Confronting War:

Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners

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PREFACE

The findings in this publication are the result of a three-year examination of many practical experiences of peace practice.

The Reflecting on Peace Practice Project has involved over two hundred international, national, and local peace agencies around the world. Through a collaborative learning effort, these agencies have pooled their experience and their wisdom to reflect on, assess, and learn more about the practice of peace. The purpose of this effort was to learn from experience what has worked and what has not worked, and why. Many joined this effort because they wanted to improve their effectiveness; they wanted to see if, and how, they could have a greater impact on the ending of war and the achievement of peace.

Organized by the Collaborative for Development Action (Cambridge, Massachusetts in the United States), the Reflecting on Peace Practice Project focused specifically on the peace practice of agencies that cross borders. It seemed clear that an international effort could not presume to improve peace practice undertaken by people in their own conflicts. However, in so many current conflicts, "outside" peace practitioners join with local activists to partner in their work. Consequently, it was essential also to engage peace agencies from areas of conflict in this exploration of the ways that external efforts can be truly helpful.

The first step in learning from experience is to gather a great deal of it. Over an eighteen month period, RPP conducted twenty-six case studies on a wide variety of types of peace efforts, undertaken in a range of geographical settings, in different stages of conflict, at different levels of society, and with varying forms of connectedness to local, indigenous peace efforts. (Appendix 1 lists these case studies.) These case studies were done at the invitation of the agencies involved, to capture their internal reflections on their work, as well as the views of a wide range of counterparts – participants, partnering local and international NGOs and other agencies, communities affected by the work, representatives of relevant levels of government, etc. The cases were conducted through field visits to the areas where the programs were undertaken.

As these case studies were collected, RPP organized several consultations bringing together more than eighty peace practitioners—again both those who live in conflict situations and those who work outside their own countries. These practitioners reviewed and reflected on what the cases were telling us.

From the case studies and the consultations, a series of issues emerged as central to effective peace practice but around which there remain significant differences of experience and belief.

Eleven such issues were identified, grouped in three broad areas:

1) Cross-Cutting Strategy Issues

Linkages between levels in peace work Roles and relationships between "insider" and "outsider" peace agencies Relationship between context analysis and strategy development Tradeoffs between working for the reduction of violence and for social justice Dealing with deliberate disruptions of peace processes Special issues and roles for humanitarian and development organizations

2) Understanding Impacts

Indicators of impact Criteria for effectiveness Inadvertent negative impacts

3) Specific Approaches and Tools

The role and impact of dialogues The role and impact of peace trainings

Papers were written that systematically recorded the experiences from the case studies and the consultations on each issue, and identified the areas where there was still ambiguous or incomplete evidence. These Issue Papers were then widely circulated for additional feedback.

The papers also formed the basis for a series of twenty-five "feedback workshops", held over an additional fifteen months, for further learning about these issues. These workshops were held in sixteen countries, with over five hundred participants representing over one hundred agencies. (See Appendix 2 for a list of feedback workshops.)

In these workshops, experienced practitioners unpacked the issues further, seeking ways of handling them that could be helpful in future peace work. Again, the focus was on how cross-border peace practitioners could be more helpful. But, because to explore this it was essential to work with activists and agencies from areas of conflict, most of whom work in some form of relationship with "outsiders," approximately one half of the participants in the workshops were activists who work on conflicts in their own countries or districts. Therefore, although RPP began with a focus on improving the peace work of "outsiders," much of what is reported below also addresses the circumstances encountered by, and should be useful to, people working for peace within their own societies.

Acknowledgements

In so many ways, credit for what follows should go to each of the many people involved in RPP. Many people gave substantial amounts of time, energy, and insights to this collective effort. Especially we must mention the efforts of the Steering Group for RPP, made up of representatives of 11 international agencies that work on conflict in various ways and locales. (See Appendix 3 for the RPP Steering Group list.) Over the three years of the project, they volunteered countless hours to keep the effort focused on the things that matter to practitioners. They also brought an ever-expanding network of colleagues from around the world into this collective inquiry. In addition, many agencies around the world volunteered their experience and provided time and staff to carry out the RPP case studies that formed the core material for the inquiry. Many others contributed time, energy, and resources to organize and host a series of feedback workshops.

Financial support for this collaborative inquiry has been generously provided by the Australian Agency for International Development (AusAid), the Department for International Development of the United Kingdom (DFID), the German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Netherlands, The Norwegian Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida). Representatives from these donor agencies also participated in some of the consultations and contributed their own perspectives on the learning. The core funding from these agencies has been supplemented by significant direct and in-kind contributions from many of the participating NGOs.

In spite of the fact that each of these individuals and agencies contributed much to the learning reported below, we suspect that not a single one of them will agree with all that follows. This is because, as we (the staff of RPP) have worked with the learning and brought it together with the help of the Steering Group, it has become clear that the perspective afforded by the broad overview of experience gained through RPP is unique.

Thus, what is discussed does not represent a consensus of all who have been involved in RPP. Rather it represents the authors' thoughts and conclusions from looking across experience, across agencies, across conflicts, and across belief systems. We have tried to stay "true" to the findings of the project; that is, we do not theorize or speculate. But, we do take the vast material generated through the involvement of so many people in this effort and consolidate, derive, and interpret it in order to identify the emergent themes that appear to have universal validity. We hope and intend to capture the tone and mood and nuance of our peace-practitioner colleagues. We are completely transparent about the sources of the ideas and insights below. But, as will be noted, in some cases we report exactly what the community of peace workers is saying, experiencing, and finding, and in some cases we present our own observations of these activities and discussions.

One purpose of this booklet is to give back to the community of peace practitioners the learning that has accumulated from the multiple thoughtful inputs of so many. Another purpose is to provide ideas, based on the collected experience and our analysis, about how ongoing peace practice can become more effective. The goal that drives us all is to ensure that the communities with whom peace practitioners work may sooner enjoy sufficient stability and absence of violence to build the societies they desire.

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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION

This book is about the effectiveness of peace practice.

This term refers to the range of activities that are undertaken by non-state groups explicitly to end violent conflict and establish the conditions for lasting peace.

Who does peace practice and what does it look like?

Since the end of the Cold War, civil society groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), agencies of the United Nations, and regional organizations have increasingly intervened in conflict areas. The end of superpower rivalry brought new possibilities for such actors to play a role in peacemaking. The goals are twofold: both to end war and to build just, sustainable societies that resolve differences nonviolently. Such efforts are undertaken in all stages of conflict, from situations of latent tension and threatened violence, to full-blown civil war, to unstable periods after peace agreements are reached.

This work is called, variously, conflict management, peacebuilding, conflict transformation, conflict resolution, conflict prevention, peacemaking, or reconciliation.

The range of programmatic efforts is wide. Agencies offer peace education programs, or training in conflict analysis, peace skills, or non-violent activism. They organize people-to-people exchanges or they develop programs to promote reconciliation through specially targeted reconstruction or economic development efforts. They facilitate unofficial negotiation channels among political leaders, or bring representatives of divided communities together for dialogue. They dispatch civilian peace monitors to conflict areas to publicize (and ideally prevent) abuses. They support the development of "peace media" stations to foster objective reporting or to counter pro-war propaganda. These are just a few of the approaches used.

Although these efforts often go unnoticed by the international press and academic programs focused on international politics, there is a great deal of such peace work being done by many people in many places. The people who do it are savvy, smart, committed, and sincere. They expend enormous energy and time.

Why Focus on Effectiveness?

These practitioners—the activists and agency staff who undertake such initiatives—want to be effective. At the same time, they are ambivalent about a focus on effectiveness. On one hand, they want to know the impacts of their efforts and, for this, they recognize the need for a system that enables them to assess effectiveness—their own and that of others. On the other hand, although they regularly make judgments about how well something is working, they are nervous about doing so because they are not sure what criteria to use for measuring outcomes.

Peace practitioners very often put off the question of effectiveness, claiming:

"It is too soon to know the impacts of what we are doing. Peace takes a long time and we cannot know in the short run what our true effectiveness is." "It is too complicated to assess outcomes. Peace requires that many people work at many levels in different ways and, with all this work, you cannot tell who is responsible for what."

"It is too hard to know impacts of peace work. So much of peace work involves intangibles—changing hearts, attitudes, etc. How can we possibly even know the extent or depth of such changes?"

"It really is not necessary to assess outcomes. We are called to be faithful, to do good, without regard for outcomes. We do what we do because we must do something. To do nothing would be worse."

"All of our good efforts must be adding up. With so much good stuff happening, the effects will become clear someday."

"Measuring effectiveness is a donor agenda. We should not be drawn into their need to quantify everything. They have to understand that the usual approaches to assessment are not appropriate for peace."

However, it is clear that not all good programs are peace programs, and not all peace programs are effective peace programs. In fact, practitioners discuss with impressive candor their own assessments of how effective their activities are.

From such self-evaluations, the record of peace work is, at best, mediocre. In recent workshops, most practitioners gave their own work an "A" (excellent) for effort but only a "C" (just passing) for results. Few felt that they had been effective enough. Many see opportunities where they could have achieved more; they want to improve the results of their hard work and commitment. They want to make a real and positive difference.

How can we understand these assessments and what do peace practitioners see as the reasons they have not had more substantial results? Some of the reasons given are:

"We are too small, our resources are too limited. With such small efforts, we cannot have a big impact."

"Our donors make us work in projects. Peace is a process, not a set of activities. So long as we have to work in project cycles, we can never be as effective as we want to be."

"We do lots of good work, but it is only a small portion of what is needed for peace. What we do is dwarfed by the actions of states, and external events overwhelm our efforts. We cannot control the big geo-political forces and these can always undermine our progress. This does not mean our work is any less valuable."

"We cannot work any harder or longer. We are doing everything we can do now. Even if it is not enough, we simply cannot do more." These are realities. Most peace programs are small, peace is complicated, many people do need to do many things, peace does take time, etc. Yet, from the vantage point of a broad overview of many activities over many locations over a long period of time, one overwhelming conclusion emerges:

All of the good peace work being done should be adding up to more than it is. The potential of these multiple efforts is not fully realized. Practitioners know that, so long as people continue to suffer the consequences of unresolved conflicts, there is urgency for everyone to do better.

So, in spite of the real limitations and constraints, the question of effectiveness is high on the agenda of peace practitioners. It is posed in several ways: How do we do what we do better, with more effect, with better effect? How do we know that the work we do for peace is worthwhile? What, in fact, are the results of our work for the people on whose behalf, or with whom, we work?

This book addresses these questions.

PART I: UNDERSTANDING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION TO PART I

Where Are We Going?

"If you don't know where you are going, any road will get you there!" This warning from Alice in Wonderland is familiar to many of us.

Peace Practitioners want to improve the effectiveness of their work. But to talk about improving effectiveness, we need first to know where we want to get and, then, to consider the options for getting there. Only when we are clear about the goal and the possible paths to travel toward it, can we begin to sort out which is the most effective way to get there.

Often, the work of peace seems to be "all over the map"—literally and figuratively. It involves many different definitions of peace. It involves a variety of programmatic paths.

Peace practitioners regularly honor this variety, noting, "It takes many people doing many things at many levels to bring peace." There are two realities that support the idea that there are many ways to work for peace. The first is that conflicts vary. Indeed there are no formulae for peace precisely because different contexts require different strategies.

The second is that, in peace practice, there is strong evidence that the process is inextricably linked to the outcome. Staying with our metaphor, recognition of this linkage would mean that the question is not "which road" to take but, more importantly, how to travel it.

Practitioners say, "The ways we interact, the attitudes we convey, the modes we adopt, the sensitivity we bring, and the relationships we form matter." Some even say, "Any road can be the right road when we go about our work in the right spirit." Given this, if effectiveness means an exclusive focus on getting to the goal, this can obscure the importance of the processes for getting there. A focus only on outcomes can distort the very essence of what it means to do effective peace practice.

Given these realities, how can we understand the "right road" to peace?

In this book, we use the "right road" to mean the most direct road, but one that does not ignore the above considerations. That is, we explore how to get where peace work wants to go through a variety of programmatic paths in the most effective way, with the fewest stumbles, diversions, or detours.

The Basic Roads and Destinations

The goals and motivations for peace programs range widely. To some peace means an end to overt violence and a functional harmony where people live with conflicts and deal with them in non-violent ways. Others see this as only a negative peace. They point instead to the need for transformation of social/political and economic arrangements to address the inequalities that fuel violence to achieve real peace—a "positive" peace. Others see that even this is inadequate. They feel that injustices must not only be corrected, but acknowledged and redressed before peace can be achieved. Still others see that peace means a situation where people's basic attitudes and behaviors are transformed so that they resist domination and violence at all levels, from the personal to the political.

It is impossible to define peace in a way that all can agree. However, overall, RPP finds the wide array of programs undertaken aim toward two basic goals:

Stopping Violence and Destructive Conflict

When agencies work to end war, their programs are aimed at ending cycles of violence which become a cause for continued war, getting warring sides to negotiate and fighters to disarm, mobilizing the public against continued war, etc.

Building Just and Sustainable Peace

When agencies focus on supporting social change, their programs are focused on addressing political, economic, and social grievances that may be driving conflict. Such changes are seen as foundations for sustainable peace.

Amazingly, there is broad agreement that these are the two big goals of peace work. While some agencies concentrate on one or the other, many undertake programs that address both simultaneously.

These are the large goals—sometimes thought of as the long-range goals—of the experience included in RPP. They point to changes at the broad level of society as a whole. We refer to these goals as "Peace Writ Large" ("writ" means written, to show that we mean "the big peace").

But these goals are lofty and ambitious. While practitioners articulate these as the vision for their efforts, they must work in much more concrete and immediate ways. The goals of their programs are defined in specific terms, such as, "to bring people to the table to talk," or, "to reduce the likelihood that these people will be killed," or, "to educate children about how to resolve conflicts without violence," etc. These are programmatic goals, but, implicit or explicit in each of these is a strategy, or an assumption, that achieving this nearer-term goal is connected to the achievement of the Peace Writ Large goals.

This is where the road analogy comes in. Through RPP it became evident that often peace practitioners only assume that good programmatic goals, because they are good, will in some undefined way lead to or support Peace Writ Large. Because this connection is assumed, practitioners often do not carefully monitor their programs' real impacts on the broader peace. That is, practitioners do good things, thinking they are working for peace. But, often the connection between what they do and what is required to promote peace in

that circumstance is so remote that, even if they achieve the immediate program goals, the impact of the program on broader peace is minimal.

The Meaning of Effectiveness

If the goals of peace practice are 1) to end violent conflict, and 2) to build sustainable just structures, then a truly effective program is one that accomplishes one or both of these goals.

But, of course, every program that does not fully accomplish these lofty goals is not, by definition, ineffective. What are appropriate and useful benchmarks below these grand goals by which to assess agencies' effectiveness in contributing to them?

What we need are interim ways to understand effectiveness—to help us be ever more effective until we do finally realize Peace Writ Large.

This is challenging because peace work is often done in small-scale projects that are limited in what they can take on and who they can reach.

The experience gathered through RPP shows that peace practitioners can and do understand effectiveness in immediate and operational ways. Each of the chapters in Part 1 explores the RPP findings on a key facet of effectiveness in peace work. These point to the elements that agencies need to consider in order to know whether they are on the right road to Peace Writ Large.

Chapter 2. We examine the drive for effectiveness criteria that can illuminate how small-scale peace projects contribute to Peace Writ Large, and we present four such criteria that have been widely tested by practitioners through the RPP process.

Chapter 3. We discuss the inadvertent negative impacts that sometimes occur as a result of well-intentioned work and explore the agency programming decisions that feed such outcomes. Negative impacts are the reverse of effectiveness.

Chapter 4. We present findings about the importance of the means of peace work to effectiveness and examples showing how the modes of operating establish (or undermine) the integrity and credibility essential for peace efforts.

Chapter 5. We present findings about the ways that peace agencies from inside and outside conflict areas best work in partnership.

Understanding the right road to peace involves incorporating the learning from these four areas: maximizing the good that can be done (effectiveness criteria), minimizing harm (negative impacts), and working with the right ethics (means of peace work) and through right relations (partnerships between those inside and outside the areas directly affected by war and violence).

CHAPTER 2. EFFECTIVENESS CRITERIA FOR PEACE WORK

How do peace practitioners know if their work is effective?

Few agencies aim to forge peace accords or end all violence. Building the broader peace is a lofty goal, but agencies have limited resources, leverage, programming expertise, and funding. Against what benchmarks, then, can agencies identify whether their programs have contributed to progress, short of the reaching of the Big Peace? How can agencies judge what, of the diversity of program approaches, will have more positive impacts on a conflict, sooner?

RPP's review of experience shows the question of effectiveness involves two levels.

The program level: Assessing effectiveness at the program focuses on whether a specific activity (for example, peace education, a dialogue workshop, advocacy, or an international accompaniment effort) is achieving its intended goals. In order to understand this, agencies assess the effectiveness of the inputs that they make and the processes they use. This usually includes the project design, the selection of participants, how well the methodology was implemented, how well problems and follow-up were managed, how participants responded, and what were the immediate results.

The Peace Writ Large level: The effectiveness question at this level asks whether, in meeting specific program goals, an agency makes a contribution to the bigger picture. To understand this, agencies need to gauge changes in the overall environment that did or did not come about as a result of actions taken. Assessing effectiveness at this level puts the onus on agencies to look for changes outside the things for which they are directly responsible. They must assess how their efforts have, or have not, supported the ending of violence or the achievement of justice.

The experience gathered through RPP shows that agencies do attempt to assess their effectiveness at the program level—though not systematically or regularly. However, most agencies neglect to question how their discrete programs contribute to progress on the bigger picture, to Peace Writ Large.

KEY CHALLENGES FOR ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS

Peace agencies often work to affect complex social changes such as "better intergroup relationships" as described in the example. In assessing whether their programs have the hoped-for impacts, they face three key challenges:

• *Attribution of complex social impacts to any given peace effort*: Proving that peace activity A caused social outcome B is extremely difficult. Many influences at many levels affect people and societies, and few peace agencies claim that major advances are the result of their efforts alone. More often, an outcome is the result of the

cumulative efforts of many actors. Singling out any one intervention as the cause is often an unhelpful distortion of reality.

• *Credibility of reported impacts:* Since impacts often concern intangible changes in people's attitudes, values, relationships, and ideas, assessment must rely on subjective reports of agencies and participants that are often, unintentionally, biased. More reliable are impacts that result in observable deeds—visible actions or steps people take as a result of a change in attitude or values. However, understanding why people took such actions raises again the attribution problem discussed above.

• *Significance of the changes for Peace Writ Large:* Even if results can be credibly attributed to a particular peace effort (satisfying the first two challenges), how can we know that this program outcome is significant for peace? RPP found that this question is rarely considered by peace agencies. Rather the connection is simply assumed. In the absence of any clear and proven formula for peace, peace practice is largely theory-driven. Agencies undertake activities premised on particular theories of change that implicitly assume a given activity will promote progress on peace.

THEORIES AND BELIEFS DIVERT ATTENTION FROM EFFECTIVENESS

Programmatic approaches reflect underlying beliefs held by agencies and activists about what needs to be done to achieve peace. These beliefs constitute the basic understandings behind a given approach. And these conceptual frames, or theories of change (as many practitioners call them), differ widely among agencies.

For example, some practitioners believe that peace is built and sustained by social attitudes so they work to create awareness to support a culture of peace, tolerance, and coexistence. Some agencies believe that if leaders agree, the rest of society will follow and so they work with political leaders (the treaty makers). Others believe that institutions and laws shape behavior and so they work to build new institutions or reform existing ones to enable them to manage conflicts. Others see that increasing the numbers of people speaking out for peace can generate momentum and force political change so they work to build a critical mass at the grassroots. Still others believe that ensuring that more and more people in society respect individual human rights will promote peace. As the list shows, different theories of change lead to radically different proposals for action.

The experience gathered through RPP also shows that agencies rarely articulate the theory of change that guides their work. Rather, these remain implicit and undiscussed, even when different agencies cooperate on a joint effort. The result is that agencies develop programs assuming they are the "building blocks of peace," without tracing actual impacts of different approaches at the Peace Writ Large level.

Nonetheless, discussions within RPP showed that practitioners want to understand the connection between their peace programs and ultimate impacts, and they are dissatisfied with the way that peace projects are currently assessed. In the absence of meaningful criteria to assess Peace Writ Large, some peace agencies find donors imposing

quantitative measures from the development field that tell little about the real effects of peace work.

