HHS Pandemic Influenza Implementation Plan
CHAPTER 3: PUBLIC HEALTH INTERVENTIONS
Introduction
The optimal strategies for prevention and control of pandemic influenza
are the same as for seasonal influenza: vaccination, early detection and
treatment with antiviral medications, and the use of infection-control measures
to prevent infection spread during patient care. However, when a pandemic
emerges, a vaccine may not be available, and the supply of antiviral drugs may
be limited. Therefore, non-pharmaceutical public health interventions will be
an important strategy to contain infection, delay spread, and reduce the impact
of pandemic disease. In health care settings, infection-control measures will
be essential. Non-pharmaceutical interventions will also be important to help
limit virus transmission and therefore reduce an individual's risk for
infection. Pharmaceutical interventions, including vaccination and the use of
antiviral medications, are principally covered in Chapter 5, Vaccines, and in
Chapter 6, Antiviral Drugs.
Current guidance from HHS on infection control for influenza is based on
our knowledge of routes of influenza transmission, pathogenesis, and the
effects of influenza-control measures used during past pandemics and between
pandemics. Infection-control precautions primarily involve the application of
standard precautions and precautions against droplets during patient care in
health care settings (e.g., hospitals, nursing homes, outpatient offices,
emergency transport vehicles). These practices also apply to health care
personnel's going into the homes of patients. Preplanned public education
campaigns regarding cough etiquette, hand hygiene, personal social-distancing
measures (e.g., avoiding public places/meetings), and infection-control
measures when caring for ill persons at home will be key non-pharmaceutical
public health interventions during a pandemic. (For more information, please
see the HHS Pandemic Plan at
http://www.pandemicflu.gov).
Due to potential limitations in pharmaceutical interventions,
non-pharmaceutical domestic community-containment measures will likely play an
important role in slowing and limiting the spread of pandemic influenza. These
measures include isolation at home of persons who are ill, home and facility
quarantine of persons who are exposed, and community social-distancing measures
(e.g., closure of public places, specific worksites, and schools; and stoppage
of public transportation). These measures have not been applied recently for
influenza, and we have at present neither the science nor the experience to
create firm guidelines for their use during a pandemic. Therefore, extensive
collaboration among Federal, State, local, and tribal agencies and academic
institutions will be required to create practical and useful guidelines for
evaluating the trigger points and logistical steps for implementing domestic
community-containment measures.
This chapter considers public health interventions in community and
health care settings as they relate to the seven U.S. Response Stages defined
in the HHS Pandemic Influenza Plan:
- 0: New Domestic Animal Outbreak in At-Risk Country
- 1: Suspected Human Outbreak Overseas
- 2: Confirmed Human Outbreak Overseas
- 3: Widespread Human Outbreaks in Multiple Locations Overseas
- 4: First Human Case in North America
- 5: Spread throughout the United States
- 6: Recovery and Preparation for Subsequent Waves
Table 2 in the Introduction of this document indicates how these U.S.
Response Stages 16 correspond to the WHO Pandemic Periods and
Phases. The WHO phases reflect the expected progression of a pandemic worldwide
and provide a framework for evaluating the global situation. The U.S. Response
Stages are useful for planning domestic disease containment strategies and
activities. (Follow this link for more
information.)
Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health
Interventions
Responding effectively to an influenza pandemicespecially given
limited supplies of antiviral drugs and the initial absence of pandemic
vaccineswill depend on public health interventions that prevent virus
transmission by separating persons who are ill and potentially exposed persons
from the rest of their community. Interventions may include infection-control
measures, travel-related interventions, and non-pharmaceutical strategies for
disease control. These public health interventions are the focus of this
chapter.
Infection-Control Measures
Infection-control measures will be critical throughout all stages of a
pandemic, but especially during U.S. Response Stages 4 and 5 when a pandemic
virus is circulating in the United States. Infection-control measures in health
care facilities and in homes will decrease the spread of infection from patient
to health care worker and from patient to patient, thus helping States, cities,
and counties sustain local health care capacity. Throughout a pandemic, health
authorities will also promote communitywide infection-control measures,
including hand hygiene and respiratory/cough etiquette.
Travel-Related Interventions
Efforts to delay the entry of a novel, pandemic influenza virus into the
United States will require careful planning and preparation. Planning and
preparation activities at ports of entry include investigating reports of
travelers with influenza-like illness (ILI) to identify and evaluate
individuals with a high likelihood of being infected with an avian influenza
virus. Cargo inspectors at ports of entry will also identify and destroy
potentially infected animals or animal products to prevent transmission of
avian influenza to birds or humans within the United States.
An increased frequency in overseas clusters of human disease caused by a
virus capable of greater human-to-human transmission will signal that
prevention and control activities at ports of entry should be intensified.
Entry screening will shift from passive reporting of ill passengers to active
screening of travelers arriving from affected areas. Public health authorities
may consider quarantine and antiviral prophylaxis of potentially exposed
travelers.
Other travel-related public health interventions that may be considered
include:
- Restricting the number of U.S. airports that receive international
arrivals
- Restricting the number of international ports from which travelers
may embark for the United States
- Predeparture screening
- Enhanced medical surveillance en route
- Restricting travel to affected areas
Once pandemic influenza has been reported in the United States, Federal
agencies will work closely with WHO and with individual countries to reduce the
likelihood of spreading the pandemic virus internationally.
Non-Pharmaceutical Disease Control
Strategies
The implementation of containment measures can help slow the spread of
infection within and between communities. Non-pharmaceutical strategies include
disease-control measures that affect individuals (e.g., isolation of patients
and monitoring their contacts; and personal hygiene measures, such as hand
hygiene and cough etiquette), as well as measures that affect groups or entire
communities (e.g., quarantine of exposed persons, cancellation of public
gatherings, school closures, and shelter in place ["snow days"]). Guided by
epidemiologic data, local authorities will choose those measures that provide
maximum impact in preventing influenza transmission and with minimum impact on
individual freedom of movement. HHS will provide assistance to States and
communities as the pandemic threat evolves.
Role of HHS in Non-Pharmaceutical Public
Health Interventions
Responsibilities of HHS related to non-pharmaceutical public health
interventions include but are not limited to:
- Non-pharmaceutical disease-control measures related to international
travel
- Non-pharmaceutical disease-control measures in U.S. communities
- Infection-control practices for individuals
- Infection-control practices in health care settings
Specific Assumptions and Planning Considerations Related to
Non-Pharmaceutical Public Health Interventions
- Completely preventing the importation of a novel, highly
transmissible pandemic influenza virus by interception of asymptomatic persons
who will later become ill, at air- and seaports and at land border crossings
for long periods of time will not be possible. However, if a novel, pandemic
influenza virus originates outside the United States, reducing the number of
infected persons entering the country and delaying introduction of the pandemic
into the United States for weeks might be possible.
- Delayed entry and reducing the number of cases entering the
country can result in a delayed surge in U.S. cases and a greater lead time for
developing and distributing a pandemic vaccine, greater time to move antiviral
medications into areas where they are most needed, and more time to prepare for
an impending entry of the virus into the community. These actions will result
in a decreased mortality from a pandemic.
- Prior to the occurrence of recognized cases in the United
States, the appearance of a novel, pandemic influenza virus may be multifocal
(i.e., simultaneous presentation at multiple ports of entry receiving
international travelers). However, some ports of entry are more likely to be
the site of importation and will require staff augmentation.
- If the decision is made to screen every arriving and/or exiting
international traveler when pandemic influenza is circulating globally, but is
not yet present in the United States, the current number of U.S. Quarantine
Station staff will be inadequate to perform this task. Local and State health
department staff will not be a resource for the surge-capacity of needed
personnel. Additional Federal Quarantine Station staff will be required.
- When a novel, influenza pandemic virus first begins to spread
in the United States, in the absence of an effective vaccine or sufficient
quantities of effective antiviral agents, personal disease control measures
(e.g., hand hygiene, cough etiquette) and community containment measures (e.g.,
social distancing, health communications, isolation of ill persons, quarantine
of exposed persons) will constitute the primary strategies for preventing the
spread of pandemic influenza.
- When pandemic influenza transmission starts in the United
States, the necessity of continuing activities to exclude entry of pandemic
influenza through our ports and borders will be reexamined.
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HHS Actions and Expectations
Pillar One: Preparedness and
Communication
Preparedness and communication are critical elements to the
implementation of successful public health interventions and medical responses.
Activities that should be undertaken before a pandemic emerges to ensure
preparedness and to communicate expectations and responsibilities to all levels
of government and society are described below.
Planning for a Pandemic
- Action (HSC 5.1.1.1): HHS will serve as a core member, along with
DOS, USDA, DOD, DOL, and DOC, in a DHS and DOT established interagency
transportation and border preparedness working group that will develop planning
assumptions for the transportation and border sectors, coordinate preparedness
activities by mode, review products and their distribution, and develop a
coordinated outreach plan for stakeholders.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Interagency working group established,
planning assumptions developed, preparedness priorities and timelines
established by mode, and outreach plan for stakeholders in place.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance to DHS and DOT for the
transportation and border interagency working group by providing personnel;
input into planning assumptions, outreach, and priorities; and timeframes for
preparedness.
- Action (HSC 5.1.1.2): HHS will work closely with DHS and in
coordination with the National Economic Council (NEC), DOD, DOC, USTR, DOT,
DOS, USDA, Treasury, and key transportation and border stakeholders, to
establish an interagency modeling group to examine the effects of
transportation and border decisions on delaying spread of a pandemic, and the
associated health benefits, the societal and economic consequences, and the
international implications.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Interagency working group established,
planning assumptions developed, priorities established, and recommendations
made on which models are best suited to address priorities.
- Step 1: Work with DHS to develop an interagency working group
that will routinely meet to gather subject matter expertise on
non-pharmaceutical public health interventions for pandemic influenza. The
purpose will be to provide guidance on non-pharmaceutical public health
interventions. The working group will develop this guidance through literature
review, internal discussion, input of partners, and the conduct of targeted
research.
- Step 2: Identify interagency mathematical modelers (e.g., NIH
collaboration with Models of Infectious Disease Study [MIDAS]) to work on
modeling the effects of transportation and border decisions made by the
U.S.Government. Government decisions supported by this modeling might include:
screening of international travelers, quarantine of exposed passengers,
diversion of flights, international travel restrictions, domestic travel
restrictions, etc.
- Step 3: Discuss with modelers the issues that are highest
priority and the elements that would be important to include in constructing
models; also, provide assumptions for data elements to be included in models
being developed.
- Step 4: Provide technical assistance as models are constructed,
analysis is conducted, data are interpreted, and recommendations are made.
