

# IBE: Is It Needed?



**Jon Callas**  
CTO & CSO

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## Quick Notes

- It's easy to conflate IBE with Bilinear Map PKC
- I will try to stay to IBE in general
- Comments are not about implementations
  - Except when noted
  - Most comments apply to my IBE as well as others
- Everything has plusses and minuses
- Everything has appropriate uses



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## Inherent Brittleness

- All IBE (and all BLM) crypto has
  - A basic “key”
  - Subordinate, derived keys
  - This is the PKG for IBE
- This means that rollover, revocation, expiration, etc. are hard
  - And they’re hard in unique ways
  - There are also interesting solutions
    - Identum, for example, has one PKG for all users
    - This is the Mark Twain solution
      - “Put all your eggs in one basket and then watch the basket”



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## Naming is Hard!

- Nearly all rough edges of PKI reduce to naming problems
  - Ellison, Schneier, others point this out
- Some PKI systems are key-centric (SPKI)
  - Key-centrism exists because naming is hard
- Reducing a key system to naming removes the easy periphery
- We’re still left with the hard, thorny central issue
  - The thorny issue of naming is arguably *harder* with IBE
  - Since every name is a key, managing keys is managing names



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## Networks Help Solve Naming Issues

- The core IBE advantage:
  - Key =  $F(\text{Name})$
- Can be satisfied with a database / directory
- Is IBE needed when you can easily look up keys from the net?



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## Online vs Offline IBE

- Offline IBE can compute  $K=F(N)$  with no network
- Online IBE uses the net to compute  $K=F(N)$  via the network
  - I presented this in 2006
  - Trades online-ness for ability to use traditional keys/certs
    - RSA, DSA, Elgamal, EC variants, etc.
    - Even works for Lattice, hash-chain, etc. PKC



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## Is true IBE possible?

- Names alone are not enough
  - Even original Boneh-Franklin paper has a name of:
    - “bob@company.com □ current-year”
    - “bob@company.com □ current-date”
- Ironically, this is Certificate-Based Encryption
- Metadata is important!
  - Current trends create more metadata
- Names alone have no metadata
  - Lambda naming alone is good math, and bad information science



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## How Do I Own a Name?

- It is trivial for me to prove I own the string “jon” to my server
- It is difficult for me to prove I own “jon” to your server
  
- It is easy for a server to assign a name
- It is hard to correctly assign a name
  
- Many entities have many names
- These turn in to many keys



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## Key Management is Still Hard

- IBE creates many keys per name
  - bob@company.com via bank.com
  - bob.lastname@company.com via bank.com
  - bob@home.com via merchant.com
  - bob.lastname@company.com via ...
- Result is a sparse matrix of:
  - All your names \* All the PKGs
- Thus the key management problem
  - Is very easy for each PKG
  - Grows in  $n^2$  complexity for all users
- End-users are notoriously bad at complexity



## Thank You

