UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ET AL., APPELLANTS V. MADISON D. LOCKE, ET AL. No. 83-1394 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1984 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Brief for the Appellants PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING In addition to the parties listed in the caption, the United States Department of the Interior; William P. Clark, Secretary of the Interior; the Bureau of Land Management; and Robert F. Burford, Director of the Bureau of Land Management, are appellants; and Rosalie E. Locke, Sam Buccambuso, and Tony Buccambuso are appellees. TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions involved Statement Summary of argument Argument: I. Section 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), is consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment A. Congress has the power to condition retention of an unpatented mining claim located on federal land on a claimant's complaince with the filing requirements of Section 314 B. Section 314(c) is consistent with the requirements of procedural due process C. Section 314(c) does not create an impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment II. Appellees did not retain their mining claims by filing one day late, because Section 314 is not satisfied by "substantial compliance" with its requirements Conclusion Appendix OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the district court (J.S. App. 1a- 13a) is reported at 573 F. Supp. 472. The opinion of the Interior Board of Land Appeals (J.S. App. 16a-21a) is reported at 65 I.B.L.A. 122. JURISDICTION The judgment of the district court (J.S. App. 14a) was entered on October 24, 1983. A notice of appeal (J.S. App. 15a) was filed on November 21, 1983. On January 10, 1984, Justice Rehnquist extended the time for docketing an appeal to and including February 21, 1984, and the Jurisdictional Statement was filed on that date. Probable jurisdiction was noted on June 4, 1984. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252. See J.S. 19 n.20. CONSTITUTIONAL, STATUTORY, AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The relevant constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions are set out in App., infra, 1a-4a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether Section 314 of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744, violates the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the extent it provides that failure to file a timely notice of intention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of annual assessment work shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the claim. 2. Whether Section 314 is satisfied by "substantial compliance" with its requirements, so that appellees retained their mining claims by filing one day late. STATEMENT 1. The Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA or the Act), Pub. L. No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743 (codified at 43 U.S.C. (& Supp. V) 1701 et seq.), made significant changes in the law governing federal land management. FLMPA represented a comprehensive effort by Congress to modernize public land laws and to solve a number of longstanding problems in the area of federal land policy. Among these problems were the lack of centralized information about mining claims on federal lands and the unresolved status of the very large number of stale claims. a. Under the general mining laws, 30 U.S.C. 22 et seq., United States citizens may go on unappropriated, unreserved public lands in order to prospect for and develop certain minerals. An individual who locates a mining claim has the right of exclusive possession of the land for mining purposes and may extract and sell minerals he finds there without paying any royalty to the United States. 30 U.S.C. 26. After making a valuable mineral "discovery," the claimant may hold the land indefinitely, provided he expends $100 per year in assessment work on his claim. 30 U.S.C. 28. If he fulfills certain statutory conditions (including performance of $500 of development work), the claimant may obtain a patent (i.e., purchase the land and minerals) for a nominal sum; however, he is not required to proceed to patent. Until the claimant obtains a patent, paramount title to the land remains in the United States. See 30 U.S.C. 29. Since enactment of the general mining laws in the nineteenth century, Congress has removed a number of minerals from their coverage. /1/ In doing so, however, it generally has left valid existing claims intact. See, e.g., 30 U.S.C. 193; 30 U.S.C. 615; Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., No. 81-1686 (June 6, 1983), slip op. 20-21 & n.15. Prior to the passage of FLMPA, significant problems had developed as a result of the existence of numerous mining claims located on federal lands, combined with the absence of any federal recording system for such claims. Most states imposed recording requirements applicable to mining claims (as authorized by 30 U.S.C. 26), but there was no general federal requirement that a mining claimant record an unpatented mining claim or otherwise notify the Interior Department of the existence of the claim. By the mid-1970s it was estimated that there were more than six million unpatented mining claims on public lands other than national forests; in addition, more than half of the land in the National Forest System was thought to be covered by such claims. S. Rep. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 65 (1975). Many of the claims were believed to be stale. Ibid. See also Public Land Law Review Commission, One Third of the Nation's Land: A Report to the President and to the Congress 130 (1970). However, as the Senate committee explained, because of the absence of a federal recording requirement, "Federal land managers do not have an easy way of discovering which Federal lands are subject to either valid or invalid mining claim locations." S. Rep. 94-583, supra, at 65. See also One Third of the Nation's Land, supra, at 124 ("land managers do not know where claims are located"); Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309, 312 (D. Utah 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981). The potential existence of unknown mining claims made it difficult for federal land managers to take actions affecting federal lands for fear of interfering with the rights accorded to claimants under the federal mining laws. Each time the Bureau of Land Management proposed a sale or other conveyance of federal land, it was necessary to make a lengthy search of records in the county recorder's office and to produce a title abstract showing the existence or nonexistence of outstanding mining claims. Such searches in themselves constituted a major administrative burden. Moreover, if the county records indicated the existence of mining claims -- even what appeared to be only stale or abandoned claims -- it was necessary for BLM to initiate a formal administrative adjudication to determine the validity of the claims before proceeding further with the proposed action. See Strauss, Mining Claims on Public Lands: A Study of Interior Department Procedures, 1974 Utah L. Rev. 185, 193, 215-219. b. In Section 314 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 1744, Congress set out the basis for a federal recordation system that would serve the dual purpose of ridding federal lands of stale mining claims and providing federal managers with data that would allow them to make informed land management decisions. Section 314 includes two kinds of reporting requirements. Subsection (a) establishes an annual filing obligation. It requires the owner of an unpatented mining claim located prior to October 21, 1976, within three years of that date and "prior to December 31, of each year thereafter," to file with BLM a notice of intention to hold the claim or an affidavit of assessment work performed on the claim. Those who locate claims after October 21, 1976, must make such filings "prior to December 31 of each year" following the calendar year in which the claim was located. The second obligation -- an initial recordation requirement -- is imposed by Section 314(b): The owner of an unpatented claim located prior to October 21, 1976, must, within three years of that date, file with BLM a copy of the official record of the notice of location or certificate of location. Those who locate claims after October 21, 1976, must file the required documents within 90 days of location. /2/ In Section 314(c) -- the provision at issue in this case -- Congress provided that failure to comply with the filing requirements of Section 314(a) and (b) results in the invalidation of a mining claim. Section 314(c) states that, except in certain enumerated circumstances, /3/ "(t)he failure to file such instruments as required by subsections (a) and (b) of this section shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim * * * by the owner." c. The Department of the Interior has issued regulations implementing Section 314. 43 C.F.R. 3833.2-1(b)(1) provides that the owner of an unpatented mining claim located on federal land must file evidence of annual assessment work or a notice of intention to hold the claim in the proper BLM office "on or before December 30 of each calendar year." Since 1982, the Department's regulations have provided that filings due on or before December 30 will be considered timely filed if they are postmarked on or before December 30 and received by BLM by the close of business on the following January 19th. 43 C.F.R. 3833.0-5(m). /4/ Under 43 C.F.R. 3833.4(a), the failure to file a required instrument within the prescribed time period "shall be deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment of the mining claim * * * and it shall be void." BLM enters into a central computer information from both initial recordations and annual filings submitted pursuant to Section 314. Every 60 days BLM prints out the information on mining claims on a state-by-state basis. The computer printouts are microfilmed and distributed to BLM State Offices, to many state governments, and to private subscribers. 2. Appellees were mining claimants whose ten unpatented claims were located on federal land in Nevada. Since 1960 appellees have produced gravel and building materials from these claims. /5/ On October 19, 1979, appellees complied with the initial filing requirements under Section 314 by filing the appropriate documents for each of their claims. However, in 1980 appellees waited until December 31 to hand deliver their affidavits of annual assessment work to the BLM Nevada State Office, thus missing the December 30 deadline set by statute and regulation for the annual filing. J.S. App. 1a-2a. On April 4, 1981, the chief of the Records and Data Management Branch of the BLM Nevada State Office informed appellees that their claims had been declared abandoned and void because they had failed to file a notice of intent or proof of assessment work by December 30, 1980. See J.S. App. 22a-24a. /6/ Appellees sought review of the BLM action, claiming, inter alia, that they had been erroneously advised by unnamed BLM personnel as to the proper filing date and that Section 314 and the implementing regulations are unconstitutional and invalid because they resulted in the taking of appellees' property without notice and opportunity to be heard. In June 1982 the Interior Board of Land Appeals (IBLA) affirmed the BLM determination (J.S. App. 16a-21a). The IBLA concluded that any reliance on erroneous information provided by a BLM employee could not relieve a claimant of an obligation imposed by statute or regulation. It declined to rule on appellees' constitutional claim on the ground that the Department of the Interior was not a proper forum to consider the constitutionality of Section 314. The IBLA noted, however, that the regulations at issue had been upheld as consistent with the statute in Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309 (D. Utah 1979), aff'd, 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981). The IBLA went on to conclude that the administrative appeal afforded to appellees before the initial BLM determination became final satisfied the requirements of due process. 