Introduction
By
Marten H. A. van Heuven
|
Marten van Heuven served as National Intelligence
Officer for Europe from September 1987 to May
1991. Starting his career in the Department of
State’s Office of the Legal Adviser, Mr. van Heuven’s
overseas Foreign Service assignments included
Berlin, NATO, The Hague, and Bonn. He also served
as Deputy US Permanent Representative to the UN,
Geneva. In Washington, he worked in the Office
of East European Affairs, was Director of the
Office of West European Affairs, and also served
a tour in the US Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency. Mr. van Heuven received a B.A. from Yale
University, an LL.B. from Yale Law School, and
a Master in International Affairs from Columbia
University. He spent a year as a Mid Career Fellow
at Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School of Public
and International Affairs, and a year at the Department
of State’s Senior Seminar. |
The estimative materials presented in this volume are
an important contribution to institutional and national
history. They reflect the considered judgment of analysts
from all parts of the Intelligence Community. As my
former colleague Robert L. Suettinger has aptly noted,
National Estimates put on the record the big judgments,
about trends and possible futures, irrespective of whether
these judgments fit the mode of thinking of policymakers.[1]
As such, the Estimates included in this volume should
be of interest to historians and scholars.
The publication of these Estimates serves an additional
purpose. The issues that affected Yugoslavia during
the period of its existence survive the country’s
dissolution. The traditional description of Yugoslavia
as a country of six republics, five nationalities, four
languages, three religions, two alphabets, and one party
(under Tito), held the promise of analytical and estimative
complexity. Yugoslavia made good on that promise.
Even the birth of six countries to replace what used
to be Yugoslavia is not the end of the story. It is
the beginning of another story, as those diplomats,
soldiers and representatives of non-governmental organizations
presently active in the region are ready to attest.
This volume contains source material for those officials
and others—in the United States and Europe—now
tasked with helping to shape the future of the Balkans.
If it is true that history matters, this observation
applies abundantly in an area that seems driven, often
in unhelpful ways, by historical recollections and a
disposition of its people to prefer dwelling on the
past rather than facing the future.
American Involvement in Yugoslavia
Why did Yugoslavia matter to the United States? American
interest in the Balkans antedated the creation of the
Yugoslav state. The atrocities committed in the first
(1912) and second (1913) Balkan wars led the Carnegie
Endowment to organize an International Committee of
Inquiry, which produced a study on the causes and conduct
of the wars, published by Carnegie in 1914. In 1993,
in the midst of the carnage accompanying the breakup
of Yugoslavia, Carnegie President Morton Abramowitz
reissued the Report, with an Introduction by George
F. Kennan. Aggressive nationalism was a root cause of
the Balkans’ and later Yugoslavia’s troubles.
In the words of Kennan, “But that nationalism,
as it manifested itself on the field of battle, drew
on deeper traits of character inherited, presumably,
from a distant tribal past: a tendency to view the outsider,
generally, with dark suspicion, and to see the political-military
opponent, in particular, as a fearful and implacable
enemy to be rendered harmless only by total and unpitying
destruction. And so it remains today.”[2]
Following World War I, President Wilson and his advisers
were intimately involved in charting the future of the
Balkans before and during the Paris Peace Conference.[3]
During World War II, the Allies—the United States
included—dealt with Yugoslavia as a significant
piece of the strategic puzzle how to contain and defeat
the Axis powers.
Prologue: The 1948 Belgrade-Moscow split—an
intelligence failure?
When Yugoslavia was expelled from the Cominform, Washington
began to look at Yugoslavia as part of the broader East-West
Cold War that was beginning to emerge. Against this
backdrop of US-Soviet conflict, the story of Yugoslavia
told in these Estimates begins to unfold.
To understand the Estimates, however, it is important
to know about the Yugoslav- Cominform split that preceded
them. On June 28, 1948, the Cominform countries condemned
Yugoslavia for pursuing policies hostile to the Soviet
Union and expelled Belgrade from Cominform. The surprise
in Washington—as, indeed, elsewhere in the West—at
the sudden news of the split, would not be the last
time that the Washington policy community was unable
or unwilling to digest warnings from its diplomats overseas,
or its analysts at home. In 1990, history would repeat
itself.
In a well-sourced study, published in 1985, Robert
Blum concludes that the inability of Washington to anticipate
the Yugoslav expulsion from the Cominform was a story
of failed political intelligence of major proportions,
in both collection and analysis (see Appendix A).
Blum’s detailed account, however, suggests an
alternative conclusion. Already in February 1947, and
in subsequent messages to Washington, U.S. Chargé
d’Affaires in Belgrade John Cabot warned of a
possible split. In June 1947, he noted that Yugoslav
interests “may not always blindly follow Russian
instructions.” He followed up with another warning,
on July 7, 1947, that “conflicts of interest with
Russia are inevitable and the intense nationalism of
the country [would] play a decisive role.” Nationalism,
not ideology, according to Cabot, would drive Yugoslav
policies. Reportedly, when this message was shown to
then Under Secretary of State Dean Acheson, he wrote
“rubbish” across the text.
Still, Embassy Belgrade judged that there was the possibility
of a split. U.S. Chargé d’Affaires R. Borden
Reams, reported to Washington on June 18, 1948, that
“—for [the] first time in history, [the]
Soviet Union is faced with [a] consolidated Communist
regime outside [its] own borders willing to risk independence
or even [a] contrary course.” Reams concluded
that he was “convinced that [a] definite split
exists.”
Blum argues that although there were many talented
officers in the State Department, perhaps “not
enough people” were focusing on inner-Soviet Bloc
relations and Yugoslavia. Maybe they lacked the time.
Maybe the signals were “confusing and misleading.”
Possibly, the mind set in Washington, which was comfortable
with the certainty of who the enemies were, produced
a skewed perception.
What is remarkable is not that observers did not foresee
the split before it occurred. In Communist systems,
in particular, policy can be set on the whim of a single
ruler, and is by nature unpredictable. The remarkable
fact is that Embassy officers, Ambassador Cabot and
Chargé Reams in particular, fingered nationalism
as the underlying potent trend that, at some point,
would drive the Yugoslavs to assert their independence.