FOUR CRITERIA FOR ASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS

Four criteria of effectiveness emerged from the experience surveyed through the RPP process. These criteria capture how practitioners and communities think about meaningful impacts at the level of Peace Writ Large. These criteria:

• Are applicable across a broad range of types of efforts and contexts and point to outcomes achievable through a wide range of strategies.

• Are defined in relation to Peace Writ Large and reflect outcomes that are sustained beyond an agency's particular program; that is, that are independent of any agency's continued intervention. They do not replace but are extensions of the program goals agencies set for themselves.

• Reflect concrete changes in either the processes by which war and violence happen or the processes that support peace. They encompass changes that occur at a variety of levels that influence social change, including changes in people's perceptions, attitudes, and behaviors as well as in social or political structures.

• Reflect outcomes that RPP experience shows can be achieved by the programs of NGOs and other small agencies. They do not represent unattainable goals.

Where do these criteria come from? A wide range of agency experience worldwide was distilled through the RPP case studies and consultations to arrive at an initial set of criteria. These then were tested against further experience in the workshops to arrive at the four criteria presented here. These criteria represent wide ranging input from practitioners and conflict-affected communities.

RPP'S EVIDENCE SUGGESTS THAT A PEACE PROGRAM IS EFFECTIVE— CONTRIBUTES TO PEACE WRIT LARGE—IF/WHEN:

1. The effort causes participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace.

Peace practice is effective if, as a result of an agency's activities, people undertake independent initiatives, working in creative ways within their own communities to cross lines of division or to influence outside constituencies. These efforts should continue in the face of difficulty, threats, or other overt pressure. This criterion focuses on the shift made by people who are caught in conflict from being supporters, bystanders, or victims of conflict to being actors and activists undertaking personal efforts to bring about peace.

For decades, a strict buffer zone separated the two sides in the civil war, and there were few opportunities for the two communities to meet. An international agency began a few dialogue groups. Participants in these dialogues received training in how to run the sessions and, soon, spread the process by starting their own dialogue groups focused on a wide variety of concrete issues and concerns that crossed the two communities. Within a short time, they had begun 25 such groups which they, themselves, ran without outside support. These groups met regularly and undertook a variety of concrete projects to improve relations.

2. The effort results in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict.

Peace practice is effective if it develops or supports institutions or mechanisms to address the specific inequalities and injustices that cause and fuel a conflict. Such grievances may include political and economic exclusion, exploitation and inequity in the administration of justice and social benefits, or observance of people's basic rights. Peace practice focused on political institutions addresses weaknesses in or the lack of structures to manage conflicts non-violently at a variety of levels, from national constitutions to community councils.

The informal land council was established with the help of international agencies as a way to resolve the many land disputes that, in the past, had escalated into open violence. More and more people turned to it for help, and it became a nationally known and respected institution. Local authorities in other districts created similar councils.

One of the major issues of contention at the official peace talks involved allegations that the justice system was biased toward the majority group. The agency undertook a nationwide review of the administration of justice and identified problems. Its recommendations were well received by the Ministry of Justice and led to several significant national reforms.

3. The effort prompts people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence.

Peace practice is effective if it increases people's ability to resist manipulation and provocation. When people have been lured, provoked, intimidated, or socialized into supporting violence, their withdrawal in significant numbers affects the calculations of war leaders. This can be achieved through programs that increase skills for analyzing, managing, and responding to conflict, or that change values and attitudes toward the use of force, among other examples. It can be significant on a local or a national scale, depending on the context.

A town in a conflict-torn area populated by both armed groups declared itself a "zone of peace," with all residents committing themselves not to carry arms or provide support to the warring sides. Some international agencies and local NGOs from other areas of the country accompanied these communities, sending volunteers to live and work with them and to monitor developments. The goal was to show armed groups they could not attack these communities with impunity. When violence flared up in neighboring villages, the peace community remained calm. It set up committees to keep out people seen as "peace saboteurs."

In an area where there had been frequent reciprocal violence, the agency conducted a seminar with villagers, to analyze the violence and who benefited from it. The next time that youth from another village came and burned down several houses, the villagers did not immediately take up arms and retaliate. Instead, they gathered to discuss the situation and collect the facts. They decided to approach the leadership of the other village and ask that they take action to punish the young men.

4. The effort results in an increase in people's security.

Peace practice is effective if it results in concrete reductions in the threat of violence and/or changed perceptions of vulnerability. Clearly, it is not desirable to make people feel safer if the situation does not warrant it. But, in many places, an exaggerated perception of threat can lead to unnecessary acts of preemptive violence. This criterion has two dimensions: a positive impact will be seen if people both are safe and feel safe.

a) If perceptions of threat are reasonable, then the impact will be seen in concrete efforts to protect vulnerable groups and reduce the threat of violence. This can happen, for example, through peace workers providing buffer zones, physical presence, and political pressure, and through parties reaching and implementing peace pacts that guarantee security.

b) If perceptions of threat are exaggerated, then the impact will be seen in efforts that reduce the perception of threat. This can happen, for example, through efforts to promote contact and accurate information or to reduce "hate talk" in public discourse.

After the meeting the agency had organized between the two groups, refugees returned to their home areas, and people no longer feared traveling through the territories of "the other side." Women and girls of each ethnic group reported feeling safe walking through the other group's villages, even at night.

The agency organized a summer camp for parents and children from the two groups isolated from each other across the ceasefire line. The camp was held at a coastal resort in a neighboring country. Though participants from both groups were very nervous about coming, afterwards they remained in touch and visited each others' homes in the territories controlled by the other side.

USING THE CRITERIA TO UNDERSTAND EFFECTIVENESS

When an agency's programs meet these criteria, they have promoted a type of change that evidence shows helps build the bigger peace. Also, the experience gathered through RPP suggests that the four effectiveness criteria are additive. If a single peace practice effort meets all four, it is more effective than one that accomplishes only one of the valued changes. However, to assess the significance of a particular change in a given context, three additional, interconnected elements must be considered: • *Urgency of Change:* Change is more significant if it is sooner rather than later. Peace practice cannot be patient with continued suffering. Programs that promote changes that can only be realized decades hence may do some good, but too many people suffer in the interim.

• *Sustained Change:* Change is more significant if it is sustained over time rather than fleeting or one-off. Things might improve for a short period but then get worse in the long run. This clearly needs to be balanced with the notion of urgency above.

• *Proportionality of Change:* Change is more significant if it is proportional to, and on the same scale as, the violence or destructive conflict. If the violence is occurring at a national scale, efforts to address it at a very local scale will be valuable, but not as significant as those efforts that affect the national scale.

CONCLUSION

Evidence shows that these criteria are the impacts that communities care about. They are not under the direct control of any individual agency conducting a particular program they often relate to actions taken by participants or the larger community. They do not measure the things that happen within agency programs, but rather what happens outside or after the programs as a result of these programs. Agencies are not directly responsible for bringing Peace Writ Large. They are responsible for monitoring whether there is progress toward Peace Writ Large and, thus, whether the programs they are running are making a tangible contribution to that peace.

These criteria can be used by agencies to help them decide among programming and strategy options and assess their direct and indirect impacts on the attainment of Peace Writ Large.

CHAPTER 3. IDENTIFYING AND AVOIDING NEGATIVE IMPACTS

There is no perfect peace program.

RPPs' review of a variety of peace processes shows that movement toward peace often occurs as "two steps forward, one step back" rather than as linear progress. Travel on even the most direct road to peace is seldom smooth! Practitioners involved with RPP are clear that some well-meant peace efforts have had negative impacts on a conflict situation.

Furthermore, peace practitioners are human and, despite their passion, commitment, and energy, things beyond their control may go wrong and setbacks occur. Indeed, peace practitioners also make mistakes. It is important to acknowledge this and the importance of learning from mistakes. Many peace practitioners also assert that it is better to try something, and risk failure, rather than to avoid risks by doing nothing. However, this commitment should not become a justification for experimentation or failure. Communities living with conflict do not welcome experimentation. They do not accept practitioners' needs to learn by "trying."

In this chapter, we review RPP's findings about a category of peace practice errors that have implications far beyond programmatic ineffectiveness or failure. We review what experience shows about how peace practice can actually do harm by making a situation and the lives of people living in conflict worse rather than better. These negative effects are not the result of obvious personal mistakes or unethical behavior. Often, agencies recognize these and correct them. This section sheds light on a less well understood set of errors, program decisions, and approaches that, though undertaken in an ethical and responsible manner, actually worsen conflict. This is a category of mistakes that practitioners and communities need not accept as "inevitable bumps along the road to peace."

Evidence gathered by RPP indicates that negative impacts are not inevitable. It is possible to avoid them. An awareness that their work can have specific, predictable negative impacts raises two imperatives for peace practitioners.

The first imperative is to be aware of the potential negative consequences of programs and actions. If agencies learn from past accumulated experience about how negative impacts occur, they can better anticipate and avoid such outcomes in their future work.

The second imperative is to manage, reverse, or minimize harm if it does occur. If agencies have not succeeded in avoiding these outcomes or if they only recognize them after the fact, they have a responsibility to deal constructively with the consequences. They are also responsible for spreading awareness to help others avoid the same mistakes.

Two Qualifying Notes:

1. The significance of the negative impacts discussed below varies from context to context. Some are very serious, resulting in a direct escalation of violence and death. Others seem, at least initially, to be less serious in their consequences. For example, people may divert their energies to less productive paths but the outcomes may be minor in relation to Peace Writ Large.

Practitioners recognize that some of the necessary components of peace—such as an amnesty, refugee return or the demobilization of soldiers—can have negative impacts for some people. If such outcomes are negative, should a peace agency be held accountable for this or are these impacts judged as acceptable because they promote the greater peace? As peace practitioners note, "It is up to the people who bear the costs to decide if such negatives are tolerable and outweighed by the positives."

2. The following warnings about how peace practice may make things worse apply to all peace initiatives. However, whereas people involved in indigenous peace efforts have no choice but to respond to the conflict around them, international practitioners choose to become involved in other people's conflicts. Therefore, they have a special responsibility to avoid making things worse.

NEGATIVE IMPACTS

What negative impacts occur from peace efforts? What actions by peace agencies contribute to these?

1. Worsening divisions between conflicting groups

The dialogue went so badly that many participants said, "You see, those people really are unreasonable. Clearly they only understand violence, so why waste time talking?"

The agency convened a large-scale meeting to try to bring the two groups together. During the opening remarks, someone started shooting from the stands. The agency quickly closed the meeting and left the scene. The violence continued after they left, and several people were killed and many more injured.

Some programs exacerbate divisions and tensions among groups by confirming or reinforcing prejudice, discrimination, or intolerance. This is the most common negative impact cited in the experience reviewed by RPP. In some cases, as above, this can even result in overt violence between groups.

Agency actions contribute to this when:

• Programs are based purely on optimism that bringing people together will help. Agencies underestimate the depth of divisions, do too little consultation with participants beforehand, or do too little (or bad!) analysis and so are not prepared to deal with problems. • Agencies do not have the skills or experience to manage a tension-filled situation. They are too ambitious and take on volatile situations that are more than they can handle.

• Agencies claim to be playing a neutral role but openly become advocates for one side. Or, though not openly taking sides, the ways in which agencies choose who to work with favors one group over another. For example, when agencies focus exclusively on a particular, often marginalized, group and increase tensions by appearing to favor them.

• Agencies neglect to monitor the after-effects of bringing people together across lines of conflict and so are unaware when participants feel the program did not go well, or they neglect to manage the problem, leaving unhappy participants to spread views that reinforce prejudice against the other side.

• Agencies "label" people as affiliated with one particular side, for example, by inviting people to represent identified sides of a conflict in a meeting in order to ensure a spectrum of opinions is represented. This often implies that people hold more fixed positions than they actually do or want to hold in a way that proves divisive.

2. Increasing danger for participants in peace activities

An international agency trained local mediators who then went back and forth between sides under very difficult circumstances. Three of the 20 workers were killed by the warring parties.

Peace activists arrived at a school intending, by their presence, to defend it from violence. The headmistress asked them to leave, as she feared their presence would, in fact, provoke an attack.

Clearly peace work is dangerous, and people are responsible for their own decisions to take risks. But agencies have a responsibility to ensure that participants are adequately aware of any real danger and not oversold on the power and effectiveness of peacemaking approaches.

Agency actions contribute to this when:

• Agencies' actions or "aura of expertise" cause a false sense of security leading people to take risks they would not otherwise take.

• Agencies put people in dangerous situations into which they would not otherwise have gone. For example, this occurs when foreigners ask to be taken to places that local counterparts feel are dangerous, but the latter agree since they "must accompany their guests." • Participation in an agency program or affiliation with the agency draws attention that makes people become targets.

• Agencies give counterparts unrealistically high expectations and/or insufficient follow-up support so they suffer psychological burnout and trauma.

• Agencies do not explicitly analyze and discuss with local partners the differences in risk each faces in the context. This caution especially applies to foreign agencies. Often, foreigners are safer than local people because they can call on their home governments for protection or get the attention of international media. Foreign agencies have a special responsibility to avoid putting local counterparts at risk, as, for example, when local people replicate attention-getting "peace actions," such as physically intervening in potentially violent situations. (In some cases, local people are safer than foreign guests at risk).

3. Reinforcing structural or overt violence

An agency organized a dialogue process between minority and majority representatives and played a neutral facilitating role. However, because of very different levels of education and work experience between the two groups, the dialogues left the minority group feeling overwhelmed and cornered by their more powerful counterparts. The agency could not stop the participants from one side from dominating the discussion and humiliating their counterparts.

In order to be able to attend the meeting in a European capital, the agency insisted that participants from the unrecognized areas use national passports. Though some participants were willing to do so, most refused. They claimed it would mean tacit recognition of the authority of the central government over their area, which was the central issue of the conflict.

Some peace efforts are conducted in ways that reinforce the asymmetries of power behind the conflict or legitimize a status quo that systematically disadvantages some people or groups relative to others. Other peace efforts adopt or tolerate, and, thus, reinforce reliance on the threat of overt violence by the people they work with. They reinforce people's sense that force is the only option.

Agency actions contribute to this when:

• Agencies assume that simply bringing people together in equal numbers will "level the table" in conflicts marked by deep asymmetries of power.

• Agencies accept conditions placed by the more powerful side in a conflict, or influential outside states, in order to conduct a program. This often occurs around things such as control over movement, visas, decisions over participant selection, use of politicized names or symbols, etc. When peace agencies accommodate such

demands, they may be perceived by the less powerful side as extracting symbolic concessions before a program even begins and thus reinforcing power asymmetries.

• Agencies or individuals tolerate or fail to challenge behavior that affirms the perceptions of superiority and inferiority of people in conflict.

4. Diverting human and material resources from productive peace activities

Women in the society were responsible for farming, and scarcity of land was a constant source of intergroup tensions. Expecting women to be predominantly concerned about domestic issues, the peace agency organized women to address issues of sexual violence as a "domestic manifestation of the conflict."

The return of refugees to the conflict zone created tensions due to memories of the war, the lack of housing, and the severe economic crisis affecting the whole region. The peace agency spent many months interviewing individuals about their life histories and all the suffering they had experienced. People reported wanting to work toward reconciliation through tangible projects—rather than "talking about their war experiences and psychosocial trauma."

Sometimes peace programs "miss the mark." Although they do not do overt harm, they may make peace more difficult to achieve by diverting the attention, resources, and time of local people into activities not directly related (in the eyes of local people) to what drives the conflict. Local agencies and activists report that some peace agencies have people "running around doing the wrong things."

Agency actions contribute to this when:

- Agencies come in with preset ideas (and models) and do not listen to what local people want or need.
- Agencies focus too much on "talking about the past conflict" rather than on actions people can take to change things.

• Foreign agencies or international organizations especially, because of their access to greater resources, hire many local activists to run their programs, pulling their energies away from promising local initiatives and approaches.

5. Increasing cynicism

The dramatic growth of foreign-funded "peacebuilding projects" caused local people to joke about "the peace industry." Creating a peace NGO was seen as the newest form of entrepreneurial activity. Very few people understood these projects or their goals, or took them seriously. "Peace work is now the fad," many claimed.

The agency succeeded in de-mining the land and intended to work with community groups and the local government to have it allocated to the landless refugees in the

district. Shortly afterwards, they discovered that much of the land had already been "bought" from the authorities by local landowners. People suspected that the peace agency had been in league with the wealthy landowners all along.

Failed or superficial peace programs can cause people to become increasingly cynical about the effectiveness of such efforts. Cynicism among the people of a conflict area can undermine their initiative, while increased cynicism among donors can lead to reduced international involvement and the drying up of support.

Agency actions contribute to this when:

• Agencies create unrealistic expectations with communities and donors about what can be achieved, exacerbating the feeling of failure when the results do not occur.

• Agencies are not transparent about their activities with communities so that rumors and suspicions can promote cynicism.

• Agencies recast established aid and development activities as "peacebuilding," adopting new peace terminology while changing little about the content of the programs.

• Agencies assume that competence in one area of peace work translates into competence in others. Because they know negotiation techniques, for example, they assume they can work with media or with education but end up designing bad programs.

6. Disempowering local people

The international agency was asked by local organizations to provide training in NGO management and consensus-building techniques so the local organizations could run their own peace programs. The international agency undertook training programs over several months. Later they realized that participants already had these skills, as they had worked for years on community issues. The training program had reinforced the local people's sense that they could not act on their own.

Whenever people expressed frustration over how long the conflict had gone on, the agency reassured them, saying, "Peace is built one person at a time."

Agencies with experience in many conflicts can create the impression that they are the experts in peace. This can disempower people who have experience in only their own conflict. It can undermine local people's energy and initiative to act. In some cases, peace agencies inadvertently communicate the implicit message that local people cannot make peace without their outside help.

Agency actions contribute to this when:

• Agencies counsel patience, saying "peace takes time," and, by doing so, undermine people's urgency to push bold initiatives, and reinforce a sense of powerlessness to end the conflict.

• Agencies teach people things they already know or, worse, introduce topics in which they believe people need training before consulting them about their real needs, conveying the message that the outsider knows best.

• Agencies present models for dealing with conflict authoritatively, without giving people the space to examine if, and how, these approaches fit their situation.

• Agencies give the impression that they are "taking care of the situation," causing people to think problems are being handled.

• Agencies implement programs in a way that fosters dependency on outside "experts" who are constantly brought in to run activities.

• Foreign agencies work exclusively with the NGO sector and deliberately avoid support to government structures, no matter how weak. This fosters resentment and competition between NGOs and governments, and undermines NGOs' positions visà-vis their own governments.

• Agencies from the outside do not know when to leave and encourage local people and groups take over.

CONCLUSION

Good intentions do not always secure good outcomes. There are many options for designing and implementing peace programs. Not to learn from experience—to repeat the same mistakes—is counterproductive to effectiveness and wrong professionally. The experience outlined above shows how some agency decisions or approaches can have negative results. This knowledge can be used to help peace practitioners make smarter, more informed decisions about programs in the future.

CHAPTER 4: WALKING THE WALK: HOW MEANS AFFECT ENDS IN PEACE PRACTICE

"If we do not remain ethical, we are not doing peace work," said one Central African NGO leader.

Most peace practitioners feel strongly that the means employed in peace practice are as important as the outcomes. They feel that the ways they act and interact, and the processes they employ in their work, must reflect and embody the values and the ideals that they work for.

Some practitioners feel that this is true because there is an "intrinsic linkage between means and ends." Using the "wrong" means can, they claim, undermine a peace effort or even lead to direct negative impacts. Alternatively, good actions "rightly undertaken" will, ultimately and inevitably, produce good results.

Others feel that even if it were possible to be effective through "wrong" processes, peace practice nonetheless must involve certain standards and forms of behavior in order to be valid as peace practice. For example, they note, assassination of an extremist leader may reduce violence, but it would never be acceptable as peace practice.

THE ETHICS OF PEACE PRACTICE

What do we mean by the ethics of peace practice?

Practitioners refer to two dimensions of peace ethics. On the one hand, they set out the values and principles for personal behavior that build positive interpersonal relationships, credibility, trust, and legitimacy for the work they do. On the other hand, they refer to guides for principled programming for peace.

