

China, March–December 1972

205. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, March 1, 1972, 12:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. James C. H. Shen, Republic of China Ambassador to the United States
Mr. Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John A. Froebe, Jr., NSC Staff Member

ROC Doubts on U.S. Defense Commitment

Mr. Kissinger said that we have a very important problem. The President during his China visit last week did not give up any commitments. Rather, our defense treaty with the ROC was reaffirmed by Mr. Kissinger in his Shanghai press conference, by the President in his Andrews Air Force Base speech on his return, and it has been reaffirmed to Congressional leaders and in a press briefing this morning.² The worst thing now would be to begin casting doubts as to the U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of China. Peking knows our commitment is in force. Mr. Kissinger said he understands that the trip was a very painful experience for the Republic of China. He said he hoped, however, that the ROC's criticism would be directed at other part of the communiqué.³ If

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the White House. According to a March 20 covering memorandum by Froebe, Kissinger approved this memorandum of conversation "with no further distribution to be made." Memoranda of conversation between Kissinger and the ROC Ambassador to the United States are also in the Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Memoranda of Conversation. On February 24 Shen met briefly with Clark MacGregor at the White House to "elicit some background information from me on 'how things were going in Peking.'" Shen requested a meeting with Kissinger on February 29 or March 1 and a meeting with Nixon on March 2, 3, or 4. (Memorandum from MacGregor through Kissinger to Nixon, February 25; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) See Document 207 for a record of Shen's March 6 meeting with Nixon and Kissinger.

² The remarks in Shanghai and at Andrews Air Force Base are in the Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1972, pp. 426–435, and *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 381–384.

³ The President's daily briefing memoranda from Kissinger, February 28 and February 29, summarized the initial reaction of the ROC to the Shanghai Communiqué. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 39, President's Daily Briefs) The initial press reaction on Taiwan is in telegram 992 from Taipei, February 28. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON) The official reaction from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was reported in telegram 994 from Taipei, February 28. (Ibid., POL 17 CHINAT-US)

the United States does not say that our commitment is in doubt, the Republic of China should have no reason to. The President made no commitment in his talks with PRC leaders as to the withdrawal or reduction of U.S. forces on our military installations on Taiwan; Mr. Kissinger quoted the pertinent two sentences from the communiqué. He said that this has always been the U.S. position as regards U.S. forces on Taiwan. At present the U.S. Government has only a contingency figure of 3,000 by which it might reduce its forces by late FY 73; this was the figure that Ambassador McConaughy had conveyed to the ROC before the President's PRC trip. Mr. Kissinger said we have no present plans for reductions beyond this figure.

Ambassador Shen said that his government objected particularly to the communiqué's omission of any reference to the U.S. defense commitment. Mr. Kissinger replied that it would have been impossible to ask a country in which such talks were being held to include the mention of this commitment in a communiqué, and pointed out that the PRC refrained from attacking the U.S. defense commitment in the communiqué. Ambassador Shen asked how significant this PRC omission was. Mr. Kissinger said that the PRC knew in advance that he would reaffirm our defense commitment to the Republic of China at his press conference in Shanghai. The PRC had said that it would not sign a communiqué which contained a reaffirmation of our defense commitment.⁴

U.S. Policy on Status of Taiwan

Ambassador Shen asked why the U.S. in the communiqué said that it did not challenge Peking's claim to be the government of all China. Mr. Kissinger said this was not our position. The Republic of China's position is that it represents all China and that there is only one China. Thus, our understanding is that both Peking and Taipei agree that there was only one China. The U.S. position as stated in the communiqué is simply that we do not challenge the Chinese claims that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Ambassador Shen said that in Taipei this U.S. statement was interpreted to mean that

⁴ Rogers met with Shen on March 2 and discussed many of the same issues. Rogers stated that "the progressive reduction of US forces 'as tension in the area diminishes' was specifically intended to refer to the Vietnam draw-down." The PRC was aware of this interpretation since earlier drafts had been explicit on this point. When asked by Shen why the ROC was not referred to by name in the Shanghai Communiqué, Rogers answered, "any attempt by US to refer to the ROC as such would only have unnecessarily complicated the problem of arriving at an agreed text." Rogers added that the U.S. side did not want to refer to treaties with Japan and South Korea without mentioning the Republic of China. Therefore, they "deliberately left out any reference to such treaties." (Telegram 37582 to Taipei; *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, China, Vol. X)

the U.S. now recognizes the People's Republic of China's claim to Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger said that this was foolish—that the U.S. position as stated in the communiqué definitely does not do anything of the sort. He added that this statement of U.S. position is wholly consistent with the position that we took in the Chinese representation question in the U.N. General Assembly last fall—one China, two governments.

Ambassador Shen asked if the communiqué's use only of the term "Taiwan" was significant. Mr. Kissinger said it was not. Ambassador Shen said that the U.S. could have used the name Republic of China in the communiqué. Mr. Kissinger admitted that this was a valid criticism. Ambassador Shen noted that when the President first used the name People's Republic of China, his use of this term was deliberate. Mr. Kissinger said that perhaps we should have added another sentence in which we used the name Republic of China. However, he pointed out, the use of the term "Taiwan" was used only in reference to U.S. military forces and installations in the geographical entity and did not refer to Taiwan as a political entity. Ambassador Shen said that people now have the impression the Republic of China is a non-nation and asked if this was the U.S. intent. Mr. Kissinger replied that the Ambassador had his word that it was not. Ambassador Shen said that nevertheless people cannot be blamed for reading this meaning into the communiqué. Mr. Kissinger said he did not blame anyone. The problem now is what we should do from here on out—now that the ROC has called our attention to these omissions.

U.S. Force Withdrawals from Taiwan

Ambassador Shen said that in his meeting with Mr. Kissinger on February 16 just before the trip, Mr. Kissinger asked that the ROC withhold comment on the trip.⁵ He regretted that his government had not been able to do so, but pointed out that its comment had been quite restrained. Mr. Kissinger said the United States Government had no complaint on this score. Ambassador Shen, noting the communiqué's reference to withdrawal of all U.S. military installations from Taiwan, asked what installations the U.S. could withdraw. [Shen was probably referring to the fact that the great majority of our forces on Taiwan are bases jointly used by the U.S. and GRC. There are, however, a very limited number of small installations solely used by the U.S. such as the U.S. Taiwan Defense Command Compound, Taipei Air Station, and the Shu Linkou Air Station.]⁶ Mr. Kissinger said that the communiqué is

⁵ Kissinger met with Shen from 12:22 to 12:45 p.m. on February 16. No other record of this conversation has been found. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

⁶ Brackets in the source text.

not a treaty, and that it is better therefore to keep its language vague. For FY 72 and FY 73 the only plans of which Mr. Kissinger said he was aware was the contingency plan for the withdrawal of two squadrons of C-130 aircraft for FY 73. This withdrawal has been planned for some time. If the Vietnam War ends, the U.S. might then consider further Vietnam-related reductions. A total withdrawal of U.S. forces and military installations would not, however, be undertaken until peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question is achieved.

Peking–Taipei Negotiations

Ambassador Shen asked what kind of peaceful settlement Chou En-lai seemed to have in mind. Mr. Kissinger said that Chou wants to negotiate with Chiang Kai-shek. The United States would not, however, offer its good offices nor would it either encourage or discourage such negotiations. Chou said that “as bad as” Chiang Kai-shek is, he has the quality of a great Chinese nationalist. Mr. Kissinger stressed that the U.S. will exert no pressure on the Republic of China, and that it has deliberately avoided playing any intermediary role.

Future U.S.–GRC Relationships

Ambassador Shen asked where we both go from here. Mr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. has no intention of going anywhere. The U.S. wants to maintain its diplomatic relations with the ROC. It contemplates no drawdown of its forces beyond the possibility of the two C-130 squadrons. The U.S. has made clear it will not alter its diplomatic relations with Taipei. Our two countries should define some topics of practical cooperation. The U.S. purpose is not to liquidate Taiwan, and not to scuttle our Mutual Defense Treaty with the Republic of China. The U.S. objective is to move in a new direction with Peking.

Ambassador Shen asked if Chou En-lai has not been greatly encouraged by the results of the President’s visit. The U.S. has recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only government of China. The communiqué records Peking’s opposition to five different formulations on the relationship of Taiwan to the mainland. Mr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. had taken the position that it would not challenge the Chinese claims that there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. Ambassador Shen said that in context in the communiqué this could only mean that the People’s Republic of China exercises sovereignty over Taiwan. Mr. Kissinger rejected this interpretation, and said this was certainly not the U.S. intention. In the communiqué whenever reference to the government in Peking was intended, the name People’s Republic of China was used. The PRC for example had wanted to use the term “leaders of China” but the U.S. refused, insisting on the term “leaders of the People’s Republic of China.”

Negotiation of U.S.–PRC Differences on Taiwan Question in Communiqué

Ambassador Shen asked the reason for burning the oil all through the night of February 25–26 to put the communiqué in final form. Mr. Kissinger said that this had not been the case. The President had gone to bed that night although he was awakened several times to approve points that officials of the two sides were working on. Ambassador Shen asked what the sticking points were. Mr. Kissinger said that they included, first, the rate and character of the withdrawal of U.S. forces and installations—which we insisted on linking to the prospects for a peaceful settlement and reduction of tensions—and, second, U.S. hopes for a settlement of the Taiwan question that would be consistent with our position on force withdrawals. On this last night it was the PRC that made all of the concessions.

Possible U.S. Clarification on Taiwan Question

Ambassador Shen asked if the President was planning on making any report to the American people. Mr. Kissinger responded that he is inclined not to, but asked if Ambassador Shen thought he should. Ambassador Shen said that it would be logical for the President to do so since he had reported publicly on the acceptance of Peking's invitation. Mr. Kissinger noted that the President had already made one report—that at Andrews Air Force Base on returning.⁷ Ambassador Shen argued that if the President made a report, he could correct the misinterpretations of the communiqué now current. Mr. Kissinger agreed that if the President decided on a public statement, it would be an appropriate vehicle for making such clarifications. The President might make the report a written one and could possibly do so next week.

Ambassador Shen said the President's report should use the name Republic of China and should reaffirm the U.S. defense commitment to the Republic of China. He said that these omissions are the reasons for the Administration's domestic troubles in the wake of the trip. Mr. Kissinger demurred, saying that no such major domestic problems existed. Noting Ambassador Shen's reference to Mr. Humphrey, Mr. Kissinger said the opposition of left-wing Democrats such as Hubert Humphrey cannot be taken seriously—to which Ambassador Shen replied that he was only using Mr. Humphrey as an example. Mr. Kissinger said that if on the other hand Senators Goldwater, Buckley, or Governor Reagan were speaking out in criticism of the trip's impact on the ROC, their criticism would reflect a moral right on their part.

Mr. Kissinger said that when Mao and Chou—or at least Mao—die in the next five years this will cause a tremendous upheaval in

⁷ See footnote 2 above.

China. Ambassador Shen interjected that this is what the GRC has been predicting all along. Mr. Kissinger continued that a Sino–Soviet conflict might result. Thus it is most important that the U.S. and the ROC keep their relationship alive until then. Mr. Kissinger said he did not believe, however, that the PRC would attempt any attack on Taiwan in the next three to four years, noting that they do not possess the required military capability. Ambassador Shen agreed that Peking would not be able to pull off such a military campaign particularly in light of Soviet pressure from the north.

Ambassador Shen returned to the question of a written report by the President in which he might correct the mistaken impressions that he had mentioned earlier in conversation. Mr. Kissinger said that the President had not yet decided whether one would be issued.

Ambassador Shen said that during the President and Mr. Kissinger's absence he had made a request through Mr. MacGregor for a call on the President. Mr. Kissinger said that the President would not be back from Key Biscayne until Monday, noting that Ambassador Shen was planning to leave for Taipei on Saturday. If Ambassador Shen could stay until Monday, Mr. Kissinger said he was willing to recommend to the President that he receive the Ambassador. Ambassador Shen said that he was willing to stay over until next week, and would wait for Mr. Kissinger's response.

206. Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Secretary of Defense Laird, and the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 6, 1972.

Over the weekend, I have had an opportunity to evaluate the results of the China summit and the reactions at home and abroad. On the plus side it is encouraging to note that some initial expressions of concern have now been successfully allayed and the positive accomplishments are, for the most part, being generally recognized.

As I am sure all of you will agree, it will require skillful leadership on all fronts if we are to avoid erosion of our present position.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—General—February 27–March 31, 1972. Secret; Eyes Only.

It is particularly essential for our delicate and complex relationship with the People's Republic of China that not only those of us who may make public statements but that everyone throughout the bureaucracy—at the White House, the State Department, and the Defense Department, adopt a very restrained and disciplined approach in our on-or-off-the-record comments.

For your guidance and the guidance of your staffs, there should be no further public commentary or elaboration on the substantive talks or the communiqué of the China visit. Any answers to questions on those subjects should be set strictly within the framework of my arrival remarks at Andrews Air Force Base on February 28, 1972.²

These guidelines are particularly important in the following areas:

—There should be no “inside” information given out on the meetings with the Chinese officials.

—There should be no characterization of how the two sides fared at the summit, neither trumpeting of successes nor defensiveness.

—There should be no further reiteration of the maintenance of our defense commitments. Our public statements have now made it sufficiently clear that they have not been affected. Any further repetition is unnecessary and would only risk provoking counterargument from the PRC and jeopardizing what we have achieved. If it is necessary to answer a question on this subject, simply refer back to my statement of February 28 and without restating the comment in such a way that it makes a new story.

—There should be no further elaboration of the communiqué statement that the U.S. “does not challenge” the position that “all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.” The “does not challenge” should not be interpreted in the direction of either endorsement or rejection; we leave this question to the Chinese themselves.

—There should be no further elaboration of the communiqué language on U.S. forces on Taiwan.

—Discussion of overall China policy should be limited to the most general observations along the lines of my February 9, 1972 Foreign Policy Report.³

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² See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 381–384.

³ *Ibid.*, pp. 194–346.

207. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and the Ambassador of the Republic of China (Shen)¹

Washington, March 6, 1972, 4–5:04 p.m.

[Not transcribed were the first 36 minutes of the tape, which included Nixon's conversation with Haldeman concerning International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) and Nixon's conversation with Ziegler on press briefings, busing, and the Florida primary. Haldeman and Ziegler departed the Oval Office as Kissinger entered.]

Kissinger: Before you see him [Shen], I didn't want to bother you, but I should tell you that the Chinese [PRC] have called us, that they have an urgent message to give us, which can only be delivered by their Ambassador.² So I have to send somebody else up there. And the North Vietnamese have asked to see us, almost concurrently. I'm really very worried that this public linking of Taiwan to Vietnam, which we promised them we wouldn't do, which State did on Thursday [March 2].³

Nixon: Which what? State did?

Kissinger: You know, the State Department spokesman said that the 6,000 troops [on Taiwan] would be unrelated. You hinted at it.

Nixon: Yeah, I hinted at it, I did. I take some responsibility on it. Yeah.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 678–4. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² According to Howe's March 6 memorandum of conversation, Huang responded to issues raised in a March 3 message from the United States (see footnotes 3 and 4, Document 204), agreeing to disclose the Paris channel on March 10 and to invite Congressmen Ford and Boggs to China. Huang also raised concerns over security in New York and the death of a member of the PRC delegation. Howe's memorandum of conversation and Haig's March 7 covering note to Kissinger are *ibid.* NSC Files, Box 849, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 110. For additional details on the death, see footnote 3, Document 213.

³ Possible reference to a report in *The New York Times*, which reads in part: "Mr. Bray said there should be 'no surprise' if American forces on Taiwan, earmarked to support the United States operations in Indochina, continue to be withdrawn as the conflict winds down. He said that of the 8,200 United States military men on Taiwan, some 6,000 'related directly and uniquely' to Southeast Asia. The balance, he said, are related to defense commitments on Taiwan." (Tad Szulc, "Rogers Assures Taiwan on Defense Commitment," *The New York Times*, March 3, 1972, p. 3) For Rogers' comments to Shen, see footnote 4, Document 205. Nixon's own statement, made upon his return to the United States, reads in part: "With respect to Taiwan, we stated our established policy that our forces overseas will be reduced gradually as tensions ease, and that our ultimate objective is to withdraw our forces as a peaceful settlement is achieved." (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, p. 382)

Kissinger: But they didn't—yours wasn't picked up. Yours was repeated by Hugh Scott in sort of a mushy way.⁴ But—well, we'll have to see, but it makes it important now that we don't add salt to the wounds and let—I think you should just say to him [Shen] what I've repeated. You know what I've said to him, you repeat that assurance. But I wouldn't say another quote he can give.

Nixon: Well, that's why I wondered whether we should see him.

Kissinger: Well, the way things were at noon—well, whatever damage has been done has been done, and we'll find out in the message. It may simply be that they'll tell us it's a funny coincidence. But they [PRC leaders] told us, they told me that when I put in [into the Shanghai Communiqué] the phrase “as tensions diminish” that it couldn't be linked to Vietnam, and it may be—I also sent them a message, as you requested, that we wanted to announce the Paris contact; it may simply be funny coincidence, it may be their answer. It's highly subjective.⁵

Nixon: Well, let me say you can't worry about every meeting.

Kissinger: No, no. The level at which they want to deliver it concerns me.

Nixon: Yeah. When do you have to get it?

Kissinger: We'll get it at 7.

Nixon: Tonight?

Kissinger: Yeah. And the others, we were going to deliver theirs at 8, their time, 8:30, and when we got there, they said it isn't 8:30, it's 10:30. But the North Vietnamese message, we'll have in another hour and a half. There's no sense worrying about it now. And I wasn't going to tell you if you hadn't seen this fellow until after we had the message.

Nixon: [unclear]

Kissinger: I think that would be too [unclear]. I think it's important.

Nixon: Why not just not sit down when he's here?

Kissinger: No, I'd sit down for 10 minutes. He put off his departure, he tells me. Just give him your regards and say we have—it may be something perfectly technical.

⁴ For Scott's statement, see Robert B. Semple, Jr., “2 Senate Leaders Will Go to China; Invited by Chou,” *The New York Times*, March 1, 1972, pp. 1, 16. The article reads in part: “According to Senator Scott's account of this morning's meeting at the White House, the President insisted that the communiqué was not meant to imply a simple withdrawal of American troops unrelated to other developments but, rather would be linked to a decrease in tensions in Asia—particularly in Vietnam. The present American force of 8,000 men, according to Senator Scott's account, would be reduced to 2,000, with total withdrawal contingent upon a ‘peaceful settlement’ of differences between Taiwan and Peking.”