3. Appellees filed this action in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking review of the IBLA decision. Appellees asserted, inter alia, that BLM's action was unconstitutional and invalid because it resulted in taking of their property without notice and opportunity to be heard and without compensation. Appellees sought a declaration that Section 314 and the implementing regulations are unconstitutional and an order permanently enjoining appellants from enforcing the regulations against appellees. The district court granted summary judgment for appellees, holding that Section 314 is an "unconstitutional violation of procedural due process insofar as it creates an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment for failure to timely file the annual assessment notice" required by Section 314(a) (J.S. App. 10a). /7/ The court initially concluded that unpatented mining claims qualify as property interests sufficient to warrant due process protection (id. at 3a). It then determined that Section 314 creates a forfeiture of appellees' claims, since appellees had not indicated any intent to abandon the claims (J.S. App. 3a-4a). /8/ Applying the analysis set out in Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), the district court determined that extinguishment of claims pursuant to Section 314 amounts to a taking without due process because the statute creates a conclusive presumption of abandonment that is "not necessarily or universally true in fact" (J.S. App. 5a) and because, in the court's view, there are reasonable methods by which BLM could establish whether a miner intends to abandon a claim when he fails to make a timely annual filing (id. at 6a-7a). The court concluded that BLM could easily determine whether claimants had in fact abandoned their claims by notifying them of their failure to meet a filing deadline and by holding a preforfeiture hearing in cases in which there is a dispute about whether abandonment has occurred (id. at 7a, 9a-10a). The district court went on to hold (J.S. App. 10a-12a) that even if appellees had not been deprived of their due process rights, they would still prevail because they had "substantially complied" with Section 314 by submitting the required notices one day after the statutory deadline. In the court's view, the primary purpose of Section 314 is to clear federal lands of stale claims, which is accomplished by requiring the initial filing of location notices pursuant to Section 314(b); the requirement of annual filings thereafter (under Section 314(a)) is intended to facilitiate maintenance of a current index of unpatented claims "merely for the convenience of federal land managers" (J.S. App. 11a). Thus, according to the court, a standard of substantial compliance with the annual filing deadline would be consistent with the history and purpose of Section 314 (J.S. App. 12a). In addition, the court cited Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 440 U.S. 48, 57 (1970), and several earlier cases for the proposition that substantial compliance satisfies the assessment work requirement under 30 U.S.C. 28. The court reasoned that it would be anomalous for the government to insist on strict compliance with Section 314 when, at the same time, substantial compliance is sufficient under 30 U.S.C. 28. J.S. App. 12a. /9/ SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT I. The district court erred in holding unconstitutional Section 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), which provides that failure to file a timely notice of intention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of annual assessment work shall be "deemed conclusively" to constitute an abandonment of the claim. Contrary to the court's conclusion, Section 314(c) is fully consistent with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. A. Congress clearly has the power to condition retention of an unpatented mining claim located on federal land on a claimant's compliance with the filing requirements of Section 314. Congress possesses broad constitutional authority to manage and control the mineral resources of the public domain. Mining claims located on public lands are the product of Congress's exercise of that authority and are subject to continuing regulation. Section 314 serves significant governmental purposes. The filing requirements of Section 314(a) and (b) provide the means for collection of complete, up-to-date information about the status of mining claims, which in turn permits federal managers to make informed land use decisions. Automatic invalidation of claims pursuant to Section 314(c) following claimants' failure to comply with the filing requirements provides an efficient mechanism for termination of state claims. It also provides an important incentive for compliance with the filing requirements and allows federal managers to be certain about the status of claims. At the same time, Section 314 imposes only minimal burdens on claimants. This Court concluded in Texaco, Inc v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982), that Indiana clearly had the power to condition retention of a property right in privately held lands on filing within a limited period of time under its Mineral Lapse Act. A fortiori Congress has authority to impose such a condition with respect to claims located on federal lands. B. Section 314(c) is consistent with the requirements of procedural due process. The Court's holding in Texaco v. Short makes it clear that the district court here erred in concluding that claimants must receive individual notice and a hearing before their claims become invalid for failure to comply with the Section 314 filing requirements. The statute itself provides notice of the filing deadlines and the consequences of failure to meet them. The three-year grace period between enactment and the effective date of the statute afforded claimants a reasonable time within which to become familiar with the new provisions. Of course, there is no question that appellees in this case were aware of Section 314, since they previously had made a timely initial recordation pursuant to that section. Following their apparent failure to make their 1980 annual filing in a timely manner, appellees were notified and given an opportunity to appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals the BLM determination that their claims were invalid. That proceeding, in which appellees were free to submit any evidence that they had in fact complied with Section 314, was sufficient to satisfy due process requirements. BLM is not constitutionally required also to provide notice to claimants before the self-executing feature of Section 314 may operate. See Texaco v. Short, 434 U.S. at 536-537. C. The district court erred in holding that Section 314(c) creates an impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment under the analysis of Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). The forfeiture accomplished by Section 314(c) does not depend on any presumption that a claimant who fails to comply with the filing requirements in fact has abandoned his claim. Rather, Congress has merely provided in effect that failure to comply with the filing requirements will result in extinguishment of a claim. More recent decisions of this Court suggest that it would be entirely inappropriate to apply the Vlandis analysis in a manner that would invalidate the rational legislative choice reflected in Section 314. Even if the Vlandis analysis could properly be applied to this case, provision of individual notice and a hearing in which a claimant would have the opportunity to establish nonabandonment is not a "reasonable" alternative to the approach chosen by Congress, since such procedures could interfere significantly with BLM's ability to manage federal lands effectively. II. The district court erred in its alternative holding that Section 314(a) is satisfied by "substantial compliance," so that appellees retained their mining claims by filing their affidavits of annual assessment work one day late. Nothing in the language of Section 314 suggests that a claimant may retain his claim by filing later than the precise deadline specified in the statute. Congress's failure expressly to permit late filing in Section 314, despite its provision for certain other exceptions, reinforces the conclusion that it did not intend to sanction deviations from the statutory deadlines. The legislative history does not provide support for a substantial compliance standard. In addition, permitting less than total compliance with the statute is at odds with Congress's goal of enabling BLM to obtain complete, up-to-date information about the status of mining claims on federal lands and to administer those lands efficiently. The district court erred in relying on Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970), and other cases in which this Court has stated that substantial compliance is enough to satisfy the annual assessment work requirement under the general mining laws. In view of the differences between Section 314 and the provisions at issue in the assessment work cases, the reasoning of those cases clearly does not extend to Section 314. ARGUMENT I. SECTION 314(c) OF THE FEDERAL LAND POLICY AND MANAGEMENT ACT OF 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), IS CONSISTENT WITH THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT As part of its major revision of the public land laws in 1976, Congress conditioned the right to retain an unpatented mining claim located on federal land on a claimant's compliance with certain filing requirements. Section 314(c) of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. 1744(c), provides that a failure to comply with the requirements of subsections (a) and (b) of Section 314 shall be "deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment" of a claim. Section 314(a) requires annual filing of either a notice of intention to hold a claim or an affidavit of assessment work, while Section 314(b) requires an initial recordation of a notice or certificate of location. Both subsections include specific deadlines for filing of the required documents. In this case appellees in 1980 failed to file affidavits of annual assessment work for their claims "prior to December 31," as required by Section 314(a). Following appellees' failure to make a timely filing, the Bureau of Land Management declared their claims invalid and the Interior Board of Land Appeals affirmed. The district court, in reviewing the determination of invalidity, held that Section 314(c) constitutes an "unconstitutional violation of procedural due process insofar as it creates an irrebuttable presumption of abandonment for failure to timely file the annual assessment notice" required by Section 314(a) (J.S. App. 10a). In fact, as we show below, the condition Congress imposed is a reasonable one that is clearly within its power and fully consistent with due process. Contrary to the district court's holding, Section 314(c) does not create any impermissible irrebuttable presumption. The district court's use of the irrebuttable presumption analysis to invalidate the rational legislative judgment reflected in Section 314 is plainly wrong. A. Congress Has the Power to Condition Retention of an Unpatented Mining Claim Located on Federal Land on a Claimant's Compliance With the Filing Requirements of Section 314 As a preliminary matter, it is clear that Congress possesses authority to condition retention of an unpatented mining claim located on federal land on a claimant's compliance with the Section 314 filing requirements. /10/ Of course, Congress's power to manage and control the mineral resources of the public domain is very broad. The Property Clause of the Constitution, Art. IV, Section 3, Cl. 2, provides that "Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations belonging to the United States." This Court has repeatedly stated that "'(t)he power over the public land thus entrusted to Congress is without limitations.'" Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529, 539 (1976) (quoting United States v. San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16, 29 (1940)). See also Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 294-295 (1958); Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954); FPC v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 21 (1952); United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 27 (1947); Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872). The Property Clause gives Congress the power over public lands "'to control their occupancy and use, to protect them from trespass and injury and to prescribe the conditions upon which others may obtain rights in them.'" Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. at 540 (quoting Utah Power & Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 405 (1917)). The mining claims to which Section 314 applies are creations of Congress's exercise of that broad constitutional authority. The right to obtain such claims was conferred under the General Mining Act of 1872, ch. 152, 17 Stat. 91 et seq., which opened "all valuable mineral deposits in lands belonging to the United States * * * to exploration and purchase." Under that statute an individual who locates a claim obtains a right of possession that allows him to remove and sell minerals without any payment to the United States. 30 U.S.C. 26. See Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., No. 81-1686 (June 6, 1983), slip op. 14. The right to retain a claim is conditioned on, inter alia, discovery of a valuable mineral deposit and performance of $100 of assessment work each year. 30 U.S.C. 28. Failure of a claimant to perform the required assessment work entitles others to relocate the claim. A claimant who meets various statutory requirements (including performance of $500 of development work) and who tenders a nominal sum is entitled to a patent, which confers ownership rights to the land and minerals. 30 U.S.C. 29. Until a patent is obtained, however, the United States retains paramount title to the land. See 30 U.S.C. 29; Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. 334, 336 (1963); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306, 316-317 (1930); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. 762, 763 (1876). As the product of legislative action pursuant to Congress's constitutional power to regulate federal lands, a mining claim located on such lands is clearly subject to Congress's continuing authority to impose statutory conditions on its retention. See Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 339 ("The United States, which holds the legal title to the lands, plainly can prescribe the procedure which any (mining) claimant must follow to acquire rights in the public sector"). That authority unquestionably extends to the filing requirements of Section 314, which serve significant governmental interests. As we explained in the statement (at 3-4), Congress had multiple purposes in enacting Section 314. It wished to rid federal lands of millions of stale mining claims; and it also sought to provide for centralized collection by federal land managers of comprehensive and up-to-date information on the status of mining claims. Such centralized record-keeping allows federal managers to make informed and efficient land use decisions, consistent with Congress's overall objective of improving federal land management. /11/ Prior to enactment of Section 314, federal land managers lacked a source of readily available and up-to-date information about the status of claims. Thus, before they could proceed with any action that would affect a piece of federal land, they were required to undertake cumbersome title searches in county courthouses and to initiate administrative adjudications to determine the validity of any outstanding claims they discovered. See page 4, supra. The Section 314 filing requirements eliminate this significant administrative burden. /12/ Automatic invalidation of claims by the terms of Section 314(c) following a claimant's failure to comply with the filing requirements plays a significant part in fulfilling Congress's objectives. Most obviously, it promotes administrative convenience by providing a self-executing mechanism for terminating stale claims. Such a mechanism avoids the delay that would be involved in identifying all claims and making countless individual determinations of whether a given claim is stale or not. /13/ Automatic invalidation of claims under Section 314(c) also serves as an enforcement mechanism for the filing requirements. Without an effective penalty, there would be little incentive for claimants to make timely filings or, indeed, to make any filings at all. /14/ The threat of invalidation provides the powerful motivation to comply that is essential to an "accurate and perpetual inventory of mining claims on the public lands and of those persons who assert an interest in (such) claims." Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. 309, 314 (D. Utah 1979); aff'd, 649 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1981). The automatic invalidation mechanism also allows federal land managers to be certain about the current status of a claim, so that they can act expeditiously and with confidence in taking steps that affect particular lands. Section 314 imposes only minimal burdens on mining claimants. Of course, the individual claimant is in the best position to know whether he intends to retain his claim and to take the necessary steps to preserve his rights. A claimant is required simply to make a single initial recordation, followed by annual filings of either a notice of intention to retain the claim or an affidavit of annual assessment work. The initial location notice and annual assessment work affidavit are familiar documents that many claimants were required to record locally prior to the enactment of Section 314. See 30 U.S.C. 28; J.S. App. 6a. Filing deadlines are clearly set out in the statute and regulations. An annual filing may be made at any time during the calendar year "prior to December 31." If there were any doubt about the power of Congress to condition retention of a mining claim on compliance with the Section 314 filing requirements, it would be dispelled by this Court's decision in Texaco, Inc. v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982). The Court in Texaco considered the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act, which provided that a vested mineral interest in privately held land would be extinguished following a 20-year period of nonuse if the owner did not file a statement of claim with the State within a two-year period. The Court concluded that there was no question that Indiana possessed the power "to condition the retention of a property right upon the performance of an act within a limited period of time." 454 U.S. at 529; see also id. at 540 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that there was no real dispute concerning "Indiana's power to control, define, and limit interests in land within its boundaries" or that "extinguishment of a mineral owner's rights may be an appropriate sanction for a failure to register"). /15/ Texaco involved the actions of a state government with respect to vested interests in privately held land. A fortiori, imposition of a similar condition on retention of unpatented claims located on federal lands is within the power of Congress. /16/ And, as we have shown, Section 314 furthers legitimate governmental objectives, while imposing minimal burdens on claimants. Thus, Congress cannot be said to have exercised its power in an arbitrary manner. Compare Texaco, 454 U.S. at 529-530. And see Western Mining Council v. Watt, 643 F.2d 618, 629 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1031 (1981) ("The legislative history of (Section 314) makes it clear that on their face the filing requirements are neither an arbitrary nor irrational way of realizing * * * permissible governmental objectives."); id. at 629-630 (rejecting the contention that the provisions of Section 314(c) are unreasonably harsh in requiring that mining claims be conclusively deemed abandoned upon failure to file). B. Section 314(c) Is Consistent With the Requirements of Procedural Due Process The district court held (J.S. App. 9a) that Section 314(c) fails to meet procedural due process requirements essentially because an individual who fails to file a timely notice of intention to hold a mining claim or affidavit of annual assessment work does not receive notice and a hearing before his claim becomes invalid under the terms of the statute. In fact, Section 314(c) comports fully with the requirements of procedural due process. /17/ Like the appellants in Texaco v. Short, appellees in this case contended that their property rights had been extinguished without adequate notice. /18/ The reasons the Court articulated in rejecting the challenge to the Indiana statute considered in Texaco also support the conclusion that the appellees here were not deprived of notice in violation of due process. Publication of Section 314 effectively placed claimants on notice of its provisions. Section 314, like the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act in Texaco, spells out filing deadlines and the consequences of failure to make timely filings. "Generally, a legislature need do nothing more than enact and publish the law, and afford the citizenry a reasonable opportunity to familiarize itself with its terms and to comply." Texaco, 454 U.S. at 532. "'All persons are charged with knowledge of the provisions of statutes and must take note of the procedure adopted by them.'" Id. at 532 n.25 (quoting North Laramie Land Co. v. Hoffman, 268 U.S. 276, 283 (1925)). See also, e.g., FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384-385 (1947); Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. 233, 243 (1944). As the Court observed in Texaco, property owners in particular may be presumed to be aware of statutory changes affecting their rights. "It is well established that persons owning property within a State are charged with knowledge of relevant statutory provisions affecting the control or disposition of such property." 454 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted). "All persons having property located within a state and subject to its dominion must take note of its statutes affecting the control or disposition of such property and of the procedure which they set up for those purposes." Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. at 243 (citations omitted), quoted with approval in Texaco, 454 U.S. at 533 n.27. These principles apply with even greater force in the case of individuals, like the appellees in this case, who have claims located on public lands. Such individuals obtained their claims in the context of a system of governmental regulation and therefore should have a heightened awareness that their rights could be affected by statutory or regulatory changes. Of course, the Court noted in Texaco (454 U.S. at 532), there generally must be some reasonable period within which individuals have an opportunity to become familiar with a new statute that affects existing rights. See also Block v. North Dakota ex rel. Bd. of University & School Lands, No. 81-2337 (May 2, 1983), slip op. 12 n.23; Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. 55, 62-63 (1902). In Texaco the Court concluded that the two-year grace period provided by the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act provided ample notice of the statutory filing requirement and forfeiture provision and was therefore consistent with due process. The Court noted that "(a) legislative body is in a far better position than a court to form a correct judgment concerning the number of persons affected by a change in the law, the means by which information concerning the law is disseminated in the community, and the likelihood that innocent persons may be harmed by the failure to receive adequate notice." 454 U.S. at 532 (footnote omitted). See also Wilson v. Iseminger, 185 U.S. at 63; Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628, 633-634 (1877). The Court was unable to conclude that the Indiana statute was "so unprecedented and so unlikely to come to the attention of citizens reasonably attentive to the enactment of laws affecting their rights: that the two-year grace period was constitutionally inadequate. 454 U.S. at 533. The grace period provided by Section 314 is more generous than the one the Court in Texaco found to be consistent with due process. Although FLPMA was enacted in 1976, owners of existing claims were not required to make an initial recordation or annual filing until October 1979. Thus, claimants had three years within which to become familiar with the Section 314 filing requirements and the consequences of failure to comply with them, compared with the two-year grace period under the Indiana statute. Moreover, the statutory change at issue here may have been more predictable than that considered in Texaco, since mining claimants on public land cannot help being aware that their claims are subject to an ongoing system of statutory conditions and administrative regulation. Congress's judgment that three years was a sufficient period within which claimants could become familiar with the provisions of Section 314 was clearly reasonable and is entitled to deference. In any event, in the circumstances of this case the question of reasonable notice of the existence of the new statute is largely irrelevant. This case involves the obligation to comply with the December 30 deadline of Section 314(a), which comes after the due date of the initial recordation and filing required by Section 314. Those whose claims are rendered invalid on the ground that they failed to comply with the annual filing requirement by definition were aware of the existence of Section 314 because they already had complied with the initial recordation requirement. Here appellees acknowledged in their Complaint (at 4 Paragraph 12) that they filed certificates of location, maps, and affidavits of assessment work for their claims in October 1979, as required by Section 314(a) and (b). See also Mot. to Aff. 3. Moreover, it is clear that appellees knew specifically about the existence of the annual filing requirement of Section 314(a), because they in fact submitted such a filing, albeit in an untimely manner. /19/ Thus, appellees cannot claim that they themselves were unaware of the Section 314 filing requirements; instead, they can only admit that they failed to examine the statute and regulations closely enough to ascertain the relevant due date under Section 314(a) . Appellees contended below that they had a constitutional right to individualized notice and a hearing prior to invalidation of their claims for failure to make a timely annual filing for 1980, and the district court agreed. But here, as in Texaco, "it is essential to recognize the difference between the self-executing feature of the statute and a subsequent judicial (or administrative) determination that a particular lapse did in fact occur" (454 U.S. at 533). Here appellees received notice following their apparent failure to file in a timely manner and an opportunity to present evidence of compliance with Section 314 before the BLM determination of invalidity became final. Appellees took advantage of this opportunity by pursuing an appeal to the Interior Board of Land Appeals. The IBLA did not hold an evidentiary hearing in appellees' case, but that is because appellees themselves advised the Board that they had hand delivered their affidavits of assessment work to BLM on December 31, 1980, rather than "prior to December 31," as Section 314(a) requires. As the IBLA stated in its opinion, "a hearing is not required in the absence of assertions of facts which, if proved true, would entitle (appellees) to the relief sought" (J.S. App. 20a). /20/ Appellees are therefore left with the contention that the self-executing feature of Section 314(c) -- automatic invalidation of a claim following failure to comply with the filing requirements of Section 314(a) and (b) -- may not take effect unless they previously received individual notice. But as the Court in Texaco noted (454 U.S. at 536), such a claim "has no greater force than a claim that a self-executing statute of limitations is unconstitutional." /21/ In Texaco the Court held that due process did not require individualized preforfeiture notice before a vested mineral interest lapsed in accordance with the self- executing terms of the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act. The Court specifically rejected the suggestion "that each citizen must in some way be given specific notice of the impact of a new statute on his property before that law may affect his property rights" (ibid.). Like the Indiana statute, Section 314 sets out in clear terms "the circumstances in which a property interest will lapse through the inaction of its owner" (454 U.S. at 537). Due process therefore does not require individualized notice before a claim becomes invalid by operation of law under Section 314(c). /22/ Although the government argued below /23/ that this case is governed by Texaco v. Short, the district court did not even mention Texaco in its opinion. However, another district court has distinguished Texaco. In Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982), the court declared Section 314(c) unconstitutional in a case involving invalidation of claims following failure to make an initial recordation in a timely manner, as required by Section 314 (b). See page 10 note 9, supra. On the government's petition for rehearing, the district court distinguished Texaco on the ground that the Indiana statute at issue there provided for lapse only in cases in which a mineral interest had not been used for 20 years, while under Section 314 property rights may be lost as a result of failure to file, "notwithstanding actual proprietary use of the property." Rogers v. United States, No. CV-80-114-H (D. Mont. June 15, 1983), slip op. 2. /24/ The Rogers court's effort to distinguish Texaco is unavailing. In large part the attempted distinction appears to follow from the court's erroneous perception of Section 314(c) as creating an impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment (a perception shared by the district court in this case). We explain the error of that perception in the following section. In any event, the fact that Congress did not include nonuse as a necessary predicate to invalidation of a claim under Section 314(c) does not render the holding in Texaco inapplicable to this case. As we explained in the preceding section, it is clearly within Congress's power to condition retention of a mining claim located on federal lands on compliance with the reasonable filing requirements of Section 314 alone. See pages 15-23 & note 15, supra. The procedural due process standard applicable to invalidation of a claim under such a provision is not more demanding than that applied to a statute that conditions retention of a fee interest on a combination of nonuse and failure to comply with a filing requirement. Indeed, if anything, individuals who are actively mining claims located on public land should be more likely to keep abreast of statutory and regulatory changes that may affect their interests than are those who have allowed their interests in privately held lands to lie dormant. /25/ The district court also held that due process may require a preforfeiture hearing in the case of a claimant who fails to comply with a Section 314 filing deadline. In the district court's view, a hearing would give the claimant an opportunity to establish that he had not abandoned his claim. See J.S. App. 9a. But that is not the relevant issue under Section 314(c); rather, the inquiry focuses solely on whether the claimant filed an instrument that complies with Section 314(a) or (b). As we noted above (at 28-29), a claimant has a full opportunity to present evidence on that issue in the proceeding before the Interior Board of Land Appeals. /26/ C. Section 314(c) Does Not Create an Impermissible Irrebuttable Presumption of Abandonment Despite the apparent consistency of Section 314 with the requirements of due process, the district court concluded (J.S. App. 5a-10a) that Section 314(c) is unconstitutional. The court based this conclusion on its determination that Section 314(c) creates an impermissible irrebuttable presumption of abandonment, citing Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973). In fact, the irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis has no application to this case. In Vlandis the Court considered Connecticut's practice of charging higher tuition to students who were not bona fide residents while denying to individuals who previously had lived outside the State any opportunity to establish that they had become bona fide residents. The Court held that Connecticut's irrebutable presumption of nonresidence violated due process because the presumption was not necessarily or universally true in fact and because the State had reasonable alternative means of determining bona fide residence. In this case, the district court purported to apply the Vlandis analysis to reach the conclusion that Section 314 likewise violates due process. The court determined that Section 314(c) creates a conclusive presumption of abandonment that is not necessarily or universally true in fact, since failure to make a timely filing under Section 314 does not always signify intent to abandon a claim. The court further concluded that there are reasonable alternative means of determining whether a claimant in fact has abandoned a claim, i.e., through individual notice and a preforfeiture hearing. The district court was misled, we submit, in reading Section 314(c) as cancelling mining claims for which the annual filing requirement has not been met because that default demonstrates abandonment in fact. Although Section 314(c) uses the words "deemed conclusively to constitute an abandonment," it does not create a presumption at all. It is clear that Congress did not intend invalidation of a claim to turn on abandonment or intent to abandon in the ordinary, common law sense of those terms. /27/ Instead, it merely provided in effect that failure to file the required instruments in compliance with Section 314(a) and (b) would result in