In both cases, practitioners are referring to the modes and styles that define peace practice, and they are concerned to align the way they work (personally and programmatically) with their intended goals. Often, the approaches they adopt as peace practice counter the modes that characterize violent conflict. These approaches are seen as important precisely because they set out alternatives for acting, and they "model" peaceful ways of living and working.

Surprisingly, among a range of peace practitioners engaged in a wide variety of activities, there is a great deal of agreement about the elements of the ethics of peace practice. Categories are not tight and there is interaction among them, but virtually everyone agrees that the following values and behaviors are critical for defining real peace practice.

1. Peace practice is honest.

At the personal level, honesty involves sincerity and accountability. Peace practitioners claim that their own interactions are affected directly by the honesty and openness with which they operate. "Always make clear why you have come, what you have to offer, and what you can and cannot do," advises one international peace practitioner. And, local peace activists emphasize that the offers of assistance that they most appreciate come from those who are up-front and honest about what they have to offer, and, even, what they expect to get out of their work in that conflict.

Quite often, warfare entails manipulation, propaganda and misinformation that are intended to feed mistrust and suspicion between fighting groups. Personal honesty in such settings can establish grounds where other rules apply.

At the programmatic level, honesty involves not only openness but also agency transparency about the motivations and purposes of the programs they undertake. Agencies involved in peace practice need to ensure that they spread messages broadly and inclusively about what they are doing and why. Not only does this provide an alternative model to some modes of warfare, it also can help create an environment in which rumors are corrected and people understand, and therefore trust, actions of others.

A Catholic agency undertook peace work with the religious leaders in their Diocese. They hired a Muslim coordinator in order to signal their desire to work to bridge the religious divide. However, this signal was not enough. Some Christian leaders and parishioners suspected the effort of favoring Muslims, while Muslims suspected it was intended to convert them to Christianity. The agency realized that they could have prevented these suspicions if they had begun the project by informing the communities about their intentions beforehand. They were able to change the atmosphere by initiating education efforts focused on informing members of the parish, and, through the Imams, members of the Muslim communities about their purposes and activities.

Surprisingly, much of the experience gathered through RPP challenged the idea that some peace programs require secrecy in order to succeed. For example, peace activists involved in many dialogues noted that, "There is no such thing as a secret meeting— people always find out when such meetings are going on." Furthermore, they noted, it is important for the processes of peace that people beyond those included directly in dialogue be influenced and affected if dialogues are to make any real contribution to peace. Again, programmatic considerations seem to support the idea that a core value of peace practice is honesty and transparency about the peace activities being conducted. This does not mean that agencies must reveal detailed information about statements made, documents produced, or actions undertaken by participants in the activities. Some programs rely on agencies to be discrete and maintain confidentiality about what happens within a meeting or between participants. Rather, the onus is on the agency to be open and transparent about its plans, motivations, and activities.

"A picture of our final dinner together, lifting our glasses in a toast, appeared on the front page of the paper, when we all thought we had been at a secret dialogue! Detractors used this photograph to criticize us for going off to talk with the 'enemy' over lavish dinners and wine. We realized, then, that we should have managed our own publicity by inviting public attention on our terms. It was important for us to inform people broadly about the fact we were talking with each other, and why, and to include them in our process this way in order to bring them along to influence public opinion and, finally, to influence our leaders as well."

This also includes honesty about mistakes and mixed outcomes. Many practitioners talk of needing the "freedom to acknowledge failure." This is not meant to excuse mistakes or worse, encourage them! Rather, it puts the onus on transparent accountability to communities, colleagues, and funders to learn from past performance, good or bad.

2. Peace practice values life.

Peace work can be dangerous. Practitioners know that to be credible in their work, they need to acknowledge and accept risks. However, equally important in the establishment of good relationships is their commitment to protecting life—their own and, equally, the lives of others.

Foreign and local peace activists inevitably face different types and levels of risk. In many areas, foreign peace practitioners have a kind of immunity; they are less likely to be targeted and killed because local fighters do not want to risk negative international publicity and pressure. Foreign practitioners also can always leave a conflict area if it becomes too dangerous.

Personally and programmatically, it is possible to turn this inequality to the good and to use foreign immunity to increase the security of local counterparts.

When bombs went off on the connecting bus line two weeks in a row, many people were distressed, both by the civilian deaths and by the negative impacts on the struggling peace process. Staff of an international peace agency announced that they would ride this bus and share the risks with other riders. No other bombings occurred.

An international volunteer agreed to provide 24-hour accompaniment for a well-known human rights activist in a conflict region as a part of a program to provide international protection for such activism. One night, armed men came to the activist's house. The volunteer stepped outside to meet them and spent half an hour in conversation with them. The men left, and this activist was not threatened again.

Taking personal or programmatic risks to reduce potential violence represents one aspect of valuing life as an ethic of peace practice. Equally important to peace practitioners is taking care that one does not, inadvertently, increase risks or threats for others. Foreign agencies have a special responsibility to ensure that their actions and programmatic approaches do not put local counterparts into greater danger.

The situation was tense. Soldiers appeared ready to fire on the demonstrators. Two international peace activists moved into the line of fire and called to the soldiers, "This is a nonviolent demonstration. We are not throwing rocks or attacking in any way." The soldiers lowered their guns and pushed the foreigners away. This excited the crowd and

some picked up stones . Soldiers again readied to fire. And, again, the international activists stepped in front of the guns. One local person joined them.

Thinking about this later, the internationals were deeply concerned. "We were pretty sure we would not be shot," they said, "but our local colleague who decided to join us was in serious danger. Did we set up a situation that put him at greater risk? What have we done here?"

3. Peace practice is reliable.

"This person always follows through on what he says. I know I can trust him."

"When this person says she will treat our conversations as confidential, I know she means it. She will not go away and report what I say to the press."

"The parties to this conflict are looking for integrity. It does not matter who the person is, an insider or an outsider, if he/she is believable."

These comments, made about peace practitioners, capture the importance of reliability at the personal level.

Experience shows that the same value is ascribed to agencies' programs. Criticism is leveled at foreign peace agencies that "have hidden agendas" and that "change their programming priorities in mid-stream." (The implications of this for funding peace programs are discussed more in Chapter 11: The Funding of Peace Work.)

The international peace practitioner sat with an old friend over dinner. He knew this friend worked with the media, but he also welcomed the chance to discuss the meetings he had had that day with someone whose perspectives he respected. When the peace practitioner arrived at the next country involved in his activity, he found no one would meet with him. Word had gotten out about his conversation over dinner with his friend. It took some months to rebuild the trust lost as a result of this indiscretion.

4. Peace practice respects differences.

When people disagree about important things, they have choices about how to handle and live with the disagreement. Peace practitioners note that warfare and other inter-group conflict are premised on the belief that, if you have important disagreements, you cannot live or work together. Solutions come with victory, one side wins and the other loses.

Thus, respect for differences and the willingness to work with people—even those with widely divergent positions—is a central value for peace practitioners.

As one practitioner put it, "Peace work centers around increased valuing of others and tolerance for diversity in times of crisis." Practitioners believe it is important to model this ethic in their relationships with partners and participants in their activities, and in doing so, to model it for the larger society as well.

All peace practitioners share this value and all mean to show respect. Experience shows, however, that the translation of personal respect into programmatic forms is more problematic. Despite good intentions and personal commitment, partners and local communities report experiences where they have been treated with disrespect by peace practitioners due to the way programs were structured.

"You need to have respect for the communities you are working with rather than bringing in your own values. You must observe carefully. A simple example is time schedules for activities. In my country, some of the people involved in our programs do not have watches and have to walk long distances to get here. International agencies are frustrated by this, but any program must deal with it."

"They came in and 'taught' us human rights. As if we do not know what that means! We have lived under much more serious oppression than they can even imagine. I was insulted by their assumption that I do not hold the right values!"

"We wanted to discuss reconciliation and reintegration of our refugee population, not be lectured on this by 25-year-olds from peaceful countries who have never had to face these problems!"

It turns out that respect—or disrespect—is communicated through every aspect of programming and especially in partnerships between local and foreign peace agencies. How things are decided, who is consulted, when they are involved, what decisions are made, who is expected to play which roles, and so on, all convey respect or disrespect.

HEARING THE MESSAGE: CLUES THAT PEACE PARTNERS FEEL DISRESPECTED: "We need to talk more often." or "We need to meet more often."

Do people really want more conversations or more meetings? Probably not. They, too, are busy and overworked. The real message is: "I am being left out of something. My involvement and opinions are not being respected. You must think that I am not significant."

5. Peace practice eschews violence and intimidation.

The notion cited above that shooting an extremist leader can reduce violence highlights the obvious—that peace practitioners do not use violence as a tool!

Not all peace practitioners are pacifists, but all see the importance of using means to work for peace that are consistent with the goals of peace. Therefore, all seem to agree that in their personal interactions, they should not use violence or intimidation. Some stress the importance of modeling nonviolent behavior as an alternative to violent conflict. Many tell stories about how their own calm refusal to respond aggressively when threatened proved effective in defusing a tense situation. Correspondingly, peace practitioners also stress the importance of programmatic nonviolence and non-intimidation. Although some support the use of arms to maintain peace or to force withdrawal of armies, and while some accept and support the choices made by people to fight for their causes, in their own programs peace practitioners agree that such means are inappropriate and inconsistent.

6. Peace practice commits to justice as essential to peace.

One practitioner put it, "To be effective, you have to be impartial on the politics, but you can never be neutral on the morals." Practitioners agree that "neutrality" that is silent on abuses can become pacification. There is a strong consensus that peace efforts must be informed by and acknowledge the injustices that fuel violence and destructive conflict. This is manifested in both personal behavior and programmatic choices.

At the personal level, practitioners must make clear that even though they do not support the political positions of any party to conflict, they are not blind to human suffering. Credibility and trust can be damaged beyond repair if practitioners interpret the need to be impartial as the need to establish a generic moral equivalency of the two sides in any conflict. Practitioners acknowledge a responsibility to be informed of the facts of any conflict, and not "paper over" abuses and injustice in the name of promoting harmony. They see that they must communicate a clear personal stand on issues of injustice, and demonstrate concern, and be ready to help, where and how they can, when the people they work with need assistance. Human need cannot be deemed outside the mandate of practitioners.

At the programmatic level, this commitment translates into ensuring that whatever the particular programmatic approach, issues of justice and human rights are on the agenda and are not bypassed in the interests of emphasizing the possibility of harmony. The choice of programmatic content (of a training, a dialogue meeting, or a peace education manual) conveys implicit messages about justice.

"The foreign agency offered a two-day seminar on peacemaking. The entire content was about the techniques of non-aggressive communication, as if that was what the war was about!"

"When people come from 'outside' and tell me I should reconcile with those who killed my entire family, it tells me that they do not see me as a human being, with feelings and memory."

7. Peace practice honors that peace belongs to the people who make it.

No one can make anyone else's peace. People and societies must create the conditions and develop the processes for achieving and sustaining their own peace. Peace practitioners can support these processes, work alongside people as colleagues, offer different perspectives and ideas, and discuss options. But they cannot make peace in another person's context. If the solutions do not come from the communities affected, they can amount to manipulation or attempted social engineering. Recognizing this at the personal level means that peace practitioners must maintain humility about their roles. In particular, foreign peace practitioners have no right to advocate what is "best" for people who experience war and its aftermath. One activist who works in many countries put it this way: "Very few outsiders are respectful enough of the people they are working with. You need to feel humility. You can leave, but the local people must stay."

Another aspect of personal humility involves "working quietly and not broadcasting achievements." Honoring the local ownership of peace entails giving credit for any success to people who live in the situation.

"In my experience, the most effective way to channel ideas into the official circles is to let politicians take credit for what is done. Approach officials and let them take up ideas as their own proposals," said one local peace practitioner.

"During the height of the violence, people from enemy areas were calling me, and I was writing reports that were later used by the Minister, but no one knew. You have to let yourself disappear and let others take credit for what you do," recounted an activist.

"Although the international mediation was central to our final ceasefire agreement, we were really disturbed when the foreigners called a press conference to announce 'their' success!"

Recognition of the local ownership of peace also translates into specific programmatic styles and processes. For many successful peace efforts, supporting local actors in doing the analysis of the conflict and coming up with solutions is the essence of the intervention.

"Peace-building is a process of building something from within rather than responding to outside agendas."

"We don't want to publish books of poetry about peace so that somebody abroad can show how they did a neat job."

Peace programs should not offer solutions from outside. A core value, and strategy, of peace programming is enabling and supporting people in building their own peace. Real solutions only grow from and are firmly anchored in the communities affected.

This is more fully discussed in the next chapter.

CONCLUSION

Peace activists around the world affirm again and again that good peace work can never be "means-blind." They resist attempts to reduce the worth of their efforts to only the ends they achieve. They insist that an equally important standard is, "Does the implementation of peace work reflect the ideals and values that it advocates?"

The discussion above shows how ethical means in peace work, whether in personal relationships or programming choices, affect perceptions about the integrity of peace efforts and whether people trust them. The evidence shows that this affects programmatic effectiveness. A key challenge in defining the principles of effective peace work is recognition that the means used in peace practice define peace work and its outcomes.

CHAPTER 5. PEACE PARTNERSHIPS: HOW OUTSIDER AND INSIDER PEACE AGENCIES CAN BEST WORK TOGETHER

In the preceding section we examined the relationship between the ways agencies work and the outcomes they achieve.

One of the key ways agencies work for peace is through partnerships between insiders and outsiders. Each side brings perspectives, networks, assets, and leverage with particular constituencies that the other does not have.

In the peace villages in Colombia, national-level, community-based, and foreign agencies work side by side to good effect, though they express differences with each other. Communities look to the local and national organizations for communication, close assistance, and understanding of history and perceptions. They look to national organizations for training, contact with government and coordination within the country. They look to internationals for liaison with the outside world, to document events and raise international awareness of the situation, and to provide protection as independent observers.

Peace practitioners believe that the key to insider-outsider peace partnerships is working in a "relationship-based way." They hold that peace work begins with forming right relationships with allies and counterparts and then extending these outward to the people they aim to help. Unless joint efforts for peace are based on sound principles of conduct and partnership, the effectiveness of the work is in jeopardy.

RPP's evidence shows that whether insider-outsider partnerships work well does matter to effectiveness in both direct and indirect ways. While good partnerships do not always produce big impacts on the broader peace, they are necessary, if not sufficient, factors for doing so. Bad partnerships put peace work at risk, undermining programs and sometimes having clear negative impacts.

Many types of partnerships exist. In some, all aspects of decision-making and implementation are shared. In others, one partner provides limited services and support to an effort otherwise run entirely by the other partner. However, in all partnerships, agencies face the issues of choosing partners and managing the relationships well.

Despite good intentions on all sides, problems in peace partnerships are widespread.

"There are not many good examples of partnerships. Often someone has all the money but not the insight, or there is one person trying to dominate and manipulate the effort to suit his own agenda."

This is because there are often serious asymmetries of power in the relationships between insiders and outsiders. These are either managed in healthy ways, or they undermine the

ability of insiders and outsiders to work together effectively. This chapter examines the lessons drawn from practitioner experience on effective insider-outsider partnerships in peace work.

DEFINING INSIDERS AND OUTSIDERS

First, who are insiders and who are outsiders? Are there generalizable distinctions that help illustrate how groups can best work together? Intuitively, the terms "insider" and "outsider" are suggestive. They initially seem synonymous with locally-based agencies and agencies that come from abroad or foreign agencies. But examination of experience reveals that other dividing lines are far more relevant.

"I am from Achioliland and there is a conflict in Achioliland. But the people who are in conflict may say I am an outsider because of the way I try to work. It is up to them to decide."

<u>Insiders</u> are widely seen as those vulnerable to the conflict, because they are from the area and living there, or people who in some other way must experience the conflict and live with its consequences personally. In terms of those actively working for peace, it includes activists and agencies from the area, local NGOs, governments, church groups, and local staff of outside or foreign NGOs and agencies.

<u>Outsiders</u> are widely seen as individuals or agencies who choose to become involved in a conflict. Though they may feel a great sense of engagement and attachment, they have little to lose personally. They may live in the setting for extended periods of time, but they can leave and work elsewhere. Foreigners, members of the diaspora, and co-nationals from areas of a country not directly affected by violence are all seen as outsiders. Those working in leadership roles with foreign agencies, or local people working "in the manner of an outside organization" are also seen as outsiders.

In practice there are no pure insiders or outsiders, but rather degrees of insiderness and outsiderness. Often the relationship can only be defined in relative terms—one is more or less of an insider/outsider than someone else. An NGO from Nairobi was considered an outsider while working in Northern Kenya, but less so than a Swedish activist. A Nicaraguan staff member was seen as more of an insider to a conflict in Guatemala than a Canadian activist.

A common mistake is for foreign agencies to think of all nationals of a country experiencing conflict as insiders, without understanding their particular relationship to the conflict. Another common mistake is made by co-nationals or diaspora groups who do not understand that, for the reasons outlined above, they are often seen by communities in conflict as outsiders.

Defining insiders and outsiders is intended not to pigeon-hole practitioners, but to increase understanding of the, perhaps surprising, ways in which peace activists and

agencies are viewed. This awareness should be built into planning because it affects how efforts will be perceived and received by communities and, ultimately, the effectiveness of peace practice.

PEACE PARTNERSHIPS: INSIDER AND OUTSIDER ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS

Most peace efforts are undertaken by local activists and groups with minimal or no outsider support. This is for two reasons. First, much peace work is best done by insiders, and outside help would be superfluous. Second, some conflicts occur in regions that are difficult for outsiders to reach or that, in some other sense are judged "remote" so that they receive little outsider attention.

Experience shows, however, that in many circumstances, a partnership of insiders and outsiders working together for peace can produce opportunities for increased effectiveness if the partnership is both well-designed and well-managed. This is because conflicts very often have both domestic and international dimensions. Partnerships that engage people from across this range can address the interlocking elements of conflict and, by doing so, more directly ensure that solutions on one level are not undermined at other levels.

When they work together insiders and outsiders bring different and distinct qualities to peace partnerships. In broad terms, insiders provide depth of knowledge about the context and connections to the communities affected, their culture, attitudes, and world-view. Outsiders provide breadth of knowledge and connections to external constituencies, ideas, and models.

Beyond this, experience shows overlap in the roles that insiders and outsiders can effectively play. Which side of a partnership can act as an intermediary or provide training or lobby governments or monitor human rights abuses depends on the context, the geopolitical environment, the types of agencies, and the particular skills and networks each has. There are no hard and fast rules about which agency should do what.

RPP explored partnership experiences in some detail in order to identify the elements that ensure greater effectiveness. Individuals and agencies involved in RPP had very broad experience with partnerships—some of it excellent and some of it quite bad. Below, we outline the main points around which consensus emerged from this broad experience.

Insiders in Peace Work

Insiders, as those most in touch with the conflict and its consequences, clearly bring many of the key elements needed for peace work, including:

1. Clear motivation, passion, and commitment to the cause because they experience the costs of the conflict.

2. In-depth knowledge of the context, the conflict and its dynamics, the particular people and the internal politics of the groups in the setting, and the internal resources that exist for peace.

3. Their reputation, credibility, and trust with people in the setting. This can translate into ability to gain access to decision-makers, to negotiate, to mobilize constituencies, etc.

Several citizens from both ethnic groups fighting over land brought the groups together for discussion. These community peacemakers had no training but were trusted, and worked to sort out the interests and needs of both groups. After much discussion, a solution acceptable to both sides was reached.

4. Leverage and the ability to apply political pressure in the setting due to personal influence or the domestic constituencies they represent.

The head of the South African peace NGO was from an influential family well connected to the white Afrikaaner elite. His public anti-apartheid activities gave him credibility with the black community. He played a key role in orchestrating the early direct contacts between the ANC and the government.

5. Ability to provide continuity, follow-up, and long-term monitoring since they are present in the setting and able to maintain ongoing contact with the people they engage in peace efforts.

But insiders recognize that they also bring their own personal views and biases, precisely because of their intimate connections to the conflict. Personal experiences of war can make it impossible for an insider to play a neutral role between the parties to the conflict.

"Civil society is sometimes part of the problem. Despite good intentions, civil society groups are not always good for peace. Internal peace groups have their own ideologies and views."

Outsiders in Peace Work

Outsiders rarely work on other peoples' conflicts without some partnership with people in the setting. Outsider efforts that are not connected with local activists and interlocutors stand little chance of being effective.