⁵ Reference is to the March 3 message to the PRC, which was delivered in New York. See footnotes 3 and 4, Document 204. In fact, Huang Hua did not mention the linkage between the war in Southeast Asia and the United States on Taiwan during the March 6 evening meeting with Howe in New York; see footnote 2 above.

Nixon: I hope so.

Kissinger: But if even if it isn't—

Nixon: Of course, we're trying our damn level best, as you know.

Kissinger: Oh God, I mean—

Nixon: We're, I haven't said one word except that, of course, unfortunate thing that got picked up. But State then puts it out on the record, their statement was made publicly.

Kissinger: Their statement was on the record. Yours was a quotation from Scott in a sort of vapid way. But, I don't want to do them an injustice. It might not be that.

Nixon: Well, let me say this: Let's keep our balance on these things, Henry. After coming this long road with us and our going down a long road with them—

Kissinger: I'm not so worried.

Nixon: They're not going to, say discontinue relations.

Kissinger: Oh, no. That's true.

Nixon: At this point, I mean they—

Kissinger: No, but what they may do is to—it may be another delay in the Vietnam talks. That's the thing that worries me more. So that it doesn't—

Nixon: The Chinese wouldn't be doing that. I mean, what you're hearing from them, that's—hell, I don't care what we're hearing from the goddamn Vietnamese. They're—I've never felt they were going to do anything anyway. But I mean, we hope for the best. But what I meant is, if you don't, we not getting—

Kissinger: No, I think what the Chinese may do is to send us a blast to the effect that they had always said Taiwan and Vietnam were not related and that they want to officially state that our interpretation of something or other—

Nixon: Well, that wouldn't—

Kissinger: Well, it depends on how far they carry it.

Nixon: Yeah. We can confirm that we—

Kissinger: As long as they keep it in a secret channel, we can live with it.

Nixon: We can confirm that that is our understanding too, and that this public statement that was made was not authorized.

Kissinger: Right.

Nixon: That was an interpretation by a Senator and the other—

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Of course, Scott's going there.

Kissinger: Well, Scott we can handle. It's important that—

Nixon: No, the fact that he said it though, that's what I mean.

Kissinger: Well, if we get a note, that's one reason, they said we could pick it up any time before 5 tomorrow evening. As long as we get—If we get it, I'll just tell Rogers and send him the note if it's a blast, so that he can guide himself at his press conference. That wouldn't hurt.

[At this point in the conversation, Kissinger left the Oval Office to greet Ambassador Shen. Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries.]

Shen: Well, Mr. President, I'm going back to Taiwan tomorrow—

Nixon: Yeah.

Shen: And I just want to know if there's any message you have for my President—a very great old friend of yours. Also, if there's anything you want to say to him for his ear only. I'll mention your trip to the mainland and anything concerning Taiwan that you may or may not have discussed with Chou En-lai and the others.

Nixon: Well, I think that the important thing to first tell him is that, I know that when Green was there—Ambassador Green was there—that he indicated that he did not want to see him, that he wanted to see Kissinger.⁶ I think that you should know that when we came back I told Dr. Kissinger to talk to you.⁷

Shen: Yes.

Nixon: And he has talked to you. Of course, I have a record of the conversation. I knew what he was going to say before he talked to you. And I want you to tell the President that Dr. Kissinger's conversation with you represents my view. I mean to say it's an accurate description of what we talked about, and that the, and also, of course, my public statement when I returned.

Shen: Yes.

Nixon: Which is the public statement that I made. But I think that the more important thing is that he naturally, and I can understand this, knowing that Dr. Kissinger sat in on all the talks, and also that Dr. Kissinger had conversations before I got there, where no commitments were made. As a matter of fact, none were made this time, except indicating expressions of [unclear]. That you—he now, through you, and through my authorizing Kissinger, because he can't fly out there, of course, that you are able to convey to him the facts of the matter. I think that's the thing. Don't you agree, Henry, with that? Because you see, it's important that he not feel that we sent [went?] to see him on a matter, which is very important to him because somebody that he didn't feel had the information. Naturally, Green we had filled in on the basic facts. But Green sat in on the Secretary's talks, and not mine. And Kissinger was in on every minute. There was no conversation that took

⁶ See Document 215.

⁷ See Document 205.

place with Chou En-lai or Mao, of course, where Henry was not present. And I authorized Henry to tell you the substance of the whole thing. So, I think that we could have that, that you could convey to him the, in addition, of course, my personal regards, that you could convey to him, say that Dr. Kissinger has briefed you and that these are the facts of the matter. Now, of course, all this, you hear all sorts of talks about secret deals and so forth. You know I covered that in my remarks when I came home. What Dr. Kissinger told you are the facts; that's the fact of the matter. And you should rely on that statement. If he were to go to Taiwan, he would tell [unclear] exactly what he told you. Is that correct, Henry?

Kissinger: Absolutely. I told the Ambassador that what we have on the public record the facts [unclear] we've now said it through every organ of our government.

Shen: Mr. President, we're grateful to you for your government's continued interest in a peaceful settlement. Now, did Chou En-lai say anything on the steps he planned to renounce force or propose what he intended to do and how he could tackle the problems of—Any indication of anything? [unclear]

Nixon: [unclear] On the subject of Taiwan, I think that there is no other subject that is more thoroughly covered by the communiqué, and what Henry said in his backgrounder in Shanghai. What I indicated, when we talk about peaceful settlement, that is something which we're—well, for example, I think it can be said that despite great disagreements, the two things in which President Chiang and Chou En-lai agree on is the fact there's one China, that's one thing they can agree on. And the second thing is that therefore settling the problem [unclear] between the two. But in terms of how to do it and so forth, I would say that there was no discussion on that, that is something they don't think is our business frankly.

Kissinger: Well, except that we put in the communiqué two things, which are very clear. One is we reaffirmed our interest in a peaceful settlement—

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: In this case, which is after all saving our commitments. Then secondly we put in the phrase "with the prospect of a peaceful settlement in mind." So if the words—If you know your compatriots, the word prospect was not idly chosen.

Nixon: The Chinese, they're very careful about words.

Shen: [laughter]

Kissinger: They were not given a *carte blanche* to launch a military attack on Taiwan, quite the contrary.

Shen: What kind of time frame does this thing have, I mean—

Nixon: None set, as a matter of fact. None set. That was not discussed. That would be—in other words—when you say do it now, do

it next year, I mean it's a question of—And in fact, what we're trying to do now is put everything in that was there. We knew, on their part they knew too, that's a highly sensitive issue and felt it should be covered. But there was no discussion of should we do this now, next year, 2 years from now, 3 years from now, 4 years from now, 5 years from now, no kind of time frame.

Shen: Now, Mr. President, you're familiar with our history and our relationship with the Communists over the last 40 years.

Nixon: Oh, yes.

Shen: And you know the situation that exists there better than anybody else in the world.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah.

Shen: If you were in my President's shoes what would you do, and what would your advice to my President be about how to handle this thing? I mean, I hope it's not too much of a—

Nixon: Well, I know. Let me say I think along the following lines.

Shen: Yes.

Nixon: What would you do? And, I would say in the first instance, I would say that I would not raise the question of whether there is a U.S. commitment. I would accept that. Because if you raise the question, and force a vote, to do that is to create in this country, and also create in the PRC, the necessity [unclear]. We have stated the situation, and Kissinger on Chinese soil stated there wasn't [unclear]. Now the moment that you raise the question you hurt your own cause. I have to say that quite candidly. I understand your concern, you understand, but if you raise the question it will only hurt your own cause.

The second point is that in terms of what he does, what you do with regard to the mainland, I frankly do not have an answer, a view on that. In fact, Henry and I talked about that on the way back, and I said Henry, I meant we were asking ourselves the same question, how can this thing be worked out? And do you have any thoughts on it, Henry, since you and I have talked about it?

Kissinger: First of all—

Nixon: Because the Ambassador is certain to raise exactly the question I raised. You understand this. We're in a delicate position because both governments consider this to be an internal problem. So what—And I know there's some that say, well the United States should step in and set up some [unclear]. Some say that.

Kissinger: I told the Ambassador, first of all, we made it clear to the people in Peking, we called their attention to a phrase in the World Report, we're not urging either side to do something.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: So that means in effect they cannot count on us for, they can't expect us to exercise any pressure to negotiate. Secondly—

Nixon: Or to find a formula.

Kissinger: Or to find a formula. Secondly, I think we have to be realistic about the prospects. First, if you ask yourself what would have happened if the Chinese had done to us what the North Vietnamese do? Some of the people who now support you in the Democratic Party would be the first to start organizing peace conferences about our being tied up with another old aged military dictator. I'm just telling you the scenario.

Nixon: Yeah.

Kissinger: And really undermining the commitment, they would have done to us what they're doing on Vietnam.

Nixon: And with no deadline at all.

Kissinger: And with no deadlines. Supposedly they had played a deadline game with us and used Quemoy and Matsu and other things as a lever. Thirdly, in the period ahead, say 4 to 5 years, as I told you when we met, many things can happen. You are under no pressure to settle. Mao could disappear. Chou could disappear. Or both could disappear. So that this is not an issue that we have the impression will be very urgent in any intermediate [immediate?] time frame. And therefore it would be a mistake for you to panic or do anything rash.

Nixon: Well, I would not be belligerent. And second, I would not quarrel with our statement to the effect that there is a commitment. We've made it. And when you keep raising it, all you do is cause us to answer and we say, well, we've covered that. But if you keep raising it, you're going to force an eventual failure, which would not be in anybody's interests. You see, there's, as you know, Mr. Ambassador, there's a tremendous isolationist movement developing in this country. And I'm having a helluva time ending Vietnam in the right way. As you know, ending it in the right way is important because if we don't end in the right way America will withdraw from the Pacific. Period. Because of enormous frustration. Now, so it is in other things. If the new isolationists in this country get the impression that we're going to become involved in a great conflict because of the defense commitment anyplace—it could be Japan, Philippines, even Thailand, Korea, Taiwan—you can have, you can set in motion forces that you and I, that none of us want to set in motion. It's for that reason that I think that your Foreign Minister made a very good statement when he said that he accepted the proposition and that the United States keeps [unclear] its commitment will be kept. And if I were to come—so I would start with that process. The second problem, with regard to how would we resolve it. Believe me, it would be—I just don't know. I have no answer to that problem. And incidentally, they didn't ask us. Right?

Kissinger: That's right.

Nixon: They didn't ask us how to resolve it. They must be—you must be thinking about it. What ideas you might have as I would say

would be certainly extremely interesting. But we are not going to try to intervene and force it either way. I think that's the proposition. I think that's a pretty clear assessment.

Kissinger: Except for the statement that we are opposed to the use of force.

Nixon: Oh, well, that's a different matter.

Kissinger: That we will resist it.

Nixon: No, but I meant intervene to force a peaceful settlement.

Kissinger: That's correct.

Nixon: You see, that's the difference. This isn't like the Israeli-Arab thing, where we are attempting to try to broker it. You know? Here we are not trying to broker anything. That's the difference that I think you should have in mind. Now, where it goes from here, I think has to develop over a period of time. I wouldn't be panicking. I wouldn't be in too much of a hurry to produce an agreement.

Kissinger: [unclear] There's no obligation to do anything. And there's no obligation—I mean first of all everything we said we stated unilaterally, not as an undertaking to the PRC.

Nixon: There's no treaty.

Kissinger: Secondly, it's very carefully drafted, if you read it carefully.

Shen: Yes.

Kissinger: And thirdly, we are under no obligation whatever to—

Nixon: It's unilateral on their part too, you see? Both sides—there's a Taiwan section as well as a Korea section, a Japanese section, a South Vietnamese section. It's all unilaterally stated; we agreed to disagree, you see? Because their position on Taiwan, you know is stated hardline.

Shen: We know that. [laughter]

Nixon: Oh, not as hard as it has been, because they didn't use the force line in it. Very significant.

Kissinger: They didn't attack the defense treaty. And also there's a slight nuance, they said Taiwan is a province of China, and we didn't say that. We said a part of China.

Nixon: I wrote that in. I used the word "part" instead of "province."

Kissinger: [unclear exchange]

Nixon: They say they agreed to it; they do not object to it. Of course, it depends on where you are as to whether you say province or part, isn't it?

Kissinger: It's slightly less, we just wanted to—

Nixon: Province indicates downgrading to Americans, and it would not indicate that to the Chinese because you think of the whole country being province, province, province, you know? But in our

country, the word province, and in most, it means a lower level, you see? Not an equal level.

Shen: Any personal word for my President?

Nixon: By all means, to him and to Madame Chiang my best wishes for their health. I'm amazed when I get reports from the Vice President and other friends who go out there, they say he's just as sharp as a tack, and I've always been impressed with that. And I wish him good health, and we know this is a painful time, and we know that this trip was a very difficult thing for him. We had to take a long view of what the great forces are that are operating here, also recognizing that we're looking at the long view—a peaceful resolution of these problems. We may be able to be more effective if we're talking to the PRC than if we're not talking to them. That's really the philosophy. The peaceful resolution is important. In the event that we have the use of force in any part of the world, in any part of Asia, in view of the Vietnam experience, it may be, we know what I would do if I were here, but I'm a little bit tougher than some, but I would have serious doubts about what other presidents might do. That's the real problem, you see? So with a peaceful resolution we think is very, very important, and that's what this trip is about. But—

Kissinger: [unclear]

Nixon: Many times. But in terms of both, my very best wishes.

Shen: Your continued friendship?

Nixon: Oh, absolutely. Our friendship, personal, without question, as well as the [unclear]. We have a treaty, but we also have personal friendship. They know that and they will continue to have it. You've got a long journey ahead of you.

[The meeting closed with a discussion of Shen's trip and schedule.]

208. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 8, 1972.

SUBJECT

Memorandum from Secretary Rogers on Policy Toward Taiwan

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US-PRC Negotiations, Paris. Top Secret; Nodis; Homer. Sent for information. A typed note attached to the document reads: "Mr. President: Tab A has been removed and is available if you wish to see it. BAK, Staff Secretary."

Secretary Rogers sent you a memorandum in connection with your China visit enclosing his views on policy toward Taiwan over the next eighteen months (Tab A).² These views were reflected in the State position papers for your trip and are generally consistent with the line we took in Peking. No specific action is required now on this paper.

In brief, what Secretary Rogers proposes is that we should attempt to cool down Taiwan as an issue between the PRC and ourselves while encouraging an evolution of Taiwan's status either in the direction of reintegration with the China mainland by peaceful means or acceptance by the PRC of some form of separate status for Taiwan. To this end Secretary Rogers suggests a number of intermediate steps:

—Acting as if both the PRC and the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC) were the *de jure* government of the area under its control. We would seek more contacts with the former, and maintain our existing relationship with the latter including the mutual defense treaty.³

—Avoiding legalistic formulations wherever possible regarding the status of Taiwan, and speak increasingly of the PRC as China and the ROC as "Taiwan."

—Doing nothing to close the door to the idea that Taiwan might eventually be reunited with the mainland.

—Making it clear to Peking that we will not attempt to put any special military or other pressure on it from Taiwan.

—Doing everything possible to rid our relationship with the PRC of the past aura of confrontation.

² See footnote 5, Document 174. Attached but not printed is a 10-page briefing paper entitled "The Future of Taiwan: Proposal for a 'Policy of Peaceful Settlement,'" which was drafted in late 1971 and early 1972 in EA. (Memorandum from Robert I. Starr (L/EA) to Green, January 18; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHINAT–US) A copy of this paper, along with draft language on Taiwan for the Shanghai Communiqué, is *ibid.*, U. Alexis Johnson Files: Lot 96 D 695, Memcons, 1971; Top Secret, Nodis, PRC. It was forwarded to the President under a February 2 covering memorandum signed by Rogers. Holdridge and Lord forwarded it to Kissinger on February 3 under cover of a memorandum indicating "the paper still seriously underestimates the intensity of Chinese insistence on regaining Taiwan and the symbolic as well as real importance to them of this issue." They suggested sending it to the President "with a covering memo by you steering him in the direction of our own paper on this issue." (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 88, Country Files, China—President's Trip, December 1971–February 1972, Sensitive) Holdridge again forwarded the paper to Kissinger with a draft summary for the President on February 16. (*Ibid.*, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris) On March 1 Lord sent Kissinger a "slightly redone" memorandum to the President along with the Department of State briefing paper. (*Ibid.*)

³ These options are taken almost verbatim from the Department of State paper. The second, sixth, eighth, tenth, and eleventh paragraphs all have Nixon's handwritten "?" in the right margin.

—If possible, encouraging direct PRC–Taiwan contacts of an informal nature (trade, travel, reunification of families).

—Maintaining the ROC’s bargaining position in any talks it may have with the PRC (e.g., by reiterating our position that any settlement should be acceptable to the people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait).

—Emphasizing the economic aspect of Taiwan’s status over the political and the military. This would include our supporting Taiwan in international financial institutions.

—Quietly endorsing present trends within the ROC to make its government more representative, but also letting it know that we will not support Taiwan independence movement leaders.

—Reducing the possibility that Taiwan could become a major problem area in U.S. relations with Japan. This would require close consultations with the Japanese Government.

—On the assumption that Peking may become less dogmatic about gaining control over Taiwan in the long-term future, in effect not doing anything which would conflict with Peking’s acceptance as a fait accompli of Taiwan’s existence as a separate entity. (This section of Secretary Rogers’ memorandum does not make the point as explicitly as I have summarized it here, but the inference is obvious.)⁴

Comment: For the most part what Secretary Rogers proposes is very reasonable and logical, and in fact we are already doing many of the things which he suggests. I would differ with him on only one major point—the assumption that Peking might accept Taiwan’s existence as a separate entity. As you know, the depth of feeling among the PRC’s leaders is very great that Taiwan must come under PRC control.⁵

⁴ In a January 21 memorandum to Johnson, Green noted that the paper “deliberately excluded any mention of Quemoy and Matsu, the offshore island complexes in the Taiwan Strait held by the ROC. We decided not to address the issue of the Offshore Islands because we feel that the status quo there is both tolerable and likely to continue.” He concluded, “there is a strong chance that some successor government in Taipei may choose to use the Offshores as bargaining counters in talks with Peking—or even unilaterally withdraw from the islands. A more representative government on Taiwan would not need symbols of any continued pretension to be the rightful ruler of all of China; seeing the islands as an expensive and dangerous military and political luxury, it could easily decide to disengage. This day has not yet, however, arrived. Therefore, we feel the best policy for the US is not to open this issue of the Offshores in any way, and are operating on this basis.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 1 CHINAT)

⁵ The Department of State briefing paper stated: “as revolutionary fervor subsides and goals unfulfilled during twenty years remain unfulfilled, it is conceivable that Peking’s sense of urgency on the Taiwan issue will also be reduced.”

