Senator Olympia J. Snowe

SNOWE STATEMENT ON RELEASE OF INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE REPORT ON PRE-WAR INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS

“Stunning revelation of systemic, pervasive flaws in our Intelligence Community”

Contact: Antonia Ferrier/ (202) 224-5344
Friday, July 9, 2004

WASHINGTON, D.C. – Calling it “an inescapable indictment of the status quo,” U.S. Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-Maine), a member of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, issued the following statement on the release today of the 400 page Committee report on pre-Iraq war intelligence assessments. In June 2003, the Committee began reviewing the prewar intelligence assessments leading to war in Iraq. Today’s report marks the completion of the first in a two phase process. The second phase of the Report detailing how policy makers used the intelligence and the prewar assessments about post-war Iraq is expected to be released later this year:

“Today, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence releases a report that is both a detailed, comprehensive cataloguing of the facts on pre-Iraq war intelligence and a stunning revelation of systemic, pervasive flaws in our Intelligence Community that coalesced to produce broad failures in intelligence gathering and analysis. In a new era when our enemies wear no uniforms and pledge allegiance only to causes and not to states, the role of intelligence as our first line of defense becomes all the more vital. Moreover, as the President and Congress must base their decisions regarding our national security, including going to war, on this intelligence, the requirement for timely and accurate intelligence is critical and cannot be overstated. In this light, the facts in this report not only form an inescapable indictment of the status quo, but also beg for a comprehensive structural overhaul of our entire Intelligence Community.

“Before the war, the Intelligence Community assessed that ‘Iraq has chemical and biological weapons...’ Yet, we now know that key judgements relating to Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction program were overstated or were not supported by underlying intelligence reporting.

“With this report, we have an explanation – along with a blueprint of what doesn't work. Intelligence analysis is an imprecise art, with rarely – if ever – any absolutes. However, as this report reveals, it certainly doesn't work when multiple judgments regarding Iraq's Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) capabilities were based on old assumptions, pre-dating the 1991 Gulf War, carried over year after year virtually unchallenged, without any critical re-examination. In short, the perpetuation of a dangerous, monolithic ‘group think’ bred a level of complacency and lack of analytic rigor that spanned more than a decade.

“Intelligence Community analysts, collectors and managers thought Iraq had WMD and examined intelligence reporting through this prism, losing the objectivity essential for unvarnished analysis. For example, the Committee found that the underlying intelligence information did not link any of Iraq’s procurement activities for aluminum tubes, magnets, high speed balancing machines and machine tools–all reasons given for reconstitution– to its nuclear program. Furthermore, despite overwhelming evidence, the CIA dismissed analysis from the nuclear experts at the Department of Energy and the International Atomic Energy Agency suggesting that the aluminum tubes Iraq was trying to procure were more suitable for a conventional rocket program. In addition, this report reveals that Iraq UAV analysts failed to objectively assess intelligence information indicating that reconnaissance or other conventional missions were more likely missions for Iraq’s UAVs.

“As the report cites, the assessments that Iraq has mobile biological weapons facilities and that its biological weapons program was larger and more active than before the Gulf War was largely based on a single human intelligence source whose credibility was questionable and whom the Intelligence Community never directly debriefed. The report details how the assessment that Iraq has chemical weapons and has stockpiled as much as 500 metric tons of chemical agent was based on the layering of analysis on a single stream of intelligence reporting of a tanker truck which analysts assessed to be involved in chemical munitions transshipments.

“After reviewing the 30,000 pages of intelligence assessments and reporting and after interviewing 200 people, we know that the Intelligence Community never adequately explained the uncertainties that existed behind their judgments.

“From our report, we now know that–even after the lack of information sharing was found to have played a key role in the intelligence failures of 9/11, intelligence reporting continues to be highly compartmented and analysts with a ‘need to know’ are not given access to information. Essentially, the Intelligence Community continues to operate in a “stove-piped” manner, preventing critical information sharing essential for sound analysis. For example, the CIA failed to share information on the reliability of biological weapons sources with all biological weapons analysts. Had this information been shared, analysts may have come to different conclusions. One analyst even said that if one of the source’s reporting had been removed from consideration it would have reduced his confidence in the assessment Iraq had BW production units. How can analysts make judgments about issues without the full range of information? How can the best, most unvarnished assessments be produced? How could Iraq’s UAV analyst make fully informed judgements about Iraq’s intentions to use UAVs to target the United States when they did not have access to necessary information?

