Docs 222-239
May 4-31: Opening of the Peace Negotiations and the
May Offensive
222. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 4, 1969, 4:30-5:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. Top Secret. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Those attending were the President, Rostow, Wheeler, Clifford, Rusk, Fortas, and Christian. Taylor joined the meeting at 5:07 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary)
The President: Walt and Bus will explain what is happening.
General Wheeler: Starting at midnight their time, we had a number of attacks, mostly airfields, also city of Kontum./2/
/2/A second NVA/VC offensive known as "mini-Tet" began on May 4. In a telephone conversation with Clifford that morning, the President noted that enemy infiltration figures had reached a new monthly high of 35,000 during April. He stressed the need for opponents in the Congress to be informed that "we have men right there that are about to get run over damn easy." (Ibid., Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation Between Johnson and Clifford, May 4, 1968, 10:13 a.m., Tape F6805.01, PNO 1-3)
Information we have is that the attack in Danang area was light. But Chu Lai and Pleiku airfields were temporarily closed. Overall, attacks relatively light.
Could well be prelude to attack later this week. This was one of their objectives--air capability--in Tet offensive.
It will be tomorrow night before they renew attacks.
Hit 18 places.
President: Dean, what is the significance?
Secretary Rusk: I think we can expect pretty heavy fighting as we move into talks. Have no trouble going to 20th but rather the news carry their attacks good first. [sic]
General Wheeler: Have sent carrier command an alert message, he recommended no movement of his search and rescue vessels without their discovery.
Secretary Clifford: What is behind it? I believe it is their reaction to licking on Warsaw. I would be surprised if this is prelude to wide offensive. Too early in negotiations. We're limited in retaliation. This not time to use retaliation--save Thanh Hoa for now. We'll get a more dramatic opportunity.
This attack of theirs will disconcert world opinion.
Secretary Clifford: Bus, I'd get ready for attack on Thanh Hoa, and maybe others. Psychological value of getting ships and planes in place. Keep in position for a while, even if we don't use.
Secretary Rusk: I don't think there will be indignation at Hanoi, only at us if we retaliate.
Mr. Rostow: I think their intention is to do more than slap our wrists over Warsaw.
The President: Don't agree that Warsaw was a big victory. Think they wanted Paris.
Mr. Rostow: They have a fixed picture of negotiations. Think it would be easier for us to get back to the 20th now than after Harriman is in Paris. Proceed to selected target between 19th and 20th.
Justice Fortas: Perhaps they are testing to see if your hands are tied by dove sentiment. But have a hunch it is too soon for counter-reaction. Would wipe out great gain and make negotiation more difficult. You might issue a statement to help build up sentiment.
Secretary Rusk: I don't think we should leave the impression that anybody's hands are tied in the South.
President: I think we ought to background--
--35,000 infiltrated this month
--hit airfields today
--doesn't look like they are very serious
Then authorize the ships to move and hold.
Justice Fortas: Think we have to get away from infiltration as only reason for concern. Been using vastly increased flow for purposes of attacking airfields; tie infiltration to their military actions.
General Wheeler: It would be fatal for us to be forced into de facto cease fire.
Secretary Rusk: What's going on in Ashau?
General Wheeler: Finding caches of weapons, anti-aircraft guns, rice--not as many troops as thought. Believe he's in Laos. Weather turning bad; Westmoreland will have to move out in next three or four days./3/
/3/Operation Delaware/Lam Son 216, which began on April 19, involved air-supported assaults against NVA staging areas in Thua Thien Province near the Laotian border. The operation ended on May 10.
Secretary Clifford: Get ships out. May have to get ready not only for Thanh Hoa, but also Hanoi and Haiphong.
Secretary Rusk: I think we should look for bigger game. When I asked Dobrynin if he would be for return to Geneva Laos accords if we stop bombing, he said "Yes." That means stopping infiltration./4/
/4/As reported in a memorandum of conversation between Rusk and Dobrynin, May 3. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL US-USSR)
Background only on:
--80,000-100,000 last 4 months--
--April record month.
I will talk to Ball about "Meet the Press"./5/
/5/Ball appeared on this televised interview program on May 5 and discussed the increase in Communist infiltration into South Vietnam. See The New York Times, May 6, 1968.
223. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 5, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74. Secret.
Mr. President:
Knowing that you are giving much thought to the problems of the coming negotiations and the positions to be taken by your representatives, I am venturing to summarize some of the points which seem to me most important for discussion with our emissaries before their departure.
a. Our Objective: "The independence of South Viet-Nam and its freedom from attack . . . The people of South Viet-Nam to be allowed to guide their own country in their own way." It is against this objective that we should measure all our actions at the conference table. We will have succeeded if we attain it--otherwise, we have lost.
b. Cessation of Bombing: It is clear that the first objective of our opponents will be to end the bombing of North Viet-Nam and then settle back to an unhurried talk-fight kind of negotiation during which they will be under little pressure to show progress. They may feel that we are trapped in the San Antonio formula and must negotiate from within its confines but, fortunately, they have given us an "out" if we want to use it and I certainly think we should. The formula was predicated on the assumption that North Viet-Nam would take no advantage of a complete cessation of our bombing, an assumption which is obviously invalid in view of the advantage being taken of even the presently restricted bombing, evidenced by the high level of infiltration in April and the recently renewed attacks on the cities. This is not the restraint we had hoped for--it is taking advantage of our conciliatory gesture and augurs ill for restraint if we took the further step of a complete bombing pause.
Under these new circumstances, I think we should feel completely free to use the bombing issue flexibly as benefits our interest in the negotiation. At a minimum, we should not agree to a complete cessation without first verifying that the subsequent talks will be "prompt and productive", to salvage the most useful part of the San Antonio formula. "Prompt" could be left to subjective determination based on the expedition shown in tackling the items on the agenda but "productive" is a term which requires careful attention. A judgment as to whether negotiations will be "productive'' can not be made without some understanding of the likely course of subsequent events, to include a knowledge of who will attend the conferences and what will be the content and order of the agenda for the discussions. Since, in our past experience with Communist negotiators, they have usually tried and often succeeded in wrangling interminably over such matters, it appears to me of the utmost importance that we not stop the bombing until these matters are settled. We can not possibly have ground to believe that subsequent negotiations will be "productive" until these points are agreed.
c. The Preferred Agenda: If we are to press for an agreed agenda before stopping the bombing, we need to have agreement among ourselves as to the desired order of events. At the risk of repeating views previously advanced, I will give my own preferred order of agenda items and some of the reasons for the preference:
Item 1: Understandings with regard to a cessation of the bombing to include the points made in paragraph b above. Efforts to determine the restraints which enemy will observe if we give up bombing. Establishment of the point that we will continue air reconnaissance of North Viet-Nam even if we stop bombing (if we are convinced of the essentiality of the reconnaissance).
Item 2: The conditions for the withdrawal of foreign forces (North Vietnamese, US/FWF) and the disposition of military bases in South Viet-Nam. Methods of verification by both sides.
[Since this matter is a major negotiation objective of the enemy, if we can establish our sincerity on this point early in the game, the rest of the negotiation should be made easier.]/2/
/2/All brackets in the source text.
Item 3: The cessation of external reinforcement by NVN and US/FWF. The problem of rotation on our side. Methods of verification by both sides.
[If the conditions for withdrawal of foreign forces have been previously agreed, this point should not be too difficult.]
Item 4: Measures affecting the Viet Cong. Their future political rights and economic privileges. Their freedom of choice of homeland. (North or South Viet-Nam.) Any "carrots" which the U.S. might contribute to make the deal more attractive to Hanoi.
[This group of subjects is likely to prove the most formidable stumbling block in the path of our negotiators. In establishing our position, it will require close coordination with the GVN--indeed, a case can be made for making this matter a subject for direct discussion between the GVN and the NLF in a "side" negotiation to which we would be observers. Alternatively, it could be combined with the cease-fire discussion which is the next point on this suggested agenda. In any case, we need private discussions with our allies to reach agreement on a formula for Viet Cong political participation which is not a sell-out coalition solution. Your formula of "one man, one vote" seems to me to provide the basis for a satisfactory US/GVN position.]
Item 5: A cease-fire in South Viet-Nam.
[I have retained this item for last because it is as complex as all the preceding ones in combination and is likely to consume an inordinate amount of time unless both sides know by this point how they will come out on the preceding topics. With this knowledge, they may be more amenable to reason in working out the details of a cease-fire. Ideally, a cease-fire should be so timed as to set in motion the execution of the foregoing agreements in an atmosphere of cooperation in carrying out a program agreed to by both sides in their respective self-interest.
Since there will be great pressure at the outset of the negotiations to stop the fighting as the first order of business, we might consider initiating immediate cease-fire negotiations by the opposing military commanders on the pattern of the French Army-Viet Minh parleys in 1954. This device would allow them to run concurrently with the Paris discussions and, not being at governmental level, would allow VC/NLF participation without serious objections from the GVN. It might be an advantageous forum for Vietnamese-to-Vietnamese discussions of the future of the Viet Cong mentioned above, even though much of this problem is non-military.]
Item 6: Timing of implementing actions; international supervision of implementations; international guarantees of the settlement.
It seems important that your negotiators receive your guidance before leaving on such matters as have been briefly discussed above. The order of events is important as is the development of the U.S. position or positions on each of the items on the agenda. I am sure that, over the past three years, much work has been done on these points by many officials and many agencies of government but now is the time to sort out the parts of past studies which have value in establishing a coherent position in the actual situation which we are facing.
I am attaching a list of questions suggested by the points raised in this paper which may be worth discussion at your Monday meeting on this subject./3/
/3/This attachment for the next day's meeting listed six questions relating to the impending negotiations on the following topics: the status of the San Antonio formula, the nature of evidence demonstrating that the talks would be "prompt" and "productive," the value of aerial reconnaissance, the respective roles of the GVN and NLF, the fate of the current constitutional framework of the GVN, and inducements the United States could offer to bring the DRV to a settlement. For the discussion at the meeting Monday, May 6, see Document 225.
MDT
224. Information Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 6, 1968, 8:45 a.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile--Paris to be filed. Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
Mr. President:
My memorandum to you on negotiating problems is set out in the way most people believe negotiations will run./2/
/2/Not found.
This memorandum states what I believe is the optimum way they should run in our interest; and it states the reasons why I do not rule it out as wholly impossible that Hanoi may agree.
1. The southern settlement: the heart of the matter. The war is about the future of power and politics in South Vietnam. The quickest way to end the war is to get an agreement on that subject. Then all the other matters could fall quickly and naturally into place. The reason Hanoi starts with a cessation of bombing and then, quite possibly, a cease-fire in place--is to improve its bargaining position on the question of power and politics in South Vietnam.
From our point of view, therefore, I believe it would be wise for Harriman to seek an early quiet talk with the North Vietnamese negotiator in Paris--or, perhaps, Cy Vance could have a quiet, informal talk with Mai Van Bo. He should suggest that if we want peace soon, the way to do it is to get the GVN in touch with "a member" of the NLF and let them go to work on the southern settlement. Perhaps they could best do it in South Vietnam while the formal negotiations go forward in Paris. It would be hard in Paris to keep such a conversation from becoming known, given the intensity of scrutiny and gossip that will surround the negotiations.
We could then press Thieu to offer a one-man one-vote solution which would permit the NLF, disguised as a popular front party, to run if--repeat if--it accepts the constitution as the basis for political life.
2. Would Hanoi accept such a procedure? The conventional wisdom is that they would refuse. And that may be correct. But it is not certain that they would refuse, for these reasons:
--Under pressures that we may not wholly understand, they appear to be in something of a hurry.
--They are now bringing down the probable peak number of infiltrators. It is probably a peak in infiltration because they cannot afford 30,000 per month indefinitely and because they know we cannot stop the bombing if infiltration continues at 30,000 a month. Therefore, they may calculate that in the weeks ahead they may be at maximum strength inside of South Vietnam and with the passage of time we again shall impose heavy attrition on their forces and weaken their bargaining position on the ground. They have reports that in VC villages the children are being taught to chant the following: "Blood will flow in May; there will be peace in June." If they are stirring these kinds of hopes, it must mean, technically, that they are thinking about a quick, rather than a protracted, negotiation.
3. I repeat, all the conventional pre-negotiating indications are that they will go slowly and try via a bombing standdown and perhaps a cease-fire to increase their leverage and diminish ours; but I believe our negotiators should make a serious try to go promptly for the gut issue: a negotiation by South Vietnam for a political settlement, preferably to be conducted in secret in South Vietnam.
