

U.S. POLICY IN THE BALKANS:  
A HOBSON'S CHOICE

Stephen J. Blank  
William T. Johnsen  
Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

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This report is dedicated to the memory of

S. Nelson Drew  
Robert C. Frasure  
Joseph J. Kruzel

who gave their lives in the pursuit of peace in the Balkans.

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Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments may also be conveyed directly to the authors at the same address, or by telephone: commercial (717) 245-4076 or DSN 242-4076, or via Internet at johnsenw@carlisle-emh2.army.mil.

## FOREWORD

At this writing, the strategic balance may have shifted in the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia, and the region could be on the verge of a settlement. But, the "window of opportunity" may be fleeting, and the failures and frustrations of the past four years temper any optimism that conflict in the former Yugoslavia will end quickly or completely. If this opening passes without an end to the fighting, the United States may have to reassess its fundamental policy objectives--and the ways and means to achieve them--if peace is to be effected in the Balkans.

The intent of this report, therefore, is to analyze and assess existing policies, to identify any conflicts or contradictions that may stymie U.S. efforts to bring about a peaceful resolution of the crisis, and to offer potential solutions. The report does not offer an ambitious criticism of policy or an "expert's" solution to an intractable problem. Its more modest goal is to examine current policy within a context that fits Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and policy. In this manner, the report offers a broader framework for the strategic decisions that may face the United States in the not so distant future.

The Strategic Studies Institute offers this contribution to assist those engaged in the national dialog over U.S. policy in the Balkans.

RICHARD H. WITHERSPOON  
Colonel, U.S. Army  
Director, Strategic Studies  
Institute

## BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCHES OF THE AUTHORS

STEPHEN BLANK is the Douglas MacArthur Professor of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College. Dr. Blank has been an Associate Professor of National Security Affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute since 1989. Prior to this appointment Dr. Blank was Associate Professor for Soviet Studies at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education of Air University at Maxwell AFB. Dr. Blank's M.A. and Ph.D. are in Russian history from the University of Chicago. He has published numerous articles on Soviet/Russian military and foreign policies, and is the author of *The Sorcerer as Apprentice: Stalin's Commissariat of Nationalities, 1917-1924*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1994, and the coeditor of *The Soviet Military and the Future*, Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992.

WILLIAM T. JOHNSEN joined the Strategic Studies Institute in 1991 and currently serves as an Associate Research Professor of National Security Affairs. He has also held the Elihu Root Chair of Military Studies of the U.S. Army War College since 1994. An infantry officer before retiring from the U.S. Army, Dr. Johnsen served in a variety of troop leading, command and staff assignments in the 25th Infantry Division and 7th Infantry Division (Light). He also served as Assistant Professor of History at the U.S. Military Academy, and as an Arms Control Analyst in the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). Dr. Johnsen holds a B.S. degree from the U. S. Military Academy, an M.A. and Ph.D. in history from Duke University, and is a graduate of the U.S. Army War College. He has authored or coauthored numerous Strategic Studies Institute studies, as well as articles in a variety of policy journals that focus on U.S.-European security issues.

EARL H. TILFORD, JR., is Senior Research Professor and Director of Research at the Strategic Studies Institute. He earned his B.A. and M.A. in history at the University of Alabama and his Ph.D. in American and European military history at George Washington University. Dr. Tilford is the author of three books, the latest, published by Texas A&M University Press, being *Crosswinds: The Air Force's Set Up in Vietnam*. He has published more than two dozen articles in scholarly and professional journals. His next book, *Eagle in the Desert: A Look Back at the Persian Gulf War*, will be published by Greenwood Press later

this year.

## KEY JUDGMENTS

- While the war in Bosnia is complex and confusing, these circumstances should not deter the United States from seeking potential solutions to this conflict. The severity of potential European and global consequences should drive U.S. policymakers to take an even more proactive role in efforts to resolve the conflict.

- Stated and *de facto* U.S. policy objectives are not mutually reinforcing. Indeed, the goal of restoring the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina conflicts with other objectives: preventing the spread of fighting; stemming the flow of refugees; halting the slaughter of innocents; and helping support NATO's central role, while maintaining the U.S. role in shaping Europe's security architecture. The United States must seriously reconsider whether it should retain or revise this goal.

- The stability and security of the entire Balkan peninsula may be at risk. Prolonged disequilibrium could set back the development of newly emerging democracies in the region. An expanded conflict would likely bring Greece and Turkey—key NATO allies—into the conflict, probably on opposite sides.

- Protracted conflict in the Balkans could strain relations between Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States and Russia. This could lead to renationalization of security agendas in Central and Eastern Europe that could forestall the extension of market democracies in those critical regions. The consequences for Western European security policies are obvious.

- Increased strains within NATO could reduce the U.S. ability to influence events in Europe; an outcome certainly not in long-term U.S. interests.

- Continued conflict in the former Yugoslavia is likely to diminish U.S. public support for substantial U.S. engagement in international affairs. The perceived ineptitude of the United Nations and intramural squabbling within NATO could undermine U.S. public support for both of those key security organizations.

- The inability of the United States to shape a resolution

of the war in the former Yugoslavia could undermine U.S. influence in key areas of the world. Concomitantly, potential opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty. These phenomena could contribute to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad that might erode the U.S. deterrent capability to the point where an adversary might directly confront U.S. interests.

- The long-term European and global consequences for the United States from short-term decisions on Bosnia could be substantial. Thus, while it may be simplistic to say it, any decisions concerning further U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war must be framed in light of these consequences, and not simply in accordance with the day-to-day exigencies of the Balkan crisis.



## **U.S. POLICY IN THE BALKANS: A HOBSON'S CHOICE**

### **INTRODUCTION**

The United States is already engaged militarily in the ongoing crisis in the Balkans. Since November 1992, U.S. naval vessels have taken part in the maritime enforcement of the U.N. embargo of the belligerents. U.S. Air Force transport aircraft have dropped tons of humanitarian aid to besieged enclaves. U.S. Air Force and U.S. Navy aircraft participate daily in the enforcement of the U.N. "no-fly zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina, have shot down Bosnian Serb aircraft, and have been the principal participants in NATO bombing missions supporting the U. N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia- Herzegovina. American planes have been fired on by Bosnian Serb anti-aircraft batteries and surface-to-air missiles and one USAF F-16 has been shot down. U.S. Marines have already undertaken military action on the ground in Bosnia to rescue downed Air Force pilot Captain Scott O'Grady. To the south, over 500 U.S. soldiers are in Macedonia to deter expansion of the conflict.<sup>1</sup>

Given the escalating nature of the conflict (e.g., Bosnian Serb seizure of "safe havens" and Croatian offensives in the Krajina region), U.S. engagement may deepen suddenly, requiring quick decisions concerning increased U.S. military involvement in the crisis. Indeed, nearly every potential turn of events could lead to an increased commitment of U.S. military force to the region. Potential ethnic Bosnian Serb attacks against the remaining "safe havens" have brought NATO threats of "firm and rapid response of NATO's air power" that would undoubtedly involve large numbers of U.S. aircraft.<sup>2</sup>

The United States also has pledged to assist the withdrawal of UNPROFOR in Bosnia should that become necessary. Increased fighting, failure to achieve a negotiated settlement, or the unilateral U.S. lifting of the arms embargo could trigger such an operation, involving up to 25,000 U.S. ground troops.<sup>3</sup>

A rise in the already high levels of violence against civilians could lead public opinion to demand increased U.S. military involvement.<sup>4</sup> The current U.S. peace plan being explained to allies, partners, and belligerents contains numerous

military "sticks" that might be employed if "carrots" fail to bring about an end to the fighting. These "sticks" include replacing UNPROFOR peacekeepers with NATO forces, undoubtedly including U.S. forces.<sup>5</sup> Should a peace settlement be brokered, the United States has committed to providing upwards of 25,000 personnel to participate in peacekeeping operations.<sup>6</sup> In short, the United States may be inexorably drawn into increased military engagement in the Balkans.

