Docs 104-129
August-September 1961:
The Division of Berlin; the Brandt-Kennedy Correspondence; Vice President Johnson's Trip to Berlin; General Clay's Appointment as Special Representative to Berlin; NSAMs No. 92 and 94; Meeting of the Four Western Foreign Ministers at Washington
104. Editorial Note
Early in the morning of August 13, 1961, the German Democratic Republic introduced control measures that effectively prevented residents of the Soviet Zone and East Berlin from entering West Berlin. At the same time barbed wire and other physical barriers, which eventually became "The Berlin Wall," were erected to restrict crossings into the Western sectors of the city. For text of the decree imposing these restrictions and text of the Warsaw Pact powers' declaration of the same day urging the establishment of controls around West Berlin, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pages 773-776.
First reports on these measures were received in Washington by 4 a.m., and in one, telegram 176 from Berlin received at 6:37 a.m., Lightner speculated on the reasons for the restrictions:
"Evidently as a result of increased refugee flow with attendant economic loss to GDR and prestige to Socialist camp, East decided at recent Moscow conference of Warsaw Pact countries to proceed with fait accompli which would drastically disrupt freedom of movement within Berlin and erect frontier with respect entry into West Berlin of Sov Zone and East Berlin residents. In this way East has now taken some of the steps which it had been anticipated would follow from separate peace treaty with GDR." (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1361)
In response to the initial reports and telephone conversations with the Mission at Berlin and after conferring with the President at Hyannis Port, Secretary of State Rusk at 12:30 p.m. issued a 3-paragraph statement emphasizing that the restrictions were a violation of the Four-Power status of Berlin and would be the subject of a vigorous protest through appropriate channels. For full text of this statement, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, page 776.
Documentation in Department of State files and at the Kennedy Library on the discussions in the Department of State and the telephone conversations between Washington and Hyannis Port and Washington and Berlin in response to the border closing is sparse. However, for two accounts of these activities, based on interviews with the participants, see Cates, The Ides of August, pages 304-307, 317-323, 328-333, and 336-339, and Dulles, The Wall, Acts II and III. While these accounts do not agree on all the details, they are consistent with the limited documentation available in the Department of State and Kennedy Library.
105. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 13, 1961, 7 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1361. Confidential; Priority. Received at 4:50 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR.
185. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and Finn. At noon meeting of Commandants, Deputy Commandants and POLADs with GovMayor accompanied by Amrehn and Senator Klein, Brandt expressed concern re anticipated psychological reaction to East German measures./2/ He mentioned dangerous possibility of desperate actions by populace, warning that in course of day and night large crowds of people might assemble on both sides of sector boundary, creating public safety problem; West Berlin police alerted to possibility of incidents on Western side.
/2/For two other accounts of this meeting, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 10-13, and Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 300-304. The Western Commandants and their staffs had met at 10 a.m. to discuss the closing of the sector borders. For accounts of this meeting, see McDermott, Berlin, pp. 32-33, and Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 298-300. Amrehn, Brandt, and Klein joined this meeting about noon.
Senat carefully weighing every word released to public, advising West Berliners continue normal tasks and cautioning them against ill-considered actions. Senat neither urging border crossers from East report for work in West Berlin nor advising them stay in SovSector, but stating that their rights in West Berlin (to continue employment, social security, etc.) being safeguarded.
Under increasing pressure from local as well as foreign press representatives, Senat is emphasizing unlawful and inhumane nature of latest Eastern measures. House of Representatives convening in special session this evening to hear Brandt's report on situation. At his invitation Commandants and Deputy Commandants will attend. Brandt indicated Senat considering holding mass protest rally but no decision yet./3/
/3/The Mission at Berlin reported on this session in telegram 187, August 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1361)
Brandt summed up Senat evaluation that East regime action gross violation of existing rights, including Four-Power status of Berlin, and specifically Four-Power agreements of 1949, restoring status quo ante blockade. He emphasized significance of measures which East had threatened to take only after realization of so-called peace treaty and establishment "demilitarized free city of West Berlin," and stressed illegality of Warsaw Pact instructions to "GDR" government to take measures on Berlin territory. On basis of above evaluation of Eastern measures, Brandt said Senat believes Western diplomatic steps vis-a-vis SovUnion might be warranted at high level, although Commandants presumably might simultaneously consider new steps vis-a-vis Sov Commandant. Brandt mentioned in this connection that Commandants' protest letters re border crossers (Berlin's 114 Bonn, 131 Dept)/4/ not answered, but that situation now radically changed. Brandt also mentioned that he understood quadripartite conversations in progress at high level concerning means available to West (specifically economic measures) to counter latest Communist moves, in order demonstrate that West not prepared to submit tacitly to latest Eastern measures.
/4/Dated August 3, this telegram transmitted the text of a note from the Western Commandants to the Soviet Commandant protesting the East German violation of the quadripartite status of Berlin. (Ibid., 862.181/8-361) For text of the note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 765-766.
Chairman Commandant told GovMayor that Commandants carefully following developments, considering actions to be taken; they fully in agreement with GovMayor's efforts maintain calm atmosphere.
In view Department's press release Aug 13 and telephonic instruction, tripartitely agreed press statement/5/ prepared here was replaced by following brief tripartite statement to local press:
/5/For text of the press release (Rusk's statement at 12:30 p.m.), see ibid., p. 776. The telephonic instructions and the press statement have not been identified further, but presumably they are the ones described by Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 320-321.
"An Allied spokesman today said the three Western Commandants in Berlin have fully informed their governments and any comment must be expected from the capitals."
After special session House of Representatives this evening Commandants are meeting re terms and method of formal protest to Sov Commandant./6/
/6/The text of the Western Commandants' protest letter was agreed on August 14 and transmitted to Washington for approval. (Telegram 188 from Berlin, August 14, received at 2:17 p.m.; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461) The text was discussed by the Four-Power Ambassadorial Steering Group, and at 8:24 p.m. the Department of State approved the text subject to minor changes in the last two paragraphs and approval by the British and French. (Telegram 118 to Berlin, August 14; ibid.) For final text of the letter as delivered on August 15, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-777.
Lightner
106. Telegram From the Embassy in Germany to the Department of State/1/
Bonn, August 14, 1961, 1 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Received at 9:26 a.m. Repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and Berlin.
318. My British and French colleagues and I met with Brentano this morning at his request for discussion on Berlin./2/ Foreign Minister said he viewed restrictions on Berlin travel as most alarming, and felt this first move would be followed quickly by further restrictions (perhaps selective control of movements of West Berliners and West Germans to East Berlin, or even on access routes to West Berlin) if Western reaction not prompt and vigorous. There ensued discussion of Communist motivation, with Brentano and Seydoux, while recognizing role of refugee flow in Bloc decision, inclined to believe they may be attempting to test Western reaction to gradual establishment of free city concept, while Steele and I considered Ulbricht's hand had been forced by refugee flow. There was full agreement, however, that result was same, regardless of motivation, and that Western reaction to this most serious breach of quadripartite agreement thus far would certainly affect future Communist moves. There was further agreement that two immediate steps should be recommended:
/2/For another account of this meeting, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 366-369.
(1) Written protest by Commandants, which should be made "on instructions", to be followed fairly quickly by notes to Moscow. There was inconclusive discussion whether three Ambassadors should endeavor to see Pervukin, since all three of us expect to be in Berlin this week.
(2) Widest possible ban on East German travel, to be agreed by four governments and presented to NAC for concurrence at earliest possible date.
Brentano said further that Bundestag session scheduled for August 22 would probably be called this week to hear governmental declaration and to make clear government and opposition united on Berlin.
It was assumed that Washington Steering Group would be meeting today for decision on Western countermeasures, and all agreed that promptness of our reactions was vital factor.
Dowling
107. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1461. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Day and approved by Kohler. Also sent to Berlin and repeated to Paris, London, and Moscow.
Washington, August 14, 1961, 8:24 p.m.
350. Paris also for USRO Stoessel and Finn. Four Power Ambassadorial Steering Group met today consider Allied reaction GDR sector boundary restrictions. Following points covered:
1. Commandants Protest--Discussed text submitted by Berlin. Agreed delivery urgent. UK and French promised contact Govs. (This is subject another Deptel.)/2/
/2/See footnote 5, Document 105.
2. Protest to USSR in Moscow--US stated prepared consider protest at this level in addition Commandants protest. Others agreed this seemed desirable. French said Paris sending proposed text Washington today. It was agreed review text here tomorrow.
3. TTD ban--US reported on private NATO meeting, consensus of which was favorable to ban. Stated we saw pros and cons. Danger existed GDR would retaliate by imposing restrictions Western travel to East Berlin, as it did last fall. In addition, GDR presumably would hold controls for long period, and removal ban while controls still in effect would be embarrassing. On other hand, if West took no action other than protest, West Berlin would feel let down and Soviets would interpret our inaction as weakness in context larger Berlin situation. We wondered if ATO could simply close down on grounds GDR preventing East Germans from entering West Berlin, hence impossible issue them TTDs. UK stated FonOff saw same danger US mentioned, inclined hold ban until Western travel affected. French uninstructed but felt ban useful. Germans noted von Brentano had already proposed ban to three Ambassadors./3/ Said Fedrep would take parallel action denying issuance passports East Germans. Three Embassies agreed seek Gov views.
/3/See Document 106.
Comments Bonn and Berlin (in addition any already made) requested urgently, particularly on pros and cons mentioned above.
4. Other retaliatory measures--US asked views on other possible countermeasures. Following were mentioned: boycott Leipzig Fair (Germans felt they could not cooperate since included IZT agreement); cut off cultural exchanges; prevent bloc attendance Western fairs; break off US-Soviet air agreement; prevent travel Western citizens to GDR (French and Germans could not carry out). It was agreed any retaliation might well be taken against Soviet bloc as whole, since GDR action implemented Warsaw Pact decision. Generally agreed trade countermeasures should mainly be saved for more serious development involving Western access or German civilian traffic.
Comments all addressees requested urgently./4/
/4/On August 15 the Embassy in Bonn replied that a total ban on East German travel should be instituted, and noted that prominent Germans were urging German businesses not to participate in the Leipzig Fair and that the Federal Republic would cooperate in cutting off cultural exchanges. (Telegram 333; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1561) The Mission at Berlin replied on the same day stressing that a future challenge to the West in Berlin might be more serious, and countermeasures should be used as a deterrent rather than as retaliation. For this reason, although realizing that they might be dangerous, the Mission stated that economic and trade countermeasures could not be neglected except at "grave risk to our position in Berlin." (Telegram 211; ibid., 762.00/8-1561)
5. Propaganda exploitation--Agreed this most important. British presented list themes which generally acceptable. US agreed work theme into its information effort.
Rusk
108. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 14, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 509 Negotiations. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1986, 910.