209. National Security Study Memorandum 148¹

Washington, March 9, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Attorney General
The Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Science Advisor to the President

SUBJECT

US–PRC Exchanges

The President has directed that a study be made of ways in which US–PRC exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, sports, and journalism, agreed on in the Joint United States-PRC Communiqué, can be facilitated.

The study should identify US interests and objectives to be pursued through these programs. The study also should address PRC attitudes and practices in such exchange programs, including the role of governmental and nongovernmental institutions and PRC political objectives in promoting or permitting such exchanges.

The study should include consideration of the following issues:

—The roles which should be played by US governmental and nongovernmental institutions and the relationship of the US Government to nongovernmental institutions included in such programs. An assessment and the pros and cons of particular private nongovernmental groups which might be considered as chosen instruments to further exchanges should be included.

—Ways in which direct contact in a third-nation capital should be used to facilitate the implementation of the Communiqué understanding.

—Specific types of exchanges to which the US should give priority and the means to promote these particular areas.

—Other problems associated with exchanges such as funding, security and legal implications.

The study should be prepared by an ad hoc group comprising representatives of the addressees and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and chaired by the representative of the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 86, Country Files, Far East, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972. Secret.

Secretary of State. The completed study should be submitted to the Senior Review Group no later than March 24, 1972.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² Irwin asked John Richardson, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs, to chair the ad hoc group. (Memorandum from Hartman to Richardson, March 10; *ibid.*, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 148)

**210. Memorandum From President Nixon to his Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, March 9, 1972.

I have noted the comments in some columns to the effect that the Chinese statement of their position was much more aggressive and belligerent than our statement of our position. You handled the question extremely well in your backgrounder.² It occurred to me, however, that in some further discussion you may be having with members of the press, or possibly when you do a television program, you might have in mind this historical footnote.

You could begin by pointing out that I made the decision with regard to the tone of the statement of our position for two basic reasons. First, the more aggressive we stated our position the more aggressive the Chinese would have to be in stating their position. As a result of our presenting our position in a very firm, but non-belligerent manner, their position, while it was also uncompromising on principle, was not nearly as rough in its rhetoric as has been the case in previous statements they have issued over the years.

The second reason was that I realized while the statement of the Chinese position has been known to millions of Americans for many years the statement of the American position has not been known to the Chinese at all except to some at the very highest levels. In this first opportunity to present our position to the Chinese cadres and, to a certain extent, also to the Chinese masses we had to recognize that it would have no credibility whatever if it were stated in too harsh terms. This

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 341, President/Kissinger Memos, HAK/President Memos, 1971. Personal.

² Information concerning Kissinger's background press briefing has not been found.

does not mean that we had any illusions that by stating our position in less aggressive rhetoric we were going to win converts but it does mean that the fear that has been pounded into the Chinese for the past 20 years of American aggression against them should not be increased by the tone of the statement of our position in the communiqué.

Now to revert to the historical anecdote which shows that this approach on my part is not new. In July of 1959 when I visited Moscow we had an arrangement with the Soviets that I would have the opportunity to address the Soviet people by television and radio at the conclusion of my stay. We did not know until about two days before we were to leave the extent of the coverage or how long I would be allowed to talk. But then we learned that the coverage was probably going to be fairly extensive although not widely advertised and that I would be allowed to talk 30 minutes which meant, of course, approximately an hour when the translation was taken into account.

The preparation of this speech was a monumental task. State had done its best to prepare suggested remarks prior to the trip but Tommy Thompson agreed with me when we read State's draft as the trip neared the conclusion, and after I had had the Kitchen Debate and had traveled to several places in the Soviet Union, that the draft was too bland and too full of the usual bureaucratic banalities. On a crash basis, working late into the night for two nights before I was to go on, I dictated an entirely new draft with Thompson's very activist and helpful assistance. The fundamental decision we had to make was what tone the draft should take. I pointed out to Thompson that I would be speaking to two audiences—the American audience at home, which with an election coming up the next year was very important to me, and the Russian audience in the Soviet Union who for the first time would be hearing a senior American official address them on television. After thorough discussion of the matter I finally told Thompson that interested as I was in seeing that we said the right things as far as the American audience was concerned, I finally had to confront the hard fact that this was the first time an official of my rank would be allowed to speak directly to the Russian people and that I did not want it to be the last time. Under the circumstances, I decided that we should be firm on our principle but that the tone should not be aggressive and wherever possible conciliatory, provided there was no compromise of principle.

The result was a speech which most of the Kremlinologists thought was very effective from the stand-point of the Russian audience. What effect, if any, it had on the American audience is subject to question. I do recall that the *St. Louis Post-Dispatch* had a favorable editorial on it—perhaps the only time in my memory that that paper has editorialized favorably on anything I have done in the foreign policy area. As

far as reaction of the general public is concerned, however, it certainly was not a positive and if anything might have been a slight negative.

Nevertheless, while because of the tremendous pressure we were under in attempting to get it prepared it was no gem of eloquence, I think even some of our more severe critics would have to agree that it was the statesman-like approach considering all the factors I have set forth.

I would suggest you read the speech. It appears in the Appendix of *Six Crises*.³

You can now easily see why this incident which occurred 13 years ago directly bears on the approach that we take in the communiqué. Having gone through that experience I was determined that in this document, which would be the first time Chinese leaders, and cadres, and to a certain extent even Chinese masses, would ever hear the American position expressed, I had to make the strongest possible effort to set it in a tone which would not make it totally incredible when they heard it. It would not have been credible, of course, had we set forth our position in more aggressive terms because 22 years of propaganda at the other extreme would have made it impossible for the reader of the communiqué, or those who heard it read on radio, to believe it at all if the tone was too harsh.

I am not suggesting that as a result of setting forth our position in a reasonable manner that any significant change was made in Chinese public opinion—if there is a Chinese public opinion (and I, of course, am the first to recognize that there is not), but more important on the Chinese leadership, particularly the younger leadership that is coming up. But I think by handling it the way we did in the communiqué we might have had just a chance to change their picture of the American President slightly but perhaps significantly also. Before I came, the United States President was a devil with horns. As a result of our trip and possibly because of the tone of the communiqué on our part they still see the United States President as a devil but the horns may not be nearly as prominent as they were previously. If this much was accomplished it was worthwhile, even at the cost of not writing a rip-snorting, political document as some of our advisers would have suggested which would have made our right-wingers at home stand up and cheer, but which would have served to defeat the purpose of our trip.

³ Richard M. Nixon, *Six Crises* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1962).

211. National Security Study Memorandum 149¹

Washington, March 10, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US–PRC Trade

The President has directed a study of ways in which the statement on trade in the Joint US–PRC Communiqué of February 28, 1972 should be implemented.

The study should address PRC attitudes and practices in conducting trade with other countries, with special emphasis on countries with which the PRC does not have diplomatic relations, and past trading patterns and specific commodities which have constituted the principal imports and exports of the PRC. The study should also examine the political aspects of PRC trade arrangements.

Consideration of the following means of facilitating trade should be included:

—Ways in which the US Government can begin and facilitate an exchange of general trade information and data between the US and the PRC. The possible uses of our third-country contact in this effort should be examined.

—Measures which the US Government can take to facilitate contacts between exporters and importers on both sides. This should include an examination of the role which should be played by the US Government and how it should relate to US private individuals and corporations.

—Effects on US–PRC trade of the China COCOM differential.

—The effect of non-tariff and tariff barriers and the claims settlement problem on US–PRC trade.

—Additional issues including the establishment of trade centers, the exchange of trade delegations, additional means of contact, and other measures to facilitate trade.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-189, NSSM Files, NSSM 149. Secret. Also issued as Council on International Economic Policy Study Memorandum 21.

This study should be conducted by an ad hoc group chaired by the State Department and including representatives of the addressees and the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. The study should be submitted to the CIEP Review Group and the Senior Review Group by March 24, 1972.

Henry A. Kissinger
Peter M. Flanigan

212. Conversation Among President Nixon, his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), and his Chief of Staff (Haldeman)¹

Washington, March 13, 1972, 8:23–8:28 a.m.

[Not transcribed here is discussion of U.S.–PRC talks in Paris and the situation in Cambodia.]

Nixon: I noticed in the Washington daily news summary, the editorial, they made it to be critical of the fact that there was no mention of the Taiwan Independence Movement [in the Shanghai Communiqué].² Let me ask, is the Taiwan—that source is interesting because that’s a more conservative paper. But is the Taiwan Independence Movement, is violently opposed to Chiang Kai-shek; violently opposed by the Chinese; and violently opposed to the Japanese, isn’t it? Am I wrong? Or the Japanese—

Kissinger: Well the Japanese haven’t taken a position on it, but it’s—

Nixon: What in the hell is the Taiwanese Independence Movement all about?

Kissinger: It’s not a significant movement now. It’s violently opposed by both the Chinese Governments. Chiang Kai-shek had locked up the leader of the Taiwanese Independence Movement, and he’s now in this country as an exile.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 532–17. No classification marking. The editor transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume.

² Possible reference to Milton Viorst, “Has Anyone Asked the Taiwanese?”, *Washington Evening Star*, March 11, 1972, p. A–5.

³ Reference is to Peng Ming-min. See Documents 65, 91, and 178.

Nixon: I know.

Kissinger: And we had major problems with Chiang Kai-shek when we let him in here.

Nixon: That's right.

Kissinger: So—

Nixon: And with the Chinese in the PRC.

Kissinger: And with the PRC. But I noticed somebody must be feeding that because *The New York Times*, which never used to give a damn about Taiwan, had an editorial about that last week too.⁴

Nixon: On the independence movement . . .

Kissinger: Yeah.

Nixon: Do you think it's out of State? Or could there be somebody pushing the Taiwan Independence Movement? That's so goddamn—have you ever heard of the Taiwan Independence Movement?

Kissinger: No.

Haldeman: No. Not enough to matter.

Kissinger: I can't speculate.

Nixon: But we haven't, the other thing, I didn't see anything in the State Department papers indicating that we ought to support the Taiwan Independence Movement.

Kissinger: Absolutely not.

Nixon: Did we?

Kissinger: No.

Nixon: There's some kind of flap on it. Did Rogers raise that in his—

Kissinger: No. Well, they raised it at—

Nixon: At the end?

Kissinger: Well, they raised it at the end. At the end he raised it.

Nixon: He raised it at the end? What did he say—you ought to take note of this?

Kissinger: But he never raised it in the preparatory papers they gave us, never. At the end he did raise it among 500 other nit-picks.

Nixon: What 500?

Kissinger: Well, 18, 15. But in this catalog of nit-picks there was the Taiwan Independence Movement. But our formulation doesn't even preclude, it states it has to be settled by the Chinese themselves. Naturally the Taiwanese are Chinese.

Nixon: Are Chinese.

Kissinger: If they want to secede, that's their business.

Nixon: Well—

⁴ "The Forgotten Taiwanese," *The New York Times*, March 10, 1972, p. A-36.

Kissinger: Well, except—

Nixon: Our private understanding is that—

Kissinger: That we won't encourage it.

Nixon: We won't encourage it, that's all.

Kissinger: We didn't say we will oppose it either.

Nixon: We didn't say we will discourage it either.

Kissinger: We didn't say we'd oppose it. We said we will give it no support. And that's been our position. We have never given it any support.

[Not transcribed is a brief discussion of the upcoming trip to the Soviet Union.]

213. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, March 20, 1972.

SUBJECT

My March 14, 1972 Meeting with the Chinese Ambassador, in New York

I met with the Chinese Ambassador to the United Nations, Huang Hua, for an hour and 20 minutes on Tuesday afternoon, March 14, in New York City.² I had requested this meeting to cover New York City security and real estate concerns which they had raised, and other miscellaneous topics, including Dobrynin's information that we had given the Chinese military information on Soviet deployments; the functioning of the Paris channel; and Congressional visits to the PRC. At the end of the meeting, the Ambassador—somewhat ill at ease—presented a relatively mild verbal PRC complaint about our alleged bombing of North Vietnam. I said that their information was inaccurate and that we would not escalate unless Hanoi obliged us to do so. Following are the highlights of the session which was otherwise friendly.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² A 17-page memorandum of conversation of Kissinger's March 14 (4:40–6 p.m.) meeting in New York is *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 114.

Death of Chinese Official in New York

In early February, a young low-ranking member of the Chinese UN mission in New York died from apparent nicotine poisoning.³ The Chinese are convinced that it was foul play. (It may well have been, but the police now suggest the possibility that the man mistakenly gave himself an overdose while taking it for medical purposes.) They asked us last week for increased protection and a complete investigation by the Police Department once they have the full medical report.

I opened this meeting by assuring them that we will do everything possible to find out the possible culprit and increase the security of Chinese mission personnel. At my instruction, Ambassador Bush has talked to Police Chief Murphy in New York who assures us that a full-scale investigation and increased surveillance measures are being undertaken. We have also contacted FBI Director Hoover to assist the New York police in this effort. I told Ambassador Huang of these measures and suggested that he meet immediately with Bush and representatives of the New York police and FBI. The Ambassador agreed to try to keep this incident as low-key as possible. I believe they will continue to be restrained, and I will continue to monitor developments to make sure that the Chinese are given full cooperation.

New Location for Chinese UN Mission

I have been assisting the Chinese in their efforts to find a new location for their mission. They have now apparently struck a deal for a Lincoln Motor Inn on the West Side and hope to move in promptly once a contract has been signed. Here, too, they have appreciated White House efforts on their behalf.

Soviet Allegations

I told Ambassador Huang, without elaboration, that Dobrynin has alleged that Chinese sources had told Moscow that during my October visit I had given the Chinese information on Soviet troop

³ Wang Hsi-tsan, age 26, was found dead in his room in the Roosevelt Hotel on the morning of February 7. A detailed account of the investigation of Wang's death is in the March 6 memorandum of conversation between Jonathan Howe of the NSC staff and Huang Hua. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) On June 7 Bush met with Huang Hua to report that "the investigation is at a standstill but that the case is still open." Bush pointed out that the investigation had been hampered by the lack of access to PRC representatives for fingerprinting or interviews. Bush concluded: "It seems unlikely that Ambassador Huang or his staff will raise this case again with us in the immediate future unless Peking's reaction to the report given by Ambassador Bush is stronger than that apparently felt personally by Ambassador Huang." (Airgram A-925 from USUN, June 19; *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 17 CHICOM-US) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969-1976*, vol. E-13, Document 113.

“dislocations” and missile installations along the Sino–Soviet border.⁴ I added that John Scali had picked up similar information (although keyed to my July visit) from an ABC executive who had talked to a Radio Moscow correspondent in New York. I said that I had told Dobrynin that I would not discuss any conversations with the Chinese, but that in any event this information was complete nonsense and a provocation. I added that it may have come from Taiwan sources or represent a Soviet fishing expedition. I noted that Prime Minister Chou and Marshal Yeh might wish to look into this matter and we would find interesting any comments they might have. Ambassador Huang was completely inscrutable during this exchange.

Moscow Summit

I informed Huang of this Thursday’s announcement that you will be going to Moscow on May 22 and gave him further tentative planning. I said that I had turned down a Russian invitation to advance your trip in Moscow, and that we were dealing with Dobrynin here on arrangements. I pointed out again that the Soviet tactic was to have agreements in many fields come to a head in May, and I briefly reviewed some of the technical negotiations and ministerial travels underway or in prospect in coming months. I reaffirmed that we stood ready to make any agreements with Peking that we concluded with Moscow.

The South Asian Subcontinent

I told Huang that Indian Ambassador Jha had probed us on the meaning of the Shanghai Communiqué.⁵ I said that I told Jha that I wouldn’t speak for the Chinese, but the US position was that we reject the hegemony of any outside country over the subcontinent or of any country within the subcontinent. I added that you were now planning the recognition of Bangladesh during the first week of April, but we had not yet informed the bureaucracy so that we could entertain PRC comments with regard to timing.⁶ I explained that I was filling in the Chinese on conversations with the Soviets and the Indians so as to head off any distorted versions which those countries might give to the Chinese themselves.

⁴ Kissinger met with Dobrynin on March 9 and 10. Documentation is scheduled for publication *ibid.*, volume XIV.

⁵ For information on Kissinger’s talks with Ambassador Jha, see *ibid.*, vol. E-7, Document 233.

⁶ In telegram 55123 to Paris, March 30, Watson was instructed to inform the PRC representatives that the United States would announce its intention of recognizing Bangladesh on April 4. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)

Watson Channel and Travel to the PRC

I outlined Senators Mansfield and Scott's questions on their travel to the PRC and said that Watson would present Mansfield's letter in Paris at the next meeting on Monday. I said that we would forward a letter from Speaker Albert a week or so later requesting an invitation for Boggs and Ford (which, as you know, they have already agreed to in principle). Huang indicated that the PRC wishes to continue the system of Americans applying for visa applications at the nearest convenient embassy, in most cases Ottawa. We will have Watson raise this formally on Monday and get confirmation from his counterpart.⁷

PRC Complaint about US Bombing

After I had run through my business, Ambassador Huang somewhat sheepishly read a verbal message from his government complaining about alleged US bombing of North Vietnam since your visit to China. I consider their message relatively pro forma in language; also it is in the third person and in a channel where they know it will get no further distribution. He did not wish to even hand it over, but I requested it in order to get the precise language, assuring him that only you would see it (text at Tab A).⁸ The note alleges our recent bombing, said that the Chinese Government "cannot but express grave concern" over this and reaffirms their solidarity with the Indochinese people.

I responded by saying that we had checked into similar allegations which we had gotten from the North Vietnamese and found them to be untrue. I said that we would not escalate military activity unless forced to do so by North Vietnamese offensives. Since he had raised the subject, I pointed out that the North Vietnamese had postponed a scheduled meeting with us in Paris and opined that this was a curious way of proceeding.

