 
inside the building�s 
high bay area; exit 




doors are located 



throughout the site; 



natural gas enters the 



building under the 



loading dock 



stairwell. 
2.27 
Is interior glazing near 
high-threat areas 
minimized? Is interior 
glazing in other areas 
shatter-resistant? 
Interior glazing should be 
minimized where a threat exists 
and should be avoided in 
enclosures of critical functions 
next to high-risk areas. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
2.28 
Are ceiling and lighting 
systems designed to 
remain in place during 
hazard events? 
When an explosive blast shatters 
a window, the blast wave enters 
the interior space, putting 
structural and nonstructural 
building components under loads 
not considered in standard 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


building codes. It has been shown 
that connection criteria for these 



systems in high seismic activity 
areas resulted in much less falling 
debris that could injure building 



occupants. 



Mount all overhead utilities and 



other fixtures weighing 14 
kilograms (31 pounds) or more to 
minimize the likelihood that they 
will fall and injure building 
occupants. Design all equipment 
mountings to resist forces of 0.5 
times the equipment weight in 
any direction and 1.5 times the 
equipment weight in the 
downward direction. This 



standard does not preclude the 
need to design equipment 
mountings for forces required by 
other criteria, such as seismic 



standards. 



Reference: DoD Minimum 



Antiterrorism Standards for 



Buildings 


3 
Structural Systems 


3.1 
What type of construction? 
What type of concrete and 
reinforcing steel? 
The type of construction provides 
an indication of the robustness to 
abnormal loading and load 
reversals. A reinforced concrete 
moment-resisting frame provides 
Located in a 
suburban office 
complex, the HIC 
office building 
comprises a 22,000 


What type of steel? What 
type of foundation? 
greater ductility and redundancy 
than a flat-slab or flat-plate 
construction. The ductility of 
steel frame with metal deck 
depends on the connection details 
and pre-tensioned or post-
tensioned construction provides 
little capacity for abnormal 
loading patterns and load 
reversals. The resistance of load-
bearing wall structures varies to a 
great extent, depending on 
whether the walls are reinforced or 
un-reinforced. A rapid screening 
process developed by FEMA for 
assessing structural hazards 
identifies the following types of 
construction with a structural 
score ranging from 1.0 to 8.5. A 
higher score indicates a greater 
capacity to sustain load reversals. 
Wood buildings of all types - 4.5 
to 8.5 Steel moment-resisting 
frames -3.5 to 4.5 Braced steel 
frames - 2.5 to 3.0 Light metal 
buildings - 5.5 to 6.5 Steel 
frames with cast-in-place concrete 
shear walls - 3.5 to 4.5 Steel 
frames with unreinforced masonry 
infill walls - 1.5 to 3.0 Concrete 
moment-resisting frames - 2.0 to 
4.0 Concrete shear wall buildings 
-3.0 to 4.0 Concrete frames with 
unreinforced masonry infill walls 
- 1.5 to 3.0 Tilt-up buildings - 
2.0 to 3.5 Precast concrete frame 
buildings -1.5 to 2.5 Reinforced 
masonry - 3.0 to 4.0 Unreinforced 
masonry - 1.0 to 2.5 References: 
FEMA 154 and Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
square foot main 
floor for offices and 
computers, and a 
3,300 square foot 
executive mezzanine 
(a second floor over 
part of the office). 
The building that 
houses the 
Hazardville 
Information 
Company (HIC) is 
an office building of 
standard 
construction. The 
walls are made of 
CMU with a brick 
veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. The roof 
is a metal deck with 
gravel on top and 
insulation 
underneath. It is 
slightly angled to 
allow water to drain. 
The roof overhangs 
the front entrance by 
8 feet. This provides 
a covered area for 
employees to stay 
dry on rainy days. 
Cylindrical columns 
support the 
overhang. Windows 
are double glazed, 
1/4 inch thick 
annealed glass. 
3.2 
Do the reinforced concrete 
structures contain 
symmetric steel 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reinforcement (positive and 



negative faces) in all floor 



slabs, roof slabs, walls, 



beams and girders that may 



be subjected to rebound, 



uplift and suction 
pressures? 



Do the lap splices fully 



develop the capacity of the 



reinforcement? 



Are lap splices and other 



discontinuities staggered? 



Do the connections possess 



ductile details? 



Is special shear 



reinforcement, including 



ties and stirrups, available 



to allow large post-elastic 



behavior? 


3.3 
Are the steel frame 
connections moment 
connections? Is the column 
spacing minimized so that 
reasonably sized members 
will resist the design loads 
and increase the redundancy 
of the system? 
A practical upper level for column 
spacing is generally 30 feet. 
Unless there is an overriding 
architectural requirement, a 
practical limit for floor-to-floor 
heights is generally less than or 
equal to 16 feet. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

What are the floor-to-floor 



heights? 


3.4 
Are critical elements 
vulnerable to failure? 
The priority for upgrades should 
be based on the relative 
importance of structural or non-
structural elements that are 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


essential to mitigating the extent 
of collapse and minimizing injury 
and damage. 



Primary Structural Elements 
provide the essential parts of the 
building�s resistance to 
catastrophic blast loads and 




progressive collapse. These 



include columns, girders, roof 



beams, and the main lateral 



resistance system. 



Secondary Structural Elements 



consist of all other load bearing 



members, such as floor beams, 



slabs, etc. 



Primary Nonstructural Elements 



consist of elements (including 



their attachments) which are 



essential for life safety systems or 



elements which can cause 



substantial injury if failure 
occurs, 



including ceilings or heavy 



suspended mechanical units. 



Secondary Nonstructural 



Elements consist of all elements 



not covered in primary 



nonstructural elements, such as 



partitions, furniture, and light 



fixtures. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.5 
Will the structure suffer an 
The extent of damage to the 
The standard 

unacceptable level of 
damage resulting from the 
postulated threat (blast 
loading or weapon impact)? 
structure and exterior wall 
systems from the bomb threat 
may be related to a protection 
level. The following is for new 
buildings: 
construction 
techniques used to 
build the site HIC 
occupies do not 
create buildings that 


Level of Protection Below 
Antiterrorism Standards � Severe 
damage. Frame collapse/massive 
destruction. Little left standing. 
withstand explosive 
blasts. Terrorist 
threat was not a part 
of design 
consideration. 


Doors and windows fail and 
result 



in lethal hazards. Majority of 



personnel suffer fatalities. 



Very Low Level Protection � 



Heavy damage. Onset of 



structural collapse. Major 



deformation of primary and 



secondary structural members, 



but progressive collapse is 



unlikely. Collapse of non-



structural elements. Glazing will 



break and is likely to be propelled 



into the building, resulting in 



serious glazing fragment injuries, 



but fragments will be reduced. 



Doors may be propelled into 




rooms, presenting serious 



hazards. Majority of personnel 



suffer serious injuries. There are 



likely to be a limited number (10 



percent to 25 percent) of 



fatalities. 



Low Level of Protection � 



Moderate damage, unrepairable. 



Major deformation of non-



structural elements and secondary 



structural members and minor 



deformation of primary structural 



members, but progressive 



collapse is unlikely. Glazing will 



break, but fall within 1 meter of 



the wall or otherwise not present 



a significant fragment hazard. 



Doors may fail, but they will 



rebound out of their frames, 



presenting minimal hazards. 



Majority of personnel suffer 



significant injuries. There may be 



a few (<10 percent) fatalities. 



Medium Level Protection � 



Minor damage, repairable. Minor 



deformations of non-structural 



elements and secondary structural 



members and no permanent 



deformation in primary structural 



members. Glazing will break, but 



will remain in the window frame. 



Doors will stay in frames, but 
will 



not be reusable. Some minor 



injuries, but fatalities are 
unlikely. 



High Level Protection � Minimal 



damage, repairable. No 



permanent deformation of 



primary and secondary structural 



members or non-structural 



elements. Glazing will not break. 



Doors will be reusable. Only 



superficial injuries are likely. 



Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 

3.6 
Is the structure vulnerable 
to 
Design to mitigate progressive 
Unknown without a 

progressive collapse? 
collapse is an independent 
analysis to determine a system�s 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Is the building capable of 
sustaining the removal of a 
column for one floor above 
ability to resist structural collapse 
upon the loss of a major 
structural element or the system�s 
ability to resist the loss of a 
major 



grade at the building 
perimeter without 
progressive collapse? In the 
event of an internal 
explosion in an uncontrolled 
public ground floor area 
does the design prevent 
progressive collapse due to 
the loss of one primary 
column? Do architectural or 
structural features provide a 
minimum 6-inch standoff to 
the internal columns 
(primary vertical load 
carrying members)? Are the 
columns in the unscreened 
internal spaces designed for 
an unbraced length equal to 
two floors, or three floors 
where there are two levels 
of parking? 
structural element. Design to 
mitigate progressive collapse may 
be based on the methods outlined 
in ASCE 7-98 (now 7-02). 
Designers may apply static and/or 
dynamic methods of analysis to 
meet this requirement and 
ultimate load capacities may be 
assumed in the analyses. 
Combine structural upgrades for 
retrofits to existing buildings, 
such as seismic and progressive 
collapse, into a single project due 
to the economic synergies and 
other cross benefits. Existing 
facilities may be retrofitted to 
withstand the design level threat 
or to accept the loss of a column 
for one floor above grade at the 
building perimeter without 
progressive collapse. Note that 
collapse of floors or roof must 
not be permitted. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.7 
Are there adequate 
redundant load paths in the 
structure? 
Special consideration should be 
given to materials that have 
inherent ductility and that are 
better able to respond to load 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


reversals, such as cast in place 



reinforced concrete, reinforced 



masonry, and steel construction. 
Careful detailing is required for 



material such as pre-stressed 



concrete, pre-cast concrete, and 



masonry to adequately respond to 



the design loads. Primary vertical 
load carrying members should be 



protected where parking is inside 



a facility and the building 



superstructure is supported by the 



parking structure. 



Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

3.8 
Are there transfer girders 
supported by columns 
within unscreened public 
spaces or at the exterior of 
Transfer girders allow 
discontinuities in columns 
between the roof and foundation. 
This design has inherent 
difficulty in transferring load to 
redundant 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


the building? 
paths upon loss of a column or 
the girder. Transfer beams and 
girders that, if lost, may cause 
progressive collapse are highly 
discouraged. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

3.9 
What is the grouting and 
reinforcement of masonry 
(brick and/or concrete 
masonry unit (CMU)) 
exterior walls? 
Avoid unreinforced masonry 
exterior walls. Reinforcement can 
run the range of light to heavy, 
depending upon the stand-off 
distance available and postulated 
design threat. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 recommends fully 
grouted and reinforced CMU 
construction where CMU is 
selected. Reference: DoD 
Minimum Antiterrorism 
Standards for Buildings states 
"Unreinforced masonry walls are 
prohibited for the exterior walls 
of new buildings. A minimum of 
0.05 percent vertical 
reinforcement with a maximum 
spacing of 1,200 mm (48 in) will 
be provided. For existing 
buildings, implement mitigating 
measures to provide an equivalent 
level of protection." [This is light 
reinforcement and based upon the 
recommended stand-off distance 
for the situation.] 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
3.10 
Will the loading dock design 
limit damage to adjacent 
areas and vent explosive 
force to the exterior of the 
building? 
Design the floor of the loading 
dock for blast resistance if the 
area below is occupied or contains 
critical utilities. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
No. 
3.11 
Are mailrooms, where 
packages are received and 
opened for inspection, and 
unscreened retail spaces 
designed to mitigate the 
effects of a blast on primary 
vertical or lateral bracing 
members? 
Where mailrooms and unscreened 
retail spaces are located in 
occupied areas or adjacent to 
critical utilities, walls, ceilings, 
and floors, they should be blast-
and fragment- resistant. Methods 
to facilitate the venting of 
explosive forces and gases from 
the interior spaces to the outside 
of the structure may include 
blow-out panels and window 
system designs that provide 
protection from blast pressure 
applied to the outside, 
There is no mail 
room at this facility. 