As to Washington, a Policy Planning Staff memorandum
dated June 30, 1948, largely drafted by George Kennan,
concluded, “[f]or the first time in history, we
may now have within the international community a Communist
state…independent of Moscow.[4]
Was this an intelligence failure? It is worth recalling
that, at that time, there was no intelligence community
to make estimative judgments. There was no mechanism
in Washington to filter and organize the insightful
but sporadic reports of knowledgeable and experienced
diplomatic observers into a cohesive estimative opinion.
That said, there is no guaranty that, even if an intelligence
community had been in place and fully staffed at the
time, Acheson would not have acted as he did. Sometimes
policymakers already have their minds made up.
The Estimates: Paradox and Perspective
The estimative materials in this collection regarding
Yugoslavia present a paradox. On the one hand, they
reflect a thorough appreciation of the state of the
country over the period 1948-1990. The factual basis
for the assessments is detailed and, overall, accurate.
Trends in Yugoslav-Soviet relations, the internal political
and economic situation, and the cohesion of the country
are, largely, correctly identified. Judgments about
their likely evolution are mostly on the mark, even
if, in some cases, hedged by caveats.
On the one hand, the large role the Soviet Union plays
as a backdrop to the Yugoslav issue is striking. Analysts
focused on the importance of Yugoslavia’s run
for independence for its broader implications within
the Communist world. In some cases the analysts seemed
to be trying to estimate Soviet power and influence
through Yugoslav judgments of it as the Yugoslavs themselves
dealt with Moscow.
On the other hand, the Estimates on Yugoslavia do not
reflect much of an effort to put the course of the country
into the mainstream of the evolution of Europe. Yet,
Yugoslavia was a key part of a Europe that was changing,
on both sides of the Iron Curtain. After the Treaty
of Rome, in 1957, Western European countries started
pooling sovereignty into European Community—and
later European Union (EU)—institutions, processes
and practices. Meanwhile, Eastern European countries,
after the death of Stalin, embarked on a long and uneven
road toward self-assertion.
The Estimates contain sporadic references to those
other events, such as the Hungarian uprising in 1956
and the “Prague Spring” of 1968. While they
do refer to changing Kremlin policies and tactics, they
are largely silent on the transition in East- West relations,
from the Cold War to the détente that followed
the Cuban Missile crisis. Nor are the Yugoslav estimative
materials directly linked, for the most part, to the
growing trends within Moscow’s East European satellite
states toward liberalization from the Kremlin.
These issues, to be sure, were undoubtedly tackled
by the Intelligence Community in other estimative work
directly focused on those countries and trends. Nevertheless,
what is missing in the Yugoslav estimative materials
presented here is anything more than a sketch on the
broader canvas of political liberalization in Europe—both
East and West. Yet, as the last Estimate included in
this volume (NIE 15-90) was being prepared, the cascade
of change was well under way. Solidarity was part of
the Polish government. The Hungarian People’s
Republic had been abolished. The Berlin Wall had come
down. Germany was putting together the remaining elements
toward unification. Ceausescu was dead.
The evolution of Yugoslavia was part and parcel of
this larger European tableau. Indeed, in the lead-up
to these events, the “Yugoslav experiment”
must have been an attention-getter to East Europeans,
just as it was an irritant to Moscow. The estimative
materials focus largely on the latter aspect, and leave
mostly unexplored the degree to which Tito and the Yugoslav
leadership saw themselves as catalysts in a changing
Europe. The Estimates focus mostly on Yugoslavia’s
global role, as a leader of the Non-Aligned Movement.
They are largely silent on the Yugoslav role as a catalyst
for change in Eastern Europe, and where (if at all)
Yugoslavia fit into the process of Western European
political and economic integration.
Finally, the Estimates deal with the role and importance
of nationalism and, in particular, its relative nature
as both a centralizing and disruptive force. In this
sense, the agony of Yugoslavia served in the early period
to show that Communism was not monolithic and, in the
last period, served to usher in a post-Communist world
where separatist nationalism would contribute so much
to the shaping of the new order.
The Estimates: What They Tell Us about What
Washington Knew
Unlike American knowledge about the Soviet Union, which
was uneven, United States estimative intelligence on
Yugoslavia was based on commanding access to much factual
information. Western engagement to bolster Yugoslavia
through economic assistance, military transfers, and
diplomatic and other contacts opened the door. Yugoslavia’s
Five-Year Plans were also a relatively open book, although,
as some of the Estimates noted, this information was
not of uniform quality.
The Estimates also provided policymakers with a detailed
and considered analytical picture of the complex mix
of historical factors, national and regional interests,
proclivity for dispute, economic challenges and, last
but not least, the role of the West, including the United
States. The Estimates were careful to point out that
these factors might lead to a range of outcomes. Indeed,
several Estimates explicitly examined multiple alternative
possibilities. On the whole, the judgment calls on key
issues proved right. The Soviet Union did not use armed
force against Yugoslavia. The country did hold together
after Tito’s passing, until, in 1990, it became
clear it would not. The Yugoslav “experiment”
did have an effect on the evolution of Moscow’s
atellites. Western assistance never translated into
deciding influence. Paradoxically, the ability of Yugoslavia
to hold together as long as it did might have reinforced
the Washington policy of support for the political independence
and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. When this prospect
became untenable, policy was slow to adjust.
The Estimates, on the whole, probably contributed to
what became a settled Washington policy view that, for
reasons of regional stability and Western interests,
Yugoslavia should remain politically independent and
unified. Yet, it was that policy of support for the
political independence and territorial integrity of
the country that suffered a shipwreck in 1991. The Intelligence
Community saw it coming. Reluctantly but eventually,
the Washington policy community came around to this
view. By then, not surprisingly, the situation had deteriorated
and would lead to armed conflict and Western military
intervention.
The story told by the Estimates from 1948 to 1990 is
one of great improvisation, orchestrated by Tito. While
improvisation succeeded in achieving Tito’s foreign
policy objectives, accommodating to internal pressures
for openness and decentralization, Tito’s approach
ultimately led to the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Even
the potential solution of a loosely confederated Yugoslavia
never acquired a life of its own; the internal pressures
proved too strong. But the Estimates never fully explore
the question why Tito, whose style as a ruthless dictator
worked for him, chose to create a very different style
of collective rule for his successors.