Before U.S. political leaders make their decisions on whether (or more likely, when and how) to increase U.S. military involvement, they must factor a number of complicating considerations into their deliberations.<sup>7</sup> First, Bosnian Serbs and Serbia are likely to see any increased NATO or U.S. military commitment as directed against them. Second, the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina is likely to view increased U.S. engagement as a guarantee of Bosnia's existence and sovereignty, thereby bolstering the will to resist. Third, Serbia will undoubtedly perceive increased U.S. engagement as a threat to Serbian interests, precipitating a Serbian reaction that could lead to intervention by the Yugoslav Army and a widening of the war. Fourth, other states in the region and Russia may view increased U.S. or NATO military activities as a commitment to a Balkan-wide security system.

Decisionmakers also must look beyond the current crisis and fit Bosnia into the larger pattern of U.S. interests and policy. For example, increased U.S. involvement in the crisis could add to existing tensions within NATO, strain U.S. bilateral relations with key allies or new partners in Central and Eastern Europe, or generate substantial repercussions for U.S.- Russian relations. Intra-European relations could also be strained. Understanding the potential consequences of their actions offers policymakers an opportunity to identify new or clarify existing U.S. policy options for Bosnia-Herzegovina. To that end, this report will explicate the wider issues involved in the current and potential U.S. engagement in the Balkan crisis to establish a broader framework for the strategic decisions facing the United States. To provide this context, the report addresses four major questions overarching the ongoing crisis in the Balkans:

- What are the key principles that the United States wishes to uphold?

- What are U.S. objectives concerning the conflict, and are they mutually reinforcing or in conflict?

- Under what conditions should the United States apply military force to achieve those objectives?

- What are the potential consequences inherent in the use of military power?

## **KEY PRINCIPLES OF U.S. POLICY**

At the most basic level, several key principles guide the formulation of U.S. foreign policy and are germane to the Balkan crisis. First is the fundamental belief that "America's core value [is] freedom, embodied in democratic governance and market economics . . . ." <sup>8</sup> Also at stake is the U.S. tradition of supporting human dignity and respect for human rights. <sup>9</sup> Finally, the current administration has articulated a global policy of engagement, the very viability of which is affected by events in the former Yugoslavia. In succinct form, our leaders hold that "Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democracies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies, and our interests." <sup>10</sup>

Specific U.S. interests in Europe also shape U.S. policy for the Balkans. A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* stipulates three major U.S. national interests in Europe: a stable and secure Europe achieved through military strength and cooperation; U.S. access to open and vibrant European market economies; and support for the growth of democracy and individual freedoms in Central and Eastern Europe, especially Russia. <sup>11</sup> The key issue becomes how to secure these interests, given the current conditions in the Balkans.

A *National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* also establishes broad guidelines for effecting these principles. First, the United States will exercise global leadership. <sup>12</sup> But, realizing the limits of American resources and capabilities, the United States will exercise selective engagement, ". . . focusing on the challenges that are most relevant to our interests and focusing our resources where we can make the most difference." <sup>13</sup> Selective engagement, constrained resources, and the belief that

many challenges demand multinational solutions lead the United States to participate in multilateral efforts. The conviction that U.S. participation in a wide range of collective decisionmaking benefits the United States reinforces this conclusion.<sup>14</sup> That having been said, the *National Security Strategy* holds that where necessary, or where national interests dictate, the United States will act alone.<sup>15</sup> Finally, U.S. ". . . global interests and historical ideals impel us to oppose those who would endanger the survival or well-being of their peaceful neighbors."<sup>16</sup>

#### **U.S. POLICY OBJECTIVES FOR THE CONFLICT IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA**

Turning from general principles and interests to concrete realities, the *National Security Strategy* lays out five specific U.S. policy goals in the former Yugoslavia:

- A political settlement in Bosnia that preserves the country's territorial integrity and provides a viable future for all its peoples;
- Preventing the spread of fighting into a broader Balkan war that could threaten both allies and the stability of new democratic states in Central and Eastern Europe;
- Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees from the conflict;
- Halting the slaughter of innocents; and
- Helping to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture.<sup>17</sup>

Not contained within the *National Security Strategy*, but extremely important for the formulation and execution of U.S. policy in the Balkans is the aversion to deploying ground forces to the region except under certain, very circumscribed conditions.<sup>18</sup> Indeed, avoiding ground commitments, especially combat troops, has been a de facto goal in its own right.

These national goals, then, should shape the policy options

in the region.<sup>19</sup> A first step in developing those options is subjecting the national goals to a rigorous analysis to identify internal contradictions or potentially conflicting objectives. Unfortunately, the complexity of forces in the region present such contradictions in abundance and sorting through them sheds light on the significant challenges for those individuals charged with crafting policies to achieve U.S. goals in the Balkans.

### **The Conundrum of Preserving Bosnian Territorial Integrity.**

The goal of preserving the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, for example, is highly problematic. Economic and diplomatic efforts, to date, have not proved successful, and are unlikely to be so in the future. Ethnic polarization of the country has deepened sharply during more than three years of fighting and ethnic cleansing. Therefore, if the U.S. goal of preserving Bosnia's territorial integrity is to be more than a diplomatic holding pattern, military action, to include the deployment of ground forces, may be required. But avoiding the deployment of ground troops remains a key-and conflicting-goal. Unless the Bosnian government's military capacity vis-a-vis its opponents improves markedly, or unless the United States can prevail upon allies or partners to undertake the responsibility for restoring the status quo ante bellum of 1991, the goal of maintaining Bosnia's territorial integrity will likely not be realized. To date, no other country has indicated the willingness to undertake such action.<sup>20</sup>

Thus, so long as the United States retains the policy goal of maintaining the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it runs the risk of engaging ground forces in the conflict. Policymakers must recognize this policy azimuth or redefine their goal. If the United States is unwilling to revise its objectives concerning Bosnia's territorial integrity, then it may be better for the United States to introduce ground forces before a crisis emerges that makes an eventual intervention more costly in terms of resources and lives. Here, however, lies another contradiction. Neither our NATO allies, nor Russia, nor the American public support direct military action to force a settlement. Only if the war provokes a crisis of greater proportions than has already occurred is that reluctance to engage on the ground likely to change.

Even if military action was a realistic consideration, would the United States and its allies be willing to exert the level of military force that would be necessary to defeat the ethnic Bosnian Serb forces, and, perhaps the Yugoslav Army? Are U.S. and European publics willing to underwrite the levels of forces and resources that might be required? Are they willing to sustain the casualties that might result? For how long? Current indications offer little evidence of the level of governmental or public commitment that would likely be required.<sup>21</sup>

The remaining alternative would be to provide the Bosnians with the means for effective resistance. This option implies lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia. But, to date, the United States has been unable to build the consensus necessary to effect such action internationally. Moreover, unilateral U.S. lifting of the embargo is highly problematic, as Britain and France have indicated that such a move would prompt an UNPROFOR withdrawal.<sup>22</sup> This, in turn, would require U.S. ground troops to assist in the withdrawal—an outcome that the United States seeks to avoid.