“It doesn't work when hands-off leadership practices foster an alarming lack of accountability with regard to methods of gathering, analyzing and reporting information. This was most evident when the Secretary of State went before the United Nations, describing Iraq’s mobile production program, referencing the four sources who provided information on this aspect of Iraq’s BW program, believing that the information he was discussing was solid, corroborated, and credible when in fact much of it was not. In fact, from our report, we know that there were credibility problems with each of the four sources cited in the speech.

“It doesn't work when a pervasive risk-averse culture inhibits the conduct of indispensable human intelligence operations. We relied too heavily on information reported by U.N. weapons inspectors and waited until 2000 –two years after inspectors left Iraq--to establish a focused collection effort to target Iraq’s WMD programs. Even more astonishing was the fact that we waited until six weeks before Operation Iraqi Freedom to place an agent on the ground in Iraq. After U.N. inspectors left in 1998, we were left with a vacuum and were forced to rely on foreign government information and other sources with questionable credibility. Analysts, starved for information, were forced turn to outdated vague intelligence from less than credible sources.

“While we must recognize that intelligence is not an exact science, we must be exacting in its pursuit and analysis. Because intelligence is the bedrock of our ability to anticipate and act to meet the new challenges and threats that will continue to confront our nation. What matters is the next step – because it would be a dangerous disservice if we were not to learn from the lessons of this report and fail to institute the appropriate reform and that's where Congress' and the President's responsibility lies.

“A significant leap forward to reform our nation’s Intelligence Community would be to create a Director of National Intelligence (DNI), as I have joined with Senator Feinstein in proposing. It makes no sense to have one person who is the Director of the CIA and who is also responsible for the entire Intelligence Community of 15 agencies. Rather, we need a DNI with cabinet level status – so that person is guaranteed to have the ear of the President now and into the future – and whose sole responsibility is to direct and coordinate the entirety of our national intelligence community to ensure consistent priorities and that all the gears of our intelligence gathering, analysis and reporting are synchronized and focused. Perhaps the most important job the DNI will have is ensuring that the President receives the most objective intelligence – intelligence that is not simply the views of a single agency. A DNI who is in charge of the entire Intelligence Community, without the responsibility of managing another agency, will ensure that all Intelligence Community views are expressed to the President.

“Furthermore, it is critical we establish a single investigative entity that bridges the gap between all the various intelligence agencies in order to identify problem areas to ensure critical deficiencies are addressed before they become crises – or tragedies, and to develop the most efficient and effective ‘best practices’. That's why I've introduced legislation creating an Inspector General (IGI) for the entire Intelligence Community. We can't afford a fragmented approach to producing the best possible intelligence – which is what happens now with individual Inspectors General at each agency. My proposal gives the IGI subpoena powers and access to all employees across all 15 agencies, outlines penalties for failure to cooperate with an investigation, and requires the IGI's final report – which can include disciplinary or criminal action beyond just recommendations – to be submitted to the head of the Intelligence Community and to Congress.

“The fact is, we need a seamless approach to creating continuity for the overall intelligence apparatus and the community-wide IG will be able to look at the big picture and be the definitive ‘clearing house’ for making recommendations for necessary improvements, so we can break down the parochial interests and jurisdictional barriers. Because the only barriers should be the ones we construct between us and our enemies, and the only territorial battles our Intelligence Community should fight are those to protect our territory, our interests, and our people.

“In the end, we need a structure and leadership environment in which the exceptional men and women of our intelligence community can best do their jobs. Our enemies aren't waiting to overcome bureaucratic hurdles and inertia to strike us again – we can't wait in replacing our outmoded Intelligence Community structure and rebuilding an intelligence apparatus equipped not to respond to 21st century threats, but to prevent them. That is the duty to which this reports calls us and to which we must rise.”

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