No. 98-1464
In the Supreme Court of the United States
JANET RENO, ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
CHARLIE CONDON, ATTORNEY GENERAL
FOR THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA, ET AL.
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF FOR THE PETITIONERS
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
As we explain in our opening brief (at 39-42), the Driver's Privacy Protection
Act of 1994 (DPPA or Act), 18 U.S.C. 2721-2725 (1994 & Supp. III 1997),
is one of several statutes enacted by Congress to address concerns raised
by the dissemination of personal information. Federal statutes control the
circumstances in which specified private entities such as video stores,
cable television companies, and credit bureaus may disclose personal information
without the consent of the individual to whom the information pertains.
Other statutes govern the circumstances in which federal agencies may disclose
the personal information that they gather about private individuals. In
similar fashion, the DPPA addresses the particular concerns posed by the
disclosure of personal information by state departments of motor vehicles
(DMVs). Like the statutes that regulate disclosures by private entities
and by the federal government, the DPPA is tailored to address concerns
about intrusions on privacy raised by the specific type of record covered
by the statute; it also permits dissemination in circumstances where Congress
found an important public interest in disclosure of the information in that
particular kind of record.
Respondents assert that Congress's extension of federal regulation of the
dissemination of personal information to state DMV records is invalid for
two principal reasons. First, they argue that the DPPA, like the statutes
invalidated in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), and Printz
v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), commandeers the States into federal
service by requiring them to enact or implement a federal regulatory scheme.
See Resp. Br. 12-22. Second, they urge that Congress may not impose any
regulations on state entities that engage in commerce unless Congress also
imposes the same regulations on private persons. See id. at 24-27. Neither
argument has merit.
1. The DPPA Is Within Congress's Enumerated Powers.
As a threshold matter, as we show in our opening brief (at 21-23), there
can be no doubt that the DPPA regulates activity that is subject to Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, Cl. 3. Respondents
do not argue otherwise. Respondents have therefore waived any argument that
the DPPA exceeds Congress's enumerated powers, and the Court should decline
to address the argument made by amicus curiae Pacific Legal Foundation (PLF)
that the DPPA exceeds Congress's commerce power. See Robertson v. Seattle
Audubon Soc'y, 503 U.S. 429, 441 (1992) (declining to address an argument
urged only by amicus curiae).
In any event, PLF's arguments cast no doubt on the DPPA's firm grounding
in the Commerce Clause. PLF asserts without substantiation (PLF Br. 5, 6)
that States charge only "administrative fees" for motor vehicle
records, by which it apparently means fees that cover only the cost of supplying
the information. Respondents, however, have made no such claim on behalf
of the State of South Carolina. Moreover, the State of Wisconsin, which
has also challenged the DPPA, has acknowledged that it has done so in part
to protect the $8 million it receives each year from sales of motor vehicle
record information.1 Congress also heard testimony that New York earned
$17 million in one year from individuals and businesses that used the State's
computers to examine motor vehicle records. See 1994 WL 212813 (Feb. 3,
1994) (statement of Janlori Goldman, American Civil Liberties Union).
Moreover, Congress's regulatory power under the Commerce Clause is not limited
to situations in which those subject to regulation earn a profit from the
regulated activity. It is sufficient in this case that state DMVs acquire
the information at issue in connection with activities (the owning and operating
of motor vehicles) intimately tied to interstate commerce, that personal
information in state DMV records has considerable commercial value, and
that the automobile industry and national direct marketing companies rely
heavily on that information in their national marketing efforts. See Gov't
Br. 4-5. The DPPA thus regulates activities in or affecting interstate commerce
in the plainest way.
It is also well settled that Congress may exercise its regulatory power
to keep the channels of commerce free of "immoral and injurious uses."
Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 256 (1964).
Congress has done so in the DPPA by acting to ensure that commerce in personal
information does not facilitate stalking, identity fraud, and invasions
of privacy. The Act also plainly protects interstate commerce and the channels
of commerce by ensuring that access to the Nation's highways is not conditioned
upon drivers being subjected to threats to their safety and privacy.2
2. The DPPA Does Not Commandeer State Governments.
Respondents and their amici contend that this case is controlled by New
York and Printz. See Resp. Br. 12-24; National Conference of State Legislatures
et al. (NCSL) Br. 3-24; PLF Br. 11-22. Their arguments conflate compliance
with commandeering, and they ignore the fundamental distinctions between
the DPPA and the statutes at issue in New York and Printz.
a. The DPPA directly regulates the practices of state entities by restricting
their disclosure of information. The statute addresses the threats to privacy
and safety posed by DMV disclosures made without a driver's consent. In
sharp distinction, the statutes at issue in New York and Printz commanded
the States to implement federal schemes that regulated private persons and
that addressed problems neither created nor exacerbated by the States' own
activities.