Walt
225. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 6, 1968, 1:20 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Meeting Notes File. No classification marking. The meeting ended at 3 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) A summary of the meeting and a full transcript of it are ibid., Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room. Additional notes of the meeting, taken by Harold Johnson, are in the U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, Dec. 1967-June 1967.
NOTES OF THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING
WITH FOREIGN POLICY ADVISERS
ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
Ambassador Harriman
Ambassador Vance
General Goodpaster
General Taylor
Philip Habib
William Bundy
Under Secretary Katzenbach
General Johnson
Walt Rostow
George Christian
W. Jorden
The President: I want a most careful screening of the personnel in Paris--I want to be positive. I want the negotiators to get my feelings. I don't want to influence you with my pessimism. I hope you're optimistic.
Truman and Eisenhower have given me their reservations. They say be cautious about trusting them./2/
/2/According to the transcript of the meeting, the President stated: "I talked to President Truman the other day out at Kansas City. He expressed some of the reservations that he had. I talked to President Eisenhower and he has given me some of the reservations that he had. I don't agree, in total, with what either of them say, but the general feeling both of them have is that we have to be very cautious and not be very trusting with these folks, because first of all, you can't always believe everything they say. And second of all, they don't always carry out what they agree to do as both Presidents have reminded me in the number of talks that I have had with them. So I want to stress that first of all I'm glad that we are going to talk to them but I am not overly hopeful as I said in my statement. And second, I know that a good many of you think that I have a good deal at stake and the government has a good deal at stake and this is an election year and we sure would like to do what we could with all of these things that come about in a resolution. I'm very anxious to bring about a resolution but not because it's election year and not because of my own political state because I made that decision on March 31st. So you don't need to feel any expediency required of me of anything. No political conditions that I can see with the parties."
I'm glad we're going to talk, but I'm not overly hopeful. Some of you think we want resolution of this in an election year. I want it resolved, but not because of the election. Don't yield anything on that impression.
Just think of the national interest--now and ten years from now./3/
/3/In an April 23 memorandum to Harriman and Vance, Goodpaster described the relationship between the objectives of both sides in the negotiations and their relative military abilities on the battlefield. In a May 4 covering memorandum transmitting a copy of Goodpaster's memorandum to the President, Rostow wrote: "You should know that Governor Harriman, at a meeting last Thursday of Katzenbach's committee, argued, in effect, that the 'domestic political scene' required that we seek a quick settlement, even at some cost to our interests. Andy Goodpaster today told me that after presenting a paper to Harriman (copy attached) he replied: we can't get all we'd like because of domestic political factors. Harriman may be reflecting your wishes on the matter. But--if not--I would assume that the President should judge the domestic political factor at each stage of the negotiation, in the context of each negotiating issue. If that judgment is correct, you may wish to tell our negotiators on Monday that their job is to achieve U.S. objectives in Southeast Asia and leave it to the President to assess at each stage, on each issue, the extent to which domestic politics plays a role--if, indeed, it has a role." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, Walt Rostow, Vol. 74)
Secretary Katzenbach: Here are the issues:
1. They'll make a long statement denouncing U.S. aggression--"hear U.S. affirm conditions to stop bombing." They'll have a hard line on the bombing, and they'll stay with it. If pressed, they'll define "other acts of war" to include any and every violation of the border.
2. They will label the San Antonio formula as conditions--label them unacceptable.
Director Helms: They'll be tough at first--may say no further meetings until bombing settled.
Secretary Rusk: They'll probably make their statement public; we should do likewise. They'll come in with a roar.
Secretary Clifford: We've been put on notice we're being divided in two phases: bombing and acts of war; then other things.
Mr. Rostow: But they noted our position that we will be determined by March 31 speech.
Ambassador Harriman: I think their answer indicated they're willing to hear our conditions for stopping the bombing.
The NVN signed an agreement in 1962 and never kept one word of it. So I'm under no illusions.
They're arriving in Paris with a force of 43. They have asked for a villa. This indicates they are ready for phase I and phase II. They seem to be dug in for a period of time.
Secretary Rusk: Move with deliberation. May want to do some other works--if and when we see we can stop all bombing, may want to talk to USSR, get concessions from them.
Ambassador Harriman: I suggest Cy Vance come back and forth--it's only seven hours away.
Ambassador Vance: The government should speak with only one voice. Very harmful if otherwise.
Secretary Clifford: Suppose they say they want agreement on stopping bombing, do nothing else till that is done. Let's face that very real problem.
Secretary Rusk: We would quote heavily from the March 31 speech about reduction of violence. They would have to take the burden of breaking off the talks. Make them impose the ultimatum.
Ambassador Harriman: We would have to carefully define "other acts of war"--not reconnaissance.
Secretary Clifford: They could make a sharp issue if they took the San Antonio formula and called upon us to adhere.
Ambassador Harriman: Because they've repudiated the San Antonio formula, they'll probably use other approach.
The President: Assume they do say what Clark says, what do we say? Assume if you take advantage, everything here comes to naught.
Secretary Rusk: Start with points which go beyond our minimum position: DMZ, Laos Accords, control by ICC, etc.
General Johnson: Take no action that would impede military actions in the South./4/
/4/In CM-3284-68 to Harriman, May 8, General Johnson argued the necessity for "exerting maximum military pressure on the VC/NVA during the negotiations," since it would keep them paying a price, prevent them from bettering their military position, and force them to negotiate seriously. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/305 (8 May 68) IR 3864) In making a similar argument to Clifford in JCSM-289-68, May 8, Johnson, for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, wrote: "In the final analysis, no combination of concessions which North Vietnam/National Liberation Front are likely to make unilaterally would afford the allied forces advantages commensurate with those afforded North Vietnam by the cessation of bombardment." (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: If they ask for a cease-fire, our response should be mutual withdrawal of forces, amnesty, application of Manila formula.
Secretary Katzenbach: It is unlikely they'll propose a cease-fire. More likely to say they are going to refrain as gesture, so they can control it.
The President: Should we propose mutual withdrawal, re-institute DMZ, supervised election?
Ambassador Vance: Might propose DMZ.
Mr. Rostow: The critical question will be at what stage we want discussions of political settlement in the South. Earlier we get to that, the better off we'll be. They may try to move us to more inhibited military position.
Natural way to end this war is not a cease-fire, but to get at a political settlement before there's a cease-fire.
Secretary Rusk: Advantage in our making strong case at opening. The moment we agree Hanoi has a right to talk about political reorganization in the South, that is a big concession.
Mr. Rostow: I wholly agree.
The President: Shouldn't Bunker be getting Thieu to go ahead on talking with the NLF?
Secretary Katzenbach: I don't think Hanoi wants to talk about a political settlement in the South. They'll say we should talk to NLF about that.
Secretary Clifford: Combine March 31 speech and their response of April 3. You were willing to take first step to de-escalate. We can't say publicly, but San Antonio has been disposed of. They didn't respond to San Antonio.
General Taylor: On the cease-fire question, at some point I think they'll try. Against our interest, because it takes weeks and months to put into effect. We should say get experts to work on it while we continue to talk in Paris.
Secretary Rusk: It has merit.
Secretary Clifford: They may say "we're prepared to offer a cease-fire." Have to face up to it. Makes it difficult for us to explain why we can't accept it.
The President: Don't you trump their cease-fire by Manila formula?
Secretary Clifford: They then say they're willing to work toward it, but while doing that, have a cease-fire.
Ambassador Vance: U.S. can't speak for the GVN on this.
Mr. Rostow: (1) We agree to talk about cease-fire. (2) But try to push talks in another direction.
The President: What would you do about stopping the bombing?
Mr. Rostow: Start with March 31--assumptions about their behavior--then stop.
Secretary Katzenbach: I think they'll reject conditions.
Secretary Rusk: Ave [Harriman] could say we're willing to stop unconditionally, but also talk about what you're going to do unconditionally.
Director Helms: The leaders think they're in a position to win--want you to give something more.
Ambassador Harriman: When they accepted March 31, they were riding high. A lot has changed in the past month. They thought they were winning. How they judge last month may be something else.
General Goodpaster: We'll come quickly to force withdrawals. We might take this up in trial areas so their performance can be judged. We and they don't have some measure of relative positions. They may be more optimistic./5/
/5/According to the transcript of the meeting, Goodpaster's full statement was: "Sir, I think that we will come pretty quickly to this question of force withdrawals. This will be one of the blue chip questions. There are some possibilities here which might be considered. It's possible that this could be taken up in trial areas initially and their performance could be observed and we would learn the extent to which we could be sure over what they have done, and that we can, in fact, verify. I think it would be valuable all around to us and to the South Vietnamese if they saw through actual experience in a selected area what the outcome was, whether they are able to maintain their position, so that this topic, I think has got to feel right to them. In a more general way, it has seemed to me that the negotiations, to have validity, cannot help but to be coupled with the situation on the battlefield. And if a step of this kind involving force withdrawal in a certain area can be accomplished in a way that meets our objectives, we would then lay the basis for carrying this thing forward, extending it to other areas. It could be that along with such force withdrawals there could be coupled other forms of de-escalation. But all of this, I would think, lies very well down the road. There are still ambiguities. I'm sure there will remain ambiguities as to just what the situation is as to our military strength on the battlefield and as to theirs. We probably don't have the same assessment today as to how well we're doing and how well they're doing."
The President: In your opinion, have we increased or decreased our military strength because of bombing curbs?
General Goodpaster: What they've been able to do not much different from what they could have done. Their advantage though is more ease in supply and pulling people off repairs in North.
Mr. Rostow: We were pinning down establishment by instrument bombing.
General Johnson: I don't think it's hurt much at this stage. I disagree with General Goodpaster on some thing--the level of terror in October, culminating in Tet, was necessary for him to try to regain losses. Now he didn't score well in second wave. I think he hurts.
Ambassador Vance: I think we should define our objectives in the South. Fight and talk, or reduce violence?
Secretary Rusk: Basically it's status quo ante--pulling North and South apart militarily--shooting for time for Asians to look after selves.
Mr. Rostow: The crucial problem is how to deal with a coalition government.
Mr. Bundy: The principle of the South Vietnamese settling it themselves should be our position.
Ambassador Harriman: I hope Bunker will get Thieu to carry out his campaign promise to bring some into government who have a following--like Huong.
Secretary Rusk: Should have a later meeting, before the group leaves Thursday./6/
/6/In a May 6 memorandum to Wheeler, Harold Johnson wrote: "Have had a two-hour inconclusive meeting at White House with the negotiators. Top man was very clear that no yielding on any point required for reasons of political expediency. He is concerned with security interests of this nation one year from now and ten years from now. There will be another meeting later on this week. Harriman, nudged by Vance, seeking guidance on military objective. I stated that political objective was needed first. Rusk stated that basic objective is status quo ante with hope that it could be permanent for at least a few years. I then said that military objective should be elimination of enemy force to the extent that police could assure maintenance of law and order in South Vietnam. Vance appeared to be searching for a mutual de-escalation. I believe that on basis of discussion today the next meeting can be more productive and more definitive." (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, Dec. 1967-June 1967)
226. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 7, 1968, 1-3 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. In a May 7 background paper for the President, Rostow listed as negotiating issues requiring policy guidance the right to undertake reconnaissance flights, the need to make explicit the assumptions upon which the halt was based, the "possibilities for significant formal chatter" regarding substantive issues, the participation of the GVN and NLF, further mutual de-escalation and the mechanisms for disengagement, allied participation in any settlement, and as proposed by Vance, the specific agenda and tactics to follow in the talks. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968 [2])
NOTES ON TUESDAY LUNCHEON, MAY 7, 1968
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Clifford
Secretary Rusk
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
General Johnson
George Christian
Tom Johnson
Secretary Rusk: The delegation is small. Daniel Davidson is a good man. The Staff is very good, and I would go ahead. We are bringing Kaplan in to help on press problems. Also, Bill Sullivan has a personal knowledge of NVN's chief negotiator. Do you have any objections?
The President: No objections.
Secretary Clifford: No objections. It is better to start with a small staff.
Secretary Rusk: I told Cy and Averell to expect the President to be involved with these decisions.
General Johnson: Who would substitute for General Goodpaster when he is due to report to Vietnam?