- Action (HSC 5.1.1.3): HHS will work with DHS and in coordination with
DOT, USDA, DOJ, and DOS to assess their ability to maintain critical federal
transportation and border services (e.g., sustain national air space, secure
the borders) during a pandemic, revise contingency plans, and conduct
exercises.
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Revised contingency plans in place at
specified Federal agencies that respond to both international and domestic
outbreaks; at least two interagency exercises carried out to test the plans.
- Step 1: Support DHS and other agencies in their assessment and
planning to maintain critical Federal transportation and border services
through provision of guidance for Continuity of Operations Plan (COOP). (Also
see Pillar One, Action K [HSC 9.1.1.1] below.)
- Step 2: Provide technical advice and input during interagency
exercises.
- Step 3: Assess critical infrastructure for COOP and make
contingency plans to obtain assistance to maintain needed operations during a
pandemic. This effort would include the preevent training of USPHS Commissioned
Corps (CC) Officers and Medical Reserve Corps (MRC) personnel to perform
Quarantine Station activities.
- Action (HSC 5.1.1.4): HHS will support DHS and DOT, in their effort
to develop detailed operational plans and protocols to respond to potential
pandemic-related scenarios, including in-bound aircraft/vessel/land border
traffic with a suspected case of pandemic influenza, international outbreak,
multiple domestic outbreaks, and potential mass migration. (Also see Pillar
Two, Actions I and K [HSC 5.2.4.6 and 5.2.4.8] below.)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Coordinated Federal operational plans
that identify actions, authorities, and trigger points for decisionmaking and
are validated by interagency exercises.
- Step 1: Work with Federal partners; international airports;
international airlines; State, local and tribal health departments; referral
hospitals; and others in the development of plans/protocols for responding to
an inbound aircraft with a suspect case of pandemic influenza at major ports of
entry.
- Step 2: Conduct tabletops at a minimum of the 18 major
international ports of entry where Quarantine Stations are located (these ports
currently serve approximately 85 percent of international travelers). The
tabletops address pandemic scenarios which require joint response between
public health, port agencies, first responders, health care systems, airlines,
cruise lines, and other emergency response agencies that provide lodging,
meals, health care, and other necessary support to persons in quarantine. These
exercises will address coordination of efforts and identify gaps/physical needs
to respond to and should include participation from the Governments of Canada
and Mexico in accordance with the Security and Prosperity Partnership of North
America.
- Step 3: Expand development of plans/protocols for responding to
an inbound aircraft with a suspected case of pandemic influenza at major ports
of entry to maritime ports of entry and land border crossings (seen as lower
risk than international airports).
- Step 4: Conduct interagency exercises at priority maritime ports
of entry and land border crossings.
- Step 5: In support of DHS and DOT, HHS will continue to be
engaged in the Homeland Security Council/National Security Council (HSC /NSC)
Policy Coordination Committee process to provide technical information on
response to an international outbreak of pandemic influenza that has not spread
to the United States (U.S. Response Stages 1 through 3). Options for response
include the following: (1) assisting affected nations that request assistance
with technical advice on containment measures and exit screening; (2)
instituting en route and entry screening of airline passengers from affected
nations (also see Pillar Two, Action J [HSC 5.2.4.7] below); (3) isolating
passengers from affected regions who are ill and quarantining exposed
passengers and crew; (4) instituting travel restrictions for nonessential
travel/entry into the United States (also see Pillar Two, Action F [HSC
5.2.4.2] below); (5) reducing the number of ports that would manage inbound and
outbound international flights; and (6) diverting flights carrying large
numbers of passengers likely to require isolation or quarantine to airports
that have adequate facilities.
- Step 6: Provide technical assistance to DHS and DOT in the
development of detailed operational response plans and protocols to respond to
an international outbreak of pandemic influenza that has not spread to the
United States (U.S. Response Stages 13) in accordance with the options
laid out by the HSC /NSC Policy Coordination Committee.
- Step 7: Develop guidance for non-pharmaceutical interventions
including: (1) clarify existing legal authorities for quarantine; (2) home
isolation and quarantine; (3) facility quarantine; (4) work quarantine, and
measures to increase social distance (e.g., cancellation of large gatherings,
school closure, closure of other public places, reduction of public
transportation, workplace policies such as reduced operations and liberal
leave, sheltering in place). (Also see Pillar Three, Actions H and I [HSC
6.3.2.1 and 6.3.2.2] below.)
- Step 8: Share guidance with Federal partners and with State,
local, and tribal health departments to comment, identify operational details
(for potential implementation), and facilitate in writing plans/protocols.
- Action (HSC 5.1.1.6): HHS will work with DOT and in coordination with
DHS, DOD, DOJ, DOL and USDA to assess the Federal Government's ability to
provide emergency transportation support during a pandemic under NRP Emergency
Support Function (ESF) #1 (Transportation Annex;
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NRP_FullText.pdf)
and develop a contingency plan.
- Timeframe: Within 18 months.
- Measure of Performance: Completed contingency plan that includes
options for increasing transportation capacity, the potential need for military
support, improved shipment tracking, and potential need for security and/or
waivers for critical shipments, incorporation of decontamination and workforce
protection guidelines, and other critical issues.
- Step 1: Provide to DOT and other agencies technical
expertise/guidance and written documentation on decontamination procedures and
workforce protection for pandemic influenza.
- Action (HSC 5.1.2.2): Under the leadership of DOT and in coordination
with DHS and transportation stakeholders, HHS will support a series of forums
with governors and mayors to discuss transportation and border challenges that
may occur in a pandemic, share approaches, and develop a planning strategy to
ensure a coordinated national response. (Also see chapter 8, Pillar One, Action
C [HSC 5.1.2.2].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Strategy for coordinated transportation
and border planning is developed, and forums initiated.
- Step 1: Work with State, local, and tribal partners (e.g., public
health, port agencies, first responders, health care systems, airlines, cruise
lines, and other emergency response agencies) on developing response plans for
pandemic influenza at airports, maritime ports, and land borders. (Also see
Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4] above.)
- Step 2: Provide technical expertise to DOT and DHSon public
health interventions that potentially would be used to slow pandemic
influenzain support of discussions on challenges that pandemic influenza
will likely pose on the transportation and border sectors.
- Action (HSC 5.1.2.3): In coordination with USDA and transportation
stakeholders, HHS will assist DOT and DHS, develop planning guidance and
materials for State, local, and tribal governments, including scenarios that
highlight transportation and border challenges and responses to overcome those
challenges, and an overview of transportation roles and responsibilities under
the NRP. (Also see chapter 8, Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.2.3].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: State, local, and tribal governments have
received access to tailored guidance and planning materials.
- Step 1: Continue to work with Federal, State, local, and tribal
partners on developing response plans for pandemic influenza at airports,
maritime ports, and land borders. (Also see Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4]
above.)
- Step 2: Support DOT and DHS in producing planning guidance and
materials highlighting the challenges pandemic influenza would likely impose on
the transportation and border sector; provision technical expertise on public
health interventions that would potentially be used to slow pandemic
influenza.
- Action (HSC 5.1.3.1): In coordination with DOT and USDA, HHS will
support DHS in conducting tabletop discussions and other outreach with private
sector transportation and border entities to provide background on the scope of
a pandemic, to assess current preparedness, and jointly develop a planning
guide. (Also see chapter 8, Pillar One, Action E [HSC 5.1.3.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 8 months.
- Measure of Performance: Private sector transportation and border
entities have coordinated Federal guidance to support pandemic planning,
including a planning guide that addresses unique border and transportation
challenges by mode.
- Step 1: Support DHS in outreach efforts to private sector
transportation and border partners. (Also see Pillar One, Action F [HSC
5.1.2.2]; Step 1, above.)
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance for tabletop exercises to
give sector participants a sense of logistical challenges likely to be
experienced in a pandemic, help identify gaps in preparedness, and assist
partners (e.g., public health, port agencies, first responders, health care
systems, airlines, cruise lines, and other emergency response) in developing
plans for response and recovery.
- Action (HSC 8.1.2.1): In coordination with DOL and DHS, HHS will
provide technical assistance to DOJ as it convenes a forum for selected
Federal, State, local, and tribal law enforcement/public safety personnel to
discuss the issues they will face in a pandemic influenza outbreak and then
publish the results in the form of best practices and model protocols within 4
months.
- Timeframe: Within 4 months.
- Measure of Performance: Best practices and model protocols
published and distributed.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance to DOJ through guidance on
potential non-pharmaceutical pandemic prevention and control measures (e.g.,
dealing with the effects of and enforcing quarantine; and social-distancing
measures such as cancellation of large gatherings, closure of public places
[such as shopping malls], closure of schools). These measures could adversely
affect the work of law enforcement personnel, reduce public transportation, and
affect workplace policies (such as reduced operations and liberal leave,
sheltering in place). Other groups will provide technical assistance regarding
the impact of securing vaccines and antiviral stockpiles.
- Step 2: Support DOJ with expertise regarding non-pharmaceutical
public health initiatives, as they may affect law enforcement and public safety
personnel.
- Action (HSC 8.1.2.4): In conjunction with DOJ, HHS will ensure
consistency of the CDC Public Health Emergency Law Course with the National
Strategy for Pandemic Influenza (Strategy), this Plan, and other Federal
pandemic documents and then disseminate the CDC Public Health Emergency Law
Course across the U.S.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Distribution of presentations of reviewed
public health emergency law course to all States.
- Step 1: Update the CDC Public Health Law Program PowerPoint
course to ensure consistency with current pandemic influenza planning guidance
documents.
- Step 2: Work with DOJ to distribute revised course units to
participating States.
- Action (HSC 9.1.1.1): In coordination with DOD and DOL, HHS will
support DHS in providing pandemic influenza COOP guidance to the Federal
departments and agencies.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: COOP planning and personnel protection
guidance provided to all departments for use, as necessary, in updating
departmental pandemic influenza response plans.
- Step 1: Provide written, risk-stratified guidance for management
and workers in Government who provide either essential or nonessential services
as a part of the foundation for COOP decisionmaking. This guidance may include
information on prevention and control measures such as hand hygiene, cough
etiquette, self-isolation due to illness, use of personal protective equipment
(PPE; e.g., mask use, gloves, face shields, gowns), and social-distancing
measures (e.g., avoidance of large gatherings, telecommuting, office closure,
liberal leave policies, and work quarantine) and address the secondary effects
of community mitigation measures, such as school closures.
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance regarding intervention
measures and share with Federal partners guidance on pandemic influenza virus
prevention and control.
- Action (HSC 9.1.1.2): HHS will assist the Office of Personnel
Management (OPM), and in coordination with DHS, DOD, and DOL, provide guidance
to the Federal departments and agencies on human capital management and COOP
planning criteria related to pandemic influenza.
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance provided to all departments for
use, as necessary, in adjusting departmental COOP plans related to pandemic
influenza.