SUBJECT
(1) Berlin Negotiations and (2) Possible Reprisals
(1) Negotiations
I find unanimity in your immediate staff for the view that we should take a clear initiative for negotiation within the next week or ten days--safely before the Neutral Nations Conference. Since our allies are hesitant, the lead will have to come from you, at the highest level./2/
/2/For text of Rostow's August 14 memorandum to Bundy, which espoused this view, see ibid., 1981, 246A. Carl Kaysen had also supported the idea of negotiations in a memorandum to Bundy on August 14, in which he also favored increasing the airborne alert force of SAC. (Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Staff Memoranda, Carl Kaysen)
This opinion is strengthened by the border-closing episode, which can be described as one reason more for calling talks--because of the dangerous and explosive weakness it reveals in the DDR.
I hope you can discuss this general question with Secretary Rusk this afternoon./3/ His professionals are more cautious, being committed to a 4-Power process of planning. They see some virtue in the French argument that we ought not to talk about negotiation before we have reached agreement on the substance of our position. But the truth is that we're making very slow headway toward a clear position, as it is; a date for negotiation would put all our noses to the grindstone.
/3/No record of this meeting at 4:45 p.m. has been found, although it is noted in both Rusk's and Kennedy's Appointment Books. (Rusk Appointment Books; Johnson Library, and JFK Log; Kennedy Library)
(2) Reprisals for the Border Closing
The Department's proposal for a riposte is likely to be the ending of the travel permits which have been issued by the three powers in West Berlin to East Germans who want to visit allied or neutral countries. This was used a year ago in response to East German harassment of civilian traffic, and it worked well. No one thinks it will cause a reversal of policy this time, in the light of the much more serious causes of this much larger action. But it is argued that it will give some pain, since it will cut off East German access to allied countries and to those neutral nations which play along.
I find this argument unconvincing. I doubt if we should take little actions in reprisal against this big one, especially when the punishment is unrelated to the crime. The only good argument for this action is that it has been discussed among the 4 Powers before as a possible retort to border-closing, and there may be some Allied worry about our "reliability" if we don't support it now.
Incidentally, I find agreement in both Joe Alsop and George Kennan to these three conclusions: (1) this is something they have always had the power to do; (2) it is something they were bound to do sooner or later, unless they could control the exits from West Berlin to the West; (3) since it was bound to happen, it is as well to have it happen early, as their doing and their responsibility.
McG. B./4/
/4/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
109. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, August 14, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 661.62B/8-1461. No classification marking.
1. What steps will we take this week to exploit politically propagandawise the Soviet-East German cut-off of the border?
2. This seems to me to show how hollow is the phrase "free city" and how despised is the East German government, which the Soviet Union seeks to make respectable.
3. The question we must decide is how far we should push this. It offers us a very good propaganda stick which if the situation were reversed would be well used in beating us. It seems to me this requires decisions at the highest level.
John F. Kennedy
110. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 14, 1961, 9 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1461. Confidential; Priority. Received at 6:58 a.m. on August 15. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Paris, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.
197. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. At Senat request Commandants and Deputies met at noon today to hear Mayor Amrehn present situation report and Senat views formulated in morning session. In insistent manner Amrehn saw fit to impress on Commandants significance of East German measures and reiterated that in Senat's view protests alone could not suffice in light gravity of situation. Amrehn stated that Senat aware that all necessary steps could be decided upon only in capitals but asserted that indignant and aroused public would not be satisfied by just a Commandants' protest, which press had reported to be intent of last sentence of Secretary's Aug. 13 statement. Amrehn stated mood of Berliners reflects indignation with East German measures and growing disappointment with failure of West take immediate steps. He said Senat also wondered why Commandants had not already protested and recalled that in past far less important incidents had produced Commandants' protest on same day. Amrehn repeated Brandt's hope that diplomatic démarche be made at highest level. (Amrehn was reminded seriousness of situation explained delay as decisions being made and coordinated in capitals where all aspects of problem under urgent consideration.)
Amrehn also reported that--allegedly at popular demand--Senat urgently considering variety of countermeasures within West Berlin. In this connection he reiterated that West Berlin crowds this morning vocally critical of Brandt for making high-sounding statements but failing to take concrete measures. Senat too is reportedly under heavy popular pressure to close SED offices and SED West Berlin newspapers, take measures against display of East German regime decrees and propaganda in West Berlin S-Bahn stations, and deprive West Berliners employed in SovSector of wage equalization fund benefits. Amrehn emphasized that Senat aware it could not take such measures without Allied approval, and that Senat realized necessity for coordinating any local measures with larger action decided upon by governments.
Chairman Commandant ended conference with Germans by informing Mayor that Allied governments dealing with situation and Commandants awaiting decisions.
Lightner
111. Minutes of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group/1/
Washington, August 15, 1961, 10:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Secret. Prepared by Bundy on August 16.
PRESENT
Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, Agriculture, Under Secretary Fowler of Treasury, The Attorney General, The Director of CIA, Deputy Director Wilson of USIA, The Chairman, JCS, Mr. Foy Kohler, General Taylor, Mr. Bundy
[Here follows discussion of an unrelated subject.]
Turning to the immediate situation in Berlin, the Secretary of State asked Mr. Kohler to summarize recent developments. Mr. Kohler described the progress which had been made through the Secretary's statement, the delivery of the protest of the three Western Commandants in Berlin, and preparation of a protest for delivery in Moscow. The Secretary of State noted that while the border closing was a most serious matter, the probability was that in realistic terms it would make a Berlin settlement easier. Our immediate problem is the sense of outrage in Berlin and Germany which carries with it a feeling that we should do more than merely protest. It was not easy to know just what else we should do.
In the following discussion it was generally agreed that economic countermeasures would be inappropriate; either they would be much too trivial to count, like withholding Western participation in the Leipzig Fair, or they might set in train a chain of challenges and responses which might affect our own deepest interest, and that of economic and human access to West Berlin.
Similar objections applied not only to such a course as general interruption of travel by East Germans to the West, but suspension of Temporary Travel documents. Moreover, it looks as if the new fence between East and West Berlin is there to stay, and we do not want to reply with temporary and incommensurate reprisals.
The one step for which there was substantial support in the group was the possibility of reinforcements of the West Berlin Garrison. There was no general agreement; and the Secretary of Defense indicated a specific reservation on the ground that such steps, taken as a gesture, were not desirable. His own inclination was to consider some reduction in U.S. military dependents abroad.
The discussion then turned to psychological measures and propaganda. Since it was agreed that, in the words of the Secretary of State, "we must keep shooting issues and non-shooting issues separate", and since it was further agreed that the closing of the border was not a shooting issue, the problem was essentially one of propaganda. We should reap a large harvest on this front. The Attorney General particularly pressed for a new and stronger organization of our efforts in this area; and it was agreed that there would be a special meeting on this subject at 6 p.m., August 15./2/ It was further agreed that Mr. Earl Newsom/3/ would be invited to come to Washington to discuss ways and means of improvement of our propaganda efforts on the Berlin crisis.
/2/No record of this meeting has been found.
/3/Edwin Earl Newsom, public relations counsel and senior partner of Earl Newsom & Co.
McG Bundy
112. Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, August 16, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Interdepartmental Steering Group. No classification marking.
SUBJECT
Meeting of Interdepartmental Coordinating Group on Berlin and Germany, 15 August 1961/2/
/2/A summary of the discussion at this meeting was transmitted to Bonn in telegram 354, August 15, which stated that the consideration of countermeasures revealed that most of them were small and relatively ineffective. But the Coordinating Group agreed that something more than protest needed to be done both to bolster West Berlin morale and to prevent the Soviet Union and East Germany from drawing the conclusion that the West was weak. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1561)
1. Mr. Kohler ran down five tasks he felt were now imposed on the Group. In order, with the action taken at the meeting, they were:
a. Revision of Live Oak Directive.
The first point made was that the Nitze-Gray paper on military measures was a "non-committed U.S. paper", not a firm U.S. position. JCS have used it, however, in drafting a new proposed directive for the Live Oak planners./3/ General Gray had a few copies of a preliminary draft at the meeting, but I was unable to latch onto one. Toward the end of the week, the Ambassadorial Group will consider the question of furnishing the directive to General Norstad, for passing on to the Live Oak staff. General Gray told me that the airlift-before-everything feature of the original paper no longer appears, you will be happy to learn.
/3/Neither the paper nor the draft directive has been further identified, but Legere later commented that the proposed directive was "an affront to any reader with the slightest respect for plain logic," and that it was completely revised by ISA on August 17. (Notes attached to a memorandum to Taylor, June 30, 1969; National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 34, Middle of 1961/Legere) The revised paper was formalized on August 17 as JCSM 558-61, "Draft Instructions to the Military Authorities of France, the United Kingdom, and the United States." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Records)
Comment. Seems on the track. Probably no objection to the Ambassadorial Group acting on the directive, since (a) it will have been written by U.S. military, (b) it will have to be referred to governments anyway, and (c) it is only a directive to engage in planning, so governments should approve if they have any courage at all on the Berlin question.
b. Revision of Contingency Procedures.
Rather sketchily covered, since Kohler only mentioned a revised proposed note to the Soviets and a revised proposed public announcement, for use when our access is blocked. No down-to-earth substance on "Modalities of access".
c. Answer to Soviet Aide-Mémoire.
Agreed it was too early to devote much time to this requirement within the Interdepartmental Group (I suppose they meant that State was or would be working on it first).
d. NATO Action.
(1) Military Build-up
Defense agreed to prepare a "quickie" paper in general terms setting forth what extra effort by individual NATO countries the U.S. considered appropriate at this time. Ambassador Finletter has asked for such a paper for his use, and it was agreed to furnish copies for use wherever U.S. officials get asked questions by officials of NATO countries on the build-up.
(2) Economic Countermeasures
The U.S. is in good shape to lay some on when the occasion requires it (according to Undersecretary of the Treasury Fowler)--i.e., the legal angles are under control. Agreed that Treasury would prepare a paper, which could be furnished to our NATO friends (and maybe to some outraged neutrals), outlining some ways to pick one's path through legal-fiscal jungles in matters of this sort.
e. Travel Restrictions in Berlin.
The following ideas were advanced and handled as indicated, the point being Berliners' morale:
(1) Stop shipment of military dependents to Europe.
Shot down as completely counterproductive in the matter of the Berliners' morale.
(2) Increase the strength of the Berlin garrisons.
Deployment of large numbers of VOPO's and other uniformed East Germans could furnish reasonable military foundation for this move. No decision, but the Group rather liked this.
(3) Increase Allied "patrols" in East Berlin.
These "patrols" are composed of two or three official cars with officers and enlisted men, which cruise around East Berlin. U.S. has been doing it for several years, but no one knew if U.K. and French had. The Group really liked this one, which they thought would help underline the legal freedom of passage within the whole city, but I am not sure it would significantly raise the Berliners' morale.
(4) Have a prominent, national-level figure visit Berlin right away.
The Vice-President was prominently mentioned. I felt an urge to nominate you, but was able to suppress it, since the matter had not been raised with you even remotely. The Group liked the idea, and liked the V.P. for the candidate.