The statute at issue in New York required the States either to regulate
the way private entities dispose of low-level radioactive waste, or to take
title to that waste and assume liability for the private generators' damages.
See New York, 505 U.S. at 153-154. Both provisions effectively required
the States to adopt a regulatory solution to problems created by private
conduct. As the Court explained, imposing an affirmative obligation on the
States to take title to the private waste was "no different than a
congressionally compelled subsidy from state governments to radioactive
waste producers," and requiring the States to assume liability for
the generators' damages was "indistinguishable from an Act of Congress
directing the States to assume the liabilities of certain state residents."
Id. at 175. On the other hand, the option of "regulating pursuant to
Congress' direction" presented "a simple command to state governments
to implement legislation enacted by Congress." Id. at 175-176. The
Court concluded that, "[e]ither way, the Act commandeers the legislative
processes of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce
a federal regulatory program." Id. at 176 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted); see also Printz, 521 U.S. at 926 (explaining that both options
presented in New York "effectively requir[ed] the States either to
legislate pursuant to Congress's directions, or to implement an administrative
solution").3
Similarly, the statute at issue in Printz required state officials to make
reasonable efforts to determine whether proposed handgun sales by private
sellers to private buyers would violate federal law. See Printz, 521 U.S.
at 903. As in New York, the provision was invalidated because it "dragooned"
state governments into addressing problems in the private sector that were
not of their own making, and to do so by implementing a federally prescribed
regulatory solution to those problems. Id. at 928.4
No such commandeering occurs when the federal government directly regulates
the conduct of state entities. The Court did not suggest in New York, for
example, that Congress may not regulate a state entity's own production
and disposal of radioactive waste.5 Nor did the Court suggest in Printz
that Congress may not impose regulatory requirements on state entities that
themselves engage in the sale of handguns. Such regulation of the state
entities' own conduct would not commandeer state legislatures or officials
into enacting or enforcing a federal scheme for the regulation of private
conduct. When, as in the DPPA, Congress regulates state conduct directly,
the state entities engaged in that conduct are themselves the subject of
the federal regulation; Congress does not "impress" state officials
"into its service," see Resp. Br. 17 (quoting Printz, 521 U.S.
at 922), or render them agents of the federal government. The state entities
regulated by the DPPA are no more called upon to enforce a federal scheme
than are private parties who are subject to federal regulation.
b. Respondents protest (Resp. Br. 13-14), however, that compliance with
the DPPA will entail administrative burdens. But as we explain in our opening
brief (Gov't Br. 30-32), in South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988),
the Court firmly rejected the contention that a federal law directly regulating
state activity would be invalid merely because the States, as a practical
matter, might need to devote substantial effort to bring themselves into
compliance with the federal law, including changing their legislation and
administrative practices. The Court made clear that the need to take "administrative
and sometimes legislative action to comply with federal standards regulating
that activity is a commonplace that presents no constitutional defect."
Id. at 515. That point disposes of respondents' assertions (which are decidedly
overstated in any event) that compliance with the DPPA will impose onerous
administrative burdens on state DMV personnel.6
In Baker, the Court also stressed that the statute upheld in that case,
which imposed a prohibition on state conduct (the use of bearer bonds),
"regulate[d] state activities"; it did not "seek to control
or influence the manner in which the States regulate private parties."
485 U.S. at 514. The same is true here. The DPPA regulates the state activity
of dissemination of information; it does not require the States to exercise
their regulatory power over private persons. The States, for example, have
no obligation to pursue remedies against any requester who improperly obtains
or uses information from motor vehicle records.7
c. Respondents further err in arguing (Resp. Br. 20) that New York "explicitly
recognized that Congress cannot impose duties on the States regardless of
whether the duties imposed are mandatory or prohibitory in nature."