extinguishment of a claim. /28/ Of course, it would have been more straight-forward if Congress had stated: "All claimants who fail to comply with the filing requirements of Section 314(a) and (b) shall forfeit their claims." However, Section 314(c) is not the less constitutional for its circumlocutory draftsmanship. Congress's choice of statutory language cannot invalidate a provision if its operation and effect are otherwise permissible. See Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 23-24 (1976). And see United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 353 U.S. 112, 117-118 (1957). Moreover, Section 314(c) does not present the sort of dilemma the Court perceived in Vlandis. There the Connecticut legislature had established bona fide residency as the factor that would qualify an individual for a lower tuition charge, but denied certain individuals who previously had lived outside the State any opportunity to introduce evidence that they met the requirement. Such individuals thus were completely foreclosed from establishing eligibility for the lower tuition charge. Here Congress has not set up abandonment as the statutory standard and then precluded introduction of evidence on that issue; rather, it has simply required that a claimant comply with the filing requirements of Section 314 in order to retain his claim. That condition is obviously not impossible or burdensome to meet and is entirely within the control of the individual claimant. Compare Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 772 (1975). We note that in more recent decisions this Court has suggested that the irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis has little or no application to otherwise reasonable economic regulatory measures. In Weinberger v. Salfi, supra, the Court declined to apply the Vlandis analysis to duration-of-relationship Social Security eligibility requirements for surviving wives and stepchildren of deceased wage earners. In a passage of particular relevance to this case, the Court noted that the Vlandis analysis would be wholly inappropriate as applied to, e.g., a statute that established time limits for assertion of rights under the Social Security Act. The Court explained in Salfi (422 U.S. at 773) that a court should not secondguess the judgment of the legislature about "whether such a flat cutoff provision was necessary to protect the Secretary from stale claims, whether it would be possible to make individualized determinations as to any prejudice suffered by the Secretary as the result of an untimely filing, and whether or not an individualized hearing on that issue should be required in each case." The Court noted further that application of the Vlandis analysis to legislation involving economic regulation "would turn the doctrine of (Vlandis) into a virtual engine of destruction for countless legislative judgments which have heretofore been thought wholly consistent with the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution" (422 U.S. at 772). The Court concluded in Salfi that Congress could rationally adopt a prophylactic approach such as the duration-of-relationship eligibility requirement, since "any imprecision from which it might suffer was justified by its ease and certainty of operation" (422 U.S. at 780). See also Mourning v. Family Publications Service, Inc., 411 U.S. 356, 377 (1973) (declining to conclude that a prophylactic regulatory measure was equivalent to a conclusive presumption of the existence of determinative facts). And see Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. at 22-24 (declining to invalidate a statute regulating purely economic matters on the ground that it was worded in terms of a conclusive presumption of total disability). In this case, too, Congress acted reasonably in adopting a self-executing provision that minimizes administrative burdens and furthers the goal of efficient administration of the public domain. That rational legislative judgment, like the provision at issue in Salfi, should not be invalidated on the basis of a superficial application of the Vlandis analysis. /29/ Even if the irrebuttable presumption analysis of Vlandis were applicable to this case, the district court erred in concluding (J.S. App. 9a-10a) that the second prong of the Vlandis analysis is satisfied on the ground that notice and hearing procedures constitute a "reasonable and practicable" alternative to the approach Congress has chosen. As we have explained (see page 19-20, supra), Section 314 serves a number of functions, some of which have little relation to the question of abandonment. Notice and an opportunity to prove nonabandonment would not promote these functions and, in fact, could be sufficiently burdensome to impair them. For example, as we noted (at 19), if BLM must notify a claimant before invalidation of a claim may occur, there would be no effective incentive for claimants to comply with the filing requirements on their own initiative; thus, BLM might be required to provide individual notice to virtually all claimants. Provision of a hearing for those who wished to show that they had not abandoned their claims would amount to at least a partial return to the time-consuming system of claim-by-claim adjudication that BLM was required to use before enactment of Section 314. See page 4. The delay in resolution of the status of disputed claims that would result from tardy filings or hearings on the issue of abandonment could impede significantly the ability of federal managers to make land use decisions, thereby frustrating the overall purpose of FLPMA. Even if Congress had expressed concern only with eliminating abandoned claims when it enacted Section 314(c), notice and hearing procedures would not necessarily be required as a "reasonable and practicable" alternative to the system Congress established. It is true that it would be possible for BLM to give notice to each claimant who fails to make a required annual filing, since the initial recordations made by claimants have provided BLM with a listing of claims in existence as of October 1979 (or as of some more recent date for new claims). /30/ But it is not at all clear that due process would require that the burden be placed on BLM (which presumably would have to contact each claimant, inquire whether a claim has been abandoned, and, if necessary, conduct a hearing), rather than on individual claimants, who are in the best position to know whether they intend to hold their claims and to take responsibility for advising BLM of their intentions. II. APPELLEES DID NOT RETAIN THEIR MINING CLAIMS BY FILING ONE DAY LATE, BECAUSE SECTION 314 IS NOT SATISFIED BY "SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE" WITH ITS REQUIREMENTS The district court held in the alternative (J.S. App. 10a-12a) that appellees "substantially complied" (id. at 1a) with the requirements of Section 314 by filing their 1980 affidavits of assessment work one day late, i.e., on December 31 of that year. But, contrary to the district court's view, Section 314 is not satisfied by less than full compliance with its terms. The language of Section 314 appears absolute and does not suggest that some form of "substantial compliance" with the filing deadlines would suffice to avoid invalidation of a claim. Section 314(a) expressly provides that annual filings must be made "prior to December 31" of each year. Filing a notice on December 31 is plainly not the same as filing it prior to December 31. /31/ Section 314(c) on its face indicates that, except in certain enumerated circumstances (not including late filing, see pages 5-6 note 3, supra), any failure to comply with the filing requirements of subsections (a) and (b) will result in invalidation of a mining claim. We are unaware of any principle of statutory construction that would support the conclusion that such apparently absolute filing deadlines set by Congress may be read broadly to permit filing on some later date. /32/ Congress clearly knew how to make exceptions to the Section 314 requirements. In Section 314(c) itself Congress expressly described certain circumstances in which failure to comply with the filing requirements would not result in invalidation of a claim. In addition, Congress recently provided some relief for claimants who have forfeited oil and gas placer claims through failure to meet the Section 314 deadlines. Under 30 U.S.C. 188(f), if the Secretary of the Interior concludes that such failure was "inadvertent, justifiable, or not due to lack of reasonable diligence on the part of the owner," he may issue a noncompetitive oil and gas lease, even though forfeiture of the claim normally would have subjected the land to competitive leasing. /33/ The absence of any comparable provision for claims of the type held by appellees strongly suggests that Congress did not intend to permit anything less than full compliance in connection with those claims. See, e.g., Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 512 (1981). /34/ The district court itself acknowledged (J.S. App. 10a) that the language of Section 314 does not support a "substantial compliance" standard. However, it purported to find support for such a reading of Section 314 in the legislative history and purpose of the statute. In fact, there is no such support. The House Report states flatly that "(f)ailure to comply with (Section 314(a) and (b)) constitutes abandonment of the claim." H.R. Rep. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1976). It does not suggest in any way that late filing would be permissible. And a construction of Section 314 that permits less than total compliance with the filing requirements would be at odds with Congress's goal of enabling BLM to obtain complete and up-to-date information on the status of mining claims on federal lands. Of course, the conclusion that these particular claimants should not be held to have forfeited their claims by filing one day late admittedly will not interfere in any measurable way with BLM's ability to obtain information. But the district court did not define the outer limits of substantial compliance, and, indeed, in the absence of any legislative guidelines, it would be difficult to do so. BLM cannot be certain from the district court's opinion whether claimants should be allowed to file a day late, a month late, a year late, or more. The district court's decision might allow BLM to establish a clear cut-off point for substantial compliance with Section 314. But it seems almost certain that disappointed claimants would dispute BLM's judgment about what compliance is "substantial." And if the period within which claimants may file in order to meet a substantial compliance standard turns out to be more than a few months, it could significantly retard BLM's ability to collect and tabulate information about the status of mining claims. It is quite unlikely that Congress would have intended that BLM would face such complications in administering what otherwise appear to be absolute filing deadlines. The district court reasoned that a substantial compliance standard for annual filings would not be inconsistent with the legislative purpose because Congress was primarily interested in the elimination of stale claims (J.S. App. 11a), /35/ which would be accomplished through the initial recordation requirement. In the court's view, the provision for annual filings was "merely for the convenience of federal land managers" (ibid.). But as we explained above (at 19-20), elimination of stale claims is only one of the purposes served by Section 314; that section also provides an efficient mechanism for collection of up-to-date, certain information about the status of unpatented