The Estimative Record
The initial focus was on the Soviet Union, and how
the Kremlin would deal with a renegade Yugoslavia. Over
time, the perspective mutated into an interest in Yugoslavia’s
policy of non-alignment, which sought a careful balance
between East and West, while seeking an enlarged global
role, which on occasion bumped against Western interests.
The Estimates were clear-headed about the importance
of Western assistance, but sober about the limited degree
of influence the West would have on Yugoslavia’s
domestic and foreign policies. As the Kremlin’s
hard line mellowed, the Intelligence Community’s
perspective refocused on a newly evolving relationship
between Belgrade and Moscow, in which Tito successfully
sought to preserve Yugoslav freedom of action, drawing
on a strong sense of Yugoslav national pride. As Tito
aged, the analysis became increasingly dominated by
the succession issue, and the incipient crisis of competing
and antagonistic nationalistic feelings among the constituent
parts of Yugoslavia. Finally, the Intelligence Community
was riveted on the impending disintegration of Yugoslavia.
A separation into different phases is somewhat artificial.
All elements mentioned in the Estimates were present
to some degree during the entire period under review.
Nonetheless, the phases offer a rough picture of how
analytic—and policy—attention to Yugoslavia
evolved.
It is hard, even with the benefit of hindsight, to
evaluate the effect of this body of estimative material
on the Washington policy process. The volume of the
material suggests, however, that Yugoslavia did not
suffer from a lack of analysis. The length of some of
the Estimates is noteworthy, given that they were intended
principally for top policy officials. It is reasonable
to infer that the US policy world drew on the large
amount of factual material—and the analytic judgments
based on it—provided in the Estimates in organized
form. It may also be assumed that US government decisions
concerning assistance to Yugoslavia were informed by
the judgments that Yugoslavia needed assistance, but
that providing assistance would not give the West much
influence on Tito’s Yugoslavia. It is probably
safe to conclude that the estimative record in this
volume provided a broad basis on which Washington policymakers
could and did operate. There may be another lesson here.
The analysts failed to go beyond their judgments on
Yugoslavia to consider what this might mean more broadly
for the US and the West, what challenges it would pose
and what opportunities, perhaps even imperatives, for
action it signified.
There also is the problem of different perspectives
of policy makers in Washington on the one hand, and
those of US representatives abroad and analysts at home
on the other. Robert Blum notes correctly that, as the
capital of a world power, Washington is a city of agendas
and action. Once in motion, it takes more than a suggestion
from diplomats overseas—as we saw regarding the
1948 split with Moscow—or from the Intelligence
Community to accept that a fundamental change may be
in the offing. Blum may be hitting the nail on the head
when he observes, “Early in 1948 was a period
of action rather than open-minded reflection about the
Soviet Bloc.” But, as historian John Lewis Gaddis
points out, “What is remarkable about American
policy toward international communism in the early days
of the Cold War is how quickly the possibility of encouraging
heretical growths came to be seen, and acted upon.”[5]
That is the lesson of the Yugoslavia estimates.
1948-1952: Split with Moscow and the Soviet
Threat to Yugoslav Survival
The focus during this period is on the Soviet Union.
The key concern is strategic, and relates to Western
efforts to contain Soviet communism. The key question
is whether, and under what circumstances, the Kremlin
will seek to regain control over Belgrade. A corollary
question is how the split will affect Soviet policies
toward its Satellites. There is considerable attention
to the ability of the Yugoslav economy to withstand
pressure from Moscow to undermine Yugoslav stability.
ORE 49-48, dated November 18, 1948,
addresses the prospects of a Yugoslav state outside
of Kremlin control. This compact and informative Estimate
addresses issues that would occupy American policymakers
for years to come. But it also identifies the factor
of Yugoslav “national” self-interest as
overriding the cause of “international”
communism. In a perhaps unintended turn of phrase, the
opening sentence of the Estimate refers to the “first”
major rift in the USSR’s satellite empire. This
reflects an official American appreciation of the weakness
of the Soviet notion of expansion through world communism.
It explicitly states that, short of the use of armed
force, Communist party discipline “may not always
guarantee the complete submission to Kremlin authority
demanded by the Soviet system.”
The Estimate expects that the rift with Tito will cause
the Kremlin to purge “nationalist” Communists
in the satellite countries under its domain. It also
expects Tito to strengthen his international position.
But caution will prevail on both sides. Moscow cannot
afford to drive Tito into the arms of the West. Tito,
for his part, will also seek to avoid a showdown.
The Estimate seems to hedge on the issue of possible
reconciliation. There is mention of Tito’s “slim
hope of an ultimate compromise solution for the re-admission
of Yugoslavia into the Soviet orbit.” But the
judgment call goes the other way. “Early reconciliation
between Tito and the Cominform is highly unlikely.”
Moreover, “it will become increasingly unlikely
that there can be an accommodation between the USSR
and Yugoslavia as long as Tito and his followers retain
control of the Yugoslav Government.”
ORE 16-49, issued on February 10,
1949, focuses on the paradoxes facing Tito. Despite
the rift, Yugoslavia is following Moscow’s anti-Western
foreign policy line. “It is evident, however,
that as Tito’s economic situation grows more desperate
and his economic dependence on the West (particularly
the US) intensifies, he may be forced to modify his
hitherto vigorous anti-Western foreign policy.”
ORE 44-49, issued on June 20, 1949,
turns to the Yugoslav regime’s ability to resist
Soviet pressure during 1949. The effort is impressive.
It canvasses the military,
political, economic and subversive measures available
to Moscow, concluding that Tito
will withstand these pressures. The Estimate’s
judgments are unambiguous: There will
be no war. Though there may be border incidents, these
will not develop into largescale
guerilla warfare. Tito will stay in power during 1949.
A Soviet attempt to create
an independent Macedonia is unlikely. Cominform propaganda
will rally the non-
Communist Yugoslav population to Tito’s camp.
Tito is acting on his “early conviction”
that Kremlin planners do not want a war with the West,
giving him the courage to defy
the USSR. And Tito can handle the estimated two percent
(a remarkably specific number) of anti-Tito elements
within the Party. The Soviet Bloc will not be able to
exert sufficient economic pressure to force the collapse
of the Yugoslav economy. Tito will seek industrial imports
from the West, even as Yugoslavia continues to trade
with the East.