The President: Maxwell Taylor has a lot of diplomatic and military background./2/
/2/In a May 8 memorandum to Wheeler, Harold Johnson noted: "I failed to identify another topic that I raised concerning replacement for Goodpaster on the negotiation delegation. Rusk pointed out Bunker's affinity for Palmer. I informed him that Palmer would probably be leaving about 15 June to become Vice Chief of Staff and would not be available. I also said that Abrams probably could get along without Goodpaster for some period of time but that Andy would be needed eventually. There was a long silence when the President finally said that the man in whom he had confidence and liked the way that he conveyed his ideas was General Taylor. Thus, it is conceivable that he may replace Goodpaster on the delegation. I advance this now because I could foresee some reservations among the Chiefs. I have not mentioned it to them, however." (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, 199-208)
Secretary Rusk: I agree with you about Max Taylor, but a lot can happen between now and June.
Secretary Clifford: The best thing we can do is to get peace in Vietnam.
The President: I want Rusk and Clifford and Helms to brief Bobby [Kennedy] when he wants it.
Secretary Rusk: If I were a candidate I would not accept a briefing.
The President: Why? A man's judgment is no better than his information.
Secretary Rusk: They aren't interested in information.
George Christian: It wouldn't appeal to the group he is appealing to.
Secretary Clifford: I had a good visit with Fulbright.
Secretary Rusk: Do you know the difference between rape and seduction?
Secretary Clifford: I have read about both; I have not been involved in either (laughter).
Secretary Clifford: Friday, May 17, is date we have chosen on MAP program. We had good discussion about Vietnam. He wanted Mansfield and John Sherman Cooper at the discussions in Paris.
Fulbright wanted to know how seriously the President wanted peace. I told him, "Bill, about 50 times as much as you do."
The President: I have told the press that consultations would be helpful. I rely closely on Rusk, but I would hear from Ball, Rostow, Goldberg and Clifford.
Everybody's judgment is important, if we reached point where we need the judgment of Congress, we would go to Mansfield and McCormack and Dirksen. I told the Leadership that we have to depend on senior people like Mansfield and Dirksen.
Secretary Rusk: We would like to use Leonhart and Wyn Brown/3/ while Bundy is so involved. Both are discreet men.
/3/William Leonhart of the NSC Staff and Winthrop Brown, Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Liaison with the Governors.
Walt Rostow: Leonhart has responsibilities to a staff of 15. He doesn't want it to collapse.
Secretary Rusk: We need the best backstopping team we can get.
The President: Any matters arising where Congress is concerned, we will take up with Mansfield and Dirksen, McCormack and Ford. The normal procedure would be Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen. The ranking Committeeman is Hickenlooper.
[Omitted here is discussion of an NIE on the Soviet Union.]
The President: Should we have a second meeting with Harriman and Vance?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, we should have another meeting./4/ "Our side, your side" approach is a good one. We should not pull our punches. We should not understate our own case. I hope Averell will start off with a firm position. We ought to press for more than the Clifford formula. We need to make them face up to the hard issues including the no advantage formula.
/4/See Document 227.
The President: You (Secretary Clifford) and Dean go over everything with them. We want them to be tough traders. Let's not put our minimum condition on the table first.
Bombing Between 19th and 20th Parallel
Secretary Clifford: We are now confining bombing below 19th.
General Johnson: The Air Force wants to go up to 20th. Others do not want to do anything to upset the sitting down at the table this week on the 10th. A violation might occur./5/
/5/In a May 7 memorandum to Wheeler, Harold Johnson noted: "Rolling Thunder was raised and I showed a map of the targets in relation to the 20th parallel. Forces are in position. I reported that the JCS were agreed that no actions taken this week should jeopardize the initiation of talks with North Vietnam. I said that there was confidence that strikes against these targets could be controlled but that there could not be an absolute assurance that an inadvertent crossing of the 20th parallel would not occur. The discussion was desultory. The President was assured that forces were in position and that strikes could be initiated promptly following a decision. There was no decision and I did not press for one." (U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, 199-208) A joint State-Defense message sent as telegram 160360 to Vientiane, May 8, transmitted the approval of a "change in rules to permit daylight bombing in Laos with entry and/or departure across Western Laos border." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S)
Secretary Clifford: If a plane goes over the 20th Parallel, we would kick ourselves forever.
The President: When would the first meeting be?
Secretary Rusk: Friday./6/
/6/May 10.
The President: What's happening in the South?
Walt Rostow: The attack squads are being contained.
General Johnson: (Showed map of Saigon)./7/
/7/Major fighting had taken place over the last 2 days, notably in Saigon, where skirmishes with VC units continued for a week.
The President: I am uncomfortable about infiltration.
[Omitted here is discussion of the NATO troop meeting and the Poor People's March on Washington.]
227. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 8, 1968, 6-7 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room of the White House. Mansfield and Dirksen joined the meeting at 6:30 p.m. (Ibid., President's Daily Diary) Harold Johnson also took notes of this meeting. (U.S. Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, December 1967-June 1968) Johnson also summarized the meeting in a May 8 memorandum to Wheeler. (Ibid., 199-208)
NOTES ON THE PRESIDENT'S MEETING WITH
NEGOTIATING TEAM
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
William Bundy
General Johnson
Walt Rostow
Under Secretary Katzenbach
Cyrus Vance
Ambassador Harriman
General Goodpaster
Bill Jorden
General Taylor
George Christian
Phil Habib
Tom Johnson
The President: I will read the opening statement tonight./2/
/2/Reference is to the statement to be read by Harriman at the first session of the official conversations in Paris on May 13. Drafts of the statement have not been found; for text of the final statement as read by Harriman, see Department of State Bulletin, June 3, 1968, pp. 701-704.
Secretary Rusk: The delegation leaves tomorrow morning. Habib will talk to North Vietnam tomorrow about exact meeting time. We expect the North Vietnamese to have very strong statement. We will stick to the March 31 speech in key points. Ambassador Harriman may have to answer some of their statements on the spot.
The issues are:
1. The "no advantage" clause of the San Antonio formula.
2. Cessation of bombing. That is the heart of the matter.
3. The matter of reconnaissance. We must have this. They are in the South and have their intelligence.
4. Important political issues. Go ahead and get their views on more formal talks and views on terms for settlement. Thieu and Ky suggested "our side, your side" theory of the United States with South Vietnam, and Hanoi with their allies.
5. I hope we can avoid argument about an agenda. If there is no agreed agenda we should be able to add or subtract from it when we need it./3/
/3/These issues were addressed in a State Department paper entitled "Immediate Issues Requiring Policy Guidance," May 8. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Meetings with the President, May-June 1968 [2]) This paper was attached and sent to the President at 4 p.m. under cover of a memorandum by Rostow, May 8. Nitze's critique of this paper is in a May 8 memorandum to Clifford. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Courses of Action, Post-Paris Talks, 1963, 1967-1968, n.d.)
The President: Should you propose the Manila formula to start with, to set the record straight on what we are for?
Ambassador Harriman: We have proposed the following:
1. Re-establish the DMZ.
2. Leave South Vietnam to themselves.
3. Economic cooperation.
4. End aggression in the South.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: I agree with the opening statement, but I think we should "feel them out."
The President: We should talk about the new Marshall Plan for that area. The statement doesn't give "effective pitch". We need something a truck driver can understand.
Under Secretary Katzenbach: We will work on it further.
Ambassador Harriman: I am glad to have that advice.
Secretary Rusk: Our allies agree on this language. The South Vietnamese are very concerned about the idea of supervised elections.
Walt Rostow: Maybe there should be a seven-point plan.
Secretary Clifford: I like the statement. Some parts can be explained further.
General Johnson: I see nothing objectionable from the Joint Chiefs of Staff point of view.
Walt Rostow: On Page 5 there is a new note I would add (handed notes to Cy Vance).
The President: What did we do at Manila?
Bill Bundy: The principle of self-determination was set forth quite clearly.
The President: Put in language which is in accord with Manila.
I am concerned about MIG engagement in Panhandle. One of our F-4's was shot down.
General Johnson: We do not know if MIG's staged from base 6 miles south of the 20th parallel. We cannot prove they are on that airfield.
The President: Let's check to see if they staged there or not.
Walt Rostow: DIA thinks they did fly from there.
Secretary Rusk: There could be operations between 19th and 20th Parallel.
The President: We have tried to play it cool to get this thing going. I am getting to be nervous about the infiltration and this MIG activity. General Chapman told me the North Vietnamese-Viet Cong were not standing and fighting.
(Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen entered)
Secretary Rusk: A major step forward was "our side, their side" formula given us by the South Vietnamese. We need to see what they are willing to do if we stop the bombing. Since the first of the year they have been increasing their infiltration about 80,000 to 100,000.
The President: The month of May may be the worst month with highest infiltration.
Secretary Rusk: We want to talk to Mansfield and Dirksen when issues come to a head. We have had nothing to indicate Hanoi is moving toward basis of settlement. Even if we stop bombing, we must have minimum reconnaissance to know what is going on.
The President: Since March 31 we have imposed unusual restraints on ourselves including many acceptances of sites agreeable to us but not agreeable to them.
We stopped bombing above the 19th Parallel. We will coordinate all our activities carefully between Washington, Paris and Saigon. There is no hurry here. We must feel our way--every step of the way. We need to be able to take care of ourselves. We want to start with a maximum position. Always it is easier to retreat than move forward. We want them to negotiate with one point in mind "What is in our national interest--now and in the future."
There are no Democrats or Republicans on this panel. This is strictly an American team.
I will discuss everything with Senator Mansfield and Senator Dirksen first. Secretary Clifford is going over tomorrow./4/ I may ask you to fly over at some point.
/4/Clifford was going to Brussels to attend the NATO Ministerial meeting. According to notes of a May 7 telephone conversation between Harriman and Clifford, the latter had invited the delegation to fly over with him "for two reasons--the pleasure of your company and if we have anything to talk about, we can do it on the plane." (Ibid., Harriman Papers, Special Files, Public Service, Kennedy-Johnson, Chronological File, May-June 1968) The delegation arrived in Paris on May 9.
I only want one spokesman during this session. We must have a common line./5/
/5/A full transcript and a summary of the meeting from this point on are in the Johnson Library, Transcripts of Meetings in the Cabinet Room.
Secretary Clifford: Only one guarantee--the discussion will be lengthy and difficult. It took a month to get a site. It will take a long time. At present, there is a certain euphoria. I do not know why Hanoi has chosen to negotiate. It is possible they want us to relax our military posture. Hanoi will try to divide the United States during this time. They will attempt to divide the American people. We all want war to stop--but on a decent and honorable basis. We need to present an appearance of unity during these talks.
Ambassador Harriman: Cambodia and Warsaw would have been an insult to Saigon.
Secretary Rusk: They have been willing to begin talks even though we have not completely stopped the bombing.
Senator Mansfield: I can't find fault with anything said here tonight.
Senator Dirksen: I haven't let you down yet.
228. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 10, 1968, 0820Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE. Secret; Immediate; Nodis; Crocodile. Received at 6:11 a.m. Repeated to Paris for the delegation. Bunker reported on the same subjects in his 50th weekly message to the President, telegram 26826 from Saigon, May 9. (Ibid., POL 27 VIET S) Bunker's weekly message is printed in full in Pike, ed., The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 433-438.
26928. 1. I am not worried about the outcome of the fighting which has been going on around Saigon since Saturday,/2/ because the ARVN, police and US forces are very substantial and we can manage anything which they throw in, including their reserves. There are, however, some aspects of this and related matters on which I want Washington to have my views.
/2/May 4.
2. The VC main strategy manifests itself in several ways, two of which are assassination and sabotage. Assassination is concentrated on police outposts, and sabotage at public utilities. One power station is already out of action as result of sabotage, and two were damaged by shelling. A pre-offensive attack was directed against Vietnamese TV station and failed, but could be attempted again. Further sabotage efforts must be expected on other power stations, the water works, post office, government buildings, etc. This is well understood here and I am assured that every effort is being made to give all practical protection, especially to key power and water installations, but this does not preclude further individual successes by the VC.
3. A byproduct of the fighting has been some thousands of temporary evacuees, who have fled from the fighting areas, some of whom will have lost their homes and will need to be provided for. The hospitals are now full of wounded. There is a reduction in vegetable and meat supplies into the city, although some supplies are coming through from the northeast. Rice is ample.
4. The aim--or at least one aim--of all this is pretty clear: to produce as much terror and havoc in the city for as long as possible, in order to cause as much trouble as possible to the authorities and the people, with the hope of overwhelming and collapsing the administration of the city services, producing mass discontent and hopefully the uprising which they failed to achieve in the Tet offensive. There is no sign of panic or such collapse, and our military and the Vietnamese authorities are very confident that they are going to bring this under control before it reaches that stage.