L
113. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Germany/1/
Washington, August 15, 1961, 11:38 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1561. Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Drafted by Thurston (S/O) and cleared by Cash. Also sent to London, Paris, and Berlin.
356. Paris pass USRO. Following based on uncleared memorandum:/2/
/2/Not found. Presumably this is the meeting described in Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 376-377, although Rusk's Appointment Book does not record the meeting with Grewe referred to by Cates. (Johnson Library)
Quadripartite meeting this afternoon considered subject of counter-measures.
Ambassador Grewe said he had instructions press for suspension of issuance TTD. He argued that this would keep retaliation in the same general domain and would only hurt favorites of East German regime. French representative said that to take no counter-measures might create wrong impression but added we should not go too far since there was danger of escalation. For example, economic measures at this step might lead to Berlin blockade, thus not advisable. French government in principle favored cutting off issuance TTD completely then perhaps making exceptions later on. French were interested in idea of closing down ATO. We must avoid creating impression that we are closing last loop hole for East Germany. (Grewe pointed out TTD's needed only for persons going outside Germany.) French representative stated his government might consider dragging out current bilateral negotiations with Warsaw Pact countries. In general, they did not believe there should be major retaliatory measures on basis these East German measures. They liked British propaganda paper/3/ and would make use of it.
/3/Presumably the paper noted in numbered paragraph 5 of Document 107.
British representative spoke against adopting TTD approach as retaliatory measure. Situation not analogous to last September since there has been no interference with Western access and since TTD action cannot this time lead to successful result. Thus ban would be permanent. There is danger that it would lead to countermeasures of same nature as last fall, that East Berlin would be sealed off completely and that IZT would be denounced. After all, British representative argued, major objective is to arrive at arrangements to insure freedom of West Berlin. What can we do in political field to achieve this objective? British had thought of taking advantage delivery protest note to Moscow to include proposals for opening negotiations./4/ Time too short now for this, but perhaps idea should be pursued in connection with proposed reply to latest Soviet note on Berlin. Perhaps we should make a definite proposal for a plebiscite based on principle of self-determination.
/4/In addition to countermeasures the Ambassadorial Group also discussed and agreed on the text of a protest note to the Soviet Government, which would be delivered in Moscow on August 17. (Telegram 438 to Moscow, August 15; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1561) For text of this note as delivered, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 777-778.
Kohler referred to U.S. cabinet level consultations today/5/ and outlined U.S. thinking on inadequacy of TTD measure and need for more effective steps as already reported in separate cable covering meeting of Inter-Departmental Coordinating Group on Germany and Berlin (ICG) today./6/ He specifically mentioned possibility of increasing Allied military patrol activity in Soviet sector; possibility of increasing size of Allied military garrisons in West Berlin; and drastic speed up of planned NATO military build up and announcements connected therewith. He also suggested that Chancellor Adenauer might now wish to announce some German military plans before September 17 and take steps to call the Bundestag in session with a view to extending term of conscription in German army. Further, would it be possible for the French to announce the return from Algeria of a second division? He said that U.S., which was well along in carrying out military buildup, might make some supplementary announcements.
/5/See Document 111.
/6/See footnote 1, Document 112.
British representative said he would ask for instructions. Ambassador Grewe said that speaking personally this line of U.S. thinking appealed to him and that he would report it to Bonn. He indicated that action on TTD's could be viewed as minimum measure and that he thought that suspension of issuance TTD's would not be as ineffective as we think. He also alluded to recommendations of Berlin Senat as to local countermeasures. Kohler said that as reported to us these measures would probably give U.S. no great trouble, and U.K. representative said his government had already given green light to their representative in Berlin. French representative had no instructions.
Kohler concluded meeting with statement making clear that strengthening of Berlin garrison was not yet a U.S. government decision but only a proposal for consideration. It obviously served no military purpose as such. If we are to do this, however, parallel action by British and French obviously desirable and would therefore appreciate their views as well as those of Federal Republic.
Next quadripartite meeting scheduled take place morning August 16th./7/
/7/At this meeting the Ambassadorial Group discussed the timing of negotiations with the Soviet Union, the drafting of instructions for General Norstad, economic countermeasures, and the importance of information and propaganda activities. The Department of State summarized the discussion in telegram 452 to Moscow, August 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1661)
Rusk
114. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 16, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1661. Confidential; Priority; Limit Distribution. Received at 2:23 p.m. and passed to USIA at 3:45.
217. For USIA--From Murrow to Wilson./2/ Please convey on my behalf following observations to the Secretary and others who may be concerned: they are based on conversations with Mayor Brandt, with the most influential Berlin newspaper, news service, radio and television editors, and with a senior officer of the German Press Office in Bonn with whom I have had previous contact and whose judgment I value especially. These interviews, particularly those with editors, were under conditions which I am convinced represented most serious reactions which could not have been concerted to take advantage of my presence here.
/2/Repeated to Bonn. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1989, 724. Murrow, who was visiting USIA offices in Europe, had arrived in Berlin on August 12. Apparently on Monday, August 14, he sent a telegram similar to this one directly to the White House; see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 348-349, and Dulles, The Wall, p. 68. No copy of this telegram has been found.
In essence these people feel that we are facing a crisis of confidence which endangers quite seriously our position. This is based on the absence of any sharp and definite followup action since the Secretary's statement./3/ However this feeling of letdown is the greater because the President's speech/4/ had had such a large readership and television following and had evoked such widespread public acceptance as a promise of firmness. I have not been impressed by German complaints of the lack of display of US military presence since sector borders were closed. I realize also that the longstanding belief that US support is the main and only German protection makes them impatient of our desire to act in concert with NATO Allies. Taking into account these prejudices and discounting numerous emotional arguments which have been made to me I am nevertheless convinced that what is described as the surrender of East Berlin to Ulbricht with all that this immediately implies has been a shock so severe that it can gravely affect our future relations, first, with the city of Berlin and its leaders, and second with the Federal Republic once the extent of the disillusionment here is recognized in Bonn.
/3/See Document 104.
/4/See Document 81.
I am concerned less with substantive acts than with a psychological climate which I feel can and should be corrected. Since even the most uninformed here is well aware of the ring of Soviet military forces around the city I do not feel that we are being asked to do anything unreasonable. What I do recommend however is that we should take a number of steps which need not necessarily affect the substance of our position but which if sufficiently well publicized would evidence the interest and support which we have so often pledged. Simply as an example, such a relative simple step as the publicized rupture of current negotiations of new cultural agreements with Communist countries would make an impression as would a well publicized and sharply worded statement of what violations of existing commitments the Soviets have made by allowing Ulbricht to close the borders.
I am aware of the constant need of Berliners for reassurance and of the irritation this often causes. The point I want to make as strongly as possible is that I am convinced we run the risk of an abrupt and serious worsening of our relationship with the people of Berlin and then with the Federal Republic unless we take some immediate steps to reassure them since they are now in a very low state of mind. There is very little that USIA as an agency can do about this until we adopt the necessary public attitude.
Comment: I anticipate Berliners will label our Aug 15 letter/5/ of protest belated and tepid. No one here asking large violent action, merely some action, some proof this is not "another sample of `Hitler's take over of Rhineland'". I think the timetable for this crisis has been stepped up very considerably and there is real danger that Berliners will conclude they should take themselves, their bank accounts and movable assets to some other place. What is in danger or being destroyed here is that perishable commodity called hope./6/
/5/For text of this letter, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-777.
/6/On August 17 Ambassador Dowling endorsed Murrow's analysis of Berlin morale, stating that he also was "sharply disturbed by crisis of confidence in Berlin." Dowling continued that he favored "some further, dramatic step" which would reassure Berlin, and suggested that the President send a personal message to the people of Berlin. (Telegram 354 from Bonn; Department of State, Central Files, 662A.62B/8-1761)
Lightner
115. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 16, 1961, 8 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/8-1661. Secret; Niact. Received at 3:54 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Paris, London, Moscow, and POLAD USAREUR.
219. Paris for Emb, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Following is our estimate present situation.
As result increased refugee flow and related Communist prestige loss, SED regime with specific approval of Soviets and other Warsaw Pact countries has taken drastic control action to prevent entry their own people to West Berlin. Seal-off SovZone and East Berlin from West Berlin by military and police action has torn completely asunder residual web of one city fabric and of Four-Power status Berlin. Such closure boundary around West Berlin was doubtless contemplated by East as one consequence of separate peace treaty with GDR. Timing of action was apparently altered by internal GDR pressures. Increased refugee flow forced Sov/GDR hand and action of direct brute force has created a fait accompli. Well planned and abundantly accoutered with a massive display of military and police power, action was initially unqualifiedly successful and continues thus far successful so far as population East Germany or Berlin reaction is concerned, not to mention overall Western reaction.
It appears to us that there are two alternative interpretations of significance of events past 4 days:
1) Since Sovs/GDR have attained by direct action such important desiderata from their standpoint, it might be argued that it should be easier hence to negotiate with them an interim solution concerning West Berlin. Clear as it was before, it should now be crystal-clear that there is no possibility whatsoever of effective negotiations now with the Sovs concerning a broad all-German settlement which would of itself take care of the Berlin problem. Having thus already obtained such important results by last Sunday's actions, Sovs/GDR may be more "reasonable" in negotiations on other aspects of a possible Berlin arrangement.
2) On other hand, it may be argued that if Sovs/GDR are able to "get away" with this fait accompli, other similar actions may be undertaken by them prior to any negotiations and they may be even more demanding in such negotiations. Having taken such a big slice of salami and successfully digested it, with no hindrance, they may be expected to snatch further pieces greedily. Sovs/GDR want to absorb West Berlin, drive out Western Allies, and break down German national resistance. They made a big step toward these objectives last Sunday on East-West Berlin sector line. Their apparent success will encourage them to take further steps.
We believe second alternative is proper interpretation of significance of past few days' events here.
Threatening and arrogant utterances of Sov/GDR leaders since Vienna meeting, as well as their actions, would tend to support second alternative. From local standpoint, we are impressed by how even within a few days one direct action is being followed by another. While the initial action Sunday was directed almost exclusively to control of the movement of SovZone and East Berlin residents, already the East Germans have been introducing regulations and practical measures having the effect of drastically controlling and restricting the movement of West Berliners into East Berlin (ref Berlin's 200 Dept)./2/ We anticipate renewal of last fall's effort to control entry of Allied personnel into East Berlin. Two Mission cars had difficulties today. We also note arrogant tone of Sov Commandant's reply to Western Commandants' protest of Aug 3 concerning border-crossers (Berlin's 212 Dept, 185 Bonn)./3/
/2/Telegram 200, August 15, transmitted an announcement by the East German Ministry of Interior governing the movement of West Berliners into East Berlin. (Ibid., 862.181/8-1561)
/3/Telegram 212, August 16, transmitted the text of the Soviet Commandant's reply to the Western protest of August 3. (Ibid., 862.181/8-1661)
If our view as to proper interpretation is correct, it means we have now entered phase of actual practical confrontation with Sovs on Berlin, that we have moved out of phase of confrontation, by words and threats and into phase of deeds. If so, it is highly doubtful whether it can possibly suffice to reply to deeds with words of protestation.