4 
Building Envelope 


4.1 
What is the designed or 
estimated protection level of 
the exterior walls against the 
postulated explosive threat? 
The performance of the fa�ade 
varies to a great extent on the 
materials. Different construction 
includes brick or stone with block 
backup, steel stud walls, precast 
panels, or curtain wall with glass, 
stone, or metal panel elements. 
Shear walls that are essential to 
the lateral and vertical load 
The exterior walls are 
made of CMU with a 
brick veneer on the 
outside. Steel 
framework supports 
the structure, and 
exposed columns are 
enclosed in gypsum 
wallboard. 


bearing system and that also 
function as exterior walls should 
Windows are double 


be considered primary structures 
and should resist the actual blast 
loads predicted from the threats 
specified. Where exterior walls are 
not designed for the full design 
loads, special consideration 
should be given to construction 
types that reduce the potential for 
injury. Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
glazed, 1/4 inch 
thick annealed glass. 
The construction of 
interior walls is 
unknown. The level 
of protection 
provided by the 
buildings structure 
depends upon the 
blast exposure. 
4.2 
Is there less than 40 % 
The performance of the glass will 
Windows are only 

fenestration openings per 
structural bay? 
similarly depend on the materials. 
Glazing may be single pane or 
double pane, monolithic or 
used in the office 
space area of the 
building. While 

Is the window system 
laminated, annealed, heat 
strengthened or fully tempered. 
dimensions are not 
given, it looks like 

design on the exterior fa�ade 
balanced to mitigate the 
hazardous effects of flying 
glazing following an 
explosive event? 
The percent fenestration is a 
balance between protection level, 
cost, the architectural look of the 
building within its surroundings, 
and building codes. One goal is 
to keep fenestration to below 40 
the glass is at least 
40 percent of the 
wall area between 
building structural 
columns. The 
window system is a 

(glazing, frames, anchorage 
to supporting walls, etc.) 
percent of the building envelope 
vertical surface area, but the 
process must balance differing 
standard commercial 
installation and thus, 
the glass, framing, 

Do the glazing systems with 
a 1/2-inch (3/4-inch better) 
requirements. A blast engineer 
may prefer no windows; an 
architect may favor window 
and anchorage is 
expected to be 
insufficient for the 

bite contain an application 
of structural silicone? 
curtain walls; building codes 
require so much fenestration per 
square footage of floor area; fire 
design basis threat at 
the available 
standoff. One benefit 

Is the glazing laminated or is 
it protected with an anti-
codes require a prescribed window 
opening area if the window is a 
designated escape 
is that there are 
windows only on 
two sides of the 

shatter (fragment retention) 
film? 
route; and the building owner has 
cost concerns. Ideally, an owner 
would want 100 
building. 

If an anti-shatter film is 
used, is it a minimum of a 
percent of the glazed area to 
provide the design protection 
level against the postulated 



7-mil thick film, or specially 
manufactured 4mil thick 
film? 
explosive threat (design basis 
threat� weapon size at the 
expected stand-off distance). 
However, economics and 
geometry may allow 80 percent to 
90 percent due to the statistical 
differences in the manufacturing 
process for glass or the angle of 
incidence of the blast wave upon 
upper story windows (4th floor 
and higher). Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 

4.3 
Do the walls, anchorage, and 
window framing fully 
develop the capacity of the 
glazing material selected? 
Are the walls capable of 
withstanding the dynamic 
reactions from the 
windows? Will the 
anchorage remain attached 
to the walls of the building 
during an explosive event 
without failure? Is the 
fa�ade connected to back-up 
block or to the structural 
frame? 
Government produced and 
sponsored computer programs 
coupled with test data and 
recognized dynamic structural 
analysis techniques may be used 
to determine whether the glazing 
either survives the specified 
threats or the post damage 
performance of the glazing 
protects the occupants. A 
breakage probability no higher 
than 750 breaks per 1,000 may be 
used when calculating loads to 
frames and anchorage. The intent 
is to ensure the building envelope 
provides relatively equal 
protection against the postulated 
explosive threat for the walls and 
window systems for the safety of 
the occupants, especially in 
rooms with exterior walls. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Are non-bearing masonry 
walls reinforced? 


4.4 
Does the building contain 
ballistic glazing? Does the 
ballistic glazing meet the 
requirements of UL 752 
Bullet-Resistant Glazing? 
Does the building contain 
security-glazing? 
Glass-clad polycarbonate or 
laminated polycarbonate are two 
types of acceptable glazing 
material. If windows are upgraded 
to bullet-resistant, burglar-
resistant, or forced entry-resistant, 
ensure that doors, ceilings, and 
floors, as applicable, can resist 
the same for the areas of concern. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Does the security-glazing 




meet the requirements of 



ASTM F1233 or UL 972, 



Burglary Resistant Glazing 



Material? 



Do the window assemblies 



containing forced entry 



resistant glazing (excluding 



the glazing) meet the 



requirements of ASTM F 



588? 


4.5 
Do non-window openings, 
such as mechanical vents 
and exposed plenums, 
provide the same level of 
protection required for the 
exterior wall? 
In-filling of blast over-pressures 
must be considered through non-
window openings such that 
structural members and all 
mechanical system mountings 
and attachments should resist 
these interior fill pressures. These 
non-window openings should 
also be as secure as the 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


rest of the building envelope 
against forced entry. Reference: 
GSA PBS-P100 


6 
Mechanical Systems (HVAC and CBR) 

6.1 
Where are the air intakes 
Air intakes should be located on 
The air used to heat 

and exhaust louvers for the 
building? (low, high, or 
midpoint of the building 
structure) Are the intakes 
and exhausts accessible to 
the public? 
the roof or as high as possible. 
Otherwise secure within CPTED-
compliant fencing or enclosure. 
The fencing or enclosure should 
have a sloped roof to prevent the 
throwing of anything into the 
enclosure near the intakes. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 states 
that air intakes should be on the 
fourth floor or higher and, on 
buildings with three floors or 
less, they should be on the roof 
or as high as practical. Locating 
intakes high on a wall is preferred 
over a roof location. 
or cool the HIC 
Headquarters 
building is filtered in 
the HVAC room 
using standard 
industrial grade 
filters. Outside air is 
brought in through a 
vent in the wall. The 
vent is alarmed to 
prevent intruder 
access. A screened 
exhaust 


Reference: DoD UFC 4-010-01 
duct is on the roof. 


states that, for all new inhabited 
buildings covered by this 
document, all air intakes should 
be located at least 3 meters (10 
feet) above the ground. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH, Pub 2002-139 
states: "An extension 
Airflow throughout 
the building is 
through a series of 
ducts hidden in the 
ceiling of each area. 
The ducts are divided 


height of 12 feet (3.7 m) will 
in half to allow them 



place the intake out of reach of 
individuals without some 
assistance. Also, the entrance to 
the intake should be covered with 
a sloped metal mesh to reduce 
the threat of objects being tossed 
into the intake. A minimum 
slope of 45� is generally 
adequate. Extension height 
should be increased where 
existing platforms or building 
features (i.e., loading docks, 
retaining walls) might provide 
access to the outdoor air intakes". 
Reference: LBNL PUB-51959: 
Exhausts are also a concer n 
during an outdoor release, 
especially if exhaust fans are not 
in continuous operation, due to 
wind effects and chimney effects 
(air movement due to differential 
temperature). 
to serve as supply 
and return headers. 
The divider is 
insulated to 
minimize heat 
transfer from one 
side to the other. 
6.2 
Is roof access limited to 
authorized personnel by 
means of locking 
mechanisms? Is access to 
mechanical areas similarly 
controlled? 
Roofs are like entrances to the 
building and are like mechanical 
rooms when HVAC is installed. 
Adjacent structures or 
landscaping should not allow 
access to the roof. References: 
GSA PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139, and LBNL Pub 
51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.3 
Are there multiple air intake 
locations? 
Single air intakes may feed 
several air handling units. 
Indicate if the air intakes are 
localized or separated. Installing 
low-leakage dampers is one way 
to provide the system separation 
when necessary. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
No. 
6.4 
What are the types of air 
filtration? Include the 
efficiency and number of 
filter modules for each of 
the main air handling 
systems. Is there any 
collective 
MERV � Minimum Efficiency 
Reporting Value HEPA � High 
Efficiency Particulate Air 
Activated charcoal for gases 
Ultraviolet C for biologicals 
Consider mix of approaches for 
optimum protection and cost-
effectiveness. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 
Standard industrial 
grade filters are used. 


protection for chemical, 
biological, and radiological 
contamination designed into 
the building? 
2002-139 

6.5 
Is there space for larger 
filter assemblies on critical 
air handling systems? 
Air handling units serving critical 
functions during continued 
operation may be retrofitted to 
provide enhanced protection 
during emergencies. However, 
upgraded filtration may have 
negative effects upon the overall 
air handling system operation, 
such as increased pressure drop. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.6 
Are there provisions for air 
monitors or sensors for 
chemical or biological 
agents? 
Duct mounted sensors are usually 
found in limited cases in 
laboratory areas. Sensors 
generally have a limited spectrum 
of high reliability and are costly. 
Many different technologies are 
undergoing research to provide 
capability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.7 
By what method are air 
intakes and exhausts closed 
when not operational? 
Motorized (low-leakage, fast-
acting) dampers are the preferred 
method for closure with fail-safe 
to the closed position so as to 
support in-place sheltering. 
References: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 and LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.8 
How are air handling 
systems zoned? What areas 
and functions do each of the 
primary air handling 
systems serve? 
Understanding the critical areas of 
the building that must continue 
functioning focuses security and 
hazard mitigation measures. 
Applying HVAC zones that 
isolate lobbies, mailrooms, 
loading docks, and other entry 
and storage areas from the rest of 
the building HVAC zones and 
maintaining negative pressure 
within these areas will contain 
CBR releases. Identify common 
return systems that service more 
than one zone, effectively making 
a large single zone. Conversely, 
emergency egress routes should 
receive positive pressurization to 
ensure 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



contamination does not hinder 
egress. Consider filtering of the 
pressurization air. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

6.9 
Are there large central air 
handling units or are there 
multiple units serving 
separate zones? 
Independent units can continue to 
operate if damage occurs to 
limited areas of the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The HVAC ducts are 
divided in half to 
allow them to serve 
as supply and return 
headers. The divider 
is insulated to 
minimize heat 
transfer from one side 
to the other. 
6.10 
Are there any redundancies 
in the air handling system? 
Can critical areas be served 
from other units if a major 
system is disabled? 
Redundancy reduces the security 
measures required compared to a 
non-redundant situation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.11 
Is the air supply to critical 
areas compartmentalized? 
Similarly, are the critical 
areas or the building as a 
whole, considered tight with 
little or no inleakage? 
During chemical, biological, and 
radiological situations, the intent 
is to either keep the 
contamination localized in the 
critical area or prevent its entry 
into other critical, non-critical, or 
public areas. Systems can be 
cross-connected through building 
openings (doorways, ceilings, 
partial wall), ductwork leakage, or 
pressure differences in air 
handling system. In standard 
practice, there is almost always 
some air carried between 
ventilation zones by pressure 
imbalances, due to elevator piston 
action, chimney effect, and wind 
effects. Smoke testing of the air 
supply to critical areas may be 
necessary. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.12 
Are supply, return, and 
exhaust air systems for 
critical areas secure? Are all 
supply and return ducts 
completely connected 
The air systems to critical areas 
should be inaccessible to the 
public, especially if the ductwork 
runs through the public areas of 
the building. It is also more 
secure to have a ducted air 
handling system versus sharing 
hallways and plenums above drop 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


to their grilles and registers 
and secure? Is the return air 
not ducted? 
ceilings for return air. Non-ducted 
systems provide greater 
opportunity for introducing 
contaminants. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 

6.13 
What is the method of 
temperature and humidity 
control? Is it localized or 
centralized? 
Central systems can range from 
monitoring only to full control. 
Local control may be available to 
override central operation. Of 
greatest concern are systems 
needed before, during, and after 
an incident that may be 
unavailable due to temperature 
and humidity exceeding 
operational limits (e.g., main 
telephone switch room). 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
The main heater 
sends hot air into the 
Heating, Ventilation 
and Air Conditioning 
(HVAC) Room, next 
to the M&E Room. 
From here it is 
distributed 
throughout the 
building. Offices, 
restrooms and the 
employee�s lounge 
are directly heated by 
this warm air. The 



Computer Center and 
the Communications 



Center use Digital 
Environmental 



Managers (DEM) to 
direct the warm air 



where it is needed, 



add or remove 



humidity from the air 
or even cool some 



areas while warming 
others. 