That assertion is an incorrect statement of the law. New York did not hold
that Congress may impose no "duties" on state entities; such a
holding could not be squared with many of the Court's Tenth Amendment decisions,
including Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority, 469 U.S.
528 (1985), which reaffirmed that Congress may impose duties on state entities-in
that case, the duties to adhere to maxmium-hours legislation and to pay
overtime pay when required. The Court did state in New York, as respondents
observe (Resp. Br. 20), that, "even where Congress has the authority
* * * to pass laws requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power
directly to compel the States to require or prohibit those acts." 505
U.S. at 166. The DPPA, however, does not suffer from that deficiency. The
DPPA does not require state DMVs to require or prohibit anyone outside the
agency to do anything.
It is particularly difficult to sustain a contention that a federal statute
impermissibly commandeers state officials when (as with the DPPA) the statute
under challenge imposes no affirmative obligations at all.8 If a federal
statute "commandeers" state officials, one would assume that it
does so in order that they carry out some affirmative act, such as adopting
a regulatory program governing radioactive waste (as in New York) or performing
background checks to determine the legality under federal law of proposed
handgun transfers (as in Printz). By contrast, when a federal statute simply
prevents state officials or agencies from taking action, it is difficult
to see how they have been commandeered.9
d. Respondents also contend (Resp. Br. 14-17) that the DPPA is invalid because
it blurs lines of "political accountability" for decisions by
state DMVs whether to release information that is covered by the Act. Respondents
misapprehend the relevance of the issue of accountability. The Court has
made clear that concerns about accountability underlie the prohibition against
commandeering state and local governments into regulating private conduct
on behalf of the federal government. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 926-933; New
York, 505 U.S. at 182-183. As we have shown, however (pp. 4-7, supra), the
DPPA results in no such commandeering, and it therefore does not implicate
those accountability considerations.
Respondents would expand the inquiry into "accountability" to
condemn federal statutes that restrict state activity whether or not they
commandeer the State into regulating private conduct. That notion finds
no support in this Court's decisions. The Court has never held that political
accountability is impermissibly blurred merely because a state or local
official's options in carrying out a state program are constrained by federal
law. To the contrary, it is frequently the case that state decisionmakers
must take account of the substantive requirements of federal law in choosing
among various alternatives, yet that fact presents no constitutional difficulty.
For example, in Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975), the Court upheld
the application to state employment of federal wage and salary controls,
which limited annual salary increases for covered employees. If a state
employee had asked his employer for a salary increase exceeding the permissible
limit under federal law, the state employer would have had to consider,
and comply with, the federal rule restricting salary increases. Under respondents'
reasoning, however, Fry could not have been decided correctly, because a
state agency could have been placed in the position of denying a requested
wage increase to a state employee, even though it was federal law that prohibited
the state agency from increasing salaries above a certain limit.10
3. Congress's Power Is Not Limited To Generally Applicable Laws.
As we show in our opening brief (at 34-48), the central holding of the court
of appeals, that "Congress may only subject state governments to generally
applicable laws," Pet. App. 15a (emphasis added; internal quotation
marks omitted), is inconsistent with the Constitution's plenary grant of
"legislative Power" to Congress, U.S. Const. Art. I, which necessarily
includes the authority possessed by legislative bodies generally to tailor
their laws with respect to the particular problems they identify (see Gov't
Br. 39-45). In addition, the court of appeals' rigid rule finds no support
in the constitutional structure of federalism (id. at 45-48) or in precedent
or logic (id. at 34-39). Respondents and their amici make no attempt to
answer our arguments based on the Constitution's text and structure, and
the efforts they do make to defend the court of appeals' ruling are unavailing.
a. Respondents argue (Resp. Br. 25-26) that generally applicable laws do
not present the danger of blurring of political accountability present in
New York and Printz because, "[w]hen the States are subjected to statutes
which apply generally, such statutes apply so broadly that they are unlikely
to be mistaken for governmental policy choices by the States." We agree
that generally applicable laws do not blur political accountability, but
the same point is also true of statutes like the DPPA that directly regulate
only state activity directly and do not commandeer state officers into enforcing
federal law against private parties. As Judge Phillips observed in dissent
below, generally applicable laws are constitutionally permissible because
"they directly regulate[] state activities rather than using the States
as implements of regulation of third parties." Pet. App. 32a (internal
quotation marks omitted). It is only in the latter circumstance that an
impermissible blurring of political accountability occurs under the Court's
cases. See New York, 505 U.S. at 168 ("By contrast, where the Federal
Government compels [the] States to regulate, the accountability of both
state and federal officials is diminished.") (emphasis added); pp.