What actions should West then take to meet this situation? Suspension of issuance of TTDs we have already recommended (Berlin's 207 Dept, 180 Bonn);/4/ economic countermeasures likewise we believe should be instituted at once (Berlin's 211 Dept, 184 Bonn);/5/ Western travel into SovZone should be discouraged so far as possible and Western participation in SovZone sports and cultural events should be prohibited, to match restrictions on East German participation in Western events which follows from TTD ban. There may be other countermeasures which should also be applied, but we here have not been privy to detailed discussions of possible countermeasures.
/4/Dated August 15. (Ibid., 762.00/8-1561)
/5/See footnote 4, Document 107.
However, what is important is purpose of these measures. Is their purpose to slap Sov/GDR on the wrist for what they have done? Or is it our purpose by strong counteractions to endeavor to indicate to them by deeds the grave consequences of continuation on their part of their current aggressive policy with respect to Berlin? Briefly, our countermeasures should seek to have a deterrent effect. To have a deterrent effect, countermeasures must not be calculated to fit the violation, but must to a certain extent overshoot the mark. We recognize risk that countermeasures which seek to be deterrent may in turn bring on other Sov/GDR countermeasures. We believe this risk has to be borne. Abrogation of IZT by FedRep last Sept in response to GDR Sept 8 decree was a countermeasure which overshot the mark and hence had a deterrent effect, albeit for only a year. The Sovs/GDR have now resumed the encroachment program they interrupted last fall; it may be that our countermeasures will lead them to take other measures sooner than expected. However, that did not happen last fall and if we take totally ineffectual measures they will be encouraged to take further steps faster.
Seal-off of West Berlin has already changed status quo in Communist favor in a way that strengthens their bargaining position in negotiations. It has already weakened effect we hoped to derive from Western military preparations announced by President on July 25. Assuming as we do that negotiations on Berlin will still take place, it is important that our bargaining position be not further weakened by our failure to take impressive countermeasures that will be clearly and widely recognized as such.
Lightner
116. Memorandum of Telephone Conversation Between Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, August 16, 1961, 5:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Rusk Files: Lot 72 D 192, Telephone Conversations. No classification marking. Transcribed by Phyllis D. Bernau.
TELEPHONE CALL FROM SEC McNAMARA
The Sec returned his call and he said he investigated the possible redeployment of forces in West Berlin through the JCS and Norstad. It would require Br permission to move them closer to the Brandenburg Gate. The Sec assumed it would be a joint venture. Norstad feels strongly this would be a mistake as moving them closer to the border might lead to more action by East Berlin than might otherwise be the case. M cannot evaluate this though.
117. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, August 16, 1961, midnight.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Confidential; Niact. Received at 9:10 p.m. on August 16 and passed to the White House at 10 p.m. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to London, Moscow, Paris, and POLAD USAREUR. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2866.
223. Paris for Embassy, USRO, Stoessel and McGuire. Mayor Brandt handed me today letter for transmittal to President Kennedy. Informal translation follows:/2/
/2/For a slightly different translation of the letter, see Dulles, The Wall, pp. 99-101. For part of the German text, see Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 29-30.
Begin text.
Dear Mr. President:
After developments last three days my city, wish convey to you in personal, informal letter some of my thoughts and viewpoints.
Measures of Ulbricht regime, supported by SovUnion and other East Bloc countries, have almost fully destroyed remnants Four-Power status. While in past Allied Commandants have even protested against parades by so-called Peoples' Army, this time, after military occupation of East Sector by Peoples' Army, they have limited themselves to delayed and not very vigorous step. Illegal sovereignty of East Berlin government was acknowledged by acquiescing in the restrictions of the number of crossing points and of entry into the East Sector. I regard this encroachment as the most serious in the postwar history of this city since the blockade.
This development has not changed will to resist of West Berlin population, but has tended to arouse doubts as to determination of three powers and their ability to react. In this connection the decisive factor is that the West has always specifically invoked the existing Four-Power status.
I am well aware that existing guarantees for freedom of population, presence of troops and free access apply only West Berlin. However, this is matter of a deep wound in life of German people and of being forced out of spheres of common responsibility (Berlin and Germany as a whole) affecting whole Western prestige. See political psychological dangers in two respects: (1) inactivity and mere defensive posture can bring about crisis of confidence in Western powers; (2) inactivity and mere defensive posture can lead to exaggerated self-confidence on part of East Berlin regime whose newspapers already today boast of success its demonstration of military power.
SovUnion has achieved half its free city proposals through use German Peoples' Army. The second act is a question of time. After second act Berlin would be like a ghetto, which has not only lost its function as refuge of freedom and symbol of hope for reunification but which would also be severed from free part Germany. Instead of flight to Berlin, we might then experience beginning of flight from Berlin.
In this situation I consider it proper that Western powers, while demanding re-establishment Four-Power responsibilities, proclaim at same time a three-power status for West Berlin. Three powers should reiterate guarantee their presence in West Berlin until German reunification and, if necessary, have this supported by plebiscite population West Berlin and FedRep. Must also be said clearly that German question is in no way settled for Western powers but that they must insist upon peace settlement corresponding to right of self-determination of German people and security interests of all concerned. Would also consider advisable that West on own initiative bring Berlin question before UN, at least on basis that USSR has violated Declaration Human Rights in most flagrant manner. Appears better to me put USSR in position of guilty party than to have to discuss same theme after motion by other states.
I expect from such steps no significant material change present situation and recollect not without bitterness declarations rejecting negotiations with USSR on basis one should not negotiate under pressure. We now have state of accomplished extortion, and already I hear it will not be possible turn down negotiations. In such situation, when possibility of initiative for action is already so small, it is all the more important at least to demonstrate political initiative.
After acquiescence in Sov step which is illegal, and has been termed illegal, and in view many tragedies occurring today East Berlin and SovZone, we will not be spared risks of ultimate decision. It would be welcomed if American garrison were to be demonstratively strengthened.
I consider situation serious enough, Mr. President, to write to you in all frankness as is possible only between friends who trust each other completely.
(Signed) Your Willy Brandt
[Here follows the remainder of the telegram.]
Lightner
118. Record of Meeting of the Berlin Steering Group/1/
Washington, August 17, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Steering Group. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
PRESENT
The President; the Secretary of State and Mr. Kohler; the Secretary of Defense, Mr. Gilpatric, and General Lemnitzer; the Attorney General; Mr. Dulles and Mr. Murphy; Mr. Wilson; General Taylor, Mr. Bundy, and Mr. Owen
1. The Secretary of State proposed two actions:
a. Reinforcement of the West Berlin garrison.
b. A statement of protest by the three Western heads of government.
2. The President decided that the US reinforcement should be one battle group (1500-1800 men)./2/ Mr. Kohler reported that the UK had indicated, when reinforcement was discussed in the Ambassadorial Group, that it would probably rest on the modest reinforcement it was already effecting. The French had no instructions. The President said that the allied total should be at least 2500.
/2/For Taylor's recollection of this decision, see his oral history interview at the Kennedy Library.
3. The President asked about our going to the UN. The Secretary said that there would not be sufficient Afro-Asian support to make a good showing. This might encourage Khrushchev. The UN should be held in reserve for a more important and suitable occasion.
4. The President said that this Bloc move should have been foreseen and that Berlin planning should look ahead to such possible contingencies in the future.
5. The President asked about the timing of the reinforcement and of the tripartite heads of government statement.
a. It was agreed that the reinforcement would take place Saturday morning unless a strongly adverse allied reaction developed in the meantime.
b. The tripartite statement would also be made Saturday.
6. Secretary McNamara suggested that (i) this Bloc action might portend a speed-up of Khrushchev's schedule; (ii) our own military preparations should be hastened accordingly. There was some disagreement with his diagnosis, but none with his prescription. DOD proposed to move the deadline by which we would be able to put forces in Europe from January 1 to November 15, and to modify preparatory actions accordingly. Secretary McNamara indicated that this speedup would result in some imbalance and additional cost. The air units and Army specialist units would be called up earlier than now planned. Demothballing of ships would also be hastened. The Guard divisions would not be called up.
7. Secretary McNamara said that the US would not replace the battle group that would be withdrawn from the 8th Division to go to Berlin. He was considering instead some large scale movements to Europe, e.g., moving the stocks for two divisions there. He did not want a decision on this now.
8. The President stressed the need to be ready to frustrate any Bloc action looking to rapid "civilian" seizure of key points in West Berlin. It was suggested that the Communists in East Berlin might become "dizzy with success" and act rashly.
9. The President then directed that the proposed heads of government statement be revised, which was done on the spot./3/ It was agreed that the proposed reinforcement would be announced separately.
/3/For text of the proposed statement as sent to Macmillan and de Gaulle later in the day, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 1867.
10. It was agreed that the Vice President and General Clay would leave Friday evening for Bonn and Berlin, where they would deliver the President's answer to Mayor Brandt's letter./4/ Neither this answer nor Mayor Brandt's letter would be made public. It was agreed that the troop reinforcement might be credited to Mayor Brandt's request, however.
/4/For an account of the origin of the idea to send General Clay to Berlin, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 350-352 and 402-403.
11. No single announcement of the accelerated US buildup would be made. The steps would be announced seriatim, as they were taken. Our allies would make similar statements of any accelerated build-up on their part. The US speed-up would not be credited to the access closing.
12. The President asked about the NATO military build-up. Secretary McNamara said that DOD would submit a memo Friday on this subject.
13. The Attorney General asked if more could not be done to stimulate worldwide protest over the East German action./5/ A group will examine this question and report next week. It will include Mr. Dulles, General Taylor, the Attorney General, Mr. Wilson, and Secretary Goldberg.
/5/The propaganda aspects of the Berlin crisis had been the subject of a memorandum from Attorney General Kennedy to the President on August 17. For text, see Declassified Documents, 1979, 44A.
14. Mr. Dulles reported a call by General Eisenhower about Berlin. A State-DOD briefing team will be sent, with Mr. Dulles, to Gettysburg Sunday, and Mr. Dulles will notify the General./6/
/6/For a report on this briefing, see ibid., 1981, 407A.
15. The President stressed the need for balance, in any press backgrounders, regarding recent events in Berlin. We should make clear that we remained firm in defense of our rights in West Berlin, which had not been affected or threatened by those events./7/
/7/In 1989 Murphy recorded the following recollection of this meeting:
"Later that Thursday, DCI Dulles asked me to accompany him to a White House meeting that had been called to address the West Berlin problem. In addition to President Kennedy, those present included the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security Adviser, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other senior officials concerned with matters relating to national security, including Foy Kohler, then Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs and Director of the Berlin Task Force--on which I was to serve for the remainder of 1961 as a CIA representative.