5. That they have other aims in mind is obvious, such as influencing the Paris talks, impressing American and world opinion with their continued ability to mount substantial campaigns in order to cause more despair in the American public, etc. What emerges is that they are making another great effort, not on the scale of Tet but still impressive, and they have the capability of keeping this going here for some days and possibly weeks. If they break off this attack it will be to resupply, then start again some weeks hence, although perhaps on a reduced scale in view of their increasingly difficult resupply problems during the monsoon season in Laos. They are in any case willing to pay a very heavy price in terms of losses./3/
/3/On May 9 Sullivan, en route to Paris, discussed the second NVA/VC series of attacks with Westmoreland and Calhoun at Udorn. "All evidence which Westmoreland presented bears out his contention that North Vietnamese are in serious military decline and that their current situation is getting worse," Sullivan reported. "Fact that they chose to launch their current Saigon offensive even though their attack plan was compromised gives indication of their desperation and of its political motivation." (Telegram 6399 from Vientiane, May 9; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET S) Harriman asked Sullivan, who attended the Geneva talks of 1961-1962 as Harriman's deputy, to become part of the Paris delegation.
6. Along with this there has been an extraordinary movement South, and infiltration, in the last four months, and this continues. (However, our success at Khe Sanh, the A Shau Valley campaign with its capture of huge supplies, and our spoiling operations in April, also with capture of heavy supplies, have inflicted great losses on the enemy's manpower and supplies.) Hanoi and NLF broadcasts have called for the bombing of the Palace and American Embassy by VNAF defectors, and a mass uprising. We must expect that one or more of our installations in and around Saigon will be singled out at any time over the next days or weeks for special sabotage, with a possibility of more casualties to Americans.
7. There is some interesting evidence of what is going on on the enemy's side. In I Corps just north of Hue on May 1, 102 NVA troops surrendered, the largest single batch in this war, induced by the amplified broadcasts of a captured sergeant. The highest level defector of this war, Lt Colonel Tran Van Dac who joined the VC in 1945 and rose as a commissar and propagandist, defected on April 19 and revealed the plans and timing of the present offensive. This information was used in our preparations for the attack on Saigon, and has proven substantially correct. On May 8 another Lt Colonel defected near Saigon on the grounds that the political commissars were asking the impossible in military terms and he could not take it any more. He and others have added that morale is not as good as it was, and there is waning confidence in the ranks now that the VC can win. There is evidence that replacements from the North and impressed Southerners are being thrown into battle with little military training. There is also some evidence that Hanoi was moving toward a bid for talks even before the March 31 speech and that they are anxious to continue the talks.
8. It is my view that Hanoi and the NLF are hurting, are now engaged in a huge gamble, and this is a year of climax. They, perhaps, still hope for a collapse in Saigon. I feel certain they will fail. Perhaps most important in terms of their gamble is that they now hope to win because of what they regard as our desperate desire for peace. The speeches of McCarthy, Kennedy, Galbraith and others, articles in the US press and TV, the shift in Newsweek, Walter Cronkite and others, may have convinced them that if they negotiate and fight we will be ready to throw in the sponge by forcing a coalition on the South Vietnamese.
9. The arrogance of their May 3 reply--to arrange for the complete cessation of bombing and other acts of war--was part propaganda and part bravado./4/ All the evidence suggests they are going to be tough in the negotiations and are out to obtain the colossal concession of coalition government. They, or at least some in the North, must be arguing that the United States regards its bargaining position as weak, and therefore that they are in a strong position. Unless we act with genuine confidence in the strength of our bargaining position, I am fearful of the outcome.
/4/See Document 221.
10. Washington knows my position as a result of my visit. I think we are in a very strong position to negotiate, and that it is Hanoi which is worried, or at least some in Hanoi are worried, for I suspect they have their hawks and doves just as we do.
11. The conclusions I draw from all the foregoing are clear:
A. Harriman's orders to agree to a full cessation of bombing in the North should be amended.
B. We should demand as a condition of full cessation a substantial reduction in the unprecedented NVN movement South, which we are in a position to observe.
C. We should demand a reduction now in the level of violence in the South.
D. Most important, we should under no circumstances agree to full cessation of bombing in the North, while Saigon is under harassment and attack. I can think of nothing more calculated to cause despair here than to agree under these conditions. The suspicion in the South as to our negotiating intentions is that we are ready to go very far, even to coalition with the NLF or its new alliance, to stop the war. If we cease our bombing of the North while Saigon is under attack, this suspicion would enormously increase and could become unmanageable in terms of maintaining morale and unity here. Thieu is expected to establish a new and broader government shortly and we must not handicap it at the outset. A full cessation of bombing under Harriman's present instructions would encourage the hard liners in Hanoi to think we are ready to call it quits, and in the debates which must be taking place in the North they would be justified in their view that the thing to do is to keep the pressure on Saigon./5/
/5/Bunker's reports on the GVN's position on negotiations are in telegrams 26805 and 26833 from Saigon, both May 9. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE) In telegram 162732 to Paris, May 11, the Department noted its agreement that an agreement on full cessation in the midst of ongoing attacks inside South Vietnam would seriously undermine the GVN's morale. (Ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Todel Chron.) In telegram 13887 from Paris, May 12, Harriman noted that while he and Vance did not believe that their instruction required amendment, they were concerned that the NVA/VC might not reduce military activities in the South while talks went on. (Ibid., Delto Chron.)
E. I myself would go further, and even while the talks proceed I would bomb power stations, railway yards, and military installations near and in the cities below the 20th parallel, adding to their troubles in the North, creating more refugee problems for them, and putting new strains on their facilities.
F. In short, until they reduce the movements south and call off the campaign against Saigon, we should not agree to a full cessation, and at some stage we should let Hanoi know why. As a footnote, we would look ridiculous if we agreed to a full cessation, and a few days later had one of our American installations blasted by sabotage with heavy American casualties./6/
/6/In an undated memorandum to Clifford, Nitze agreed that the re-establishment of the demilitarized zone and the diminution of violence in the South had to be agreed upon prior to a complete bombing halt but that no specific prior agreement was needed on the reductions in NVA infiltration. He also stated his opposition to Bunker's call for an expansion of the bombing. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Vietnam War--Courses of Action, Post Paris Talks, 1963, 1967-1968, n.d.)
Bunker
229. Information Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the National Security Council (Smith) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 11, 1968, 2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Crocodile-Paris General, 4/9/68-5/11/68. Secret. The notation "ps" on the memorandum indicates that the President saw it.
SUBJECT
Procedural Agreement Reached at Paris Talks
Our delegation to the Paris talks reports that at the meeting today the North Vietnamese were businesslike and that the atmosphere was good. (Tab A)/2/
/2/Neither tab is printed. Tab A was the text of telegram 13865 from Paris, May 11, in which Vance summarized his second procedural meeting with Ha Van Lau held that day. Both negotiators agreed upon procedures to be followed in the official conversations. A full report on the meeting is in telegram 13866 from Paris, May 11. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Delto Chron.) Vance reported on the first procedural meeting of May 10, during which these issues initially were raised, in telegrams 13832 and 13852 from Paris, both May 10. (Ibid.)
Agreement was reached on the procedures to be followed. (Text is at Tab B.)/3/
/3/Tab B was a paper entitled "Procedures for the Conversations Between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the United States of America," May 11. The agreed procedures included: the composition of each party to the official conversations would be limited to no more than ten persons and only to citizens of each nation; only designated representatives had the right to take the floor; Vietnamese and English would be the official languages with French a working language; there would be no joint minutes; the press would not attend the sessions; the sessions would be held at the Hotel Majestic beginning at 10:30 a.m.; the time for the next session would be determined at the end of each meeting; and the French Government would be responsible for maintaining security and order both "outside and inside" the conference hall.
Cy Vance made clear to the North Vietnamese that our acceptance of Paragraph 2. (C), which refers to the citizenship of persons participating in the talks, was an entirely reasonable arrangement so long as the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam are discussing matters of primary concern to them./4/ However, our acceptance of this provision should not be construed to affect in any way the role which must be played by the legitimate Government of South Vietnam at the appropriate time.
/4/Section 2(C) of Tab B reads: "To be allowed to attend the sessions between the two parties, as well as to work at the site chosen for the conversations, the components of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam party must be citizens of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, and those of the United States party must be citizens of the United States."
Later in the meeting and in response to this point, the North Vietnamese representative said he took note of our statement and understood it but it was not necessary to discuss it here.
The first substantive meeting is scheduled for 10:30 a.m. Monday,/5/ Paris time. North Vietnamese Minister Thuy will speak first. Ambassador Harriman will follow with his opening statement which you have already approved.
/5/May 13.
Bromley Smith
230. Editorial Note
The first plenary meeting of the official conversations between the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) and the United States began at 10:30 a.m. on May 13, 1968, in the International Conference Hall of the Hotel Majestic. Xuan Thuy, the chief negotiator for the DRV, set the tone for the 3-hour session in his opening statement, a hard-line presentation of his side's objectives. He insisted that the talks were to be aimed solely at compelling the United States to terminate its remaining bombing over the territory of the DRV. Discussion of other questions would begin only after that. Thuy also related the long history of "U.S. aggression" against his nation.
At the conclusion of the North Vietnamese statement, W. Averell Harriman, the head of the U.S. delegation, noted his rejection of and disagreement with various points in the statement. Harriman then read his prepared statement. He described the U.S. objective in the Vietnam conflict as an effort "to preserve the right of the South Vietnamese people to determine their own future without outside interference or coercion." He in turn charged that it was the DRV which had continued its aggression with attacks subsequent to President Johnson's speech of March 31. He reiterated the long-held position of the U.S. Government that some form of reciprocal restraint was required from the DRV, and suggested the restoration of the demilitarized zone as an initial "test of good faith." He also emphasized that a restoration of the Geneva Accords of 1954, in conjunction with honoring the Geneva Accords of 1962, would provide the best means for peace in Vietnam.
Thuy responded that Harriman's statement contained no new elements and again repeated his earlier critique of U.S. policy. The DRV delegation's suggestion to have the next meeting 2 days later was accepted. Telegrams 13926, 13936, and 13963 from Paris, May 13, reported on the meeting. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Delto Chron.) Harriman and Vance's telegrams reporting on the meetings are also in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel-Delto. Other collections of HARVAN telegrams are in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing) and HARVAN-(Incoming), and ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSCFiles, Paris Talks/Meetings, HARVAN Cables.
Biweekly meetings began with the second meeting on May 15; beginning in June, the meetings were held on a weekly basis. These public sessions quickly devolved into polemics and thus became opportunities to chastise the other side. Although continuing for nearly the next 5 years, the meetings at the Majestic provided little more than a forum for propaganda and public posturing and soon lost their significance in terms of the diplomatic evolution of the Paris talks. In addition to the record of the formal negotiations as reported in the cable traffic from Paris cited above, the summary records and complete transcripts of the official conversations are ibid., RG 59, EA Files: Lot 71 D 10; see also Paul Kesaris, ed., Transcripts and Files of the Paris Peace Talks on Vietnam, 1968-1973, Reels 1-2 (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1982). Delegation member William Jorden's notes of these meetings are in the Johnson Library, William J. Jorden Papers, WJJ Notes, Paris Meetings.
231. Memorandum From the President's Special Consultant (Taylor) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 13, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 8I, 1/67-12/68, Taylor Memos--General. Secret. In an attached note transmitting the memorandum to the President, May 16, Rostow wrote: "Herewith Gen. Taylor's thoughts, in support of Amb. Bunker, on the need to go slow on total bombing cessation." A notation by the President on the covering note reads: "Walt--Review with Rusk & Clifford. L"
Mr. President:
In his cable of May 10 (Section II, Saigon 26928),/2/ Ellsworth Bunker makes a case against a total cessation of bombing of North Viet-Nam for an inadequate return to which I heartily subscribe. To gain the advantages from a total cessation which he seeks and to avoid the adverse consequences he foresees (suspicion and despair in South Viet-Nam; encouragement to increased violence in North Viet-Nam), I would suggest the adoption of the following negotiation position, immediately or progressively as the talks develop:
/2/Document 228. Commenting on the views of both Bunker and Taylor in a May 18 memorandum to Rostow, Ginsburgh noted that they "involve potential pitfalls if not properly related to the total talking-fighting scenario." He advised against any public disavowal of the San Antonio formula and equating attacks on Saigon with those in the Hanoi-Haiphong area. He recommended that the administration "use the very next occasion of any significant enemy offensive action to resume bombing between 19 and 20" parallels or, even if the NVA/VC did not attack in South Vietnam, resume bombing anyway if several weeks of no progress at Paris elapsed. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan, Misc. & Memo's, Vol. I)
a. Tacit or overt disavowal of the San Antonio formula.