6-7, supra. When the federal government itself directly regulates the activities
of state entities in commerce, responsibility for the regulation clearly
lies with the federal government.
b. Amici Alabama et al. urge the Court to reconceptualize its entire Tenth
Amendment jurisprudence. See Ala. Br. 9-10. They argue that the Court should
abandon its emphasis in New York and Printz on impermissible "commandeering"
of state and local governments, and instead should distinguish principally
between laws of general applicability that include States among the regulated
entities, and laws that do not apply to private parties and States in the
same way. That emphasis on general applicability is appropriate, amici argue,
because laws that "target" States for a "unique burden"
should be held invalid under a "process-oriented" approach to
the Tenth Amendment that examines whether Congress has "singled out"
the States. Ibid.
There is no support in this Court's jurisprudence for the proposition that
laws that apply only to state entities, or apply to state entities differently
than they apply to private entities, are invalid because they target the
States as politically powerless entities. Amici seek to enlist Garcia and
Baker for their position (see Ala. Br. 4-16), but their argument turns those
decisions upside down. In Garcia, the Court emphasized that the States retain
considerable influence in the federal legislative structure established
by the Constitution, especially through their representation in the Senate.
The Court explained that "the principal means chosen by the Framers
to ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure
of the Federal Government itself," and that "the composition of
the Federal Government was designed in large part to protect the States
from overreaching by Congress." 469 U.S. at 550-551.11 The Court in
Garcia therefore abandoned the framework of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), and instead emphasized the workings of the political
process to safeguard state interests in the federal system. "State
sovereign interests * * * are more properly protected by procedural safeguards
inherent in the structure of the federal system than by judicially created
limitations on federal power." Garcia, 469 U.S. at 552.
To be sure, the Court observed in Baker that "Garcia left open the
possibility that some extraordinary defects in the national political process
might render congressional regulation of state activities invalid under
the Tenth Amendment." 485 U.S. at 512 (emphasis added). Neither Garcia
nor Baker suggested, however, that the mere fact that a federal regulatory
statute might apply only to a particular kind of state activity, or might
apply to state activities differently than similar regulation applied to
private activities, would be evidence of an "extraordinary defect[]"
in the federal legislative process. When the Court in Baker adverted to
"extraordinary defects," it was referring to a situation in which
a particular State might have been deprived of its opportunity to participate
in the process of framing federal legislation. Thus, the Court in Baker
noted that "South Carolina ha[d] not even alleged that it was deprived
of any right to participate in the national political process or that it
was singled out in a way that left it politically isolated and powerless."
Id. at 513.
It strains credulity to suggest that a federal statute's applicability to
all States of the Union demonstrates that the States have been reduced to
a position of political powerlessness. As the Court pointed out in Garcia,
the States have substantial influence in the federal government. If South
Carolina, or any of the other 49 States of the Union, perceived that the
proposal to enact the DPPA threatened to impinge on state prerogatives,
its officials were free to make their objections known to the Congress.
And if many States had perceived that the DPPA was adverse to their legitimate
interests, it is doubtful that the DPPA would have been enacted. But far
from impairing the States' governmental interests, the DPPA is particularly
respectful of those interests; as we have explained (Gov't Br. 32-33), the
DPPA poses no obstacle to the use of personal information in DMV records
by state agencies. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(1) and (4). It is therefore unsurprising
that a representative of the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
appeared before Congress in support of the DPPA. See 1994 WL 212696 (Feb.
4, 1994) (statement of Marshall Rickert, Motor Vehicle Administrator for
the State of Maryland).
Amici's attempt to analogize this case to one in which the government targets
a particular member of the press or a minority religion for adverse treatment
(see Ala. Br. 13-14) is therefore unpersuasive.12 Similarly, in light of
the Court's emphasis in Garcia on the States' substantial influence in the
federal system, the 50 States of the Union cannot reasonably be likened
to a discrete and insular minority that lacks political influence. Cf. Baker,
485 U.S. at 513 (citing United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S.
144, 152 n.4 (1938), when referring to the possibility of an extraordinary
defect in the national political structure leaving a particular State isolated
and powerless). The 50 States of the Union are not a vulnerable political
constituency that needs judicial protection against discrimination.