- Step 1: Provide input to OPM regarding non-pharmaceutical
prevention and control measures related to pandemic influenza to assist in COOP
planning. (Also see Pillar One, Action K [HSC 9.1.1.1] above.)
- Action (HSC 9.1.1.3): In coordination with DHS, DOD, and DOL, HHS
will provide assistance to OPM to update the guides Telework: A Management
Priority, A Guide for Managers, Supervisors, and Telework Coordinators;
Telework 101 for Managers: Making Telework Work for You; and
Telework 101 for Employees: Making Telework Work for You, to provide
guidance to Federal Departments regarding workplace options during a pandemic.
(Also see chapter 7, Pillar One, Action D [HSC 9.1.1.3].)
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Updated telework guidance provided to all
departments for use, as necessary, in updating departmental COOP plans related
to pandemic influenza.
- Step 1: Provide to OPM written, risk-stratified guidance for
management and workers in Government who provide either essential or
nonessential services. This guidance will include information on telework
during a pandemic. (Please see Telework Annex of the HHS Pandemic Influenza
Plan at http://www.pandemicflu.gov.)
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance regarding non-pharmaceutical
public health interventions as they relate to telework and Government
organizations through OMB.
- Action (HSC 9.1.2.1): As a Sector-Specific Agency, HHS, in
coordination with DHS, will develop health care- and public health-specific
planning guidelines focused on sector-specific requirements and cross-sector
dependencies.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Planning guidelines developed for the
health care and public health sector.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance through the Government
Coordinating Councils (GCC) and the Sector Coordinating Councils (SCC) to
support the development of planning guidelines focused on health care- and
public health sector-specific requirements and cross-sector dependencies.
- Step 2: Achieve approval from the GCC concerning the planning
guidance.
- Action (HSC 9.1.2.2): HHS will work with DHS in DHS' support of
private-sector preparedness with education, exercise, training, and information
sharing outreach programs.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of performance: Planning guidelines developed for each
sector.
- Step 1: Identify HHS personnel to work with DHS.
- Step 2: Meet with DHS to review DHS strategy and program for
developing outreach programs.
- Step 3: Provide subject matter expertise in developing the
planning guidelines for each sector.
Communicating Expectations and
Responsibilities
- Action (HSC 4.1.4.3): HHS will work with DOS to ensure that adequate
guidance is provided to Federal, State, tribal and local authorities regarding
the inviolability of diplomatic personnel and facilities and will work with
such authorities and DOS to develop methods of obtaining voluntary cooperation
from the foreign diplomatic community within the U.S. consistent with U.S.
Government treaty obligations. (Also see chapter 8, Pillar One, Action A [HSC
4.1.4.3].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Briefing materials and an action plan in
place for engaging with relevant Federal, State, tribal and local authorities.
- Step 1: Provide broad guidance regarding public health
interventions for pandemic influenza (e.g., quarantine, travel restrictions)
that would pertain to foreign nationals.
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance to DOS regarding this
guidance for diplomatic personnel and facilities, as DOS works with State,
local, and tribal authorities to obtain voluntary cooperation from the foreign
diplomatic community.
- Action (HSC 5.1.4.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOT, and DOL,
will establish workforce protection guidelines and develop targeted educational
materials addressing the risk contracting pandemic influenza. (Also see chapter
7, Pillar One, Action I [HSC 5.1.4.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidelines and materials developed that
meet the diverse needs of border and transportation workers (e.g., customs
officers or agents, air traffic controllers, train conductors, dock workers,
flight attendants, transit workers, ship crews, and interstate truckers).
- Step 1: Consult with other Government agencies (e.g., NIOSH at
HHS/CDC, DHS, OSHA at DOL), travel organizations (Air Transportation
Association of America, Inc. [ATA], International Air Transport Association
[IATA]), and representatives from relevant occupation sectors to identify
job-specific activities that may place workers at risk for occupational
exposure to pandemic influenza virus.
- Step 2: Consult with the aforementioned entities to determine
appropriate job-related behaviors and personal protective measures to reduce
risk of exposure to pandemic influenza virus, in consultation with the
aforementioned entities.
- Step 3: Develop workforce protection guidelines that are relevant
to each of the U.S.Response Stages (15) for influenza pandemics, and
disseminate educational materials that include job-specific guidelines to
minimize risk of exposure.
- Step 4: Identify points of contact in each of the above-mentioned
agencies for clearance and feedback on recommendations and reports.
- Step 5: Post recommendations and reports on the HHS Web site (http://www.pandemicflu.gov), and devise
additional communication methods (e.g., e-mail) for just-in-time distribution
to appropriate stakeholders.
- Step 6: Consult with the transportation industry and Federal
partners to determine other effective communications media and methods of
disseminating guidance and educational materials, such as PowerPoint
presentations for "train-the-trainers" programs by various work groups.
- Action (HSC 5.1.4.3): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOT, DOD,
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and transportation and border
stakeholders, will develop and disseminate decontamination guidelines and time
frames for transportation and border assets and facilities (e.g., airframes,
emergency medical services transport vehicles, trains, trucks, stations, port
of entry detention facilities) specific to pandemic influenza.
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Decontamination guidelines developed and
disseminated through existing DOT and DHS channels.
- Step 1: Coordinate with DHS, DOT, DOD, and EPA, as well as local,
State, Federal, and private-sector transportation providers on efforts for
developing guidelines and timeframes on decontamination.
- Step 2: Work with experts on subject matter (influenza and
infection control) to develop U.S. Response Stage-specific protocols in regard
to influenza and to develop environmental as well as occupational health
guidance on cleaning agents, PPE, and custodial procedures for decontamination
of specific locations or items (e.g., airline seats, lavatories, baggage
inspection services, airport waiting areas). Protocols are also needed for
transportation vehicles (e.g., airplanes, cruise ships, cargo vessels) carrying
a suspected case-patient (passenger or crew) to the United States from affected
regions and for port areas or transportation stations that may have been
contaminated by a suspect case or by a bird or bird products.
- Step 3: Based on feedback, work with Federal agency partners (DOT
and DHS) to update protocol(s).
- Step 4: Work with travel industry and Federal agency partners
(DOT and DHS) to disseminate cleaning protocols and environmental health
information to custodial personnel at airlines, commercial shipping lines, and
international ports of entry facilities.
- Action (HSC 7.1.3.3): HHS, in coordination with USDA, DHS, and DOL,
will work with the poultry and swine industries to provide information
regarding strategies to prevent avian and swine influenza infection among
animal workers and producers. (Also see chapter 2, Pillar Two, Action K [HSC
7.1.3.3] and chapter 7, Pillar One, Action P [HSC 7.1.3.3].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidelines developed and disseminated to
poultry and swine industries.
- Step 1: Provide written, risk-stratified guidance for management
and workers to prevent avian influenza. Guidance will include a description of
risk factors faced by animal workers in the poultry and swine industries. This
guidance will include information on sanitizing hands, cough etiquette,
self-isolation due to illness, use of PPE (e.g., mask use, gloves, face
shields, gowns), and social-distancing measures (e.g., work quarantine).
Guidance may also include recommendations intended to decrease the risk of
genetic reassortment of avian and human influenza (e.g., seasonal influenza
vaccination).
- Step 2: Draft guidance will be shared with USDA and DHS for
discussion and finalization of guidance. Because of its existing strong
relationship with the poultry and swine industries, USDA will work with
representatives of those industries to publish and disseminate the developed
guidance and encourage inclusion of recommended measures into the routine
practices of these industries.
- Step 3: Provide further technical assistance to USDA when the
written guidance does not fully address specific situations being faced or when
new policy is needed.
- Action (HSC 8.1.3.1): HHS, in coordination with DOL, will provide
clear guidance to law enforcement and other emergency responders on recommended
preventive measures including pre-pandemic vaccination, to be taken by law
enforcement and emergency responders to minimize risk of infection from
pandemic influenza. (Also see chapter 7, Pillar One, Action Q [HSC 8.1.3.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Development and dissemination of guidance
for law enforcement and other emergency responders.
- Step 1: Provide written, risk-stratified guidance on prevention
measures for management and workers in Government and the private sectors who
provide either essential or nonessential services. This guidance will include
information on sanitizing hands, cough etiquette, self-isolation due to
illness, use of PPE (e.g., mask use, gloves, face shields, gowns), and
social-distancing measures (e.g., avoidance of large gatherings, telecommuting,
reduced business operations, liberal leave policies, work quarantine) and
address the secondary effects of community mitigation measures such as school
closures.
- Step 2: Publish the risk-stratified guidance on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov and in
other appropriate publications serving this work sector.
- Step 3: An interagency non-pharmaceutical interventions working
group will provide technical assistance to law enforcement and emergency
response organizations when written guidance does not adequately cover specific
situations being faced or when new policy is needed.
- Action (HSC 9.1.3.1): As a Sector-Specific Agency, HHS will support
DHS as it conducts forums, conferences and exercises with key critical
infrastructure private sector entities and international partners to identify
essential functions and critical planning, response and mitigation needs within
and across sectors, and validate planning guidelines. (Also see chapter 7,
Pillar One, Action R [HSC 9.1.3.2].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Planning guidelines, validated by
collaborative exercises which test essential functions and critical planning,
response, and mitigation needs.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance to DHS as that department
conducts forums, conferences, and exercises with key infrastructure
private-sector entities to identify essential functions and critical
planning.
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance to DHS as that department
works with major industry and professional organizations to educate them on the
effects pandemic influenza may have on critical infrastructure.
- Action (HSC 9.1.3.2): As a Sector-Specific Agency, HHS will provide
assistance to DHS in its effort to develop and coordinate guidance regarding
business continuity planning and preparedness with the owners/operators of
critical infrastructure and develop a Critical Infrastructure Influenza
Pandemic Preparedness, Response and Recovery Guide tailored to national goals
and capabilities and to the specific needs identified by the private sector.
(Also see chapter 7, Pillar One, Action R [HSC 9.1.3.2].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Critical Infrastructure Influenza
Preparedness, Response, and Recovery Guide developed and published on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance to DHS through coordination
with the SCC. The occupational health and educational materials Sub-Council has
begun development of seminars on pandemic influenza preparedness. Part 1 of the
seminars will address issues for occupational health professionals; Part 2 will
focus on issues that corporations, medical centers, small- and medium-sized
companies, and community-based occupational health clinics face in developing a
response plan surrounding pandemic influenza.
- Step 2: These DHS seminars for the occupational health sector
will be followed by further HHS technical assistance to DHS as it reaches out
to the other subsectors within the public health and health care communities to
develop equivalent seminars.