While insistence on evidence of "productive" discussions as a price for a total cessation of bombing offers possibilities for maneuver under the San Antonio formula, the "no advantage" condition has always been difficult to use to advantage. To equate "no advantage" to the maintenance of normal levels of infiltration poses impossible problems of establishing what is normal and of proving departures from that normal after we have stopped the bombing.
However, we now have the possibility of getting rid of the San Antonio formula on the ground that it has been invalidated by subsequent events which make it impossible for us to assume that no advantage would be taken of a total cessation of bombing. Since March 31, we have instituted a unilateral geographical restraint on our bombing and the enemy response to it has been to take the fullest advantage of it by conducting infiltration at an ever increasing rate and by resuming the attack of South Vietnamese cities after the pattern of the Tet offensive. It is impossible to consider a further reduction of our bombing until these escalatory acts of the enemy cease and we receive some tangible evidence indicating the adoption of appropriate restraints in compensation for the present restrictions on our bombing,
b. Resumption of bombing between 19th and 20th parallel.
We have this action available to us at any time. We would be justified in taking it now but I would prefer holding it for use at some point during negotiations when it will produce maximum effect. If our adversaries reject our demand for the restraints mentioned in the preceding paragraph, that would be an excellent time to renew our bombing up to the 20th parallel.
c. Discussions of total cessation of bombing.
The foregoing actions would not preclude a continuing discussion of a total cessation of bombing but we should try to keep it within the confines of the total package of issues to be negotiated. The bombing is our primary "persuader" and should be retained to the last to make a maximum contribution to "prompt and productive" discussions and agreements. We should not be reluctant to resume bombing in the Hanoi-Haiphong area whenever it becomes apparent that the enemy is increasing his activities in the South or deliberately stalling the negotiations.
If you see any merit in the foregoing views, I would suggest that they be passed to our negotiators in Paris.
MDT
232. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 14, 1968, 1:10-2:30 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret. The President's Daily Diary indicates the meeting lasted until 3:03 p.m. (Ibid.)
NOTES OF TUESDAY LUNCHEON
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
The President: I do not know what we should do about conference report on taxes. Labor is completely against it. If we don't do it, Congress will go for more than $6 billion. Mills has gotten by with an increase in debt limit without trouble in the past. Watson says he cannot live with the ceiling under this conference report. Nitze says he can't live with it at Defense, but Budget tells me you can by substituting military for civilians in jobs.
Secretary Rusk: We do not have recommendations of our team about how to handle tomorrow's Paris meeting. We either must speed up delegation or slow down talks. There was nothing new on the first day. We must not get too itchy to move on to new steps. We may want to repeat a few lines on Laos and Cambodia. I am concerned about time factors. We should tomorrow stick to opening statement--not push on to something new./2/
/2/That evening at 7:30 p.m., Rostow sent the President a copy of a proposed telegram written by Rusk and concurred in by Clifford, containing a redraft of the statement to be made by Harriman on May 15. (Ibid., National Security File, Files of Walt Rostow, Vol. 76) It was transmitted as telegram 164167 to Paris, May 15. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Todel Chron.)
The intervention by Trudeau in Canada is not good. It is like U Thant's--it asks us to stop bombing; doesn't ask Hanoi to do anything./3/
/3/During a visit to Canada that weekend, Thant charged that the U.S. bombing was of "questionable morality and doubtful legality" and urged Johnson to enact an unconditional cessation of bombing. At the same time, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre-Elliot Trudeau issued a similar statement. See The New York Times, May 13-14, 1968.
The President: Are you concerned about Thieu's problem in forming a new cabinet?
Secretary Rusk: Yes, but Ky will go along if there are no changes in general.
Walt Rostow: The "deal" is that Ky will be main negotiator in "your side, our side" situation.
CIA Director Helms: It is troublesome until it settles down.
Secretary Rusk: Are you meeting with South Vietnam legislators?
The President: They are not on the schedule.
Secretary Rusk: They are volatile.
The President: I called Senator Fulbright Friday./4/ He was going to Arkansas. What is the military situation in Vietnam?
/4/No record of the President's call to Fulbright on Friday, May 10, is in his Daily Diary.
General Wheeler: General Westmoreland says it is relatively optimistic. The enemy has taken heavy losses. Westmoreland is coming out of Ashau Valley because of the weather. I do not expect enemy successes.
Secretary Clifford: The breakdown is as follows: I Corps--94 U.S. Maneuver battalions vs. 47 enemy battalions, two to one in our favor. We are in good shape in the coastal areas.
II Corps--the U.S. has 61 Maneuver battalions vs. enemy 25-28.
III Corps--the U.S. has 90 battalions vs. enemy 14-17.
IV Corps--the U.S. has 48 battalions vs. enemy 11-13.
Hence, they are not going to run over us.
Secretary Rusk: Can we avoid massive destruction of housing as we did in Saigon?
General Wheeler: No, except house to house fighting.
Secretary Clifford: 20,000 dwellings were destroyed in Saigon. It was close to Tet figure of 27,000 dwellings destroyed.
The South Vietnamese are quick to call in artillery.
General Wheeler: That is true. They show less restraint than we do.
Secretary Clifford: We have had a good play on the role of South Vietnam. Life did a good story. South Vietnam did well in Ashau Valley.
Ambassador Bunker and General Westmoreland want our negotiations in Paris to have a man with recent Vietnamese experience. General Wheeler and the Pentagon favor it. Secretary Rusk and I think we must be careful that man is not too much brass. We think it would be good on a rotating basis available to them. We don't want him to be of high rank./5/
/5/In telegram 26832 from Saigon, May 9, for Rusk and Clifford, Bunker despaired that "no high level military officer from here thoroughly conversant with and up to date on the whole military situation has been added to the staff to help Averell and Cy interpret what is going on here." He suggested that following a proposal by Westmoreland, a military officer could be sent to Paris from Vietnam every 2 weeks on a rotating basis. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET) In a May 9 note to Nitze, Read indicated that Rusk, Bundy, and Rostow concurred with the proposal, and he requested that Nitze likewise concur and note his acceptance in a transmission of the proposal to Clifford. There is no indication of concurrence from either Nitze or Clifford on the memorandum. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: I would have no problem with rotating Colonels.
General Wheeler: It would be good to do it on a two-week basis.
Secretary Clifford: Let's do it with no higher than Colonels sent.
Secretary Rusk: Is that okay with the President?
The President: Yes.
Bombing Targets Between 19th and 20th Parallels
General Wheeler: We propose extending armed reconnaissance to 19° 50' to establish buffer zone.
(Jim Jones enters. President agrees to 3:00 p.m. Cabinet Meeting)./6/
/6/The President met with the Cabinet from 3:04 to 5 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's Daily Diary) According to notes of the meeting, which was dominated by discussion of fiscal matters, Clifford reviewed the military situation in Vietnam, specifically noting the following: "there has been a change of tactics between the time of Tet and now. The wearing process is becoming too severe. They attacked 129 cities, following up only in Saigon. As Secretary Rusk said, that has not been successful. The status of our forces is good. We have superior forces in all for corps and sufficient strength in coastal areas to meet the enemy's threat. Effort in May may be the first step with another step in June and July. The enemy has been engaged in a plan to get men down. 113,000 are passing down to South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia. In April and May there were 66,000. We can expect the enemy will maintain a tough military posture during the time of negotiations." Rusk added: "We took major step of de-escalation--has been [bombing restrictions on] 70% of land and 90% of the population. They have done nothing." (Ibid., Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings)
General Wheeler: Showed the President a map with proposed targets. I also recommend seeding and rain-making in area.
The President: Are we together on this?
Secretary Rusk: I have no problems with seedings. The North Vietnamese representative in Paris used the 20th Parallel in his statement.
Secretary Clifford: Psychologically, it would be a bad time to expand our bombings. It would be difficult to ask them to phase down. The targets are not worth the political and psychological problems created. The product of our bombing will not be that important. General Wheeler and I will have to talk this out.
CIA Report
Secretary Rusk: I also am concerned that Hanoi thinks it can mobilize public opinion such that they can do anything and we must stop all our efforts. They must learn you did not withdraw in order to bend to their wishes. I would not oppose strikes between 19th and 20th.
The President: I want to hear both sides. I am sensitive that we do anything to hinder negotiations. I also worry that we kill some of our people by holding back to 19th.
Study this document carefully and let's meet on this tomorrow.
Secretary Clifford: I appear on Friday/7/ before the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee. They will want to get into sensitive areas.
/7/
May 17.Secretary Rusk: I would memorize the March 31 speech and not go beyond it.
Secretary Clifford: I cannot go into the San Antonio formula?
Secretary Rusk: I would say to them what I have said to newsmen: "I make no point in my negotiating with you. We are trying to negotiate with Hanoi in Paris."
Walt Rostow: The rate of infiltration is one you must get down.
President: What are the latest figures?
General Wheeler: Starting in November through May, we show 113,400 infiltrees. (These are starts--not actual infiltrators into the South.) During March, April and May, there were 76,000 people on the move. They will start to arrive in June, extending into August for another round of attacks in July.
The President: I got the impression that since Tet there were 100,000 starting down.
CIA Director Helms: The figure was 80,000.
Walt Rostow: 100,000 since January 1.
CIA Director Helms: That's right.
General Wheeler: Two Divisions in North Vietnam are starting to move.
[Omitted here is discussion of the situation in Czechoslovakia and postponement of the convening of the UN General Assembly.]
Walt Rostow: I have analyzed the North Vietnamese statement in Paris./8/ It says again that the United States is the aggressor. "U Thant, DeGaulle, Senator Kennedy and Fulbright say you should stop bombing." They want world opinion to sway us. The sooner we show we will do what is right, the better.
/8/See Document 230.
233. Notes of Meeting/1/
Washington, May 15, 1968, 5:53-6:50 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, Tom Johnson's Notes of Meetings. Top Secret.
NOTES ON THE MEETING IN THE CABINET ROOM
THOSE ATTENDING THE MEETING WERE
The President
Secretary Rusk
Secretary Clifford
General Wheeler
CIA Director Helms
Walt Rostow
George Christian
Tom Johnson
CIA Director Helms: There has been no use of airfield on May 13, 14 and 15 by MIG 21's or forays south of the 20th Parallel. There has been an increase in SAM emplacements. They do try to knock everything out of the air down as far as Danang when they operate out of it, including B 52's if they can./2/
/2/In CM-3282-68 to Clifford, May 8, Harold Johnson noted that Sharp had requested authorization to pursue enemy planes and bomb enemy targets such as Bai Thuong Airfield, a major staging area for MiG attacks, and the Thanh Hoa bridge, actions with which the JCS concurred. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET S) In a May 15 memorandum to Rusk, Read noted that both Bundy and Katzenbach had concurred in the request for authorization but wanted greater guarantees that the 20th parallel would not be crossed. (Ibid.)
Secretary Rusk: UPI 88 is most unfortunate. (UPI 88 attached.)/3/
/3/Not printed. United Press International news story 88, datelined Saigon, May 15, reported leaked information from "authoritative military sources" that permission for an attack on Bai Thuong Airfield was withheld because of its potential impact on the Paris talks and that this decision underscored the administration's de facto limitation of the bombing to the 19th parallel.
Secretary Clifford: The reasons why I think the President should delay a decision for a week are:/4/
/4/Clifford's reasons for not expanding the bombing up to the 20th parallel are derived from two memoranda he received from Warnke. In the first, dated May 14, Warnke noted the disadvantageous position of the DRV by having to talk while bombing continued; therefore, "this geographic expansion of the bombing would enable the North Vietnamese to get off the hook on which they are now impaled" and lead to a hardening of their negotiating position or to the collapse of the Paris talks. (Washington National Records Center, Department of Defense, OSD Files: FRC 330 73 A 1304, VIET 385.1 (Jan-May 1968)) In his second memorandum, May 15, Warnke described analyses of several agencies regarding the air interdiction campaign, which demonstrated the "pointlessness" of expanding the bombing up to the 20th parallel. He cited the CIA's assessment that a greater concentration of attacks would not significantly impact infiltration routes and noted the conclusion of the President's Science Advisory Board (PSAB) "that we are at least as well off with our present campaign restricted to the southern area of the Panhandle of North Vietnam as we would be with any other bombing campaign which would involve the northern parts of that country." (Ibid.)
1. In Paris we have a posture based on the March 31 speech, and the fact that we have been bombing only up to the 19th. I do not think we should be the first to change our position.