Lifting the arms embargo to "level the playing field," and to allow the Bosnian government to defend the territory it currently holds does not secure its authority over all of Bosnia. That goal, despite the boost to it by Croatia's recent success in the Krajina region, seems well out of reach of the Bosnian government. Only substantial military aid, and time to receive, distribute, and train on it, could produce such an outcome. Whether the aid or the time would be available without large-scale U.S. intervention is not known. But, even were such an outcome to occur (i.e., military defeat of the Bosnian Serbs) without deeper U.S. involvement, the United States and its allies and partners would face the prospect of tens of thousands more Serb refugees—which contradicts the objective of stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees.

Even absent a flood of refugees, lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia raises additional questions. First, how much aid should be allowed to flow to the Bosnian government? This is not a calculation that can be made with a high degree of certainty. Too little aid simply prolongs the war by raising Bosnian expectations, but not necessarily providing adequate capabilities to prevail. Too much assistance could lead to an overwhelming defeat of Bosnian Serb forces that might cause Bosnian government

forces to overreach, precipitating intervention by the Yugoslav Army on behalf of their ethnic brethren. Finally, there is the larger issue of whether the Yugoslav Army would permit a Bosnian Serb defeat under any condition.

Underwriting the territorial integrity of Bosnia also implies that the United States is unwilling to see the Bosnian government irrevocably be defeated. To prevent such an outcome may require direct U.S. military engagement. Air power, alone, is not likely to provide a sufficient shield, and ground troops may be required to preclude defeat. But, again, this option conflicts with the existing U.S. policy of not employing U.S. ground forces. Absent U.S. or European intervention, the only possible way to prevent a Bosnian defeat might require introducing forces from outside the region—such as the new U.S. initiative that supposedly calls for the introduction of forces from the Muslim world, which would be highly inflammatory.<sup>23</sup>

Should the parties involved agree that less than full territorial integrity of Bosnia might be an "acceptable" goal, who would determine and then enforce what constituted an appropriate settlement? Certainly, the goals of the Bosnian government are likely to exceed those of outside parties involved in the conflict. Given recent Croatian and Bosnian successes on the battlefield, it is highly unlikely that Bosnian expectations for greater territory will diminish. Even should the Bosnian government initially settle for less than the full restoration of its borders, how long might that settlement last before revanchist and irredentist forces began to emerge? While the answers to such questions are not known for certain, the probability for a return to conflict is high.

Nor would a territorial settlement envisaged under the existing Contact Group (Britain, France, Germany, Russia, and the United States) plan (51 percent of the territory for the Bosnian-Croatian federation and 49 percent for ethnic Serbs) or the similar U.S. plan currently circulating in Europe meet the requirement to ". . . provide a viable future for all its peoples."<sup>24</sup> Policymakers must recall that one of the primary causes of this conflict is that not one ethnic group is willing to remain under the political control of another ethnic group. Thus, absent a massive exchange of populations after the conclusion of hostilities—in other words, legally sanctioned

ethnic cleansing—the seeds of future conflict will be sown.<sup>25</sup> Granted, this may be the best settlement possible at the moment, but policymakers should be under no illusions that the territorial divisions currently under consideration will result in a long-term resolution of the underlying sources of the conflict.

In a broader context, support for Bosnian territorial integrity raises a larger issue. On the one hand, by restoring the territorial integrity of Bosnia, the United States and its partners would be endorsing the Bosnian desire to secede from the Republic of Yugoslavia. On the other hand, they would be denying ethnic Serbs their right to exercise self-determination and to secede from Bosnia-Herzegovina. Support for Bosnian self-determination also directly conflicts with the concept of preserving the territorial integrity of existing nation-states (i.e., the former Yugoslavia) which has been the fundamental organizing principle of modern international politics since the Treaty of Westphalia (1648).<sup>26</sup> Finally, where does self-determination logically end? How does support for self-determination stack up against the chaotic prospect of dozens or hundreds of ever dividing states in Europe and elsewhere? Squaring these interlocking circles, specifically and generally, will be profoundly difficult and will vex policymakers as they craft policies for resolving the conflict in the Balkans.

### **Containing the Conflict.**

To date, efforts to contain the conflict and prevent the spread of fighting have been largely successful. How long that success can be sustained in the face of increasing pressures from belligerents for a military resolution of the crisis remains to be seen. For instance, Croatian successes have resulted in Serbian counter-deployments along their borders and rhetoric that could lead to a resumption of the Serbo-Croatian war.<sup>27</sup> Croatian offensives north and east of Dubrovnik also could spark a reaction from Serbia. Or, successful Croatian-Bosnian offensives against Bosnian Serb areas (e.g., Banja Luka or the Brcko corridor) could precipitate Serbian intervention. This time, however, given the increased firepower and capabilities of each side, the war could be substantially bloodier, with the potential to spill over the borders of the former Yugoslavia.



Nor, given the recent successes against ethnic Serbs, is the Bosnian government likely to agree to an early settlement. After four years of failed negotiations and recent battlefield success, it may have concluded that much more is to be gained through continuing the war than by ending it. And, so long as the war continues, the potential for the crisis to spin out of control and escape its current bounds remains a clear possibility.

### **Refugees .**

Stemming the destabilizing flow of refugees has been partially successful. Internally, the past flow of refugees within the borders of the former Yugoslavia has been extensive.<sup>28</sup> The U.N. and other relief organizations have been able to cope, more or less. While the levels of misery have been high, these organizations have succeeded in keeping significant numbers of people alive. This, in turn, has kept the overflow of refugees into Europe, as a whole, at manageable levels.

A number of problems, however, may upset the delicate balance within the former Yugoslavia that could have destabilizing effects on the crisis. Within Bosnia and Croatia, rising numbers of Bosnian refugees have already strained relations within the Bosnian-Croat Federation.<sup>29</sup> The "ethnic cleansing" of Croats and Muslims in the Banja Luka region to make way for ethnic Serbs displaced from the Krajina will undoubtedly increase those frictions.<sup>30</sup>

The large numbers of ethnic Serbs fleeing from the Krajina to Serbia (estimates range from 150-200,000) also pose longer-term problems.<sup>31</sup> This influx of refugees, extremely bitter at their perceived desertion by Serbia and, especially, Slobodan Milosevic, could spark an internal crisis within Serbia. This could lead Milosevic to harden his attitude toward a potential peace settlement, or could precipitate the intervention of the Yugoslav Army into the crisis in an effort to retain his power.<sup>32</sup> Any massive increases resulting from further large-scale offensive operations or ethnic cleansing, moreover, run the risk of overwhelming local, as well as U.N. capacities and will greatly compound these problems.

Over the long term, the number of refugees in Serbia may form an irredentist bloc within national politics that could

exert negative influences—from a U.S. perspective—for a considerable time. Additionally, Serb plans to settle a proportion of these refugees in the already tense Kosovo region could spark a crisis that holds the significant potential to trigger a general Balkan war.<sup>33</sup>

Refugee flow outside the former Yugoslavia has remained within manageable levels, and apparently has not overly strained the capacity of European neighbors to absorb it. That said, Germany, which has accommodated the largest percentage of refugees, has called for European Union members to establish a quota system to ensure a more equitable distribution of refugees among member states.<sup>34</sup> A large increase in the numbers of refugees within Bosnia, or the former Yugoslavia, could nonetheless place a strain on the European ability to respond. Certainly, a massive refugee flow resulting from a wider Balkan war would place significant strains that would have consequences for the emerging democracies in Central and Eastern Europe that are contiguous to the current conflict.