- Action (HSC 9.1.4.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOL, OPM,
Department of Education, VA and DOD, will develop sector-specific infection
control guidance to inform personnel, governmental and public entities, private
sector businesses, and community-based organizations (CBO), and faith-based
organizations (FBO). (Also see chapter 7, Pillar One, Action S [HSC 9.1.4.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Sector-specific guidance and checklists
developed and published on http://www.pandemicflu.gov.
- Step 1: Provide written, risk-stratified guidance on infection
control for persons working or taking part in Government, private, voluntary,
or FBO and CBO activities that provide both essential and nonessential
services. This guidance will include information on sanitizing hands, cough
etiquette, self-isolation due to illness, use of PPE (e.g., mask use, gloves,
eye protection, gowns), and social-distancing measures (e.g., avoidance of
large gatherings, telecommuting, reduced business operations, liberal leave
policies, work quarantine) and address the secondary effects of community
mitigation measures such as school closures.
- Step 2: Publish this general risk-stratified guidance and
checklists on http://www.pandemicflu.gov and in other
appropriate publications serving many sectors of society, in accordance with
HHS/CDC's National Center for Health Marketing.
- Step 3: Provide technical assistance to organizations and
sector-specific publications to assure that appropriate guidance is
communicated with their constituents. Technical assistance also will be
provided when written guidance does not adequately cover specific situations
being faced or when new policy is needed.
- Action (HSC 9.1.4.2): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOL, EPA,
Department of Education, VA and DOD, will develop interim guidance regarding
environmental management and cleaning practices including the handling of
potentially contaminated waste material and will revise as additional data
becomes available. (Also see chapter 7, Pillar One, Action T [HSC 9.1.4.2].)
- Timeframe: 3 months for development of initial guidance, then
ongoing.
- Measure of Performance: Development and publication of guidance
and checklists developed and published on http://www.pandemicflu.gov and through
other channels.
- Step 1: Consult with DHS, DOL, EPA, ED, VA, and DOD to identify
environmental management and cleaning activities that may place employees at
risk for exposure to a pandemic influenza virus.
- Step 2: In consultation with the aforementioned entities,
determine appropriate job-related behaviors and personal protective measures to
reduce risk of exposure to pandemic influenza virus.
- Step 3: Develop guidance for environmental management and
cleaning practices to prevent exposure.
- Step 4: Develop workforce protection guidelines that are relevant
to each U.S.Response Stage, and disseminate educational materials on pandemic
influenza that include job-specific guidelines to minimize risk of
exposure.
- Step 5: Identify points of contact in each of the aforementioned
agencies for clearance of recommendations and reports.
- Step 6: Post recommendations and reports on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov, and devise
additional communication methods (e.g., e-mail, etc.) for just-in-time
distribution to appropriate stakeholders.
- Step 7: Consult with the involved partners to determine other
effective communication media and methods of disseminating the guidance and
educational materials, such as PowerPoint presentations to "train the trainers"
for the various work groups.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.10): HHS will work closely with DHS, DOT, and in
coordination with DOS, State, community, and tribal entities, and the private
sector to develop a public education campaign on pandemic influenza for
travelers, which raises awareness prior to a pandemic and includes messages for
use during an outbreak. (Also see chapter7, Pillar Two, Action D [HSC
5.2.4.10].)
- Timeframe: Within 15 months.
- Measure of Performance: Public education campaign developed on
how a pandemic could affect travel, the importance of reducing nonessential
travel, and potential screening measures and transportation and border messages
developed based on pandemic stages.
- Step 1: Develop and evaluate content of public education
campaign.
- Step 2: Assess the most effective ways of disseminating
information to travelers.
- Step 3: Ensure that State health departments, Customs and Border
Protection (CBP), and other port partners are aware of the educational tools
and methods of dissemination.
- Action (HSC 5.2.5.1): HHS will work with DHS, and in coordination
with DOS, DOT, DOD, and international and domestic stakeholders, to develop
vessel, aircraft, and truck cargo protocols to support safe loading and
unloading of cargo while preventing transmission of influenza to crew or
shoreside personnel.
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Protocols disseminated to minimize
influenza spread between vessel, aircraft, and truck operators/crews and
shoreside personnel.
- Step 1: Consult with other Government agencies (e.g., DHS, OSHA)
and representatives from the relevant private-sector partners to identify
job-specific activities that may place crew or shoreside workers at risk for
exposure to pandemic influenza virus.
- Step 2: Determine job-related behaviors and personal protective
measures to reduce risk of occupational exposure to pandemic influenza
virus.
- Step 3: Develop workforce protection guidelines that are relevant
to each U.S.Response Stage and disseminate educational materials on pandemic
influenza that include job-specific guidelines to minimize risk of
exposure.
- Step 4: Identify points of contact in each of the aforementioned
agencies for clearance of recommendations and reports.
- Step 5: Post recommendations and reports on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov, and devise
additional communication methods (e.g., e-mail) for timely distribution to
appropriate stakeholders.
- Step 6: Consult with cargo industry and other partners to
determine other effective communication media and methods of disseminating the
guidance and educational materials, such as PowerPoint presentations for
train-the-trainers programs for various work groups.
Advancing Scientific Knowledge and
Accelerating Development
- Action (HSC 6.1.17.3): HHS, in coordination with DHS, will develop
and test new point-of-care and laboratory-based rapid influenza diagnostics for
screening and surveillance. (Also see chapter 2, Pillar One, Action C [HSC
6.1.17.3].)
- Timeframe: Within 18 months.
- Measure of Performance: New grants and contracts awarded to
researchers to develop and evaluate new diagnostics.
- Step 1: Plan for a point-of-entry screening program for pandemic
influenza (in collaboration with DHS) at priority sites, and implement such a
program in the event of U.S. Response Stage 2 being reached.
- Step 2: Deploy new, rapid, influenza diagnostic screening tests
to be used at priority ports of entry into the United States if the new tests
are found sufficiently sensitive and specific for screening use in border and
port-of-entry settings.
Pillar Two: Surveillance and Detection
Surveillance and detection are critical elements in the implementation
of successful public health interventions. In many cases, the impact of
non-pharmaceutical interventions on the spread of a pandemic depends on the
swift identification of an outbreak and the efficacy of public health
interventions. This impact may only be known through the generation and
analysis of accurate surveillance data. The activities described below should
be undertaken before a pandemic emerges and during a pandemic to ensure
outbreaks are detected and their spread is limited.
Ensuring Rapid Reporting of Outbreaks
- Action (HSC 5.2.1.1): HHS, with USDA, and in coordination with DHS,
DOT, DOS, DOD, DOI, and State, local, and international stakeholders, will
review existing transportation and border notification protocols to ensure
timely information sharing in cases of quarantineable disease. (Also see
chapter 2, Pillar Three, Action A [HSC 5.3.3.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Coordinated, clear, interagency
notification protocols disseminated and available for transportation and border
stakeholders.
- Step 1: Identify and contact key partners in transportation and
border sectors (e.g., port agencies, airlines, cruise lines, conveyance
owner/operators, and other emergency response agencies that serve the
ports/borders).
- Step 2: Review and update suggested protocols.
- Step 3: Establish and communicate criteria for activating
notification protocols (e.g., call-down lists).
- Step 4: Establish and test call-down lists and notification
trees.
- Action (HSC 5.2.2.1): HHS will work in coordination with DOD to
support DHS deployment of human influenza rapid diagnostic tests with greater
sensitivity and specificity at borders and ports of entry to allow real-time
health screening. (Also see Pillar Three, Action F [HSC 5.3.1.6] below; and
chapter 2, Pillar Two, ActionA [HSC 5.2.2.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months of development of tests.
- Measure of Performance: Diagnostic tests, if found to be useful,
are deployed; testing is integrated into screening protocols to improve
screening at the 2030 most critical ports of entry.
- Step 1: Plan for a point-of-entry screening program for pandemic
influenza at priority ports of entry, and implement the program in the event of
reaching U.S.Response Stage 2. (Also see Pillar Three, Action F [HSC 5.3.1.6]
below.)
- Step 2: Evaluate the sensitivity and specificity of new, rapid,
influenza diagnostic screening tests in compliance with Federal Food, Drug and
Cosmetic Act (FDCA). (Also see chapter 1, Pillar One, Action Y [HSC 4.1.8.4]
Step 4, and Pillar Two, Action Q [HSC 4.2.3.9]; and chapter 2, Pillar One,
Actions A, F, and C [HSC 6.2.3.2, 6.1.17.2 and 6.1.17.3].)
- Step 3: Deploy new, rapid, influenza diagnostic-screening tests,
if they are found to have sufficient sensitivity and specificity to be useful
screening tools in border and ports-of-entry settings. These tests are to be
used at U. S. points-of-entry chosen on the basis of the number of travelers
entering through these ports. (Note: Ports at which Quarantine Stations are
located serve 85 percent of international travelers and would be the highest
priority sites for deployment of new screening tools.)
- Action (HSC 4.2.8.1): HHS, in coordination with USAID, will develop
community- and hospital-based infection control and prevention, health
promotion, and education activities in local languages in priority countries.
(Also see chapter 1, Pillar One, Action M [HSC 4.2.8.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 9 months.
- Measure of Performance: Local language health-promotion campaigns
and improved hospital-based infection-control activities established in all
Southeast Asian priority countries.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 0
- Step 1: Create a work group and develop partnerships among
offices and divisions within HHS, quarantine field stations, health educators,
risk-communication specialists, WHO Regional Offices, and USAID missions.
- Step 2: Begin planning and strategy development to determine
priority countries for the campaign, evaluate public health infrastructure in
these countries, and identify needs.
- Step 3: Identify elements to prevent transmission of infectious
agents in health care settings and in the community, including the following:
- Determine optimal infection-control precautions to limit the
person-to-person spread of infection in health care settings
- Determine environmental infection-control recommendations for
appropriate decontamination of the health care environment to reduce exposure
via contaminated equipment, surfaces, etc.
- Step 4: Develop recommendations for community containment and
outbreak mitigation, including isolation of cases, quarantine of contacts,
social-distancing measures, and personal hygiene measures.
- Step 5: Provide content and support the development of
infection-control training material.
- Step 6: Initiate a preevent messaging project to provide
information to hospital-infection-control programs and communities.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 12
- Step 7: Pilot test materials/activities with representatives and
members of target audiences.
- Step 8: Revise communication and education activities, using
feedback from the pilot test to make revisions and finalize
materials/activities.
- Step 9: Implement the program through continuous shifting toward
crisis communication, evaluation, and changes, as necessary.
- Step 10: Monitor the educational program.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 35
- Step 11: Shift from risk-communication to crisis-communication
model.