mining claims, thus facilitating federal land use planning. /36/ The latter purpose is by no means unimportant, particularly in view of the overall objectives of FLPMA. The district court's attempt to support its reading of the statute through denigration of the purpose of the annual filing requirement is simply unjustified. In support of its conclusion that less than full adherence to the terms of the filing requirements is sufficient under Section 314, the district court relied on decisions in which this Court has suggested that substantial compliance satisfies the requirement under the general mining laws, 30 U.S.C. 28, that a claimant perform assessment work in the amount of $100 during each year. See Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48, 57 (1970); Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935); Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, supra. The Court indicated in those cases that not every default in assessment work results in loss of a mining claim. In particular, the Court concluded in Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. and Krushnic that failure to expend $100 on a claim in a single year would not result in forfeiture of the claim if the claimant had satisfied the assessment work requirement in subsequent years or if its substantial attempts to resume such work had been frustrated by actions of the United States. The assessment work cases cited by the district court do not control this case. The Sectin 314 filing requirements impose obligations above and beyond annual assessment work and the other conditions established by the general mining laws. As we explained above (at 3-4), Congress intended that the new filing requirements would eliminate the unsatisfactory situation that had existed under the general mining laws, including the need to prove through time-consuming case-by-case adjudication whether a claimant had met statutory requirements. Congress's objective of improving on the old system, rather than simply continuing it, argues against reading into Section 314 the Court's gloss on a provision of the general mining laws. /37/ Moreover, Section 314 is clearly distinguished from the provisions at issue in the pre-FLPMA assessment work cases. Under 30 U.S.C. 28 failure to meet the annual assessment work requirement renders a claim open to relocation, but not if the original locator has resumed work on the claim prior to any relocation. It was this express allowance for preservation of a claim through resumption of work that allowed the Court in Virginia-Colorado Development Corp. and Krushnic to conclude that a failure to perform assessment work in a single year did not result in forfeiture of the claim. In contrast, there is no provision in Section 314 for any grace period to accommodate the late filing. In addition, the savings clause at issue in the pre-FLPMA assessment work cases, 30 U.S.C. 193, did not provide expressly that a failure to comply with the annual assessment work requirement would invalidate the claim automatically; rather, it stated only that a claim must be "maintained in compliance with the laws under which initiated" in order to avoid being brought within the leasing system. In contrast, in Section 314(c) Congress provided that failure to comply with the filing requirements of subsections (a) and (b) "shall be deemed conclusively" to constitute abandonment of the claim. That language is absolute and provides no support for the district court's view that Section 314 is satisfied by "substantial compliance" with its requirements. 434 F.Supp. at 649, 650 n.1. Officers and directors of a CONCLUSION The judgment of the district court should be reversed. Respectfully submitted. REX E. LEE Solicitor General F. HENRY HABICHT, II Assistant Attorney General LOUIS F. CLAIBORNE Deputy Solicitor General CAROLYN F. CORWIN Assistant to the Solicitor General DAVID C. SHILTON ARTHUR E. GOWRAN Attorneys JULY 1984 /1/ See 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq. (oil, gas, oil shale, coal, and other energy and fertilizer minerals); 30 U.S.C. 611 (sand, gravel, and other building and construction minerals). The minerals on public lands that Congress has removed from the coverage of the general mining laws are now generally subject to leasing or other contractual arrangements. See 30 U.S.C. 181 et seq.; 30 U.S.C. 601 et seq. /2/ Both subsection (a) and subsection (b) require an initial submission by October 1979 in the case of claims located prior to October 21, 1976. However, only subsection (a) requires annual filings thereafter. For ease of reference, we will refer to subsection (a) as the annual filing requirement and to subsection (b) as the initial recordation requirement. This case involves the failure to make a timely annual filing required by subsection (a). /3/ Section 314(c) provides that it shall not be considered a failure to file "if the instrument is defective or not timely filed for record under other Federal laws permitting filing or recording thereof, or if the instrument is filed for record by or on behalf of some but not all of the owners of the mining claim." /4/ This amendment was prompted by the overload on the United States Postal Service caused by holiday mail during the latter part of December. See 47 Fed. Reg. 56305 (1982). /5/ Appellees located their claims in 1952 and 1955, prior to the effective date of the Common Varieties Act of 1955, 30 U.S.C. 611, which prospectively withdrew common varieties of building and construction minerals from the coverage of the general mining laws. See page 3 & note 1, supra; Watt v. Western Nuclear, Inc., slip op. 20-21 n.15. /6/ The form letter appellees received (J.S. App. 22a-24a) advised them that they could relocate their claims subject to valid intervening rights of third parties or the United States. In fact, appellees may not relocate their claims because common varieties of sand and gravel have been withdrawn from the coverage of the general mining laws. See note 5, supra. The appendix to the Jurisdictional Statement reproduces the letter sent to appellee Madison D. Locke, J.S. App. 22a- 24a. The other three appellees received identical letters. /7/ The court did not address appellees' request for an injunction against enforcement of Interior Department regulations. /8/ The court noted (J.S. App. 5a-6a) that during the 1979-1980 assessment year appellees produced over $1,000,000 worth of gravel and sand from their claims. /9/ The United States District Court for the District of Montana has declared Section 314(c) unconstitutional in a case involving invalidation of claims based on failure to record timely notices of location required by Section 314(b). Rgoers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (1982). The court in Rogers applied an irrebuttable presumption analysis similar to that employed by the district court in this case. Id. at 9-11. However, the court in Rogers rejected the contention that substantial compliance is sufficient to satisfy Section 314. 575 F. Supp. at 8-9. The government did not seek review of the judgment in Rogers because it failed to file a notice of appeal to this Court within the 30-day time limit set by 28 U.S.C. 2101(a). /10/ Appellees did not raise below the question of congressional authority to enact Section 314; the district court also did not refer to that issue. However, this Court in Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516, 525-530 (1982), concluded that it was appropriate to consider such an issue before addressing constitutional challenges based on procedural due process. /11/ Congress stated in the declaration of policy set out in FLPMA, "the national interest will be best realized if the public lands and their resources are periodically and systematically inventoried and their present and future use is projected through a land use planning process coordinated with other Federal and State planning efforts." 43 U.S.C. 1701(a)(2). /12/ BLM has advised us that the Section 314 filing requirements have indeed facilitated actions involving federal lands. For example, the State of Utah recently selected 223,000 acres pursuant to the indemnity selection program under 43 U.S.C. 853. In the course of a month, BLM was able to use the data base generated with the aid of Section 314 filings to identify 32,000 of those acres as covered by valid mining claims; that information was then used in reaching an agreement on acreage available for the State's indemnity selection. BLM estimates that prior to passage of Section 314, it would have taken four months of research at county courthouses, an additional 60 days for publication in the Federal Register and local newspapers, and perhaps several years to determine the status of claims through validity examinations and mining contest hearings in order to accomplish a similar result. Thus far, the major benefits of the Section 314 recordation program have been in the area of land conveyance and disposal of isolated, unmanageable tracts pursuant to Section 203 of FLPMA, 43 U.S.C. 1713. Information generated by the program has also aided in the demarcation of active mineral exploration areas, which in turn facilitates the planning of new areas of mining and industrial activity on public lands. /13/ Of course, many stale claims presumably were eliminated as a result of claimants' failure to make initial recordations by October 1979. However, annual filings serve to weed out additional claims that have become stale since October 1979, thus continuously freeing up public land for relocation by other miners or for other uses. /14/ Past experience indicates that filing requirements will not be effective unless there is some enforcement mechanism. Prior to the passage of Section 314, there were several statutory recording requirements applicable under special circumstances. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 11, 1955, ch. 797, Section 4, 69 Stat. 683, 30 U.S.C. 623 (requiring recordation and reporting for claims on lands withdrawn for power site development). BLM has advised us that because there was no statutory penalty for noncompliance (see MacDonald v. Best, 186 F. Supp. 217 (N.D. Cal. 1960)), it rarely received the required filings. /15/ The Indiana statute required filing of a statement of claim only if a mineral interest had not been used for a period of 20 years. It seems clear, however, that the authority to condition retention of an interest on filing is not confined to situations in which property has not been used in recent years. A filing requirement that applies to both active and inactive interests, such as that imposed by Section 314, can serve many legitimate purposes, as we explained at pages 19-20, supra. /16/ Congress's power undoubtedly encompasses the authority to impose a new condition in connection with mining claims already in existence at the time FLPMA was enacted. Texaco, too, involved a statute that provided for extinguishment of existing interests if owners failed to meet new requirements. As the Court's discussion in Texaco (454 U.S. at 526-529) shows, provisions that affect interests created before their enactment have been upheld in a number of cases. Appellees cannot contend that they obtained their claims with the expectation that the claims would never be subject to the condition that claimants comply with reasonable filing requirements. Compare, e.g., Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 144-148 (1982); United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 22-23 (1977); City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497, 514-515 (1965). Claimants have always been subject to certain statutory requirements that form part of a system of regulation of federal lands; thus, they cannot object if Congress chooses to alter those conditions prospectively in order to achieve reasonable legislative objectives. See, e.g., FHA v. The Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S. 84, 91 (1958). And cf. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., Nos. 83-245 and 83-291 (June 18, 1984) (retroactive legislation in previously regulated area did not violate due process); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 14-20 (1976) (same). The functions served by Section 314 bear some resemblance to the purposes underlying the enactment at issue in City of El Paso v. Simmons, supra. There the Court held that a Texas Statute that limited the right of reinstatement of contractual claims to purchase public land to five years from the date of forfeiture did not violate the Contract Clause. Although the right of reinstatement had not been so limited at the time individuals entered into the contracts, the Court noted that the State possessed reserved power to safeguard the vital interests of its people. The Court determined that the Texas statute of repose served important state objectives, including clarification of land titles, elimination of massive litigation over titles, and effective administration of property by the State, while the measure taken to induce purchasers to comply with their contracts was quite mild. 379 U.S. at 509-517. Of course, the standard under the Due Process Clause is less searching than that applicable to states under the Contract Clause. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., v. R.A. Gray & Co., slip op. 14-15. /17/ At the oustset, we note that the property interest at issue in this case is somewhat weaker than the interest considered in Texaco v. Short. The severed mineral interests in Texaco were defined by state law as "vested" and as entitled to the same protection as fee simple titles. See 454 U.S. at 519 n.5. The mining claims here are unpatented and are defined in terms of a "right of present and exclusive possession." Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S 306, 316 (1930); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 460 (1920). Until a claimant proceeds to patent, paramount title to the lands on which the claims are located remains in the United States. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 336. This Court has repeatedly characterized mining claims as "property in the fullest sense of that term." Wilbur v. United States ex rel. Krushnic, 280 U.S. at 316; Bradford v. Morrison, 212 U.S. 389, 394-395 (1909); Belk v. Meagher, 104 U.S. 279, 283 (1881); Forbes v. Gracey, 94 U.S. at 767. However, such claims remain subject to conditions set by Congress, and the Interior Department has authority to issue regulations affecting claims and to determine their validity. Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371 U.S. at 336; Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. at 460. /18/ Appellees also claimed (Complaint 6-7 Paragraph 17) that Section 314(c) effected a taking of their property without just compensation. The district court did not address the just compensation issue; however, it did characterize Section 314(c) as effecting a taking of appellees' property interests (J.S. App. 4a). This Court's decision in Texaco makes it clear that the district court's characterization is incorrect. In Texaco the Court explained (454 U.S. at 530) that a statute under which property is deemed to be abandoned upon the owner's failure to take reasonable actions imposed by law does not amount to a "taking" that requires just compensation under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There is no "taking" because it is the owner's failure to do the required act, rather than any action of the government, that directly causes extinguishment of the property right. The Court noted in Texaco that it had "never required the State to compensate the owner for the consequences of his own neglect: and that "after abandonment, the former owner retains no interest for which he may claim compensation" (ibid.). The action required by Section 314 -- filing of standard documents in a timely manner -- is clearly reasonable and within the capability of any claimant. Thus, invalidation of a claim following a claimant's failure to comply with the statutory requirements does not effect any taking. /19/ This case therefore differs from Texaco v. Short, in which the record did not indicate whether the appellants were aware of the enactment of the Mineral Lapse Act. See 454 U.S. at 522. Appellees in this case apparently were aware of not only the filing requirements, but also the effect on their claims of a failure to comply with the requirements. In their Complaint (at 4 Paragraph 12) they stated that they made their initial recordation and filing prior to October 21, 1979, "in order to protect (their) ten mining claims from forfeiture." Appellees' account of their efforts to comply with the 1980 annual filing requirement (see Mot. to Aff. 3) also suggests that they were aware that a failure to comply with that requirement would result in forfeiture. /20/ The relevant issue in determining whether a claim has become invalid by operation of Section 314(c) -- whether a claimant has complied with the filing requirements of Section 314 -- is quite different from, e.g., the issues relevant to the determination considered in Cameron v. United States, supra. In Cameron the Court considered the authority of the Interior Department to nullify an unpatented mining claim on the basis of inconsistency with requirements of the general mining laws. The Court concluded that the agency could nullify a claim after proper notice and an administrative hearing. 252 U.S. at 460. The relevant issues in such a case -- whether there had been a mineral discovery within the limits of the claim, whether the land was mineral in character, and whether the claimant otherwise had complied with requirements of the general mining laws (id. at 456) -- are best determined in a hearing. /21/ This Court has upheld the constitutionality of statutes of limitations that may operate to extinguish causes of action existing at the time of enactment of the statute, so long as the legislature provides a reasonable grace period within which suits may be brought on those existing causes of action. See, e.g., Block v. North Dakota, slip op. 12 n.23; Soper v. Lawrence Bros., 201 U.S. 359, 369 (1906) (Holmes, J.); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. at 632-634. See also, e.g., Anderson Nat'l Bank v. Luckett, 321 U.S. at 240-241 (statute governing disposition of abandoned bank deposits); Montoya v. Gonzales, 232 U.S. 375, 378 (1914) (Holmes, J.) (adverse possession); Wilson v. Iseminger, supra (extinguishment of ground rents); Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280, 289-290 (1830) (recording statute). And see City of El Paso v. Simmons, supra (limiting to five years the right of reinstatement of contractual claims to purchase public lands). There is no suggestion in these cases that individual notice and a hearing must be afforded to those whose interests are affected by such statutes. Of course, there are many other situations in which failure to comply with a filing deadline results in loss of an important right or other penalty. An obvious example is the time periods within which a party must act in order to preserve his right to judicial review. This Court has held that the requirement of a timely notice of appeal, filed within the deadlines set out in Fed. R. App. P. 4, is "mandatory and jurisdictional" and that failure to file a timely notice deprives the appellate court of jurisdiction to act. See Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982); Browder v. Director, Illinois Dep't of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 264 (1978). The deadlines for filing in this Court (see 28 U.S.C. 2101) are also jurisdictional. See Dep't of Banking v. Pink, 317 U.S. 264 (1942). Indeed, this case is before the Court only because we ourselves lost the opportunity to obtain review of Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. 4 (D. Mont. 1982), in which another district court held Section 314(c) unconstitutional; following the decision in Rogers, government attorneys failed to file a notice of appeal to this Court within the 30-day time limit set by 28 U.S.C. 2101(a). And see U.C.C. Section 9-302 (1977) (requiring filing of a financing statement in order to perfect a security interest); U.C.C. Section 9-403(2) (1972) (providing that perfection lapses after a five-year period unless a creditor files a continuation statement); 26 U.S.C. 6651(a)(1) (providing a penalty for failure to file a timely tax return). Again, there is no suggestion that due process requires individual notice to those who may lose property or otherwise suffer penalties if they fail to meet these deadlines. /22/ Indeed, since the federal government itself is the owner of the land on which the mining claims affected by Section 314 are located, the case for individualized preforfeiture notice is even weaker here than in Texaco. Under the Indiana statute it would have been relatively nonburdensome for each surface owner to provide preforfeiture notice to the owners of the mineral interests on his land. Here, there would be a considerable burden on the federal government if it were required to notify each delinquent claimant. It was reasonable for Congress instead to place on claimants themselves the minimal burden of complying with the Section 314 filing requirements. BLM has advised us that, beginning in 1980, its practice has been to mail annual reminder notices to claimants several months before the annual filing deadline in an effort to promote compliance with the statute. Thus, every claimant who has made an initial recordation should receive advance warning that the December 30 deadline for annual filing is approaching. The 1980 reminder notice stated explicitly: "You must file on or before 12/30/80. Failure to file timely with the proper BLM office will render your claim abandoned." We assume that appellees received a reminder notice from BLM in 1980. However, the record does not indicate whether or not appellees in fact received a notice. We do not believe such advance warning is constitutionally required; rather, it is a matter of administrative judgment within BLM's discretion. In any event, it would be far-fetched to suggest that, once BLM provides a reminder notice in advance of the filing date, the Constitution would require yet another reminder after the filing date had passed. /23/ See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, at 34-36. /24/ Of course, the distinction between the two statutes is probably due in large part to their differing purposes. Nonuse was relevant under the Indiana statute because its primary purpose was to encourage productive use of private lands. See 454 U.S. at 551-552 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Section 314 provides an administratively convenient method of clearing stale claims from federal lands, serves as an enforcement mechanism that enables collection of up-to-date information about the status of mining claims, and allows federal managers to make land use decisions with some certainty. See pages 19-20, supra. Nonuse has only limited relevance to those functions. /25/ In support of their conclusion that the Indiana Mineral Lapse Act provided insufficient notice to owners of mineral interests, the dissenters in Texaco cited Lambert v. California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957), although they acknowledged that Lambert did not control there because "the imposition of criminal sanctions giv(es) rise to a rigor in the application of due process standards that would be inappropriate where only interests in property are at stake * * *" (454 U.S. at 547 n.4 (Brennan, J., dissenting; emphasis in original)). In Lambert the Court characterized the California registration statute at issue there as "entirely different" from other licensing or registration statutes relating to the regulation of business activities, because "circumstances which might move one to inquiry as to the necessity of registration are completely lacking" (355 U.S. at 229). Section 314 is clearly distinguishable from the California law considered in Lambert. The filing requirements under Section 314 form part of a comprehensive system of regulation of public lands. See H.R. Rep. 94-1163, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-4 (1976); S. Rep. 94-583, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1975). Indeed, claimants have always been subject to some regulation under the provisions of the general mining laws. Thus, they have good reason to keep informed about any new statutory or regulatory requirements. In an area subject to an ongoing system of governmental regulation, lack of notice of filing requirements may not be a defense even to the imposition of criminal penalties. See, e.g., United States v. Freed, 401 U.S. 601, 607-610 (1971) (proof of specific intent unnecessary in connection with the crime of possessing an unregistered firearm). See also United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277,281 (1943) (criminal penalties may "serve as an effective means of regulation"); United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 253-254 (1922). /26/ As this Court noted in Texaco, 454 U.S. at 534-536, the reasoning of cases such as Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), which provide that due process requires notice and opportunity for an appropriate hearing in cases involving deprivation of property by adjudication, does not apply to the self-executing feature of a statute; rather, it applies to a judicial proceeding brought to determine, e.g., whether lapse of a mineral estate did or did not occur. Thus, Mullane governed the proceedings associated with appellees' appeal to the IBLA, but not the self-executing invalidation of their claims pursuant to Section 314(c). /27/ In effect, Section 314(c) simply assigns a new definition to the term "abandonment" for purposes of that provision. As the House report accompanying the legislation states, "(f)ailure to comply with (Section 314(a) and (b)) constitutes abandonment of the claim." H.R. Rep. 94-1163, supra, at 11. /28/ Section 314(c) does not amount to a legislative determination that, contrary to fact, all (or even some) claimants who fail to file a timely annual notice have actually abandoned their claims. It expresses instead a determination that claimants who fail to comply with the filing requirements should lose their claims. In the framework of mining law, denominating those claims "abandoned" produces that result. See 2 The American Law of Mining Section 8.5A (Rocky Mountain Mineral Law Foundation ed. 1982). This was Congress's understanding of the "deemed conclusively" language. The Senate version of the bill provided that any claim for which the claimant has not applied for a patent within ten years "shall be conclusively presumed to be abandoned and shall be void." 122 Cong. Rec. 4039 (1976). Senator McClure described that provision as follows: "In essence, what the bill does is say that if there is an unpatented mining claim on the public domain * * * they would have to proceed to patent within 10 years or relinquish the claim." Id. at 4052. See also Public Land Policy and Management Act of 1975: Hearings on H.R. 5224 and H.R. 5622 Before the Subcomm. on Public Lands of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 224 (1975) (remarks of Jack O. Horton, Assistant Secretary of the Interior) (under the administration's proposal for recordation of mining claims, "(f)ailure to comply would render the claim invalid"). /29/ Commentators have criticized the irrebuttable presumption analysis employed in Vlandis. See Note, Irrebuttable Presumptions: An Illusory Analysis, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 449, 472-473 (1975); Note, The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1534, 1556 (1974). In Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. at 536 n.28, the Court declined to reach the question whether a state could indulge in an assumption of abandonment if the statutory period of nonuse were shorter than 20 years or if "the interest affected is such that concepts of 'use' or 'nonuse' have little meaning." We do not believe that the Court intended to imply in any way that the federal government could not condition retention of a mining claim located on public land on compliance with reasonable filing requirements alone, without regard to use or nonuse. See page 21 note 15. /30/ As we noted (at 31 note 22), BLM's current practice is to send out annual reminders to claimants several months before the due date of the annual filings required by Section 314(a). In addition, it sends notices to those whose claims have been declared void because of failure to comply with the Section 314 filing requirements. See, e.g., J.S. App. 22a-24a. The district court appears to have recognized (J.S. App. 9a) that it would have been impossible for BLM to use such procedures in connection with the initial recordation requirement under Section 314 because it could not have identified and adjudicated each of the millions of claims that had been located on federal lands over the years. Cf. Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. at 11 (expressing the view that allowing a hearing to a mining claimant prior to invalidating his unpatented mining claim for failure to make an initial recordation would not be overly burdensome to the government). /31/ The legislative history does not indicate why Congress chose to require filing of annual notices "prior to" December 31, rather than on or before December 31. It may well be that Congress wished to require filing by the end of the calendar year and that the earlier deadline resulted from careless draftsmanship. See Sherwood, Mining-Claim Recordation and Prospecting Under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 23 Rocky Mtn. L. Inst. 1, 25 (1977). However, the supposition that Congress might not have meant what it said would not warrant reading of the statute that is contrary to its plain language. See United States Railroad Retirement Board v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 179 (1980). Of course, there is nothing to prevent Congress from setting any filing deadline it wishes whether or not a different time might seem more natural. Perhaps it might be argued that the words "prior to December 31" should be read as though Congress had said "prior to the close of business on December 31." However, we are unable to conclude that the words of the statute can be stretched this far. The natural reading of "prior to December 31" is on or before December 30. Any confusion on this point would be dispelled by the Secretary's regulation, which states that claimants must make their annual filings" on or before December 30 of each calendar year." 43 C.F.R. 3833.2-1(b)(1). Claimants are charged with knowledge of the regulation. See 44 U.S.C. 1507; Heckler v. Community Health Services, No. 83-56 (May 21, 1984), slip op. 12-14; FCIC v. Merrill, 332 U.S. at 384-385. As we noted above (at 6), the Secretary has revised the implementing regulations to provide that annual notices will be considered timely filed if they are postmarked on or before December 30 and are received at the proper BLM office by the following Jauary 19th. While that amendment is a liberalization of the previous regulation (which required that annual notices actually be received at the BLM office on or before December 30), it does not depart from the plain words of the statute. Rather, it rests on the Secretary's interpretation of the term "(f)ile," which is not defined by the statute itself. Congress has delegated to the Secretary the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the purposes of FLPMA. See 43 U.S.C. 1740. /32/ In fact, under normal rules of statutory construction, time requirements imposed on an individual generally are mandatory and are strictly construed against that individual. See 2A C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction Section 57.19, at 445 (4th ed. 1973). Moreover, the language of public land grants generally is strictly construed against the grantee and in favor of the government. See Andrus v. Charlestone Stone Products Co., 436 U.S. 604, 617 (1978); United States v. Union Pacific R.R., 353 U.S. at 116; 3 C. Sands, Statutes and Statutory Construction Section 64.07, at 137 (4th ed. 1974). The court in Rogers v. United States, 575 F. Supp. at 8, concluded that the plain language of Section 314(c) provides no support for a theory of substantial compliance. The court noted that "(c)arving out such a substantial compliance exception would clearly defy the 'plain meaning' rule of statutory construction." 575 F. Supp. at 8 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185,201 (1976)). /33/ In addition, Congress has established grace periods in connection with other requirements under the mining laws. For example, 30 U.S.C. 188(b) provides that certain oil and gas leases will terminate automatically upon the lessee's failure to make annual rental payments on or before the anniversary date of the lease. However, Congress also provided that the Secretary may reinstate the lease if the lessee pays or tenders the annual fee within 20 days of the anniversary date and can show that the failure to make a timely payment was justifiable or not due to a lack of reasonable diligence. 30 U.S.C. 188(c). See Ramoco, Inc. v. Andrus, 649 F.2d 814 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1032 (1981). /34/ If Congress should conclude that the results of the operation of Section 314(c) are too harsh in cases like that of appellees, it presumably could modify the provision or enact some other form of relief, as it did in the case of oil and gas placer claims. /35/ The district court cited the Senate Report (S. Rep. 94-583, supra, at 65) for the proposition that Congress was primarily interested in the elimination of stale claims when it enacted Section 314. J.S. App. 11a. But the Senate bill did not include a provision for annual filings; instead, it required that a claimant make an initial recordation and proceed to patent within ten years in order to retain a claim. Thus, the comments in the Senate Report do not reflect the legislative purpose underlying the annual filing requirement. The Conference Committee rejected the approach of the Senate bill and instead adopted the House amendments, which contained both the initial recordation requirement and the annual filing requirement. H.R. Rep. 94-1724, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1976). /36/ See Topaz Beryllium Co. v. United States, 479 F. Supp. at 314, in which the court stated: The Act has a multitude of purposes -- not just the cleansing of the public domain of dormant and unpursued mining claims. Some purposes, among others, are land use planning and management; the identification of lands subject to valid locations and invalid locations; and the identification of unauthorized occupanices. /37/ And see 2 The American Law of Mining, supra, Section 8.20E, at 244 (suggesting that for all practical purposes Virginia-Colorado and Krushnic have been overruled). APPENDIX