#### **Halting the Slaughter of Innocents.**

This goal has not been realized. While war in the former Yugoslavia was not inevitable, the pent up emotions, strident nationalism, inadequate political institutions, statal disintegration, and economic dislocations that accompanied the dissolution of the Yugoslav state made war—and its attendant depredations on noncombatants—likely. However, individual atrocities on a broad scale, and state-sponsored, or at least condoned, "ethnic cleansing" have exponentially increased the suffering. The fact that external actors (e.g., the U.N., the Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe [OSCE], the European Union [EU], and the Contact Group) have been unable either rapidly to agree on goals, or the ways and means to achieve those goals, has contributed to the prolongation of the fighting. That having been said, too little credit, especially in the United States, has been given to U.N. efforts to attenuate the violence and to provide humanitarian assistance.

#### **Supporting NATO's Central Role in Post-Cold War Europe.**

The NATO experience in the conflict in the former Yugoslavia has not "help[ed] to support NATO's central role in post-Cold War

Europe while maintaining our role in shaping Europe's security architecture." Within the Contact Group, for example, Russo-Franco-British and U.S.-German positions diverge.<sup>35</sup> Disagreements among Britain, France, and the United States over NATO policy toward Bosnia have brought intra-Alliance relations to their lowest point since France's departure from the integrated military structure (1966) or, perhaps, the Suez Crisis (1956).<sup>36</sup> Despite cooperation and apparent consensus over meeting Bosnian Serb threats to the remaining "safe havens," NATO allies have voiced strong disapproval of congressional efforts to force President Clinton unilaterally to lift the arms embargo of Bosnia.<sup>37</sup> Ironically, this friction is occurring when concern over preserving NATO cohesion ostensibly has taken priority over reaching a solution to the Bosnian crisis.<sup>38</sup>

### **Avoiding the Commitment of U.S. Ground Troops.**

Avoiding the employment of ground forces is fraught with consequences. First, the United States has elevated a means normally used to assist in achieving a national objective to the status of a policy goal. In doing so, the United States has stood the strategy formulation process (i.e., the balancing of objectives, options, and resources—also known as ends, ways, and means) on its head.<sup>39</sup> In effect, the United States has denied itself the use of a key element of national power, and considerably circumscribed its ability to influence resolution of the conflict through an integrated and complementary application of national power.

Second, efforts to avoid deploying forces may drive U.S. short-term decisions that are inimical to long-term U.S. objectives and interests. For example, the United States has promised to assist in the withdrawal of UNPROFOR should that be required. That would, however, require the deployment of upwards of 25,000 U.S. ground troops. To avoid that possibility, the United States may be forced to take steps to ensure that NATO allies do not call upon the United States. This might require increased use of U.S. air power or the employment of additional U.S. forces in the region (e.g., the French desire to have U.S. helicopters airlift elements of the Franco-British Rapid Reaction Force into Gorazde). Either case could be an incremental step that leads to a deeper U.S. involvement in the crisis that could eventually lead to the introduction of U.S. ground forces. Thus,

the United States may be caught in the paradoxical "Catch-22" situation where actions taken to avoid a substantial deployment of ground forces might actually precipitate such an event.<sup>40</sup>

Alternatively, in order to prevent the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, U.S. policy might be heavily influenced by British or French pressure. For example, British and French insistence that the United States not unilaterally lift the arms embargo of Bosnia undoubtedly contributed to President Clinton's veto of recent congressional legislation.<sup>41</sup> At the very least, the United States would surrender the initiative to others. At worst, such a possibility holds the potential to undermine long-term U.S. leadership or influence in Europe.

#### **CONDITIONS FOR EMPLOYING U.S. MILITARY POWER**

Theoretically, once a decision has been made to engage the United States in a crisis or conflict, and potential options for employing the elements of national power have been assessed, policymakers must establish the conditions under which the United States might employ military force. To guide these deliberations, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement* notes that,

The decision on *whether* and *when* to use force therefore is dictated first and foremost by our national interests. In those specific areas where our vital or survival interests are at stake, our use of force will be decisive and, if necessary, unilateral. In other situations posing a less immediate threat, our military engagement must be targeted selectively on those areas that most affect our national interests—for instance, areas where we have a sizable economic stake or commitment to allies, and areas where there is a potential to generate substantial refugee flows into our nation or our allies.<sup>42</sup>

The *National Security Strategy* also underscores that such decisions will be undertaken only after carefully balancing costs and risks with national interests at stake. Specifically, the government will consider a number of key issues before committing military forces:

- Have we considered nonmilitary means that offer a reasonable chance of success?
- Is there a clearly defined, achievable mission?
- What is the environment of risk we are entering?
- What is needed to achieve our goals?
- What are the potential costs—human and financial—of the engagement?
- Do we have reasonable assurance of support from the American people and their elected representatives?
- Do we have time lines that will reveal the extent of success or failure, and, in either case, do we have an exit strategy?<sup>43</sup>

Not included within the criteria spelled out in the *National Security Strategy* are a number of additional questions that merit reflection. For instance, will the employment of military power help achieve national objectives? Will allies or partners join, or at least endorse, the U.S. resort to military force? Will the application of military force in a specific instance have ramifications upon broader U.S. interests (e.g., will the employment of U.S. military power in the Balkans estrange U.S.-Russian relations, leading to a "Cold Peace"?)?

Existing guidelines contained in the *National Security Strategy* for how military force will be used are equally explicit. U.S. troops deployed abroad will be assigned clear missions, and should combat be expected, they will be provided the means to fight effectively and to achieve their objectives decisively. To ensure the latter condition, two key questions must be answered before forces are committed: "What types of military capabilities should be brought to bear, and is the use of military force carefully matched to our political objectives?"<sup>44</sup> Moreover, whenever possible, allies and relevant international organizations will be proportionately incorporated into U.S. plans and activities.<sup>45</sup>

At present, it is not clear that in the case of Bosnia the

United States has sufficiently addressed these important questions. Certainly, given the previous discussion of the contradictions inherent in the stated U.S. policy objectives for resolving the conflict in the Balkans, additional effort should be devoted to focusing U.S. goals more clearly.

Nor is it entirely clear that these questions have been thoroughly addressed for ongoing operations or for missions that the United States has committed itself to perform. For example, how long will the United States participate in the United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Macedonia? Or, how long will the United States engage in air operations supporting Operation DENY FLIGHT, the enforcement of the "no-fly" zone over Bosnia? At present, the duration of these operations appears to be indeterminable.

Looking to the future, is there a clearly defined, achievable mission for U.S. participation in implementing a peace plan? For how long will the United States take part? What is the "exit strategy" if conflict resumes? And, while assisting the withdrawal of UNPROFOR, should that become necessary, have the key questions been answered: What is the mission; for what time period; has a full risk assessment been accomplished; is there a reasonable assurance of public support for such an operation?