Cooling (or heat 
removal) is done by 
two chillers in the 



M&E room. Three 



Trane 100-ton 



chillers are available; 



normally only two 
are needed to cover 



all heat loads. The 



chillers remove heat 



from the Chilled 



Water System, and 
use the Condenser 



Water System to 
send the waste heat 



to two rooftop 
Cooling Towers. The 
Chilled Water is then 



routed from the 



chillers to air 




handlers for the 



majority of the 



building; cooling for 



the Computer Center 



and the 



Communications 



Center is done by 



directing Chilled 



Water to the DEMs. 



Chiller operation 



along with Chilled 



Water and Condenser 



Water flow are 



managed from a 



single control unit in 



the M&E room. A 



single Chilled Water 



pump provides 



adequate flow for all 



cooling situations; a 



backup pump is 



available at the push 



of a button. The 
same 



is true for the 



Condenser Water 



pumps. 
6.14 
Where are the building 
automation control centers 
and cabinets located? Are 
they in secure areas? How 
is the control wiring routed? 
Access to any component of the 
building automation and control 
system could compromise the 
functioning of the system, 
increasing vulnerability to a 
hazard or precluding their proper 
operation during a hazard 
incident. The HVAC and exhaust 
system controls should be in a 
secure 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


area that allows rapid shutdown 
or other activation based upon 
location and type of attack. 
References: FEMA 386-7, DOC 



CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 and LBNL Pub 



51959 

6.15 
Does the control of air 
handling systems support 
plans for sheltering in place 
or other protective 
approach? 
The micro-meteorological effects 
of buildings and terrain can alter 
travel and duration of chemical 
agents and hazardous material 
releases. Shielding in the form of 
sheltering in place can protect 
people and property from harmful 
effects. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 


To support in-place sheltering, 
the air handling systems require 




the ability for authorized 
personnel to rapidly turn off all 
systems. However, if the system 
is properly filtered, then keeping 
the system operating will provide 
protection as long as the air 
handling system does not 
distribute an internal release to 
other portions of the building. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 

6.16 
Are there any smoke 
evacuation systems 
installed? Does it have 
purge capability? 
For an internal blast, a smoke 
removal system may be essential, 
particularly in large, open spaces. 
The equipment should be located 
away from high-risk areas, the 
system controls and wiring 
should be protected, and it should 
be connected to emergency power. 
This exhaust capability can be 
built into areas with significant 
risk on internal events, such as 
lobbies, loading docks, and 
mailrooms. Consider filtering of 
the exhaust to capture CBR 
contaminants. References: GSA 
PBS-P100, CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139, and LBNL Pub 51959 
Yes. 
6.17 
Where is roof-mounted 
equipment located on the 
roof? (near perimeter, at 
center of roof) 
Roof-mounted equipment should 
be kept away from the building 
perimeter. Reference: U.S. Army 
TM 5-853 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
6.18 
Are fire dampers installed at 
all fire barriers? Are all 
dampers functional and seal 
well when closed? 
All dampers (fire, smoke, outdoor 
air, return air, bypass) must be 
functional for proper protection 
within the building during an 
incident. Reference: CDC/NIOSH 
Pub 2002-139 
Yes. 
6.19 
Do fire walls and fire doors 
maintain their integrity? 
The tightness of the building 
(both exterior, by weatherization 
to seal cracks around doors and 
windows, and internal, by zone 
ducting, fire walls, fire stops, and 
fire doors) provides energy 
conservation benefits and 
functional benefits during a CBR 
incident. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



Reference: LBNL Pub 51959 

6.20 
Do elevators have recall 
capability and elevator 
emergency message 
capability? 
Although a life-safety code and 
fire response requirement, the 
control of elevators also has 
benefit during a CBR incident. 
The elevators generate a piston 
effect, causing pressure 
differentials in the elevator shaft 
and associated floors that can 
force contamination to flow up or 
down. Reference: LBNL Pub 
51959 
No elevators in HIC. 
6.21 
Is access to building 
information restricted? 
Information on building 
operations, schematics, 
procedures, plans, and 
specifications should be strictly 
controlled and available only to 
authorized personnel. References: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
No. 
6.22 
Does the HVAC 
maintenance staff have the 
proper training, procedures, 
and preventive maintenance 
schedule to ensure CBR 
equipment is functional? 
Functional equipment must 
interface with operational 
procedures in an emergency plan 
to ensure the equipment is 
properly operated to provide the 
protection desired. The HVAC 
system can be operated in 
different ways, depending upon 
an external or internal release and 
where in the building an internal 
release occurs. Thus maintenance 
and security staff must have the 
training to properly operate the 
HVAC system under different 
circumstances, even if the 
procedure is to turn off all air 
movement equipment. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 and 
LBNL Pub 51959 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

7 
Plumbing and Gas 
Systems 


7.1 
What is the method of 
water distribution? 
Central shaft locations for piping 
are more vulnerable than multiple 
riser locations. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.2 
What is the method of gas 
distribution? (heating, 
cooking, medical, process) 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.3 
Is there redundancy to the 
main piping distribution? 
Looping of piping and use of 
section valves provide 
redundancies in the event sections 
of the system are damaged. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.4 
What is the method of 
heating domestic water? 
What fuel(s) is used? 
Single source of hot water with 
one fuel source is more vulnerable 
than multiple sources and 
multiple fuel types. Domestic hot 
water availability is an operational 
concern for many building 
occupancies. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.5 
Where are gas storage tanks 
located? (heating, cooking, 
medical, process) How are 
they piped to the 
distribution system? (above 
or below ground) 
The concern is that the tanks and 
piping could be vulnerable to a 
moving vehicle or a bomb blast 
either directly or by collateral 
damage due to proximity to a 
higher-risk area. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
7.6 
Are there reserve supplies 
of critical gases? 
Localized gas cylinders could be 
available in the event of damage 
to the central tank system. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

8 
Electrical Systems 


8.1 
Are there any transformers 
or switchgears located 
outside the building or 
accessible from the building 
exterior? Are they 
vulnerable to public access? 
Are they secured? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Transformers 
providing electricity 
to this site are 
located outside the 
building. The two 
12.47KV feeders lead 
to two separate 
transformers outside 
the building, one 
near the north side, 
and the other near the 
south side. 
8.2 
What is the extent of the 
external building lighting in 
utility and service areas and 
at normal entryways used 
by the building occupants? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.3 
How are the electrical rooms 
secured and where are they 
located relative to other 
higher risk areas, starting 
with the main electrical 
distribution room at the 
service entrance? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.4 
Are critical electrical 
systems co-located with 
other building systems? Are 
critical electrical systems 
located in areas outside of 
secured electrical areas? Is 
security system wiring 
located separately from 
electrical and other service 
systems? 
Collocation concerns include 
rooms, ceilings, raceways, 
conduits, panels, and risers. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Yes. 
8.5 
How are electrical 
distribution panels serving 
branch circuits secured or 
are they in secure locations? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
8.6 
Does emergency backup 
power exist for all areas 
within the building or for 
There should be no single critical 
node that allows both the normal 
electrical service and the 
Yes. Critical 
computer 


critical areas only? How is 
the emergency power 
distributed? Is the 
emergency power system 
independent from the 
normal electrical service, 
particularly in critical areas? 
emergency backup power to be 
affected by a single incident. 
Automatic transfer switches and 
interconnecting switchgear are the 
initial concerns. Emergency and 
normal electrical equipment 
should be installed separately, at 
different locations, and as far 
apart as possible. Reference: GSA 
PBS-P100 
systems are backed 
up by an UPS which 
is maintained 
separately from the 
sites generator back-
up power. 
8.7 
How is the primary 
electrical system wiring 
distributed? Is it co-located 
with other 
Central utility shafts may be 
subject to damage, especially if 
there is only one for the building. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

major utilities? 



Is there redundancy of 
distribution to critical areas? 



9 
Fire Alarm Systems 


9.1 
Is the building fire alarm 
system centralized or 
localized? How are alarms 
annunciated, both locally 
and centrally? Are critical 
documents and control 
systems located in a secure 
yet accessible location? 
Fire alarm systems must first 
warn building occupants to 
evacuate for life safety. Then they 
must inform the responding 
agency to dispatch fire equipment 
and personnel. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Centralized. 
9.2 
Where are the fire alarm 
panels located? Do they 
allow access to 
unauthorized personnel? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Building next to 
HIC. 
9.3 
Is the fire alarm system 
stand-alone or integrated 
with other functions such as 
security and environmental 
or building management 
systems? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Standalone. 


What is the interface? 


9.4 
Do key fire alarm system 
components have fire- and 
blast-resistant separation? 
This is especially necessary for 
the fire command center or fire 
alarm control center. The concern 
is to similarly protect critical 
components as described in Items 
2.19, 5.7, and 10.3. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
9.5 
Is there redundant off-
premises fire alarm 
reporting? 
Fire alarms can ring at a fire 
station, at an intermediary alarm 
monitoring center, or autodial 
someone else. See Items 5.21 and 
10.5. 
Yes. 

10 
Communications and IT Systems 

10.1 
Where is the main telephone 
distribution room and where 
is it in relation to higher risk 
areas? Is the main telephone 
distribution room secure? 
One can expect to find voice, 
data, signal, and alarm systems to 
be routed through the main 
telephone distribution room. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Communications. 
10.2 
Does the telephone system 
have an UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? What is its type, 
power rating, operational 
duration under load, and 
location? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Many telephone systems are now 
computerized and need a UPS to 
ensure reliability during power 
fluctuations. The UPS is also 
needed to await any emergency 
power coming on line or allow 
orderly shutdown. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.3 
Where are communication 
systems wiring closets 
located? (voice, data, signal, 
alarm) Are they co-located 
with other utilities? Are 
they in secure areas? 
Concern is to have separation 
distance from other utilities and 
higher-risk areas to avoid 
collateral damage. Security 
approaches on the closets include 
door alarms, closed circuit 
television, swipe cards, or other 
logging notifications to ensure 
only authorized personnel have 
access to these closets. Reference: 
FEMA 386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.4 
How is communications 
system wiring distributed? 
(secure chases and risers, 
accessible public areas) 
The intent is to prevent tampering 
with the systems. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

10.5 
Are there redundant 
communications systems 
available? 
Critical areas should be supplied 
with multiple or redundant means 
of communications. Power outage 
phones can provide redundancy as 
they connect directly to the local 
commercial telephone switch off 
site and not through the building 
telephone switch in the main 
telephone distribution room. A 
base radio communication system 
with antenna can be installed in 
stairwells, and portable sets 
distributed to floors. References: 
GSA PBS-P100 and FEMA 386-7 
No. 
10.6 
Where are the main 
distribution facility, data 
centers, routers, firewalls, 
and servers located and are 
they secure? Where are the 
secondary and/or 
intermediate distribution 
facilities and are they 
secure? 
Concern is collateral damage from 
manmade hazards and redundancy 
of critical functions. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
Interior and secure. 
10.7 
What type and where are 
the WAN (wide area 
network) connections? 
Critical facilities should have two 
Minimum-Points-of-Presence 
(MPOPs) where the telephone 
company�s outside cable 
terminates inside the building. It 
is functionally a service entrance 
connection that demarcates where 
the telephone company�s property 
stops and the building owner�s 
property begins. The MPOPs 
should not be collocated and they 
should connect to different 
telephone company central offices 
so that the loss of one cable or 
central office does not reduce 
capability. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.8 
What type, power rating, 
and location of the UPS 
(uninterruptible power 
supply)? (battery, on-line, 
filtered) 
Consider that UPS should be 
found at all computerized points 
from the main distribution 
facility to individual data closets 
and at critical personal 
computers/terminals. 
Lead acid battery. 