Amici's argument is particularly implausible as applied to the DPPA, for
the DPPA is one of several federal statutes that regulate the disclosure
of personal information by private and governmental entities. The statute
books "teem with laws regulating the disclosure of information from
databases." Travis v. Reno, 163 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 1998), petition
for cert. pending, No. 98-1811; see also Gov't Br. 20-21, 39-41. Many of
these other federal statutes, applicable to private entities, "adopt
record-keeping and information-disclosure criteria at least as complex,
and impose a burden at least as great, as the [DPPA]." 163 F.3d at
1005.13 Thus, even though the other federal statutes do not apply to private
databases in exactly the same way that the DPPA applies to the records of
state agencies, nonetheless the States have not been "singled out"
for burdensome treatment.
Amici Alabama et al. contend (Ala. Br. 14) that Congress may not restrict
disclosures from DMV records unless it places identical restrictions on
the disclosure of the same information by all private entities. Congress,
however, permissibly concluded that the dangers posed by the dissemination
of motor vehicle records differ from the dangers posed by the dissemination
of video store and credit bureau records, and tailored its legislative responses
accordingly. Disclosures of personal information in DMV records are particularly
problematic because forgoing a driver's license is not a realistic option
for most individuals.14 Motor vehicle records also raise unique privacy
concerns because the license plate number, which must be displayed to the
public, can be made the key to the driver's identity and home address. In
effect, absent the DPPA, every vehicle owner would be required to provide
every stranger with the key to his personal information. As Representative
Moran, one of the DPPA's sponsors, explained: "The key difference between
DMV records and other public records comes from the license plate, through
which every vehicle on the public highways can be linked to a specific individual."
140 Cong. Rec. H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
In addition, as the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators
informed Congress, "driver and motor vehicle records maintained by
one state can be accessed from practically anywhere using only a computer
modem." 1994 WL 212696 (Feb. 4, 1994). Other records systems (both
private and governmental), such as personnel files and medical records,
are not necessarily so readily accessible to the public. Thus, even if information
similar to that held in DMV records, such as an individual's name, home
address, and social security number, may be kept in other records systems,
the danger of disclosure from those records systems is not necessarily so
great as the danger of disclosure from DMV records. As Rep. Moran observed,
"[a]nyone with access to data linking license plates with vehicle ownership
has the ability to ascertain the name and address of the person who owns
that vehicle. Other public records are not vulnerable to abuse in the same
way." 140 Cong. Rec. H2523 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1994).
Congress therefore had a legitimate basis for addressing in one tailored
statute the privacy concerns raised by dissemination of personal information
from DMV records, rather than attempting to address all privacy concerns
raised by all disclosures of information from all private and public databases,
as Alabama apparently would require that it do. Although respondents and
their amici disagree with that legislative judgment, "nothing in Garcia
or the Tenth Amendment authorizes courts to second-guess the substantive
basis for congressional legislation." Baker, 485 U.S. at 513. There
is no reason for the Court to depart from its usual practice of giving Congress
wide latitude in setting its legislative priorities and selecting its legislative
means. See Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955). To
the contrary, the special protections that the States enjoy in the political
process make such deference particularly appropriate in this context.
* * * * *
For the foregoing reasons, and for those set forth in our opening brief,
the judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
OCTOBER 1999
1 See Affidavit of James S. Thiel, General Counsel, Wis. Dep't of Transp.,
In Support Of Motion To Realign State Defendants As Plaintiffs ¶ 8
(Dec. 8, 1997), Division of Motor Vehicles of Wis. Dep't of Transp. v. Reno,
petition for cert. pending, No. 98-1818 (affidavit lodged with the Clerk).
Wisconsin charges only three dollars per motor vehicle record. Ibid. Thus,
even relatively small fees, when aggregated, can produce a substantial revenue
stream for a state DMV.