Answering such difficult questions is not an easy task. But, where such difficult questions are not asked and forthrightly answered, policy failure is the likely product. As former Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara indicates in his recent book, *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, the failure to ask the difficult questions about policy, questions the answers to which were bound to be unsettling, allowed the Kennedy and Johnson administrations to make decisions based on addressing short-term crises. "Over and over again . . . we failed to address the fundamental issues; our failure to identify them was not recognized; and deep-seated disagreements among the president's advisers about how to proceed were neither surfaced nor resolved."<sup>46</sup>

### **Potential Consequences of Minimizing Use of U.S. Military Power.**

To date, the United States has minimized the use of its

military power in the Balkans and neither the administration nor Congress appears willing to underwrite the employment of ground troops beyond existing U.S. commitments.<sup>47</sup> These constraints on the use of force seem to minimize U.S. risk by maintaining the status quo, and avoiding a major deployment of ground forces. By opting not to impose by force the Contact Group's plan, however, the United States and its allies continue to allow Pale, Belgrade, Sarajevo, and, lately, Zagreb to shape events, while concomitantly constraining the U.S. ability to act unilaterally or as the leader of a coalition. The net result may be a further erosion of U.S. credibility.<sup>48</sup>

Failure to confront violence in Bosnia and the Balkans may have additional and considerable ramifications. Since the Vietnam War, it has been fashionable among Western intellectuals, especially American academics, to ridicule "the Munich analogy."<sup>49</sup> To be sure, neither Radovan Karadzic nor Slobodan Milosevic is another Adolf Hitler, and the conditions of 1995 are not analogous to those that caused World War II. While one can learn from the study of the past, historical episodes are distinct and the past does not repeat itself. Be that as it may, Serb belligerence may encourage other potential aggressors—in Europe, and around the world.<sup>50</sup>

Prolonged conflict could also have an adverse effect on international security institutions. Certainly, the United Nations would emerge greatly impaired from aggression rewarded in Bosnia. European security organizations, which help ensure U.S. interests in that key region of the world, would also suffer a further erosion of credibility. The OSCE has already suffered from its failure to resolve the crisis.<sup>51</sup> NATO's cohesion would likewise suffer further loss. Moreover, failure in the Balkans could foment divisions within the EU and its military arm, the Western European Union (WEU).

Within the United States, domestic support for any future vigorous foreign policy initiatives could plunge. That might also lead to reduced support for emerging democracies and purely humanitarian relief operations. Finally, the combined effect of an inward-looking and unilateralist U.S. attitude with weakened support for and credibility of NATO could fragment the Atlantic Alliance, leading to the renationalization of European security agendas. None of these outcomes is in U.S. national interests.

Nor is there any guarantee that minimizing the use of force will continue to contain the conflict within the borders of the former Yugoslavia, much less within Bosnian territory. As recent ethnic Serb attacks on the eastern Muslim enclaves and Croatian seizure of the Krajina region amply demonstrate, a high likelihood exists that the war can expand quickly. Should Belgrade choose to come to the aid of ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or decide to expand the conflict into Slavonia while Croatian forces are preoccupied in the Krajina, the war could escalate rapidly. And, as indicated earlier, a rising tide of ethnic Serb refugees into Kosovo has also exacerbated already high tensions in that explosive region. Thus, a number of scenarios are possible for events in the region to spin out of control.

If the United States opts to continue existing policies eschewing military force, then it will be limited to economic and diplomatic initiatives. Such efforts have not yet yielded substantial results at the bargaining table (although the cumulative toll is substantial).<sup>52</sup> This leads to two options for further efforts. On the one hand, U.S. and European negotiators could continue trying to isolate Bosnian Serbs by inducing Milosevic's cooperation in more strictly enforcing the existing embargo in return for temporarily lifting economic sanctions against Serbia. The Contact Group, however, can agree on neither the terms for the Serbian side of the deal nor on how long sanctions might be lifted.<sup>53</sup> Even if consensus could be achieved within the Contact Group, there is little historical evidence that Milosevic will deliver his part of the bargain.

The other option, therefore, is for the United States and its allies and partners to strengthen the existing embargo of Serbia and Montenegro, and use economic warfare to force Belgrade and Pale to change their course. This would require adding to the commodities prohibited, making the embargo more impermeable, and subsidizing states (Hungary, Italy, and the Balkan states) negatively affected by the increased sanctions.<sup>54</sup> Given the split within the Contact Group and the unlikelihood of economic subsidies, this option offers little prospect for success. That having been said, if the United States and its allies continue to eschew the application of decisive military power in conjunction with economic and diplomatic efforts, it may be the only option available that has any chance for long-term success.



Of course, diplomatic and economic initiatives may not force the warring parties and their supporters to yield. Indeed, such efforts may spur them to escalate the conflict within Bosnia-Herzegovina. At that point, the United States and its NATO allies might be left with lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia as their only recourse. But, lifting the embargo is likely to draw swift Bosnian Serb, and perhaps Serbian, response (e.g., renewed ethnic cleansing, violation of safe havens, and hostage taking). If the United States and its NATO allies are not prepared to take steps to forestall such potential Serb actions (such as air strikes, supplying the Bosnians with equipment, and providing training), lifting the arms embargo will be little more than, in the words of U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Madeleine Albright, "a feel-good option."<sup>55</sup> Ignoring the arms embargo of Bosnia also could lead to a broader war between Croatia and Serbia, or to conflict in Kosovo that could draw Albania, Macedonia, Greece, and their neighbors into a general Balkan war.

Beyond the likely deadly results inside Bosnia, lifting the arms embargo would have severe repercussions throughout Europe. Unless the United States is able to build consensus within NATO for such an option, it has the potential to disrupt U.S. relations with its key European allies. Moreover, Britain and France, the nations that bear the largest portion of the UNPROFOR burden, have threatened to remove their contingents in the event the United States no longer complies with the arms embargo of Bosnia.<sup>56</sup> Undoubtedly, UNPROFOR would collapse, and the United States would have to make good on its pledge to provide ground forces to assist in UNPROFOR's withdrawal. Finally, Russia has threatened to defy the trade sanctions regime against Serbia should the United States unilaterally overturn the arms embargo of Bosnia.<sup>57</sup> Such an outcome would have obvious effects on U.S.-Russian, as well as European-Russian relations.

### **Potential Consequences of an Increased U.S. Military Role.**

Writing in the 19th century, Antoine Henri Jomini warned that, "Wars of opinion . . . originating in religious or political beliefs, are the most deplorable for they enlist the worst passions and become vindictive, cruel, and terrible."<sup>58</sup> Jomini went on to state that, "No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such resistance unless it be strong

enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself."<sup>59</sup> It is far better, according to Jomini, to let time be "the true remedy for all bad passions . . . to attempt to restrain such a mob by force is to attempt to restrain the explosion of a mine when the powder has already been ignited: it is far better to await the explosion and afterward fill up the crater."<sup>60</sup>

Should the United States choose to exert greater levels of military force in the region, the consequences could be, in our time, just as significant as they were in Jomini's day. In the near term, increased involvement will remove the veil of impartiality in the eyes of the belligerents, for regardless of how evenhanded the United States and its allies try to be, the perception will be that they have chosen sides-against the Bosnian Serbs. The United States also runs the risk of involving itself in an asymmetric conflict (i.e., the United States perceives such involvement to be of a limited nature, while the current belligerents see themselves engaged in a total war of survival), a circumstance which has caused the United States much agony in the past.<sup>61</sup> Moreover, the conflict would divert U.S. attentions, energies, and resources away from other, equally pressing issues and initiatives-domestic and external. Finally, national leaders must reckon with the potential for loss of life and expenditure of national treasure.

Longer-term consequences are equally daunting. U.S. policymakers must understand that increased military involvement in the ongoing conflict indicates, *de facto* at least, a U.S. willingness to uphold a Balkan security order. Decisionmakers must look, therefore, beyond the confines of the existing crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina and examine issues in a broader context. For example, does U.S. intervention to establish the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina extend to border guarantees for Albania or Macedonia, and what would be the repercussions in Serbia or Greece? What does supporting the self-determination of Bosnians mean for ethnic Serbs in Bosnia or for ethnic rights in Kosovo or Vojvodina or for minorities in Macedonia?