Are the UPS also connected 
to emergency power? 
Critical LAN sections should also 
be on backup power. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 

10.9 
What type of LAN (local 
area network) cabling and 
physical topology is used? 
(Category(Cat) 5, Gigabit 
Ethernet, Ethernet, Token 
Ring) 
The physical topology of a 
network is the way in which the 
cables and computers are 
connected to each other. The main 
types of physical topologies are: 
Bus (single radial where any 
damage on the bus affects the 
whole system, but especially all 
portions downstream) Star 
(several computes are connected 
to a hub and many hubs can be in 
the network � the hubs can be 
critical nodes, but the other hubs 
continue to function if one fails) 
Ring (a bus with a continuous 
connection - least used, but can 
tolerate some damage because if 
the ring fails at a single point it 
can be rerouted much like a 
looped electric or water system) 
The configuration and the 
availability of surplus cable or 
spare capacity on individual 
cables can reduce vulnerability to 
hazard incidents. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.10 
For installed radio/wireless 
systems, what are their 
types and where are they 
located? (RF (radio 
frequency), HF (high 
frequency), VHF (very high 
frequency), MW (medium 
wave) 
Depending upon the function of 
the wireless system, it could be 
susceptible to accidental or 
intended jamming or collateral 
damage. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.11 
Do the IT (Information 
Technology � computer) 
systems meet requirements 
of confidentiality, integrity, 
and availability? 
Ensure access to terminals and 
equipment for authorized 
personnel only and ensure system 
up-time to meet operational 
needs. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Yes. 





10.12 
Where is the disaster 
recovery/mirroring site? 
A site with suitable equipment 
that allows continuation of 
operations or that mirrors 
(operates in parallel to) the 
existing operation is beneficial if 
equipment is lost during a natural 
or manmade disaster. The need is 
based upon the criticality of the 
operation and how quickly 
replacement equipment can be put 
in place and operated. Reference: 
DOC CIAO Vulnerability 
Assessment Framework 1.1 
In local geographic 
area. 
10.13 
Where is the back-up 
tape/file storage site and 
what is the type of safe 
environment? (safe, vault, 
underground) Is there 
redundant refrigeration in 
the site? 
If equipment is lost, data are 
most likely lost, too. Backups are 
needed to continue operations at 
the disaster recovery site or when 
equipment can be delivered and 
installed. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.14 
Are there any SATCOM 
(satellite communications) 
links? (location, power, 
UPS, emergency power, 
spare capacity/capability) 
SATCOM links can serve as 
redundant communications for 
voice and data if configured to 
support required capability after a 
hazard incident. Reference: DOC 
CIAO Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
10.15 
Is there a mass notification 
system that reaches all 
building occupants? (public 
address, pager, cell phone, 
computer override, etc.) 
Will one or more of these 
systems be operational 
under hazard conditions? 
(UPS, emergency power) 
Depending upon building size, a 
mass notification system will 
provide warning and alert 
information, along with actions 
to take before and after an 
incident if there is redundancy 
and power. Reference: DoD UFC 
4-010-01 
No. 
10.16 
Do control centers and their 
designated alternate 
locations have equivalent or 
reduced capability for voice, 
data, mass 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Yes, large conference 
room. 


notification, etc.? 
(emergency operations, 
security, fire alarms, 
building automation) Do the 
alternate locations also have 
access to backup systems, 
including emergency power? 



11 
Equipment Operations and Maintenance 

11.1 
Are there composite 
drawings indicating location 
and capacities of major 
systems and are they 
current? (electrical, 
mechanical, and fire 
protection; and date of last 
update) Do updated O&M 
(operation and maintenance) 
manuals exist? 
Within critical infrastructure 
protection at the building level, 
the current configuration and 
capacity of all critical systems 
must be understood to ensure 
they meet emergency needs. 
Manuals must also be current to 
ensure operations and 
maintenance keeps these systems 
properly functioning. The system 
must function during an 
emergency unless directly affected 
by the hazard incident. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.2 
Have critical air systems 
been rebalanced? If so, when 
and how often? 
Although the system may 
function, it must be tested 
periodically to ensure it is 
performing as designed. 
Balancing is also critical after 
initial construction to set 
equipment to proper performance 
per the design. Rebalancing may 
only occur during renovation. 
Reference: CDC/NIOSH Pub 
2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.3 
Is air pressurization 
monitored regularly? 
Some areas require positive or 
negative pressure to function 
properly. Pressurization is critical 
in a hazardous environment or 
emergency situation. Measuring 
pressure drop across filters is an 
indication when filters should be 
changed, but also may indicate 
that low pressures are developing 
downstream and could result in 
loss of expected 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 



protection. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 

11.4 
Does the building have a 
policy or procedure for 
periodic recommissioning of 
major M/E/P 
(Mechanical/Electrical/ 
Plumbing) systems? 
Recommissioning involves 
testing and balancing of systems 
to ascertain their capability to 
perform as described. Reference: 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.5 
Is there an adequate 
operations and maintenance 
program including training 
of facilities management 
staff? 
If O&M of critical systems is 
done with in-house personnel, 
management must know what 
needs to be done and the 
workforce must have the 
necessary training to ensure 
systems reliability. Reference: 
CDC/NIOSH Pub 2002-139 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.6 
What maintenance and 
service agreements exist for 
M/E/P systems? 
When an in-house facility 
maintenance work force does not 
exist or does not have the 
capability to perform the work, 
maintenance and service contracts 
are the alternative to ensure 
critical systems will work under 
all conditions. The facility 
management staff requires the 
same knowledge to oversee these 
contracts as if the work was being 
done by in-house personnel. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
11.7 
Are backup power systems 
periodically tested under 
load? 
Loading should be at or above 
maximum connected load to 
ensure available capacity and 
automatic sensors should be 
tested at least once per year. 
Periodically (once a year as a 
minimum) check the duration of 
capacity of backup systems by 
running them for the expected 
emergency duration or estimating 
operational duration through fuel 
consumption, water consumption, 
or voltage loss. Reference: FEMA 
386-7 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

11.8 
Is stairway and exit sign 
lighting operational? 
The maintenance program for 
stairway and exit sign lighting 
(all egress lighting) should ensure 
functioning under normal and 
emergency power conditions. 
Expect building codes to be 
updated as emergency egress 
lighting is moved from upper 
walls and over doorways to floor 
level as heat and smoke drive 
Yes. 


occupants to crawl along the floor 
to get out of the building. Signs 
and lights mounted high have 
limited or no benefit when 



obscured. 



Reference: FEMA 386-7 


13 
Security Master Plan 


13.1 
Does a written security plan 
exist for this site or 
building? When was the 
initial security plan written 
and last revised? Who is 
responsible for preparing 
and reviewing the security 
plan? 
The development and 
implementation of a security 
master plan provides a roadmap 
that outlines the strategic 
direction and vision, operational, 
managerial, and technological 
mission, goals, and objectives of 
the organization�s security 
program. Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
HIC does have a fire 
evacuation plan. HIC 
does not have a mass 
evacuation plan and 
rally point. 
13.2 
Has the security plan been 
communicated and 
disseminated to key 
management personnel and 
departments? 
The security plan should be part 
of the building design so that the 
construction or renovation of the 
structure integrates with the 
security procedures to be used 
during daily operations. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.3 
Has the security plan been 
benchmarked or compared 
against related organizations 
and operational entities? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.4 
Has the security plan ever 
been tested and evaluated 
from a cost-benefit and 
operational efficiency and 
effectiveness perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

13.5 
Does it define mission, 
vision, short-long term 
security program goals and 
objectives? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.6 
Are threats, vulnerabilities, 
risks adequately defined and 
security countermeasures 
addressed and prioritized 
relevant to their criticality 
and probability of 
occurrence? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.7 
Has a security 
implementation schedule 
been established to address 
recommended security 
solutions? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.8 
Have security operating and 
capital budgets been 
addressed, approved and 
established to support the 
plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.9 
What regulatory or industry 
guidelines/standards were 
followed in the preparation 
of the security plan? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.10 
Does the security plan 
address existing security 
conditions from an 
administrative, operational, 
managerial and technical 
security systems 
perspective? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.11 
Does the security plan 
address the protection of 
people, property, assets, 
and information? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.12 
Does the security plan 
address the following major 
components: access control, 
surveillance, response, 
building hardening and 
protection against biological, 
chemical, radiological and 
cybernetwork attacks? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

13.13 
Has the level of risk been 
identified and communicated 
in the 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

security plan through the 
performance of a physical 
security assessment? 


13.14 
When was the last security 
assessment performed? 
Who performed the security 
risk assessment? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
13.15 
Were the following areas of 
security analysis addressed 
in the security master plan:  
Asset Analysis: Does the 
security plan identify and 
prioritize the assets to be 
protected in accordance to 
their location, control, 
This process is the input to the 
building design and what 
mitigation measures will be 
included in the facility project to 
reduce risk and increase safety of 
the building and people. 
Reference: USA TM 5-853, 
Security Engineering 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

current value, and 



replacement value? 



Threat Analysis: Does the 
security plan address 
potential threats; causes of 
potential harm in the form 
of death, injury, destruction, 
disclosure, interruption of 
operations, or denial of 
services? 



(possible criminal acts 
(documented and review of 
police/security incident 
reports) associated with 
forced entry, bombs, 
ballistic assault, 



biochemical and related 



terrorist tactics, attacks 



against utility systems 
infrastructure and buildings) 



Vulnerability Analysis: 
Does the security plan 
address other areas and 




anything else associated 
with a site or building and 
it's operations that can be 
taken advantage of to carry 
out a threat? (architectural 
design and construction of 
new and existing buildings, 
technological support 
systems (e.g. heating, air 
conditioning, power, lighting 
and security systems, etc.) 
and operational procedures, 
policies and controls) Risk 
Analysis: Does the security 
plan address the findings 
from the asset, threat, and 
vulnerability analyses to 
develop, recommend and 
consider implementation of 
appropriate security 
countermeasures? 



Building Design Mitigation Measures 
Asset-Threat/Hazard 
Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 
1. Explosive 
Blast/Structural 
High 
FRF film on window 
Medium 
2. Explosive 
Blast/Structural 
High 
Enclose open entrance 
area 
Medium 
3. Chemical/Mechanical 
High 
Extend Air Intake 
Medium 
4. Biological/Mechanical 
High 
Extend Air Intake 
Medium 
5. Radiological/Site 
Medium 
Mass Evacuation Plan 
and Rally Point 
Low 

IG IX -77 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems






U
ni
t 
X 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 45 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Electronic Security Systems 
OBJECTIVES 
1. 1.	Use the assessment process to identify electronic security system 
requirements that are needed to mitigate vulnerabilities 
2. 2.	Describe the electronic security system concepts and practices that 
warrant special attention to enhance public safety 
3. 3.	Explain the basic concepts of electronic security system components, their 
capabilities, and their interaction with other systems 
4. 4.	Justify selection of electronic security systems to mitigate vulnerabilities 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1. 1.	Control centers and building management systems 
2. 2. Perimeter layout and zoning of sensors 
3. 3.	Intrusion detection systems and sensor technologies 
4. 4.	Entry-control systems and electronic entry control technologies 
5. 5.	Closed circuit television and data-transmission media 
6. 6.	Definitions of the degree of security and control 

REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, pages 3-47 to 3-50; Appendix D; 
and Security Systems and Security Master Plan sections of 
Checklist at end of Chapter (pages 1-81 � 1-92) 
1. 2.	Unit X visuals 
2. 3.	Case Study 

REQUIREMENTS 1. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
1. 2.	Unit X visuals 
2. 3. Instructor Guide 
3. 4. Student Manual 