Using Surveillance to Limit Spread
- Action (HSC 5.2.3.1): In coordination with DOT, DOS and DOD, HHS will
support DHS in its efforts to closely work with domestic and international air
carriers and cruise lines to develop and implement protocols (in accordance
with U.S. privacy law) to retrieve and rapidly share information on travelers
who may be carrying or may have been exposed to a pandemic strain of influenza.
(Also see chapter 2, Pillar Two, Actions M, N and O [HSC 5.2.4.8, 5.3.1.5, and
5.3.1.6].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Aviation and maritime protocols
implemented and information on potentially infected travelers available to
appropriate authorities.
- Step 1: Support DHS education efforts for airlines and cruise
lines regarding the reporting of illnesses having public health significance.
- Step 2: Support the development of protocols to retrieve and
rapidly share information on travelers for purposes of public health
investigation, including the sharing of information collected through Customs
Form 6059B (Customs Declaration), the Advance Passenger Information System
(APIS), and Passenger Name Record (PNR) data.
- Step 3: Work with States to utilize existing means (e.g., EPI-X
Forum) for timely sharing of traveler information between HHS and States for
public health investigation in accordance with applicable privacy requirements
and international agreements on passenger privacy.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOT, DOS, DOC,
and DOJ, will develop policy recommendations for aviation, land border, and
maritime entry and exit protocols and/or screening and review the need for
domestic response protocols or screening.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Policy recommendations for response
protocols and/or screening.
- Step 1: Gather best evidence (from international partners and
science) regarding effective exit- and entry-screening measures.
- Step 2: Review existing screening and response protocols with
CBP, USCG, and other Federal partners at ports of entry and other domestic
transportation hubs; identify gaps.
- Step 3: Update protocols to include more advanced screening and
detection of public health threats (e.g., health declarations), and identify
gaps in existing domestic policy to implement such protocols.
- Step 4: Update response protocols to public health threats (to
include control measures such as isolation/quarantine of travelers at airports,
border crossings, and maritime ports isolation); identify gaps in existing
policy for implementing such protocols.
- Step 5: Based on identified gaps, develop policy recommendations
that facilitate exit- and entry-screening measures at ports and borders for
public health threats. To inform further policy development, include real-time
evaluation of the measures when implemented.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.2): HHS, working collaboratively with DHS and DOT
and in coordination with DOS, DOC, Treasury, and USDA, will develop policy
guidelines for international and domestic travel restrictions during a
pandemic, based on the ability to delay the spread of disease and the resulting
health benefits, associated economic impacts, international implications, and
operational feasibility. (Also see Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4] above.)
- Timeframe: Within 8 months.
- Measure of Performance: Interagency travel curtailment policy
guidelines developed that address both voluntary and mandatory travel
restrictions.
- Step 1: Coordinate with DHS, DOT, DOS, DOC, Treasury, and USDA on
assessment of the impact of international and domestic travel restrictions on
public health, the economy, diplomatic relations, and travel industry.
- Step 2: Based on the above assessment, develop criteria and
policy guidelines on voluntary versus mandatory international and domestic
travel restrictions for use during a pandemic.
- Step 3: Determine effective methods of implementing travel
restrictions, such as through limitation of entry of persons into the United
States, imposition of requirements for exit screening from countries
experiencing an influenza pandemic, the closure of certain modes of domestic
public transportation, or the closure of international ports of entry.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.4): HHS, working with DOS and in coordination with
DHS, DOT, and transportation and border stakeholders, will assess and revise
procedures to issue travel information and advisories related to pandemic
influenza. (Also see chapter 1, Pillar One, Action K [HSC 5.2.4.4]; and chapter
7, Pillar Two, Action B [HSC 5.2.4.4].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Improved interagency coordination and
timely dissemination of travel information to stakeholders and travelers.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Work with domestic and international partners to define
appropriate trigger points for issuing Travel Health Advisories.
- Step 2: Develop and maintain up-to-date Travel Health Advisories
on the CDC Travelers' Health Web site through all pandemic U.S. Response
Stages.
- Step 3: Identify steps and methods for rapidly obtaining
clearance and publicly posting Travel Health Advisories (within 24 hours).
- Step 4: Identify domestic and international response partners who
should be notified in advance regarding new Travel Health Advisories (e.g.,
DOT, DOS, DHS, FAA, ATA.WHO, GHSI, International Partnership on Avian and
Pandemic Influenza (IPAPI), consular officials, Ministries of Health in
affected countries, and IATA).
- Step 5: Confirm an appropriate point of contact for each of these
partners, and develop and implement a means for timely communication to these
points of contact regarding new Travel Health Advisories.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 15
- Step 6: Continue activities initiated in Stage 0.
- Step 7: Work with travel industry partners, Federal agency
partners, and port facilities managers to ensure rapid distribution of key
Travel Health Advisories to travelers at international ports of entry.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.5): HHS will provide technical assistance to DOT
and DHS, which will in turn work in coordination with DOD, DOS, airlines/air
space users, the cruise line industry, and appropriate State and local health
authorities to develop protocols to manage and/or divert inbound international
flights and vessels with suspected cases of pandemic influenza that identify
roles, actions, relevant authorities, and events that trigger response.
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Interagency response protocols for
inbound flights completed and disseminated to appropriate entities.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance to DOT and DHS regarding
potential triggers for dynamic management/diversion of inbound international
flights/vessels having passengers with suspected pandemic influenza and sites
to which vessels could be diverted. Possible circumstances requiring diversion
of flights/vessels would include high-risk situations en route (e.g.,
occurrence of multiple cases, suspected outbreak, or conditions for high
probability of transmission of confirmed pandemic influenza). Additionally,
diversion may be warranted for situations such as a destination airport/port
that is overwhelmed by a concurrent quarantine situation or is otherwise unable
to implement adequate control measures.
- Step 2: Work with airlines and airports; State, local and tribal
health departments; and Federal partners on developing or refining protocols
for standard management of flights with passengers who have suspected cases of
pandemic influenza.
- Step 3: Work with the North American cruise industry, maritime
ports, the USCG, DHS, and other Federal partners to develop standard protocols
for management of vessels carrying persons who have suspected cases of pandemic
influenza.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.6): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOT, DOS, DOD,
air carriers/air space users, the cruise line industry, and appropriate State,
local, and tribal health authorities, shall develop en route protocols for crew
members onboard aircraft and vessels to identify and respond to travelers who
become ill en route and to make timely notification to Federal agencies, health
care providers, and other relevant authorities. (Also see Pillar One, Action D
[HSC 5.1.1.4] above, and Pillar Two, Actions K and B [HSC 5.2.4.8 (below) and
5.2.2.1 (above)]; and chapter 2, Pillar Two, Action A [HSC 5.2.2.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Protocols developed and disseminated to
air carriers/airspace users and cruise line industry.
- Step 1: Establish criteria and case definitions (based on
symptoms and high-risk exposures, e.g., travel, activity) for case
reporting.
- Step 2: Develop protocol, including use of appropriate
infection-control practices, for management of passengers with suspected
influenza identified en route.
- Step 3: Develop and implement training for international
conveyance crews and operations staff for recognition of, response to, and
reporting of cases.
- Step 4: Update surveillance and response protocols based on
refined case definitionsas well as the potential availability of new,
rapid, virologic screening tests and updated infection-control
practicesas new knowledge is gained regarding a pandemic influenza
strain.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.7): HHS, working closely with DHS and DOT, and in
coordination with transportation and border stakeholders and appropriate State
and local health authorities will develop aviation, land border, and maritime
entry and exit protocols and/or screening protocols (Protocols will be revised
as new rapid diagnostic tests become available) and education materials for
non-medical, frontline screeners and officers to identify potentially infected
persons or cargo. (Also see Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4] Step 5, above.)
- Timeframe: Within 10 months.
- Measure of Performance: Protocols and training materials
developed and disseminated.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 01
- Step 1: Gather the best scientific evidence for effective port
entry/exit screening (e.g., thermal scanners, health declarations, x rays) and
response measures (isolation, quarantine) for persons and goods, and the best
response at U.S. ports of entry.
- Step 2: Use knowledge from Step 1 above, and engage port agencies
(e.g., CBP, Transportation Security Administration [TSA], USCG) in the design
of a surveillance system for inbound and outbound travelers and goods (directly
or indirectly) from/to target areas at U.S. ports of entry.
- Step 3: Identify and design data collection tools for information
gathering (e.g., the airline, airport, flight number, symptoms, exposure
history, immediate actions taken, and followup actions taken).
- Step 4: Establish response protocols and criteria for identifying
a person for further medical evaluation or public health action (e.g.,
isolation, quarantine, medical surveillance).
- Step 5: Establish response protocols for cargo posing a public
health threat.
- Step 6: Develop training materials for nonmedical, frontline
screeners and officers who will conduct surveillance and response.
- Step 7: Train nonmedical, frontline screeners to conduct
surveillance and response at port of entry.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 23
- Step 8: Initiate active surveillance measuresentry and/or
exit screening, using updated case definitions for pandemic influenza.
- Step 9: Update education of all frontline staff at ports of entry
in surveillance and response as well as in personal protection measures.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 10: Discontinue entry-screening efforts and implement
exit-screening efforts.
- Step 11: Update education of all frontline staff at ports of
entry in exit-screening measures.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.8): With DHS, and in coordination with DOT, DOJ,
and appropriate State, local, and tribal health authorities, HHS will work to
develop detection, diagnosis, quarantine, isolation, EMS transport, reporting
and enforcement protocols and education materials for travelers, and
undocumented aliens apprehended at and between ports of entry, who have signs
or symptoms of pandemic influenza or who may have been exposed to influenza.
(Also see Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4] above, and Pillar Two, Actions B
and I [HSC 5.2.2.1 and 5.2.4.6] above; and chapter 2, Pillar Two, Action A [HSC
5.2.2.1].)
- Timeframe: Within 10 months.
- Measure of Performance: Protocols developed and distributed to
all ports of entry.
- Step 1: Develop U.S. Response Stage-specific response protocols
for travelers and undocumented aliens with signs and symptoms of influenza or
with significant history of exposure. These protocols will be based on U.S.
Response Stage-specific case definitions for detection, as well as on criteria
for isolation, quarantine, and transport to medical facility for further
treatment and evaluation.
- Step 2: Identify stakeholders required for implementing the above
protocols.
- Step 3: Develop Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) with
appropriate stakeholders.
- Step 4: Develop and distribute protocols to stakeholders.
- Step 5: Develop and distribute to all ports of entry, educational
materials (based on above protocols) for potential travelers and undocumented
aliens apprehended between ports of entry.
- Action (HSC 5.2.4.9): HHS will provide technical assistance to DHS,
and work in coordination with DOS, Treasury, and the travel and trade industry,
to assist DHS tailor existing automated screening programs and extended border
programs to increase scrutiny of travelers and cargo based on potential risk
factors (e.g., shipment from or traveling through areas with pandemic
outbreaks).