Expanded U.S. military involvement in the Balkans may also risk increasing friction with Russia. Such an outcome could have consequences not only in the Balkans, but throughout Europe or

globally.<sup>62</sup> That said, other issues impinging on U.S.-Russian relations may also contribute to such an outcome.<sup>63</sup> Hence, the United States must be aware of potential Russian consequences, but not necessarily be severely circumscribed by them.

Enlarged U.S. military participation in the conflict also opens a host of post-conflict questions that require forethought. Will the United States assist in the apprehension and prosecution of war criminals? What will be the U.S. role in the repatriation of peoples and compensation? Will the United States facilitate the mass exchange of populations and the establishment of "ethnically pure" states? To what extent will the United States assist in the development and funding of a comprehensive Balkan aid package to assist in post-conflict reconstruction?<sup>64</sup>

Finally, should the United States be unable to sustain an internal consensus for the prolonged deployment of U.S. forces in the region, are policymakers prepared for the potential consequences? Premature removal of U.S. forces from peacekeeping operations would undermine U.S. credibility throughout the world, not just in the Balkans or Europe, as the "demonstration effect" of failure might encourage other states or groups to test U.S. resolve.<sup>65</sup> Such an outcome would also have a similar effect on the credibility of the United Nations and NATO, two institutions that loom large in the U.S. global security architecture.<sup>66</sup> Key allies within NATO might question the level of U.S. commitment to Europe, with repercussions that extend to U.S. interests elsewhere in the world (e.g., the Middle East). Finally, a U.S. withdrawal may add impetus to the rising tide of "neo-isolationism" or unilateralism in the United States that will further undermine U.S. support of international institutions, which one must emphasize, generally serve U.S. interests.

## **CONCLUSIONS**

As the foregoing discussion indicates, there are no easy alternatives for U.S. policymakers to pursue in their efforts to resolve the ongoing war in the former Yugoslavia. Each has its pluses and minuses; each is fraught with risk-including staying on the present course. But, while the war is complex, confusing, and appears intractable, the United States should not be deterred from seeking potential solutions. In fact, the severity of potential consequences should drive U.S. policymakers to take an

even more proactive role in conflict resolution efforts, for much more is at stake than simply the fighting in Bosnia.

Should the fighting spill over the borders of the former Yugoslavia, for example, the stability and security of the entire Balkan peninsula may be at risk. This disequilibrium could set back the development of newly emerging market-based democracies in the region that have struggled successfully, to date, to change their national and international behavior. An expanded war also would likely involve Greece and Turkey—two key U.S. and NATO allies, probably on opposite sides. The ramifications for Balkan security and NATO would be significant.

Instability in the Balkans naturally influences security within the remainder of Europe. Most immediately, a massive exchange of populations could generate a wave of refugees that destabilizes the region. Of greater importance, perhaps, prolonged strife in the Balkans could strain relations between Western Europe and Russia, as well as between the United States and Russia. This could lead to a nationalization of security agendas throughout Eastern Europe, which would have cascading effects for security agendas in Central and Western Europe, as well.

Continued war in the Balkans also holds significant potential to increase strains within NATO. As discussed above, differences with key NATO allies over the course of policy regarding Bosnia already have placed a heavy strain on relations within the Alliance. These tensions could be exacerbated by continued stagnation of the peace process, escalation of the fighting to include Greece and Turkey, or the withdrawal of British, French, or other NATO forces from UNPROFOR.

Increased strains within NATO could spur European efforts to build a Common Security and Foreign Policy based on the European Union and a European Security and Defense Identity based on the Western European Union. Either result would reduce the U.S. ability to influence events in Europe—especially if combined with a withering of NATO; an outcome certainly not in long-term U.S. interests.

Continued conflict in the former Yugoslavia is also likely to diminish support within the United States for substantial U.S.

engagement in international affairs. The apparent ineffectualness of the United Nations, and the intramural squabbling within NATO could undermine U.S. public support for both of those key security organizations; thereby undercutting the larger role anticipated for these institutions in supporting and promoting U.S. security interests.

The inability of the United States to shape a resolution of the war in the former Yugoslavia is likely to have additional indirect consequences for U.S. global security interests. Should nations question the depth of U.S. commitment to security and stability or its willingness to confront aggression, U.S. influence might be undermined in key areas of the world. At the same time, potential opponents might perceive that they could challenge U.S. interests at low levels without fear of penalty. At the very least, subnational and transnational groups may draw the lesson that they have a fairly free hand to pursue their agendas in this new security order. If combined, these phenomena could have a "snowball" effect that contributes to a downward spiral of U.S. influence abroad. Eventually, the United States might find its deterrent capability sufficiently eroded that an adversary might directly confront major U.S. interests.

Whether a creative and decisive application of U.S. military power could contribute to a satisfactory conclusion to the war without causing more harm than good is unknown and probably unknowable at this juncture. In the wake of its experiences in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia, the United States understands that there are limits to what even great powers can accomplish. Memories of these ordeals, especially when combined with the frustrations resulting from past efforts to resolve the apparently intractable Balkan tragedy, temper any inclination to use military power.

Continued frustration at apparently ineffective economic and diplomatic initiatives, and a reluctance to use military power to force a resolution of the crisis might tempt the United States to withdraw from efforts to end the fighting. But the United States cannot simply throw up its collective hands and walk away. Frustrating as the crisis in the Balkans may be, and even if new efforts fall short, the larger issues involved require continued U.S. engagement. The consequences for U.S. European and global security interests are too great.

Moreover, the first major setback of the war for ethnic Serbs has changed conditions sufficiently to offer an opening for flexible and innovative approaches to end the fighting. This is a welcome opportunity and the United States must make the most of it.

Because so much is at stake, the United States must use this opportunity to reassess its policies for ending the war in Bosnia. This reassessment must take into account not only the changed conditions on the ground in the former Yugoslavia, but also larger U.S. European and global security interests. This may require, for example, that the United States reconsider whether continued pursuit of the goal of restoring the territorial integrity of Bosnia-Herzegovina serves either its short-term objective of stopping the fighting or long-term U.S. European and global security interests. In short, while it may be simplistic to say it, any decisions concerning further U.S. involvement in the Bosnian war must be framed in light of the broader consequences, and not simply to accommodate exigencies of the day.

#### **ENDNOTES**

1. The United States began participating in maritime enforcement in July 1992. U.S. participation in Operation SKY MONITOR began in October 1992, and became Operation DENY FLIGHT in April 1993. U.S. aircraft supporting NATO operations shot down four Serbian aircraft in February 1994. The first close air support missions occurred in March 1993. U.S. soldiers first deployed to Macedonia under Operation ABLE SENTRY in July 1993.

2. The quotation is taken from Press Statement by the Secretary General Following North Atlantic Council Meeting on July 25, 1995, NATO Information Service, p. 1, as evidenced by the waves of NATO airstrikes and the high U.S. level of participation that commenced on August 29, 1995.

3. See, e.g., Ann Devroy and Bradley Graham, "Seeking to Reassure Europe, Clinton Alarmed Congress," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1995, p. 1.

4. For example, a broad coalition of 27 groups that normally

support only peaceful initiatives has called for U.S. and western military forces to protect the remaining Bosnian "safe havens" and to take military action to ensure the delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia. Dana Priest, "Coalition Calls for Action in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, August 1, 1995, p. 14.