⁷ See Document 214.

⁸ The attached statement reads in part: "In the fortnight since the conclusion of President Nixon's visit, the United States has carried out incessant, large-scale bombings against the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam. On March 10, the U.S. Government further proclaimed the week from March 26 to April 1 a so-called 'national week of concern for prisoners of war'. The Chinese Government cannot but express grave concern over this. The Chinese Government would like to state frankly that the United States will not be able to attain its goal by this line of action. If the U.S. Government truly wants to bring about an early release of its prisoners of war, it should accept the seven-point proposal and the two points of elaboration put forward by Viet Nam and enter into earnest negotiations with the Vietnamese side." The statement concluded that the Chinese people "can only express their indignation and support the three Indochinese peoples in their war of resistance through to the end. We hope that the U.S. Government will give serious consideration to this view." A notation on the statement indicates the President read it. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 114.

214. Backchannel Message From the Ambassador to France (Watson) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Paris, March 20, 1972, 1258Z.

639. To the White House Eyes Only for Dr. Kissinger. Had 65-minute meeting with Amb. Huang today.² Spirit extremely open and friendly. Accompanying him, like the last time, was interpreter and First Secretary Tsao, who speaks English but very little French.³

In discussing ping-pong team,⁴ Huang was concerned about Carl MacIntyre, President of the organization called "US March for Victory," and that he would invite a ping-pong team to the US from the "clique

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1038, Files for the President—China Material, China, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China [April–May 1972]. Secret. A shortened version of this message was sent through Department of State channels as telegram 5316 from Paris, March 20. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 115.

² On March 10 the White House announced that Watson would be the third-country contact point with the PRC. (Department of State *Bulletin*, April 3, 1972, p. 500) Watson returned to the United States and met with Kissinger on March 10. Talking points for Kissinger prepared by Lord, March 10, and handwritten notes from this meeting are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, China, Paris Channel, March 10, 1972–April 1973. General Walters held his forty-fifth and final meeting with Huang on March 5. See *Foreign Relations 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 116. President Nixon appointed Walters Deputy Director of Central Intelligence on March 2. He was confirmed by the Senate on April 10 and sworn in on May 2.

³ At the first meeting on March 13, Watson and Huang briefly met at the PRC Embassy. Watson's March 13 report to the Department of State in telegram 4739 reads in full: "For the Secretary from Ambassador Watson. Had first meeting at 1100 today, nothing of substance took place except for fact he wants to repay my call, which will take place Thursday at 1100 at our embassy." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) He gave a more detailed account in two March 13 backchannel messages to Kissinger, numbered 625 and 626. Watson and Huang agreed that they would handle "major" issues while subordinates could discuss routine matters. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—General—Feb. 27–March 31, 1972) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 117 and 118.

⁴ In a February 22 meeting among Rogers, Foreign Minister Chi P'eng-fei, and Secretary to Chou En-lai Hsiung Hsiang-hui, the Chinese complained that the PRC was prepared to reciprocate the U.S. team's visit of April 1971, but that they discovered in August that an ROC team was touring America. (Memorandum of conversation, February 28; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US/NIXON) The Department of State's instructions to Watson for the March 20 meeting, approved by Haig, reads in part: "It is particularly important that early on you emphasize importance we attach to principle of reciprocity in exchanges" and suggested inviting the PRC team for a visit in either April or June. (Telegram 46040 to Paris, March 17; *ibid.*, POL CHICOM–US) The PRC team visited April 12–24 and visited the White House on April 18. (Department of State *Bulletin*, May 15, 1972, p. 698)

of Chiang Kai shek" during the visit of the table tennis delegation of China. The Chinese would like to call this to the attention of the Americans in this regard in hopes that America will take measures so that the bilateral exchanges between China and the US can take place without impediment. As far as concrete arrangements or details of the stay are concerned, the Chinese Association of Table Tennis will be told to have the Chinese delegation at the United Nations send somebody to contact the American association. Huang also hopes that the American Govt will be kind enough to cooperate along these lines and also take necessary security measures. If the American Govt has any propositions to make along these lines, Chinese will be glad to know of them.

I also received a paper, contents of which I will telegraph to Senators Mansfield and Scott, which reads of follows:

"Sirs,

The Chinese People's Institute of Foreign Affairs has the pleasure to invite you to come to China for a visit in the latter part of April. Mrs. Mansfield and Mrs. Scott as well as your assistants are also welcome.

Practical matters such as the specific date of the visit and the composition of your party may be arranged through the Chinese Embassy in France. With regards."

In answer to this invitation, I told them that the Senators would like to come either 16th or 27th of April, so when date is firm on their part, we are ready when they notify us to follow through it.

I also raised other matters as requested by State in their telegram 46040. They are also very pleased with the musk oxen/panda flying arrangements, but Huang will get official confirmation from his gov't.

I also handed to him the thank-you letters from the President and the Secretary.⁵

I am not replying to State Dept. cable of instructions until receiving your ok later today.⁶

Comment: Most important thing it seems to me in the conversation was that today was the first official forward-looking example of carrying out the agreements in the joint communiqué. He laid great stress on this point, to which of course I agreed. I also said that he could be assured that all kinds of necessary security measures will be taken during the visit of their ping-pong team. I also took up with him the

⁵ Telegram 46040 to Paris, March 17, indicated that these letters, as well as a letter from Mansfield and Scott, were being sent via pouch to Paris. Copies of Nixon's March 14 letters to Chou and Mao are in Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 114, Geopolitical Files, China, Nixon, Richard M., Letters to Mao and Chou.

⁶ Apparent reference to telegram 46040, March 17.

matter of the press, as outlined in para 9 reftel, and he is absolutely in accord.⁷

Ambassador Huang during our meeting said that for routine matters he would like them conducted between his First Secretary Tsao Kuei-sheng and I restated I would use Allen Holmes, our Political Counselor (whom I trust completely). For the long pull I would appreciate your advice as to whether I should have a bright, Chinese-speaking officer.

At the close of the meeting I invited Huang to join Nancy and me at a small private dinner at the residence some time in April. He seemed delighted and accepted immediately. Date to be arranged.

Warm regards,

Watson

⁷ Paragraph 9 of telegram 46040 reads in part: "In contacts with press, you should not discourage speculation that talks are substantive. You should make it clear, however, that content of discussion will not be revealed."

215. Memorandum for the President's File by John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, March 23, 1972.

SUBJECT

Meeting with Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, on Thursday, March 23, 1972, at 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Mr. Marshall Green, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Major General Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John H. Holdridge, Senior Staff Member NSC

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 88, Memoranda for the President. Secret; Nodis. According to the President's Daily Diary, the meeting was held from 4:08 to 5:02 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files)

Prior to hearing Mr. Green's account of the trip which he and Mr. Holdridge had made to brief Asian leaders on the President's visit to China,² the President gave Mr. Green guidance on the line which he should follow for his appearance on "Meet the Press" March 26.³ Mr. Green should put the purpose of the President's China initiative in the most positive light. The themes to mention were: the move could be a great historical landmark; we were acting not only in our own interests but in the interests of the friendly Asian countries, and in fact we were their spearhead; the Asian nations all welcomed the move and our allies were fully reassured as to its value to them and about continued U.S. support; the effort had to be made to see if relations could be improved with the PRC, even if this should not work out; there is now real hope for a peaceful future. The President suggested that Mr. Green might quote statements by Asian leaders welcoming the China initiative.

The President noted that if the question comes up of "why not wait until after Mao and Chou (who are 78 and 73, respectively) pass from the scene and then make the approach?", Mr. Green should point out that changes in leadership do not necessarily result in a softer line from the new leaders. The President cited the successors to Stalin in the USSR as cases in point.

The President said that another point to stress was that the Nixon Doctrine should not be interpreted as a U.S. withdrawal from Asia, but rather as a means for the U.S. to stay involved.

The President stated that Mr. Green should also play down the Taiwan aspect as much as possible. He wanted Mr. Green to give

² U.S. allies were briefed about the China trip in Washington, or by Green and Holdridge, and not through individual Embassies. According to telegram 33189 to Moscow, Tokyo, Taipei, Saigon, Hong Kong, and Paris: "President has directed that there should be no comment of any kind on US-PRC joint communiqué or explanatory press conference. You are directed to inform appropriate staff members of this immediately." (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/NIXON) Nixon dispatched Green and Holdridge to meet with leaders in East and Southeast Asia immediately after the President's trip. In a February 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Haig discussed the trip and noted: "I think it is an exceptionally good idea and one that we should pursue but only if John Holdridge or some other NSC member accompanies Marshall to insure that he hews to the desired line." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1330, NSC Unfiled Material, 1972, 4 of 8) Green's mission was announced by the Department of State on February 16. (Department of State *Bulletin*, March 20, 1972, p. 440) Documentation on these meetings is in National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 US/GREEN). Holdridge also relayed backchannel messages directly to Haig; see footnote 4 below. Holdridge and Green visited South Korea, Japan, the Republic of China, the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, South Vietnam, Australia, and New Zealand.

³ Transcript of Green's interview on the National Broadcasting Company's *Meet the Press* news program is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, April 17, 1972, pp. 571-577.

minimal comment to the reaction on Taiwan, other than to cite what the ROC leaders said after his, Mr. Green's, visit since the heat had died down on this issue and there was no sense in reigniting it.⁴

Mr. Green said that he would of course follow the President's guidance. With respect to stressing the positive aspects of the President's China visit, he had in fact used such an approach in talking to the Asian leaders in the countries he had just visited.

Mr. Green remarked that one theme which he believed had been effective was that the President's China initiative offered a real hope for peace, and was particularly welcomed by the young people who had been turned off by the seemingly endless cold war.

The President talked at length on the philosophy which he had followed in making his China initiative. The move had to be made; we simply could not go on indefinitely in a hostile relationship with one-quarter of mankind, especially as the People's Republic of China grew in military power. It was far better to be on the inside talking with the Chinese than on the outside looking in. Moreover, the move had to be now, at a time when the Chinese leaders needed us. We needed them, but they needed us too. Now, as a result, the international situation had become much more fluid, and the Soviet Union could no longer take Sino-U.S. hostility for granted in its policy calculations.

The President recalled that he had set forth his thoughts on this issue in the October 1967 *Foreign Affairs Quarterly*.⁵ Mr. Green said that the President had spoken in similar terms to him in Djakarta that same year, before becoming a candidate.

The President mentioned that the PRC leaders had apparently tacitly accepted his explanation of the restraining role which the U.S. exercised with respect to Japan. He had pointed out that without the presence of the U.S., the likelihood of Japanese rearmament was high, since it was extremely illogical for a nation to be an economic giant while remaining a military pygmy. The failure of the Chinese leaders to challenge this position strongly suggested that they accepted it. (Mr.

⁴ Chiang Kai-shek cancelled their scheduled meeting, but Green and Holdridge did meet with Foreign Minister Chow Shu-kai, Vice President C. K. Yen, and Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Holdridge noted: "All were concerned particularly over need for continued U.S. support for Taiwan's economic development. My assessment is that leaders and people of Taiwan will try to make the best of situation, and with typical Chinese determination, will probably be able to get along quite well. Our relationship with them will continue, because they have nowhere else to go." Holdridge's summary of their meetings with leaders in the Philippines, South Vietnam, Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China is in telegram 45662 from Saigon, March 6; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China-general—Feb. 27–March 31, 1972.

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 3.

Holdridge corroborated this impression—the Chinese leaders had not belabored the President in stating their own position, but apparently just made it for the record.)

The President asked Mr. Green for a run-down of the reactions to the China visit in Japan, Indonesia, the Philippines, Indochina, Thailand, and Singapore, as noted by Mr. Green during his recent tour.

Mr. Green said that in Japan, the Japanese leaders had been reassured by his visit and had no quarrel with the purposes and results of the President's China trip (particularly on the score of there having been no secret deals). The problem was the effect of the trip on Japanese internal politics. In Indonesia, there was real racial hatred of the Chinese but understanding of the President's purposes. There had been near-chaos in the Philippines, but this had quieted down after he had talked to President Marcos and Foreign Minister Romulo,⁶ and had backgrounded the press.

Continuing, Mr. Green observed that understanding and support of the trip had been greatest in the three countries of Indochina, where the leaders saw the outcome of the President's China visit as possibly benefitting their own countries directly. In Thailand, Thanom, Praphat, Dawee, Pote Sarasin, and the King had all expressed their support, although they all were concerned about PRC support for the insurgency in Thailand.⁷ They felt they were under pressure. The King had been particularly strong on the need for continued U.S. aid to cope with the insurgency. Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew, a typical Han Chinese, had immediately seen the value of the China visit.

Mr. Green stressed that his swing through the area had brought out clearly the need for continued U.S. assistance to our friends and allies. We would be judged by our actions, not our words. The President agreed.

In conclusion, the President asked Mr. Green to put in a good word for Ambassador Watson if the occasion arose on "Meet the Press." The line the President suggested was that we had full confidence in Ambassador Watson's ability, and that while he would of course be dealing directly with the PRC Ambassador in Paris he would be operating in ways that all Ambassadors operate in such situations—carrying out instructions which were very carefully drafted by experts in Washington. Ambassador Watson had always been impeccable in his official performance.⁸

⁶ Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos and Foreign Minister Carlos P. Romulo.

⁷ King Bhumibol Adulyadej; Chairman of the National Executive Council, Thanom Kittikachorn; Deputy Chairman, Praphat Charusathien; Director of Development, Agriculture and Communication Directorate, Dawee Chulasapaya; and Director of the Economic, Financial and Industrial Directorate, Pote Sarasin.

⁸ Apparent reference to an incident involving Watson that occurred on a flight between Washington and Paris.

216. Memorandum From Phil Odeen of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 29, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Forces on Taiwan

Secretary Laird had forwarded to the President (Tab B) a summary of current and planned FY 73 forces deployed on Taiwan.²

Laird reports that authorized U.S. personnel on Taiwan for FY 73 will total 1,139 spaces more than the 6,000 indicated on the deployment plan jointly recommended by State and DOD and approved by the President in February. The increase results from an error in the original plan and does not represent a change in the major unit deployments.

The new end FY 73 figure of 7,139 men compares with 8,735 in end FY 72 and about 9,000 in FY 71. *Instead of the 2,700 man reduction in FY 73 approved by the President, the reduction will only be about 1,600.*

Laird also separates Taiwan based personnel into three categories: (a) those primarily engaged in supporting the SEA conflict, (b) those with a broader post-war theater mission, and (c) those needed for the defense of Taiwan itself.

You will recall that prior to the China trip DOD stated that about two-thirds of our Taiwan deployments were SEA related while one-third were needed for defense of the island. In his memo, however, Laird objects to recent statements by Secretary Rogers and others at State based on this two-third–one-third formula that about 6,000 of the current 8,735 personnel on Taiwan are engaged in SEA support (see State Transcript, Tab A).³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for action. Concurred in by Holdridge and Kennedy. Attached was a March 31 covering note from Kennedy to Kissinger, which reads in its entirety: "Henry: This all adds up to a suggestion that we need to cool off all comment on Taiwan force levels and stop further pronouncements. It would be best handled by a call from you to Secretaries Laird and Rogers or a call from Haig to Eliot and Pursley, if you agreed that this is the course to be followed." Kissinger's handwritten comment on this note read: "I want *no* reductions made on Taiwan until end of VN war under *any* pretext."

² Tabs B and C, attached but not printed, are two memoranda with summary tables from Laird to Nixon, both dated March 18.

³ Attached but not printed.

The Laird Position

Laird's position regarding the number of personnel needed for defense of Taiwan (about 2,400) has not changed. However, the figures on the personnel supporting the SEA conflict change markedly:

—only 3,100 rather than 6,000 personnel are primarily engaged in support of SEA operations.

—only half of these can be withdrawn after the SEA conflict ends, the others must remain to meet theater needs.

—the others (about 3,000 troops) are also required for theater missions and are scheduled to remain on Taiwan under current DOD planning.

The reason for the wide divergence between the current and past DOD positions is that previous DOD estimates assumed that all personnel deployed to Taiwan during the Vietnam build up are SEA related. However, although these forces moved to Taiwan in support of Vietnam operations, most of them now have a theater mission and no longer are directly involved in SEA support. Laird's current position narrows the definition to include only those forces currently engaged in support of SEA activity.

History of Taiwan Deployments

During the Vietnam build up, U.S. deployments in Taiwan nearly tripled rising from 3,700 personnel in 1964 to 9,800 in 1968. These increases were caused by growth of Taiwan based airlift, communications, maintenance and other Vietnam support operations.

Some forces came to Taiwan from elsewhere in Asia (principally Japan) to make room for forces arriving from the U.S. Others came from CONUS and will return home once the war winds down.

In an attempt to clarify the situation I had my staff do an analysis of current Taiwan military deployments. Based on data supplied by DOD, we divided them into three categories. The calculations are rough because many personnel are involved in support and maintenance activities which are difficult to break down by the missions they perform.

Personnel directly linked to SEA who would be withdrawn as the conflict ends include about 2,060 in FY 72 and 480 in FY 73. This is about 500 greater than Laird's estimate. These include:

—two C-130 airlift squadrons, one scheduled for return to CONUS and the second scheduled for redeployment to Okinawa by end FY 73. Total personnel 1,540.

—about 520 persons providing communications support, equipment repair and other general support for the airlift squadrons and general SEA activity.

On the other hand about 2,250 personnel are *linked directly to the defense of Taiwan* or have theater missions (e.g., intelligence) which

probably can not be accomplished from elsewhere in Asia. The Laird estimates are the same and include:

—about 450 persons in the Military Assistance Group, Taiwan Defense and Communications Command and the embassy.

—about 1,100 persons involved with intelligence operations that could not be accomplished from other locations in the Pacific.

—about 700 men involved with the maintenance of the air strip on Taiwan to provide rapid access for tactical air reinforcements.

The remaining 4,400 men have a *a theater role* and could be relocated (at a cost) to other Asian countries if political considerations dictate (Laird's estimate is 4,900). These 4,400 men include:

—about 3,060 personnel associated with two C-130 airlift squadrons including support.

—about 430 personnel associated with [1 line of source text not declassified] material on Taiwan.

—about 570 personnel manning regional communications facilities on Taiwan and about 390 material and general support personnel.

Tables summarizing these general categories and giving a more detailed description of the units involved are at Tab C.