2 Respondents and their amici attempt to cast doubt on the validity of the
DPPA by arguing that the Act was intended to protect privacy and personal
safety, not commerce. The DPPA does regulate the commercial use of motor
vehicle information, however, in significant ways. For example, the DPPA
prohibits state DMVs from disclosing personal information for use in surveys,
marketing, and solicitation, unless individuals are provided an opportunity,
in a clear and conspicuous manner, to block such use of information pertaining
to them. See 18 U.S.C. 2721(b)(12). More fundamentally, however, this Court
has repeatedly made clear that Congress may exercise its Commerce Clause
power to address any legitimate goal, whether or not the particular problem
being addressed is predominantly commercial in character. See, e.g., Heart
of Atlanta Motel, 379 U.S. at 256-257; United States v. Darby, 312 U.S.
100, 114-115 (1941); Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, 491 (1917);
Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 356 (1903).
3 Amici NCSL et al. are therefore incorrect in arguing (NCSL Br. 10-11)
that the Court did not understand the "take title" provision invalidated
in New York as "requir[ing] state governments or officers to regulate
the primary activities of private parties." When the Court concluded
that the "take title" provision impermissibly compelled the State
to enact or enforce a federal regulatory program, it plainly understood
that the State would have to do more than simply take title to the radioactive
waste; the State would also have to develop some legislative or administrative
solution for the problems presented by the waste to which it took title.
Moreover, the Court analogized the "take title" provision to a
coerced subsidy of waste producers by the State. 505 U.S. at 175. Such a
subsidy would be a regulation of the primary, private conduct of producing
radioactive waste, as would be a compelled state assumption of the private
waste producers' liabilities (ibid.).
4 Respondents argue (Resp. Br. 19) that the DPPA does impermissibly commandeer
the States into "regulating" private individuals, because it requires
the state DMVs in some circumstances to withhold information that individuals
request from the state DMV. Such "prohibition of access" to the
requested information, respondents maintain, is tantamount to regulation
of the individuals who request access. There is no support for respondents'
position that direct federal regulation of state activity is transmuted
into "commandeering" of the State's regulatory machinery merely
because of its indirect effect on private persons, and applying respondents'
position to other contexts shows that it is implausible. For example, as
we have observed (Gov't Br. 44), the federal government may issue security
directives to govern the operation of major airports, even if those airports
happen to be owned and operated by state and local governments. Respondents
have not disputed that point. But if respondents' understanding of "commandeering"
were correct, then the federal government could not require that access
to the tarmac and baggage handling areas at such airports be restricted
to persons with valid security clearances, because such a requirement would
impermissibly require state and local governments that operate the airports
to "regulate" those persons barred from the sensitive areas of
the airport because they did not have the necessary clearances. Respondents'
argument cuts the concept of "commandeering" loose from its tether.
5 Under our constitutional structure of federalism, Congress could conclude
that the sale of certain highly dangerous products should be undertaken
only by state entities (if at all), and not by private parties. Such a regulation
would be unobjectionable under the Commerce Clause. Under respondents' theory
of "commandeering," however, if Congress did confine the sale
of such dangerous products to state entities, Congress would be barred by
the Tenth Amendment from imposing safety regulations on the state entities
permitted to make such sales. Yet respondents cannot dispute that, if both
state and private entities were permitted to make such sales of dangerous
products, Congress could validly make the very same safety regulations applicable
to state entities (because respondents agree that "generally applicable"
legislation may be applied to state entities). Thus, under respondents'
reasoning, the validity of congressional regulation as applied to state
activity does not depend on anything of substance in the regulation; it
depends entirely on whether the regulation also applies to someone other
than the State. That approach bears little relation to the principles of
federalism that underlie the Court's decisions in New York and Printz. See
also Gov't Br. 45-48.
6 Respondents stress the supposedly "complicated" nature of the
exceptions to the general bar on disclosure in the DPPA (Resp. Br. 5), the
"laborious" process of determining whether any particular request
falls within one of the exceptions (id. at 14), and the "considerable
training" of state personnel that will be needed to make them familiar
with the substantive requirements of the Act (id. at 7 n.8). Those complaints
about the burden of coming into compliance with the Act are much exaggerated.
The Act does not require that a state DMV adopt any particular mechanism
for ensuring that its disclosures of personal information are consistent
with the DPPA. Most of the steps necessary for compliance could probably
be satisfied by the initial development of a form for use by requesters.