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Enhanced risk-based screening protocols
implemented.
- Step 1: Study existing traveler- and cargo-screening programs,
e.g., Automated Manifest System (AMS).
- Step 2: Identify gaps in existing programs and appropriate
stakeholders.
- Step 3: Assess current techniques of interviewing travelers, and
identify as well as develop enhanced techniques to identify as rapidly as
possible persons who are ill.
- Step 4: Determine potential triggers for the interruption of
refugee/immigrant travel to the United States.
- Step 5: Define potential risk factors to be included in
screening/response protocols.
- Step 6: Develop, with appropriate partners, risk-based protocols
to increase scrutiny of potentially infected persons and goods (with criteria
for seizing and destroying cargo, when necessary).
- Action (HSC 5.2.5.2): HHS will provide technical assistance to USDA
and coordinate with DHS and DOI as USDA reviews the process for withdrawing
permits for importation of live avian species or products and identify ways to
increase timeliness, improve detection of high-risk importers, and increase
outreach to importers and their distributors.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Revised process for withdrawing permits
of high-risk importers.
- Step 1: Review, revise, and if necessary develop regulations
(such as 9 CFR 94.6) that are adequate to prohibit entry of high-risk birds and
bird byproducts from countries affected by H5N1.
- Step 2: Obtain access to CBP's AMS to allow identification of
shipments with birds or bird products.
- Step 3: Assess the volume of shipments containing birds and bird
products entering the United States during a 1-month period.
- Step 4: Increase staffing at ports of entry to accommodate
increased inspections of shipments.
- Step 5: Ensure each Quarantine Station has the means to safely
dispose of birds or bird products that are denied entry.
- Step 6: Promote better communication between HHS, USDA, CBP, and
U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) through regular conference calls and
e-mail distribution lists.
- Step 7: Work with USDA as it reviews its process for identifying
high-risk shipments and/or importers and for withdrawing permits.
- Action (HSC 6.2.4.2): HHS will work with DHS, and in coordination
with Sector-Specific Agencies, DOD, DOJ, and VA, and in collaboration with the
private sector, to prepare to track the integrity of critical infrastructure
function, including the health care sector, to determine whether ongoing
strategies of ensuring workplace safety and continuity of operations need to be
altered as a pandemic evolves. The collection of personal information, if and
where necessary, will be performed in accordance with U.S. privacy law. (Also
see chapter 2, Pillar Two, Action J [HSC 6.2.4.2].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Tracking system in place to monitor
integrity of critical infrastructure function and continuity of operations in
nearly real time.
- Step 1: In collaboration with DHS, convene a panel of subject
matter experts to identify the types and forms of data to establish operational
status of the critical infrastructure sectors of health care and public
health.
- Step 2: Analyze the feedback and update the HHS Critical
Infrastructure Data System to address more accurately the infrastructure
tracking needs.
- Step 3: Work with OMB to have the Critical Infrastructure Data
System revised to accept the necessary technical edits.
Pillar Three: Response and Containment
In approaching the problem of pandemic influenza, HHS supports a layered
strategy of response and containment. In the event of sustained and efficient
human-to-human transmission of an influenza virus with pandemic potential, HHS
will first leverage available resources and interventions to contain the
outbreak at its source and to delay or limit its introduction to the United
States If such efforts fail, HHS resources and recommended interventions will
be directed to limiting or otherwise delaying the spread of pandemic within the
United States; minimizing suffering and death; sustaining critical
infrastructure and a Constitutional form of Government; and reducing the
economic and social effects of the pandemic. Currently, HHS is basing its
response and containment protocols and policy discussions on scientifically
sound modeling assumptions. As more experience with pandemic influenza is
gained, HHS will use evidence-based decisionmaking to further revisit and
refine its response protocols, strategies, and policies.
Containing Outbreaks
- Action (HSC 4.3.2.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOD and DOT, and
in collaboration with foreign counterparts, will assist DOS in DOS support of
the implementation of pre-existing passenger screening protocols in the event
of an outbreak of pandemic influenza. (Also see chapter 1, Pillar Three, Action
J [HSC 4.3.2.1].)
- Timeframe: Ongoing.
- Measure of Performance: Protocols implemented within 48 hours of
notification of an outbreak of pandemic influenza.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 0
- Step 1: Develop standards and procedures for conducting and
evaluating exit screening for all travelers (U.S. and non-U.S. citizens) for
pandemic influenza, and travel exclusion for persons who are ill at
international points of embarkation, including land borders, in collaboration
with the WHO Secretariat and Ministries of Health of other countries.
- Step 2: Develop binational and multinational arrangements
regarding exit screening and travel exclusion for persons who are ill; these
arrangements include standards, procedures, oversight, and assessment.
- Step 3: Develop logistical and operational plans with the WHO
Secretariat and other countries for conducting medical exit screening and
travel exclusion for persons who are ill in affected countries.
- Step 4: Work with the WHO Secretariat and IATA to develop
predeparture screening/exclusion guidelines on ILI for transport organizations,
including international passenger airlines and cargo carriers (for crew).
- Step 5: Develop system for collection of data on number of
persons screened, number of persons with travel restrictions, criteria for
restriction and disposition.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 1
- Step 6: As part of the HHS and DOS process to issue Travel
Advisories, inform the public that affected countries may begin predeparture
screening.
- Step 7: In collaboration with the WHO Secretariat and affected
countries, assist in the institution, oversight, and assessment of predeparture
exit-screening in affected countries, according to predetermined standards and
arrangements.
- Step 8: Assess the adequacy of affected countries' predeparture
exit screening and exclusion of persons who are ill, and provide feedback.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 23
- Step 9: Potentially limit international ports of embarkation to
the United States to ensure adequate screening.
- Step 10: Reevaluate existing exit-screening and exclusion
measures in affected countries, and provide feedback.
- Step 11: Apply criteria for conducting exit screening of
U.S.-bound persons coming from affected areas.
- Step 12: Implement enhanced medical exit-screening measures and
protocols.
- Step 13: Conduct ongoing evaluation of the effectiveness of
screening efforts.
- Action (HSC 4.3.2.2): HHS will support DOD efforts, in coordination
with DOS, DOT, and DHS to limit DOD military travel between affected areas and
the U.S.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: DOD identifies military facilities in the
U.S. and outside continental U.S. (OCONUS) that will serve as the points of
entry for all official travelers from affected areas.
- Step 1: Provide technical assistance to DOD regarding travel
restrictions to affected areas and entry screening of official travelers coming
from affected areas.
- Action (HSC 5.3.1.1): HHS will assist DOS and DHS, in coordination
with DOT, DOC, Treasury, and USDA in their work with foreign counterparts to
limit or restrict travel from affected regions to the U.S. as appropriate, and
notify host government(s) and the traveling public. (Also see chapter 1, Pillar
Three, Action H [HSC 5.3.1.1].)
- Timeframe: As required.
- Measure of Performance: Measures imposed within 24 hours of the
decision to do so, after appropriate notifications made.
- Step 1: Support DHS and DOS in limiting travel from affected
regions by providing technical advice regarding voluntary and mandatory
travel-restriction options and overseas exit screening in affected
countries.
- Action (HSC 5.3.1.2): HHS will assist DOS, in coordination with DOT,
DHS, DOD, air carriers and cruise lines, as DOS works with host countries to
implement predeparture screening based on disease characteristics and the
availability of rapid-detection methods and equipment. (Also see chapter 1,
Pillar Three, Action P [HSC 5.3.1.2].)
- Timeframe: As required.
- Measure of Performance: Screening protocols agreed upon and put
in place in affected countries within 24 hours of an outbreak.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 0
- Step 1: Develop standards and procedures for conducting and
evaluating exit screening for all travelers (U.S. and non-U.S. citizens) for
pandemic influenza and travel exclusion for persons who are ill at
international points of embarkation, including land borders, in collaboration
with the WHO Secretariat and Ministries of Health.
- Step 2: Develop binational and multinational arrangements
regarding exit screening and travel exclusion for persons who are ill; these
arrangements include standards, procedures, oversight, and assessment.
- Step 3: Develop logistical and operational plans with the WHO
Secretariat and other countries for conducting medical exit screening and
travel exclusion for persons who are ill in affected countries.
- Step 4: Work with the WHO Secretariat and travel organizations
(e.g., IATA and International Council of Cruise Lines [ICCL]) to develop
predeparture screening/exclusion guidelines for ILI for transport
organizations, including international passenger airlines and cargo carriers
(for crew).
- Step 5: Develop a system for collection of data on the number of
persons screened, number of persons with travel restrictions, criteria for
restriction and disposition.
- Step 6: Develop prevention and containment measures for cases and
contacts in affected countries.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 1
- Step 7: Inform the public that affected countries may begin
predeparture screening as part of the HHS and DOS process to issue Travel
Advisories.
- Step 8: In collaboration with the WHO Secretariat and affected
countries, assist in the institution, oversight, and assessment of predeparture
exit screening in affected countries, according to predetermined standards and
arrangements, in collaboration with WHO and other affected countries.
- Step 9: Assess the adequacy of predeparture exit screening and
exclusion by affected countries of persons who are ill, and provide
feedback.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 23
- Step 10: Potentially limit international ports of embarkation to
the United States to those with enhanced predeparture exit screening.
- Step 11: Re-evaluate existing exit-screening and exclusion
measures in affected countries, and provide feedback.
- Step 12: Implement enhanced medical exit-screening measures and
protocols.
- Step 13: Potentially implement more restrictive visa requirements
for all non-U.S. citizens.
- Action (HSC 5.3.1.5): HHS will work closely with DHS and in
coordination with DOT, DOS, DOD, USDA, appropriate State, and local,
authorities, air carriers/air space users, airports, cruise lines, and seaports
to implement screening protocols at U.S. ports of entry based on disease
characteristics and availability of rapid detection methods and equipment.
(Also see chapter 2, Pillar Two, Action N [HSC 5.3.1.5].)
- Timeframe: As required.
- Measure of Performance: Screening implemented within 48 hours
upon notification of an outbreak.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 0
- Step 1: Design, in collaboration with frontline port agencies
(e.g., CBP, TSA, and USCG), a new surveillance system for inbound travel at
U.S. international airports and seaports that receive passengers (directly or
indirectly) from target areas.
- Step 2: Specify entry data to be collected for each traveler or
crew member (e.g., the airline, airport, flight number, cruise line, vessel,
symptoms, exposure history, immediate actions taken, and followup actions
taken).
- Step 3: Design a data collection form.
- Step 4: Evaluate the usefulness of thermal scanning.
- Step 5: If thermal scanning is deemed useful, install thermal
scanners at international ports of entry, and train personnel how to use
them.
- Step 6: Establish criteria for identifying a person for further
medical evaluation.