IG X -1 
Unit X 
UNIT X OUTLINE	Time Page 

X.  Electronic Security Systems	45 minutes IG  X-
1


1.	 Introduction and Unit Overview 5 minutes IG  X-3

2.	 Perimeter Layout and Zoning Sensors 5 minutes IG  X-5

3.	 Intrusion Detection Systems and Technology 10 minutes IG  X-6

4.	 Entry Control Systems and Technology 5 minutes IG  X-13

5.	 CCTV Systems and Data Transmission Media 5 minutes IG  X-18

6.	 Terminology for the Degree of Security 5 minutes IG  X-18

7.	 Activity: Electronic Security Systems 10 minutes IG  X-20

PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
�	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to identify 
topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
The Instructor will walk the students through the various components and technology 
currently available for use in security systems, including biometrics for access control, 
closed circuit television, and terminology to describe levels of security. These are the 
mitigation measures available to reduce risks due to vulnerabilities in physical security 
systems. 
�	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this Unit. 
�	Activity: There is no student activity associated with this Unit. However, any 
mitigation measures identified as a priority to reduce high risks will be covered in Unit 
XI as part of the group presentation. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-1 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit X Electronic Security Systems (ESS). This unit will describe the types of 
sensors, concepts of operation of electronic security systems, and terminology used in 
the industry. 
VISUAL X-2 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Use the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist to identify electronic 
security system requirements that are needed to mitigate vulnerabilities. 
2. 2.	Describe the electronic security system concepts and practices that 
warrant special attention to enhance public safety. 
3. 3.	Explain the basis concepts of electronic security system components, their 
capabilities, and their interaction with other systems. 
4. 4.	Justify selection of electronic security systems to mitigate vulnerabilities. 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-3 
Electronic Security Systems 
Concepts 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist, Section 12, can be used for the 
assessment of security systems. Security systems historically have been designed, 
installed, serviced, and monitored by physical security companies, typically after the 
completion of the building. New Internet and wireless technologies have significantly 
changed the way in which security systems are designed and now incorporation of 
security system design and processes should begin at the earliest stages of design or 
renovation. An electronic security system is the physical implementation of the elements 
of the Layers of Defense: 
. � Deter 
. � Detect 
. � Deny 
 � Devalue 
 In this unit, the student should have an appreciation for: 
. � Basic concepts of ESS 
. � Use of ESS 
. � General ESS Description 
. � ESS Design Considerations 

Fundamental objective: 
Provide appropriate, effective, 
and economical protective design 
for assets. 
Approach: 
Coordinated effort between security 
and law enforcement and engineering 
communities. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-4 
Perimeter Zone 
The protection of a facility is designed with layers of defense, detection, and response. 
Before we discuss security systems, we need to review several basic concepts: 
�	A protected area�s perimeter is usually defined by an enclosing wall or fence or a 
natural barrier such as water. For exterior sensors to be effective, the perimeter around 
which they are to be deployed must be precisely defined. 
Perimeter Zone and Layers of 
Defense 
. �	First layer of defense is from the perimeter outward. 
. �	Second layer of defense is between the building and the perimeter. 
. �	Third layer of defense is inside the building. 

VISUAL X-5 
Perimeter Layout and Zoning 
Sensors 
. � After the perimeter has been defined, the next step is to divide it into specific 
detection zones. The length of each detection zone is determined by evaluating the 
contour, the existing terrain, and the operational activities along the perimeter. 
. �	The exterior and interior Intrusion and Detection Systems should be 
configured as layers of unbroken rings concentrically surrounding the asset. These rings 
should correspond to defensive layers that constitute the delay system. The first 
detection layer is located at the outermost defensive layer necessary to provide the 
required delay. Detection layers can be on a defensive layer, in the area between two 
defensive layers, or on the asset itself, 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
depending on the delay required. 
�	If an alarm occurs in a specific 
zone, the operator can readily 
determine its approximate location 
by referring to a map of the 
perimeter.
 VISUAL X-6 
Intrusion Detection Systems 
There are a number of different sensor technologies: 
. �	Boundary Penetration Sensors 
. �	Volumetric Motion Sensors 
. �	Exterior Intrusion Detection Sensors 
. �	Fence Sensors 
. �	Buried Line Sensors 
. �	Microwave Sensors 
. �	Infrared Sensors 
. �	Video Motion Sensors 

VISUAL X-7 
Boundary Penetration Sensors 
. �	Structural Vibration Sensors 
. �	Glass Breaking Sensors 
. �	Balanced Magnetic Switches 
. �	Passive Ultrasonic Sensors 
. �	Grid Wire Sensors 

Structural vibration sensors detect low-frequency energy generated in an attempted 
penetration of a physical barrier (such as a wall or a ceiling) by hammering, drilling, 
cutting, detonating explosives, or employing other forcible methods of entry. 
Glass breaking sensors detect the 
breaking of glass. The noise from 
breaking glass consists of frequencies 
in both the audible and ultrasonic 
range. 
Balanced magnetic switches (BMSs) 
are typically used to detect the opening 
of a door. These sensors can also be 
used on windows, 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
hatches, gates, or other structural 
devices that can be opened to gain 
entry. 
Passive ultrasonic sensors detect 
acoustical energy in the ultrasonic 
frequency range, typically between 20 
and 30 kilohertz (kHz). They are used 
to detect an attempted penetration 
through rigid barriers (such as metal or 
masonry walls, ceilings, and floors). and 
windows and vents covered by metal 
grilles, shutters, or bars if these 
openings are properly sealed against 
outside sounds. 
Grid wire sensors consist of a 
continuous electrical wire arranged in a 
grid pattern. The wire maintains an 
electrical current. An alarm is generated 
when the wire is broken. The sensor 
detects forced entry through walls, 
floors, ceilings, doors, windows, and 
other barriers. 
VISUAL X-8 
Volumetric Motion Sensors 
Designed to detect intruder motion within the interior of the protected volume 
. � Microwave Motion Sensors 
. � Passive Infrared (PIR) Motion Sensors 
. � Dual Technology Sensors 
. � Video Motion Sensors 
. � Point Sensors 
. � Capacitance Sensors 
. � Pressure Mats 
. � Pressure Switches 

Microwave motion sensors use 
high-frequency electromagnetic 
energy to detect an intruder�s motion 
within the protected area. Interior or 
sophisticated microwave motion 
sensors are normally used. 
Interior microwave motion sensors 
are typically monostatic; the 
transmitter and the receiver are 
housed in the same enclosure 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
(transceiver). 
Sophisticated microwave motion 
sensors 
may be equipped with electronic range gating. This feature allows the sensor to ignore 
the signals reflected beyond the settable detection range. Range gating may be used to 
effectively minimize unwanted alarms from activity outside the protected area. 
Passive infrared (PIR) motion sensors 
detect a change in the thermal energy pattern caused by a moving intruder and initiate an 
alarm when the change in energy satisfies the detector�s alarm criteria. These sensors are 
passive devices because they do not transmit energy; they monitor the energy radiated by 
the surrounding environment. 
Dual technology sensors combine two different technologies in one unit to minimize the 
generation of alarms caused by sources other than intruders. 
Video motion sensors generate an alarm when an intruder enters a selected portion of a 
CCTV camera�s field of view. The sensor processes and compares successive images 
between the images against predefined alarm criteria. There are two categories of video 
motion detectors, analog and digital. Analog detectors generate an alarm in response to 
changes in a picture�s contrast. Digital devices convert selected portions of the analog 
video signal into digital data that are compared with data converted previously; if 
differences exceed preset limits, an alarm is generated. The signal processor usually 
provides an adjustable window that can be positioned anywhere on the video image. 
Point sensors are used to protect specific objects within a facility. These sensors 
(sometimes referred to as proximity sensors) 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
detect an intruder coming in close 
proximity to, touching, or lifting an 
object. Several different types are 
available, including capacitance 
sensors, pressure mats, and pressure 
switches. 
Capacitance sensors detect an 
intruder approaching or touching a 
metal object by sensing a change in 
capacitance between the object and the 
ground. 
Pressure mats generate an alarm 
when pressure is applied to any part 
of the mat�s surface, such as when 
someone steps on the mat. 
Pressure switches are mechanically 
activated contact switches or single 
ribbon switches. 
VISUAL X-9 
Exterior Intrusion Detection 
Sensors 
. �	Strain Sensitive Cable - fences and gates 
. �	Fiber Optic Cable - fences, gates, and gravel pathways 
. �	Bistatic/Monostatic Microwave - line of sight, clear zones 
. �	Active Infrared - portals, short perimeter gap filters 
. �	Ported Coax - exterior clear zones 
. �	Dual Technology (PIR/MW) - portals and gap fillers 
. �	Video Motion - volumetric traffic, open areas 

Exterior intrusion detection sensors are 
customarily used to detect an intruder 
crossing the boundary of a protected 
area. They can also be used in clear 
zones between fences or around 
buildings, for protecting materials and 
equipment stored outdoors within a 
protected boundary, or in estimating the 
POD for buildings and other facilities. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Because of the nature of the outdoor 
environment, exterior sensors are also 
more susceptible to nuisance and 
environmental alarms than interior 
sensors. Inclement weather conditions 
(e.g., heavy rain, hail, and high wind), 
vegetation, the natural variation of the 
temperature of objects in the detection 
zone, blowing debris, and animals are 
major sources of unwanted alarms. 
VISUAL X-10 
Fence Sensors 
. � Strain sensitive cables 
. � Taut wire sensors 
. � Fiber optic sensors 
. � Capacitance proximity sensors 

Fence sensors detect attempts to penetrate a fence around a protected area. Penetration 
attempts (e.g., climbing, cutting, or lifting) generate mechanical vibrations and stresses 
in fence fabric and posts that are usually different than those caused by natural 
phenomena like wind and rain. 
Strain sensitive cables are 
transducers that are uniformly 
sensitive along their entire length. 
They generate an analog voltage when 
subject to mechanical distortions or 
stress resulting from fence motion. 
Taut wire sensors combine a 
physically taut-wire barrier with an 
intrusion detection sensor network. The 
taut wire sensor consists of a column of 
uniformly spaced horizontal wires up 
to several hundred feet in length and 
securely anchored at each end. 
Fiber optic sensors are functionally 
equivalent to the strain-sensitive cable 
sensors previously discussed. However, 
rather than electrical signals, modulated 
light is transmitted down the cable and 
the resulting received signals are 
processed to 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
determine whether an alarm should be 
initiated. 
Capacitance proximity sensors 
measure the electrical capacitance 
between the ground and an array of 
sense wires. Any variations in 
capacitance, such as that caused by an 
intruder approaching or touching one of 
the sense wires, initiates an alarm. 
VISUAL X-11 
Buried Line Sensors 
A buried line sensor system consists of detection probes or cable buried in the ground, 
typically between two fences that form an isolation zone. These devices are wired to 
an electronic processing unit. The processing unit generates an alarm if an intruder 
passes through the detection field. Buried line sensors have several significant features: 
. �	They are hidden, making them difficult to detect and circumvent. 
. �	They follow the terrain�s natural contour. 
. �	They do not physically interfere with human activity, such as grass 
mowing or snow removal. 
. �	They are affected by certain environmental conditions, such as running 
water and ground freeze/thaw cycles. 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-12 
Microwave Sensors 
. � Bistatic system 
. � Monostatic 

Microwave intrusion detection sensors are categorized as bistatic or monostatic. Bistatic 
sensors use transmitting and receiving antennas located at opposite ends of the microwave 
link, whereas monostatic sensors use the same antenna. 
A bistatic system uses a transmitter and a receiver that are typically separated by 100 to 
1,200 feet and that are within direct line of sight of each other. 
Monostatic microwave sensors use the 
same antenna or virtually coincident 
antenna arrays for the transmitter and 
receiver, which are usually combined 
into a single package. 
VISUAL X-13 
Infrared (IR) Sensors 
The IR sensors are available in both active and passive models. An active sensor generates 
one or more near-IR beams that generate an alarm when interrupted. A passive sensor 
detects changes in thermal IR radiation from objects located within its field of view. 
Active sensors consist of transmitter/receiver pairs. The transmitter contains an IR light 
source (such as a gallium arsenide light-emitting diode [LED]) that generates an IR beam. 
The receiver detects changes in the signal power of the received beam. To minimize 
nuisance alarms from birds or blowing debris, the alarm criteria usually require that a high 
percentage of the beam be blocked for a specific interval of time. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-14 
Video Motion Sensors 
Video motion sensors are available on most digital video recorders used in security 
applications. They can be programmed to activate alarms, initiate recording, or any other 
designated action when motion is detected by a security camera. Some digital video 
recorders can be programmed to monitor very specific fields of view for specific rates of 
motion in order to increase effectiveness and minimize extraneous detections. Video 
motion sensors can also greatly improve the efficiency of security personnel monitoring 
security cameras by alerting them when motion is detected. 
VISUAL X-15 
Entry Control Systems and 
Technology 
. � Coded Devices 
. � Credential Devices 
. � Biometric Devices 