Based on this analysis, therefore, the 6,000 man figure used by Secretary Rogers is an over estimation of our Taiwan deployments directly related to SEA activity. On the other hand, Laird's most recent position that only about 1,540 personnel are directly involved in SEA support and scheduled for return to CONUS or other redeployment understates the President's flexibility.

If necessary we could shift some units having a regional defense mission to other locations. For example, if the two C-130 airlift squadrons were relocated along with their maintenance and other support, Taiwan deployments could be reduced about 3,100 men to near pre-war levels (4,000 men). Moreover, about 1,300 communications support and maintenance personnel could probably be relocated without degrading the ROC defensive capabilities. This would reduce deployments below pre-war levels.

Next Steps

If you want to consider FY 73 deployments below the 7,135 currently planned by DOD I could prepare a memorandum to DOD requesting analysis of lower deployment postures. This would cause concern within DOD however, and I doubt we would get an objective analysis at this stage.

Alternatively, you could ask me to do an analysis of existing deployments and the implications of lower levels. This would avoid DOD concern and the possibility of a leak, but it would be difficult to obtain data. A thorough job might even require traveling to Taiwan itself.

Finally, you could wait for the preparation of the ongoing study of Asian deployments. This is part of our NSSM 69 work on overall Asian deployments and will be ready for DPRC consideration sometime late this spring.

In my opinion there is very little to be gained from further consideration of the exact number of Taiwan personnel related to SEA activity versus those personnel needed for other purposes. Moreover, I believe further public discussion of our Taiwan deployments and the number related to SEA activity will only increase ROC uncertainty regarding our future intentions and should be avoided.

I therefore recommend you call Secretary Laird and explain that:

—the 6,000 man figure mentioned by Secretary Rogers and others at State originated from DOD and refers to those deployments that are both SEA related *and* related to the overall defense of Asia, *but that*

—in the future, statements should avoid numerical estimates and reflect the uncertainty in our current plans. The overall question of our post-war Asian deployments will be addressed in the DPRC this spring.

In addition, Secretary Rogers should also be cautioned to avoid making numerical estimates of SEA related Taiwan deployments. In view of the joint memorandum you received from Secretary Laird and Rogers recommending FY 73 deployments, it would also be useful to remind State that our future Asian deployments will be addressed in the DPRC this spring.

Alternatively you could ask Al Haig to call both DOD and State or ask me to prepare a memorandum.

I will call.

Prepare a memorandum, to State and DOD.⁴

Other, see me.

⁴ Kissinger initialed his approval of this option. On April 7 Odeen forwarded to Kissinger a draft memorandum intended for Laird and Rogers. Kissinger did not sign it but wrote on Odeen's covering memorandum: "Let me do by phone. I don't want this to leak." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X)

**217. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Robert Hormats
of the National Security Council Staff to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

SRG Meeting on U.S.–PRC Trade and Exchanges

In order to have the agencies consider ways in which the statements on trade and exchanges in the Shanghai Communiqué should be implemented you directed two papers:

—NSSM 148² called for a study of ways in which U.S.–PRC exchanges in such fields as science, technology, culture, and journalism could be facilitated. It asked that the study include the roles of U.S. governmental and non-governmental institutions, ways in which direct contact in a third nation capital should be used to facilitate exchanges, specific types of exchanges to which the U.S. should give priority, and other problems associated with exchanges such as funding, security and legal implications.

—NSSM 149/CIÉP SM 21³ called for a study of PRC attitudes and practices in conducting trade with other countries, ways in which the USG can facilitate trade, and the effect on non-tariff barriers, tariff barriers, the claims settlement problem, and other trade issues on U.S.–PRC trade.

We suggest that you begin the meeting with a discussion of the trade paper, since Peter Flanigan and the CIEP people could then depart, if they so wished, before the session on exchanges.

Trade

The Trade Paper

The paper was prepared by the Ad Hoc Group chaired by Ambassador Brown.⁴ It discusses the background of U.S.–PRC trade to date, the objectives of both sides, PRC trade patterns and practices, ways

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, NSSM 148–149, 3/31/72 [1 of 2]. Secret. Sent for action.

² Document 209.

³ Document 211.

⁴ Davis forwarded the responses to NSSM 148 and NSSM 149 to members of the Senior Review Group on March 27. The papers and Davis' covering memorandum are in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 148. The papers are also *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-061, SRG Meeting, NSSM 148–149, 3/31/72 [1 of 2].

in which trade between the U.S. and the PRC might be facilitated, substantive issues which we should raise with the PRC, and U.S. laws and practices which affect our trade with the PRC.

The PRC appears concerned about import and export control discrimination against the PRC, and the lack of Most Favored Nation treatment. Foreign Minister Chi also indicated that the claims question could be discussed. The PRC has made it clear that trade could be expected to grow only slowly and hinted that the rate of growth would be determined politically.

The paper points out that despite the historic allure of the China market, we must recognize that trade will not grow rapidly, although in such areas as aviation and agriculture we may be able to sell to the Chinese. The PRC looks on trade as a means of obtaining items essential to its economy and exports only items which it must in order to get the hard currency for vitally needed imports. It also uses trade as a means of encouraging people-to-people relationships and influencing policies of other countries concerning such issues as Taiwan.

The paper contains a number of alternatives for facilitating trade between the U.S. and the PRC:

—Improve the ability of our Embassy in Paris to act as a contact point by assigning officers within the existing Embassy structure or personnel to a separate China Section of the Embassy. (The handling of this matter will depend on how much status you wish to give to the Paris talks.)

—Ask the PRC to designate one or more contact points to which American businessmen might be referred, continue and expand cooperation between the American Consulate General in Hong Kong and the American Chamber of Commerce in Hong Kong (which is likely to become a middleman for U.S. businessmen in establishing contacts with PRC), encourage groups interested in trade with PRC by providing them with information and guidance, and encourage formation of a private “Sino–American Trade Council” (perhaps under the auspices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce).

—Undertake a number of other measures including: a vanguard trade delegation⁵—with U.S. businessmen and USG representatives—to establish liaison with the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT); a U.S. trade exhibit in the PRC; assistance to U.S. [PRC?] trade and industrial associations wishing to exhibit in the U.S.; and, contacts with PRC banks through the Treasury representative in Hong Kong.

—Among specific issues are: the U.S. position on the sale of civil aircraft to the PRC, mutual visits by U.S. and PRC ships, the question of scheduled air services, means of facilitating prompt issuance of export licenses, Most Favored Nation treatment, the COCOM differential, the private claims/blocked assets problem, the issue of Ex-Im credits, the cotton textile problem, and the issue surrounding meat imports.

⁵ Kissinger’s handwritten comment beside this paragraph reads: “Location?”

The paper does a good job of pulling together the major issues and provides a large number of *possible* ways in which we might facilitate trade with the PRC. There appear to be no major issues over which the agencies violently disagree. However, there is a danger that, in their enthusiasm to facilitate trade with the PRC, the *agencies are inclined to move too quickly and in too many areas at once*. In addition, State shows signs of wanting to take the ball and run without proper controls from the White House.⁶

The Meeting

The best way to handle the trade paper at the SRG would be:

- First, to determine what our objectives are in trade with the PRC and their objectives in trading with us.
- To identify which, if any, specific options or recommendations are disagreed on by the agencies.
- To seek agreement on the items of highest priority to facilitate trade between the U.S. and PRC in a way consistent with objectives.
- To determine the timing of our action on individual items and our presentations to the PRC.

The meeting should focus primarily on *our objectives and the timing, style, and coordination of our approaches to the PRC*. Specifically, we need to determine our priorities and try to *determine between those items which we should deal with now and raise with the PRC on a priority basis*—which may include means of facilitating contacts and transmittal of information, plus resolution of impediments to trade such as the claims issue. It should also *identify items of medium-term priority*—which could include trade missions and exhibitions *and issues presently of low priority* such as Most Favored Nation status and providing China with Ex-Im credits.

The Issues

The highest priority items at this point are to facilitate trade by:

- Encouraging the exchange of general information on products and trading techniques.
- Facilitating contacts between individual, or groups of, Americans interested in trading with the PRC.
- Removing, where feasible, major obstacles to trade and resolving pressing trade issues by settling the claims question, and providing the PRC with information on U.S. laws and regulations concerning trade. Other items such as trade exhibitions might be explored with the PRC in Paris, and the issues of Ex-Im credits and MFN need not be decided at this time.

In pursuing the above issues, our objectives should be to gradually improve trade relations, avoid giving the appearance of “rug mer-

⁶ Kissinger’s handwritten comment beside this paragraph reads: “How?”

chants" intent on pushing our products, recognize that the PRC will require balance in trade, and gauge our actions based on consideration of PRC receptivity.

The following considerations are major elements in assuring a rational approach to trade issues:

—Rather than pushing products on the Chinese—which particular agencies in response to prodding from the private sector may wish to do—we should attempt to exchange information on products and methods of trade so that importers and exporters on both sides know what the other country has and wants to sell or buy, and how to engage in trade.

—In approaching the Chinese, there may be a tendency to avoid raising unpleasant matters which may impede trade between us. (These would include the claims issue, questions of export licensing, U.S. legal obligations on textiles and meats.) However, raising these issues in a frank and businesslike manner will be far preferable in the long run to papering over potential problems.

—Regarding the variety of items recommended in the paper, it is important to get a better idea of when particular items should be raised with the PRC. (From the paper it is unclear when the agencies believe we should raise particular items.) In order to avoid pushing too hard, we should carefully assess PRC receptivity in determining how far and how fast to move. And, instead of venturing forth enthusiastically with a wide variety of programs, we might consider attempting to draw out the PRC.

Among the main issues are:

—How quickly should we move on the many items suggested in the paper to facilitate trade relations? Should we begin merely by making proposals in Paris for PRC reaction, or move now on a number of fronts? Which items should we move on now and which require Presidential decisions at this time?

—When should we bring up with the Chinese potentially sensitive issues such as the *claims question* and *textile restraints*. (*The claims settlement issue is extremely important.* Failure to settle the claims problem might mean that PRC ships or goods would be subject to harassing lawsuits by U.S. citizens, and this also should be settled with the PRC to remove a major impediment to trade. The textile problem could become embarrassing domestically and internationally if we do not clarify our position with the PRC, and I believe it should be brought up relatively soon.)

—Should the USG at this point encourage any one private group to clear information and research on PRC trade practices. The paper contains an option that the USG encourage formation of a "Sino-American Trade Council," perhaps under the auspices of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. (I am inclined to believe that this is a good idea since it would allow a primarily private organization to deal with the PRC to exchange information; however, this may raise domestic equity problems, and it is not certain that the PRC would deal directly with such a group.)

⁷ Kissinger's handwritten comment beside this paragraph reads: "Can't we start dialogue?"

An additional issue which you should focus on is that of inter-agency coordination. The paper makes no mention of a White House role in future implementation of the trade scenario. You might stress in the meeting that in view of the President's keen interest in the development of trade with the PRC, and the number of specific questions of judgment and timing which will be necessary as relations evolve, there must be *constant interagency discussions on these matters and positions taken by our negotiators in Paris should be cleared by the NSC and CIEP staffs.*

Exchanges

The Exchange Paper

NSSM 148 was prepared by an Ad Hoc Group chaired by Assistant Secretary of State for Cultural Affairs John Richardson, Jr. The study finds that while we and the PRC share a common interest in moving to normalize relations—in part through exchange programs—the specific objectives that each side will seek through such contacts are quite different. Where the U.S. will attempt to develop favorable attitudes toward the United States among PRC elite groups, the Chinese side will use people-to-people contacts to build popular support for their cause which can be used to undercut USG backing of the Nationalists. As well, there is a basic disparity of institutions through which exchange programs will be promoted which gives us very limited leverage to influence Chinese involvement in American society or to elicit genuine reciprocity on their part.

The study suggests that in order to provide some degree of structure and control on our side of the exchange relationship, the U.S. government will want to identify one or more “umbrella organizations” to coordinate exchanges and provide guidance, assistance, and funding to private groups. (It identifies as a likely organization to play such a role the National Committee for U.S.-China Relations.) It also suggests that the State Department will want to expand the capabilities of the Paris Embassy in order to facilitate negotiations with the Chinese on exchange matters, and to process specific requests. The study thus implies a three-tiered structure of exchange relationships between the U.S. and the PRC: an “approved” level of programs that have been negotiated between PRC and U.S. authorities in Paris, a second level of exchanges that have USG blessing but that are managed without negotiated approval via one or another “umbrella” organizations, and a third level of contacts that the Chinese will be free to develop through groups that are not directly subject to governmental influence.

While this NSSM makes substantial progress in identifying the problem areas and procedures related to implementing exchange pro-

grams with the PRC, we find a number of deficiencies in the present version:

—The study clearly envisages a predominant State influence in developing exchanges. There is no mention in the paper of White House interest, or of the NSC.

—No clear position is developed for responding to the Chinese should they resist dealing with “umbrella organizations” that are acceptable to the U.S.

—The paper does not spell out very clearly how official judgments will be passed in approving certain exchange programs and rejecting others.⁸

—The exact mechanics of dealing with the Chinese on exchange matters, and liaising with private groups in the U.S., are not clearly conceptualized.

—The paper looks at possible future problems, but does not address those that exist now, e.g., what is being done to process the myriad of requests for assistance on exchanges which we are now receiving.

It is our feeling that in some measure it is too early to define fully such aspects of exchange programs, in part because we have only limited evidence of Chinese intentions in this area. We are now in the process of gaining such experience through our dealings with PRC authorities and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations—as noted, now the prime candidate for an “umbrella organization”—in connection with the tour in the U.S. of the Chinese ping pong team. We suggest that shortly after the tour is over we assess this experience as the basis for more explicitly structuring our approach to dealing with the PRC in the area of exchanges.

The above noted problem areas concerning exchange programs are worked into your talking points for discussion of NSSM 148.

One important issue is common to both papers—the level and composition of State’s machinery in Paris for dealing with PRC representatives on these and other matters. State clearly prefers a major and all but independent section in the Embassy. This could have the effect of eroding over time Ambassador Watson’s role and White House control. Your talking points raise this issue in the context of the proposals in the two papers in order to get a firm grip on the question before State runs away with the ball on its own.

Your book contains:

- Talking points arranged to deal with *trade first and then exchanges*.
- Analytical summaries of each of the State papers.
- NSSM Response—Trade

⁸ Kissinger’s handwritten comment above this paragraph reads: “Can’t we get some systematic approach?”

—NSSM Response—Exchanges
—NSSM 148—Trade Issues
—NSSM 149—Exchanges⁹

⁹ Copies of these documents are attached but not printed. NSSM 148 and 149, the resulting reports, and “issues and summary” papers for each are also in the National Archives, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 80 D 212, National Security Files, NSSM 148.

218. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, March 31, 1972, 3:05–3:55 p.m.

SUBJECT

SRG Meeting on NSSM 148 (US/PRC Exchanges) and NSSM 149/CIEPSM2
(US/PRC Trade)

PRESENT

Dr. Kissinger, NSC
Mr. Holdridge, NSC
Mr. Rush, OSD
Mr. Nutter, OSD
Mr. Doolin, OSD
Admiral Moorer, JCS
Ambassador Brown, State
Mr. Richardson, State (Cultural Affairs)
Mr. Hinton, CIEP
Mr. Helms, DCI
Mr. McGinnis, Treasury
Mr. Lynn, Commerce

Dr. Kissinger opened by saying that the major thing he wanted out of this meeting is a strategy—i.e., what do we want to do and, via the negotiations in Paris, how do we get there from here? He noted that the Chinese liked nothing less than a series of ad hoc choices and

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Reds), 1972. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted by Doolin on April 7 and approved by Nutter. Copies were sent to Laird, Rush, and Nutter. A notation on the memorandum indicates that Laird saw it. The meeting was held in the White House Situation Room. The time and place of the meeting are taken from a more extensive record in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 93, Country Files, Far East, China Trade/Exchanges, February 2, 1972–July 4, 1973, 2 of 2.

offerings, and said we need some sense of priorities so that we can proceed. After telling Mr. Hinton that he wanted the CIEP involved in a systematic way, he asked Ambassador Brown to explain our priorities concerning the trade issue. Ambassador Brown said that if the paper² met with the approval of the group, an action program of the most important items would be developed to be presented to the PRC. He also said that we should get something moving on the claims question, as well as establish a point of contact acceptable to the PRC that can be used by US businessmen. Mr. Hinton said we should not expect much by way of trade except at the ends of the spectrum where Japanese competition is weak (e.g., grain and civil aircraft), or possibly something in the middle such as fertilizer. Hinton expressed some doubt on the question of funnelling all US businessmen through one point of contact. He added that there is little chance for either MFN or EXIM in the near term, and that, in short, we should not move too fast too soon. Kissinger seemed to agree, noting that we do not want the big thrust submerged in a wave of uncoordinated trade applications. Mr. Lynn asked a series of questions: Where do we stand now? Should we create the image that we are all that eager to press ahead on the trade front? What is the trade potential, given PRC non-use of long-term credits? Lynn felt that we should not get US business convinced that there is a great market where none exists, at least over the next 3–5 years. (Mr. Helms said the CIA estimate was an annual market of \$300 million maximum.) Kissinger said that the question of contacts could be handled in one of three ways: (1) All contacts should be made at the Department of State for referral to Paris, (2) Another “umbrella” organization could be established which would refer requests to the PRC, or (3) A point of contact could be established in the PRC. Mr. Rush then focussed the discussion by noting that the entire subject is dominated by political considerations and that it was vital that allies such as Japan and Taiwan not be alienated. He cautioned that we should keep the bud growing but not overdo it. With regard to contacts, Mr. Rush argued that a close watch should be kept either through an umbrella organization or by the Department of State. Mr. Helms said he found Mr. Rush’s logic to be unassailable, adding that if we go too fast we will end up in a terrible mess. Ambassador Brown agreed. Kissinger said he felt that the PRC would likely take our guidelines in this regard and that if we give none, the Chinese will likely feel their way toward a congenial umbrella group. Mr. Rush said that there are two ways we can handle this. One way would be to tell the PRC through Ambassador Watson that we don’t want a flood of visas issued. The second would be to tell the business community, through

² Reference is to the response to NSSM 149, summarized in Document 217.

the Department of State, that there isn't a great potential for trade with the PRC. Kissinger then told Brown that the paper has to be put in action program format, as we must tell the Chinese soon how we visualize things or the Paris meetings will peter out—or the Chinese will devise their own contacts. Brown argued that the claims question negotiations should be separate; Kissinger agreed, but said that those negotiations should commence only after there is some glimmering of movement regarding the trade question. Hinton then raised a potential textile problem to which Kissinger replied that he thought the PRC would handle this unilaterally and with restraint. Brown closed the discussion of NSSM 149 by saying that an action program would be prepared within a week.³

Turning to NSSM 148,⁴ Mr. Richardson said that we are starting a learning process in which we are trying to show the PRC that exchanges through responsible structures are in their interest as much as in ours. Kissinger said that we should tell the PRC which groups are the responsible ones, and John Holdridge replied that this was done in February in Peking by the State contingent. Kissinger said that, in any event, Ambassador Watson should be provided a list to present to the Chinese as our recommendation, adding that he did not think the PRC would challenge our list. Richardson said the list would be drawn up but we would need more consultations with the private sector. A question was raised as to whether the exchanges would be on the basis of equality. Kissinger said there would be no fingerprinting of citizens of the PRC and seemed to indicate that equality would be the rule, but the meeting tailed off at this point, and Dr. Kissinger's reaction was not totally clear.