- Step 7: Develop training materials for frontline officers who
will conduct surveillance.
- Step 8: Train port agencies (e.g., CBP, TSA, USCG officers) to
conduct surveillance.
- Step 9: Develop a mechanism for data transmission to HHS on a
daily basis (e.g., via Web-based reporting).
- Step 10: Develop a mechanism for merging data from multiple
sources.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 1
- Step 11: Pilot test a surveillance system at several ports of
entry, and identify issues.
- Step 12: Find solutions to issues, and update
system/training.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 23
- Active surveillance (entry screening) for pandemic influenza (not
yet in the United States):
- Step 13: Implement entry-screening measures, by using updated
case definitions for pandemic influenza.
- Step 14: Potentially restrict arrivals to a limited number of
U.S. ports of entry.
- Step 15: Establish criteria for identifying a screened person for
further medical evaluation.
- Step 16: Detail previously identified staff (e.g., CBP, TSA) to
support enhanced surveillance activities.
- Step 17: Meet all flights with travelers on board who have
symptoms suggestive of influenza, and do the following:
-
- Evaluate travelers who are ill; isolate them and arrange for
treatment, if needed
- Collect specimens for virologic testing, as appropriate
- Step 18: Meet all flights from affected areas to accomplish the
following:
-
- Distribute Travel Health Advisories and Warnings to all
travelers
- Collect contact information from all travelers
- Collect epidemiologic information from all travelers (via
questionnaire) to evaluate likelihood of overseas exposure
- Evaluate travelers for evidence of fever and other ILI
symptoms
- Step 19: If a traveler who is ill with suspected pandemic
influenza is identified:
-
- Quarantine exposed travelers (e.g., fellow passengers or
crew) onsite or at home
- Consider antiviral prophylactic therapy for exposed travelers
(this would apply to travelers exposed on the airplane due to contact with a
traveler who is ill on the same plane)
- Implement contact tracing and followup if the traveler who is ill
is determined to have a pandemic strain
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 4-5
- Step 1: As instructed by HHS, discontinue entry-screening efforts
and return to U.S. Response Stage 0 level of passive surveillance of all
travelers.
- Action (HSC 5.3.1.6): HHS will work closely with DHS, in coordination
with DOT, HHS, USDA, DOD, appropriate State, and local authorities, air
carriers, and airports, in DHS consideration of implementing response or
screening protocols at domestic airports and other transport modes, as
appropriate, based on disease characteristics and availability of
rapid-detection methods and equipment. (Also see chapter 2, Pillar Two, Action
O [HSC 5.3.1.6].)
- Timeframe: Ongoing.
- Measure of Performance: Screening protocols in place within 24
hours of directive to do so.
- Step 1: Evaluate utility of screening at domestic airports, if
appropriate; assess resources needed to implement screening and develop trigger
points for such implementation.
- Step 2: Investigate potential screening measures/technology
(e.g., thermal scanning) and, if appropriate, procurement, availability of
equipment, probable location in individual domestic airports for both entry and
exit screening, and staffing and training requirements; develop protocols for
implementation and evaluation.
- Step 3: If deemed appropriate, develop protocols, staffing and
training requirements, and evaluation/data collection plan for medical
screening at entry and exit, to include evaluation for fever and of
symptoms.
- Step 4: If deemed appropriate, develop epidemiologic
questionnaires for entry and exit screening, and plan for distribution to
travelers as well as collection, interpretation, and data
collection/evaluation.
- Step 5: Investigate resource requirements for the collection and
laboratory testing of medical specimens for virus isolation; develop protocols
for use (including data management and evaluation) as well as a staffing and
training plan.
- Step 6: Update protocols and training as new, rapid-screening
tests become available.
- Action (HSC Action 5.3.2.1): HHS will, in coordination with DHS, DOS,
DOT, and USDA, issue travel advisories/public announcements for areas where
outbreaks have occurred, and ensure adequate coordination with appropriate
transportation and border stakeholders. (Also see chapter 7, Pillar Three,
Action B [HSC 5.3.2.1].)
- Timeframe: Ongoing.
- Measure of Performance: Coordinated announcements and warnings
developed within 24 hours of becoming aware of an outbreak, and timely updates
provided, as required.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 0
- Step 1: Work with domestic and international partners to define
trigger points for issuing Travelers' Health Advisories during the Pandemic
Alert and Pandemic Periods.
- Step 2: Develop and maintain up-to-date Travel Health Advisories
on the HHS/CDC Travelers' Health Web site through all pandemic stages. Identify
steps for rapid clearance and posting (within 24 hours).
- Step 3: Identify domestic and international response partners who
should be notified in advance about new Travel Health Advisories (e.g., DOT,
DOS, DHS, FAA, IATA, the WHO Secretariat, consular officials, Ministries of
Health in affected countries, the IATA).
- Step 4: Confirm a point of contact for each of these partners,
and develop and test a means for rapid communication to these points of contact
(e.g., e-mail blast, mass fax) regarding new Travel Health Advisories.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 15
- Step 5: Continue activities from Stage 0.
- Step 6: Work with travel industry partners, Federal agency
partners, and managers of port facilities to ensure the rapid distribution of
Travel Health Advisories to travelers at ports of entry.
- Step 7: Ensure that appropriate Federal, international, and
private partners are notified in advance of all Travel Health Advisories.
- Action (HSC 6.3.2.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOT, Education,
DOC, DOD, and Treasury, will provide State, local, and tribal entities with
guidance on the combination, timing, evaluation, and sequencing of community
containment strategies (including travel restrictions, school closings, "snow
days", and quarantine during a pandemic) based on currently available data, and
update this guidance as additional data becomes available. (Also see Pillar
One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4] Step 7 above.)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance provided on community influenza
containment measures.
- Step 1: Explore data on effective sequencing and combination of
various community-containment strategies from modeling, past outbreak response,
and scientific studies.
- Step 2: Share above findings with State, local, and tribal
entities to assess feasibility of implementation.
- Step 3: Work with State, local, and tribal entities to agree on
authorities and triggers for implementing community-containment measures
consistently across jurisdictions.
- Step 4: Develop guidance regarding each containment strategy: the
steps required to complete this action item are numerous, and the required work
cannot be adequately reflected in the three brief, consolidated steps above.
Because few data exist for most of these containment strategies, the steps
below outline the requirements for providing guidance on 10
community-containment strategies being considered.
- 1. Strategy: Home Isolation and Quarantine
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 03
- Step 1: Develop guidance for State, local, and tribal health
departments for monitoring contacts of persons infected with suspected or
confirmed pandemic influenza, including procedures for passive monitoring,
active monitoring without activity restrictions, and active monitoring with
activity restrictions (quarantine). (See HHS Pandemic Influenza
Plan, Supplement 8, Appendix 1.) This guidance includes the
following:
- Recommendations for implementing home isolation
- Training for individuals assessing home quarantine
feasibility
- Security/enforcement issues relating to home quarantine
- Infection control recommendations to fit the specific needs of
patients receiving care in the home setting as well as the infection-control
needs of other persons in the household
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 2: HHS, through consultation, will assist State, local, and
tribal health departments in the implementation of home isolation and
quarantine.
- Step 3: Evaluate the effectiveness of home isolation and
quarantine in decreasing transmission, and address logistical problems.
- Step 4: Provide updated guidance on home-quarantine
infection-control practices, as needed.
- 2. Strategy: Facility Quarantine
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 03
- Step 1: Determine definition of facility quarantine.
- Step 2: Develop Federal guidance document for quarantine
facilities that describes the needs of particular population groups (e.g.,
international travelers, the elderly, special needs populations, the homeless,
students at colleges and universities) and addresses issues related to
staffing, supplies, transportation, infection control, and security.
- Step 3: Local health departments are to develop plans and
facilities for quarantine.
- Step 4: Work with States, localities, and tribes to further
encourage local governments to identify facilities for housing individuals not
qualified for home quarantine.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 5: Local and State authorities are to implement facility
quarantine as needed.
- Step 6: Evaluate the effectiveness of facility isolation and
logistical problems. Update recommendations based upon findings.
- 3. Strategy: Work Quarantine
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 03
- Step 1: Develop and disseminate guidance documents and materials
for work quarantine, addressing issues related to transportation, symptom
monitoring, PPE, and psychological support.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 2: State, local, and tribal governments are to implement
work quarantine as needed.
- Step 3: Evaluate the effectiveness of work quarantine.
- 4. Strategy: Cancellation of Public Events
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 03
- Step 1: Develop guidelines that identify key public events that
might facilitate the spread of influenza, and identify trigger points for
restriction of public events by local authorities.
- Step 2: Encourage State, local, and tribal authorities to
identify large public events scheduled during upcoming months that have a high
potential for facilitating the spread of influenza, and obtain contact
information for organizers of these events.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 3: Advise State, local, and tribal health departments on
implementation of public event cancellations, as needed.
- 5. Strategy: Closure of Schools
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 03
- Step 1: Identify trigger points for school closure.
- Step 2: Contact the Department of Education and State education
departments to determine that plans exist to deal with school closures in the
event of an influenza pandemic.
- Step 3: Encourage education departments to establish/enhance ways
of communicating with staff and students during school closures (e.g., e-mail,
phone trees, local media).
- Step 4: Encourage State, local, and tribal education departments
to consider the development of home curricula/distance-based learning for use
during school closure. Consideration may be given to working with home
schooling authorities.
- Step 5: Work with State, local, and tribal entities, including
the educational sector, to agree on authorities and triggers for implementing
school closures consistently across jurisdictions.
- Step 6: Determine the Federal role in determining timing and
coordination of school closures.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 7: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
partners as they implement school closure and home education, as needed.
- 6. Strategy: Closure of Other Public Places
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Develop guidelines for closing public places, including
shopping malls and recreation facilities, during a pandemic.
- Step 2: Work with State, local, and tribal public health staff,
as well as the private sector, to develop guidelines for closing public
places.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 35
- Step 3: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
partners as they implement closures of public places.
- 7. Strategy: Closure of Public
Transportation
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Develop options for reducing local public transportation
in the event of a pandemic, and assess the potential impact on functioning of
essential services.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 35
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
partners as they implement closure of public transportation systems.
- 8. Strategy: Closure of Specific Worksites
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Provide guidance to State, local, and tribal governments
as well as businesses regarding the potential role of worksite closure in the
containment of pandemic influenza.
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
health departments in identifying employers and worksites in local
jurisdictions that deliver nonessential services.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 35
- Step 3: Local governments are to work with large local employers
to discuss the role of worksite closures in their State/local pandemic plans
and to educate workers on means of preventing influenza transmission and on the
necessity of staying home from work while they are ill.
- Step 4: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
authorities as they implement worksite closures as needed.