"Mr. Dulles introduced me to the President as an officer who had served several years in Berlin and might therefore provide helpful insights into the psychology of the West Berlin population. In response, the President, as if to caution me not to reopen the issue of the wall itself, observed that `our writ does not run in East Berlin' and asked me to speak to the question of West Berlin morale. The problem, I explained, was one of West Berliners' perceptions. Although they realized that since 1948 there was little the Allies could do to counter Soviet and East German actions in East Berlin, in essence Berlin remained for them one city. East Berliners could shop and attend the theater in West Berlin while relatives and friends in both sectors exchanged regular visits. Whereas over the years there had been frequent crackdowns at border-crossing points, the actual closure of 13 August came as a deep emotional shock. This shock, plus the perception of Western inaction, caused many to fear that the Allies intended gradually to withdraw their protection from West Berlin. Thus, it seemed essential that steps be taken to restore confidence and rekindle the spirit of the West Berliners.
"Others agreed, and the President moved rapidly to order the movement overland from West Germany of reinforcements for the US garrison and a visit by the Vice President. Obviously, the measures had been under consideration by the principals beforehand, but this meeting seemed to crystallize everyone's resolve and led to specific decisions." (Central Intelligence Agency, Studies in Intelligence, vol. 33, No. 4, Winter 1989, pp. 79-80)
119. Message From the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (Norstad) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
Paris, August 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak. Top Secret; Eyes Only. Repeated to USAREUR.
Exclusive for Gen Lemnitzer from Gen Norstad. Info exclusive for Gen Clarke from Gen Norstad, eyes only. From all reports, the West Berliners continue to be strong and of good morale, considering the circumstances, but they have clearly indicated strong dissatisfaction and disappointment with the developments of the situation since the events of last weekend. Messages from Lightner in Berlin and press reports of British Ambassador Steel's reaction to his Berlin trip yesterday would suggest that the situation is quieting down. Bruce Clarke has told me over the phone that from his air and ground inspection completed yesterday morning, he felt that the situation was relatively quiet. I was surprised, therefore, to receive your message this morning/2/ with the news of the action that it is proposed to take over the coming weekend. However, Clarke has just confirmed to me that we are prepared to move the battle group on receipt of orders.
/2/Lemnitzer's cable, August 18, summarized the discussion at the August 17 Steering Group meeting (see Document 118), noted McNamara's and his military objections to sending a battle group to Berlin, and concluded that the "decision was made for political, psychological and morale purposes and not for military reasons." (Eisenhower Library, Norstad Papers, Policy File, Berlin-Live Oak)
Although my views have not been solicited, I think the seriousness of the situation demands that I advise you of my thoughts. I agree, of course, that there is no military justification for the movement of a battle group to Berlin at this time. 12 to 13 thousand men could do very little in the military sense that could not be done almost equally well by the 10 to 11 thousand that make up the combined Allied garrison in Berlin at this time. Further, the movement of the battle group from its normal station could be considered a weakening diversion, although this is not a really serious point. From the political and the psychological standpoints, I assume higher authority has given consideration to the reaction of the West Berliners to a combat reinforcement of this relative magnitude, that is, substantially a 50% increase in U.S. fighting strength. Since Lightner has indicated in message Berlin to State 141, Aug 17,/3/ that they appear not to be concerned with their own physical well-being, there is the danger of their expecting armed action to restore the status quo ante. I gather from your message that the force will be given no mission but to remain in Berlin, and this means, of course, remaining in Berlin indefinitely.
/3/Telegram 141 to Paris (226 to the Department of State), August 17, in a general assessment of measures that might be taken in Berlin, proposed strengthening the Berlin garrison for the political effect it would have on the local population. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-1761)
I fully recognize the desirability, if not the necessity, of acknowledging the concern of Brandt and the West Berliners, but I would hope that this could be done by filling established and legitimate military needs which could be sustained on a long-term basis. For instance, we long ago established a requirement for an Engineer company and 9 additional APC's for the Berlin garrison. With all its associated and transport vehicles, a total of about 40, this would make an impressive convoy entering Berlin. In addition to that, some of the permanent Berlin garrison is in Wildflecken undergoing routine training. The overland movement of these elements, involving 600 troops, back to Berlin would require an additional convoy of at least 30 two-and-a-half-ton trucks. The movement of these two convoys into Berlin would certainly be a token of the seriousness of our intentions, would have a valid military basis, and would not run the risk of being unnecessarily provocative at a critical time.
In the light of the atmosphere at the time this subject was considered, I can readily appreciate the desire to dramatize our action by sending the Vice President to Berlin. However, recognizing that this is entirely a matter of personal judgment, I feel that with the relatively quieter atmosphere of this morning, the Vice President's trip might be wasted. The delivery of the President's reply to the Brandt letter by the hands of the hero of a Berlin crisis of an earlier day, General Lucius Clay, would appear to me to be a brilliant stroke; but to add to this the great stature of the Vice President would be overdoing it, and would run the risk of exciting great expectations in West Berlin and possibly also among the unhappy East Germans. This is a big gun which we may need and need badly in the weeks and months to come.
I recognize that a firm decision may have been made, and I am prepared to see that that part of it which falls within my bailiwick is carried out promptly and effectively. If circumstances permit, however, I hope that you will discuss this further with Secretary McNamara.
120. Letter From President Kennedy to Governing Mayor Brandt/1/
Washington, August 18, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Brandt Correspondence. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2867.
Dear Mayor Brandt: I have read with great care your personal informal letter of August 16th/2/ and I want to thank you for it. In these testing days it is important for us to be in close touch. For this reason I am sending my answer by the hand of Vice President Johnson. He comes with General Clay, who is well known to Berliners; and they have my authority to discuss our problems in full frankness with you.
/2/See Document 117.
The measures taken by the Soviet Government and its puppets in East Berlin have caused revulsion here in America. This demonstration of what the Soviet Government means by freedom for a city, and peace for a people, proves the hollowness of Soviet pretensions; and Americans understand that this action necessarily constitutes a special blow to the people of West Berlin, connected as they remain in a myriad of ways to their fellow Berliners in the eastern sector. So I understand entirely the deep concerns and sense of trouble which prompted your letter.
Grave as this matter is, however, there are, as you say, no steps available to us which can force a significant material change in this present situation. Since it represents a resounding confession of failure and of political weakness, this brutal border closing evidently represents a basic Soviet decision which only war could reverse. Neither you nor we, nor any of our Allies, have ever supposed that we should go to war on this point.
Yet the Soviet action is too serious for inadequate responses. My own objection to most of the measures which have been proposed--even to most of the suggestions in your own letter--is that they are mere trifles compared to what has been done. Some of them, moreover, seem unlikely to be fruitful even in their own terms. This is our present judgment, for example, on the question of an immediate appeal to the United Nations, although we shall continue to keep this possibility under lively review.
On careful consideration I myself have decided that the best immediate response is a significant reinforcement of the Western garrisons. The importance of this reinforcement is symbolic--but not symbolic only. We know that the Soviet Union continues to emphasize its demand for the removal of Allied protection from West Berlin. We believe that even a modest reinforcement will underline our rejection of this concept.
At the same time, and of even greater basic importance, we shall continue and accelerate the broad buildup of the military strength of the West upon which we are decided, and which we view as the necessary answer to the long-range Soviet threat to Berlin and to us all.
Within Berlin, in the immediate affairs of the city, there may be other specific appropriate steps to take. These we shall review as rapidly and sympathetically as possible, and I hope you will be sure to express your own views on such measures clearly to Vice President Johnson and his party. Actions which effectively demonstrate our continued commitment to freedom in Berlin will have our support.
I have considered with special care your proposal of a three-power status for West Berlin. My judgment is that a formal proclamation of such a status would imply a weakening of the four-power relationship on which our opposition to the border-closing depends. Whatever may be the immediate prospects, I do not believe that we should now take so double-edged a step. I do agree that the guarantees which we have pledged to West Berlin should be continuously affirmed and reaffirmed, and this we are doing. Moreover, I support your proposal of an appropriate plebiscite demonstrating the continuing conviction of West Berlin that its destiny is freedom in connection with the West.
More broadly, let me urge it upon you that we must not be shaken by Soviet actions which in themselves are a confession of weakness. West Berlin today is more important than ever, and its mission to stand for freedom has never been so important as now. The link of West Berlin to the Free World is not a matter of rhetoric. Important as the ties to the East have been, painful as is their violation, the life of the city, as I understand it, runs primarily to the West--its economic life, its moral basis, and its military security. You may wish to consider and to suggest concrete ways in which these ties might be expanded in a fashion that would make the citizens of West Berlin more actively conscious of their role, not merely as an outpost of freedom, but as a vital part of the Free World and all its enterprises. In this double mission we are partners, and it is my own confidence that we can continue to rely upon each other as firmly in the future as we have in the past.
With warm personal regards,
Sincerely,/3/
/3/Printed from an unsigned copy.
121. Report by Vice President Johnson/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Vice Presidential Security Files, VP Travel, Berlin. Secret. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1983, 2868. For two other reports on the trip, see ibid., 1978, 209A and 301B. The Vice President also reported on his trip in a meeting with the President, Taylor, Rusk, Clay, Bohlen, and Bundy on August 21. A memorandum for the record of this meeting is in the Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. For three other accounts of the visit to Berlin, see Cates, The Ides of August, pp. 404-413 and 423-436; Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 483-486; and Begegnungen und Einsichten, pp. 30-33.
REPORT BY VICE PRESIDENT LYNDON B. JOHNSON ON HIS VISIT TO GERMANY, AUGUST 19-20, 1961
In submitting my recommendations, I wish to place special emphasis on my confidential discussions with Chancellor Adenauer and Mayor Brandt,/2/ for they point to the fundamental facts which must be considered in making future decisions.
/2/For a memorandum of Johnson's conversation with Adenauer on August 19, see Declassified Documents, 1983, 2514; for memoranda of his conversations with Brandt on August 20, see ibid., 1976, 258B, and 1983, 2515.
Chancellor Adenauer told me that he believes the best economic minds should undertake a thorough review of the possibilities of economic sanctions as a matter of extreme urgency. He himself has felt that we should apply sanctions and more recently has become a strong convert to this idea, but he recognizes that a proposal of this kind must be carefully considered in all its ramifications. I listened without making any commitments beyond the promise that I would place his views candidly and fully before the President.
We then discussed the issues raised by Mayor Brandt's letter/3/ to which the President had replied in a letter I was taking to West Berlin./4/ I explained that we took the position that we had already made great sacrifices but we were prepared to make more sacrifices in cooperation with our allies. I added that the United States had acted decisively in the present situation as can be seen from the President's policy of sending the Vice President and General Clay to Bonn and Berlin, and directing that additional reinforcements, with their equipment, should be sent to West Berlin. Our arrival, and the arrival of the men and machines, would be almost simultaneous.
/3/See Document 117.
/4/Document 120.
I emphasized the importance to us all of receiving greater support and assistance from the British, the French and the Germans. I said I realized that in days past the Germans had operated under a good many restrictions--economic, fiscal, legal and military--but it was necessary now to consider this whole problem in a new context.