Moreover, the DPPA permits the Attorney General to impose civil penalties
on a state DMV only when the DMV has a policy or practice of substantial
noncompliance with the Act, 18 U.S.C. 2723(b); it provides for criminal
punishment only when an individual knowingly violates the Act's restrictions,
18 U.S.C. 2723(a); and it allows recovery under a civil damages provision
only when an individual knowingly discloses information for a purpose not
permitted under the Act, 18 U.S.C. 2724(a). Thus, despite respondents' protestations
that the DPPA places state officials in peril (Resp. Br. 6-7), the DPPA
does not impose strict civil or criminal liability on state officials, and
sanctions are not available for mere errors in judgment as to whether particular
requests for information are permissible under the Act.
Respondents have therefore fallen far short of showing that the Act's supposed
burden poses any danger to the residual sovereignty of the States protected
by the constitutional structure of federalism. "Even the more expansive
conception of the Tenth Amendment espoused in National League of Cities
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), recognized that only congressional action
that 'operate[s] to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral
operations in areas of traditional governmental functions,' runs afoul of
the authority granted by Congress." Baker, 485 U.S. at 529 (Rehnquist,
C.J., concurring in the judgment). Not only does the DPPA not pose any threat
to the States' ability to structure their integral operations; it specifically
protects the States' interests in regulating driving and in determining
when motor vehicle information should be used for legitimate governmental
purposes, as we have observed (Gov't Br. 32-33). See also p. 17, infra (noting
that American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators supported passage
of the DPPA).
7 Respondents argue (Resp. Br. 23) that the Court engaged in a "balancing"
analysis in Baker, and that no such balancing of federal and state interests
is appropriate in this case. We agree that balancing is not appropriate
in this case, but we do not agree that Baker applied a balancing analysis.
The Court concluded in Baker that the Tenth Amendment is not violated by
the application of federal regulation to state activity, even though the
States may, in response to that federal regulation, deem it necessary or
convenient to change their legislation or administrative practices. See
485 U.S. at 515. That holding did not depend on a court's possible evaluation
of the relative weights of the state and federal interests. Nor does Baker
suggest that a court should make its own evaluation of the onerousness of
the administrative burden that Congress has imposed on a state entity, to
determine whether the federal regulation is consistent with constitutional
principles of federalism.
8 Respondents and amici NCSL et al. incorrectly argue (Resp. Br. 7; NCSL
Br. 15-16) that the DPPA affirmatively requires state DMVs to make disclosures
to the federal government in certain circumstances. The distinction between
a permissible requirement of compliance with federal standards and impermissible
commandeering does not generally turn on whether the regulation at issue
imposes a restriction or an affirmative obligation on state entities. But
in any event, as we explain in our opening brief (at 28 n.12), the DPPA
does not create any new disclosure requirements beyond those otherwise existing
under federal law. Although the DPPA provides that personal information
from motor vehicle records "shall" be disclosed to carry out the
purposes of other specified federal statutes, see 18 U.S.C. 2721(b) (1994
& Supp. III 1997), that provision only makes clear that the DPPA does
not relieve state agencies of reporting requirements that the other federal
statutes might impose. See also 1994 WL 212696 (Feb. 4, 1994) (statement
of Marshall Rickert, American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators)
(urging Congress to amend the Senate version of the bill to clarify that
it would not "create conflicts with other current federal privacy and
disclosure requirements as they related to motor vehicle and driver records").
The DPPA therefore imposes no reporting obligations independent of those
in the underlying statutes, and any consideration of the validity of such
reporting obligations should await a case in which those underlying statutes
are directly placed in issue. That is especially so since the affirmative
reporting requirements have not been the focus of contention in this case
in the lower courts. Respondents' complaint alleged that the DPPA "commands
the states * * * not to disclose state motor vehicle and driver's license
records except as provided by [the] Federal statute," J.A. 11; it did
not assert as a specific basis of invalidity that the DPPA requires the
States to disclose information. Nor did respondents challenge the DPPA on
that basis in the court of appeals. This case therefore presents no occasion
for the Court to consider the validity of federal disclosure requirements
applicable to state entities. Cf. Printz, 521 U.S. at 918 (distinguishing
that situation); id. at 936 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (same).