The function of an entry control system is to ensure that only authorized personnel are 
permitted into or out of a controlled area. Entry can be controlled by locked fence gates, 
locked doors to a building or rooms within a building, or specially designed portals. These 
means of entry control can be applied manually by guards or automatically by using entry 
control devices. In a manual system, guards verify that a person is authorized to enter an 
area, usually by comparing the photograph and personal characteristics of the individual 
requesting entry. In an automated system, the entry control device verifies that a person 
is authorized to enter or exit. The automated system usually interfaces with locking 
mechanisms on doors or gates that open momentarily to permit passage. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
All entry control systems control 
passage by using one or more of three 
basic techniques (e.g., something a 
person knows, something a person has, 
or something a person is or does). 
Automated entry control devices based 
on these techniques are grouped into 
three categories: coded, credential, and 
biometric devices. 
VISUAL X-16 
Coded Devices 
. � Electronic Keypad Devices 
. � Computer Controlled Keypad Devices 

Coded devices operate on the principle that a person has been issued a code to enter into 
an entry control device. This code will match the code stored in the device and permit 
entry. Depending on the application, a single code can be used by all persons authorized 
to enter the controlled area or each authorized person can be assigned a unique code. 
Group codes are useful when the group is small and controls are primarily for keeping out 
the general public. Individual codes are usually required for control of entry to more 
critical areas. Electronically coded devices include electronic and computer controlled 
keypads. 
Electronic keypad devices are 
similar to telephone keypads (12 
keys). This type of keypad consists 
of simple push-button switches that, 
when depressed, are decoded by 
digital logic circuits. When the correct 
sequence of buttons is pushed, an 
electric signal unlocks the door for a 
few seconds. 
Computer controlled keypad devices 
are devices similar to electronic keypad 
devices, except they are equipped with 
a microprocessor in the keypad or in a 
separate enclosure at a different 
location. The microprocessor monitors 
the sequence in which the keys are 
depressed and may 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
provide additional functions such as 
personal ID and digit scrambling. When 
the correct code is entered and all 
conditions are satisfied, an electric 
signal unlocks the door. 
VISUAL X-17 
Credential Devices 
. � Magnetic Stripe Card 
. � Wiegand-effect Card 
. � Proximity Card 
. � Smart Card 
. � Bar Code 

A credential device identifies a person having legitimate authority to enter a controlled 
area. A coded credential (e.g., plastic card or key) contains a prerecorded, machine-
readable code. An electric signal unlocks the door if the prerecorded code matches the 
code stored in the system when the card is read. 
Magnetic stripe card is a strip of 
magnetic material located along one 
edge of the card which is encoded 
with data (sometimes encrypted). The 
data is read by moving the card past a 
magnetic read head. 
Wiegand-effect card contains a series 
of small-diameter, parallel wires 
approximately 1/2-inch long, 
embedded in the bottom half of the 
card. The wires are manufactured from 
ferromagnetic materials that produce a 
sharp change in magnetic flux when 
exposed to a slowly changing magnetic 
field. This type of card is impervious 
to accidental erasure. The card reader 
contains a small read head and a tiny 
magnet to supply the applied magnetic 
field. It usually does not require 
external power. 
Proximity card is not physically 
inserted into a reader; the coded 
pattern on the card is sensed when it is 
brought within several inches of the 
reader. Several techniques are 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
used to code cards. One technique uses 
a number of electrically tuned circuits 
embedded in the card. Data are encoded 
by varying resonant frequencies of the 
tuned circuits. The reader contains a 
transmitter that continually sweeps 
through a specified range of frequencies 
and a receiver that senses the pattern of 
resonant frequencies contained in the 
card. Another technique uses an 
integrated circuit embedded in the card 
to generate a code that can be 
magnetically or electrostatically coupled 
to the reader. 
Smart card is embedded with a 
microprocessor, memory, 
communication circuitry, and a 
battery. The card contains edge 
contacts that enable a reader to 
communicate with the microprocessor. 
Entry control information and other 
data may be stored in the 
microprocessor�s memory. 
Bar code consists of black bars 
printed on white paper or tape that 
can be easily read with an optical 
scanner. This type of coding is not 
widely used for entry control 
applications because it can be easily 
duplicated. 
VISUAL X-18 
Biometric Devices 
. � Fingerprints 
. � Hand Geometry 
. � Retinal Patterns 

The third basic technique used to control entry is based on the measurement of one or 
more physical or personal characteristics of an individual. Because most entry control 
devices based on this technique rely on measurements of biological characteristics, they 
have become commonly known as biometric devices. Characteristics such as fingerprints, 
hand geometry, voiceprints, handwriting, and retinal blood-vessel patterns have been used 
for controlling entry. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
Typically, in enrolling individuals, several reference measurements are made of the 
selected characteristic and then stored in the device�s memory or on a card. From then on, 
when that person attempts entry, a scan of the characteristic is compared with the 
reference data template. If a match is found, entry is granted. 
Fingerprints verification devices use one of two approaches. One is pattern recognition 
of the whorls, loops, and tilts of the referenced fingerprint, which is stored in a digitized 
representation of the image and compared with the fingerprint of the prospective entrant. 
The second approach is minutiae comparison, which means that the endings and 
branching points of ridges and valleys of the referenced fingerprint are compared with the 
fingerprint of the prospective entrant. 
Hand geometry devices use a variety of physical measurements of the hand, such as 
finger length, finger curvature, hand width, webbing between fingers, and light 
transmissivity through the skin to verify identity. Both two- and three-dimensional 
units are available. 
Retinal patterns is based on the premise that the pattern of blood vessels on the human 
eye�s retina is unique to an individual. While the eye is focused on a visual target, a low-
intensity IR light beam scans a circular area of the retina. The amount of light reflected 
from the eye is recorded as the beam progresses around the circular path. Reflected light is 
modulated by the difference in reflectivity between blood-vessel pattern and adjacent 
tissue. This information is processed and converted to a digital template that is stored as 
the eye�s signature. 
Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-19 
Closed Circuit Television Systems 
. � Interior CCTV - alarm assessment, card reader door assessment, emergency exit 
door assessment, and surveillance of lobbies, corridors, and open areas 
. �	Exterior CCTV - alarm assessment, individual zones and portal 
assessment, specific paths and areas, exclusion areas, surveillance of waterside activities 

VISUAL X-20 
Summary 
Remember all the different components of the system must support each others function. 
For example, the best barriers are those tied to a detection system, like a strain sensitive 
cable alarm sensor on a chain link fence, with a steel cable woven into the fence, delay 
function, and overseen by an assessment method, such as a CCTV system. 
. �	Use the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist to identify electronic 
security system requirements. 
. �	Public safety is enhanced by electronic security system (deter, detect, 
deny, devalue). 
. �	Electronic security systems components and capabilities interact with 
other systems (LAN, doors, windows, lighting). 
. �	Electronic security systems can be used to mitigate vulnerabilities. 

Unit X: Electronic Security Systems 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL X-21 
Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit X Case Study activity in the Student 
Manual, and the GIS portfolio. 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 
At the end of 10 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
Student Activity 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon the various components and technology available 
for use in electronic security systems. 
The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary building design vulnerability assessment. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Working in small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS 
portfolio to determine answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 

Take 10 minutes to complete this activity. Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group. 
Transition 
In the next unit, you will finalize and present of Case Study Results. This will include 
preparation and presentation of the top three risks identified by the group, the 
vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and top three recommended mitigation measures 
to reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be prioritized as well as the top 
three recommended mitigation measures with rationale and justification. It includes any 
consideration for changes to security systems per Unit X. 
UNIT X CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: ELECTRONIC SECURITY SYSTEMS 
In this Unit, the emphasis will be upon the various components and technology available 
for use in electronic security systems. The Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a screening tool for preliminary building design 
vulnerability assessment. 
Requirement 
Refer to the HIC Case Study and to the GIS portfolio to determine answers to the 
questions. Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 
1. 1.	Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist that address security systems 
2. 2.	Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the risk 
ratings determined in Unit VI Case Study Activity and, based on this detailed analysis, 
decide if the rating is accurate. 
3. 3.	Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from 
security system design. 
4. 4.	Estimate the new risk ratings for high risk asset-threat pairs based on the 
recommended mitigation measures. 

Section 
Vulnerability Questions 
Guidance 
Observations 
12.1 
Are black/white or color CCTV 
(closed circuit television) 
cameras used? Are they 
monitored and recorded 24 
hours/7 days a week? By 
whom? Are they analog or 
digital by design? What are the 
number of fixed, wireless and 
pan-tilt-zoom cameras used? 
Who are the manufacturers of 
the CCTV cameras? 
Security technology is frequently 
considered to complement or 
supplement security personnel 
forces and to provide a wider area 
of coverage. Typically, these 
physical security elements 
provide the first line of defense 
in deterring, detecting, and 
responding to threats and 
reducing vulnerabilities. They 
must be viewed as an integral 
component of the overall security 
program. Their design, 
engineering, installation, 
operation, and management must 
be able to meet daily security 
challenges from a cost-effective 
and efficiency perspective. 
During and after an incident, the 
system, or its backups, should be 
CCTV systems are 
used in the back 
parking area, 
including the loading 
dock area. The HIC 
security officer 
monitors the cameras 
from his desk. There 
is a VHS recorder. It 
is an older generation 
analog system. 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Unit X: 
Electronic 
Security 
Systems 
What is the age of the CCTV 
cameras in use? 
functional per the planned 
design. Consider color CCTV 
cameras to view and record 
activity at the perimeter of the 
building, particularly at primary 
entrances and exits. A mix of 
monochrome cameras should be 
considered for areas that lack 
adequate illumination for color 
cameras. Reference: GSA PBS P-
100 

12.2 
Are the cameras programmed to 
respond automatically to 
perimeter building alarm 
events? Do they have built-in 
video motion capabilities? 
The efficiency of monitoring 
multiple screens decreases as the 
number of screens increases. 
Tying the alarm system or 
motion sensors to a CCTV 
camera and a monitoring screen 
improves the man-machine 
interface by drawing attention to 
a specific screen and its 
associated camera. Adjustment 
may be required after installation 
due to initial false alarms, 
usually caused by wind or small 
animals. Reference: Physical 
Security Assessment for the 
Department of Veterans Affairs 
Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.3 
What type of camera housings 
are used and are they 
environmental in design to 
protect against exposure to heat 
and cold weather elements? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.4 
Are panic/duress alarm buttons 
or sensors used, where are they 
located, and are they hardwired 
or portable? 
Call buttons should be provided 
at key public contact areas and as 
needed in offices of managers and 
directors, in garages and parking 
lots, and other high risk 
locations by assessment. 
Reference: GSA PBS P-100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.5 
Are intercom call boxes used in 
parking areas or along the 
building perimeter? 
See item 12.4. 
No. 
12.6 
What is the transmission media 
used to transmit camera video 
signals: fiber, wire line, 
telephone wire, coaxial, 
wireless? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Telephone wire. 
12.7 
Who monitors the CCTV 
system? 
Reference: DOC CIAO 
Vulnerability Assessment 
Framework 1.1 
The HIC security 
officer. 

Unit X: 
Electronic 
Security 
Systems 
12.8 
What is the quality of video 
images both during the day and 
hours of darkness? Are infrared 
camera illuminators used? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.9 
Are the perimeter cameras 
supported by an uninterruptible 
power supply, battery, or 
building emergency power? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.10 
What type of exterior Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) sensors 
are used? (electromagnetic; fiber 
optic; active infrared; bistatic 
microwave; seismic; 
photoelectric; ground; fence; 
glass break (vibration/shock); 
single, double, and roll-up door 
magnetic contacts or switches) 
Consider balanced magnetic 
contact switch sets for all 
exterior doors, including 
overhead/roll-up doors, and 
review roof intrusion detection. 
Consider glass break sensors for 
windows up to scalable heights. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 
12.11 
Is a global positioning satellite 
system (GPS) used to monitor 
vehicles and asset movements? 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Unknown without a 
more detailed on-site 
assessment. 