Dennis J. Doolin

Deputy Assistant Secretary

³ See footnote 9, Document 229.

⁴ Document 209.

219. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, undated.

1. The U.S. side has made a full investigation of the incidents that the Chinese side brought to its attention on March 24, 1972.²

The U.S. side has verified that the ship and aircraft in question on the dates cited went within twelve nautical miles of the Paracel Islands but at no time moved closer to the Islands than three nautical miles. The ship and aircraft were conducting surveillance on an infiltration trawler engaged in carrying contraband in the vicinity of Lincoln (Tung) Island in the Paracels.

In the interest of U.S.–Chinese relations the U.S. side has issued instructions that henceforth a distance of at least twelve nautical miles should be maintained from the Paracel Islands. This is without prejudice to the U.S. positions either on the territorial sea question or the various claims to the Paracel Islands.

2. The Chinese message read to the U.S. side on March 14, 1972, together with recent public statements by the Chinese side on the Indochina conflict, require comment.³

The U.S. recognizes that the People's Republic of China is obliged to take positions that support its friends. However, the Chinese side must understand that certain of its recent comments can only be considered inconsistent with the spirit with which the two sides have conducted relations. This spirit has consisted of an attempt to look with understanding at the other side's viewpoint across an ideological gulf.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. According to an attached April 3 memorandum from Lord to Kissinger, Lord delivered the message to PRC representatives in New York on the evening of April 3. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 119.

² At a March 24 meeting between Haig and Huang Hua in New York, the PRC Ambassador read a note protesting incursions by U.S. naval vessels and aircraft. A memorandum of conversation, March 24, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See also *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 118.

³ See Document 213. In his April 3 report to Kissinger (see footnote 1 above), Lord wrote: "Then (as you instructed) I made an informal comment on a personal basis along the following lines. I had been with Dr. Kissinger on all his trips and sat in on all his meetings, and I knew personally that there was no policy he believed in more than improving relations with the People's Republic of China. This was the spirit in which we approached our relationship and one which we were prepared to apply also to North Vietnam. And this was the framework of the message I have just given her. It was also in this light that we had issued instructions concerning the Paracel Islands contained in the message. Frankly speaking, I added, this had been a very difficult issue within our Government."

The United States has gone to great lengths to take account of deeply held Chinese views. With regard to the Indochina issue it has done nothing to embarrass the Chinese side or complicate its position and it has consistently acknowledged that a peaceful settlement must be made with North Vietnam directly.

The Chinese side can be under no misapprehension concerning the profound importance of this issue for the United States. Nor would it be in the long term interest of the People's Republic of China for the U.S. to be exposed to embarrassment. The Chinese side knows full well the attitude behind the proposals the U.S. side has put forward for a negotiated settlement; that the U.S. side recognizes that a settlement must meet Hanoi's concerns since North Vietnam is a permanent factor in the area; that the U.S. has no intention of maintaining bases or a military presence in Indochina after a settlement is reached; and that it cannot be U.S. ambitions in the areas that should concern the People's Republic of China.

In light of these considerations it is difficult to understand some recent Chinese statements. For instance, it is unacceptable to be accused of sabotaging the talks in Paris when the Chinese side knows full well that it is the North Vietnamese which effectively cancelled a private meeting set for last November and postponed a private meeting set for this March. On both occasions the lack of advance notice caused technical and scheduling difficulties. Furthermore, the U.S. side fails to understand the continued Chinese reiteration that the U.S. accept the PRG's seven point plan when it has been repeatedly explained that the North Vietnamese maintain in private talks the priority of their own nine point plan; that the U.S. has responded to both plans; that the North Vietnamese themselves acknowledge that only two points of their plan really remain at issue; and that the North Vietnamese have refused to date to consider seriously any American proposal. In this connection, the U.S. side wishes to call attention to the passage in the Shanghai Communiqué in which the U.S. side stated that "no country should claim infallibility and each country should be prepared to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good."

The U.S. side believes that major countries have a responsibility to use a moderating influence on this issue and not to exacerbate the situation. The U.S. side repeats its constant position. On the one hand, any attempt to impose a military solution upon the U.S. can only lead to unfortunate consequences. On the other hand, the U.S. will continue to do everything reasonable to bring the Indochina war to a rapid conclusion on a basis just to both sides.

The U.S. also wants to reiterate the extreme importance that it attaches to the improvement of its relations with the People's Republic of China.

220. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, April 12, 1972, 5:15–6:40 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations

Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: I must tell you Mr. Ambassador, that you have seduced another journalist.

Ambassador Huang: Which one?

Dr. Kissinger: Joseph Kraft. He was convinced when he went to China that we were all taken in by you. He wasn't going to let this happen to him, and he even wrote some articles from China about excessive sentimentality toward China. But I saw him 48 hours after he returned, and he is already planning a return visit to China. He wants to take his wife to China, and he is talking about nothing else. This is not a recommendation on my part. It is information.

Ambassador Huang: Which paper is he accredited to?

Dr. Kissinger: He writes in the *Washington Post*, and he's syndicated all over the country. He is an unreliable friend and a dangerous enemy.

Mr. Ambassador, I wanted to see you in the spirit in which we have communicated with each other to tell you our thinking about Vietnam.

We recognize that you are men of principle, and we are not asking for your support or mediation. But we believe that what has started between our two countries is of such historical importance that whenever there is a possibility of misunderstanding it is important that we know what the other side is thinking. We know that you will make certain public statements, and this is not an attempt to debate your public statements.

I also have other relatively minor things, but let me talk about Vietnam first.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. According to the attached April 16 covering memorandum from Lord, Kissinger approved this memorandum but did not forward it to Nixon. Apparently no summary memorandum was prepared.

Ambassador Huang: It so happens that I got instructions from my government to make an appointment with you. That is about a reply from the Chinese side to the April 3 message of the U.S. side.²

Dr. Kissinger: I thought this might be the case. Would you like to give me your reply first?

Ambassador Huang: I am prepared to listen to the Doctor first.

Dr. Kissinger: See . . . how do you like your new quarters, incidentally?³

Ambassador Huang: They are quieter than the Hotel Roosevelt, and there are more conveniences than at the hotel.

Dr. Kissinger: It is comfortable?

Ambassador Huang: Yes, very comfortable.

Dr. Kissinger: I owe an apology to your lawyer. He is much more efficient than my reports indicated.

Ambassador Huang: We are also very pleased that we could move so quickly.

Dr. Kissinger: We are delighted.

Ambassador Huang: Anyway, we must thank you for your concern.

Dr. Kissinger: We didn't do much.

What I wanted to do then is to summarize what our concern is, what our attitude is. We are not seeking military bases. We are not seeking a military victory. We have taken very seriously the advice of the Prime Minister when I visited Peking in July about not leaving a "tail" of advisers behind. We will withdraw all our forces, including advisers. We are not concerned with the preservation of any one person. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.) In short we do not believe that we are the imperialism that need concern the People's Republic in Southeast Asia.

What we cannot do is to accept a military solution which is imposed on us. We do not believe that this is in anybody's interest. We believe that the same principles are involved in Southeast Asia, and the same motives, that were involved in South Asia three months ago. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.) We believe that without Soviet offensive weapons and without Soviet encouragement this recent series of events would never have happened. And we believe that the motive in the short term affects us, but in the long term it is not directed against us. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)

I told the Prime Minister in July, I told him in October, and the President told him that we would not accept a military defeat. I told

² Document 219.

³ All ellipses are in the source text.

the Ambassador on March 13 (*sic*) that we would not expand military operations in Indochina unless they were expanded by our opponents against us.⁴ After the Chinese message to us I kept an especially close watch on military operations, and I don't think that one can find any military actions against the Democratic Republic between March 15 and April 2, after the offensive started. Indeed I can tell you in all frankness I received four different recommendations from our military commanders during that period who saw the military buildup of North Vietnam and asked permission to take preventive measures. In each case the President and I refused permission.

So I must tell you, Mr. Ambassador, that we did not want a military solution and even today we do not want a military solution. And I would like to summarize for you all the messages which have passed between us and the North Vietnamese. I'm not asking you to give me your judgment, but in considering the situation in Peking we want the Prime Minister, for whom we have such an enormous regard, to at least know our side.

On February 14 the North Vietnamese proposed a private talk with us for March 15 in Paris. On February 17 we accepted that without condition, and suggested March 20 as a date.

Ambassador Huang: The 17th?

Dr. Kissinger: No, the 20th. We suggested March 20th because for me it must always be worked so that my absence is not noticed so much, so that they think in Washington that I am visiting a girl.

On February 29 the North Vietnamese accepted the date of March 20. We then made all the preparations, which are quite complex for us, of getting airplanes, landing rights and so forth.

On March 7 the North Vietnamese informed us that this date was . . . that they wanted to postpone the meeting until April 15, claiming we had engaged in air attacks between March 2 and March 6. For the information of the Prime Minister, there were no air attacks between March 2 and 6. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.) And when we do something we tell you privately. We admit transgressions on Chinese soil when they occur.

On March 13 we accepted the new proposal and proposed April 24 as the date. The reason we proposed April 24 was because I had already agreed to go to Japan the weekend of April 15.

We then did not hear from North Vietnam at all for over ten days even though we were accepting their own proposal. So we suspended—since they had not agreed to private talks, we suspended the public talks.

⁴ Reference is to a March 14 meeting in New York. See Document 213.

On March 27 the North Vietnamese accepted the date of April 24. On April 1 (*sic*) we therefore informed the North Vietnamese that the plenary sessions would resume on April 13, in other words that we were prepared to return to the peace talks.

On April 2 they attacked across the DMZ. We then told them on April 6 . . . they knowing already that we had agreed to go to the plenary sessions, they held a press conference and publicly demanded that we go April 13 to a meeting. We then informed them on April 6 that in these conditions we could not come on April 13 and that whether we would come on April 20 depended on the military operations. Their reply to this was to start military attacks near Saigon.

Now I would like to tell you our attitude. The Prime Minister told me once that it was very difficult for you to enter the war in 1950, but you felt that you had to do it because your word counts.

Ambassador Huang: Would you please repeat that sentence?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister once, in a historical discussion, told me that it was a very hard decision to send peoples' volunteers into North Korea, but you had to do it because you said you would do it and your word counts.

Well, we are in a similar position. We have told the Democratic Republic and told you that if we are put under military pressure we would respond and, painful as it is for us, our word counts also.

Now we have told the Democratic Republic that I, nevertheless, even though they've attacked across the DMZ and even though they've launched regular army attacks, I am prepared to come to the meeting on April 24 with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, and I would come there with the attitude of bringing a rapid conclusion to the war. If this private meeting makes any progress at all, we will resume the public sessions very shortly thereafter.

If the Democratic Republic returns to the agreements it has made with us in 1968, we will stop the military operations in North Vietnam.

And I repeat that we accept a neutral Vietnam. We want no bases. We will discuss a fair political process. But painful as this is and whatever the price to whatever relationship, we will not swerve from the present course if the Democratic Republic continues to pursue the actions on which it is now engaged. We believe it would be tragic if this would jeopardize the relationship which is so important for our foreign policy and on which we have worked with so much seriousness. We are convinced that if Hanoi meets us with anything like the largeness of spirit of the Chinese leaders, we would find a solution as satisfactory with them as we have found in our relations with the People's Republic.

I have a few other things which do not concern Vietnam, but perhaps the Ambassador would want to give me his comments on Vietnam which I suspect are not in complete agreement with ours.

Ambassador Huang: I am going to convey a message to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Could you give us the paper informally? Then Mr. Lord would not have to write it all down.

Ambassador Huang: I can read it slowly.

(Dr. Kissinger says to Lord: "It must be pretty tough.")

Ambassador Huang: There are two points in the message.

(The Ambassador then reads the following from a typed message in Chinese and Miss Shih translates it slowly.)

"1. The Chinese side has noted the promise conveyed in the April 3, 1972 message from the U.S. side that U.S. ships and aircraft would no longer come within 12 nautical miles of China's Hsi Hsa Islands. At the same time, the Chinese side reiterates that the Hsi Hsa Islands are indisputably Chinese territory, that the width of the Chinese territorial sea stipulated by her is 12 nautical miles, and that it requires all quarters to show full respect for this.

"2. Regarding the second point of the April 3, 1972 message, the Chinese side has the following comments.

"The spirit with which the Chinese and U.S. sides have conducted relations consists of frankness in the exchange of views without concealing the great differences existing between them and an effort to seek common ground. The Chinese side has always acted in this spirit. The U.S. message reproaching against the Chinese side is unacceptable.

"The U.S. side can be under no misapprehension concerning China's principled stand on the question of Indochina. The U.S. side knows full well that the Chinese side firmly supports the peoples of the three Indochina countries in their war against U.S. aggression and for national salvation. The Chinese side is convinced that the Vietnamese 7 point proposal and the 2 points of elaboration have provided a reasonable basis for a peaceful settlement, that any attempt by the U.S. side to intensify the war and exert pressures can only give rise to even stronger resistance by the Indochinese peoples, that the Chinese people sharing weal and woe with the Indochinese peoples will certainly give them strong support, and that the Chinese believe that such actions on the part of the U.S. side can only exacerbate tension and provide opportunities for others to take advantage of it.

"In the light of these conditions one cannot but be surprised that the U.S. side should express difficulty in understanding recent Chinese statements on the Indochina issue. China realizes that the United States of America is in a difficult position on the Indochina issue. However, the U.S. side must understand that this situation was brought about entirely by the U.S. itself. The concentration of U.S. naval and air forces for the wanton bombing of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, the clamors about expanding the war, the indefinite suspension of the

Paris talks, etc. decidedly will not help the U.S. gain its objective but can only make the U.S. even more bogged down in an embarrassing position.

“The Chinese side wishes to call attention to the following passage in the Shanghai Communiqué:

‘. . . the two sides agreed that countries, regardless of their social systems, should conduct their relations on the principles of respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, non-aggression against other states, non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.’

“On the question of Indochina, it is the U.S. that has violated these principles and harmed Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and not Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos that have harmed the U.S. If the U.S. takes its above statement seriously and truly has a desire to effect a reasonable settlement of the question of Indochina, then it should examine its own attitude.

“The Chinese side reiterates that it attaches importance to the normalization of Sino–U.S. relations and that it is firm in upholding its principles.”

That is the full text of the message. (Attached at Tab A)⁵

(Dr. Kissinger says to Mr. Lord: “Did you get it?” Mr. Lord: “Yes.”)

Ambassador Huang: I will report to Peking what the Doctor has said just now.

Dr. Kissinger: May I make two informal comments about your message.

We too value the normalization of relations between the People’s Republic and the United States very highly. And we will examine this message with great care and great seriousness.

But I would like to point out first, that we did not . . . regardless of the public positions you have to take, the record I have given you leaves no doubt that we didn’t suspend the talks indefinitely. (Ambassador Huang checks the translation.)

Secondly, with respect to the bombing, we are asking Hanoi to live up to its own agreement. We did not start the bombing.

But thirdly, and most important, and this is not put forward in the spirit of debate because these discussions remain secret, this Administration, which overcame twenty years of hostility toward Peking, has no dogmatic views about Hanoi. If we could normalize our relations

⁵ Attached but not printed was a typed version of the message. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 120.

with Peking, we can certainly normalize our relations with Hanoi. But if Peking had treated us the way Hanoi does, we would still be in a posture of hostility.

And the problem is, as I pointed out to the Prime Minister and Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying, whether one small country should be able to threaten all international relations because its view is so totally focussed on a very special perspective of a very special problem. There is no reasonable objective for us to achieve in securing military bases in Southeast Asia. We want the independence and neutrality of South-east Asia.

But I have pointed out the other considerations to you already, and I'm just conveying this to the Prime Minister for his understanding of our approach.

I have a few other . . . unless you want to pursue this topic.

Ambassador Huang: I'm not ready to talk on this subject. Please go ahead.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to inform you of a number of things.

One is of some importance, which I tell you in the spirit of our relationship. We wanted the Prime Minister to know that the President has ordered that the number of nuclear weapons on Taiwan be reduced by 50 per cent before the end of this year. This will be done without announcement, and this information should, of course, be treated confidentially by Peking. This is simply for your information and this is a process which will continue.

We thought you should be aware of the fact that the campaign of allegations that I showed your people photographs of Soviet military installations is continuing. We have information that in March a high-ranking East European diplomat told a high-ranking Indian diplomat in Europe that this had occurred.⁶

With respect to the visit of Senators Mansfield and Scott, they are looking forward very much to their visit to your country. The President and I spoke to them yesterday, and I think they will provide very useful bipartisan support for the policy of normalization of relations. We have urged them, and they agree, that they will discuss with your officials any public statements they will make after returning to the U.S. in order to avoid any embarrassment or misunderstanding.

To mention Vietnam in connection with the two Senators, the Ambassador is, of course, aware that this is a very complex domestic issue in this country.

⁶ Kissinger had been informed of this through an April 7 "blind" memorandum, which was included with the briefing materials prepared by Lord for this meeting. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

Ambassador Huang: Well, I don't quite follow you.

Dr. Kissinger: I have another sentence. And therefore it would on the whole be preferred by us to receive any communication of Chinese views on this subject through this channel rather than through the two Senators, though, of course, we recognize you will state your basic position.