I said there was great wisdom for us in our present predicament in remembering the proverb which tells us that where there is a will, there always is a way. We must have the will and we must find the way.
Chancellor Adenauer listened to my statement of this case with the utmost attention. He then told me that he was prepared to extend the period for military conscription in West Germany but the announcement of this new policy would come after the election. He also said he would agree to increase the number of Germans in military service, provided some of the restrictions mentioned by me could be removed. He explained that Defense Minister Strauss had discussed some of these questions in detail with Mr. McNamara.
I replied that the American people would support our commitments with all our national power and all our national resources if only they did not feel that they were being asked to bear an unfair and totally disproportionate burden. They would resent being placed in a position in which there would in effect be a unilateral American commitment when there should be a common determination to carry a shared burden.
Chancellor Adenauer understood this point very clearly. I then explained to Chancellor Adenauer that some of President Kennedy's major problems now arose over the struggle for funds for the mutual security program. An important part of these funds were directly related to Berlin and to the German situation. I added that some of the strongest criticism of the President's program came from the rather sizable group in this country that were opposed to the American people doing so much more than other nations.
I said that anything more which could be done by Germany, France and Britain should be done; and it should be done quickly. I suggested that one immediate measure which would be helpful would be to increase the number of West German police and to give them additional training.
Chancellor Adenauer said he recognized that Germany could not expect America to carry a bigger burden without herself being ready for greater sacrifices.
On Saturday, August 19, I addressed the House of Representatives of West Berlin. Immediately following that address I had my most significant private discussion with Mayor Brandt.
He was somewhat apologetic about his letter to the President and regretted that its contents had been given unauthorized publication in the Federal Republic, a disclosure for which he said he was not responsible. I said it did not add luster to our cause to have our own allies writing critical letters to the President of the United States and putting him to the public question. I then remarked that I had not come to Berlin to debate the past but to reason together with him in quiet co-operation.
Mayor Brandt responded quickly to this approach and I got the clear impression that he was a chastened person, subject to one important exception; he seemed convinced that his letter, with all its faults, had at least moved American policy off dead center.
I told Mayor Brandt that all the points in his letter had been most carefully and sympathetically considered in Washington, even when it had proved impossible to agree with them, and the American policy was set forth clearly and candidly in the President's reply. He appreciated this candor.
I took this occasion to emphasize that the United States could not accept his proposal to abandon the four power treaty and replace it with a three power arrangement. He agreed that the consequences of any such action might go beyond what he had anticipated.
We then turned to the question of bringing the Berlin issue before the United Nations. I explained that it was our judgment that it was very unlikely that this approach would yield any helpful result, particularly when the General Assembly was entangled in the complications of the Bizerte affair.
I acknowledged that everyone in Washington fully appreciated the deep emotions aroused in West Berlin by the division of the city by concrete wall and barbed wire and armed soldiers. We have been aware of this threat for some time, and had responded to it not with words but with actions.
Three times in the last few months the President had taken significant and far-reaching decisions. He had added two billion dollars to the defense budget earlier this year as the Communist challenge became more clearly defined. Then, in a national appeal to the American people and in a special message to Congress, the President added another five billion to the defense program, called up many thousands of young Americans to active duty, lengthened the period of military service, and authorized other painful and costly programs for the protection of the free world and the national interest.
Many of these expenditures and decisions by the President and the Congress were directly related to the situation in Berlin. Now, in a third measure, the President has sent the Vice-President and General Clay to Berlin, and had strengthened their presence in the divided city by the dispatch of additional American troops and military equipment.
After listening to this review of America's actions, which plainly impressed him, Mayor Brandt conceded the force of my argument that it was essential for the people of West Berlin to do far more for their own defense. It was impossible for the United States to carry the load by itself, or to ask Britain and France to do more, if the people of West Berlin failed to make a prompt and adequate contribution to their survival in freedom.
West Berlin has a large and vibrant population; it has important economic resources; and it has the respect of the free world as it faces the Communist challenge. I urged Mayor Brandt to use the strength of West Berlin more comprehensively lest that respect be compromised as others began to do more for the divided city than the citizens were willing to do for themselves. I said it would be very helpful if we could have more British and French soldiers marching in front of the American tanks--but it would be much easier to obtain these allied contributions if West Berlin stood in the front line of its own defense.
He agreed with the broad principles of this analysis, and with the necessity of working out arrangements that would lead to a greater Berlin contribution as a course of action infinitely more preferable than public debates about past mistakes. Mayor Brandt in short was co-operative as well as chastened.
The morale of West Berlin, badly shaken and nervous, has now been restored. As important as the presence of our mission in the restoration of German respect for and confidence in American policy was the arrival of the American troops.
The single most important element in this process of restoring good relations was, beyond question, the sight of the American tanks. The impact would have been immeasurably more significant if the tanks had been new and shining models of our latest and best equipment, fully symbolic of America's power in this jet age.
I returned from Germany with new pride in America's leadership but with an unprecedented awareness of the responsibility which rests upon this country. The world expects so much from us, and we must measure up to the need, even while we seek more help from our allies. For if we fail or falter or default, all is lost, and freedom may never have a second chance.
Since Berlin is basically one battle--even though an important battle--in the world wide struggle between Communism and freedom, there is no single solution to the situation which confronts us. However, there are certain steps which I would recommend as a result of any conversations with leaders of the Federal Republic of Germany and with our officials who are on the scene:
1. It would seem imperative that we urge the other nations of the Western alliance--and specifically England, France and Germany itself--to make a greater contribution to the defense of West Berlin. This is of great importance not only because of the need for strength in that area but because of its effect on promoting a higher degree of unity in the Western alliance.
2. Plans should be made now for increasing the strength of the military forces in Berlin at intervals calculated to bolster morale which must inevitably in the months that lie ahead sag at times. In this connection, it would be extremely helpful for some of our newest and most modern tanks and other forms of "heavy" equipment such as howitzers to be brought into Berlin. The enthusiasm of the Berliners while reviewing the entry of our combat group into the city on Sunday although high at all times was noticeably higher when a few tank carriers went by.
3. As a further step in maintaining morale of Berliners it would be well for the countries of the Western alliance to plan now to send other high officials into Berlin for visits at appropriate times. The people of Berlin obviously feel that this is one evidence of the good faith of their allies.
4. Chancellor Adenauer's unusual interest in a study of the imposition of economic sanctions should lead to a "new look" on our part at this tactic.
5. Every encouragement should be given to increase the West German police and adding to their training.
6. Careful consideration should be given to the fact of lifting some of the remaining restrictions on German military forces--possibly in progressive steps timed to serve as counter measures for Communist moves.
6. It would be well for the United States to quietly discourage any participation in the Leipzig fair and to impose greater restrictions upon passes used to travel from the East into the Western zone. These steps while not important in themselves should be undertaken simply because failure to do so might give the impression that the United States is not serious in its commitments to Berlin./5/
/5/On August 21 Bohlen sent Secretary Rusk his report on the trip stressing that the effect on Berlin morale "was extraordinary and excellent." (Memorandum to the Secretary; Department of State, Central Files, 033.1100-JO/8-2161; printed in part in Bohlen, Witness to History, pp. 485-486)
122. Memorandum From President Kennedy to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, August 21, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2161. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information. Also published in Declassified Documents, 1979, 467A.
SUBJECT
Berlin Political Planning
I want to take a stronger lead on Berlin negotiations. Both the calendar of negotiation and the substance of the Western position remain unsettled, and I no longer believe that satisfactory progress can be made by Four-Power discussion alone. I think we should promptly work toward a strong U.S. position in both areas and should make it clear that we cannot accept a veto from any other power. We should of course be as persuasive and diplomatic as possible, but it is time to act. My initial views on both subjects are set out below.
1. The Calendar
I like your plan to issue, before September first, an invitation to negotiations. I think this means that we should this week make it plain to our three Allies that this is what we mean to do and that they must come along or stay behind. I shall be glad to write to General de Gaulle myself if desirable.
I also like your idea that the four Foreign Ministers, at New York for the United Nations, should be empowered to work out a place and time for negotiations. If there is a better way, I'd be glad to accept it. In general, I like the idea of an announcement before September first, discussion of ways and means before October first, and formal negotiation about November first.
Within the category of "discussion of ways and means," I place the possibility of preliminary private talks between appropriate US-USSR diplomats. I like Chip Bohlen for this, on our side. Obviously such talks would have to be based on a clear and solid sense of our policy, and so I do not think they can begin for about a month--say around September 25th.
I do not think well of the plans for a three-Ambassador call upon Khrushchev to try to smoke him out. Until we have something to suggest ourselves, we shall not get any more out of him than we have been getting since Vienna.
2. The Substance of Our Policy
The Acheson paper/2/ is a good start, but it is not a finishing point. What you and I need is a small group of hard workers who can produce alternatives for our comment and criticism on an urgent basis. This, in my judgment, should be a labor separated from the day-to-day operational work and planning under Kohler. I think of such people as Bohlen, Owen and Hillenbrand from State and Bundy and Sorensen over here. Maybe there should be fewer; probably there should not be more. This group should be as nearly invisible as possible, and it should report directly to you and me. Most of the elements of a firm policy are standing around now--and I believe a group with orders from the two of us could prepare a clear paper for my decision in one long session on August 31st. We shall need a paper by that time if we are to talk with our allies and get something like an agreed position from them by the end of September. I would suggest that such a group bring in preliminary proposals on Friday of this week--August twenty-fifth.
/2/Document 89.
In general, what I think we should say to such a small group as guidelines is this:
1. Make the framework of our proposals as fresh as possible--they should not look like warmed-over stuff from 1959.
2. Protect our support for the idea of self-determination, the idea of all-Germany, and the fact of viable, protected freedom in West Berlin.
3. Do not insist on maintenance of occupation rights if other strong guarantees can be designed. Occupation rights are a less attractive base, before the world, than the freedom and the protection of West Berliners.
4. Consider well the option of proposing parallel peace treaties. If we table our own drafts, we might do a lot with this; and Khrushchev would have to look at what we say, because he has invited just this course.
5. Examine all of Khrushchev's statements for pegs on which to hang our position. He has thrown out quite a few assurances and hints here and there, and I believe they should be exploited.
6. Do not put too much distance between our initial proposals and our fall-back position. Indeed it may be well not to have any fall-back position. Our first presentation should be, in itself, as persuasive and reasonable as possible.
Can I have your prompt reaction to this?
John Kennedy
123. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France/1/
Washington, August 21, 1961, 9:17 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2161. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Kohler and Holloway. Repeated to London, Bonn, Berlin, and Moscow.
1004. Paris for USRO Stoessel McGuire. Following discussion Quadripartite Ambassadors' meeting August 21, Kohler chairman.
1) Kohler announced U.S. prepared back German NATO proposal boycott Leipzig Fair. U.S. participation small but attempt being made discourage prospective exhibitors.