2. Our hope is that we can persuade them to de-escalate, such as demilitarization of the DMZ. We are in a weak position if we take an escalatory step.
If you do the job on the airfield you hit it hard and pound it later.
3. They are negotiating while we bomb up to the 19th. They may have to ask for total cessation or no more conversations. There is a question of face involved.
4. Curious Oriental approach--this action could give them reason to break off negotiations. It is small chance, but I do not like to gamble on it.
5. The target is not important enough to warrant this. It will not affect the future of the war. The CIA says "it would hinder but not seriously impede" flow into the South./5/
/5/The CIA's assessment is quoted in Warnke's May 15 memorandum to Clifford.
The President's annual science advisory report says this type of bombing doesn't seriously affect their movement./6/ We might cut the flow down 25%, but it will not cut down much.
/6/PSAB Chairman Donald Hornig had presented the Board's findings during a May 3 meeting with Rostow, Wheeler, and McConnell. The report noted that infiltrated supplies stood only a 10 percent chance of interdiction while in North Vietnam but a 25 percent chance of being interdicted in Laos. It also concluded that an expansion of the bombing to the 20th parallel would not appreciably impact the enemy's infiltrative capabilities, but conversely a halt to the bombing over the remaining territory of the DRV "would not result in an appreciable increase in the movement of supply." (Memoranda from Rostow to the President, May 4 and May 6, memorandum from Ginsburgh to Rostow, May 6, and memorandum from Hornig to the President, May 6; all in the Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, 3 F-Memos on Bombing in Vietnam, 3/67-10/68)
Therefore, it is not worth the risk. The talks are going well. They have not laid down any ultimatums. The polemics were expected.
They might take some action. If they did, I would not object to hitting the airfield. If they do not move within a week, you may want to reconsider this action.
Secretary Rusk: We have three proposals:
1. Challenge and pursuit between 19th and 20th by our aircraft.
2. Strike the airfield.
3. Targets.
I do not think the "escalation" argument holds. They have taken advantage of our restraint. They have moved planes south of the 20th. They are negotiating expecting us to operate up to the 20th.
I worry about UPI 88 very much. It confirms to Hanoi there is a 19th parallel confinement. We should not let MIG's operate between 19th and 20th.
I would authorize air to engage MIG's and use Talos missiles.
I suggest the JCS send a message on the gravity of this leak. It looks like an effort to put pressure on Washington.
I would put off until next week hitting the airfield.
Secretary Clifford: I would hope we wouldn't do it. This is an overt act on our part. They will pick it up immediately. We do not want to give them that type of argument. Planes could get north of the 20th.
General Wheeler: The JCS suggests only VFR conditions on attack on the base. (Visual flight rules.) Control system would be for electronic planes warning them of the 20th penetration. There is a possibility of penetration.
From the military point of view, these are worthwhile targets. MIG's can operate off sod field. It is a staging field. They can refuel, go down to the south and sooner or later try to knock off a B 52. It also gives them a chance to hit at our planes in Laos.
They have stacked up supplies. They are moving three times as much supply into the south, including PT boats. They pose a threat to naval forces. They have 76,000 men on the road south. They may move the 330th division and the 350th division. On the 19th of May--Ho has a birthday. We may have some surprises.
Military targets are worthwhile.
Secretary Rusk: We did not promise not to put U.S. aircraft north of the 20th. We promised not to bomb. If a plane veers over 20th in a turn, I have no problems.
We do not want steady erosion of our strength due to Joe Clark,/7/ U Thant, Trudeau of Canada, and others.
/7/Senator Joseph Clark.
From a political point of view, we must let them know our position of March 31 cannot be steadily eroded by world opinion.
I would take it in stages. First, engage them in air.
Walt Rostow: World opinion we must consider, but we must remember they have shown an act of goodwill only by coming to the conference table and demanding a complete halt to bombing without any response by them.
The President: Jorden is doing an unusually good job in Paris. But all of us here should talk to opinion molders.
I consider UPI 88 rank insubordination. I am concerned.
I did not like the story on the draft being the lowest in some time. This looks like a blueprint of deterioration.
You do not get any gains at a peace table by weakness.
Walt Rostow: We must show them they can't push us back by this kind of pressure. They are taking our temperature. We are getting nowhere now with formal fencing.
I think we should bring aircraft in, both in the air and with route reconnaissance. Up to Route 7. We should move back in quietly.
Would they break up the negotiations? Nobody knows. The intensity of their movements give us a case that they aren't interested in serious talks. They have not done much at all in Hanoi except conventional propaganda.
The President: We can't win war or peace based on public opinion. We should show whatever strength we can. I do not think this will affect the negotiations. We should not go above the 20th parallel. All of Clark's arguments will apply in a week. We will wait until next Tuesday,/8/ as Clark suggests.
/8/May 21.
We already have made an overly generous concession by taking Hanoi and Haiphong off the list.
After Tuesday, have a few planes up in that area very carefully.
General Wheeler: The recommendations came out of the Embassy.
Walt Rostow: It was signed Bunker./9/
/9/See Document 228.
The President: We have got to do anything we can to nick them.
We ought to support our men or get out. I am not for this gradualism. If it busts up the meeting, they weren't interested in serious talks anyway.
Go out with wire to Harriman./10/
/10/A possible reference to telegram 165857 to Paris, May 17. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, A/IM Files: Lot 93 D 82, HARVAN-(Outgoing)-May 1968)
234. Memorandum From Daniel I. Davidson and Richard C. Holbrooke of the U.S. Delegation to the Vietnam Peace Talks to Ambassador Harriman and Ambassador Vance/1/
Paris, May 16, 1968.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S-AH Files: Lot 71 D 461, Chron.-1968--Mr. Davidson. Secret.
SUBJECT
Is Hanoi Signaling a Possible DMZ for Bombing Trade?
Among the most interesting aspect's of Thuy's May 15 statement was his treatment of the DMZ./2/ His description of American military action in the DMZ was clear and surprisingly accurate. He did not accuse us of basing artillery in the DMZ but of basing long-range artillery below the DMZ and firing into the DMZ and the area above it. He did not accuse us of basing infantry in the DMZ, or of sending U.S. forces into the northern portion, but he accused us of conducting clearing operations in the southern portion of the DMZ.
/2/In his statement, Thuy insisted that the United States unconditionally end all acts of war such as the bombing and naval attacks in the southern part of North Vietnam, reconnaissance missions, psychological warfare operations, commando raids, and "artillery bombardment from south of the DMZ." (Telegram 14098 from Paris, May 15; ibid., IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345 Peace Conference, Delto Chron.) A summary of the May 15 session was transmitted in telegram 14057 from Paris, May 15. (Ibid.) In a note transmitting a copy of this telegram to the President, May 15, Rostow labeled the session "the hair pulling contest in Paris." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I)
Thuy then stated that the U.S. must cease its arrogant sabotage of the DMZ and the firing of its artillery units into the DMZ and across into the territory of the DRV and it must also pull out all its own and its satellite forces from the southern portion of the DMZ. This demand was apparently emphasized by the North Vietnamese spokesman at his press conference yesterday.
It is possible that this is Hanoi's way of beginning a discussion of the DMZ, a subject they know is of prime importance to us. There are other indications suggesting that the North Vietnamese may be trying to signal their interest in a detailed discussion of the DMZ. Manac'h told Anderson/3/ (who passed it on to Vance) that he thought the DRV was interested in the possibilities of a deal involving the DMZ. Bui Diem said that French journalists had told him that if the U.S. had first stopped the bombing, North Vietnam might be willing to make a deal concerning the DMZ.
/3/Robert Anderson, Political Counselor at the Embassy in France.
In our previous internal discussions, many of us had regarded an attempt to obtain a truly demilitarized DMZ as hopeless, since standing by itself, the result of that achievement would so strongly favor us. What Hanoi might be trying to do with its accusations of U.S. violations of the DMZ is to create a situation where it looks as if demilitarization is a concession (or move towards the Geneva Accords) by both sides. Actually, as Hanoi knows, the trade would be the DMZ for a bombing cessation. The difference between the apparent trade and actual trade would allow Hanoi to contend it had never negotiated over bombing and that the U.S. had stopped unconditionally. In this sense it would be like our old Phase A-Phase B formula. The resemblance increases if Phase A is to be the stopping of bombing and Phase B demilitarization of the DMZ.
Hanoi knows full well the importance we attach to the DMZ. It must have realized that we will not cease military operations in the DMZ unless it does. It is possible that in their discussion yesterday they have defined the actions in the DMZ which they wish us to take in return for similar actions on their part./4/
/4/Telegram [document number not declassified] from Paris, May 16, reported that Harriman and Vance suggested waiting until after the meeting on May 18 with the DRV delegation before resuming bombing in order to give the North Vietnamese a chance to respond with a proposition on the DMZ. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I) Rostow sent the telegram to the President at 1 p.m. on May 16.
235. Telegram From the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State/1/
Saigon, May 16, 1968, 1220Z.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 VIET. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Received at 11:25 a.m. The telegram is printed in full in Pike, The Bunker Papers, Vol. 2, pp. 439-444.
27497. For the President from Bunker. Herewith my fifty-first weekly message.
1. A number of significant events occurred during the past week.
2. The back of the enemy attack on Saigon has been broken and again he has suffered extremely heavy casualties. From the beginning of the attacks on the night of May 4-5 to midnight May 15, in the country as a whole the enemy lost 11,633 killed (more than half in the Saigon area) and well over 2,000 weapons. Friendly losses for the same period were 907 KIA, 169 missing, and something over 300 weapons. The enemy clearly suffered a heavy setback militarily. But I think it is also clear that he had objectives other than military. One was an attempt to bolster his position at Paris and impress American and world opinion with his ability to mount substantial campaigns against the cities and towns of South Vietnam. In shifting their strategy from the countryside to the cities, and especially Saigon, they are hoping by means of repeated attacks, raids, sabotage, shelling and the destruction of more and more parts of the city to undermine the fabric of government and to produce the uprising that would destroy it. One cannot ignore the fact that in creating another 125,000 refugees or evacuees in Saigon and Gia Dinh and in the severe damage or destruction of another 16,000 houses (probably a conservative estimate) the enemy has had a considerable measure of success. In the recent attacks, except for I Corps and Saigon, mostly by rocket and mortar fire, much of the enemy's main force has been uncommitted and he is, therefore, in a position to continue his harassing attacks. That he will continue to be defeated and suffer heavy losses, I have no doubt. But if he continues to create refugees, to destroy and damage houses and industrial plants, the question is how long this can be endured without threatening all that has been achieved here.
3. Hanoi, I think, is taking a calculated gamble, believing that our desire for peace and to deescalate the war is now so great that we cannot reverse this trend, that we will not dare to restore full bombing of the North or retaliate against Hanoi. It is for this reason that in my two messages this past week (Saigon 26928 and 27121)/2/ I urged that we not agree to cease our bombing of the North without specific commitments from Hanoi with respect to activity in the South. It seems to me we should make it clear that the attacks against Saigon and the cities, which are essentially attacks on civilians, are just as much "taking advantage" of the San Antonio formula as the doubling of the rate of infiltration which has occurred since August-September 1967 and the attacks on the demilitarized zone; and that these cannot be carried out with impunity and without fear of retribution.
/2/Telegram 26928 is Document 228. Telegram 27121 is not printed. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET/CROCODILE)
4. Thieu inaugurated a series of weekly radio and television speeches to the nation May 9. It was a good speech reviewing the impact of the recent attacks, noting the heavy casualties inflicted on the enemy, but also the damage and suffering caused by the Communists. He emphasized the fact that the enemy had increasingly resorted to sabotage, assassination, and indiscriminate shelling accompanied by considerable political activity. He congratulated the people and the armed forces for their performance during this new test of their courage and determination. He concluded his speech by expressing the hope that in his next address to the nation, probably this week, he would be able to speak to them on the subject of "reorganizing" the government.
5. In my talk with him on May 14, Thieu said that he was in the final stages of deciding on the new structure of the cabinet and was examining with Tran Van Huong names for those to be replaced. He said that he had talked with Ky on the day before and had overcome his objections to Huong as Prime Minister. Thieu himself had canvassed the whole field and remarked that, "the fact is there is no one to appoint Prime Minister except Huong." His decision not to make any change in the military commands is also reassuring. This presumably, for the present at least, will apply also to General Loan as Director-General of the National Police. In any case, it appears now doubtful that Loan will be able to resume his duties for some time. His leg wound is apparently serious enough to make it possible that some amputation may be necessary. Even if his leg is saved, he will lose some mobility and it seems unlikely that he can continue actively as police director. The circumstances under which this situation has developed are such as to avoid what might have been a source of friction between Thieu and Ky.