5. Potential "carrots" include a land swap that would favor each side, lifting sanctions against Serbia, and a "mini-Marshall Plan" for Bosnia. "Sticks" include, if Serbs refuse, lifting the arms embargo against Bosnia and replacing UNPROFOR with NATO troops. Should the Bosnians refuse to accede to the terms of the plan, UNPROFOR could be withdrawn and the embargo lifted against all sides. See various reports in e.g., Ann Devroy, "Europeans Respond Favorably to Ideas for Bosnia Settlement, Clinton Is Told," *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1995, pp. 1, 26; and "U.S. Talks with Serb President 'Useful,'" *The Washington Times*, August 18, 1995, p. 13.

6. The United States first announced it would provide peacekeeping forces in the wake of a negotiated settlement in February 1993. See, for instance, Elaine Sciolino, "U.S. Backs Bosnian Peace Plan; Serbs May Keep Occupied Land," *The New York Times*, February 11, 1993, p. A1. The numbers of troops have fluctuated, but 25,000 has been articulated since September 1993. See, e.g., John Lancaster and Daniel Williams, "U.S. Shapes Terms For Role in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, September 26, 1993, p. A1. Changes in the situation in Bosnia and Croatia may reduce the required U.S. commitment. See Eric Schmitt, "Fortunes of Bosnian War Ease U.S. Military Tasks," *The New York Times*, August 21, 1995, p. 6; and "Administration Retreats from Troop Plan for Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, August 28, 1995, p. A24.

7. Administration officials have begun to hint that U.S. troops will be dispatched to the region in 1996, either to assist in an UNPROFOR withdrawal or to implement a peace settlement. Schmitt, "Fortunes of Bosnian War Ease, U.S. Military Tasks," p. 6.

8. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, p. 1.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 2 and 24, respectively.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
11. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-28.
12. *Ibid.*, p. ii.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 7.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
15. *Ibid.*, p. ii.
16. *Ibid.*
17. *Ibid.*, p. 25.

18. Granted, U.S. Army forces are engaged in a preventive deployment in Macedonia, and the Clinton administration has promised to provide forces to oversee peacekeeping operations in Bosnia or to help extract UNPROFOR from Bosnia. But, the administration is adamantly opposed to deploying U.S. ground forces except under stringent conditions. See, for example, President Clinton's recent statement in President Clinton, "The Risk of 'Americanizing' the War," *Newsweek*, August 7, 1995, p. 40: "From the beginning of my presidency, I have refused to cross that line ['a massive NATO commitment, including U.S. ground forces'], and I will continue to do so." And, importantly, there has been some wavering within Washington on the number of troops that might be required to support an UNPROFOR withdrawal. See, Thomas E. Ricks and Carla Anne Robbins, "Pentagon Officials Say Fewer Troops May Be Needed for U.N Bosnia Pullout," *The Wall Street Journal*, July 20, 1995, pp. 1, 2. Nor are U.S. European allies convinced of the depth of U.S. commitment. See, e.g., William Drozdiak, "Allies Set to Prod U.S. Into Role in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, July 19, 1995, p. 1, 17.

19. As Clausewitz cautions policymakers. See Karl von Clausewitz, *On War*, ed. and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976, p. 81.

20. Even within the Contact Group, which nominally has achieved consensus on its current peace plan, individual members



do not universally share U.S. goals. Britain and France appear more intent on halting the fighting sufficiently to facilitate the withdrawal of their forces. Germany is unwilling to provide substantial military forces, and has taken a largely pro-Croatian stance. Russia, on the other hand, has consistently and openly supported Serbia. Increasingly, the United States has assumed what many perceive to be a pro-Bosnian position.

21. One need only look as far as congressional opposition to the participation of U.S. ground forces at the current levels of violence. See, e.g., Michael Dobbs, "Dole, Gingrich Attack Use of Pentagon Funds for U.N. Reaction Force," *The Washington Post*, June 30, 1995, p. 20; William Branigin, "U.N. Vote on New Bosnia Force Delayed by Republican Concerns," *The Washington Post*, June 16, 1995, p. 29; and Art Pine and Doyle McManus, "U.S. Support for New Rapid Reaction Force in Bosnia Wanes," *Los Angeles Times* (Washington ed.), June 15, 1995, p. 4.

22. Michael Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a Death Blow to U.N. Peacekeeping," *The Washington Post*, July 12, 1995, p. 15; and Eric Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the Balkans," *The New York Times*, July 12, 1995, pp. 1, 6.

23. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Presses Bosnian Rivals to Accept New Peace Plan," *The New York Times*, August 15, 1995, p. 10; Devroy, "Europeans Respond Favorably to Ideas for Bosnia Settlement, Clinton is Told," pp. 1, 26, and Francois Raitberger, "U.S. Plan Adds Force of Muslim Nations," *The Washington Times*, August 16, 1995, p. 10.

24. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 25.

25. Given the massive population shifts already accomplished or underway, a large-scale post-hostilities population exchange may be unnecessary. See, e.g., Richard Gross, "Refugees Creating Ethnic States," *The Washington Times*, August 14, 1995, p. 1. That said, such shifts may only establish the basis for future irredentist movements.

26. Rene Albrecht-Carrie, *A Diplomatic History of Europe*, rev. ed., New York: Harper and Row, 1973, p. 4; and Derek Mc Kay

and H.M. Scott, *The Rise of the Great Powers, 1648-1815*, London: Longmans, 1983, p. 8. The concept of the fundamental importance of the territorial integrity of the nation-state was reconfirmed formally as late as 1975 in the Helsinki Final Act. See Helsinki Final Act, Questions Relating to Security in Europe, Articles I, III, and IV. Moreover, *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. ii, stipulates that the United States will continue to support the principle that national borders and national sovereignty should remain intact.

27. See, for instance, Christine Spolar, "Yugoslav Tanks, Artillery Move to Croatian Border," *The Washington Post*, August 9, 1995, p. 15; and James Rupert, "Croatia Claims Victory in Serb Breakaway Region," *The Washington Post*, August 8, 1995, p. 1.

28. Estimates indicate 405,000 refugees in Serbia or Serbian held land, and 385,000 in Croatia. Gross, "Refugees Creating Ethnic States." Total refugee figures are not known. Estimates in 1992, after the first year of the war, indicated over 630,000 refugees. (Bill Frelick, *Yugoslavia Torn Asunder: Lessons for Protecting Refugees From Civil War*, Washington, DC: U.S. Committee for Refugees, 1992, p. 1.) These figures are in addition to refugees living outside the former Yugoslavia that are estimated to exceed 530,000 (United Nations Press Release REF 95-08-11, p. 1).

29. John Pomfret, "Refugees Straining Muslim-Croat Pact," *The Washington Post*, July 27, 1995, p. 30.

30. For reports of ethnic cleansing in Banja Luka region, see, e.g., Raymond Bonner, "Croats Bid Tearful Farewell to Serb-held City in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, August 18, 1995, p. 4.

31. Jane Perlez, for example, estimates approximately 200,000 ethnic Serb refugees from the Krajina region. Jane Perlez, "Bosnian Serbs, Angry at Setback and Tired of War, Blame Leaders," *The New York Times*, August 14, 1995, p. 1. This figure is an increase from an estimate of 150,000 on August 11, 1995, and totals may continue to rise. See Jane Perlez, "Croatian Serbs Blame Belgrade for Their Rout," *The New York Times*, August 11, 1995, p. 1.

32. For examples of bitterness, see *Ibid.*, and Christine

Spolar, "Milosevic Faces Charges of Betrayal Over Loss of Serb Area in Croatia," *The Washington Post*, August 10, 1995, p. 22.