Ambassador Huang: Could you repeat this sentence?

Dr. Kissinger: We understand you will state your basic position. But, of course, you are the best judge of this.

With respect to your table tennis team, we are doing everything behind-the-scenes to guarantee their security and to provide them as warm a reception as our table tennis team received in the People's Republic.

I can tell you that when they visit Washington, the President plans to receive them, but as a personal visit, and, of course, there will be no political statements of any kind. He will simply express the friendship of the American people for the Chinese people. And if any of them play table tennis with me and I win, then I know your courtesy has reached excessive limits.

I want to review very quickly the status of our negotiations with the Soviet Union.

There is no basic change in the discussions on Strategic Arms Limitation. If the discussions go on much longer there will only be five people in the world who understand them, none of them the head of a government.

Miss Shih: None of them . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Head of Government. Because they are getting technically complex. But the basic issue right now is whether submarines should be included in the limitations. However, we expect to solve this issue before our visit to Moscow.

Our Secretary of Agriculture is returning from Moscow today, and he was received by Mr. Brezhnev. We are discussing with them the sale of grain to the Soviet Union. The issue is for how long we can give credits.

We begin talks on the settlement of lend-lease debts this week. A Soviet delegation is in Washington.

We will open negotiations on April 17 on the opening of ports in the Soviet Union and the United States to each other's shipping.

On April 27, the Soviet Minister of Economics, Patolichev, will come to the United States for economic discussions, on economic relations.

We want to repeat our basic principle. We are prepared to make any agreement with the People's Republic that we have made with the Soviet Union.

Ambassador Huang: Will you repeat that sentence?

Dr. Kissinger: Any agreement we have made with the Soviet Union we are also prepared to make with the People's Republic. Any commercial arrangement we make with the Soviet Union, such as extension of credits, we are also prepared to make with the People's Republic.

But most importantly—because I know that economic issues are not your principal concern—we understand the strategy that is being pursued in Moscow. We will not participate, directly or indirectly, in enabling any other country to increase or coordinate pressures on the People's Republic. And we will leave no doubt about this on our visit. And, of course, I plan, at the invitation of the Prime Minister, to visit the People's Republic at the end of June, on which occasion I will give him a full account. In the meantime, any comment from Peking will be taken extremely seriously in Washington.

The Prime Minister—this is a minor point—the Prime Minister mentioned to General Haig when he visited Peking⁷ a Japanese account about my alleged views and I have here a letter of apology from the Japanese about the falsification, if you are interested. If you would like to see it, this is a translation.

You are very safe—you can show me Chinese documents and I wouldn't know what I am reading. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

(Dr. Kissinger hands over the material and the Ambassador reads it carefully while Miss Shih copies down highlights.)

Dr. Kissinger: I can let you see the original the next time I come.

I don't know what's in there (gesturing at the file the Ambassador is reading.)

Mr. Lord: I never know what he is going to hand over on me.

Dr. Kissinger: I am teaching Winston Lord an absolutely new method of diplomacy.

(At this point Dr. Kissinger excuses himself to make a phone call and for several minutes the Chinese continue to read the material. Mr. Lord makes some explanations of what occurred concerning the magazine article.)

Dr. Kissinger: (pointing toward the document) Did you read this? They wrote the article before the meeting with me.

Ambassador Huang: It is most interesting.

The Chinese table tennis team arrived in Detroit at about 11:30 a.m. The correspondents attached to the delegation informed us about the situation there.

Dr. Kissinger: Were they well received?

⁷ See Document 183.

Ambassador Huang: I believe that the United States knows their itinerary thereafter.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes. (Aside to Lord: "Make sure that I receive them.")

Ambassador Huang: We appreciate very much the concern shown by the U.S. side over the security and other matters with regard to the visit of our table tennis team. We hope, as our two sides have expressed, that this visit will help enhance understanding and friendship between our two peoples.

If the Doctor has nothing more to say, I will take leave.

Dr. Kissinger: I would never admit that I have nothing more to say. A professor must never admit that.

Ambassador Huang: I hear you are leaving for Ottawa tomorrow afternoon, so probably you have a lot of things to do before that. You are very busy.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it is not so complex a visit as one to Peking. But I will be back on Saturday.

How far are you permitted to travel outside the city, Mr. Ambassador?

Ambassador Huang: The U.S. Permanent Mission to the United Nations has given us a note on this question. It consists of some regulations.

Dr. Kissinger: Anything that causes you personal inconvenience, if you would point it out, we can adjust it.

Ambassador Huang: The regulation set down by the United States Government applies to China, the Soviet Union and other countries. And here we are preoccupied with the United Nations' affairs, so we do not need very much to travel to other cities.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand you have a swimming pool in your hotel.

Ambassador Huang: It is like a big bathtub.

Dr. Kissinger: Are you using it?

Ambassador Huang: We are not using it now because it is in the open.

(There was a further exchange of pleasantries and the Chinese then left to get in their car to drive back to their Mission.)

221. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, April 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Chou En-lai on the Bombings on Hanoi and Haiphong

Chou En-lai has now spoken out against the bombings of Hanoi and Haiphong, but in what can be considered very mild and minimal terms. Following a call on him on April 16 by the DRV Chargé in Peking, during which the Chargé presented Chou with a copy of an April 15 NLF/PRG Central Committee appeal, Chou made a brief statement (Tab A)² containing the following points:

—He said that the Chinese Government and people “firmly support” the “just stand” of the NLF/PRG as contained in the appeal.

—He congratulated the “North Vietnamese people and army on the brilliant victories they have won on various battlefields.”

—He accused the U.S. of having embarked again on “the old track of war escalation,” including the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong. However, this had failed before and would fail this time. It would only make the Vietnamese people, North and South, unite more closely to fight and defeat “the common enemy.”

—He stressed that the peoples of Indochina would never stop fighting nor would the Chinese Government and people cease to support them, so long as U.S. “aggression” continued. “Victory certainly belongs to the heroic Vietnamese people and other Indochinese people.”

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 295, Memoranda to the President, April 1972. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. An April 17 covering memorandum to Kissinger indicates that Lord drafted this memorandum.

² Attached but not printed is the April 16 New China News Agency International Service report. Rodman was dispatched to New York on April 16 to deliver to the Chinese a 2-page message from the U.S. that reported that the DRV had cancelled the April 24 meeting. The message reads in part: “For the information of the Chinese side, the United States side is proposing to the North Vietnamese the following compromise: The United States is prepared to state that it will agree to resumption of the plenary sessions on April 27, 1972 if the North Vietnamese attend the private meeting agreed upon for April 24, 1972.” The message concluded that the “cavalier behavior of the North Vietnamese” had “forced the President to take certain retaliatory measures. A continuation of the North Vietnamese effort to impose a military solution on the U.S. must have very serious consequences. The President wants to reiterate that his fundamental objective remains a rapid end to the war on a basis just for both sides. His strong preference is for a negotiated solution and it is not by his choice that a resurgence of the conflict takes place.” The message and Rodman’s memorandum of conversation are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 121.

—He pointed out that “if the U.S. Government really wants to solve the Vietnam question, it must stop escalating the war and pushing the ‘Vietnamization’ policy, and resume negotiations in Paris and seriously consider and actively respond to the seven-point peace proposal put forward by the Provisional Revolutionary Government of the Republic of South Vietnam and the elaboration of the two key problems in the proposal.”

Comment: Chou’s line on this occasion is essentially what it has been before³—things are going very well for the “people” in both the South and the North, final victory will certainly be theirs despite the U.S. stepped-up military measures, the Chinese will continue to give their support so long as the fighting lasts, but no direct Chinese role is required. Chou’s remarks were *not* responsive to the NLF/PRG appeal’s call on “brothers and friends to demand that the Nixon Administration . . . end its escalation of the war against the DRV and to more strongly support and help the Vietnamese people in their efforts to completely defeat the U.S. aggressors.”

As before, Chou did not mention the Nixon Administration, but spoke only of “U.S. imperialism.” He referred only in passing to the bombing of Hanoi and Haiphong, citing it as just another instance of U.S. escalation and not as a major theme.

From the emphasis Chou placed on negotiations, it would appear that the Chinese would prefer a political settlement of the war rather than a continuation of the fighting.

³ Kissinger had sent a memorandum to Nixon on April 13 that discussed Chou En-lai’s views on Vietnam. Chou’s statement was prompted by the DRV’s April 11 statement, which was given to him by a DRV diplomat in Beijing. The April 11 statement was apparently prompted by DRV displeasure at the nature of the PRC’s April 10 statement on Vietnam. The memorandum to the President from Kissinger, drafted by Holdridge, concluded: “As indicated by the absence of references to the Nixon Administration, Peking is still trying to keep the Vietnam war separate from its relations with the U.S. There is no doubt, though, that Peking is indeed watching events in Vietnam very closely, and is concerned over the implications of the fighting on U.S.–PRC relations, particularly if heavy U.S. attacks on North Vietnam continue.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV)

222. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, April 18, 1972, 5:30–5:55 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Shin Yen-hua, Interpreter

Dr. Kissinger: We had your ping-pong team in Washington today. We had a very good session with your ping-pong team.²

Ambassador Huang: This morning?

Dr. Kissinger: At noon. The President received them at the White House. I saw some old friends, from the Foreign Ministry. (There was then a brief exchange on some of the Chinese with the team, including Mr. Chien and Dr. Kissinger's foreign office escort when he was in Peking.)

I already feel that they are old friends.

I have only a few items for you, Mr. Ambassador.

First, with respect to the note you handed us yesterday [*sic*],³ we are investigating it, but I can tell you now that if it happened, it was unintentional. We regret that it happened, and we shall take steps to reduce the possibility that it can happen again.

I must tell the Ambassador that I was at a dinner last night where they have two Chinese cooks. (Ambassador Huang laughs). It is embarrassing for other guests because I get very special treatment. They come in and shake my hand and talk to me.

Ambassador Huang: They certainly know you.

Dr. Kissinger: Through you.

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: I meant through our visits in China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No summary memorandum of this conversation has been found.

² Nixon met with the PRC table tennis team from 12:04 to 12:21 p.m. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary)

³ Huang Hua gave Rodman a short note at 1 a.m. on April 18 protesting the incursion of a U.S. aircraft over Hainan Island. (Message attached to Rodman's memorandum of conversation, April 18; *ibid.*, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 122.

The second thing I wanted you to know, for your information, is that we have learned that India has offered to Indonesia and Japan the same treaty commitment the Soviet Union has with India, and that they (India) have told Indonesia that they would be a bridge to the Soviet Union in this area. This is . . .⁴

Ambassador Huang: You mean that India will be the bridge between the Soviet Union and these countries?

Dr. Kissinger: India has offered exactly the same treaty, word for word, as the Indian–Soviet Union treaty. But this is simply for your information. We know that Japan has refused, and we think that Indonesia will refuse it.

Now, the major reason I wanted to see you was to tell you a rather delicate piece of information. You will remember, Mr. Ambassador, I told you, and before that I also told the Prime Minister, that the Soviet Government invited me on many occasions to come to Moscow to discuss the Summit, and I have always refused.

Now within recent days the Soviet Government has renewed this invitation and made it for a secret visit to review the summit and the entire international situation. In light of the rather complicated international situation, the President thought that I should go on a secret trip. And I shall therefore go within the next two days.⁵ (Ambassador Huang nods impassively.)

We wanted you to know. First, you are the only government being informed. We know that we can count on your discretion. We wanted you to know that all the principles we have discussed with the Prime Minister and other Chinese officials remain in full force as far as the President and I are concerned. (Ambassador Huang smokes a

⁴ Ellipses in the source text.

⁵ In a conversation immediately following the meeting with the PRC table tennis team (see footnote 2 above), Kissinger and Nixon discussed Sino-American relations and Kissinger's upcoming trip to New York. Kissinger affirmed: "I'm going to tell them [the Chinese] that they [the Soviets] invited me to go there [Moscow]. I had refused to go there just for the summit, but now they want to discuss the whole international situation." Nixon and Kissinger agreed that the trip would be a "jolt" to the Chinese. Kissinger added: "It doesn't hurt, we have to play it up with them as we're playing it up with Moscow." Nixon advised: "Be sure to say that the President has taken a very strong line with Moscow with regard to the China relationship, we will not let them discuss it in any way." Kissinger repeated that the Moscow trip will "shake them up." Nixon rejoined: "Good, so let them shake. They'll shake even more when we announce the Russian summit, but that's part of the deal." Kissinger answered: "No, the Russian summit we gave them advance warning of. But it's amazing that they're not playing the game that the Russians played with them, they're not needling the Russians about lack of support for Vietnam. They're beginning to needle Hanoi, with ambiguous references that imply we told you so." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, April 18, 1972, 12:21–1:46 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 711–14) Haldeman was also present for this meeting. The editor transcribed the portion of the tape recording printed here specifically for this volume.

little faster on his cigarette.) We will under no circumstances engage in any collusion, direct, or indirect, against the People's Republic (Ambassador Huang examines his napkin), or that could harm the interests of the People's Republic.

And as a sign of good faith, we tell you this ahead of time. When I return I shall call you, and within a few days upon my return, if you are agreeable, I will tell you the major outlines of what was discussed as we have always done.⁶

Ambassador Huang: What time will you return?

Dr. Kissinger: When will I be back?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I will be back on Sunday night or Monday night. No later than Monday night.

Ambassador Huang: We can fix a time when you are back.

Dr. Kissinger: I would prefer that, because I may be very busy immediately upon my return. If there is something that is especially urgent and I cannot get away, I will ask Mr. Lord, who will accompany me, to come see you.

In no event will you be faced with an unexpected situation. And I repeat, the previous piece of information that I gave you and the whole evolution since my visit to Peking, leaves us under no illusions as to the real purpose of the people we are visiting.

I must repeat again that this is very delicate information. We have told none of our allies or any other country.

Those are the principal items I have. I have one technical one which is related to my pedantic nature.

Miss Shih: What was that?

Dr. Kissinger: Pedantic character. He (Ambassador Huang) understands very well. (Ambassador Huang smiles.)

With all these visits I have to make my schedule many months ahead of time. Simply for my guidance, the best time for me to come to Peking after the Moscow Summit, which was arranged when the President was there (Peking), would be around June 24 for three or four days. I wonder whether the Prime Minister could let you know if

⁶ On April 26 Haig traveled to New York to meet with Huang Hua. According to the memorandum of conversation, Kissinger could not attend because he was helping Nixon prepare for a speech. Haig relayed information on the Soviet-American summit, arms talks, Vietnam, and other issues. He emphasized that "Nothing was discussed or agreed upon in any way which could harm the interests of the People's Republic of China." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 127.

that is convenient. Our difficulty after July 1 is that there is the Democratic Convention. I don't think I should be in Peking during the Democratic Convention.

Ambassador Huang: Three days or four days?

Dr. Kissinger: Three or four days. I am prepared to come for four days.

Ambassador Huang: June 24?

Dr. Kissinger: June 24 through June 28. I can do it anytime between the 21st through the 28th. I can't leave much later than the 28th. If three days earlier is convenient, we can do it, say from the 21st through the 25th.

That is all I have, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: I remember that previously General Haig, and you also, mentioned a correspondent named Joseph Alsop would like to visit China.

Dr. Kissinger: Very much.

Ambassador Huang: We agree to his visit to China. We are going to inform him of that and will ask him to contact our Embassy in Canada to work out a specific time about the visa problem.

Dr. Kissinger: He is out of the country right now, but he will be back at the end of the week. That is very courteous of you.

Ambassador Huang: I have nothing else to say.

(There was then further discussion about Mr. Alsop, with Dr. Kissinger saying he was very demanding but also intelligent and well disposed to the People's Republic of China. Light conversation included a brief discussion of the Chinese pandas that had just arrived in the United States. As the Ambassador was leaving, he wished Dr. Kissinger "a good journey," and Dr. Kissinger replied that it would not be as good as his one to Peking.)

223. Editorial Note

Senators Hugh Scott (R-Pennsylvania) and Mike Mansfield (D-Montana) visited the People's Republic of China and held a series of meetings with top officials from April 19 through 22, 1972. Memoranda of conversation with Deputy Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua, April 19 and 20, and Chou En-lai, April 20 and 22; reports from each Senator; and public statements made in Hong Kong are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box

316, Congressional, May–June 1972, Vol. 5. See also *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume E–13, Documents 123–126.

At the April 22 meeting, Scott and Mansfield focused on ending the war in Vietnam and obtaining the release of all United States prisoners of war. They also briefly raised Korea, exchanges between the United States and the People's Republic of China, and Americans held in the PRC. According to an April 12 memorandum from Holdridge to Kissinger, Admiral Elmo Zumwalt intended to brief the Senators about Americans imprisoned in China prior to their trip. Holdridge noted: "I do not see any reason why Senators Scott and Mansfield should not be briefed about the American prisoners in China, although in my opinion this should be done in a low-key way so as not to give the Chinese the impression we are carrying on a high-pressure campaign against them." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—general, April 1–June 22, 1972)

Chou En-lai revealed few specifics during these talks. For example, at the April 22 meeting, Chou raised the issue of Sino-Japanese relations and the dangers of a resurgent Japanese military. Near the end of their discussion, Mansfield asked Chou about the "timetable" for U.S. withdrawal from Taiwan, and added, "how do you expect to reclaim Taiwan?" Chou stated: "On this point I can only stand by our agreement that we should not discuss any issue we talked about—I can only say two sentences: (1) In any case, Taiwan will eventually return to the embrace of its motherland, and (2) in any case, the U.S. will finally withdraw all its troops from Taiwan."

After reviewing the memoranda of conversation and reports from this trip, Winston Lord wrote to Henry Kissinger on May 12 that "There is nothing in these materials that is particularly sensitive or startling." (Ibid., Box 1038, Mansfield/Scott Trip to China) Kissinger forwarded to the President the Senators' memoranda of conversation with a July 3 covering memorandum, noting that "While these materials contain no great insights regarding our developing relationship with the PRC, they do indicate that the Senators did an effective job in building on the official dialogue which we have initiated with the Chinese over the past year." (Ibid., Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, May–June 1972, Vol. 5)

Mansfield and Scott's trip to the PRC helped initiate a similar visit by members of the House of Representatives. In a February 29 memorandum to the Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations, Clark MacGregor, and Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, William Timmons, Deputy Assistant to the President for Congressional Relations, Richard K. Cook, reported, "Shortly after this morning's bi-partisan leadership meeting Jerry Ford called, expressing his and Speaker Albert's deep anger over the announcement that Mike Mansfield and Hugh Scott would visit the PRC in the near future."