As noted above, outsiders bring power, resources, certain kinds of influence, and access to a wider stage to a partnership.

Outsiders add value in a partnership when they:

1. Lobby, advocate, and raise awareness internationally on the local and international causes of the conflict and on peace initiatives by insiders.

2. Apply influence and pressure on national political authorities.

3. Use channels to and leverage with outside constituencies to increase security of insiders, through on-site presence, monitoring, and reporting.

4. Provide comparative experiences and new ideas and techniques from other settings in ways that insiders can decide whether or not to take up.

5. Host a "safe space" where all sides of a conflict can come together for dialogue, training, conferences, joint work, etc.

6. Use external contacts and credibility to mobilize resources.

HOW INSIDER-OUTSIDER PARTNERSHIPS GO WRONG

"For peace to be sustainable, local people need to be the ones to make it," is a widely held belief amongst peace practitioners. (See Chapter 4 on means and ends for more on this). In the RPP workshops, insider and outsider practitioners stressed again and again that the role of outsiders is to support internal forces working for peace.

However, in spite of this strong commitment, the RPP discussions showed that in many partnerships insiders feel undermined or weakened by outsiders.

There were many concerns expressed by insiders, often presented in their own words, below.

• Sometimes external models "crowd out the space" for people in the context to make their own ideas heard.

• Often outsiders impose "Western" values and devalue or ignore local solutions. They show "arrogance" and "neocolonial attitudes." They may introduce techniques or approaches, such as "the culture of dialogue" that are inappropriate in some places.

• Outsiders often focus on "perceptual work" at the expense of "structural work." They often "downplay the conflict and its roots." They often try to provide "quick fix solutions for historical problems."

• Outsiders often interpret the need to be neutral between the parties as the need to be silent on the abuses the parties commit.

• Outsiders are attracted to work at the grassroots with the victims of conflict but, in doing so, they sometimes undermine local and national peace networks.

• Outsiders enter new situations with "institutional biases and strengths that can blind them to what is already happening."

- Outsiders are often unaware of local realities and political nuance. They come "armed with easy ethnic or two-party frameworks for conflict."
- The "tourist nature" of the way some outsiders operate leaves them with "no real understanding of local dynamics to drive their programs."

• "Outsiders mistakenly think they are not part of the conflict." Many lack awareness of how their own identities relate to the conflict.

• Many outsiders also "seek legitimacy in the conflict. They become stakeholders because they want to be seen to succeed."

The fact that these critiques are heard again and again in many different settings points to the problematic nature of partnerships. Significantly, many outsiders share these same concerns regarding their own efforts to help with other people's conflicts.

At the heart of the challenge facing insider/outsider partnerships is a serious power asymmetry felt by insiders. They feel that the priorities, biases, agendas, and analyses of outsiders tend to dominate. One source of domination is felt to arise from the way that peace work is funded. A reverse domination comes from the control exercised by insider gatekeepers.

Insider Dependency on Outsider Funding

Outsider partners usually bring the funds that insiders need to realize their programs. Some outsiders use their resources as an excuse to dictate terms of work to their partners. But, insiders also concede that, "We agree too readily to outsider programs in order to access their funding." In situations where insider agencies compete for scarce resources, many feel that challenging outsider ideas would put their own ability to get funds at risk.

Because of the dominance that results from external funding, many local peace activists are ambivalent about partnering with outsider agencies.

The agency purposefully avoided external funding or partnering with international NGOs as they conducted community meetings, peace education work, and public peace marches and campaigns in their country. Though their small size and volunteer nature sometimes impeded their ability to follow-up consistently, or recruit a large membership, they preferred to maintain independence from direct outside support

But dependence on outside funding is a reality for much peace work. Whether it leads to bad partnerships and outcomes depends on how it is managed. In some experiences reviewed by RPP, insiders retained full control of their strategy, decision-making, and program despite their dependence on funds from outside. Sometimes, this was possible because the insider agency deliberately raised funds from a broad base of sources, thereby ensuring that no one outsider had the ability to control its work. Sometimes it was possible because the several agencies involved forged transparent and solid relationships that addressed the implicit power asymmetry. (Ways to do this are described in the final section of this chapter.)

Outsider Dependency on Insiders as Gatekeepers

In insider/outsider partnerships, insiders also can wield power over outsiders in damaging ways. Insiders are the conduits to communities affected by conflict and to those engaged in peace activities. Outsiders depend on insider partners to gain access to communities both in order to understand them and to conduct programs with them. This can give insiders a great deal of influence over the direction and conduct of programs. This is as it should be.

However, in some cases, local agencies compete to monopolize outsiders, partly to ensure access to outsider funds but also in order to derive influence and power from the relationship.

"It is a familiar story. An outside peace organization comes to an area of localized conflict where they have few contacts. They meet with a local organization run by well-known person. This person acts as 'the introducer' but, in fact, only introduces the agency to people in his family or in his circle of close associates. They may be involved in peace work in some way but they may not be the best people at all."

Practitioners acknowledge that this dynamic is very common. As one Northern Irish practitioner described, "Gatekeepers keep other gatekeepers out. They get credibility from outsiders and want to keep others away." The result is that outsiders gain access to the situation in a way that is limited, or detrimental. The outsider can end up with no contact at all with important sectors of the society. Or the peace initiative is distorted to further the gatekeeper's personal or political special interests.

One senior official involved in the dialogues felt strong ownership of the process. He insisted that he rule on all potential joiners from his side, and he often refused to let certain people become involved because of his own personal conflicts with them. This restricted who was able to participate and limited the positive influence of the project to a small, closed group of allies representing only one segment of the political spectrum.

Manipulation by gatekeepers is not inevitable. Many partnerships avoid this trap. Experience shows that when outsiders consult very broadly with many insider counterparts and activists, they maintain a wide range of contacts to balance out and inform perspectives. Programs then do not become dependent on the goodwill of any one interlocutor. This approach is parallel to that adopted by insiders who avoid manipulation by a single outside funder by consciously raising funds from multiple donors so that no one can dominate.

PRINCIPLES FOR WORKING TOWARD EFFECTIVE PEACE PARTNERSHIPS

Insider and outsider peace agencies often end up working together as much by chance as by design. Rarely can either be sure that they are working with "the right" or "the best" partner.

The evidence shows that successful peace partnerships are the result of how agencies interact rather than derived from some intrinsic "rightness." Many of the ways that agencies best work together echo the findings in Chapter 4 on means and ends. Others, elaborated below, are concrete operational recommendations for peace partnerships that were highlighted by participants in the RPP process.

The best partnerships occur when insiders and outsiders work as a team in a coordinated program that includes both perspectives as valuable. Some roles need to overlap. In every partnership, both insiders and outsiders should be jointly engaged in planning, evaluation, analysis, and monitoring because the combination of insider and outsider perspectives provides a necessary reality-check for the biases of both. As well, insider and outsider staff are safer if they work together so they should be conscious of their roles in providing security, in different ways, for each other. Finally, each brings different and important networks to the work, and both should focus efforts on mobilizing the constituencies where they have maximum contacts and leverage.

While many of these things seem obvious, it is surprising (and distressing) how often they are not observed. The boxed examples show how, unintentionally, these principles of good partnerships can be violated.

1. At the core of good partnerships is recognition that each partner's knowledge and credibility are important to the effort and that each party's reputation will be hurt by failure. Thus, the relationship should be horizontal and based on mutual consultation; neither party should be seen as simply a service provider, financial underwriter, or subcontractor to do a job. Both parties should have equal influence on decisions. There should be joint processes for setting strategies, defining goals, and evaluating results.

The international agency contracted the local NGO to act as the mediator for a joint workshop between warring communities. The local NGO had no role in planning the program. After the opening session, one faction left, followed by a high-ranking government minister who took their side. Those who remained then claimed their only recourse was to continue the fighting. The international agency stopped the program, but the local agency's credibility was seriously damaged.

2. The agencies' roles should not only be clearly and explicitly defined; they should also be re-negotiated and re-assessed frequently. Often peace partners assume that a common vision and values will be the glue of their relationship and they rely only on verbal, open-ended agreements to this effect.

The local peace teams were comprised of young people from the affected communities who went through an intensive training program in peace skills over several months. Later, inexperienced international volunteers arrived to accompany the local peace monitors. These outsiders were given no training and did not speak the local language. It was never clear to the local peace team workers why the internationals were there or what their presence added to the work.

3. Partners should take time to identify shared criteria by which to evaluate and improve their relationship.

An international agency began working with youth groups from the two ethnic communities to rebuild cross-ethnic contact. The agency built and equipped a youth center in each ethnic enclave and planned that each would provide different activities to draw youth together for classes and sports events. The agency soon expressed its dissatisfaction with the way the youth groups were working, and what it saw as "their slow, bureaucratic procedures." The youth resented the partner's constant pressure, and unwillingness to listen to their reservations about the project. After some months, many youth activists wanted to withdraw from the partnership, even at the cost of losing the centers. No time had been spent on discussing the relationship between the agencies and their expectations for the project.

4. Partners should take the time to understand and define where their missions diverge. That is, they should explicitly recognize that they have differences as well as a common vision, and they should clarify and acknowledge these as valid.

The international agency spearheaded an advocacy campaign according to international norms in the war-torn country. Local and international NGOs in the area shared the overall goals and agreed to be on a steering committee to guide the effort. But big differences in approach soon emerged. The local groups wanted the campaign to confront the government on its abuses of power. The initiating agency felt its core mandate would be damaged by such a confrontational stance and resisted such attempts. Tensions mounted within the coalition and the campaign floundered.

5. Even in a horizontal relationship, the initiative and definition of needs must come from insiders.

After the peace accord was signed, the international agency thought it could help with post-conflict civil society-building by working to reduce inflammatory reporting in the media. The staff created and conducted English language professionalization workshops for journalists using the internet. However, this program did not engage senior media managers. Because they controlled media policies, the training reached only very junior people who would not hold key positions for another ten years. The program had little effect.

6. Together insiders and outsiders build a sustainability strategy for when outsider funding and programming is phased out.

The outside agency built community centers for minorities who were marginalized in the region. These centers were effective so long as the international agency stayed involved. However, when it left the region, 90% of the centers closed down.

CONCLUSION

Because conflicts have both internal and external dimensions, insider/outsider partnerships for peace can add to program effectiveness. Many agencies (both inside and outside) concentrate on choosing the "right" partner. Experience shows, however, that effective partnerships are built through procedures rather than based on a single selection decision. The discussion above gathers lessons from the good and bad experiences of many agencies. If applied, common pitfalls may be avoided and more positive, and more effective, partnerships may be built.

PART II: IMPROVING EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE PRACTICE

CHAPTER 6. WHAT PEACE PRACTITIONERS DO NOW

If we want to improve peace-practice, we first have to know how it is done now. What is it that peace practitioners do and what do they not do? What shapes current work? What is missing from it? What does experience show about why and how current peace practice does not produce the impacts practitioners intend?

RPP found clear patterns in how peace practice is done now, and identified specific gaps that undermine effectiveness. These findings are reviewed below in four categories. First, we begin with how peace practitioners do, and do not, analyze the contexts where they work. We then turn to how peace programs are carried out—i.e. what the work actually looks like now. Third, we discuss who is most often involved in peace work, and, fourth, we comment briefly on a bias, found in much peace practice, toward building positive alternative systems rather than directly confronting the "bad" that perpetuates conflicts. With these findings as a base, we then move to suggestions for how to improve peace practice.

HOW AGENCIES DO ANALYSIS NOW

Peace practitioners regularly emphasize the importance of analyzing the contexts where they work. But, contextual analysis turns out to be complicated. The RPP findings show both the problems that arise from doing more analysis than is necessary or helpful, as well as problems that arise from leaving out critically important factors that undermine programs! Although it might seem as if we are criticizing current peace practice for doing too much and too little analysis simultaneously, the discussion is really focused on sorting what is, and is not, important for carrying out effective peace efforts.

What peace practitioners believe:

Peace practitioners involved in RPP consistently and uniformly emphasize the importance of context analysis. As one person said, "Analysis is not optional, it is essential and obligatory for peace work." The evidence is strong that the more peace practitioners know and understand about the situations in which they are working, the less likely they are to make mistakes and the more likely they are to identify productive avenues for working.

What peace practitioners do:

However, in spite of a shared commitment to full and ongoing context analysis, most of the peace agencies involved in RPP do not, regularly, do such analysis. Instead, experience shows that they do "partial" analysis, shaped, on the one hand, by their expertise as an agency (or individual) and, on the other, by their beliefs about how to bring positive change in conflict settings. That is, peace practitioners in general focus their analysis on where, in a given context, the things they know how to do can be useful and on whether their approach to change fits that particular context.

As their programs progress, most agencies continue to do more and deeper analysis, but this, also, is only partial. Most focus their ongoing analysis on areas that immediately relate to their own activities and the responses to these activities. They rarely examine in detail the broader and developing context or consider concerns that lie beyond their immediate programmatic reach.

The results:

Some kinds of partial analysis can have negative consequences. For example, when analysis is driven by a particular theory of change or based on a pre-set model for peace, it may only incorporate confirming evidence and, therefore, obscure as much as it reveals. Similarly, when undertaken at a distance or based on limited local input, partial analysis can produce misguided program designs.

But, the fact that most agencies rely on partial analysis turns out not to be as negative as one might expect. And there is evidence that an overemphasis on "full" analysis also can undermine effective programming.

For example, in some cases when an agency has undertaken a long and detailed analysis before beginning its activities, staff have become so committed to it that, as the situation changes, the original understanding actually becomes a programming straightjacket. Further, some people report that the need to do analysis can get in the way of action, causing them to postpone urgent programs until they feel they "know everything."

The evidence shows that, although knowing more is always better, it is also true that peace work undertaken on the basis of partial analysis can also be effective and that too much concern with "getting the analysis right" can, in some circumstances, actually divert or limit programming options.

ASPECTS OF ANALYSIS THAT ARE TOO OFTEN MISSING

Even though it is not always necessary to know everything in order to be effective, RPP experience does show that knowing certain things matters a great deal. When they are missing, as they very often are, programs suffer.

Specifically, the evidence shows that context analysis often misses:

1. What the Conflict Is Not About

Often overlooked are: areas where differing sides agree, where they share common understandings, where they interact, and where they avoid taking part in conflict. These constitute the basis for peace in any society and, therefore, represent important factors that peace practice should reinforce, support, and build upon. An agency struggled to create space for people from the conflicting sides to meet in dialogue groups. As they effectively mobilized a significant number of dialogues, the authorities of one side reacted by adding restrictions that made travel and joint meetings almost impossible. After some months of negotiating with the authorities, and of trying to find ways around the restrictions, the agency suddenly discovered that there was one village along the border where citizens from both sides regularly and easily passed into each other's territories. This space had remained open, and had been used by ordinary people, throughout the war!

2. What Needs to Be Stopped

Also not considered are: what needs to be stopped in the war system and/or injustice system and who will resist attempts to stop these things. This includes analysis of who has economic as well as political interests in perpetuating war both inside the affected conflict area and outside in the broader world. Without this, well-intentioned peace programs can bring people together or provide training but they will not succeed because other forces will continually undermine anything positive that is done.

3. International or Regional Dimensions of Conflict

In almost all conflicts, both the things that need to be supported and the things that need to be stopped are inside and outside the immediate conflict area. Many peace agencies seem to assume that the focus of work needs to be in the location of the conflict. This approach sends the message that responsibility for solving a conflict rests entirely on the shoulders of those suffering from it. Yet, most conflicts have inter-regional and international dimensions. Repeatedly, people within conflict areas suggest that foreign peace agencies are blind to the work that could be done outside the zone where fighting is occurring. They call on their international colleagues to take up the challenge of affecting international public opinion, global economic injustice, and damaging foreign policies of outside actors as integral to strategies for ending violence. Sometimes the focus can be on other governments, sometimes with diaspora groups. Noticeable examples of such work include the land mines, small arms, and conflict diamond campaigns.

4. What Has Been Tried


If one is about to plan a new peace program, it is very important to consider first what has already been tried and the results of this effort (and why these results occurred). Peace practitioners often repeat program approaches (such as dialogues, or training, or women's consultations, etc.) that others have tried before with little effect (or that even failed) without analyzing why this has happened.

These, then, are the findings of RPP with regard to how peace practitioners now think about, and do, context analysis and the results of these approaches. Below we turn to an examination of how the work of peace practice is done.

HOW PEACE PRACTITIONERS WORK NOW: BASIC PEACE STRATEGIES

As RPP looked at the many peace programs in operation, it became clear that in spite of the great variety of activities, all of them can be mapped in a simple matrix, illustrated in Diagram 1, below.

DIAGRAM 1



The horizontal axis indicates that peace practice takes essentially two approaches to engaging people for peace:

More People

Believing that peace can only be achieved when many people are involved, this approach sets out to engage more people in peace activism, in talking to the other side, in protesting violence, in gaining new understanding, etc. The theory behind this approach is that the achievement of peace depends on involvement of "the people." "More people" strategies are context-specific. In some situations, getting more people involved may mean getting only a few individuals to take a first step because, in that setting, no one has yet taken such a risk. In other circumstances, getting more people involved may mean organizing massive demonstrations or public campaigns involving literally thousands of people. In addition, the issues around which more people should become involved will vary from place to place and time to time. But, the essential strategy is focused on increasing the numbers of people who support the processes for stopping violence or building justice.

Key People

Believing that peace cannot be achieved without the direct involvement of certain people deemed important to the peace process, this approach sets out to engage these "key" individuals in dialogue, in programs designed to increase understanding, in changing laws, in negotiating a cease-fire, etc. People are deemed "key" for a variety of reasons that, as above, depend on the given context. They may represent important entry points

for work (as, for example, when a program targets children because all sides of a conflict can agree on benefits for children when they agree on nothing else). They may have leverage beyond themselves and, thus, be key in terms of affecting people on a broader scale (as when a program targets media, or religious leaders, or school teachers because they can influence people by their own access or prestige). Or, they may be key because they are in some sense necessary to a peace agreement (as when programs target warlords or particular political actors without whom peace accords cannot be made or sustained).

Sometimes, a person or group may be key for more than one reason. For example, the media can be an entry point (because they are open to new information) and a leverage point (because of their ability to influence public opinion). Politicians may be key both because they have leverage on public opinion and because they are necessary to any peace agreement.

Some peace practice agencies have programs that take both the more people and the key people approaches; many concentrate on one or the other.

The Diagram's vertical axis shows that peace practice also works at two basic levels.

The Individual/Personal Level

Believing that a central aspect of peace-building is changing the thinking of individuals, some agencies concentrate on activities that are intended to bring changes in the attitudes, values, or perceptions of individuals.

The Socio/Political Level

Believing that systemic, institutional, societal level change is necessary for peace, some agencies focus their programs in the public realm. These agencies believe that sustainable peace cannot be achieved until political and societal institutions support it. Such programs focus on supporting changes in politics, economics, justice systems, and other institutions.

One can work on "more people" at either the Individual/Personal or at the Socio/Political levels, and one can work with "key people" at either or both levels. A number of different types of activities fit within each quadrant.

To illustrate, a program that brings children to an inter-ethnic camp every summer and a program that revises the grade-school curriculum in the government schools both work to engage more children in peace-building. The former, however, focuses at the level of individual attitude-change (Individual/Personal) while the latter addresses the institutions of education (Socio/Political) of a national government.

Similarly, a program that focuses on training youth for employment who otherwise would likely join fighting groups as well as a program that engages political leaders in negotiations both work with "key" individuals. While the first focuses at the Individual/Personal level, the second focuses on the Socio/Political level by pursuing a political outcome. This matrix represents the types or categories of programmatic approaches to peace that RPP found in the broad spectrum of peace practice included in the Project. It is possible to map all peace practice within this matrix of four quadrants. The strategies implied by the quadrants of the matrix are descriptive of work at all levels and represent the range of the theories of change described in Chapter 2 that we have discovered through RPP.

The dotted lines between the quadrants of the matrix reflect the fact that borders between these approaches and levels are more fluid than closed boxes would suggest. For example, is a dialogue that aims to affect individual perceptions and attitudes about political solutions to a conflict focused at the personal level or the societal level? Such a program is clearly based on the theory that individual attitude change is central for broader social change toward peace, but the particular attitudes that are addressed are those related to political agreements, reflecting the belief that peace can only be achieved through such agreements. We do not really need to decide whether this hypothetical program is one or the other. Rather than meaning to pigeonhole projects, these quadrants are intended to be suggestive of the range of approaches taken by peace agencies and some of the important distinctions observed in strategies for affecting peace.