33. Lllazar Semini, "Albania Warns Serbia on Kosovo," *The Washington Post*, August 16, 1995, p. 26. If Albania were drawn into the conflict, it is highly likely that Macedonia and, possibly, Greece and Turkey would enter the fray, precipitating a general Balkan war.

34. "Germany Calls For EU Quota for Refugees" in *Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-95-152*, p. 1.

35. *Segodnya*, Moscow, May 26, 1995, in *FBIS-SOV-95-102*, May 26, 1995, p. 5; "Russia and US Split on NATO's Roles in Bosnia," *Financial Times*, June 8, 1995, pp. 1, 14. Aleksandr Zotov, President Yeltsin's special envoy to the group, recently remarked that the Contact Group is divided, cannot agree on a peace plan, and, because it works on consensus, no one can impose a solution. *Vecernje Novosti*, Belgrade, *FBIS-SOV-95-099*, May 23, 1995, pp. 8-9.

36. Reference to the Suez Crisis is taken from Henry Kissinger, "Expand NATO Now," *The Washington Post*, December 19, 1994, p. A27.

37. "Russia, Germany Slam Embargo Vote," *The Washington Times*, August 3, 1995, p. 17; Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a Death Blow to U.N. Peacekeeping," and Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the Balkans," pp. 1, 6.

38. See, e.g., Daniel Williams, "In Policy Switch, U.S. Puts Bosnia Aside to Preserve Alliance," *The Washington Post*, November 30, 1994, p. A32.; and Michael R. Gordon, "U.S. In Shift, Gives Up Its Talk of Tough Action Against Serbs," *The Washington Post*, November 29, 1994, p. A1.

39. A discussion of the ends, ways, and means model is found in Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., "Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy," in *Military Strategy: Theory and Application*, Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., ed., Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1993, pp. 3-8.

40. For details of the French initiative and U.S. reactions,

see Craig R. Whitney, "Disunity Imperils French Proposal for Bosnia Force," *The New York Times*, July 18, 1995, p. 1; Eric Schmitt, "U.S. Sees French Plan as Nudging It to the Brink of War," *The New York Times*, July 18, 1995, p. 7; Ann Devroy and Michael Dobbs, "U.S.: Unity Must Precede Balkan Action," *The Washington Post*, July 18, 1995, p. 17; and Drozdiak, "Allies Set to Prod U.S. Into Role in Bosnia," p. 1. For the "Catch-22" predicament, see Rick Atkinson, "Near Catastrophe Forced West to Prop Up U.N. in Bosnia," *The Washington Post*, July 30, 1995, p. 23.

41. For allied influence on President Clinton's decision to veto legislation directing that the United States unilaterally lift the arms embargo against Bosnia, see Clinton, "The Risk of 'Americanizing' the War," p. 40.

42. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, pp. 12-13. The hierarchy of interests conforms to those laid out by Donald Nuechterlein in *America Overcommitted, United States National Interests in the 1980s*, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 1985, Chapter I: "National Interest as a Basis of Foreign Policy Formulation." The Clinton administration has maintained a consistent position on the critical issues of when and how military forces should be deployed. Compare *The Clinton Administration's Policy on Performing Multilateral Peace Operations*, May 4, 1994, pp. 3-5; *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, July 1994, pp. 10, 13-14; and *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 1995, pp. 12-13 and 16-17.

43. *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 13.

44. *Ibid.*

45. *Ibid.*

46. Robert S. Mc Namara (with Brian Van De Mark), *In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam*, New York: Times Books, 1995, pp. 331-332.

47. Katharine Q. Seelye, "Many in Congress Reluctant To Widen U.S. Role in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, June 2, 1995, p. 1; Pine and McManus, "US Support of New Rapid-Reaction Force in Bosnia Wanes," p. 4; and Barbara Crossette, "Washington Seeks Delay on Expanding U.N. Force in Bosnia," *The New York Times*, June 14, 1995, pp. 1, 15.

48. Bruce George, MP, and John Borawski, "Continental Drift," *European Security*, Vol. IV, No. 1, Spring 1995, pp. 1-2.

49. George C. Herring, "America and Vietnam: The Unending War," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 70, No. 5, Winter 1991, pp. 1-2.

50. Richard H. Schultz, Jr. and William J. Olson, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security*, Washington, DC: National Strategy Information Service, 1994, p. 42.

51. George and Borawski, "Continental Drift," pp. 1-2.

52. See, for example, the discussion of the differences in Croatian and Serbian economies and standards of living in John Pomfret and Christine Spolar, "Croatian Drive Turns Tables on Serbians," *The Washington Post*, August 22, 1995, p. 1.

53. Steven Greenhouse, "U.S. Still Opposes European Plan for Bosnia," *The New York Times*, August 4, 1995, p. A3. Carl Bildt, the EU negotiator recommends a nine month suspension of the sanctions against Serbia, while the United States argues for no more than two or three months. Also, significantly under the Bildt plan, sanctions could not be reimposed for at least nine months, even if Milosevic reneges on his promises.

54. Otherwise those states will only more loudly call for ending the embargo. Budapest, *Nepszabadsag*, in Hungarian, May 23, 1995, *FBIS-EEU-95-101*, May 25, 1995, pp. 8-9, for Hungary's burden from the embargo.

55. John Pomfret and Dana Priest, "Bosnia Force May Be Used This Week," *The Washington Post*, June 5, 1995, p. 1.

56. See, e.g., Dobbs, "Serbs May Have Dealt a Death Blow to U.N. Peacekeeping," p. 15, and Schmitt, "U.S. and NATO Face Unhappy Choices for U.N. Force in the Balkans," pp. 1, 6.

57. Lee Hockstader, "Yeltsin Threatens to Defy Yugoslav Trade Embargo," *The Washington Post*, August 11, 1995, p. 30.

58. *Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War*, J. D. Hittle, ed., Harrisburg, PA: The Telegraph Press, 1947, pp. 47-48.

59. *Ibid.*, p. 51.

60. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

61. As the U.S. experiences in Korea, Vietnam, Lebanon, and Somalia demonstrate.

62. For example, within the ongoing crisis the Russians have resisted any increase in the use of force. Moreover, friction over the Balkans extends into pan-European issues, such as NATO's Partnership for Peace initiative and NATO enlargement. See, Lenard Cohen, "Russia and the Balkans: Pan-Slavism, Partnership, and Power," *International Journal*, Vol. 46, No. 4, Autumn 1994, p. 844; and Russian Foreign Minister Kozyrev's statement in Kozyrev Welcomes U.S. Role in Bosnia Peacekeeping," in *FBIS-SOV-95-106*, June 2, 1995, p. 9.

63. For example, Russian actions in Chechnya and Moldova, events in the Transcaucasus, CFE Treaty implementation, implementation of START I Treaty; ratification of START II Treaty; or NATO enlargement.

64. Substantial reconstruction aid is an incentive contained in the latest U.S. peace plan. See, e.g., Greenhouse "U.S. Presses Bosnian Rivals to Accept Peace Plan," p. 10, and "U.S. Talks with Serb President Useful," p. 13.

65. Schultz and Olson, *Ethnic and Religious Conflict: Emerging Threat to U.S. Security*, p. 42.

66. "The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations," pp. 1-2, and *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, p. 26, respectively.

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Commandant

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STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

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Director of Research  
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Authors  
Dr. Stephen J. Blank  
Dr. William T. Johnsen  
Dr. Earl H. Tilford, Jr.

Editor  
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretary  
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

\*\*\*\*\*

Composition  
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