2) Kohler hoped UK/French would instruct their commandants associate themselves with U.S. in discussing with Senat possible EastZone sequestration S-bahn rolling stock. Announced U.S. commandant instructed in addition agree de facto measures keep rolling stock West Berlin by means short legal expropriation.
3) Kohler and Ambassadors agreed troop reinforcement and Johnson visit very successful in restoring morale. Grewe thought GDR silence on reinforcement via autobahn "very significant attitude".
4) Kohler announced U.S. acceptance UK proposal for TTD ban by categories. French agreed in principle but wanted discussions Bonn on adding categories, particularly trade people. UK proposed that its plan be adopted with proviso other categories could be added. Kohler agreed with understanding that this action not be portrayed as counter-measure but as means reducing tension by stopping GDR propagandists, etc.
5) Meeting agreed that Soviet note August 19/2/ on sector boundary closure protest required no answer and ended that particular exchange. Kohler noted that tripartite declaration discussed August 18 meeting now had no relevance and would be dropped in view divergent ideas./3/
/2/For texts of the Western protest notes of August 15 and 17 and the Soviet replies of August 18, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 776-780, or Department of State Bulletin, September 4, 1961, pp. 395-400.
/3/A report on the August 18 meeting was transmitted in telegram 845 to London, August 19 (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-1961); regarding the tripartite declaration, see footnote 3, Document 118.
6) Kohler reported Soviet concurrence to initialing recently concluded U.S.-Soviet civil air agreement with postponement signing until later.
7) Discussion on negotiating problems evolved along lines August 18 meeting. French unwilling accept U.S. suggestion of possible discussion by Foreign Ministers at UNGA September 19. French demurred at Secretary's suggestion in TV appearance Sunday Aug 20 of public posture that negotiations will take place as anticipating decisions of Allies and inciting neutrals to call upon West for further concessions. French also argued necessary develop firm negotiating position before moving toward negotiations. Kohler replied this not feasible before German elections and unacceptable to U.S. to wait until after that date to act. Kohler again outlined U.S. position stressing necessity of early initiative for negotiations as concomitant to our military build-up.
UK indicated could accept proposal discussion Foreign Ministers at UNGA if preceded by Ambassadorial probes. Latter, Caccia said, could be omitted from text of note and put forward orally at time delivery Western replies. UK also suggested that negotiations be proposed in broader terms than Germany to include other East-West problems. U.S. agreed to discuss language on this with UK tomorrow. U.S. then asked French to report fully to Paris urging French reconsideration Western negotiating position, referring in this connection to Rusk-de Gaulle talks in Paris./4/
/4/See Document 100.
Next meeting tentatively morning August 23.
Rusk
124. Record of Meeting of Secretary of State Rusk, Secretary of Defense McNamara, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff/1/
Washington, August 21, 1961, 2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Lemnitzer Papers, Box 29, L-216-71. Top Secret. The source text is Lemnitzer's handwritten notes.
Sec State
1. Does not expect USSR to change schedule.
2. Ger considering moving elections from 17 to 10 Sept.
3. Expects USSR action prior to Party Congress--prob about 1 Oct.
4. K proposals for (a) peace treaty with Germany (b) free city of Berlin, etc.
Not acceptable to US
US Counter proposal--unified Berlin--Germany on basis of self determination
K will probably not accept. He says E Berlin is capital of E Germany.
5. Prob several days of discussion.
6. We must look at what vital issues are: Rights in Berlin--access also. Rights of Berliners. These are the vital issues (legal also). Sec State considers it crucial this time. Not like previously--this is it. Sino-Soviet Bloc has improved its position. Is ready to make major efforts in LA, ME & Asia & Africa. Is ready to challenge US & NATO, SEATO & CENTO.
8. Oslo meeting--disappointing NATO response re African & other probs.
9. If we get kicked out of Berlin--enormous emphasis [prestige?] to Commie bloc--our allies will seek adjustment with USSR.
10. Berlin could result in: a. Status quo--Sec State believes it unlikely to improve status quo. Soviets have [are?] not in habit of giving.
11. Can USSR improve their status quo--we cannot stop peace treaty. If West Germans could improve their rel with E Germany--more likely E & W could work out a reunification.
12. Hope other countries will not recognize E Ger--in case of a peace treaty.
13. What happens after treaty remains to be seen--K could reserve tripartite rights in Berlin. K could agree to permit E & W Germany to live side-by-side.
14. We would not be prepared to renegotiate our rights with E Germans. A clear title on our rights cannot be transferred by K to E Germans.
15. The may become crisis--E Ger could bar our access to Berlin.
16. Sec State rec. ascending intensity of actions. If battle group was stopped, we could have started airlift. We would propose UN action, economic actions, blockade, etc. while we built up mil. preparations.
17. We would need time to justify mil moves. Most difficult to decide is whether initiation of conventional action can be maintained for any period.
18. We must let K know we are ready to move into nuc. war.
19. Mil actions best--pressures in Germany itself. Sec State recognizes it could move rapidly into nuclear war.
20. We cannot accept loss of Berlin or surrender.
21. Br & Fr agree to our def of vital interests. UK may be willing to renegotiate rights. De Gaulle--we are there--rights are non-neg. Germans--might be willing to add.
22. West has not encouraged refugees. West does not want to de-Germanize E Germany. Our interests would be with refugees not leaving E Ger.
23. Not much help from neutrals (Nehru) at least until shooting starts. They know USSR committed to world rev & they may be next. Their ability to be neutral depends on E-W struggle.
My Questions
24. UK--merely building to where they should be now. Fr--if necessary they might consider evac of Algeria. West Europe more for political rather than mil action. Germans want to wait until after election. UK ready to re-call Parliament in order to call up more forces--more ready reserves on continent.
25. 1st neg. with Russians could take place in early Oct.
26. Discussed UN going to Berlin.
27. Govts of West Europe will not be ready to go from small mobile probe to nuc war. Only as last resort.
28. Govts have got to be able to assure that everything has been done--only resort is nuc. war. Nitze's point--re Germans.
29. Sec State wants to give more thought to channeling instructions to commdrs.
125. Memorandum by the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, August 24, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 35, Berlin-NATO-Military Buildup. Secret. Attached to Document 253. According to a handwritten notation, copies of the memorandum were taken to a 9:45 a.m. meeting with Bundy and the President on August 24. Taylor's recommendations were subsequently transmitted to Bonn and Berlin for comment. (Telegram 415 to Bonn, August 24; Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2461)
COMMENTS UPON GDR RESTRICTIONS ON ALLIED CIRCULATION BETWEEN THE WEST AND EAST SECTORS OF BERLIN
1. It appears to me that the new measures of restraint imposed by the GDR on Allied circulation between the sectors in Berlin are more serious than seem to be generally regarded. For the first time the East Germans have aimed restrictions specifically and publicly at the occupying powers. This new measure has nothing to do with the restraint of refugees, the primary excuse for the sealing off of the East Sector. Its target is the Western Allies who are to be humiliated publicly before all of Germany. It is a measure aimed at further depressing the morale of West Berlin, at destroying the confidence of West Berlin in the Western Powers, and at offsetting the effects of the Johnson-Clay visit.
2. If we allow this provocation to pass unchallenged, it is difficult to see how we can resist restrictions by the GDR on Allied movements on the autobahn, the railway and perhaps in the air.
3. A minimum action to take is for the Western Powers to announce that they will disregard these restrictions and cross into the East Sector wherever and whenever they see fit. What they would do subsequently in living up to this bold language would depend upon circumstances.
4. A second course which recommends itself to me (if supported by our representatives in Berlin) would be for the Western Commandants (or at least the U.S. Commandant) to call up the Soviet Commandant, in Karlshorst, informing him that they are calling on him in a body, crossing at X (a place other than Friedrichstrasse). They would further inform him that they will hold the USSR responsible for any incidents in transiting this Sector border. After waiting a reasonable time to permit the word to get about, they would then proceed to X prepared to cross by force if resisted.
5. While such a course of action is fraught with some hazard and the outcome cannot be clearly predicted, I have the feeling that it would break the rhythm of mounting Communist provocation and prevent later and more hazardous incidents.
M.D.T./2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears these typed initials.
126. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, August 24, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2461. Secret. Drafted by Brown and approved in S on September 8.
SUBJECT
Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
The Secretary
Foy D. Kohler, Assistant Secretary
Dean Brown, WE
Herve Alphand, French Ambassador
Jean Claude Winckler, Counselor
The Ambassador said the Berlin situation is developing seriously. Yesterday's measures/2/ had been the first direct threat to allied access rights. The dangerous period may have come faster than we thought. First, we must be ready to apply counter-measures immediately. This means some review and some government decisions. We all seemed agreed on this. Second, we should make a diplomatic démarche to the Kremlin, either the three Ambassadors together or one speaking for them. The French Government has a draft of what form this approach should take. (The Ambassador then read from the attached paper. /3/ In summary, it states that Soviet actions create an intolerable situation. Does Khrushchev want a showdown? If not, then he must abandon unilateral actions and create a relaxed atmosphere in which discussions can take place.)
/2/On August 23 the number of sector crossings in Berlin for residents had been reduced to seven and, for the Western Allies, to the one at Friedrichstrasse. On the same day the Soviet Union protested to the Western Allies the use of the air corridors to the city for transporting extremists from the Federal Republic. For text of the note, see Documents on Germany, 1944-1985, pp. 783-784.
/3/Not found.
The Ambassador then commented that unless we take this approach the Soviets will continue their actions believing we are weak when we are not.
The Secretary replied that Khrushchev might simply say that he has made proposals and where are the West's?
The Ambassador said we should then say that we are ready to talk when the tension disappears.
The Secretary asked if the French based this attitude on the Soviet airlift note. When the Ambassador replied affirmatively, the Secretary said the French had expressed their reluctance at the Paris Ministerial meeting even before the Soviets had acted in Berlin.
The Ambassador replied that the West was under threat at that time. To offer negotiations, he continued, without knowing the aims and results of those negotiations could lead to miscalculation by the Soviets. The Secretary said he agreed. We want to protect our vital interests without war. We must get into contact with the other side. The French propose setting up pre-conditions for contact. This might assure mis-calculation before contact.
The Ambassador said that the suggested language is the only one the Soviets understand. The US may believe that public opinion must be considered; the Soviets, however, will interpret a willingness to negotiate as a sign of weakness and will step up their threats.
The Secretary said we are talking about the possibility of negotiations. By the time the UNGA comes, we should be ready. If we don't express a willingness to negotiate, there will be increasing pressure within the alliance and in much of the world believing that diplomacy has made no effort to find out if there is a way to avoid a disastrous chain of effects.
The Ambassador replied that it is public knowledge that we want to negotiate. The other side will feel we are ready to yield. They'll say they are ready to negotiate on a peace treaty and turning over Berlin to the GDR.
The Secretary said we do not have to agree to this. There could be discussions over a period of time as to what negotiations would be about.