This is what RPP found about how peace practice is now carried out. We turn now to what RPP found about who is most often involved in activities by peace practitioners.

A BIAS TOWARD THE EASY TO REACH

RPP found that most peace agencies work with people who are, comparatively, easy to reach. As a beginning point, this makes sense, because initiating peace activities in a tense conflict arena is difficult.

However, the broad review by RPP showed that, even once their activities are launched, few agencies ever reach beyond the "easy." Very often, programs focus on children, or women, or schools, or churches because, in some way, they are deemed non-political and because they are often ready to collaborate. Women and children are usually (though not always) non-belligerents and, thus, apparently less committed to the pursuit of war than those directly engaged in fighting. They are easy to identify, and they often welcome the attention of agencies who bring resources with their programs.

A telling example of working with the easy to reach is discussed in Chapter 9 on dialogue programs. In their analysis of the lack of effectiveness of some dialogues, dialogue participants noted that they very often participate in dialogues because they share positions that are closer to those of the "other" side than to those of the extremists in their own societies. And, retrospectively, they note that the limited success of their dialogue processes often stems from their inability, or reluctance, or lack of opportunity to dialogue with those whose views are radically different within their own societies.

A BIAS TOWARD DOING GOOD VERSUS STOPPING BAD

RPP found that much of peace practice is focused on doing good rather than stopping bad. Agencies describe their work as building the positive preconditions for peace. But it

became clear through RPP that there is no agreement on what or how much needs to be built to create a peaceful society, and peace means different things for different people. As a result, the benchmarks for such positive-focused peace practice are highly idealized conditions of social harmony that do not exist in most countries that are at peace!

Also, evidence shows that much of the work that focuses on what needs to be built differs little from good participatory practice in community development, social work, democracy building, good governance, legal reform, etc. Calling all this work "peace work" when it happens in areas of violent conflict has reduced, rather than increased, clarity around what, in particular, is necessary to end destructive conflict. It has led to the perception that anything done with goodwill in areas of conflict constitutes "building peace." It has contributed to a lack of any clear guideposts for weighing priorities between different types of work.

Finally, the focus on doing good rather than stopping bad means that many peace programs never address the systems (or individuals) that promote or perpetuate war. As a result, they miss the mark of what is needed to change things sufficiently to ensure that peace is achieved and is sustainable.

CONCLUSION

We said above that we should know how peace practice is done now if we want to consider how to improve it. We reviewed four aspects of current work: context analysis, programmatic approaches, who is included, and common biases. We found a complex picture with regard to analysis but were able to identify certain specific issues that, when missing from analysis, seem regularly to undermine programmatic effectiveness. These included: a) analysis of what the conflict is not about (who is not fighting, where and why); b) analysis of what needs to be stopped and who will resist this; c) analysis of international or regional dimensions of conflect and; d) analysis of what has been tried before and the results of these efforts.

With regard to programmatic approaches, we found that all peace work can be mapped onto a four-cell matrix that reveals the basic theories or beliefs about how peace is achieved or about how change occurs that lie behind any given program strategy. This matrix also locates individual programs in relation to all other options for programming. We then saw that most peace work concentrates on engaging those people who are already pre-disposed to support peace rather than war but few activities reach beyond this group to those who are harder to reach. Finally, we saw that much if not most peace practice is biased toward doing good, rather than stopping bad.

With these findings in mind, we turn now to our discussion of how to improve peace practice.

CHAPTER 7. HOW TO IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE PRACTICE

The goals of peace practice are 1) to end violent conflict, and 2) to build sustainable just structures. In Chapter 2 we discussed four criteria that were identified through RPP as useful for determining when a program is more, or less, effective in supporting these goals. With this background, we turn to an examination of how to improve effectiveness.

From the accumulated experience gathered through RPP, three ideas emerged for improving effectiveness—for ratcheting up, magnifying, and extending the impacts of peace practice, sooner, in changing the systems that perpetuate human suffering. Each of these three ideas points to an aspect of understanding, and working with, the specific context of a conflict. Although there may be additional ways to improve impacts in certain conflict areas, the areas discussed below came up again and again in the RPP experience and, therefore, seem to have special importance.

These ideas are posed in the form of questions. They incorporate the lessons learned and discussed above about how peace practice is done now and what is missing.

To improve the effectiveness of their work, individuals or agencies undertaking any form of peace practice should consider:

a) How should we focus our work to be most effective, soonest? (How to Do Analysis)

b) How can individual programs have wider impacts? (How to Work)

c) Who needs to be reached for improved effectiveness? (With Whom to Work)

How To Do Analysis: How should we focus our work to be most effective, soonest?

It is clear that effective peace practice would end the motivations and opportunities for waging war and would reinforce and strengthen those factors that ensure peace and justice. Therefore, context analysis should highlight the factors on each side of this equation in ways that provide a reasonable and accurate basis for program design and implementation.

The discussion above of RPP's findings about how analysis is done now and what is missing from it suggests the elements that experience shows to be most critical for effective peace practice.

What Needs to Be Stopped and Who Will Resist

Peace practice should be driven by hard analysis of who and what is driving the war system or the injustice system. We know that more people do not fight, or even want to fight, in wars than do. We know that it takes effort, organization, and funds to start and maintain a system of war or injustice. Analysis of the vulnerable points in these systems is critical. Breaking into the systems that keep war and injustice going is one area where peace programs can improve impact.

Attention to what is bad also would anticipate likely resistance to progress toward peace. Experience shows that, when faced with the threat of peace, people who have an interest in perpetuating conflict will undertake extreme, often violent, acts to spoil the peace process. The greater the progress toward peace, the more likely it is that extremists will take action to sabotage it. Analyzing where such resistance may arise and planning how to respond to such events are important if momentum toward peace, once started, is to be maintained.

What Needs to Be Supported¹

Peace can never be imported. It grows from and is maintained by systems within societies strong enough to enable people to live together and solve problems without violence. Some of these exist everywhere, even where there is open conflict. One aspect of context analysis, therefore, is to identify the factors—systems, processes, individuals, groups, locations, understandings—that reinforce peace and justice. Programs that are designed to support, reinforce, and build on these are more effective than those that assume all good ideas must come from outside the contexts of conflict.

Analysis of what to support will include assessment of potential partnering organizations and their capacities for working. It should also include assessment of who has the potential to exert the most influence, the soonest, toward peace.

These are the essential elements of context analysis. In both areas, three reminders are in order.

Locate the problems: First, it is important for peace practitioners to review the things to be stopped and supported both inside, and outside, the actual context of conflict.

Identify past failures: Second, it is always important to review what has already been tried and how this did or did not work in order not to repeat mistakes and misdirections.

Anticipate negative impacts: Third, anticipation of how things might go wrong—specifically what negative impacts may occur—is important.

Finally, before moving on to how to improve actions in peace practice, it is important to report on one consistent finding from RPP about how the best analysis occurs. The finding is simple. The best analysis is based on broad, continuing consultations with

¹ Clearly there are commonalities here in the recognition of "connectors" as an important capacity of Do No Harm analysis. See Anderson, Mary B., *Do No Harm: How Aid Can Support Peace—or War*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1999.

many people, from many parts of society, in a conflict region (and beyond it, to a broad range of others who are concerned with or involved in that conflict). That is, the more people one listens to, the more one learns about where agreements lie, where serious disagreements lie, where are the ideas for solutions, where are potential resisters to change, who can be trusted, who already works in connected ways, where such activities occur, and on and on. Limited consultation always results in limited understanding. Broad consultation always results in broader understanding. In the experience of peace practitioners, the latter is essential for effectiveness.

For outsiders, breadth of consultation is essential but, experience shows, even this can result in flawed programs if, having consulted broadly, an outside agency goes away and decides on a program without local involvement in this decision. At some point, consultation in order to identify and learn about perspectives must also be linked, practitioners observe, to a process of consultative program design and implementation with partners and affected communities. In many examples reviewed by RPP this process of joint analysis has been cited as the key to effective programming because it is responsive to the real dynamics of the conflict at hand.

HOW TO WORK: HOW CAN INDIVIDUAL PEACE PROGRAMS HAVE WIDER IMPACTS?

One of RPP's main findings is that work that stays within any one quadrant of the matrix is not enough to build momentum for significant change. Any individual peace program will have more impact if its effects transfer to other quadrants of the matrix.

Many peace activities are discrete efforts directed toward affecting one (often small) piece of the puzzle. Most peace practitioners talk of the importance of linkages among the work at all levels and across sectors of society. Often, people will say, "I have to assume that, over time, all of our different activities will add up." But, the evidence is that, without explicit efforts to add it up, this does not automatically or inevitably occur.

The "adding up" of activities seems to be one crucial area for improving effectiveness. A way to make this happen is for individual programs to plan, explicitly, how to connect their particular work to activities that produce impacts in other quadrants of this matrix.

Note: This does NOT mean that each agency, or coalition of agencies, needs to have programs in all the boxes of the matrix!

But they do need to connect to other activities for maximum effectiveness. Connections need to be made both across the two approaches—More People and Key People—and across the two levels—Individual/Personal and Socio/Political. Both connections, in different ways, are critical for effectiveness. As the text that follows shows, working only at the Individual/Personal level will not result in structural change that is necessary for peace, whether the work begins with More People or Key People, or even when the work connects the two. Activities must connect to other activities at the Socio/Political level to result in changes that really contribute to peace. Within work that is focused at the Socio/Political level, connecting More People and Key People is also critical.

1. Connecting the Individual/Personal level and the Socio/Political level

Evidence shows that when programs focus only on change at the Individual/Personal level without regard to how these may be translated to Socio/Political level, actions inevitably fall short of having an impact on the larger goals.

Many peace efforts that work either with More People or with Key People at the Individual/Personal level aim to build relationships and trust across lines of division, to increase tolerance, to make peace seem possible and within reach to people, or to inspire hope. Practitioners and communities talk of having been "transformed personally" by a particular program or "having my perceptions about the other side changed" or "improving my relationships and communication with individuals on the other side." But evidence shows that, in order to have a real impact on conflict, personal change must be translated into actions at the Socio/Political level.

An agency managed to change the mind of a key leader so he met his main opponent in the conflict. Both leaders emerged with more positive views of each other. However, neither took any actions to affect the larger society, so the effort did not produce significant change in the conflict.

Does work at the Socio/Political level likewise need to transfer to the Individual/Personal level? Evidence suggests sometimes yes, and sometimes no. For example, if societal change is not internalized by individuals, it may also not be durable. New structures and rules need to be embedded in people's psyches, expectations, and values to be sustainable. Otherwise, they can be resisted, ignored, and, ultimately, overturned. So work on individual attitudes and behaviors can cement institutional changes. But in other cases, Socio/Political change, such as new laws, are taken up and internalized simply because they are enforced, and so explicit work at the Individual/Personal level to change hearts and minds is not needed.


2. Connecting More People and Key People at the Socio/Political level

Evidence shows that even in activities at the Socio/Political level, work with More People is not enough if it does not reach Key People, and work with Key People is not enough if it does not reach More People. Some examples will illustrate these common problems of peace programming.

An agency organized an ongoing high-level dialogue process involving influential people with decision-making power in the official negotiations. This resulted in improved communication in the official negotiations and the uptake of some ideas on solutions. However after several years the two sides remained far apart on a political resolution. Leaders on both sides claimed they were blocked from making more progress. Public opinion was "not ready." The effort was stuck at the key people level, and unable to affect the more people level. Foreign volunteers moved into a town that had experienced violent clashes in order to prevent further violence through non-violent direct action. At times, these activists put their bodies in the way of guns and bombs. They spent considerable time visiting with the victims of the violence and injustice in the area, and building coalitions of volunteers to participate in their protest activities. However, they had little access to or impact on decision makers at the political level. The work was stuck with More People and unable to affect the Key People level.

The Diagram below shows the interconnections among approaches and levels.

DIAGRAM 1



The arrows reflect the findings about the importance of transferring impacts among the boxes. Wherever an agency's particular project is located on this matrix (in terms of who the work targets and at what levels), the agency needs to plan where the impacts of that project's work need to transfer—who else needs to be affected, and at what level, in order to produce significant change?

The key importance of translating changes at the Individual/Personal level into Socio/Political level actions is shown by the heavy downward arrows. The importance of connecting More People and Key People strategies at the Socio/Political level is shown by the horizontal arrow. The dotted upward arrows show the finding that, sometimes, though not always, work is necessary at the Individual/Personal level to ensure that Socio/Political changes are internalized in the behavior of individuals. (Note: There is no horizontal arrow connecting More People and Key People at the Individual/Personal level because evidence shows that this is not a critical connection for effectiveness.)

How such connections may best occur varies from context to context. However, some lessons emerge across contexts. In general, more specific interactions across quadrants have greater effects. When people working at the different levels and with different approaches concentrate on the same issue at the same time, the impacts of all programs are magnified. This may occur through face-to-face contact among staff of agencies working in different quadrants who are planning and/or implementing different aspects of a common campaign (as, for example, a disarmament campaign). It may occur when many agencies take up aspects of an issue simultaneously and there is a concerted effort to link those separate initiatives so that they translate into Socio/Political or structural change.

Several examples will illustrate how such interactions among quadrants increase the momentum and impacts of peace efforts.

An example of a multi-layered effort that connected activities involving community leaders (Key People) and many citizens (More People), bringing them together in one place in order to talk through disputes that resulted in formalized peace agreements (Socio/Political level) comes from an RPP case study of Southern Sudan.

In Southern Sudan, church leaders became discouraged by the failure of many attempted peace initiatives to stop the fighting between the different southern factions that had cost more lives in recent years than the North-South war. They traveled the region and met with traditional leaders over many months, as well as worked with their broad church constituencies. They then brought the two together. They organized a massive assembly of citizens, traditional and church leaders—representing two main groups in the conflict and many levels of society—to meet for some days to discuss and settle intergroup differences. The result was profound at several levels. Traditional leaders were able to agree on specific peace accords and communicate their commitments to people directly. The terms of these agreements were widely accepted and adhered to in the months that followed, greatly increasing the security of the general population. Thousands of people traveled to the location of the conference and took part, and many more who were not present still upheld the agreements made.

Another example illustrates an effort that began by focusing on selected youth (as Key in this context), then connected to activities involving a broad range of citizens (More People) on an issue at the Socio/Political level that successfully crossed boundaries between people recently at war.

In the Balkans, some youth groups across the region proposed that they undertake a bus tour through the region together, focused on studying the environment. As they developed their plans, they began to realize that the tour could influence people far beyond the fifty youth who could fit on the bus. Announcing the trip as an eco-bus tour, they set out to raise the issues of ecological connectedness across the region. Part of the design of their program involved preparation in each town and city they would visit to reach the general public with their message. Youth in these locations visited city and town officials, organized the media for press conferences and arranged community meetings. As the bus arrived in each place, the schedule was in place for interaction between the youth on the bus and local people and politicians. In this way, the specific environmental issues were raised but more important to the planners, these discussions always emphasized the strong linkages among the entities of the region as they are interconnected environmentally and politically. The real message of the bus tour was a peace message, and its impacts were magnified by the transfer of the experience of a few young people on a bus into the broader societal and political realm, affecting many people. In one country, the principles advocated by the youth were adopted by the Parliament as the standard for environmental legislation.

And in yet another region, Fiji, an association of civic leaders initiated a campaign intended to address the legal exclusion of Indo-Fijians that underlay ongoing flare-ups of violence and military coups. This group of leaders (Key People) spent many months developing broad-based recommendations for constitutional reforms (Socio/Political level). Realizing that the changes they proposed needed broad acceptance, they then developed an approach to reach More People. The fact that the constitutional changes were overturned by a subsequent coup does not diminish the effectiveness of the approach taken by this group.

A civic group in Fiji promoted constitutional reform to address entrenched inequalities between ethnic groups in their country. They conducted a public consensus-building process including an ever-expanding group of civic leaders on the issues of constitutional change, and ultimately many of its recommendations were taken up by the government. The group then linked up its efforts with other activists to conduct a public education campaign around the country to publicize the new constitutional provisions through a series of workshops, campaigns, and sales of T-shirts and posters.

We reiterate: These findings do not mean that a single agency, or even a group of agencies, must have programs in all areas. In fact, unless the peace agency is very large and its staff have multiple skills, trying to work everywhere can be counterproductive. No one agency should try to do things it is not prepared for or capable of doing!

Rather, the point is that activities of some kinds are going on in all areas within the societies where peace work occurs. While these activities may be logical and useful starting points for agencies due to their skills, attributes, and access, unless the activities connect to others that will produce Socio/Political changes, they will not be effective. Whatever the focus of an individual peace agency, staff should look for and find ways to connect to existing activities, processes, and/or impacts of others that work within the More People and Key People quadrants at the Socio/Political level. If analysis shows (as it rarely might) that there are no activities occurring in either the More People or Key People quadrants at the Socio/Political level, this would indicate that, somehow, such activities should be developed or encouraged on the part of appropriate actors. It is important to remember that the single most important connection for significant change is that whatever is done be translated into Socio/Political action. Without such action, fundamental and sustainable changes required for peace seem not to occur.

WITH WHOM TO WORK: WHO NEEDS TO BE REACHED TO IMPROVE EFFECTIVENESS?

To end war or to prevent it through sustainable peace requires the involvement of those people who hold power and therefore, of necessity, must agree to a peace and maintain the systems that sustain it—namely, governments, combatants or so-called "hardliners." These are the groups often referred to by peace practitioners as the "hard to reach."

Particularly important in the findings of RPP is inclusion of government. The strong emphasis that NGOs place on working with civil society has meant that few peace agencies make direct connections to official governmental actors and functions. Especially in post-war countries where people often do not trust the motivations and integrity of their government officials, there is a tendency to eschew interaction of any kind with official structures.

In one post-war society, members of the youth peace group were lamenting the fact that they had such a corrupt and ineffective government. When challenged about what they could do about this, one said, "We cannot meet with our government officials. If we do, we will be tainted," and another said, "We cannot trust them, so why interact with them?" A third member responded, "But, if we do not ever interact with them, then they will never become accountable to us nor represent us. We have to engage with them to affect them."

Important also is inclusion of militias, commanders, and others who may have a direct interest in continuing conflict. In some contexts, rebel groups or militias who have devoted themselves for many years to a particular cause are likely saboteurs of any peace progress. Unless it is possible to find ways either to include them in peace, or to ensure that their actions to undo peace are ineffective (in terms of public response), they will always be able to undermine the effectiveness of peace practice.

Much experience shows the necessity of working with these forces for a variety of reasons—to stop the fighting, to sustain agreements, to reach (through government institutions) large numbers of people.

From experience, peace practitioners affirm that there are always ways to work with those who are "hard to reach," because in any context these groups are not monolithic. Even in repressive governments, there are civil servants who want to do a good job, function as legitimate representatives of their offices, and work for progress in the country they serve. Even among fighters, there are those who want the fighting to end if other alternatives to make a living can be found.

Building on what has been learned about understanding and improving effectiveness, the chapter that follows brings these findings together in outline form as an aid for peace practitioners.

PART III: IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE PROGRAMMING

CHAPTER 8. USING THE FINDINGS

Peace practice is not simple. Therefore, a guide for peace practitioners must also not be simple—or simplistic. Yet, past experience does provide lessons that are useful for future efforts. Below, we gather these lessons in summary form.

There is a logic to the way the lessons are presented. In the best of worlds, a strategy for effective work follows predictable steps. A statement of goals and an analysis of current realities precede program planning. Then, based on these, practitioners consider programming options for what to do, where to do it, and with whom to work, and select the option that promises to go from the present situation to the goal in the most direct and quickest way. And before this option is pursued, a peace practitioner will consider potential negative impacts in order to avoid them.

However, in reality many peace practitioners find themselves engaged in programs without full analysis, and, analysis should be a continuous process in any case. Similarly, choices of partners are often made on the basis of incomplete knowledge and, over time, partners may change. The elements of a strategy cannot be static; effective strategies adapt and adjust to changing conditions.

The presentation below allows for the dynamic and interactive processes that actually occur in the real world of peace practice. Although captured in boxes, these should not be seen as a sequence of steps but as a listing of the elements to be simultaneously considered and reconsidered as events unfold.