Security System Mitigation Measures 
Unit X: Electronic Security 
Systems Asset-
Threat/Hazard Pair 
Current Risk 
Rating 
Suggested Mitigation 
Measure 
Revised Risk 
Rating 
1. Explosive Blast/Site 
High 
Upgrade CCTVs to 
digital and use DVRs. 
Install CCTVs to monitor 
front parking. 
Medium 
2. Explosive 
Blast/Building 
High 
Upgrade CCTVs to 
digital and use DVRs. 
Install CCTVs to monitor 
interior lobby and loading 
dock. 
Medium 
3. Chemical/Mechanical 
Systems 
High 
Install basic chemical 
sensors on outside air 
intake-HVAC system. 
Medium 
4. Biological/Mechanical 
Systems 
High 
Evaluate acquisition of 
portable or basic level 
biological sensors 
High to Medium 
5. Radiological 
High 
Evaluate acquisition of 
portable or basic level 
radiological sensors 
High to Medium 

Unit XI:  Case Study




U
nit 
XI 
COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security 
TIME 135 
minutes 
UNIT TITLE Case Study 
OBJECTIVES 1.	Explain building security design issues to a building owner 
for consideration prior to a renovation or new construction 
1. 2.	Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset � 
threat/hazard pairs 
2. 3.	Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the benefits in 
reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest 

SCOPE	The following topics will be covered in this unit: 
1.	Activity: Preparation and presentation of the top three risks 
identified by the group, the vulnerabilities identified for these 
risks, and top three recommended mitigation measures to 
reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be 
prioritized as well as the top three recommended mitigation 
measures with rationale and justification. Includes any 
consideration for changes to security systems per Unit X. 
REFERENCES 1.	FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential 
Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings 
1. 2.	Student Manual, Unit XI (handouts will be a 1-page summary of analysis 
results and briefing format for presentation of information) 
2. 3.	Unit XI visuals 
3. 4.	Case Study � Hazardville Information Company 

REQUIREMENTS 1. Overhead projector or computer display unit 
1. 2.	Unit XI visuals 
2. 3. Instructor Guide 
3. 4. Student Manual 

 Unit XI 
UNIT XI OUTLINE	Time Page 
XI. Case Study	135 minutes IG XI-
1 
1. 1.	Activity: Preparation of Presentation by Groups 45 minutes IG XI-15 
2. 2.	Presentation by Groups 90 minutes IG XI-20 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 
 �	Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Notes to 
identify topics that should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic 
content, and prepare for a locally oriented discussion. 
 The Instructor will review the Hazardville Information Inc. site and building 
portfolio, DoD Antiterrorism Standards, and GSA Interagency Security Criteria, and 
provide the building owners parameters for the Design Basis Threat and Levels of 
Protection. 
. �	Optional Activity: There are no optional activities in this unit. 
. �	Activity: The students will prepare and present the top three risks 
identified by the group, the vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and top three 
recommended mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks 
will be prioritized as well as the top three recommended mitigation measures with 
rationale and justification. Includes any consideration for changes to security systems per 
Unit X. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-1 
Introduction and Unit Overview 
This is Unit XI Case Study activity. This unit will review the Hazardville Information 
Company, Inc., site and building portfolio, DoD Antiterrorism Standards and GSA 
Interagency Security Criteria, and provide the building owners parameters for the Design 
Basis Threat and Levels of Protection. 
Students will prepare and present the top three risks identified by the group, the 
vulnerabilities identified for these risks, and top three recommended mitigation measures 
to reduce vulnerability and risk. The top three risks will be prioritized as well as the top 
three recommended mitigation measures with rationale and justification. Includes any 
consideration for changes to security systems per Unit X. 
VISUAL XI-2 
Unit Objectives 
At the end of this unit, you should be able to: 
1. 1.	Explain building security design issues to a building owner for 
consideration prior to a renovation or new construction. 
2. 2.	Explain the identification process to arrive at the high risk asset � 
threat/hazard pairs. 
3. 3.	Justify the recommended mitigation measures, explaining the benefits in 
reducing the risk for the high risk situations of interest. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-3 
VISUAL XI-4 
VISUAL XI-5 
Hazardville Information Company 
The Case Study will be a comprehensive review and practical application of FEMA 
426. 
In this unit, the following topics will be presented: 
. � Company Functions 
. � Company Infrastructure 
. � Threats/Hazards 
. � Vulnerabilities 

Hazardville Information Company 
The Hazardville Information Company supports approximately 1,000 users and 100 
applications as a primary data center and as a disaster recovery backup site. 
HIC has over 130 employees and approximately 80 to 100 employees are in the building 
at any given time. 
. � Regional computer center 
. � Suburban business park 
. � Customers and neighbors 

HIC 5-Mile Radius 
The Hazardville Information Company is located approximately 15 miles outside of a 
major urban city in the suburbs, and adjacent to a major interstate highway. There are 
several commercial iconic properties, one military installation, and several government 
offices within a 5mile radius of the HIC building. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
 VISUAL XI-6 
HIC Local Imagery 
The office building is part of a corporate business park. HIC does not control the front 
parking area, signage, or other general site conditions such as stormwater drainage, 
lighting, or vehicle and pedestrian traffic flow and movement. The business park is 
responsible for grounds maintenance to include cutting the grass, planting flowers, 
trimming trees, sweeping the parking lot, and towing unauthorized vehicles. Trash service 
is the responsibility of tenants. HIC has a large dumpster located at the rear of the loading 
dock area approximately 50 feet from the building. 
HIC receives the mail and packages at 
the front office lobby desk. Large 
packages and equipment are delivered to 
the rear loading dock. HIC does not 
have a separate mail room, but does 
have an internal administrative space 
with copiers, printers, supplies, and 
staff mailboxes. The front desk 
receptionist is responsible for sorting 
and screening all mail. 
The business park is adjacent to a 
major interstate highway and there are 
a number of storage tanks, 
manufacturing and production 
facilities, and other commercial 
properties across the interstate. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-7 
VISUAL XI-8 
VISUAL XI-9 
HIC Office Building 
The HIC office space has client and staff parking in the front and a rear parking and 
loading dock area for supply trucks, vendors, and trash. 
The front parking are is unrestricted, but the back parking area is fully enclosed with 
chain link fencing on the perimeter of the property. There is no gate or means to prevent 
vehicles from transiting around the rear of the business park. 
HIC HazMat Sites 
There are a significant number of hazardous waste sites in near proximity to the HIC 
building. The vast majority are small generators such as gas stations, dry cleaning, and 
other commercial businesses. Large generators include the petroleum storage and 
production facility located across the interstate. 
HIC Emergency Response 
The local emergency response capabilities include primary police, fire, and medical 
facilities approximately 8 to 10 miles away. There are multiple means of ingress and 
egress to the HIC building complex and the site is served by fire mains with a hydrant 
located approximately 200 feet from the HIC office. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-10 
HIC Functional Layout 
. � Downstairs: Computers Center, Communications, Staff 
. �	Upstairs: Executive offices 
. �	Highbay loading dock, mechanical and electrical (M&E) room 

VISUAL XI-11 
HIC Car Bomb Blast Effects 
The nominal range-to-effects chart radius of influence of a small car bomb detonation at 
the front entrance indicates that the building would experience significant damage, but 
likely not suffer progressive collapse. The front fa�ade of the building is approximately 
75 percent annealed glass and has an 8-foot overhang. The terrain slopes upward from the 
parking lot to the main entrance, and is landscaped with flower beds and trees. Key staff 
would probably be killed and administrative functions destroyed, but the Computer 
Center and Communications functions would likely survive relatively intact. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-12 
HIC Truck Bomb Blast Effects 
A truck bomb detonation occurring on the interstate would also significantly damage the 
HIC building, primarily glass breakage and potentially some structural damage. If the 
truck bomb were to detonate near the tank farm, the ensuing explosion, fire, and plume 
would have significant impact on the HIC building. 
VISUAL XI-13 
HIC Truck Bomb Effects 
A truck bomb detonation at the rear of the HIC building at the loading dock would result 
in significant structural damage and potentially progressive collapse. The Computer 
Center, Communications, and other critical functions would be destroyed. Critical 
infrastructure that would be destroyed includes the mechanical/electrical room. 
VISUAL XI-14 
HIC Building Data 
. � Structural 
. � Mechanical 
. � Electrical 
. � IT 
. � Physical Security 

HIC Structural System 
The HIC building is a two-story steel frame structure with a brick facade and annealed 
glass. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-15 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
The air used to heat or cool the HIC Headquarters building is filtered in the HVAC room 
using standard industrial grade MERV 8 filters. Outside make-up air is brought in through 
a vent in the wall located approximately 3 feet above ground level. 
The Computer Data Center has two additional air cooling units located in the data center 
and uses the main chill water supply. The data center maintains a slight net positive 
pressure compared to the main office areas. 
VISUAL XI-16 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
The return air for the main office space has sufficient room inside the ductwork and 
mechanical room area to incorporate additional filters and equipment. 
VISUAL XI-17 
HIC Mechanical Systems 
Chiller operation along with chilled water and condenser water flow are managed from 
a single control unit in the M&E room. A single chilled water pump provides adequate 
flow for all cooling situations; a backup pump is available at the push of a button. The 
same is true for the condenser water pumps. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-18 
HIC Electrical One-Line Diagram 
HIC�s electrical loads are divided between two main electrical buses, the Computer Center 
Bus (CCB) and the Support Bus (SB). They are located in separate "closets" of the 
building. A tie breaker allows the buses to be connected, so they can be powered by a 
single main transformer, or to allow SB loads to be carried by the backup diesel generator. 
The system is monitored by a digital energy management system, which provides 
indications, alarms, and instructions. VISUAL XI-19 
HIC Mechanical and Electrical 
Room 
Typical of many commercial office buildings, the mechanical and electrical systems share 
common utility penetetrations and floor space. There are no redundant utility feeds to the 
building from different directions. 
VISUAL XI-20 
Physical Security 
HIC uses a layered approach to physical 
security. 
. �	The outermost physical security layer is provided by a contract security 
firm and the Defense Protective Service (DPS). 
. �	The parking lot behind the HIC office is well lit and monitored by older 
generation analog CCTV cameras. 
. �	The front parking lot is lit, but not monitored. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
HIC�s middle layer of security is the 
building envelope. 
�	The building is monitored by door 
and window alarms, which connect 
to ADT, the nationwide alarm 
company. 
The innermost layer of physical 
security 
involves the Computer Center and the 
Communications Center. 
. �	Equipped with locked doors, rooms meet the government�s requirements 
for handling classified material. 
. �	Only authorized employees possess the necessary proximity cards and 
PINs to gain access. 