The Ambassador said we have different views. Over the years we have agreed that we must keep a firm position, that we don't have to take the initiative, and that what we now have in Berlin is better than we could get. Why has the US changed?
Mr. Kohler said we start by agreeing that the key is a demonstration of firmness and determination. We have done this. We don't feel weak, and we don't believe the Soviets think we are weak. We are convincing them by acts. We can show the world we are ready to negotiate and that the Soviets are at fault if negotiations do not occur. We give a demonstration of weakness by an appearance of disunity. The three Governments believe we should take the next step; only France is unbending.
The Secretary asked why the US and France disagree on so many important questions: test suspension, disarmament, the Congo, Southeast Asia, SEATO, consultation, the UN. There is no important question on which the two countries are working closely.
The Ambassador attributed this to the UN, wherein the US attaches significance to a consensus of nations and from which France has only suffered. He then said that the US may consider a meeting of Foreign Ministers. He did not believe France would want to be associated with it.
Mr. Kohler asked about the note to the Soviets./4/ If we, the UK, and the Germans agreed on it, would France expect us to send it without taking any part itself?
/4/Reference is to a draft reply to the August 3 Soviet note. The French objected to the draft because the final paragraph called for negotiations with the Soviet Union. A copy of the draft was transmitted to Moscow in telegram 562, August 25, for information only. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2561)
The Ambassador said his Government only disagreed on the last paragraph about negotiations. He didn't know what the procedure would be.
The Secretary mentioned the President's letter to de Gaulle/5/ on this subject.
/5/For text of this letter, dated August 24, in which Kennedy appealed to de Gaulle to agree that negotiations be part of the reply, see Declassified Documents, 1986, 2260.
The Ambassador suggested we await a reply to it before going further on the note. He said he had seen President de Gaulle before the latest Soviet measure./6/ Now that the latter has occurred President de Gaulle would be even more adamant. He then asked: Is there something we don't know? The meeting between the two Presidents had gone extremely well, especially on Berlin. Suddenly something had happened. Had it?/7/
/6/For Alphand's account of his conversation with de Gaulle on August 23, see L'Etonnement d'etre, pp. 362-366.
/7/On August 22 Winckler had made this point even more forcibly in a talk with Kohler, stating that Couve de Murville had been "astounded" by the change in the U.S. position between the President's speech and the Foreign Ministers meeting. Winckler concluded that France was "not only disturbed but alarmed by what seems to it to be a sudden and inexplicable reversal of the U.S. tactical position." (Memorandum of conversation; Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/8-2261)
The Secretary replied negatively. We have different appreciations of what the situation calls for. The President is worried about the alliance falling into disunity over the lack of response to Khrushchev's proposals.
Mr. Kohler suggested the Ambassador confirm this by reading the reports of NATO discussions.
The Secretary said that France is virtually isolated in NATO on this issue. The disunity of the alliance is what will impress Khrushchev the most.
127. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, August 24, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, General Clay. Confidential. A copy was sent to Rusk.
You have asked for my views on the assignment of General Clay as U.S. Military Commander in Berlin.
Both General Lemnitzer and I believe the appointment of General Clay as Commander of U.S. Forces in Berlin would complicate and strain the command channel and the command relationships between the Berlin Commander on the one hand and Generals Clarke and Palmer on the other. Instead, we recommend the appointment of General Clay as Chief of Mission with the rank of Ambassador.
I understand that at present the United States maintains a Mission in Berlin, as well as an Embassy in Bonn. Ambassador Dowling functions both as Chief of the Berlin Mission, and also as Ambassador to the Federal German Republic. Under our proposal, Ambassador Dowling would be relieved of his responsibilities as Chief of the Berlin Mission, and these would be assigned to General Clay. The U.S. Commander in Berlin, Major General Watson, who also carries the title of U.S. Commandant and Deputy Chief of Mission, would report to General Clay. Mr. Lightner, who is assigned as Assistant Chief of Mission and Deputy Commandant, would remain in his present post.
Robert S. McNamara
128. Telegram From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief, Europe (Norstad)/1/
Washington, August 25, 1961, 10 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, President's Office Files, Germany. Top Secret; Immediate. Repeated to USAREUR for Clarke. A draft of this cable showing Bundy's revisions is ibid., National Security Files, Germany, Berlin, Cables.
JCS 1265. From CJCS. Exclusive for General Norstad and General Clarke signed Lemnitzer. Do not deliver prior to 0800 local time.
1. The objective of insisting on our access to East Berlin by the US Command, Berlin, is to demonstrate our determination to maintain our legal right of entry to East Berlin. Concurrently we desire to give political and psychological evidence of US attitude in regard to developments in the Berlin situation. A clear distinction must be made, however, between US right of access to East Berlin and West Berlin. While we consider the US right of access to East Berlin to be important, we do not consider it so vital that it must be maintained by the use of force which entails combat, except that required for self-defense if our forces are fired upon in the implementation of measures indicated below. U.S. forces so fired upon in East Berlin should defend themselves and withdraw to West Berlin, forces fired upon in West Berlin should return fire only so long as they are under fire. No line of action should be initiated to maintain the U.S. right of access to East Berlin, therefore, which would result in serious loss of U.S. prestige if U.S. forces involved should have to withdraw. However, U.S. right of access to West Berlin from FRG is of such importance as to require, if necessary, the use of force entailing combat.
2. While we do not recognize the authority of the GDR/USSR to restrict our access it is considered that the U.S. right of access to East Berlin is satisfied, for practical purposes, as long as one entry point is available for the unimpeded movement of allied personnel.
3. Four types of resistance can be encountered at the access point(s) to East Berlin:
a. Administrative.
b. Passive obstacles which can be removed by personnel.
c. Heavier obstacles which require bulldozer and/or tanks or demolition to remove.
d. Mobs or crowds of civilians or formations of GDR troops or police which refuse to move out of the way of vehicles.
4. Should administrative resistance, such as abnormal requests for identification, or long delays be encountered a request should be made for a Soviet officer. If the Soviet officer does not appear and clear passage within a reasonable time, the vehicle should move forward shaking off any restraint if this can be done without actually knocking down or running over the persons blocking access. If this cannot be done, the vehicle should withdraw.
5. In the event passive obstacles which can be moved by personnel are encountered, the obstacles should be removed and the vehicles proceed.
6. If heavier obstacles which require bulldozer and/or tanks or demolition to remove are encountered, the vehicles should withdraw and instructions should be requested from higher authority.
7. If mobs or crowds or formations of GDR troops or police block passageway, the procedures in paragraph 4 above refer. If it becomes clear that entry cannot be secured without running over or combat with East German personnel, United States vehicles should withdraw, and instructions should be requested from higher authority.
8. In any of the above situations where the vehicle is fired upon, or where it is obvious that vehicles cannot proceed or the lives of personnel are immediately endangered, the vehicle will withdraw.
9. Your recommendation for additional courses of action within the parameters outlined in paragraph 1 above are invited.
129. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom/1/
Washington, August 26, 1961, 7:15 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/8-2661. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Holloway and approved by Hillenbrand. Also sent to Bonn, Paris for USRO, Moscow, and Berlin.
982. Following based on uncleared memcon./2/
/2/The memorandum of this conversation, which was held at 10:30 a.m., is ibid., Secretary's Memoranda of Conversation: Lot 65 D 330.
Ambassadorial Group and military advisers met today with Secretary and Secretary McNamara.
Secretary raised questions of how Western countries see future developments of Berlin situation and how they propose to handle? He pointed out that responsibility for deciding to go to nuclear war is so grave that we must be assured that all other alternatives have been canvassed. Unfortunately, present state Western planning and readiness not adequate to ensure that we have available a wide range of effective alternatives. US does not want to go from a repulsed jeep probe on autobahn to all out nuclear war in one move. We envision rather a series of responses in ascending order of violence. But plans and forces for such responses and their political concomitants must be available. At present, they are not and we run grave risk of relying upon assumption that by saying we will go to nuclear war we are thereby assuring that there will be no war.
Secretary McNamara pointed out that there are also deficiencies in our planning for nuclear warfare. Until such planning takes place, we will not know what our shortages are or what our chances are to make good on such shortages. Planning for conventional war has already revealed shortages which are now being filled as a result.
Defense Secretary reported his serious concern at state of Live Oak and NATO planning. He reported US now doing NATO planning which is undesirable but necessary in view time factor. He said we must enlarge and expand Live Oak to provide wide range alternatives within which governments could make decisions. After considerable discussion problem of bringing all NATO countries into planning process without causing inordinate delays, US reps expressed hope that instructions would go forward to General Norstad to have Live Oak planning take account of NATO implications, such plans to be subject to subsequent review by NATO planners. In meantime, NAC directives to NATO on planning could be prepared and consideration be given to inviting Stikker US for consultation Ambassadorial Group. Secretary noted that events would inevitably merge tripartite plans and action with NATO plans and action in any event.
Nitze reviewed discussions of military experts noting--
1) On blocking or harassing of Berlin air access, experts have catalogued twelve possible situations, three of which require expanded Jack Pine planning which group now discussing. Plans requiring political decisions prior implementation have been isolated. All agreed Smirnov threat (Bonn 430)/3/ to civil air lines which probably could be made good showed urgency finalizing air access plans. Nitze reported group confident military planes can supply garrison and handle passenger traffic even in face electronic harassment but military planes unable mount freight airlift with present capability in face such harassment.
/3/Telegram 430 from Bonn, August 26, summarized an AP dispatch in which Smirnov advocated that air traffic to Berlin be subject to the same controls as rail and road traffic. (Ibid., Central Files, 862.72/8-2661)
2) Naval measures up to and including full blockade Bloc shipping within US capability but economic effect upon USSR negligible and effect on GDR would be for limited period. Secretary suggested US prepare battery legal positions for use in case we wish institute navicert system, seize USSR electronic-spy trawlers, etc. Nitze reported political repercussions from neutrals on naval measures will be severe but that measures would convince Sovs that their actions in Germany were dangerous.
3) Group is considering papers on Live Oak and NATO planning. A recommendation to Ambassadors along line Rusk/McNamara remarks reported above may be available Monday when the Ambassadors meet again.
Only political question raised was Grewe's fear that Soviets have speeded up time table to go to brink because they know we are vulnerable at this time. Germans believe Sovs will stop at brink and begin "nibbling" against West Berlin's political status. Berlin's myriad vulnerabilities could leave city "hollow shell" by time Allies ready for showdown. Grewe hoped we could plan non-military countermeasures to halt this process. He agreed Caccia remark that heretofore there had been consensus that our moves were appropriate. Grewe offered no suggestion new actions. Secretary commented that primary responsibility for maintenance West Berlin morale was with West Berliners themselves. They have been magnificent for 15 years. Even the massive aid we are prepared give them cannot substitute for their internal decisions to maintain their way of life in face adversity.
Rusk
The Office of Electronic Information, Bureau of Public Affairs, manages this site as a portal for information from the U.S. State Department. External links to other Internet sites should not be construed as an endorsement of the views or privacy policies contained therein.