6. Concern over the subject of negotiations seems to be a countrywide subject in South Vietnam at present, linked, as it is, to the future of every South Vietnamese in the most direct way. Reports from various sources in II, III, and IV Corps, I think, give some general indications of how the average person is thinking. An observer from Gia Dinh Province in III Corps feels that the peace initiative had produced three divergent positions: in the first group are GVN officials, the military, wealthy businessmen, some educators, Catholics and those who came South after 1954. This group strongly opposes peace moves at this time, for it feels that the GVN is in no position to emerge from talks with results that will be acceptable; that the result of talks would see the formation of a coalition government with eventual takeover by the Communists. In the second group are low to middle income urban workers who were initially pleased with the prospects of peace, but now seem concerned about their economic future in a peace-time situation without the U.S. presence. In the third group are the peasants and farmers in rural areas without any political views or ideological beliefs who would welcome an early end to the fighting on practically any terms.
7. In II and IV Corps also, there seems to be evidence that the urban and rural poor want peace more than anything else and are not greatly concerned in the manner in which this might be achieved. There is on the other hand a growing body in the cities who have seen death and destruction all around them, who have been outraged by the terror tactics of the Viet Cong, and who are increasingly apprehensive of any arrangement which would threaten to bring the Communists to power. In the rural areas also, although there is much bending with the wind, there is growing resentment at the enemy tactics of forced heavy taxation, of abduction, and assassination and terror.
8. A welcome development of this attitude has been the gathering momentum of the self-defense program throughout the country. In a radio and television speech on May 11, Vice President Ky outlined the objectives of the people's self-defense organization: 1) to mobilize the entire population; 2) to create a force in the rear areas to release the army for combat; 3) to strengthen the will of the people for defense of the national cause; 4) to create a people's force to strengthen the voice of the Republic of Vietnam at the conference table; 5) to permit the country to maintain a total war of an extended duration; and 6) to distribute the national potential rationally to permit it to fight and produce at the same time. The students seem to have taken hold with a good deal of enthusiasm and have already been pressed into service in Saigon. Professor Nguyen Van Truong, of the University of Saigon, remarked that he thought the students were enthusiastic in participating in the defense of the capital and that if the Communists attack them or attempt to kidnap them, they will meet with strong opposition.
9. I have reported quite fully on our discussions with Thieu, Ky, and Dr. Tran Van Don on the subject of peace negotiations. They have been pleased with the two statements made by Ambassador Harriman. But at yesterday's meeting, I sensed some sensitivity on their part that we might be getting into substantive talks without their presence. I note that Ambassador Bui Diem expressed some similar fears in Paris. This continues to be a highly sensitive matter here and could be politically explosive.
[Omitted here is discussion of political, military, and economic matters, pacification, and urban recovery.]
Bunker
236. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant (Rostow) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 18, 1968, 12:40 p.m.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Paris Todel-Delto 11, 5/17-24/68. Secret; Nodis; Harvan.
Mr. President:
Herewith Harriman's brief account of today's slugfest.
We're clearly deadlocked on reciprocity; and we shall see whether:
--they stick and test us by seeing how long we can take it, while they try to mount political pressure on us;
--or, let some third party suggest a face-saving form of reciprocity.
Their choice will be significant. If they hold--and are in no hurry--it suggests they are content to enjoy peace and quiet down to the 19th parallel and await political events in Saigon and the U.S.
If something turns up on the side in coming days, it suggests they may be in Paris for serious business.
W.W. Rostow/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
Attachment
Telegram From the Embassy in France to the Department of State
Paris, May 18, 1968, 1450Z.
14293. Delto 82. From Harrison and Vance. Ref Paris 14240 (Delto 76); State 165857 (Todel 108)./3/
/3/Telegram 14240/Delto 76 from Paris, May 17, transmitted the delegation's planned opening remarks. (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I) These remarks had been redrafted in accordance with instructions transmitted in telegrams 165857 and 165860 to Paris, both May 17. (Ibid., Harvan Paris Todel-Delto 11, 5/17-24/68) According to a notation on a May 17 memorandum from Rostow to the President, the President affirmed Rostow's suggestion that Harriman make a statement noting the "positive propositions" he had made as well as "the areas of potential agreement" that had been indicated. (Ibid.)
1. May 18 meeting opened 10:30 a.m. and ended 2:40 p.m. Thuy asked to speak first and them launched into a diatribe concerning US offenses and crimes against North Viet-Nam, South Viet-Nam, Laos, Cambodia, and humanity. He took two hours fifteen minutes to present all this, beginning and ending with rigid statement that purpose of our meeting was to "determine" cessation of bombing and all other acts of war, and when to take up other matters of interest to both sides.
2. I opened with notes (Paris 14240), supplemented by a few comments on the inaccuracies of Thuy's statement. I then moved to the details of North Vietnamese military presence in South Viet-Nam, utilizing large part of info contained in State 165857, plus other info concerning the specific NVN regular army units fighting around Saigon. DRV del squirmed visibly during these remarks.
3. I continued by asking for their response to our proposals on DMZ, Laos and Cambodia, and called upon them to end polemics. I then laid emphasis on the pertinent sentences of the President's March 31 speech, which I stated was the basis for our meeting. I closed by asking again, "What restraints will you take to contribute to peace?"
4. Thuy said he would reply to the questions which I had put to him. He then responded in brief fashion, not really answering any of my questions. He stated categorically that the first thing which had to be determined was when we were going to stop the bombing and all other acts of war. He said only after fulfilling the requirement of cessation of bombing can other questions be taken up. I asked him to read carefully the sentences of the President's March 31 speech to which I had referred, reiterating the danger to US and allied forces. He said it is the US which has launched attacks on the DRV, and it is up to the US to exercise restraint. He added, "The US cannot ask for evidence of restraint on the part of the DRV." Since we had hit a head-on disagreement there were a few moments of silence. Thuy then said he had nothing further to say today and suggested we adjourn. He asked when we would like to meet again, and I suggested Wednesday May 22, to which he agreed./4/
/4/Thuy set the tone during the next meeting on May 22 by re-reading his statement of May 18. (Telegrams 14502/Delto 113 and 14503/Delto 114 from Paris, May 22; National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, IS/OIS Files: Lot 90 D 345, Paris Peace Conference, Delto Chron.) In Intelligence Note No. 371 sent to Rusk, May 20, Hughes noted: "Throughout this week, the Hanoi regime strove hard for propaganda effect, showed itself more sensitive to U.S. propaganda charges than might have been expected, and tried to back up its Paris team with spectacular military gestures and pressures in South Vietnam." (Ibid., Central Files 1967-69, POL 27-14 VIET)
Harriman
237. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
Washington, May 18, 1968.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Country File, Vietnam, Harvan Misc. & Memos, Vol. I. Confidential. Extensive enemy rocket and mortar attacks on Saigon began on May 18, and a separate Capital Military District Command was set up to reduce or eliminate the attacks. Its mission later evolved into one of combating and infiltrating the VCI. (Memorandum from Helms to Rostow, June 17; Central Intelligence Agency, DDO/IMS Files, Job 79-207A, AA-3-FE Division 1968)
Mr. President:
You asked for my comments on Saigon's 27539 (attached)./2/
/2/Not printed. In the telegram, dated May 17, Bunker noted: "I want to make it clear that I am not suggesting cessation of attacks as trade off for stopping bombing. Still less that we should cease fighting while talking. But it seems to me that Hanoi should be made to understand that attacks on Saigon or other centers of population, which are essentially attacks on civilians, are in our view 'taking advantage' of San Antonio formula, and cannot be carried out with impunity and without fear of retaliation. I believe this is just as much 'taking advantage' as the more than doubling of the rate of infiltration which has occurred since August/September 1967, or violation of the DMZ."
My own personal view is that we should not become embroiled in a highly theoretical and "precious" application or interpretation of the San Antonio formula. To me, your speech of March 31 opened a new chapter which brushes aside much of the discussion which preceded it. You paid for that new chapter by a major act of de-escalation. To me, the most important fact about the present situation is that seventy-eight percent of the land area and ninety percent of the population of North Viet-Nam are free from bombing while there is not a single square mile of South Viet-Nam which is immune from Viet Cong and North Vietnamese attacks by rockets, mortars or infantry.
Although you reaffirmed the San Antonio formula in your March 31 speech, I do not believe that we should accept all of the barnacles which accumulated around the San Antonio formula--including the so-called Clifford interpretation.
The simple truth is that no one in the world can tell us what will happen if we stop all of the bombing of North Viet-Nam. Hanoi refuses to tell us and therefore no one else is able to tell us. This is not a problem of diplomatic technique; there are many many ways by which Hanoi could let us know what in fact they would do if we stop all the bombing. This could be done without any loss of face on their part. It boils down to a question of will. Of course they would be glad to exchange some sort of talks, somewhere, for a full cessation of the bombing while they go ahead with their part of the war full scale.
I realize that I am branded as a "hawk" and that this has been an embarrassment to the Administration in some quarters. But looking at all of our experiences in the management of crises in the past three decades, I cannot, for the life of me, see how we can achieve any peace unless some elementary notions of reciprocity, fairness and equity are maintained.
Averell Harriman has already called to the attention of Hanoi the impact of the recent attacks on Saigon on the discussions in Paris and on our attitude toward the good faith of the other side. I don't think that Bunker's cable requires us to do anything different than we have thus far been doing in Paris. But I do believe that our discussions in Paris must be based upon the most simple, honest and fair considerations and that we should not spin spider webs of logic to confuse the requirements of a fair and honorable peace in Southeast Asia. This is why I objected to Averell's use of the so-called "Romanian formula" at the discussions in Paris today.
Hanoi still nurtures the illusion that they can somehow mobilize domestic and world public opinion to force your hand. The beginning of wisdom on their part is a demonstration by us that they cannot succeed in any such nonsense.
Finally, let me say that the present attitude of Hanoi is such that some of the argumentation among our own people is beside the point. Hanoi is not providing any handholds for us to grasp in any direction--therefore we should not come apart among ourselves in the absence of some movement by Hanoi.
Dean Rusk
238. Notes of Secretary of Defense Clifford's Staff Meeting/1/
Washington, May 20, 1968.
/1/Source: U.S. Army Military History Institute, Harold K. Johnson Papers, Notes on Meetings with the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Council, and the President, Dec. 1967-June 1968. No classification marking. The notes were taken by Johnson. According to a notation on the notes, the meeting began at 9:30 a.m. The participants are not indicated.
1. Luncheon meeting w/Mr. McNamara on Saturday 18 May 68.
Discuss SVN and a number of programs.
Most interested in new job and has long-range goals.
2. Paris talks going about as SecDef expected.
NVN maybe be over-doing the propaganda point.
Press cynical about polemics.
Present formal discussions not likely to lead to anything. At some point private contacts and private discussions should be broached. None at this stage.
SVN is concerned at direction of Paris talks.
USG is encouraged with selection of Tran Van Huong.
Encouraging factor in discussions is that no ultimatum has been announced by NVN.
3. Military developments in SEA./2/
/2/Wheeler gave this portion of the briefing. He reviewed the same information in CM-3333-68 sent to Rostow on May 20. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/337 (20 May 68))
75-85,000 in pipeline moving south.
As many as 35,000 could--rpt could--be in SVN.
Peak period of resupply into northern provinces--July-Aug.
10,000 tons moving through Thanh Hoa.
51 new trans-shipment points between 17-19 .
Yen Bai completed.
4-5 SAM BNs operational below Thanh Hoa.
Enemy improving his offensive capability and strengthening his defense of his home land.
Need to discuss strategy followed in the countryside./3/
/3/According to Nitze's handwritten notes of the meeting, dated May 22, Carver followed Wheeler with an assessment of the internal military and political situation inside Vietnam. Nitze's notes of this reads: "Danang, serious, 2 NVA Divisions, seems under control. Huong--Southerner, strengthen base. Difficulty--may not sit well with Ky, Khang, Vien. Were not formally consulted. Generals displeased. Thieu & Huong need tact during next ten days." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Nitze Papers, Defense Department, Deputy Secretary of Defense Notes, 1968, 4 of 6)
[Omitted here is discussion of a march on Washington, Clifford's appearance before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on various military-related issues.]
239. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense Clifford/1/
JCSM-315-68
Washington, May 21, 1968.