The Estimate adds another judgment to which one element
of the Intelligence Community took exception “For
the purposes of US policy,” military pressures
from the East “may eventually necessitate”
Western military and economic assistance. The Director
of Naval Intelligence took a footnote: “The Office
of Naval Intelligence has no cognizance over the formulation
of U.S. policy.” This is an early indication of
the reluctance of elements in the Intelligence Community
to be part of analysis that ventures into the policy
arena.
ORE 8-50, issued on May 11, 1950,
judges that the position of Yugoslavia has improved.
The failure of past Soviet tactics has forced Moscow
to revise its estimate as to the vulnerability of the
Tito government. Future Soviet tactics will continue
to be aimed at preventing Yugoslav stabilization. But
“large-scale guerilla warfare against Yugoslavia
does not appear likely in 1950.” Since Tito needs
Western assistance, he will be amenable to settling
outstanding issues. The strategic significance of Yugoslavia,
as an obstacle to Soviet expansion, or as a potential
Western base, “will progressively increase as
Yugoslav ties with the West grow stronger.”
ORE 20-50, issued on September 1,
1950, constitutes another (see ORE 44-49) comprehensive
attempt to assess the state of the Yugoslav economy,
in answer to the question whether Yugoslavia can hold
its own in the face of continued Soviet pressure. What
is remarkable about the Estimate is the detail of the
statistics on all elements of the economy. The key judgment
is that the economy has made a strong recovery from
the effects of World War II, and has adjusted to the
break with the USSR. But there are caveats. The Tito
government is pursuing heavy industrialization within
the framework of a planned economy. This approach is
causing innumerable problems. The Estimate finds that
Yugoslav resources are adequate to support gradual industrial
expansion, well beyond pre-war levels, but “Tito’s
success in strengthening and expanding Yugoslavia’s
economy will depend primarily on the extent to which
he realizes the basic limitations on the rate and extent
of economic development possible in a country of Yugoslavia’s
resources.” The bottom line is that, in 1950,
the United States had a detailed picture about the state
of the Yugoslav economy.
NIE-7, dated November 21, 1950, is
a snapshot of the effect of the economic crisis on
Yugoslavia’s stability. “Substantial outside
aid is essential.” The dangers are internal
discontent and external pressures. But “the probability
is that Tito’s police regime can
survive,” though in weakened condition. The Soviet
aim remains the elimination of the
Tito government, though the Kremlin has been “unwilling
thus far to launch a military
attack.” Relations with Western governments have
improved; in the United Nations,
Yugoslavia is no longer a Communist mouthpiece, but
is moving toward neutrality.
The Estimate addresses specifically Yugoslavia’s
importance to the West. The
discussion is strategic, and reveals an evolution of
the mindset in Washington.
Yugoslavia is important “as a vital link in the
defense of the Eastern Mediterranean, and
the Near and Middle East; its inclusion in the bloc
that forms a potential threat to the
southern flank of a Soviet attack on Western Europe;
and its importance as a key
member of a potential Balkan-Near and Middle East bastion
of Western-oriented states
from which the Communist Satellites and the USSR can
be attacked directly.” This last
phrase is as startling as it is unusual for such a policy
consideration to be included in an Estimate. Yugoslavia
is judged to be a salient in the Soviet ideological
front, but of secondary economic importance to the West,
mainly as a convenient outlet for Western manufactures.
The next few Estimates return to the question of the
odds of a Soviet armed attack.
Concerns apparently were high in 1951-1952. NIE 29,
issued on March 20, 1951,
begins with the premise that the Soviets, still wedded
to the idea of replacing the Tito
regime with one subservient to the USSR, are unlikely
to be able to overthrow Tito by a
coup. Hence, Tito’s overthrow can only be achieved
by armed invasion. Moscow’s
Satellites are now judged to be capable of launching
a major surprise invasion.
Combined Satellite and Soviet forces also could invade
Yugoslavia. Western
assistance and military supplies, however, could enable
Yugoslav forces to hold out in
the mountains. While there is evidence of preparations
for a possible invasion by
Satellite forces, these “do not, however, provide
conclusive evidence of an intention to
attack.” Kremlin thinking is anyone’s guess.
But an attack in 1951 should be
considered “a serious possibility.” This
last word stands in curious contrast to the
stronger term used in the title of the Estimate, which
mentions the “probability” of an
attack. A Review of the Conclusions of NIE-29, issued
on May 4, 1951, reports that
Satellite capabilities for initiating an attack with
little or no warning have increased, but
there have been no major changes in Soviet strength.
The NIE expresses the following
judgment: “Although developments to date do not
appear to warrant the conclusion that
a Satellite attack will take place in 1951, or indicate
that such an attack is more likely this spring than
later in the year, they do give added emphasis to the
conclusion of NIE- 29 that ‘an attack on Yugoslavia
in 1951 should be considered a serious possibility’.”
NIE-29/2, issued on January 4, 1952,
revisits the threat of invasion once more. The key judgment
is that “we believe that an attack upon Yugoslavia
in 1952 is unlikely.” The judgment was not unanimous;
The Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the
Army, agreed that an attack was unlikely “unless
the USSR is prepared to accept general war.” He
also warned about the effect of “unforeseen political
events and/or miscalculation.” The Estimate assesses
the Soviets as follows: “Past Soviet actions suggest
that the Kremlin does not consider Yugoslavia as an
isolated problem, but views it as one of several factors
affecting the general position of the USSR. Consequently,
there is little likelihood that the USSR will launch
a Satellite attack upon Yugoslavia without carefully
assessing the effect of such an attack upon the general
Soviet political and strategic position.”
The preceding three estimative products reflect the
classic analytic challenge of distinguishing between
capabilities and intentions and the importance of getting
both right. It was critical at this uncertain period
in terms of developments elsewhere in Europe and the
Korean peninsula that the Intelligence Community provide
clear, unambiguous, and accurate judgments about Soviet
intentions.
1953-1963: Yugoslavia and the West—the
Policy of Non-alignment
The focus in this period shifts away from preoccupation
with the threat of Soviet bloc invasion to Yugoslavia’s
relations with the West. The judgments are focused on
Yugoslavia’s response to the post-1955 shift in
Moscow’s policy toward Belgrade. The key question
is whether, and under what circumstances, Yugoslavia
can hold its own in a bi-polar world.
