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| ERIC #: | EJ743241 |
| Title: | On the Psychology of the Recognition Heuristic: Retrieval Primacy as a Key Determinant of Its Use |
| Authors: | Pachur, Thorsten; Hertwig, Ralph |
| Descriptors: | Heuristics; Recognition (Psychology); Primacy Effect; Inferences; Probability; Cues; Prediction |
| Source: | Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, v32 n5 p983-1002 Sep 2006 |
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| Publisher: | American Psychological Association. Journals Department, 750 First Street NE, Washington, DC 20002-4242. Tel: 800-374-2721; Tel: 202-336-5510; Fax: 202-336-5502; e-mail: order@apa.org; Web site: http://www.apa.org/publications. |
| Publication Date: | 2006-09-00 |
| Pages: | 20 |
| Pub Types: | Journal Articles; Opinion Papers; Reports - Descriptive |
| Abstract: | The recognition heuristic is a prime example of a boundedly rational mind tool that rests on an evolved capacity, recognition, and exploits environmental structures. When originally proposed, it was conjectured that no other probabilistic cue reverses the recognition-based inference (D. G. Goldstein & G. Gigerenzer, 2002). More recent studies challenged this view and gave rise to the argument that recognition enters inferences just like any other probabilistic cue. By linking research on the heuristic with research on recognition memory, the authors argue that the retrieval of recognition information is not tantamount to the retrieval of other probabilistic cues. Specifically, the retrieval of subjective recognition precedes that of an objective probabilistic cue and occurs at little to no cognitive cost. This retrieval primacy gives rise to 2 predictions, both of which have been empirically supported: Inferences in line with the recognition heuristic (a) are made faster than inferences inconsistent with it and (b) are more prevalent under time pressure. Suspension of the heuristic, in contrast, requires additional time, and direct knowledge of the criterion variable, if available, can trigger such suspension. |
| Abstractor: | Author |
| Reference Count: | 0 |
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| Note: | N/A |
| Identifiers: | N/A |
| Record Type: | Journal |
| Level: | N/A |
| Institutions: | N/A |
| Sponsors: | N/A |
| ISBN: | N/A |
| ISSN: | ISSN-0278-7393 |
| Audiences: | N/A |
| Languages: | English |
| Education Level: | N/A |
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