9 Similarly, as we have noted (Gov't Br. 29-30), it is indisputable that
Congress may preempt state law to bar a state agency from taking regulatory
action, even if the anti-commandeering principle would prevent Congress
from requiring the States to regulate. Respondents and their amici object
that this case does not involve preemption. See Resp. Br. 28; NCSL Br. 16;
Ala. Br. 29. We have not argued that the DPPA is a preemption provision;
rather, we have pointed out that preemption provides a useful analogy because
several of respondents' arguments (such as the argument that Congress cannot
legislate with respect to the States unless it also imposes similar regulation
on private entities) cannot be squared with this Court's preemption jurisprudence.
See Gov't Br. 38-39. Amici Alabama et al. also argue (Ala. Br. 29) that,
even though some federal preemption clauses may be phrased in terms of precluding
state legislatures and administrative bodies from taking action, preemption
actually has relevance only for the state judiciary, and has little or no
real effect on the operation of state legislatures and administrators. That
understanding of preemption is incorrect. Congress has enacted several provisions
that preempt even legislative bodies from taking action in a field governed
by federal law, see, e.g., 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1), and the application to
the legislative bodies of the preemption clause is hardly surplusage, as
amici suggest. See Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493
U.S. 103 (1989) (Machinists preemption directly prohibits city officials
from taking particular actions with respect to private employers, thereby
conferring a right that employers may vindicate in damages actions under
42 U.S.C. 1983); 493 U.S. at 119 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (rejecting damages
remedy but agreeing that "plaintiffs may vindicate Machinists pre-emption
claims by seeking declaratory and equitable relief in the federal district
courts").
10 A state agency may also find that its regulatory alternatives are constrained
by a preemption provision in a federal statute. For example, the Airline
Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1708,
precludes the States from enacting or enforcing any law related to any price,
route, or service of an air carrier. 49 U.S.C. 41713(b)(1). Under the Airline
Deregulation Act, a state consumer-protection agency may not take regulatory
action against an airline for overcharging passengers, even if passengers
request the state agency to take such action. See Morales v. Trans World
Airlines, 504 U.S. 374 (1992). But even though the state agency must decline
the passengers' request for regulatory action against the airline, and even
though the federal government is ultimately responsible for the fact that
the state agency is prevented from doing so, there is no impermissible "blurring"
of political accountability in such a situation. Rather, a constitutionally
valid preemption provision is simply given its proper effect under the Supremacy
Clause, U.S. Const. Art. VI, Cl. 2. Similarly, in Golden State Transit Corp.,
supra, the City of Los Angeles was held liable under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for
the failure of city officials to respect limitations imposed by federal
law on their licensing activities, with no suggestion of any constitutionally
significant blurring of accountability as between the city and federal authorities.
11 The Court observed in Garcia that "Madison placed particular reliance
on the equal representation of the States in the Senate, which he saw as
'at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of sovereignty remaining
in the individual States, and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty.'" 469 U.S. at 551-552 (quoting The Federalist No. 62,
at 408 (James Madison) (B. Wright ed. 1961)). The Court concluded: "In
short, the Framers chose to rely on a federal system in which special restraints
on federal power over the States inhered principally in the workings of
the National Government itself, rather than in discrete limitations on the
objects of federal authority." 469 U.S. at 552.
12 Even on its own terms, amici's analogy to the Court's First Amendment
cases fails. In Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991), the Court explained
that "differential taxation of speakers, even members of the press,
does not implicate the First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or
presents the danger of suppressing, particular ideas." Id. at 453 (emphasis
added); see also id. at 446 (observing that "selective taxation of
the press through the narrow targeting of individual members offends the
First Amendment"). The DPPA, however, does not target or single out
any particular State for unequal treatment. For the same reason, the DPPA
is unlike the ordinance invalidated in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye,
Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which targeted a particular
unpopular minority religion for hostile treatment.
13 Indeed, Wisconsin--which has joined Alabama's amicus brief before this
Court--"disclaimed any contention that Wisconsin's burden exceeds the
travail of banks or other entities regulated by statutory equivalents"
to the DPPA. Travis, 163 F.3d at 1005.
14 See 1994 WL 212834 (Feb. 3, 1994) (statement of Prof. Mary J. Culnan,
Georgetown University) ("Few people can survive without a driver[']s
license or an automobile, and a condition of having either is to register
with the state. * * * This is in direct contrast to most of the other mailing
lists based on private sector data, such as a list of subscribers to a particular
magazine."); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715 (1977) (driving an
automobile is "a virtual necessity for most Americans").