NIE-93, issued on June 26, 1953, emphasizes
the Yugoslav relationship with the United States and
the West. Yugoslavia will require outside military aid.
Tito also needs US economic aid, particularly to help
underwrite Yugoslavia’s foreign exchange deficits.
Tito may calculate that the United States will regard
Yugoslavia of sufficient strategic importance to leave
Washington no choice but to continue economic assistance.
In his contacts with the US, the UK, and France, Tito
“will probably continue to seek greater commitments
from the NATO powers,” but he “will not
press for full membership in NATO.” Yugoslavia’s
approach will be to “obtain the maximum Western
commitments for Yugoslavia’s defense while allowing
minimum Western influence over Yugoslavia’s domestic
and foreign policies.” Given the steady pattern
of Yugoslav efforts to seek balanced position between
East and West, the mention of full membership in NATO
is surprising. It is oddly out of context with US intelligence
judgments about Yugoslavia’s foreign policy orientation
up to this time.
ONE Memorandum to the DCI, dated
October 13, 1953, assesses Tito’s reaction to
the US/UK decisions to leave Trieste and turn the city
and surrounding area over to Italian control. The Memorandum
forecasts strong Yugoslav objections, but unwillingness
to jeopardize a growing relationship with the West that
has brought Yugoslavia much needed support.
In the mid-Fifties, in the space of 18 months, the
Intelligence Community sought to define—and redefine—-probable
developments in Yugoslavia, its future orientation,
and probable effects of possible US courses of action.
These National Estimates, each of which supersedes or
partially supersedes the previous one, are NIE 31-55,
issued on February 23, 1955 (superseding NIE 93), NIE
31/1-55, issued on May 19, 1955, NIE 31-2-55, issued
on September 7, 1955, and NIE 31-56, issued on July
24, 1956. Since the rift with the Kremlin, Yugoslavia’s
position has been anomalous. First, it hoped the split
might be temporary. Unremitting Soviet hostility and
economic difficulties compelled closer relations with
the West. In 1950, Yugoslavia accepted Western assistance
rather than face economic collapse. Capitalizing on
Western interest in keeping Yugoslavia free from Soviet
domination, Tito built up diplomatic and military ties
with the West, amounting by mid-1955 to $700 million
in economic grants and close to $1 billion in military
aid. Belgrade also reoriented its foreign trade toward
the West. It accommodated itself to the Western solution
to the Trieste issue, and entered into mutual defense
commitments with Greece and Turkey.
By 1955, however, Stalin had died and the Kremlin was
pursuing “normalization” of relations with
Yugoslavia. Normalization included resumption of full
diplomatic relations with Moscow and the Satellites,
renewed Party relations, reopening of borders, restoration
of trade in non-strategic materials, and other measures
making for a more normal relationship.
The initiatives for improved relations came from Moscow.
Initially, the Yugoslavs viewed them warily. With time,
however, they warmed to renewed contacts with the Soviet
world. They began to see the possibility of “peaceful
coexistence.” In April and May 1955, Tito was
conveying to Western diplomats the idea that Western
security might best be served by a neutral belt comprising
Yugoslavia, Austria, a reunified Germany, Sweden, and
possibly other states. Meanwhile, Yugoslav negotiators
were showing themselves as “disputatious and unbending”
on aid issues. And, on May 13, came the announcement
that a Soviet delegation headed by Khrushchev and Bulganin
would shortly visit Belgrade.
The Intelligence Community assessed that “the
Yugoslav regime probably believes that its own best
interests…lie in avoiding too close an association
with either great power bloc.” But the answer
to the key estimative question was elusive: “The
currently unresolved state of Tito’s relationships
with both the West and the Sino-Soviet Bloc, makes it
impossible to chart future Yugoslav foreign policy with
any great degree of certainty.” Meanwhile, Belgrade
would view its relationship with the West strictly as
“a marriage of convenience.”
But there was clarity on a key trend: “Yugoslavia’s
position vis-à-vis the two major power blocs
is in process of readjustment.” Furthermore, “[E]vidence
available so far indicates that Yugoslavia has preserved
its independent status. We consider it unlikely that
Tito has as yet decided that his interest can best be
served from a position within rather than outside the
Communist orbit or that he has made a covert agreement
with Moscow to join the Bloc.” But, he will “almost
certainly side with the USSR on most major international
issues.”
The new situation required a look at the issue of
US influence. The judgment was not encouraging: “US
ability to influence Yugoslav policy—never decisive
at its strongest— has sharply declined in the
last two years and will probably continue to do so.”
Two further Estimates delve into the gyrations of Yugoslavia’s
policies and prospects. They are NIE 31-57, issued on
June 11, 1957, and SNIE 31/1-57, issued on November
19, 1957, which supersedes the former on foreign policy
issues.
The internal situation is marked by the same trends
noted in previous estimates. The power of the Yugoslav
Communist dictatorship remains intact, despite chronic
popular discontent, dissatisfaction among youth, nationalist
and separatist forces, bad feelings between the economically
backward and more advanced republics, and chronic fear
of Serb domination. This relatively shallow analysis
of Yugoslav internal developments reflected both the
low priority accorded to this in Washington, as well
as a lack of information.
Yugoslavia is following a foreign policy of maneuver
and non-commitment, reflecting a desire to maintain
national independence, the Marxist-Leninist predilection
of its leaders, the necessity of preventing European
hegemony of any one great power, the strategic need
for friendly neighbors, the continuing requirement of
foreign aid, and the unique position of a Communist
country outside the Soviet Bloc.
The revolution in Hungary has subjected the relationship
with Moscow to new strains.
The high point of the earlier rapprochement has been
Tito’s visit to Moscow in June
1956. But now, “the Soviet leaders appear not
to have foreseen the political and
ideological effects in the Satellites of restoring Tito
to good standing in the Communist
world.” Thus, “it was Soviet misgivings
about the course of events in the Satellites that
brought about serious strains in the relationship in
the second half of 1956 and led to
renewed attempts to isolate Yugoslavia from the rest
of Eastern Europe.” In fact, Moscow started blaming
Yugoslavia for Soviet troubles in Eastern Europe. But
it came around again to a softer view. SNIE 31/1-57
opens with the judgment that “The Yugoslav leaders
have appeared convinced that the USSR under Khrushchev
is willing to live with Yugoslav independence and with
gradually increasing autonomy among the Satellite regimes.”