These five elements should be considered for effectiveness:

- The Goal (Where are we going?)
- Analysis of Context (Where are we now?)
- Program Planning/Design (What can we do to go from here to there?)
- Implementation (How shall we do it?)
- Outcomes (With what results?)

THE GOAL

The Question: If the goals of peace practice are

- To end violence and destructive conflict, and,
- To build a just, sustainable peace,

Then what is our peace effort doing to make this happen?

The Task: To link specific program goals to Peace Writ Large.

Peace programs that are not consciously and directly linked to the large and long-term goal of peace will very often miss the mark. They may do some good for some people, but they will make very little real contribution to the realization of Peace Writ Large. But, because no one agency or practitioner can alone achieve the Peace Writ Large goal, what can every specific peace program aim for? The answer to this is found in the four criteria of effectiveness as these may be applied to any specific peace activity.

To link goals to Peace Writ Large, ask:

• Will this effort cause participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace?

• Will this effort result in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict?

• Will this effort prompt people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence?

• Will this effort result in an increase in people's security and in their sense of security?

ANALYSIS OF CONTEXT

The Question: Why is there violence and destructive conflict now? The following four sub-questions are key:

- What needs to be stopped and who will resist inside the context of conflict?
- What and who need to be supported inside the context of conflict?
- What needs to be stopped and who will resist outside the conflict area?
- What and who need to be supported outside the conflict area?

The Task: To identify together with local actors in the context of conflict the most pressing issues that must be addressed to end violence and injustice and to identify areas about which people do not fight as the basis for supporting peace.

PROGRAM PLANNING AND DESIGN

First Question: Given the goals of Peace Writ Large and the criteria by which we shall judge effectiveness, and given the analysis of the current situation, what shall we do to go from here to there?

The Task: With partners and colleagues in the context of conflict, to consider program options and to determine which approaches should be undertaken in this context to move from the current situation to the desired outcomes.

Experience shows that a great variety of approaches may contribute significantly to peace. The questions posed here do not presume that there is one best approach. Rather, as discussed above in Chapter 7, More People approaches must be linked, strategically, to Key People approaches, and both of these must be pursued at the Socio/Political level, for real effectiveness. Thus any agency deciding on its own approach should consider what it knows best how to do and then, given this, make choices based on the following questions:

• Given our goals and our situation, should we begin work at the Personal/Individual level or at the Socio/Political level?

• Given our goals and our situation, should we focus our program on More People or Key People?

• If we begin at the Personal/Individual level, what shall we do to ensure that our effects translate to impacts at the Socio/Political level?

• Within the Socio/Political level, if we focus on More People, how shall we ensure that we connect our work to processes involving Key People? If we focus on Key People, how shall we translate this to processes and impacts with More People?

Within these questions, agencies should consider who must be reached. In all cases, they should identify the critical hard-to-reach people; that is, governments, combatants, and hard-liners or war supporters (whether More or Key) that must be reached for real change and plan how, over time, they will engage with them.

Test: Given what we plan to do:

• Will changes happen quickly enough? (Or can they be accomplished more quickly through some other means?)

• Will changes be sustained enough? (Or will they only last a short time?)

• Will changes be big enough? (Or is the conflict so much bigger that they will have little significance in proportion to it?)

The benchmark: Can some other way of working accomplish more, sooner? Second Question: Has this plan been tried before and, if so, with what results? The Task: To avoid repeating mistakes and/or pursuing program approaches that have little chance of making any significant contribution to peace.

PROGRAM IMPLEMENTATION

The Question: How shall we work to do what we have planned?

The Task: To ensure that styles and approaches of working (both personal and organizational) are consistent with program goals and to ensure that right relationships are initiated and maintained with partners.

Are our approaches of working:

- Honest?
- Valuing of life?
- Reliable?
- Respecting of difference?
- Eschewing violence and intimidation?
- Committed to justice as essential for peace?
- Honoring of the fact that peace belongs to the people who make it?

With our partners, do we:

- Act as equals, recognizing the essential values brought to the work by the other?
- Regularly and frequently discuss and work through our roles and responsibilities?
- Develop shared criteria by which to judge our relationship?
- Explore honestly and openly the areas where our ideas and missions diverge?

• Ensure that the people working from inside the context of the conflict have the stronger influence on our definitions of needs and the initiatives we undertake?

• Work together to think through the strategy for continuing when our outside partner leaves the conflict?

Another Question: Are there any ways that our program may have a negative impact? The Task: To anticipate and avoid negative impacts.

The Test: Are there any aspects of our program that might:

- Worsen divisions among conflicting groups?
- Increase danger for participants?
- Reinforce structural or overt violence?
- Divert resources from more productive peace activities?
- Increase cynicism and discouragement?
- Disempower local people?

OUTCOMES

The Question: Did we move things toward Peace Writ Large?

The Task: To link program outcomes to goals, i.e. contributing to Peace Writ Large, and to monitor (and adjust appropriately) weaknesses and strengths in our peace effort.

• Has this effort caused participants and communities to develop their own initiatives for peace?

• Has the effort resulted in the creation or reform of political institutions to handle grievances that fuel the conflict?

• Has the effort prompted people increasingly to resist violence and provocations to violence?

• Has the effort resulted in an increase in people's security and in their sense of security?

And:

• Have these changes happened quickly enough? (Or could they have been accomplished more quickly through some other means?)

• Have these changes been sustained enough? (Or have they only lasted for a short time?)

• Have these changes been big enough? (Or is the conflict so much bigger than the changes that they have little significance in proportion to it?)

The benchmark: Could some other way of working have accomplished more, sooner?

These five boxes capture the essentials learned through RPP about what elements are critical for improving effectiveness in peace practice. None of the elements is surprising.

Together they can help peace practitioners develop better strategies for linking their specific work with the larger goals of peace. They do not tell peace activists what to do, but they do provide guidance for thinking through the implications of programming options and for planning in ways that ensure greater and more lasting effectiveness.

PART IV: SPECIAL AREAS OF PEACE PRACTICE

INTRODUCTION TO PART IV

Now that we have seen the implications that the RPP learnings have for peace programming overall, this section examines three specific areas of concern to practitioners: Dialogue projects, peace trainings, and the funding of peace work.

These are areas that came up again and again in the course of the RPP process as of central concern to practitioners. Dialogues and trainings are among the most common approaches in peacework. And funding is a critical basic condition to even undertaking peace programs, and an area that is fraught with concerns for practitioners.

CHAPTER 9. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF DIALOGUE PROJECTS

Many people believe that dialogues are an effective way of working for peace.

But the record of dialogues is mixed. Many dialogues have a positive impact on the people who take part in them. Some, however, reinforce prejudices, confirming people's negative stereotypes about the other side. While some dialogue participants follow up by taking actions to affect the broader peace, more often, positive dialogue experiences do not translate into impacts beyond the individual level.

RPP gathered experience both from practitioners who run dialogues as well as from participants in dialogues about what has worked and what has not. When viewed through the lens of the RPP findings detailed in Chapter 7, clear lessons emerge about how to improve the effectiveness of dialogues in order to have the maximum effect on the factors that drive conflict.

WHAT IS DIALOGUE?

RPP focused on non-official dialogues. Findings presented come from these experiences, although some may also be relevant for official dialogues. In peace practice, dialoguerefers to deliberate, arranged conversations organized, and often facilitated by, peace agencies or individuals. Dialogues provide opportunities (meetings, structures, processes, "space") for direct contact and communication between people on opposing sides of conflict.

The dialogue approach is used by peace agencies in a variety of ways.

At different societal levels: Some dialogues involve political elites who have decision-making influence on the political resolution of the conflict. These are often conducted as confidence-building measures prior to official negotiations or

as backchannels to official negotiations. Other dialogue efforts focus on sectors of civil society, bringing NGOs, journalists, religious leaders, academics, youth, etc., into discussions with those on the other side. Some dialogues bring together both elites and civil society actors to jointly identify problems and solutions or to build accountability of leaders to civil society.

Across lines of conflict or within: Most often dialogues are used to bring people together across lines of conflict. Sometimes, however, they are used to bridge groups with polarized views on one side of a conflict.

With different goals: Agencies use dialogues to build communication and respect between groups on opposite sides of conflict, to identify and work on common problems, to promote reconciliation, or to model and legitimize contact and cooperation across conflict lines. Agencies see the basic purpose of dialogues as either building interpersonal understanding and relationships between participants, or solving concrete problems. Many dialogues combine both.

With more or less active facilitation: Methodologies used in dialogue meetings vary widely. Some are highly structured and involve active facilitation by a third party (the convening NGO) with formal ground-rules on what can be discussed and how. Some are unstructured, with conveners simply providing a venue, organizational help, and funding, and then letting participants proceed on their own.

Alone or combined with other activities: Often, dialogues are combined with training in conflict analysis or negotiation skills, with study tours or joint reconstruction projects, or with case studies illustrating how similar conflicts have been solved. Some dialogues are one-off events; others are carried on as a series, sometimes over an extended (and indefinite) period of time.

Dialogues, used in the diverse ways outlined above, are one of the most common approaches of peace practice. A wide range of agencies conduct dialogues across many contexts. Like training programs, they are often the first initiative agencies will undertake in a conflict setting.

There are many reasons for this. Like negotiation and mediation, dialogues involve peace practitioners in direct interventions with representatives of conflicting sides. They are visible, easily documented, and easier to raise funds for (than other approaches). They get media attention and sometimes even peace prizes! Also, practitioners often feel that even if dialogue efforts do not do much good, they cannot do much harm either.

IMPACTS OF DIALOGUE PROJECTS

What impacts do people expect from dialogues?

Peace practitioners, the conveners of dialogue projects, see dialogue work as valuable in its own right. "Talking is better than fighting," they say. To assess impacts, they focus on participant satisfaction, the quality of inputs by practitioners, and whether the process has fostered better communication and good relationships. Many practitioners are reluctant to look for more concrete impacts. They assume that personal impacts on participants will affect the dynamics of a conflict. They are often patient with how long this may take; some dialogues, for example, focus on youth with the long-term goal of influencing tomorrow's leaders.

Participants in dialogues, whether they are community leaders, national politicians, or residents of conflict-affected areas, want dialogues to bring concrete, tangible changes in a conflict and the ways it affects their lives. They express very little interest in the processes or methodologies that conveners use, though they recognize clearly when a dialogue effort goes wrong. They are generally impatient with dialogues conducted purely for the sake of meeting people on the other side or improving personal communication.

As with other peace practice approaches, dialogues target either More People or Key People.


Dialogues target More People so that large numbers of people will gain positive perceptions of the other side and push for change. This can happen through dialogues that involve significant numbers of people directly in talking or dialogues that aim to affect more people by modeling cooperation and tolerance through high-profile, public dialogues that affect public opinion. These More People strategies represent a bottom-up approach to change.

They target Key People so that changes in the views of the other side may affect the decisions or actions they take. Key People may be political or military leaders. They may be peoplewho are influential on some issue related to the conflict, such as business leaders if economic forces drive the conflict. Key People approaches generally involve small numbers and represent a top-down approach to social change.

Impacts at the Individual/Personal Level

The immediate impact of dialogue work is intended and is felt at the Individual/Personal level, through changes in the attitudes and perceptions of the participants themselves. The concentration of immediate dialogue impacts at this level is shown in Diagram 1.

DIAGRAM 1



Positive impacts at the Individual/Personal level reported from dialogue are:

• Positive reactions to the dialogue itself, reflected in the agreement to continue, reports of being energized or empowered, or having a positive experience.

• Changed attitudes towards the other side, shown in reports of greater knowledge and awareness of the other side's perceptions of the conflict or fewer negative stereotypes about the other side.

• Improved interpersonal relationships with participants from the other side.

• Increased resistance to propaganda, shown in reports that direct contact helped inoculate participants against manipulation in their views about the other side.

• New patterns of communication, exhibited through participant reports that, for example, "We learned to communicate and negotiate with each other." As one practitioner put it, "Success is when people are able to talk to each other without shouting."

• Generation of new ideas, reflected in the creation of new concepts or concrete proposals for resolving specific issues that drive the conflict, reviewed and affirmed by those present from both sides.

Some of these impacts are felt to be significant by individuals. But by themselves, these impacts on individuals do not affect the factors driving conflict. Experience shows that individuals may continue to talk across conflicts lines, in times of calm or crisis, without any discernable impact on a conflict.

Personal level impacts are the most frequently reported outcomes from dialogue work. Both participants and conveners are dissatisfied with these. They are discouraged when meetings go well, participants enjoy them, but there is little or no concrete follow-up. In evaluating dialogue work in RPP discussions, practitioners and participants often gave the dialogue sessions themselves high grades, but gave the actual results quite low grades.

"Five years into the dialogue process, in terms of impacts, I can only tell anecdotes. For example, a loyalist, who was in a dialogue for the first time, addressed the young people there: "I hope you do not think it is easy for me," he said, "but I guess it is not easy for him (the republican) either." And they shook hands, recognizing each other. That's it – it does not look like much! How significant is a handshake? But I do not think they would kill each other."


"People have learned new ways of speaking but there is no solution yet to the problem."

Impacts at the Socio/Political Level

How do the impacts of dialogue work transfer from the Individual/Personal level to tangible and concrete changes at the Socio/Political level? This is what RPP's overall findings suggest should happen for peace programs to have an impact on Peace Writ Large. Socio/Political level impacts are also what participants in dialogues want as a result from dialogue work.

As discussed in Chapter 7, agencies need to ensure that the impacts of dialogue processes transfer between quadrants in order to improve their effectiveness. Most important, dialogues need to transfer impacts from the Individual/Personal level to the Socio/Political level. These basic findings are reflected by the arrows in the diagram from Chapter 7. In addition, evidence shows that work with More People is not enough if it does not reach Key People, and work with Key People is not enough if it does not reach More People, both at the Socio/Political level.

DIAGRAM 2



The evidence on whether dialogues do this is mixed. Some dialogues do combine Key People and More People strategies, but most do not. Some dialogues do translate into Socio/Political level changes, while most do not.

What do Socio/Political level changes look like? RPP found examples of four types of impacts.

• **Specific Actions:** Sometimes dialogue participants take actions in their professional or political capacity that show increased responsiveness to the concerns of the other side. For example after one ongoing dialogue that focused on concerns regarding refugee return, members of the group worked to encourage return by accompanying returning refugees, promoting communication with villagers who had stayed in the village, and setting up security arrangements in these areas.

• Adoption of Ideas into Official Structures or Political Negotiations: Sometimes, dialogues generate ideas and language that are used in the official peace process or by official government and leadership structures. These may help in the formal negotiation process.

• Changes in Public Opinion: Sometimes, dialogues can moderate overall public attitudes toward the other side or towards the resolution of conflict through negotiation. Indicators of moderation include reduced levels of fear and tension, and reduced use of inflammatory language and content by the media. This could result from public acceptance of high-profile dialogues that break taboos against contact and communication.

• **Rising Demands by Peace Constituencies:** Sometimes dialogues can mobilize such large numbers of people voicing demands for peace, or support for negotiations, that political leaders cannot ignore them. Demands can be made through large-scale demonstrations, lobbying campaigns, peace meetings involving thousands of people, or development of peace structures and activities (NGOs, projects, etc.).

IMPROVING THE ABILITY OF DIALOGUES TO PROMOTE SOCIO/POLITICAL LEVEL CHANGE

What can dialogue conveners do to help support these Socio/Political level changes that result from actions taken outside or beyond the dialogue?

RPP's evidence suggests four basic aspects of dialogues that can be structured to ensure that the impacts move beyond the Individual/Personal level to the Socio/Political level. These are: content, duration and timing, participant selection, and facilitation.

1. Dialogue content

a) Move the focus to concrete problems.

Dialogues that never address concrete problems have little chance of affecting change at the Socio/Political level. Dialogues often start out with more relationship-focused goals such as building contact, communication, and understanding. This may be the only realistic entry point in situations where there has been little contact, and deep hostility

exists between two groups. But evidence also shows that dialogues should not retain an exclusive focus on contact and relationships over the long term. Comments of dialogue participants confirm this.

"People get involved in dialogues to make a practical difference, and improve the quality of their lives. They are looking for tangible things: reduced fear, less disruption of daily life, diminished violence, less property damage, better relations between the community and police, less tension, etc. Improved interpersonal relationships are great, but really a by-product."

"If agreement about a common political platform is nowhere in sight, then some time spent building relationships is important. But once some general agreement on a political direction exists, such as the two-state solution in Israel/Palestine, then dialogues need to get political. If they do not it may be interesting, but it will not lead anywhere."

Evidence also shows that the initial relationship-building focus is not always necessary. Many dialogues start with a focus on specific issues and concrete problems.

b) Plan follow-up beyond the dialogue.

"The workshop was like an oasis where everything seemed possible. But we could have gained a lot from some anticipation and warnings about difficulties to expect when we returned home, and ideas for how to deal with them. We also would have liked more support from the agency on how to follow up."

Practitioners acknowledge the re-entry problem. Peace agencies cannot be responsible for what participants do outside the dialogue, but they can focus discussion on this and help participants assess what is realistic. In addition, participants can clarify what they would like the facilitators to do for follow-up. A topic for discussion at any dialogue meeting should be "What comes next?" Time should be allotted for participants to discuss not only what should be done but also obstacles they will encounter and how to address them.

<u>Caution</u>: Evidence shows that one common tool for follow-up—a written statement, product, or document—is not always helpful. While some participants appreciate such a concrete outcome to mobilize around, others say such statements are almost always superficial and are initiated more to demonstrate a product for funders than for the benefit of participants.

2. Duration and timing of the dialogue

a) Sustain the commitment over some time.

In the words of one participant in many dialogues, "One-off interventions are hopeless and useless." Experience shows that dialogue should be sustained over time. Some participants in dialogues suggested that no process should be initiated without a minimum two-year commitment. Such commitment gives participants time to transfer the personal impacts of the dialogue to the Socio/Political level. In fact, many dialogues begin with plans for a short timeframe but are compelled by participants to continue much beyond that.

<u>Caution</u>: Dialogue practitioners and participants should be alert as to when a dialogue should stop. Talk that never goes beyond the Individual/Personal level should not be continued indefinitely.

b) Do not quit if peace breaks out.

Experience shows that non-official dialogues that run parallel to official peace processes can help reinforce momentum for peace. Commonly, there is a perception that official talks will solve the problem, so the unofficial processes stop. But when the official process stalls or stumbles, there is often nothing to back it up. Insiders make this point.

"We need to parallel the official talks to make an impact so that the talks do not break down. We need to deal with the day after a political agreement is reached and work on how we can sustain it."

"The problem in the Middle East was that we got complacent after Oslo. There was much more work that unofficial processes could have done."

3. Who Participates

a) Ensure the broadest possible representation of views.

"You can always find people who are willing to come together. It is more important to figure out who they should be."

"In the Middle East, it is the easiest thing in the world to get the Arab and Israeli opposition parties together for dialogue; they share many of the same views."

Dialogues need to incorporate the real range of positions on all sides or they will be so detached from the real conflict that they cannot effect any Socio/Political change. While conveners do not select participants alone, they do have leverage as to who is included. Evidence shows that it can be helpful when they use this leverage to include more hard-line views.

Many dialogues attract people who are already open to contact and communication with the other side. The dialogues go well, but participants have more views in common with fellow moderates on the other side than with their own leadership or public opinion. They avoid involving the difficult people or those seen to be perpetuating conflict. They end up having limited impact because they create 'islands of moderation.'

<u>Caution</u>: There are limits to the principle of inclusivity. It may be counterproductive to include people who will simply sabotage the meeting because they are unwilling to listen to the other side or engage in a serious way with them. This not only wastes an

opportunity but also reinforces negative stereotypes among other participants, thus having real negative effects.

b) Include participants who can link impacts to Key People or More People.

Participants in dialogues who are linked to Key People, either political leaders or other influentials, or are linked to broad constituencies or public opinion, are more able and likely to follow up in ways that can affect Socio/Political level change.

When participants are linked to political elites, ideas and solutions discussed in the dialogue can be directly channeled into the political process. When participants are linked to broad public constituencies, the products of the dialogue can be channeled to affect public views. Some claim that for dialogues to be effective, participants need to have influence with both the politicians and the public; without these links, the dialogue will fall into the trap of either a "top-down" or a "bottom-up" strategy without impacts beyond one group.

c) Include (or manage) the media.