- 9. Strategy: Sheltering in Place ("Snow Days")
Restrictions
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Develop guidelines that describe the role of sheltering
in place in the control of pandemic influenza and steps in implementation.
- Step 2: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
partners in their decisions regarding which services are necessary and which
employees should be exempt from sheltering in place.
- Step 3: State, local, and tribal governments are to work with
businesses and education sectors (including colleges and universities,
daycare/preschool) on the role of sheltering in place in their respective
pandemic plans.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 35
- Step 4: Provide technical assistance to State, local, and tribal
health departments as they implement sheltering in place in response to
pandemic influenza, as needed.
- Step 5: State, local, and tribal governments to work with
businesses and the education sector (e.g., colleges and universities,
daycare/preschool) on the role of sheltering in place in their respective
pandemic plans.
- 10. Strategy: Thermal Scanning in Public
Places
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 01
- Step 1: Review data on the effectiveness and cost-effectiveness
of thermal scanning in prevention of disease transmission, and make
recommendations on potential use of thermal scanning during influenza pandemic.
If thermal scanning is recommended:
- Determine whether there are legal considerations that need to
be addressed regarding thermal scanning in public places
- Develop options for using thermal scanning, such as using
thermal scanning to discourage febrile people from attending large public
gatherings
- Research the availability of thermal-scanning equipment
- If this technology, upon evaluation, is found to be feasible,
effective, cost-effective, and appropriate, consider the purchase and the
stockpiling of thermal-scanning equipment
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 25
- Step 2: Consider the installation and use of thermal-scanning
equipment in key public areas, if recommended.
- Action (HSC 6.3.2.2): HHS will provide guidance on the role and
evaluation of the efficacy of geographic quarantine in efforts to contain an
outbreak of influenza with pandemic potential at its source, within 3 months.
(Also see Pillar One, Action D [HSC 5.1.1.4] Step 7, above.)
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance available within 72 hours of
initial outbreak.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Evaluate efficacy of geographic quarantine (from
modeling, past international experience, and other scientific means).
- Step 2: Develop and disseminate guidance materials on the use of
cordon sanitaire (enforcement, maintenance of basic infrastructure,
transportation, medical monitoring, and communication mechanisms).
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 35
- Step 3: Work with State and local governments to determine if
cordon sanitaire should be implemented in specific situations.
- Action (HSC 6.3.2.3): HHS, in coordination with DHS and DOD and in
collaboration with mathematical modelers, will complete research identifying
optimal strategies for using voluntary home quarantine, school closure,
snow-day restrictions, and other community infection-control measures.
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance developed and disseminated on
the use of community control.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 02
- Step 1: Review existing research on community-containment
methods, and work with partners to fill the gaps in present knowledge (e.g.,
sensitivity and specificity of thermal scanning, effect of holiday school
closure on seasonal influenza rates, rates of compliance for recommended home
isolation and quarantine.)
- Step 2: Work with the MIDAS network and/or other groups of
mathematical modelers to evaluate the potential effectiveness of specific
community-containment methods.
- Step 3: Act as a liaison between State, local, and tribal health
departments and mathematical modelers to interpret and distribute findings and
to issue guidance.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stage 3
- Step 4: Work with international partners to help evaluate the
impact of community-containment methods in affected nations and to disseminate
findings/ recommendations.
- Steps During U.S. Response Stages 45
- Step 5: Evaluate the impact of containment methods in the United
States.
- Action (HSC 6.3.2.5): All HHS- (as well as all DOD-, and VA-) funded
hospitals and health facilities will develop, test, and be prepared to
implement infection control campaigns for pandemic influenza. (Also see chapter
7, Pillar Three, Action C [HSC 6.3.2.5].)
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance materials on infection control
developed and disseminated on http://www.pandemicflu.gov and through
other channels.
- Step 1: Review existing guidelines, recommendations, and
factsheets; identify gaps.
- Step 2: Develop and/or update as needed, recommendations and
factsheets for health care settings, including:
- Inpatient and acute-care hospitals
- Nursing homes and long-term-care facilities
- Outpatient and community health facilities
- Dialysis centers
- Prehospital care (EMS)
- Factsheets on home care during an influenza pandemic
- Step 3: Disseminate recommendations and factsheets by publishing
them on http://www.pandemicflu.gov.
Additional dissemination mechanisms that may be considered include the
following:
- HHS public health outreach systems, including the HAN, Epi-X,
and the National Healthcare Safety Network (NHSN)
- HHS' influenza- and health care-related Web sites (e.g., CDC,
HRSA, and CMS)
- HHS' Emergency Communications System (ECS) including the
Clinician Outreach and Communication Activity (COCA)
- HHS' National Center for Health Marketing, Division of Public
Private Partnerships
- Conference calls with health care partners and organizations
such as the Association for Professionals in Infection Control and Epidemiology
(APIC), the Society for Healthcare Epidemiology of America (SHEA), the American
Hospital Association (AHA), the Infectious Disease Society of America (IDSA),
the American Medical Association (AMA), the American College of Physicians
(ACP), the American College of Emergency Physicians (ACEP), the American
Medical Directors Association (AMDA), the American Nurses Association, the
American Public Health Association (APHA), the American Academy of Physician
Assistants (AAPA), the American Osteopathic Association, and schools of public
health
- Action (HSC 6.3.2.7): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOC, DOL, and
Sector-Specific Agencies, and in collaboration with medical professional and
specialty societies, will develop and disseminate infection control guidance
for the private sector. (Also see chapter 7, Pillar Three, Action E [HSC
6.3.2.7].)
- Timeframe: Within 12 months.
- Measure of Performance: Validated, focus group-tested guidance
developed and published on http://www.pandemicflu.gov and in other
forums.
- Step 1: Discuss with HHS partners and provide written,
risk-stratified guidance for management and workers in Government and the
private sectors that provide both essential and nonessential services. This
guidance may include information on sanitizing hands, cough etiquette,
self-isolation due to illness, use of PPE (e.g., mask use, gloves, face
shields, gowns), and social distancing measures (e.g., telecommuting, office
closure, work quarantine).
- Step 2: Share the draft on risk-stratified guidance, produced by
the interagency non-pharmaceutical interventions working group, with medical
professional and specialty societies for comment and improvement.
- Step 3: Give the updated infection-control guidance to CDC's
National Center for Health Marketing for development of communication materials
that will be focus-group tested.
- Step 4: Publish the infection-control guidance on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov.
- Action (HSC 6.3.3.1): HHS, in coordination with DHS, VA and DOD, will
develop and disseminate guidance that explains steps individuals can take to
decrease their risk of acquiring or transmitting influenza infection during a
pandemic.
- Timeframe: Within 3 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance published on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov and through
VA and DOD channels.
- Step 1: Develop general guidance for individuals regarding
measures they can take to decrease their risk and others' risk for infection
with influenza. This guidance will include information on hand hygiene, cough
etiquette, self-isolation due to illness, indications for use of PPE (e.g.,
masks, gloves, eye protection), and social-distancing measures (e.g., avoiding
public gatherings, telecommuting, work quarantine).
- Step 2: Publish the risk-stratified guidance on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov and in
other broadly distributed publications.
- Action (HSC 6.3.3.2): HHS, in coordination with DHS, DOD, VA, and DOT
and in collaboration with State, local, and tribal partners, shall develop and
disseminate lists of social distancing behaviors that individuals may adopt,
and update guidance as additional data becomes available. (Also see chapter 7,
Pillar Three, Action F [HSC 6.3.3.2].)
- Timeframe: Within 6 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidance disseminated on
http://www.pandemicflu.gov and through
other channels.
- Step 1: Gather information on possible effective
social-distancing behaviors.
- Step 2: Develop guidance on social-distancing methods.
- Step 3: Develop guidance on avoidance of public places.
- Step 4: Develop guidance for curtailing nonessential travel.
- Step 5: Develop guidance for limiting nonessential visits to
physicians.
- Step 6: Create a list of social-distancing behaviors for
individuals, and determine the best way to communicate these behaviors to the
public.
- Step 7: Share communication materials and guidance with stated
partners, and publish these items on http://www.pandemicflu.gov.
- Step 8: Update guidance and materials as new information becomes
available.
- Action (HSC 8.3.1.1): HHS, in coordination with DOJ, DOS and DHS,
will determine when and how it will assist States in enforcing their
quarantines and how it will enforce a Federal quarantine.
- Timeframe: Within 9 months.
- Measure of Performance: Guidelines on quarantine enforcement
available to all States.
- Step 1: Define roles of Federal agencies in the enforcement of
Federal quarantine, both on and off Federal property.
- Step 2: Clarify roles and responsibilities for enforcement
authority at Federal and State level.
- Step 3: Communicate the role of Federal agencies in the
enforcement of quarantine with States.
Sustaining Infrastructure, Essential
Services, and the Economy
- Action (HSC 5.3.3.1): HHS with USDA, and in coordination with DHS,
DOT, DOS, and DOI will provide emergency notifications of probable or confirmed
cases and /or outbreaks to key international, Federal, State, local and tribal
transportation and border stakeholders through existing networks. (Also see
chapter 1, Pillar Three, Action L [HSC 5.3.3.1]; chapter 2, Pillar Three,
Action A [HSC 5.3.3.1]; and chapter 7, Pillar Three, Action H [HSC 5.3.3.1].)
- Timeframe: Ongoing.
- Measure of Performance: Emergency notification occurs within 24
hours or less of events of probable or confirmed cases or outbreaks.
- Step 1: Work with domestic and international partners to define
trigger points for issuing emergency notifications of probable or confirmed
cases and/or outbreaks.
- Step 2: Identify domestic and international response partners who
should be notified.
- Step 3: Confirm a point of contact for each of these partners,
and develop and test a means for rapid communication (e.g., e-mail blast, mass
fax) regarding notifications to these points of contact.
- Step 4: Ensure that appropriate Federal, international, and
private partners are notified of probable or confirmed cases and/or
outbreaks.
- Action (HSC 5.3.5.6): HHS will provide support to DOT and DHS, and
work in coordination with NEC, Treasury, DOC, and DOS and the interagency
modeling group, in a DOT and DHS assessment of the economic, safety, and
security related effects of the pandemic on the transportation sector,
including movement restrictions, closures, and quarantine, and develop
strategies to support long-term recovery of the sector.
- Timeframe: Within 6 months of the end of a pandemic.
- Measure of Performance: Economic and other assessments completed
and strategies implemented to support long-term recovery of the sector.
- Step 1: Support DOT and DHS by providing information to
facilitate modeling, including expertise in selection of data elements to be
used in models and assumptions chosen in construction of models (e.g., the
expected length of time measures would be in place).
- Step 2: Review model results and provide comment on the
interpretation of the results.
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