Though there have been and will be many ups and downs,
“Yugoslavia will maintain its rapprochement with
the USSR.”
The Hungarian rebellion also had domestic effects on
Yugoslavia, where the leadership
“appeared to be seriously concerned” about
Hungarian popular disaffection. NIE 31-57
examines four “possible developments” for
a post-Tito Yugoslavia. One is “a period of
crisis in which traditional national rivalries would
reassert themselves and the unity of
the Yugoslav state would break down.” The Estimate
does not assess the likelihood of
such a scenario, although it is interesting that the
focus has shifted from the centralizing
to the disintegrative nature of nationalism. Also, the
Hungarian uprising “brought to the
fore previously latent fears that US policy poses a
potential threat to all Communist states.”
NIE 15-61, issued on May 23, 1961,
four years later, presents a picture of a more
settled pattern. Yugoslavia is politically stable. (This
stability may explain the gap
between Estimates regarding Yugoslavia.) It is gaining
domestic support for its
distinctive type of mixed socialism. Personal consumption
is up and annual economic
growth is at 12 percent. This picture “is unlikely
to undergo substantial change in the
next several years.” Yugoslavia is judged as having
skillfully exploited its unique
position as a Communist state outside the Sino-Soviet
orbit. It enjoys a substantial flow
of Western military and economic aid. Its policy of
non-alignment has given it international prestige. “We
do not expect any substantial change in these policies.”
NIE 10-61, issued on August 8, 1961,
while not Yugoslav-specific, does address the broad
theme of authority and control in the Communist movement
and also assesses the role of Yugoslavia in the process.
It paints a comprehensive picture of inexorable, fissiparous
tendencies, concluding that observable trends suggested
increasing complexity and diversity within the Communist
system, and a growing challenge to Moscow’s attempts
to assert influence and control.
The Estimate frankly attributes the fact of unity within
the Communist movement not so
much to the absence of conflict of interest, as to the
overwhelming influence of Soviet
economic and military power. Two factors, however, are
steadily eroding Moscow’s
predominance. One is the ascendance to state power of
the Communist parties in
Eastern Europe. The other is the impulse given by World
War II to autonomous
tendencies among the Communist parties in Europe. Both
factors contribute to a
growing sense of particular national interests, and
to greater self-reliance of local Communist parties
in articulating and promoting them.
Khrushchev, who succeeded Stalin after the latter’s
death in 1953, was conscious of the need for a more
flexible approach. His intent, according to the Estimate,
was not to grant genuine autonomy, but to allow a more
flexible policy to guarantee maximum effective Soviet
control. This new approach, however, far from assuaging
restlessness in Eastern Europe, only encouraged the
release of pent-up forces wanting reform. This evolution
is stimulated further by the reversal of Stalin’s
policy toward Yugoslavia and the recognition of its
Communist party’s right to a “separate road.”
The Estimate notes Albanian fears that Yugoslavia might
re-establish its former tutelage over the Albanian Communist
movement, and thus constitute a threat to Albanian independence—a
theme addressed earlier in NIE-42/1, issued October
20, 1952. This is why Albania chose to align itself
with China.
The Estimate dwells on the rise of China and the competing
influence of the Chinese Communist Party in the Communist
system. The Estimate considers it unlikely that the
two major Communist parties can resolve their differences,
but regards an open rupture as equally unlikely, leaving
the two parties openly contending for leadership, but
with the Soviet Communist Party in the stronger position
because of greater Soviet economic and military power.
These trends, according to the Estimate, could eventually
diminish the effectiveness of the Communist movement
as a whole, opening new opportunities for the West.
The Estimate further predicts that, in this field of
tension, other parties will be tempted to bargain between
Moscow and Beijing, adding, cautiously but presciently,
that “[I]n the long run, some of the parties in
Eastern Europe, or factions within them, may attempt
to develop further the autonomy conceded by Stalin’s
successors.” The Summary of the Estimate concludes
by noting the “remarkable survival of old-fashioned
impulses of nationalism.”
1963-1967: “Revolutionary Workers’
Movement” and Return to Moscow
Picking up the analytical line of NIE 10-61, the perspective
during this period shifts to loosening cohesion in the
Communist world. The key question is what place and
role Yugoslavia has in a Communist world in which Moscow
must compete for allegiance. A Memorandum For The Director
on Yugoslavia and the Soviet Bloc, issued on July 18,
1963, by the Board of National Estimates, and signed
by Chairman Sherman Kent, reveals just how much changed
since the Yugoslav break with Moscow fifteen years earlier.
A terse, 13-paragraph memorandum, it presents a picture
of economic progress and political stability. Yugoslavia
has a new constitution. Leadership succession seems
to have been settled by the elevation of Alexander Rankovic
to second position in the government and in the party.
The economy is on the upsurge. Yugoslav pessimism about
relations with the Common Market, and about Most Favored
Nation (MFN) status with the United States, is offset
by optimism about Yugoslavia’s prospects in relations
with the underdeveloped world, which Belgrade sees as
potential markets for products of Yugoslav industry.
Relations with Moscow have improved significantly.
This is “in very great part the personal work
of Tito,” who visited Moscow in December 1962,
confirming his impression—thus the memorandum—that
Khrushchev and his associates were altering the internal
system in the USSR in the direction favored by Yugoslavia.
Yugoslavia is now receiving Soviet military goods. Mutual
exchanges with Moscow Satellites have increased; there
are even joint projects.
Belgrade’s previous emphasis on its independence
of all “blocs” has been replaced by a rhetoric
stressing the importance of Yugoslavia’s role
as part of the “international revolutionary workers’
movement.” The change reflects the altered Yugoslav
assessment that Moscow now accepts independent behavior
of other Communist countries.
The memorandum states that Moscow is no longer working
to regain control over Yugoslavia; instead, Khrushchev
seeks Yugoslav support within the Communist world, to
demonstrate that intimate relations with Moscow are
possible without becoming a Soviet puppet.