/1/Source: Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 911/372 (13 May 68) IR 3945. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Adequacy of the Strategic Reserve and Related Matters
1. Reference is made to your memorandum, dated 13 May 1968, in which you requested answers to five specific questions concerning the adequacy and readiness of our strategic reserve and the status of plans for the expansion and modernization of the Armed Forces of the Government of South Vietnam./2/
/2/Clifford transmitted the questions to Wheeler in this May 13 memorandum. The President had asked Clifford in a May 7 memorandum to ask the JCS to respond to these questions. (Both in Johnson Library, Clark Clifford Papers, Memos on Vietnam, February-August 1968)
2. The answers to the questions posed in the reference are contained in the Appendix hereto and, for the most part, represent a compilation of information previously provided, updated to insure currency. More detailed answers to questions 3 and 4 will be provided in the response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 16 April 1968, subject: "RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U)."/3/ The reply by the Joint Chiefs of Staff is expected to be forwarded during the week of 20 May 1968.
/3/In this memorandum to Wheeler, April 16, Nitze argued that given the possibility that an agreement on mutual de-escalation might be achieved at Paris, the JCS needed to develop a plan to reorient the RVNAF toward self-sufficiency. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JMF 911/535 (16 Apr 68))
3. This memorandum will serve to confirm the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on these matters, as presented during their meeting with you on 20 May./4/ A more detailed overview of the entire worldwide US military posture is contained in JCSM-221-68, dated 10 April 1968./5/
/4/See Document 238.
/5/Not found.
4. Without attachment, this memorandum is Unclassified.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler/6/
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates General Wheeler signed the original.
Appendix
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS RELATED TO THE STRATEGIC
RESERVE AND CURRENT CAPABILITIES
Question 1. What can we do to get help to Westmoreland if he becomes involved in another major enemy offensive?
Answer
1. (TS) Army. There are currently no CONUS-based Army forces that are deployable. Under emergency conditions, four brigades above Program 6, totaling about 17,000 personnel, could be provided during July-August by drawing down other units of the Strategic Army Force (STRAF), but these brigades could not be sustained on a permanent basis. This would then leave the STRAF no combat-ready Army forces available to reinforce Europe--or to meet possible contingencies elsewhere in the world.
2. (TS) Navy. At the present time, Seventh Fleet Navy forces are heavily committed to operations in Southeast Asia. In the event of another major enemy offensive, all Seventh Fleet units could be provided to Southeast Asia for a surge effort of about 30 days duration. After notification and transit time, on-line CVAs could be increased from three to five, cruisers from one to three, and destroyers providing naval gunfire support from seven to thirteen. To continue the surge effort beyond this would require redeployment of naval units from other worldwide assets. As an example, to maintain more than 3 CVAs on Yankee Station would necessitate reduction of CVA deployments to the Mediterranean.
3. (TS) Air Force. Following the deployments approved under Programs 5 and 6, the only Air Force tactical fighter and reconnaissance units which will be available for immediate deployment are two F-100 tactical fighter squadrons and two reconnaissance squadrons ordered to active duty from the Air National Guard. In addition, 32 AC-119 gunships can be provided between July and December, eight AC-130 gunships provided in September, and 50 A-1 aircraft between July and November.
4. (TS) Marine Corps. One and one-ninth Marine division/wing team (MEF) is available but could be deployed only by revision of current tour/rotation policies and involuntary extension of terms of service and could not be sustained without mobilization. One F-4 squadron at Iwakuni, Japan, can be deployed and sustained. There are no Marine Corps forces included in the approved Reserve callup.
Question 2. What is the status of our plans to strengthen the strategic reserve? How can they be further expedited? When do we need to call up additional reserves? Will anything more be required in the way of Congressional action?
1. (TS) Status of Plans to Strengthen Strategic Reserve
a. On 2 April 1968, a three-increment Reserve callup totaling 56,877 was recommended for the period April through May for support of Southeast Asia deployments and for the initial rebuilding of the strategic reserve. This force included five infantry brigades and two tactical fighter squadrons (see DJSM-380-68, dated 2 April 1968).
b. On 6 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reaffirmed the above position in response to an OSD alternative proposal and recommended that the decision on subsequent Reserve callup be reviewed in 30 days and that inactivation of the 6th Infantry Division be delayed pending this review. Actual callup authorized on 11 April 1968 was 24,550, which included two infantry brigades and two tactical fighter squadrons (see JCSM-215-68, dated 6 April 1968)./7/ On 7 May 1968 this number was reduced by 1262 personnel when the callup of selected Air Force units was cancelled.
/7/Not printed. (Department of Defense, Official Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, JMF 911/372 (9 Mar 68))
c. On 10 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that measures should be taken to improve the military posture in order to:
(1) Sustain and permit more effective use of forces already in Southeast Asia.
(2) Provide and sustain the additional forces approved for deployment to Southeast Asia.
(3) Restore and maintain NATO-deployed and augmentation forces.
(4) Restore and maintain other deployed forces.
(5) Respond effectively to other contingencies.
(6) Establish and maintain a high state of readiness in the Reserve component forces in order to augment Active Forces rapidly, when required.
The Joint Chiefs of Staff also stated that the level of forces necessary to achieve the required posture was set forth in JSOP 70-77, emphasized the urgency in attaining these levels, and pointed out that the need to move ahead quickly on reequipping and modernizing our forces was of the utmost importance (see JCSM-221-68, dated 10 April 1968)
d. The Army has initiated planning based on a tentative OSD decision for a 4-1/3 division STRAF which, in fact, would reduce rather than increase the capability for strengthening the STRAF. Similarly, Air Force capability is being reduced by a directed inactivation of B-52 and F-101 squadrons and Navy ASW capability is being reduced by directed inactivation of CVS/CVSGs and VP squadrons.
2. (TS) How Can the Plans for Strengthening the Strategic Reserve be Expedited?
a. By prompt approval of the recommendations contained in JCSM-215-68, dated 6 April 1968. In that memorandum, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that without the full callup (56,877) it is unlikely that units of the strategic reserve could be brought to levels of training necessary for contingency deployments because of personnel turbulence imposed by the need to sustain Southeast Asia deployments. The principal need is to restore a deployment capability; this requires trained, deployable manpower. The only source, on a timely basis, is from callup of Reserve units and individuals, as well as extensions of terms of service. Alternatively, for the Army, continue to raise the level of readiness of the 6th Infantry Division force.
b. By deferring programmed inactivation of units within the current active structure and by bringing to a high state of readiness certain portions of the Ready Reserve.
3. (TS) When Do We Need to Call Up Additional Reserves?
a. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that a total of 56,877 be alerted for callup prior to 29 May 1968.
b. Without a congressional extension of the President's authority, which expires on 30 June 1968, the decision to call up the additional forces recommended by the Joint Chiefs of Staff must be made by 30 May 1968, if the desired 30-day notice to the Reserve units is to be available. This means action should be initiated now to seek such a callup. It may be desirable to bring certain Air Force units of the Ready Reserve to a high state of readiness (Combat Beef) rather than to call them immediately to active duty.
c. In addition to the Reserve recall of 58,877 personnel to sustain Southeast Asia deployments, Navy personnel deficiencies require the extension of terms of service and the recall of individual Reservists.
4. (TS) Will Anything More be Required in the Way of Congressional Action?
Required actions are:
(1) Supplemental appropriations.
(2) Extension of Presidential authority for callup of Reserve units beyond 30 June 1968.
(3) Authority to call individual reservists for periods of active duty up to 24 months.
(4) Authority to extend terms of service for a period not to exceed 12 months.
Question 3. What is the status of US/GVN plans for expanding the Armed Forces in South Vietnam? What are the target operational dates for the new units? How realistic are the forecasts of operational readiness?
Question 4. What are the critical equipment and personnel shortages which must be overcome if the foregoing plans are to be executed on time?
Answer
The answers to questions 3 and 4 are being developed in detail in response to a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, dated 16 April 1968, subject: "RVNAF Improvement and Modernization (U)." The program now being prepared by the Joint Staff and the Services, is expected to cost approximately $1.5 billion over the next 5 years. It provides for the modernization of the existing FY 1968 force structure and for further expansion and modernization of the RVNAF structure to a strength of about 801,000. Additionally, it provides for the turnover of US equipment to the RVNAF if negotiations require a mutual US/North Vietnamese Army withdrawal of forces. While it appears that the strength goal of about 801,000 can be reached by end FY 1969, the complete expansion and modernization of the South Vietnamese Air Force and Navy will not be achieved prior to FY 1973, due to the time necessary to reach minimum required training levels for the relatively sophisticated equipment to be provided. The time to reach minimum training levels is the controlling factor in the rate of transfer for some equipments. There will be some adverse impact on the readiness of CONUS and non-Southeast Asia deployed US forces as a result of equipment being diverted to the RVNAF.
Question 5. Are the Joint Chiefs of Staff satisfied that we are running no unacceptable risks in this period of reduced strategic capabilities? What happens if the enemy were to increase pressures in Laos, Thailand, Korea, the Middle East or elsewhere?
Answer
(TS) No. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that we are running high risks in the current situation. In JCSM-221-68, dated 10 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that the issue which most concerns them is the decreased readiness of US forces worldwide and the limited capability of the strategic reserve. Further, the risks associated with the current military posture and the possibility of communist-inspired diversionary contingencies erupting elsewhere increase as the commitment in Southeast Asia is prolonged. The current negotiations with North Vietnam provide no valid basis for a relaxation of efforts to improve our limited military capability. The following are of specific concern:
a. There are no major Army combat forces ready to reinforce NATO on a timely basis without redeployment from Southeast Asia. Only 1-1/3 Marine division/wing teams are available to meet the M+60 commitment of 2 MEFs to NATO without redeployment from Southeast Asia and then they can be sustained only under conditions of mobilization. Naval reinforcement of NATO (10 CVAs and seven CVSs earmarked) would require substantial redeployment from Southeast Asia. Air Force augmentation to USCINCEUR of 37 tactical fighter squadrons can be provided by redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia and Korea and from the remaining Air National Guard
b. Until the seizure of the USS Pueblo, the Air Force had no tactical air support forces in Korea; they now have five tactical fighter and one interceptor squadron there on a temporary basis. On 22 April 1968, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that the Air Force posture in Korea be maintained, and they provided a plan to stabilize this posture through CY 1968 (see JCSM-215-68). Because personnel were deployed on temporary duty, decisions on replacements must be made immediately. The two US divisions deployed in Korea are both operating at reduced strength levels and, from a logistic standpoint, are inadequately supported. As an initial step in improving the level of combat readiness and consequently the defensive capabilities of US Eighth Army, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended that 8,500 filler spaces be authorized in Korea. As of this time, approval has not been granted.
c. Fighter/attack and B-52 sortie rates in the western Pacific and the additional deployment of aircraft to Korea have resulted in a SIOP degradation of about 250 alert weapons programmed against more than 200 targets.
d. Twenty-eight ships of the Atlantic Fleet are now in caretaker/reduced manning status or were decommissioned earlier than planned because of personnel drawdowns to support Southeast Asia and other worldwide commitments. The inability to utilize these ships has worsened the already severely-taxed sustaining base. Additionally, the deficiencies in the material condition of certain ships and aircraft, including their logistic base, and the shortages in certain critical ratings contribute to the steady decline of the staying power of Navy forces.
e. Simultaneous employment of Reserve forces to deal with civil disturbances in a number of different US cities or the prolonged use of Active Forces in this role would reduce further the limited capability to reinforce deployed forces and to respond to other contingencies.
f. The current military posture of the US provides an exceedingly limited range of response options in the event the USSR or CPR and/or their allies choose to exert pressure in locations outside the immediate area of current operations in Southeast Asia. A case in point is Korea, currently the most volatile region outside Southeast Asia and one in which the United States would be directly involved from the outset. In the event of hostilities there, timely reinforcement would be extremely doubtful. The National Command Authority thus would be confronted with an early decision to employ nuclear weapons in order to avert disaster to US and ROK forces and the possible loss of South Korea to communist aggression.
g. Increased procurement funds and production capacity must also be made available to resolve the many deficiencies in our worldwide logistic support forces, facilities, and materiel.
h. Should increased pressures in any area result in a requirement to commit significant US forces, such forces could only be made available through immediate mobilization of Reserve component forces and/or by the redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia. In the former case, the most constraining factor is time, both to train and deploy Reserve component forces as well as production lead time required for essential items of equipment which have been withdrawn or diverted to higher priority active units. The redeployment of forces from Southeast Asia would require not only time but, perhaps more importantly, a reassessment of US priority interests with the possible loss of hard-won gains in Southeast Asia.
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