VISUAL XI-21 
IT 
The Computer Center is the heart of the Hazardville Information Company�s (HIC) 
operation. 
The Computer Center is composed of several interconnected systems and one 
independent system for classified data processing. The systems run either VMS, Unix, 
or Windows. 
Data: 
HIC has two T1 lines and one T3 line 
connected at the demark to ATT�s 
high performance backbone network. 
The ATT fiber connectivity provides 
more than enough bandwidth for 
HIC�s current needs and planned 
future expansion. 
Telecom and Network Connections: 
. �	Two T1 lines (1.544 Mbps) 
. �	One T3 (45 Mbps) 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. � Frame Relay 
. � Narrowband ISDN (64/128 Kbps) 

Voice 
NEC DS2000 telephone systems that 
come with an 8-slot cabinet that can 
handle 32 lines from 48 stations. 
VISUAL XI-22 
Emergency Response 
In the event of an emergency, the HIC senior management use the large conference 
room as an emergency operations center. The room is equipped with network and 
telephone connections and cell phones are able to receive a signal. 
The nearest fire station is approximately 21/2 miles north of the HIC Headquarters. 
Seven others are within 5 miles of the site. Firefighters are trained as Emergency 
Medical Technicians (EMTs) and Hazardous Material Technicians. Many are also 
skilled in technical rescue (high places, confined spaces, etc.). Ambulances are also 
dispatched from these stations. Emergency response time for emergencies is estimated 
to be 8-10 minutes. Fire hydrants are available in the office park. 
The nearest hospital with an 
emergency room is 5 miles away. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-23 
Threats/Hazards 
. � Terrorism 
. � Intelligence 
. � Crime 
. � HazMat 
. � Natural Hazards 

VISUAL XI-24 
Design Basis Threat 
Explosive Blast: Car Bomb � approximately 250 lb TNT equivalent. Truck Bomb � 
approximately 5,000 lb TNT equivalent (Murrah Federal Building class weapon) 
Chemical: Large quantity gasoline spill and toxic plume from the adjacent tank farm, small 
quantity (tanker truck and rail car size) spills of HazMat materials (chlorine). 
Biological: Anthrax delivered by mail or 
in packages, smallpox distributed by 
spray mechanism mounted on truck or 
aircraft around metropolitan area. 
Radiological: Small "dirty" bomb 
detonation within the 10-mile radius of 
the HIC building. 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-25 
VISUAL XI-26 
VISUAL XI-27 
Level of Protection 
GSA Level II Interagency Security Criteria 
. � Perimeter Security 
. � Entry Security 
. � Interior Security 
. � Administrative Procedures 
. � Blast/Setback Standards 

Level of Protection 
DoD Low, Inhabited Building 
. � Potential Structural Damage 
. � Potential Door and Glazing Hazards 
. � Potential Injury 

Level of Protection 
DoD Low, Inhabited Building Stand-off Distance or Separation Requirements 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-28 
VISUAL XI-29 
VISUAL XI-30 
Members of the instructor staff should be available to answer questions and assist groups 
as needed. 
Level of Protection 
UFC 4-010-01 Appendix B DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New and 
Existing Buildings Standards 1-12 
What standards are applicable to the Case Study? 
Level of Protection 
UFC 4-010-01 Appendix B DoD Minimum Antiterrorism Standards for New and 
Existing Buildings Standards 13-22 
What standards are applicable to the Case Study? 
In addition to the standards, review the DoD Recommendations for New and Existing 
Buildings, Appendix C. 
Case Study Activity 
In this Unit, the students will finalize the assessment, determine high priority risk 
concerns, recommend mitigation options, and present findings to the class. 
Activity Requirements 
. �	Working in small groups, refer to the HIC Case Study and the GIS 
portfolio to determine answers to the worksheet questions. 
. �	Then review results to identify vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures, rank and prioritize the findings. 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
At the end of 45 minutes, reconvene the class and facilitate group reporting. 
VISUAL XI-31 
VISUAL XI-32

Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Car Bomb Blast/Site 
�	Protect front entrance from car bomb blast � 82-foot stand-off 
a. o	Use planters, plinth walls, landscaping 
b. o	FRF film on windows or replace with laminated glass 
c. o	Consider closing in overhang area 

Truck Bomb/Site 
�	Protect rear parking area from truck bomb 
o	Use chain link gate, vehicle pop barriers, pre-screening away from building 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Chemical/Mechanical-HVAC 
. �	Install emergency shut down switch, protect outside air intake 
. �	Evaluate carbon filters for chlorine type spills 
 .�	Upgrade filters to MERV 11 to remove gasoline plume and other particulates 
 .Biological/Mechanical-HVAC 
. �	Evaluate UVGI 
 .�	Evaluate a standalone mailroom on separate HVAC zone 
 .Radiological/Site 
. �	Install emergency shut down switch on HVAC 
. �	Upgrade filters to MERV 11 to remove radioactive particulates 

Unit XI: 	Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES
	CONTENT/AC
TIVITY 
VISUAL XI-33 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Other significant vulnerabilities/mitigations 
Blast/Site 
. �	Separate front lobby from interior office space with security door if 
primary mail entry point is the lobby area 
. �	Distribute internal functions for redundancy 
 �	Evaluate other utility connections/distribution capability for redundant 
feed to the building 
 Blast/Structural/Building 
. �	Strengthen overhead anchorage elements 

o	Heaters 
VISUAL XI-34 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Mechanical 
 .�	Fire sprinklers 
 .o Install enunciator panel and go to zones, dual stage in data center, clean agents versus 
water 
 .�	Chill water 
 .o	Install backup piping to primary air handling units 
. �	Install exhaust fan in UPS room (lead acid batteries) 
 .�	Place bollards around or relocate natural 
 .gas meters Electrical 
 .�	Primary Bus 
 .o	Separate Computer Center Bus from Support Bus 
. �	Place bollards or fencing around transformers 
. �	Increase size of generator fuel tank 

Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES	CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
VISUAL XI-35 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
IT Systems 
. �	Store backup tapes/data at least 10 miles away 
. �	Identify alternate telecom carrier circuits and availability 
 �	Conduct full extended load test of emergency power/UPS system 
 Physical Security 
. �	Raise height of rear perimeter fencing 
. �	Evaluate installing a small Security Operations Center and increase 
monitoring/awareness of exterior 
. �	Upgrade CCTV system to digital and DVR and install additional cameras 
to view front parking, lobby, and loading dock 

VISUAL XI-36 
Vulnerability/Mitigation Findings 
Emergency Operations/Disaster Recovery 
. �	Install mass notification system 
. �	Post shelter and evacuation procedures 
. �	Identify rally point at site away from building 
. �	Use Computer Data Center for Shelter in Place 
. �	Acquire personal protective evacuation hoods 

Transition 
This completes the Building Design 
for Homeland Security instruction. In 
this course, you have learned how to 
perform a multi-hazard risk 
assessment of a building and have 
become familiar with the key 
concepts of to protect buildings from 
manmade threats and hazards: 
Unit XI: Case Study 
INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
. � Asset Value 
. � Design Basis Threat 
. � Level of Protection 
. � Layers of Defense 
. � Vulnerability Assessment 
. � Risk Assessment 
. � Mitigation Options 

Using the approach and guidance provided in FEMA 426, the majority of building owners 
should be able to complete a risk assessment of their building in a few days and identify 
the primary vulnerabilities, mitigation options, and make informed decisions on the ability 
of their building to survive, recover, and operate should an attack or event occur. 
Course certificates will be presented in the next unit. 
UNIT XI CASE STUDY ACTIVITY:
PREPARATION AND PRESENTATION OF GROUP RESULTS

In this activity, students work with their groups to finalize their assessments, decide 
on high priority risk concerns, determine appropriate mitigation measures and present 
findings to the class. 
Requirement 
1. 1. Based on findings from the previous activities completed in the previous ten 
units, complete the following table. 
2. 2. Be prepared to present conclusions and to justify decisions to the class in a 5-7 
minute presentation. 

Prioritized Asset-
Requirements to Mitigate 
Rationale 
Threat/Hazard Pair 


Car Bomb Blast/Site and 
Building 
Protect front entrance from car 
bomb blast � 82-foot stand-off 
DoD Standard 1 DoD 
Standard 6 

Use planters, plinth walls, 
landscaping 
DoD Standard 8 

FRF film on windows or 


replace with laminated glass 


Consider closing in overhang 


area 

Truck Bomb/Site 
Protect rear parking area from 
truck bomb 
DoD Standard 1 


DoD Standard 6 

Use chain link gate, vehicle 
pop barriers, pre-screening 
away from building 
DoD Standard 8 

Consider closing in overhang 


area 


Chemical/Mechanical-HVAC 
Install emergency shut down 
switch, protect outside air 
intake 
DoD Standard 17 DoD 
Standard 18 

Evaluate carbon filters for 
DoD Recommendation 6 

chlorine type spills 


Upgrade filters to MERV 11 
to remove gasoline plume and 
other particulates 

Biological/Mechanical-
Evaluate UVGI 
DoD Standard 13 
HVAC 



Evaluate a standalone 
DoD Standard 17 

mailroom on separate HVAC 


zone 
DoD Standard 18 
Radiological/Site 
Install emergency shut down 
switch on HVAC 
DoD Standard 17 


DoD Standard 18 

Upgrade filters to MERV 11 
to remove radioactive 
particulates 

Armed Attack/Site and 
Building 
Separate front lobby from 
interior office space with 
security door if primary mail 
entry point is the lobby area 
DoD Standard 11 DoD 
Standard 19 DoD 
Recommendation 2 

Distribute internal functions 


for redundancy 
DoD Recommendation 3 

Evaluate other utility 
connections/distribution 
capability for redundant feed 
to the building 
DoD Recommendation 12 
DoD Recommendation 13 
DoD Recommendation 15 

Blast/ Structural 
Strengthen overhead anchorage 
elements - Heaters 
DoD Standard 15 DoD 
Standard 20 
Blast/Mechanical 
Fire sprinklers - Install 
enunciator panel and go to 
zones, dual stage in data center, 
clean agents versus water Chill 
water - Install backup piping 
to primary air handling units 
Install exhaust fan in UPS 
room (lead acid batteries) Place 
bollards around or relocate 
natural gas meters 
DoD Standard 16 DoD 
Standard 17 DoD Standard 18 
DoD Standard 19 
Electrical 
Primary Bus - Separate 
Computer Center Bus from 
Support Bus Place bollards or 
fencing around transformers 
Increase size of generator fuel 
tank 
DoD Standard 18 DoD 
Standard 19 
IT Systems 
Store backup tapes/data at 
least 10 miles away Identify 
alternate telecom carrier 
circuits and availability 
Conduct full extended load test 
of emergency power/UPS 
system 
DoD Standard 18 DoD 
Standard 19 DoD Standard 20 

Physical Security 
Raise height of rear perimeter 
DoD Standard 1 

fencing 



DoD Standard 2 

Evaluate installing a small 


Security Operations Center and 


increase monitoring/awareness 


of exterior 


Upgrade CCTV system to 


digital and DVR and install 


additional cameras to view 


front parking, lobby, and 


loading dock 

Emergency 
Install mass notification 
DoD Standard 18 
Operations/Disaster 
system 

Recovery 

DoD Standard 22 

Post shelter and evacuation 


procedures 
DoD Recommendation 
14 

Identify rally point at site away 


from building 


Use Computer Data Center for 


Shelter in Place 


Acquire personal protective 


evacuation hoods 


Unit XII:  Course Wrap-up 
Uni
t 
XII 
COURSE TITLE 
Building Design for Homeland Security 



TIME 60 minutes 
UNIT TITLE 
Course Wrap-up 

SCOPE 
1. Discussion of general issues and concerns 


2. Course evaluation 


3. Distribution of course certificates 

REFERENCES 
No references are required for this unit. 


REQUIREMENTS 
1. Course evaluation form (one per student) 

2. Course certificates 
PREPARATION 
Before training this unit, review the students� lists of expectations 

recorded in Unit I. 

Unit XII Outline 
Time 
Page 
XII. Wrap-up 
60 minutes 
IG XII-1 
1. General Discussion 
15 minutes 
IG XII-2 
2. Course Evaluations 
15 minutes 
IG XII-2 
3. Course Certificates 
30 minutes 
IG XII-2 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES 
Review the students� course expectations, as listed in Unit I. Relate those expectations to 
key concepts covered in each unit of the course. Determine whether the students feel that 
each expectation was met, and discuss as needed. 
Invite questions and comments from the students related to the training or to building 
design for Homeland security in general (e.g., state or local issues, funding sources, use 
of FEMA 426, etc.). 
Address the students� concerns, as needed. 
Distribute the course evaluation forms. Ask the students to take their time in completing 
the evaluation. 
Distribute the course certificates to the students. 
CONTENT/ACTIVITY 
General Discussion 
Sample questions to ask include: 
. �	How does this expectation relate to material covered in the course? 
. �	Has this expectation been met? 
. �	Have any issues have been left unaddressed? 
. �	How does this issue relate to your role in building design for Homeland 
security, and how do you expect to apply this material on the job? 
. �	Are there any questions or comments about the course content, exercises, 
written exam or other aspects of the training? 
. �	Are there any questions or comments about building design for Homeland 
security in general? 

Course Evaluations 
FEMA uses the evaluations to improve future course deliveries. The students� feedback 
is very important for ensuring a quality program. 
Course Certificates