The key judgment of the estimative memorandum is that
Yugoslav cooperation with Moscow is likely to grow,
though it expresses a caveat that this depends on Khrushchev’s
“political fortunes and life span.” As to
Tito’s successors, the memorandum concludes that
they will continue to attach priority to maintaining
Yugoslav independence. Analysts now must begin assessing
the shape and implications of post-Tito Yugoslavia.
1967-1983: Succession and Emerging Ethnic Nationalism.
After another lengthy estimative gap, the focus during
this period is the internal evolution of Yugoslavia.
Tito’s death in 1980 is the defining event of
this period. The key question is how the internal trends—ethnic
nationalism in particular—driving the transition/succession
process will affect the unity of the country after Tito
leaves the scene.
NIE 15-67, issued April 13, 1967,
returns to Yugoslavia with a detailed exposition of
the Yugoslav “Experiment.” It characterizes
the country as a Communist state in name and in theory,
but in practice as fully independent. It gives the “experiment”
high marks;
Yugoslavia has a viable and independent—though
unstable—economy, it has
democratized public institutions, and it enjoys a significant
global position. Progress
toward decentralization will not be smooth, but “probably
irreversible.”
The discussion focuses on forces tugging at the country’s
cohesion—six republics
whose people “are divided by differences in religion,
nationality, language, political
experience, and economic development.” Curiously
absent is any reference to the
lethal armed internal conflict during WW II and the
residual animosities, which that
conflict generated. Moreover, according to the Estimate,
Yugoslavia is a state “whose
political, economic, and foreign policies have for nearly
20 years reflected mainly
improvisation and compromise.”
Paragraph six of the discussion lays bare the underlying
seeds of schism: Serbs,
Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians think of themselves
first in those national terms,
and only secondarily as Yugoslavs. This represents an
interesting and important
analytical shift. The early (e.g. 1948) emphasis on
nationalism stressed the external
manifestation of Yugoslav national identity as a sign
of independence from the Soviet
bloc. Now national identity is analyzed as relating
to particular internal (to Yugoslavia)
ethnic interests.
Moreover, the country’s populations, except the
Serbs, are haunted by fears of a return
to “greater Serb” hegemony. The unifying
Soviet threat has diminished. Progressive
devolution of economic and political responsibility
has enhanced the attraction of a
loose confederation, as opposed to strict central federal
control. Disparities of wealth
are driving the constituent republics apart.
The Estimate notes that, while Tito has managed these
problems of “particularization,”
he does not anticipate any real solution. It warns of
exploitation by ambitious politicians of the emotional
appeal of particularism, but sees, on balance, an attenuation
of
particularist trends. However, should Tito die before
completing his overhaul of State
and party structures, “[I]t is remotely possible
that a concatenation of…unfavorable
events could endanger the cohesion of the Federation.”
However, the Estimate’s
bottom line is that the state will survive intact.
An ONE Memorandum, dated March 10,
1969, deals with the succession problem, and its effect
on internal stability. The basic threat is factionalism.
The picture is confused: Ideological convictions, national
antagonisms “rooted deep in history,” and
personal loyalties make prediction hazardous. Yugoslavia
has been in a state of flux for nearly two decades,
in an environment of innovation and experimentation,
plagued by constant problems of antagonisms, economic
weakness and political factionalism. Aware that “liberalization
of the economy generates a need for political liberalization,”
Tito has now discarded the expedient of an heir apparent,
preferring not to lodge too much power in the hands
of one individual. The memorandum dryly notes, however,
that as long as Tito remains in power, there is no way
to test the new system of collective governance. But
the ultimate judgment is cautiously positive: Tito’s
departure will not produce an immediate crisis.
A lengthy “Intelligence Appraisal”,
issued by ONE on July 27, 1971, lays out a
detailed picture of Yugoslavia. The notation that it
is in response to National Security
Study Memorandum (NSSM) 129 indicates that this is a
case where the policy and
intelligence worlds in Washington are interacting. The
picture is mixed. Yugoslavia
faces a difficult transition. It is moving to new, more
open patterns of politics. Its
economy, moving toward radical decentralization of authority,
faces problems. The
country enjoys greater contact with the West. Its leadership
is preparing for the post-
Tito period.
The key question is whether Yugoslavia can survive
as a single state, despite bitter
antagonisms between Serbs and Croats, Serbs and Albanians,
and strong regional
rivalries and resentments. The principal power centers
at the top of the Communist
Party (LCY) and the federal government appear indecisive.
But there is “a good
chance” that over the long term a sense of common
purpose, buttressed by a sense of
common peril, will enable the hybrid Yugoslav system
to survive “essentially intact.”
The Soviet Union is seen as the most menacing threat,
a view accentuated by the
Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. Suspicions
of Western Europe have
abated, and Yugoslav political and cultural views are
increasingly shaped by Western
concepts.
Success in carving out international stature is providing
a spur to national pride and cohesion. Relations with
the United States have improved markedly. “Belgrade
seems to have reassessed the entire course of its post-1948
relations with Washington and concluded that American
sympathy and support for Yugoslav independence is genuine—not
just an artificial and inherently temporary adjunct
of the United States- Soviet relationship.” However,
the appraisal is deeply hedged. “Change and disarray
will confront the Yugoslav leadership with a variety
of serious problems.” Separatist sentiments will
weaken the federation. The Yugoslav system will remain
unsettled. Beyond these “rather gloomy near certainties,”
and the “somber eventualities within Yugoslavia
itself,” the future of Yugoslavia remains indistinct.
The Estimate proffers four illustrative scenarios of
possible futures. The most likely is a linear projection
of the existing Yugoslav situation: a united, independent,
and non-aligned Yugoslavia. Other scenarios are more
troubling. One is a contested secession, after Croatia
breaks away. A variant is total disintegration, with
a state of civil war marked by fighting, whereupon “Yugoslavia
ceases to exist.” Some republics turn to the Soviet
Union for help. Other turn to the West.
Discussion of these scenarios leads to a fundamental—and
prescient—judgment: in all
these alternatives, the West and the United States may
have a critical role to play. This
conclusion is worth remembering in the light of the
remark in 1991, attributed to then
Secretary of State James Baker, that “the United
States does not have a dog in this
fight.”