Experience shows that the media need to be included in a dialogue strategy in some way in order to minimize the potential of negative reporting of the dialogue. A strategy to include the media may also capitalize on its potential as a positive instrument for affecting public opinion.

Many dialogue meetings are convened on the understanding that they are off-the-record and confidential. The purpose of such ground rules is to create a space where participants feel free to express their views openly. But as one participant stated, "There is no such thing as a secret meeting! The media will be there anyway, because someone will talk to the press or leak a photo of the group."

Dialogue participants involved in RPP agreed that bringing in the media from the beginning would help participants deal with the rumors, accusations, and bad publicity they often face for participating in such meetings. In some cases where the inclusion of the media could truly undermine the purpose of a dialogue, RPP experience shows that, at the least, conveners should always have a plan for managing media attention if it comes.

4. Dialogue facilitation

Minimize overly structured/interventionist facilitation.

Experience shows that the more that participants take responsibility for a dialogue process, the more likely they are to follow through afterwards. Participants in dialogues report finding some facilitation methods too interventionist ("heavy handed") such as when facilitators decide unilaterally on the participants and agenda, or control communication patterns, set strict ground rules, or conduct elaborate exercises. Such active intervention by facilitators is not necessary for dialogues to succeed. Some examples suggest that such methods may make it less likely that participants will follow-up independently.

When dialogues are well established and interaction between groups is ongoing, participants widely prefer that facilitators adopt a less interventionist approach. "Provide the money and bring people together to do their own thing," was suggested by one veteran participant as the most useful facilitator role. In some dialogues, conveners are praised for their ability to play a very low-profile role or to undertake a minimal formal role in the meetings but work actively behind the scenes.

In general, dialogue participants express minimal requirements for the role of a dialogue convener and even caution against thinking that an active third party is always necessary.

Participants in long-standing dialogues who attended an RPP workshop felt that conveners should:

• Provide funding and an arena for the meeting.

• Help shape the agenda and present the issues in a way that gives people options regarding where to concentrate their energies.

- Bring in comparative international experience.
- Intervene in creative ways to keep the process going should tensions rise, either during or around the meeting. Some concrete examples of the latter are checking in with people individually or drafting short papers summarizing positions and proposals and disseminating these to participants to keep the momentum going.

<u>Caution</u>: Where people have high levels of mutual hostility, and little experience of contact with the other side, competent and structured facilitation is important. "We need professionals, not just people who think it is a good idea to bring people together," one participant commented. There is a high potential for exacerbating divisions with a roomful of people from opposite sides of a conflict when dialogues are undertaken without careful preparations and a high level of skill. (See Chapter 3 on Negative Impacts for examples of this.)

CREDIBILITY FOR DIALOGUE CONVENERS

Whether an agency can get "the right people" into dialogue and maintain their involvement depends on how credible the agency and the process they are running, are seen to be.

How do peace agencies gain and maintain the credibility they need for a dialogue process to take off ? Lessons here parallel many of the basic ethical principles for peace practice outlined in Chapter 4 on means of peace work. However, some specific advice for dialogue conveners also emerged, suggesting that agencies must be:

• Transparent about their motivations, processes, and funding sources.

• Diligent in documenting the process and results.

• Able to show a genuineness of interest, concern, and motivation (participants report being "suspicious of agencies that want to gain status off our backs").

• Culturally and linguistically competent.

• Able to give away credit for success to participants and politicians (and able to control their own egos!).

- Discrete.
- Highly informed about the conflict and the context.
- Consistent and reliable in enforcing any ground rules.
- Careful not to overstep their role.

CONCLUSION

As is true for other peace practice approaches, positive personal impacts from dialogues do not just add up on their own to peace.

The evidence gathered through RPP suggests how the effectiveness of dialogues can be improved by structuring the dialogue content, timing, facilitation, and who is included in ways that make it more likely participants will translate their personal experience into a broader Socio/Political impact.

CHAPTER 10. IMPROVING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF PEACE TRAININGS

Many people believe that training is an effective way to work on conflict.

RPP experience shows that participants are generally positive about the training programs that peace agencies offer. However, experience also shows that it is difficult to trace concrete impacts from training on Peace Writ Large.

Training programs seem to have become a default activity for peace work, perhaps because they are viewed as safe and likely to do little harm (though there is evidence showing that they can, indeed, have negative effects). Furthermore, trainings are often encouraged by funders because, in the words of one practitioner, "They are easy to measure," unlike other programmatic approaches.

On the other hand, training is rarely seen as an end in itself, but rather as an aspect of multipronged processes for affecting conflict. Trainings are expected to influence people's thinking, actions, and decisions, and, thereby, to catalyze people into taking action on the conflict around them.

RPP's findings identify ways that trainings can have increased impact on the causes and societal manifestations of conflict, through changing the ways they are structured, who they involve, and the roles that agencies play in helping participants follow up.

THE RANGE OF PEACE TRAININGS

Peace trainings share the aim of disseminating knowledge and skills to people as they try to affect conflict. Specific training programs introduce a variety of approaches to do so: conflict resolution and negotiation; conflict management; conflict transformation; conflict analysis; non-violent action; and peace and conflict impact assessments.

Beyond this, trainings differ greatly in content, approach, and purpose, and they are used by peace agencies in a variety of ways. Some trainings are capacity-building for people who are already engaged in work on conflict, while others aim to introduce concepts to non-activists. Some involve people at grassroots levels; others involve political leaders. Somefocus on enhancing skills among groups of people on one side of a conflict, while others bring people together from both sides, sometimes as a non-threatening way to get them to talk to each other. Some trainings are one-day workshops, while others are extended courses of several months, or longer. Some involve ongoing apprenticeship programs.

IMPACTS OF TRAININGS: THE INDIVIDUAL AND PERSONAL LEVEL

When asked for their views on the utility of a variety of peace training, the majority of participants surveyed through RPP were generous, reporting that trainings had been useful. When asked to identify specific benefits, people had a range of responses:

"Training gave me the motivation to stay in the field of peacebuilding. Peacebuilding in my region is neither understood nor accepted. The positive examples from workshops gave me the strength and faith to face political and cultural ignorance."

"I used to get affected very quickly if I thought people betrayed me. I would moralize and make judgments. Through conflict resolution training, I learned that I should not moralize, but rather try to understand how others view the situation."

"The training was helpful because it brought together people from different parts of the world and provided a friendly environment for the participants to learn from each other and establish informal contacts."

Evidence shows that trainings often have a range of positive impacts on participants but that these remain largely at the Individual/Personal level, affecting people's attitudes, ideas, skills, and perspectives on conflict. Participants most often report having been personally "transformed," and cite specific concepts and new approaches that they found useful for follow-up. However, the follow-up is usually at the personal level, with family, friends, and colleagues.

Many people involved in training also maintain that training can provide the "spark" that, in retrospect, proves critical to the success of a given program or process. Prominent activists from several countries, when asked about the most useful contribution from the outside to their protracted conflicts, pointed to training conducted by international NGOs many years earlier. They claim these were critical in giving them new ideas, new interactive methodologies for working with people, and fresh energy to undertake efforts.

The strength of these personal impacts cannot be ignored, given how much people cite them, and how important they feel they are.

DIRECT FEEDBACK ON USEFUL TRAINING FROM PARTICIPANTS Participants describe the following elements as critical to useful training.

• <u>Objectives:</u> Clear goals should be set from the beginning, and facilitators should be flexible enough to adjust to the needs of participants. Participants suggest that useful trainings do not try to accomplish everything, but instead give sufficient time to explore a few key issues in depth.

• <u>Characteristics of trainers</u>: Most prefer trainers who are activists themselves, and many value a mixed training team including a local trainer as well as an international trainer.

"Good trainers" must be respectful, responsive to the goals/needs of participants, knowledgeable about the context, and able to prevent the training from being hijacked by particular participants.

• <u>Participants:</u> Include people with diverse experiences to allow for cross-fertilization of ideas, but with equivalent levels of experience and compatible needs and objectives for the training. Too many different needs/objectives creates a situation where, as one participant described, "You cannot please everyone, so it pleases no one."

• <u>Methodology</u>: Participants do not like being "sold" something, as one described, or lectured at. Participants reported that they "do not like lectures where your only task is to listen, listen, listen!" Open discussion and participatory methodologies are preferred.

The matrix developed in Chapter 7 illustrates the peace strategies represented by training.


By involving individuals in formative experiences, trainings aim to affect More People or Key People at the Individual/Personal level. Involving More People means disseminating training widely and bringing large numbers of people into an awareness of ways to address conflict. Involving Key People means targeting key decision-makers so that their exposure to new concepts and approaches to conflict resolution will influence their decisions. Key People strategies can also mean training people who are participants in another peace activity, as a means of supplementing that activity.

But the impact of these training strategies usually stops at the Individual/Personal level. While significant to individuals, these do not, by themselves, affect the conflict more generally. This is contrary to the implicit assumptions behind many training strategies. Trainings are rarely conducted simply to increase the general level of understanding of conflict among affected populations, or among activists. Agencies who conduct training want and expect them to make a difference, to bring about some kind of significant change. In training Key People, the hope is that they will take actions that have Socio/Political effects. In training More People, agencies hope to create a critical mass of people with changed attitudes and new skills who will take action at the Socio/Political level.

USING SKILLS IN WORK ON CONFLICT: IMPACTS AT THE SOCIO/POLITICAL LEVEL

Trainings have the potential to show impact that goes beyond the Individual/Personal level, when participants apply the skills and knowledge they gain to their work on conflict at the Socio/Political level, as illustrated in Diagram 1.

DIAGRAM 1



RPP experience shows that there are specific things peace agencies can do to increase the likelihood that participants will use training in these ways. These are:

1. Focus on content that is locally-grounded and practical.

2. Select participants who have a way to use training to address conflict at the Socio/Political level.

3. Follow-up after training when participants return to their communities.

1. Focus on content that is locally-grounded and practical.

Training content does matter. Content that is grounded in the context and provides practical tools is seen as essential. Much of the material presented in training is criticized by participants as too theoretical, too removed from their culture and values, too divorced from the political realities driving their conflict, and, sometimes, too condescending, i.e. presented on the assumption that trainees do not hold certain values or know things they do know. Many training agencies say they adapt the training to local traditions and realities, but evidence shows that these adaptations are usually very minor and token. When trainings do not respond to cultural norms and realities, nor address what is causing the violence in that situation, participants may value the skills learned and try to use them, but be unable to use them in a way that the rest of society sees as relevant.

A woman attended a training to become a mediator in her community. She explained, "I never used it. In our communities respected elders are relied on to deal with conflicts. It is almost impossible for a younger woman to gain entry or be accepted as a mediator in the village. Even in the street, when conflict erupts, it is hard for a woman to interfere, and there is no real opportunity to talk through the issues with people."

An agency held a training in a rural community to teach young people, who were often involved in the violence, the basic skills of communication and speaking, including eyecontact, how to confront non-violently, etc. A participant pointed out that what caused him and his peers to fight was not an inability to communicate. He said, "You do not understand. I need cattle to be respected and be able to get a wife. Therefore, I am going to continue to carry out raids to get cattle, since I have no other options."

Grounding in participants' contexts does not preclude inclusion of cross-contextual experience. Rather, such experience should be presented but in a pragmatic way. Many participants describe the most helpful practical advice received in training as coming from exposure to other participants' hands-on experiences, particularly from different conflict areas, or through concrete examples from other places where they recognize familiar dynamics. Learning what others have done in different situations and cultures helps participants develop new strategies and ideas for their own contexts.

2. Select participants who can address the conflict at the Socio/Political level.

Who is trained turns out to be a critical determinant of whether the impact goes beyond the Individual/Personal. Training should be focused on people who have the capacity, motivation, and position to use new approaches beyond their personal lives.

More People strategies do not seem to show significant results. Mass training in generic peace skills for untargeted groups are, for the most part, not helpful in addressing things driving a conflict. They may even be harmful in that they consume time and resources that could be better utilized.

The agency trained hundreds of citizens in negotiation and mediation skills, proposing that the wide dissemination of such skills could foster a culture of non-violence. After several years they saw very few concrete results. Participants claimed to value the new ideas but almost none went on to work on the many social tensions and ethnic divisions destabilizing the country.

In general, there is a tendency by peace trainers to involve the "easy to reach" constituencies, such as youth, women, and political moderates. Yet in situations of war and conflict, such groups often have little power to change things. As one local practitioner said, "It took us far too long to reach those with power and to realize that hope was not a strategy."

3. Assist participants with follow-up.

Trainings are often short-term, one-off experiences that are insufficient to impart clear skills and the practical experience and confidence to use them. As one participant noted, "People have five days of training and the next day they go out with flip charts and markers and start training other people."

When participants return home, ready to implement new ideas and activities, if they do not have access to ongoing support, funding, or feedback on questions that come up, they often cannot make progress.

"Once the seminar is over and we are back to the daily work, many of the skills we learn remain unused and lose their value. There are no follow-up tasks and we can rarely create time for initiatives next to our daily obligations. It would help to have something that would reinforce the knowledge and skills learned during training, and to help us develop these skills further, rather than let them fade away."

Follow-up is particularly important for individuals who go outside their communities for training, as they typically face problems of re-entry as a "lone peaceworker" among their friends and cohorts. Many agencies are aware of this, and address the problem through creating networks (using email, for example) to provide moral and pragmatic support. However, direct support on the ground is stronger in ensuring that training of individuals has broader impacts.

Follow-up support can also be provided through creative strategies to help new approaches gain acceptance in communities.

Members of a local community formed a group to address land reform, one of the key issues driving the conflict. An international agency provided them with intensive training

in mediation so they could develop the capacity to serve as community mediators. The international agency then held a public presentation of the new mediators to the community, attended by local mayors, and representatives from the capital. The ceremony incorporated traditional rituals and let the community see that the mediators were at their service. The community mediators were often sought out by the communities and managed to resolve most of the issues brought before them.

Finally, participants in training note it is extremely helpful if there is a concentration of peers in their own communities who have also been trained. This gives people additional resources for practical and moral support.

TRAINING AS A CONTRIBUTION TO PEACE WRIT LARGE

Trainings are not, alone, intended to bring peace. However, when used as one tool in a strategy, trainings can contribute to Socio/Political change that promotes peace.

The evidence gathered by RPP provides examples of how trainings have contributed to the kinds of changes identified in the effectiveness criteria above.

Those who are trained create new structures (or reform existing ones) for dealing effectively with grievances that fuel conflict.

A network provided conflict resolution training as part of their work with members of a traditional council of elders. This training led to an open discussion of the roles and responsibilities of the council, increased the credibility of the council in resolving conflicts, and increased people's awareness about the council as a resource. This also led to the establishment of a parallel women's council.

An agency gave funding to train a group of active citizens from the village. They created a monitoring group to respond to conflicts and tensions at the village level. One day, an angry mob rallied around the local gas station, after the owner raised the price of petrol. The monitors arrived at the scene and talked with the owner and found out he had raised prices because his electricity costs had increased and he needed to cover this expense. When the crowd was told, they quieted, and the monitors helped the group and the station owner negotiate a fair petrol price.

More People become actively engaged in efforts for peace.

Local peace activists from both sides of the conflict participated in several intensive conflict resolution trainings hosted by international agencies. Thirty of these activists then participated in an ongoing training to discuss and design strategies for peacebuilding projects. They formed a permanent working group of trainers and initiated a series of 15 peacebuilding projects aimed to recruit more participants into bi-communal activities across a range of civil society, including business leaders, educators, lawyers, students, women, etc. This spread into a wide-ranging bi-communal movement in the country. At a subsequent peace convention, 4000 people showed up, and it became a public demonstration of support for the faltering peace process.

Religious leaders, who had not previously been engaged in peace activism, participated in peace training, which changed their views. They subsequently began to incorporate peace themes into their weekly prayer talks. This began to change the public discourse.

SPECIAL CAUTIONS

Trainings should not be seen as simply risk-free or default activities. Two negative impacts that can occur from trainings warrent special mention here.

• Trainings can reinforce violence.

An agency was asked to conduct a training for a company in an area of deep racial divisions. It followed the company's request on how to design the training. They later found out that the grouping of participants the company suggested reflected the lines of racial hierarchies in the company and in society, and, therefore, reinforced structural violence.

• Trainings can disempower local activists. They can reinforce implicit messages about outsiders' "superiority." People in conflict areas find it condescending and counterproductive to be taught things they already know.

CONCLUSION

This section has reviewed the findings from RPP on how to improve the impacts of peace trainings on the Socio/Political level. While training strategies remain, at best, indirect ways to affect conflict, agencies can maximize the effectiveness of these approaches by shaping the content, focus, and selection of participants and through follow-up after the training.

CHAPTER 11. THE FUNDING OF PEACE WORK: IDENTIFYING CHALLENGES AND IMPROVING RESULTS

"Funding can drive peace programs." This opinion is widely held by practitioners from within areas of conflict and by those that work across borders. As one activist put it, "Our experience is that the one who pays sets the conditions, goals, and methodologies."

Experience shows that funding does have a powerful influence on peace programming. The way that resources are allocated for peace initiatives can either support or undermine their effectiveness. This happens through the terms under which funding is granted, the specific programming supported or denied, and through the levels of funding provided.

Funders have influence because peace agencies are rarely self-financing. Many survive through project-specific funding which means that they find it difficult to refuse funds, even when there are strings attached that may undermine program effectiveness. Furthermore, overall funding levels for peace initiatives are small. The resulting competition between agencies is strong and increases the influence of funders and funding modalities on programming.

Most funders are uncomfortable with such influence, and readily acknowledge that they are not the experts in peace. They look to local and international practitioners to educate them about what works and what does not work. Many are frustrated by their own organizational constraints that they see result in counterproductive funding dynamics. In the last several years, some have undertaken significant changes to correct these problems.

But the experience reviewed by RPP showed that much remains to be done. One local practitioner summed this up by saying, "We always have an idea of what we want to do—but in reality have to shoehorn these into the offered, existing frameworks. The result is usually that the projects end up being neither what we want to do, nor what the donors want to fund."

HOW FUNDING MODALITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS UNDERMINE EFFECTIVENESS

Funding for peace efforts comes from a variety of sources including governments, international organizations, NGOs, church coalitions, political parties, private foundations, and sometimes private individuals or businesses. Some of these groups limit their involvement strictly to financing others' programs; some, such as UN agencies, NGOs, and church coalitions run their own programs as well as fund the work of others. Some donors have a greatdegree of freedom in setting and changing funding policies; others are part of large bureaucratic structures and/or government departments that have only limited leeway for change—at least in the short term.

Criticisms of funding modalities are familiar: funding is too short-term, too projectized, too rigid, too little, too late, or sometimes, paradoxically, too much, too fast. Donors are

often frustrated by the array of complaints, feeling it is impossible to get it right. However, with increased clarity about how funding can be tied to the effectiveness of peace practice it should be possible to make changes to improve results.

RPP's findings show that some commonplace funding mechanisms and styles of interaction between funders and practitioners undermine the effectiveness of peace initiatives on Peace Writ Large.

1. Short timeframes limit agencies' ability to transfer the impacts of peace programs.

"Everyone is hooked on time. Organizations give big money and little time," said one insider activist. Funding for peace work is often granted for short-term timeframes or one-off events. It is common for peace programs to receive funding for six months or one year, or for one meeting, event, or workshop. Reliance on short-term funding has far-reaching consequences for peace initiatives:

• It shortens the time for context analysis before programs are initiated.

• It means that projects end before they are able to pursue linkages with other efforts in order to enhance effectiveness.

• It results in a focus on quick impacts and, so, often limits the possibility of addressing the structural aspects of conflict.

• It is difficult to sustain work once it begins. A short timeframe means rushing to an exit strategy regardless of conditions (or having a shifting series of exit strategies as a project gets new short-term cash injections).

For these reasons, short-term funding limits agencies' ability to spread the impacts of their work to other levels and constituencies, and so, to achieve a wider impact. As we have seen, the impacts of individual small peace programs do not add up automatically. Rather, agencies need to transfer the impacts of their work deliberately to the Socio/Political level, in order to affect the bigger picture.

"One-off meetings are useless. We need sustained commitment. If funders cannot do that, they should not get involved. Much more could have been done in my country if funding had not dried up at critical moments," claims an Israeli peace advocate.

"In our projects, by the time people were ready to engage in the multi-ethnic activities funders would support, the international money had moved elsewhere," reflects a Bosnian practitioner.