An ONE Memorandum, issued on January
5, 1972, deals with the crisis in Croatia,
where students at Zagreb University had gone on strike
the previous November. The
Estimate concludes that the main share of responsibility
for the crisis should be
attributed to the strong liberal wing of the Croatian
Communist Party (League of
Communists of Croatia), which has sought to exploit
nationalistic sentiment in order to
consolidate local power and win concessions from Belgrade.
Tito bore down hard on
these manifestations of “rotten liberalism.”
But he also made clear that the essentials of
his decentralized system should survive. Croatian liberals
in Zagreb drew
encouragement from Tito’s assertions that there
cannot be a return to the past. But his
concept of a Communist Party that guides but does not
lead suffered a setback. The
Estimate identifies the conundrum posed by a basic contradiction.
How should one
understand a program of decentralization that continues
to be run firmly from the
center?
Two themes stand out in this Assessment. One is the
appearance of nationalism, not
as a force in support of Yugoslav national unity, but
of the opposite, namely separatism
on the part of the Yugoslav republics. The second theme
is put as a key question.
“Can a country such as Yugoslavia—poor,
backward and Balkan—long exist as a
pluralistic society within a single state?” The
Memorandum’s answer: “[W]e see no
need, as yet, to revise our previous estimates that
the chances are slightly better than
even that Yugoslavia will survive Tito’s death
as a single state.”
An ONE Memorandum, dated 27 September,
1972, turns to the problem of Croatian
separatists. It notes official Yugoslav concern about
a spate of terrorist incidents, in
Yugoslavia and abroad, such as the assassination of
the Yugoslav ambassador to
Sweden. The discussion introduces two new elements.
One is the fact that, at the time
of writing, there may now be a million Yugoslav “semi-émigrés”
working abroad. The
second is that exact numbers are non-existent. Moreover,
no one in Belgrade has an
accurate track of the activities of Yugoslavs abroad.
An ONE Memorandum, dated November
17, 1972, asked whether Yugoslavia can
somehow strike a balance between the need for central
authority and the urge for
pluralistic achievement? And can Tito, in his waning
years, achieve this balance?
The watershed crisis in Croatia has ended the era of
federal optimism. Tito had to use
his power and had to purge many officials, in Croatia
and elsewhere. The
Memorandum notes that “Tito would remind his critics
that to allow the nationalists of
Croatia and Serbia to rule without restraint from the
center would simply make certain
that there would ultimately be no Yugoslavia in which
the democratic process could
unfold.”
The Memorandum also returns to the issue of nationalism.
Nationalism is a force for
unity against perceived outside threats. As such, it
represents an alternative source of
spiritual strength. “But…there are other
kinds of nationalism—Croatian, Serbian,
Macedonian, etc.—which flourish in Yugoslavia,
and they are directed essentially
against one another and against Belgrade” (emphasis
supplied).
NIE15-73, issued July 5, 1973, examines
the prospects for Yugoslavia after Tito. Stane Dolanc,
a Slovene, has emerged as Tito’s heir apparent.
Elemental fear of a hostile outside is keeping Yugoslavia
together, despite a decline in federal power to help
appease certain nationalist appetites. But Tito has
misjudged the balance; the demonstrations in Zagreb
took authorities by surprise. Tito, according to the
Estimate, is not about to give up “the fundamentals
of [his] course: “‘pluralistic’ socialism,
international non-alignment, and national sovereignty.”
“But,” the Estimate continues, “he
is now convinced that only a strong, invigorated party
can carry on in his absence. The Estimate concludes
that, while Moscow would welcome a return of Yugoslavia
to the Communist bloc fold, it is likely to turn a generally
amiable face to post-Tito Yugoslavia.
NIE 15-79, dated 25 September, 1979,
also addresses the prospects for post-Tito
Yugoslavia. It registers a lower confidence score than
NIE 15-73 about Yugoslavia’s
sustainability. While Tito’s passing will not,
during the next six months, pose a threat to
the integrity or independence of the Yugoslav state,
the successor regime will face
mounting domestic and foreign challenges. The variables
will be the nature of the
Soviet reaction, economic ‘stagflation,’
and the efficacy of Western assistance. The
judgment of the Estimate is that “the odds remain
at least marginally in favor of
Yugoslavia’s continuing as an integral, independent
state.” “Internal instability and
vulnerability to external pressures during a prolonged
transition period, however, could
make even an integral Yugoslavia a recurring source
of international tension.”
Though Tito can claim personal credit for Yugoslavia’s
international prestige
disproportionate to its size, he is leaving inadequate
and ineffective decisionmaking
structures and procedures to deal with the challenges
ahead. These include growing
economic strains and sharper conflicts of interests
among the constituent parts of
Yugoslavia. Moscow is likely to move cautiously: “under
certain circumstances
Moscow would see advantages in a stable, viable Yugoslavia.”
As to the West, the Estimate is clear about the limits
of its influence: “No amount or kind of Western
support can stop Tito’s successors from engaging
in a self-destructive succession struggle or prevent
Yugoslavia’s constituent nationalities from embarking
on a civil war, if they are determined to do so. However,
skillfully timed and carefully designed and orchestrated
Western support could make a very large difference.”
A Memorandum to Holders of NIE 15-79,
issued on February 1, 1980, revisits the
judgments above in the light of the Soviet invasion
of Afghanistan. It concludes that
these principal judgments remain valid. The Afghanistan
analogy has only limited
application to Yugoslavia.
1983-1990: Post-Tito Disintegration and Collapse
With Tito gone and transitional structures failing,
the analytical focus during this period
is on the factors that are tearing Yugoslavia apart.
The key question is whether it can
hold together as a federal state. NIE 15-90 addresses
this question with classic
analytical rigor and honesty.
SNIE 15-83, issued on January 31,
1983, is entitled Yugoslavia: An Approaching
Crisis? It is a dense and comprehensive analysis.
Two problems in particular face the new leadership:
economic slowdown and ethnic strains. The national leadership,
hostage to the need for elusive consensus, is weak.
The regime will try and muddle through. The West can
help deal with financial problems; Moscow is unlikely
to view this as a challenge it must counter, but might
become more deeply involved to advance its interests.
A troubled Yugoslavia will be a source of great power
rivalry. A major crisis is likely to be gradual, and
unlikely within the next year. But Yugoslavia will be
on its own: Overcoming the crisis will depend on Yugoslavia’s
own leadership.