The "too much, too fast" dynamic often results in the sudden emergence of what practitioners, communities, and funders decry as a "peace industry." In the volume of new NGOs that flood into an area to start peace programs, the work of established,

locally-rooted peace initiatives is often undermined. Local people are often pulled into working on internationally-driven agendas.

Conversely, longer-term, more open-ended funding frameworks enable agencies to develop the links needed for their work to have a wider effect.

In an area of interreligious tensions, a foreign agency began a shelter program involving both groups. When the response was less interested than they envisioned it would be, the agency undertook an exercise to map the causes and consequences of the conflict together with participants. This slowed the project, but the donor extended the grant on the agency's request. As a result, participants saw opportunities for other actions to affect the conflict, and undertook peace campaigns and boycotts involving the wider community.

The above two examples show work focused at the Individual/Personal level (through reconstructing houses or interpersonal dialogue) moving over time and at the initiative of local groups, to impacts at the Socio/Political level through boycotts, peace campaigns, and community peace committees.

The message about short-term funding is being heard by funders, and a few have recently revised their policies to encourage proposals with a longer-term strategic plan.

2. Formulaic approaches block responsiveness to local peace agendas.

Most people who make funding decisions are not experts on a wide range of conflicts. They, understandably, are looking for tested ways to do the most good with the funds they have. In the absence of known formulae for peace, certain programming approaches have become prevalent. These are often applied uncritically across contexts.

Effective work needs to be embedded in its specific context. Programs that are grounded in local needs and realities can be sustained by local organizations with a stake in them. When funding is tied to pre-set approaches and formulas, agencies are encouraged to forgo analysis with affected communities about how to further peace in this particular conflict.

It is impossible to exaggerate the importance of local ownership of both the analysis and the solutions offered by peace programs. Much experience gathered by RPP shows that this is the essence of successful interventions. Pre-set criteria established by funders preempt, or bypass, the processes of analyzing with affected counterparts what needs to be stopped and what needs to be supported in this particular conflict. They are thus inherently unstrategic.

Foreign and national peace agencies, assuming that a major drought was causing conflict, were working to address irrigation and water issues. One NGO decided to facilitate a series of open-ended meetings with the conflicting communities separately. The conveners listened while the communities analyzed what was going on. In these meetings, the communities determined that the fighting was not because of the drought,

but because certain groups were promoting conflict because of benefits they could derive. The communities then suggested solutions.

Two specific formulae that were criticized repeatedly in RPP as substituting for local ideas are the model of joint projects and quotas imposed for participation of specific groups.

Joint Projects

Many donors insist on participation by people from both sides of a conflict as a precondition for funding peace initiatives, from dialogue efforts to research projects to reconstruction efforts. Experience shows that where there is existing contact and cooperation, such approaches can solidify this and achieve a great deal. However, when monetary incentives are used to create new cooperation across lines of conflict, they rarely achieve much. In many cases, such efforts left people feeling manipulated into working together superficially, while tensions continued to build.

This seems especially the case in internal conflicts marked by deep power asymmetries. The joint-projects model assumes that both sides have something to gain through working together. But normalization of relationships across lines of conflict is often seen as cooptation by the less powerful side.

After the peace process began, there was a dramatic growth of joint projects between people from both sides, paid for almost entirely with external funding. When renewed violence broke out, people from the weaker side stopped all participation in such projects. The donors had defined their goals as funding joint projects. Funding for efforts to bring along resisters in each community was not available.

Quotas for Specific Groups

Ensuring that specific numbers of defined target groups are involved in peace programs is another standard approach among funders. Often the intention is to promote important social justice goals such as equal representation for women, minorities, or underprivileged groups. Over the very long term, such programs may support fundamental social change. However, in many conflict situations, local people see these as diverting focus from addressing the real causes of their current conflict.

"Certain foreign-supported peace programs required that at least 50% of the beneficiaries be indigenous women. We and other local agencies were frustrated because this did not correspond at all to the conditions in our country."

3. Lack of direct contact between funders and communities blocks understanding and accountability.

Funding agencies are often unable to engage with individual projects due to a shortage of staff. They are under pressure to put most funding into direct programming, and limit headquarters staff and overhead. It is common that a peacebuilding advisor is brought on at headquarters to develop policy directions for field offices. But such global advisors

have few opportunities for direct contact with the communities affected by funding. Accountability and feedback loops are weak.

"The donor liked the program, thought it was helpful, but this was not necessarily the view of the community. The funder's criteria involved 'a return to normalcy,' while the community was focused on whether the project had helped them to create peace."

4. Lack of systematic communication between funders, operational agencies, and local actors weakens the linkage between internal and external aspects of a conflict.

In preceding chapters, we noted that all conflicts have both internal and external dimensions. Direct engagement of international donors with their intermediary and local counterparts can facilitate analysis of these internal and external issues in a conflict and can open avenues for strategic programming that addresses the multiple factors. Separation of donors from field programs undermines these linkages and misses one critical opportunity for improving effectiveness.

"Our efforts hit a brick wall after several months. Resentment had built up from local people being left out of decision-making and this fed into rumours and propaganda about what we were up to. This was not our intention, but we just made assumptions about the capacity of local people and the leading political parties. We should have been more prepared to listen to our counterparts and let them indicate their capacities. We could have done better."

Furthermore, in peace processes, the one constant is change. Communication systems between donors and NGOs established only around funding cycles assume that a conflict environment is static.

NGOs criticize donors for being too rigid and not being able to respond to changing circumstances. Expectations of funder rigidity can be a self-fulfilling prophecy. NGOs tend to overspecify the terms in project proposals, believing this is what donors want. They write inflexible timelines into their proposals, and then find themselves trapped by these very terms.

Funders claim that they expect to be educated about the requirements of peace work by their NGO partners. They acknowledge that the experts are field practitioners. As one government donor put it, "NGOs need to be willing to push us to listen. They should resist the seduction of going where the money is."

CONCLUSION

The four findings about how funding affects peace programs all point in one direction. They suggest that donors to peace actions should become more directly engaged. They should commit funds for longer periods; they should listen to (and participate in) local analysis of every conflict setting and tailor responses to those specific conditions; they should open lines of communication and maintain openness to be responsive to the dynamics of a conflict; and they should engage in development and execution of strategic programming that addresses both internal and external factors in any conflict. In peace programming, donor engagement offers opportunities for improving effectiveness.

PART V: CONCLUSION

In recent years, there has been a tendency to label all good activities intended to improve the lives of some people as "peace practice." As more and more individuals and agencies undertake programs in areas of conflict, and as donors designate funds for conflict prevention and resolution, the definition of what constitutes peace work has blurred. This book has argued that this blurring is both misleading and counter-productive.

The suffering and destruction associated with violence and injustice mandate a tougher stance about what is, and what is not, peace work. If programs do not, in any perceivable way, contribute to stopping violent conflict or creating sustainable justice, do they deserve the name?

Participants in RPP pushed hard to gather experience, and understand it, in order to clarify accountability in peace practice. They asked how they, individually and as a group, could improve the impacts of their efforts and know when and how and why they were actually being effective—or not. They agreed and accepted the admonition that peace is "not an area for amateurs," and they sought to learn how to do a better job, faster. And, they learned a great deal.

The lessons they learned, reported in the preceding pages, are not complex. Their merit lies in the fact that they provide a kind of ranking of importance of the myriad of issues that peace practitioners regularly face. They focus analysis and planning on the factors that, experience shows, matter most to effectiveness. They highlight the linkages that must be pursued among different types of peace programming if, together, these efforts are to have real impacts. They provide guidance on how to assess progress and how to monitor results. Overall, they clarify what is, and what is not, really peace practice.

Peace practice combines personal dedication with hard-headed savvy. Dedication without savvy can result in programs that consume time, energy, and faith but that miss the mark in terms of promoting social change that is necessary for peace. Savvy without personal dedication can result in actions that lack integrity, feed cynicism, and reinforce the systems that perpetuate war and injustice.

It is the authors' hope that the presentation of lessons learned through the experiences of so many dedicated people will help both to reinforce the impressive dedication that so many peace practitioners regularly exhibit and, at the same time, add new insights and clarifications that translate into more savvy and, hence, more effective peace practice.

APPENDIX 1: RPP Case Studies

1. Forging a Formula for Peaceful Co-Existence in Fiji: A case study on the Citizen's Constitutional Forum (Peter Woodrow)

2. An Overview of Initiatives for Peace in Acholi, Northern Uganda (Mark Bradbury)

3. International Service for Peace (SIPAZ): Promoting Peacebuilding and Non-Violent Conflict Transformation in Chiapas, Mexico (Carlisle Levine)

4. When Truth is Denied, Peace Will Not Come: The People to People Peace Process of the New Sudan Council of Churches (Hadley Jenner)

5. Part I: The Georgia-South Ossetia Dialogue Process: A View from the Inside (Lara Olson)

Part II: Partnering for Peace: Conflict Management Group and the Norwegian Refugee Council Collaborating on the Georgia-South Ossetia Dialogue Process (Susan Allen Nan)

6. Building Peace Through Third Party Impartial Facilitation: The Story of OAS-ProPaz in Guatemala (Orion Kriegman)

7. Kenyan Peace Initiatives: Kenya Peace and Development Network, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee, the National Council of Churches of Kenya, and the Amani People's Theatre (Janice Jenner and Dekha Ibrahim Abdi)

8. The Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA) (Sue Williams)

9. The Cooperation for Peace and Unity (CPAU), Afghanistan (Sue Williams)

10. Extending the Humanitarian Mandate: Norwegian Church Aid's Decision to Institutionalize its Commitment to Peace Work (Mary B. Anderson)

11. Reflecting on the Christian Peacemaker Team in Hebron (Sue A. Lyke and Joseph G. Bock)

12. Local peace constituencies in Cyprus: the Bi-communal Trainer's Group (Oliver Wolleh)

13. Weaving New Relations, A Contribution to Peace: A Case Study on Yek Ineme in El Salvador (Patricia Ardon)

14. NGO Participation in Conflict Prevention in Burundi (Lennart Wohlgemuth)

15. Explicit and Implicit Peacebuilding: Catholic Relief Services in Mindanao, Philippines, and Bosnia-Herzegovina (Reina Neufeldt, Sarah McCann, Jaco Cilliers)

16. The Interreligious Peace Foundation: Christians, Muslims, Buddhists, and Hindus Addressing the Conflict in Sri Lanka (Alexandre Bilodeau)

17. The Peacemakers: NGO Efforts in the Middle East: 1948-2001 (Everett Mendelsohn)

18. From Forgiveness to Reconciliation: Moral Re-Armament and the Agenda for Reconciliation (Donna Isaac)

19. The Balkan Dialogue Project (Donna Isaac)

20. Towards Reconciliation: Impact Assessment Background and General Preliminary Findings, Peace Teams, Osijek, Croatia (Jessica J. Jordan and Marina Srabalo, and Project Coordinator for Impact Assessment, Michelle Kurtz)

21. Conflict Prevention through Supporting Democratic Representation and Participation of Hungary's Roma Minority: A Case Study of Partners Hungary in Tiszavasvari (Lara Olson)

22. Women Weaving Peace Together: A Contextual Case Study on The Leitana Nehan Women's Development Agency, Buka, Bougainville Province, Papua New Guinea (Andy Carl)

23. Preparing the Table: A Retrospective on the Centre for Intergroup Studies, 1968-1990, Cape Town, South Africa (Greg Hansen)

24. UNICEF Sri Lanka: Children As Zones of Peace (Luc Zandvliet and Orion Kriegman)

25. Peace Zones of Apartado, Colombia (Sue Williams and Phillip Thomas)

26. Conflict Transformation by Training in Nonviolent Action: Activities of the "Centre for Nonviolent Action" (Sarajevo) in the Balkan Region (Martina Fischer)

APPENDIX 2: RPP Phase II Feedback Workshops

October 24-26, 2001, Soesterberg, Holland: RPP held two workshops as part of the European Platform for Conflict Prevention's "Towards Better Peacebuilding Practice" conference. The two sessions together involved 48 people, representing European and other international humanitarian agencies and conflict resolution agencies that undertake peace programming in diverse conflict areas.

November 27, 2001, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: RPP conducted a session on the special issues that humanitarian and development agencies face when undertaking explicit peace programming, as part of a 3-day consultation for the Local Capacities for Peace Project ("Do No Harm"). The 21 participants included field staff from international humanitarian and development organizations that have been working with LCPP, many of who were also involved in RPP and were interested in subsequently hosting RPP workshops.

December 10-11, 2001, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA: This one-and-a-half-day workshop involved 17 international practitioners and academic-practitioners based in Cambridge and other east coast cities, as well as activists and NGO leaders from the Middle East, Sri Lanka, Lebanon, Pakistan, and Bosnia who already were based in the US.

January 11, 2002, Londonderry, Northern Ireland: In collaboration with INCORE, RPP conducted a one-day workshop with 12 participants from conflict resolution and community development agencies with experience primarily working in Northern Ireland. (Due to an outbreak of local violence in Londonderry, several additional participants were unable to attend at the last minute.)

January 14-15, 2002, London, United Kingdom: RPP held a one-and-a-half-day workshop that was co-hosted by International Alert, Conciliation Resources, and Responding to Conflict. The 29 participants included primarily staff of all three agencies, which work with conflict transformation programs around the world, as well as other international practitioners based in London.

January 15-16, 2002, Jakarta, Indonesia: RPP held a two-day workshop, co-hosted by Catholic Relief Services, World Vision, and Mercy Corps, all of whom have offices in Jakarta. The 31 participants were primarily ex-patriot staff of the three hosting agencies and other international NGOs with programs in the region. There were also a few partners from Indonesian peacebuilding agencies and academic practitioners from Indonesian Universities.

January 21-22, 2002, Ambon, Indonesia: RPP conducted a two-day workshop that was co-hosted by Mercy Corps. The 33 participants included Mercy Corps staff, and their local partners involved with peacebuilding programs in the region. This workshop was conducted simultaneously in Bahasa Indonesian and English.

January 21-23, 2002, Sogakope, Ghana: RPP conducted a three-day workshop in collaboration with the West African Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). It was scheduled to coincide with their annual meeting, and involved 30 WANEP members from Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Cote d'Ivoire, Ghana, Guinea, Liberia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, and Togo.The workshop was conducted simultaneously in French and English.

February 11-12, 2002, Vancouver, Canada: RPP held a two-day workshop focused on special issues for humanitarian and development agencies pursuing peace building. The 24 participants included practitioners from humanitarian and development agencies in the United States and Canada, as well as practitioners from peace and conflict resolution organizations from the United States and Africa (including Kenya, Ghana, and Burundi).

February 13, 2002, Vancouver, Canada: RPP held an additional one-day session, cosponsored by the Liu Centre for the Study of Global Issues, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). This workshop brought together 30 operational peace practitioners, policy analysts, and donors to focus on donor-NGO relationships in peacebuilding and the role that funding dynamics play in effective peace work.

February 27, 2002, Jakarta, Indonesia: As part of a week-long internal training for World Vision's Asia Pacific peacebuilding team, World Vision conducted a session based on RPP materials. The session was facilitated by Bill Lowrey of World Vision, and focused on understanding the balance and tradeoffs between working for a reduction of violence versus social justice.

March 1-2, 2002, Ibadan, Nigeria: A two-day workshop was co-hosted by RPP and the Center for Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of Ibadan, and INCORE (Northern Ireland). Participants included 18 practitioners and academic-practitioners from Nigeria and other areas of Africa

March 6-7, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya: RPP co-hosted a two-day workshop with the Coexistence Initiative (New York, USA) and the Nairobi Peace Initiative (Kenya). The 28 participants included practitioners with experience working at both the grassroots and international level, from Kenya, Rwanda, Burundi, Uganda, DRC, Sudan, Somalia, South Africa, and Guinea, as well as a few practitioners from international agencies based in Europe (the Netherlands, United Kingdom). This workshop was conducted simultaneously in English and French.

March 6-7, 2002, Capetown, South Africa: This two-day workshop was co-hosted by the Center for Conflict Resolution in Capetown. The 27 participants included practitioners from South African conflict resolution and peacebuilding agencies, as well as practitioners from agencies based in Mozambique, Malawi, Zimbabwe, and Lesotho.

March 11-12, 2002, Stockholm, Sweden: RPP conducted a two-day workshop cosponsored by Diakonia. The 26 participants were primarily members of organizations in the Swedish Peace Team Forum, a coalition of Swedish NGOs with experience in a range of conflict areas (particularly in Colombia, Central America, the Middle East and Liberia). Three participants from the Middle East also attended.

March 23, 2002, Nairobi, Kenya: As part of a meeting of an international group of practitioners called Action for Conflict Transformation, Dekha Ibrahim Abdi and Mohammed Suleman (Afghan Development Agency) facilitated a session on Criteria for Effectiveness using the RPP workshop materials. The 15 participants were from 13 countries across Africa, as well as Afghanistan. Dekha Ibrahim Abdi prepared a report for RPP staff capturing the learning from the session.

April 8-10, 2002, Melbourne, Australia: RPP held a two-day workshop co-sponsored with World Vision Australia, bringing together 35 practitioners from international and local agencies, and donors who fund them. Participants were practitioners from Australian NGOs who have experience with peace programming in the surrounding areas, as well as several practitioners from Fiji. This workshop was followed up by a one-day consultation with the broader NGO community based in Melbourne to introduce the RPP project more broadly, and to present the findings thus far.

April 15-16, 2002, Mindanao, Philippines: RPP held a two-day workshop, co-hosted by Catholic Relief Services for 28 participants including CRS staff and local NGO counterparts, and other international agencies with programs in the region.

May 3-4, 2002, Milwaukee, Wisconsin, USA: This two-day workshop was cosponsored by the Peace Studies Program at the University of Wisconsin and the Applied Conflict Resolution Organizations Network (ACRON), a network of US-based conflict resolution practitioners. It involved 21 participants, primarily members of ACRON, as well as several academic-practitioners. The workshop focused on how best to define measures of effectiveness for peacebuilding practice.

May 16 – 18, 2002, Irvine, California, USA: This two-and-a-half-day workshop focused on the role and impact of NGO-run dialogue processes. This workshop was co-hosted by the U.C. Irvine Center for Peace Studies. The 23 participants included dialogue practitioners from local and international organizations with experience in the Middle East, Northern Ireland, Guatemala, and the U.S.

May 29-31, 2002, Guatemala City, Guatemala: This two-and-a-half-day workshop was co-sponsored by the Organization of American States, Unit for Promotion of Democracy. It brought together 39 practitioners from locally based agencies and international NGOs from Guatemala and the broader region (including Mexico and Nicaragua), as well as members of donor agencies.

June 1-2, 2002, Harrisonburg, Virginia, USA: This two-day feedback workshop was part of Eastern Mennonite University's Summer Peacebuilding Institute (SPI), which draws international activists, humanitarian workers, and conflict resolution practitioners with several years of operational experience from a range of conflict areas. The 19 participants included SPI students from Sierra Leone, Liberia, Uganda, Kenya, Nicaragua, Haiti, East Timor, Nepal, Indonesia, and Canada. **June 6-7, 2002, Oslo, Norway:** This two-day workshop was co-sponsored by the Norwegian Ecumenical Platform for Peace and Reconciliation (NEPAR). It involved 30 practitioners from the Norwegian NGOs, including the Peace Research Institute of Oslo, Nansen Dialogues Center, Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Church Aid, and other humanitarian organizations, as well as some practitioners from conflict areas.

September 4-5, 2002, Uppsala, Sweden: This two-day dialogue-focused workshop built off the UC Irvine session. RPP brought a "triad" of people who had been involved in dialogue processes from each of four conflict areas: Burundi, Cyprus, Ethiopia/Eritrea, and the Middle East. Each "triad" included one participant from each side of the conflict, and a practitioner who was involved in running the dialogue. Thus, the workshop focused on including perspectives from people who have been participants in dialogue processes (rather than facilitated them).

October 9-11, 2002, Bonn, Germany: This two-day workshop was co-sponsored by Church Development Service (EED) and Service Oversees (DUE). It brought together 13 practitioners from German NGOs who undertake peacebuilding and development work in diverse contexts for a presentation of RPP's preliminary findings.

APPENDIX 3: RPP Steering Group

Dekha Ibrahim Abdi

Responding to Conflict/ Coalition for Peace in Africa Kenya

Anna Åkerlund Diakonia

Sweden

Andy Carl

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