Cook then called Albert and summarized the Speaker's points in a February 29 memorandum: 1) "The House has 'carried the water' for the President on foreign policy" and "should be treated on at least a co-equal basis with the Senate." 2) "The pre-eminence of the Senate in matters of foreign policy is an anachronism not consistent with recent legislative challenges to the Executive on foreign policy matters." 3) Ford and Albert were not consulted prior to the announcement. 4) "Mansfield and Scott have not evidenced loyalty to the President on 'gut' votes and that the PRC deliberately chose to invite 'friendly' U.S. legislators." After discussing the matter with Kissinger, Cook wrote that a visit by Ford and Hale Boggs (Albert said he could not go to the PRC) to China would be considered and that they would meet with Kissinger privately. (Ibid., Box 1036, Files for the President—China Material, China—general—Feb. 27–March 31, 1972) Boggs and Ford visited the PRC June 26–July 4. Documentation is *ibid.*, Box 1038, China—Boggs/Ford trip, June–July 1972, and *ibid.*, Subject Files, Box 316, Congressional, July–August 1972, Vol. 6.

224. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, April 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Transfer of Two Submarines to Taiwan

At Tab A is a CNO message sent April 26 about noon to Chief MAAG Taipei approving the sale of two submarines to the Republic of China (ROC).²

So far as we know, this message does not have a White House clearance. If this is so, CNO's action would be contrary to (a) General Haig's memorandum of October 21, 1971³ asking DOD to obtain your clearance on the transfer of all major items of military equipment to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Haig. Kissinger's handwritten comment at the top of this memorandum reads: "What *are* the answers to these questions? Zumwalt freewheels too much."

² Attached but not printed is CNO telegram 2617242 to CHMAAG Taipei, April 26.

³ Document 160.

the ROC; and (b) Jeanne Davis' request last week that State and DOD send a joint memorandum to you or the President on the transfer of submarines to the ROC.

State has asked Embassy Taipei to hold up notifying the ROC until we have sorted this matter out here.

State cleared the CNO message in draft on the explicit understanding that DOD would obtain General Haig's clearance.

The CNO message also leaves unanswered the following questions:

—Why two, rather than one, submarines must be transferred to the ROC.

—Why the torpedo tubes and other equipment giving the subs an offensive potential are apparently not being removed. The subs are to be used only for anti-submarine warfare training. Thus, if we are going to transfer the craft, we would at least reduce the political irritation to Peking by being able to argue that the subs have virtually no offensive potential.

—Why the craft are being sold to the ROC for scrap value (of about \$150,000 apiece) rather than for their much higher current value.⁴

⁴ In an April 29 memorandum from Holdridge, Haig indicated that he did not authorize the CNO's message but wrote: "Go ahead w/transfer per HAK-Laird discussion." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) However, in a May 11 memorandum to Haig, Holdridge requested guidance on the three questions raised in his April 28 memorandum. He asked if only one submarine should be transferred. Haig wrote on this memorandum: "None—for now. Raise only after S.E. Asia clarifys." (Ibid.) On May 16 Haig sent a memorandum to Eliot and Pursley that reads in its entirety: "We are aware of the wish of the Republic of China to have its submarine crew now training at the New London Naval Base begin training on the Republic's own submarine at the mid-point of the course. However, it is desired that no offer to transfer one or more submarines to the Republic of China be extended at this time." (Ibid.)

225. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, May 3, 1972, 3:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Mr. James C.H. Shen, Ambassador of the Republic of China to the United States
Mr. Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Embassy of the Republic of China
Mr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Mr. John A. Froebe, Jr., NSC Staff Member

SUBJECT

Review of Ambassador Shen's Taipei Consultations

Ambassador Shen said that he had spent a useful ten days in Taipei on consultation during the latter half of March. He saw President Chiang twice and Vice President Yen twice, but had spent more time with Deputy Premier Chiang Ching-kuo. Ambassador Shen said that President Chiang had asked him to reciprocate President Nixon's greetings which the President on March 6 had asked Ambassador Shen to convey to President Chiang.² Ambassador Shen said Deputy Premier Chiang had also asked that he convey his to Mr. Kissinger. Shen said that his time in Taipei had given him a good chance to observe the reaction there to events of recent months, and added that he had found people to be taking it well in stride.

Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. had held to its promises and that the U.S. is moving ahead only at a slow pace in its efforts to improve relations with Peking.

U.S.–PRC Discussions in Paris

Ambassador Shen complained that he had been unable to learn from the Department of State anything as to the progress of U.S. discussions in Paris with the PRC. Mr. Kissinger replied that there have been no political discussions in Paris, only exploration of the development of exchanges of various sorts. Asked, Mr. Kissinger said that the U.S. Government definitely would keep the Republic of China informed of developments in the Paris channel.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret; Sensitive. According to the attached May 10 covering memorandum from Froebe to Kissinger through Holdridge, Kissinger approved this memorandum of conversation and wanted no further distribution of it. The meeting was held in the White House from 3:20 to 3:35 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438 Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² See Document 207.

U.S. Military Assistance to the ROC

Ambassador Shen said that the Deputy Premier had asked him to stress two things to Mr. Kissinger upon his return to Washington. First, the GRC's basic policy of opposition to Communism remains unchanged. It has had no contacts with the Soviet Union. Second, the GRC has not been in touch with the Chinese Communists and it does not intend to establish any contacts with Peking. Similarly, Peking has not so far attempted to contact Taipei, although GRC officials believe that the Chinese Communists may well try to establish such contacts in the future.

Mr. Kissinger asked Ambassador Shen to inform his Government that U.S. Government contacts with Peking are now on the technical level, dealing with the problems of developing exchange programs and handling the cases of individuals. He reiterated that the U.S. has had no discussions of substance with the PRC in Paris.

Ambassador Shen asked what reason Huang Chen had given for departing Paris for Peking. Mr. Kissinger, taking note of Huang Chen's absence, said he understood that Huang would return before long, and added that in Huang's absence our Embassy in Paris had been in touch with a First Secretary of the PRC Embassy.

Ambassador Shen said that he had not brought a shopping list back to Washington, but had been asked by Taipei to check on the status of several items of military assistance: the transfer of 200 M-48 tanks, MAP support of 100 F-5Es and 45 F-5Bs for conversion of fighters and for training purposes, Phase II co-production of UH-1H helicopters and of T-54 helicopter engines and waiver of the ten percent military assistance deposit requirement. Mr. Kissinger assured Ambassador Shen that the White House was not holding these items up, and asked Mr. Froebe to give him a report on this list by the following Monday.³

³ Davis asked the Departments of State and Defense for "a coordinated status report" by May 9 (a Tuesday) on the military hardware raised by Shen. (Memorandum from Davis to Eliot and Pursley, May 4; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-8 US-CHINAT) On May 12 Eliot sent a 9-page status report to Kissinger. (Ibid.) Froebe reported to Kissinger on June 20 that Defense and State agreed on credits for helicopter co-production and that the 10 percent deposit requirement should not be waived. State and Defense disagreed on transfer of 400 M-48 tanks, funding of fighter and training aircraft, and a T-53 helicopter engine assembly program. Froebe suggested that Kissinger ask Rogers to provide a "coordinated State-Defense memorandum giving their views on these items for the President's consideration." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "Can't we [do this] informally without rubbing his [Rogers'] nose in it?" An undated covering note attached to the memorandum from Holdridge to Kennedy noted: "Dick: Looking at HAK's comment, he seems to have missed the point. Far from any intention of rubbing it in, we only want to assert his policy primacy as regards to military assistance. Our concern, of course, is that Tarr may try to move in on this area, indicated here by the statement in State's memorandum that 'he will resolve the State/Defense differences' on the three assistance items for the ROC."

Ambassador Shen also asked the prospects for the transfer of F-4 fighter aircraft. Mr. Kissinger suggested that we first take care of the list of items Ambassador Shen had just given him, and then turn to the question of F-4s. Ambassador Shen asked why the sensitivity over F-4s. Mr. Kissinger replied that Phantoms invariably raise sensitivities, and asked Ambassador Shen if his government had ever made a formal request for these aircraft. Ambassador Shen said that the Vice President had been asked about the transfer of F-4s when he was in Taipei in August 1970, and added that Congress had considered the matter in late 1969 and early 1970. Mr. Kissinger mentioned that Senator Goldwater had on occasion mentioned the matter of F-4s for the ROC, and added that he would check into the matter.

Current North Vietnamese Offensive

Asked about the current situation in Vietnam, Mr. Kissinger said the crux of the matter now involves the offensives of three to four North Vietnamese divisions. The question is how long these forces can maintain the momentum of their present drive. If the South Vietnamese can establish a defense around Hue, the North Vietnamese can probably be punished so badly that the steam can be taken out of their offensive. Ambassador Shen said that he had been encouraged by the President's television statement on Vietnam last week, but asked if the North Vietnamese can still be stopped. Mr. Kissinger replied that they could.

Mr. Kissinger's Japan Trip

Ambassador Shen asked Mr. Kissinger when he was departing for Japan. Mr. Kissinger said that the timing of the visit depends upon the Vietnam situation. Ambassador Shen asked if Mr. Kissinger would be able to visit other countries in East Asia after Japan. Mr. Kissinger replied that he planned to visit only Japan. Asked what the content of his discussions in Japan would include, Mr. Kissinger said that he would rule out economics, except in terms of general principles. When Ambassador Shen returned to the possibility of Mr. Kissinger's including other countries in his trip, Mr. Kissinger thanked him for his thoughtfulness and noted that Korea had already been suggested. Asked if the Japan visit would come before the President's Moscow trip, Mr. Kissinger said he hoped this would be the case, or, if not, certainly immediately thereafter. In response to Ambassador Shen's question, Mr. Kissinger said he had visited Japan before—in 1962 when, he recalled, the ROC Ambassador had given him a dinner.

Ambassador Shen, noting that President Chiang would be inaugurated for his fifth term on May 20, asked if the United States Government planned to announce soon the fact that Ambassador Eisenhower would represent the President at that event. Mr. Froebe said that an announcement was planned for probably tomorrow.

Prospects for U.S.–PRC Relations

Ambassador Shen asked if there was anything else the ROC could do to contribute to its relationship with the United States at this point. Mr. Kissinger said the two governments should stay in close touch, and again assured Ambassador Shen the U.S. was moving forward slowly in its efforts to improve relations with Peking. Ambassador Shen said that much of this problem would seem to depend on how far the U.S. has decided to move in its relationship with Peking. Mr. Kissinger replied that the U.S. had no intention of going much beyond where it is now, and, responding to Ambassador Shen's question, affirmed this would hold true for the foreseeable future.

226. Letter From President Nixon to the Premier of the People's Republic of China Chou En-lai¹

Washington, May 8, 1972.

Dear Mr. Premier:

I want to inform you personally of a major decision I have made concerning Southeast Asia which I am announcing tonight.²

In recent weeks we have intensified our efforts to find a just peace in Indochina. We have resumed negotiations with the North Vietnamese in public and private forums and have offered to discuss either mutual de-escalation or a settlement of military issues alone or a comprehensive settlement. At the same time we have used all available means to point out the consequences of Hanoi's trying to impose a military solution.

The response to our efforts has been North Vietnam's massive escalation of the war and complete intransigence in public and private negotiations. In these circumstances, I have ordered certain military actions in order to bring this conflict to a close. Effective immediately, all entrances to North Vietnamese ports are being mined and United States forces have been directed to take appropriate measures to prevent ships from delivering supplies to North Vietnam. Rail and other communications within North Vietnam will be interrupted to the maximum extent possible.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 114, Geopolitical Files, China, Nixon, Richard M., Letters to Mao and Chou. No classification marking.

² Nixon announced his decision to mine North Vietnamese harbors at 9 p.m., Eastern Standard Time. See *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, pp. 583–587.

These actions are not directed at any other nation. Special care has been taken that all foreign vessels currently in North Vietnamese ports will be able to depart safely within three daylight periods. After that time any ships attempting to leave or enter these ports will do so at their own risk. It is my hope that there will be no incidents involving third countries.

These operations are designed to bring the conflict to a rapid end on a basis just to both sides. They will stop when American prisoners of war are returned and there is an internationally supervised cease-fire throughout Indochina. When these conditions are met, we will stop all of our military acts of force throughout Indochina and proceed with a complete withdrawal of all American forces from Vietnam within four months.

We understand that the People's Republic of China must take certain formal positions in response to these developments. At the same time, in the spirit of frankness that has characterized our conversations thus far, we would hope that you would understand the imperatives that have forced this decision upon us.

It is easy to employ phrases like "imperialism." Such slogans will not stand the test of the reasonable proposal I am setting forth this evening to end the war. Our terms provide for the United States to withdraw with honor. They would end the suffering and bring prisoners home. They would not require surrender and humiliation on the part of either side. They would allow negotiation on a political settlement that reflects the popular will. They would permit all the nations which have suffered in this long war to turn at last to the urgent works of healing and peace. They deserve immediate acceptance by North Vietnam.

You know our position from our exchanges ever since last July. We have assured you—as we have assured the North Vietnamese—that we do not seek a victory in any sense. We do not seek territory or bases or a permanent force or an American-sponsored government in South Vietnam. As part of either a military settlement or a comprehensive settlement we remain prepared to withdraw all American forces, without leaving any residual force behind. We have only one objective—to let the South Vietnamese determine their political future free from outside interference.

On the other hand, we have also told you of the serious consequences that could ensue if North Vietnam were to launch the massive assault which is now taking place and is designed to embarrass the United States.

It should be clear that it is not the United States which represents a long-term threat to the People's Republic of China. It is not the United States which seeks a long term presence in Indochina.

During the past three years the People's Republic of China and the United States have been patiently opening a new relationship based on the profound interests of both countries. We now face an important decision. We must consider whether the short term perspectives of a smaller nation—all of whose own reasonable objectives could so clearly be achieved—can be allowed to threaten all the progress that we have made. I would hope that after the immediate passions have cooled, we will concentrate on longer term interests.

I have no higher goal in my foreign policy than to build upon the positive beginning that together we made in February. It would be a deep disappointment to me if North Vietnamese actions were to jeopardize this beginning. There is no need for this to happen.

This is an opportunity for statesmanship. It is an opportunity for a decisive turn toward peace. We are willing to cooperate with any country to bring about an immediate settlement without the sacrificing of principles. There can be an early peace in Indochina that will meet the concerns of all parties, including both North Vietnam and the People's Republic of China. And such a solution will allow our two countries to make further progress in our bilateral relations, for the sake of our two peoples and the peoples of the world.³

Yours sincerely,

Richard Nixon

³ The letter was delivered by Rodman to Huang Hua in New York on the morning of May 8. A memorandum of conversation between Rodman and Huang Hua, May 8, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 128.

227. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

My May 16 Meeting with the Chinese

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. The memorandum is marked "not forwarded" and was not initialed by Kissinger.

I met with Chinese Ambassador Huang Hua in New York for an hour in the evening, on May 16, to outline for his Government the prospects for the Moscow Summit. We also discussed the Indochina situation, in a somber but restrained fashion. The full transcript is at Tab 1,² and highlights follow.

The Moscow Summit

Noting that we were not giving this information to any other government, I proceeded to outline for the Ambassador the major agreements and issues that we expected in Moscow:

—First, I handed a paper summarizing the various bilateral agreements we expect to sign in Moscow, such as SALT, space cooperation, environmental cooperation, etc. (Tab A)³

—Then, I verbally outlined the statement of principles on US–Soviet relations which we are in the process of drafting. (Talking points on these principles at Tab B.)⁴ I pointed out that in some respects these principles were similar to those in the Shanghai Communiqué and I added that we had inserted a couple of points which were designed to prevent implications for third countries and counter the Brezhnev Doctrine.

—In response to a Soviet suggestion for a bilateral nuclear non-aggression pact, I said that we would not agree to their formulation which could be interpreted as sanctifying nuclear weapons against third countries, and said that any agreement in this area would express a general attitude on nuclear weapons rather than specific obligations.

—I reaffirmed the enormous importance we placed in our relations with the PRC. We would sign no agreements knowingly that would be against their interests, were prepared to conclude any agreements with Peking that we did with Moscow, and welcomed their comments on negotiations that caused them concern.

Comment: The Ambassador, as usual, listened impassively to this presentation. I think that discussion, on top of all the previous briefings we have given them, should prepare the Chinese for the impressive set of agreements we will sign in Moscow.

² The 9-page memorandum of conversation is attached but not printed. Lord accompanied Kissinger to New York. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 129.

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed is a paper detailing the three agreements mentioned by Kissinger and additional agreements concerning Health, Science and Technology, Maritime, Incidents at Sea, and a Joint Commercial Commission. See *ibid.*

⁴ Attached at Tab B but not printed are the talking points listing the 12 principles. See *ibid.*

Indochina

In addition to Europe, I cited Indochina as a logical agenda item for your talks with the Soviet leaders. I informed the Ambassador about the proposal from “various sources” (i.e., the Russians) that we resume the Paris plenary sessions. I said that we believed a private meeting was necessary first in order to determine whether there would be progress, and that we had proposed a secret meeting in Paris on May 21. There followed a brief, moderate exchange on Indochina along the following lines:

—Referring to press reports that day of Chou’s saying that we had strayed from the Shanghai Communiqué with our military actions, I reminded the Ambassador that we had warned the PRC a half-dozen times since your Peking trip about our intention to react strongly if Hanoi attempted to impose a military solution. In any event, we had kept, and would keep, all the promises we made, whether in the Shanghai Communiqué or informally.

—Ambassador Huang referred to the PRC public statements a few days ago as the authoritative Chinese position.⁵ He added that the Chinese would support the Vietnamese people against our aggression and for national salvation until the end.

—He then asked whether we had any more facts about the alleged damage done by US forces to Chinese merchant ships earlier this month.⁶ I told him that an investigation was underway but that preliminary reports indicated that US forces had inadvertently caused damage to Chinese ships while attacking North Vietnamese barges. I expressed regrets on your behalf and said that if they would give us an estimate of damage, we would look into the question of compensation. (We had already conveyed this position to the Chinese as soon as they published their protest so as to forestall any heightening of the rhetoric.)

—I then made a general pitch on Indochina along familiar lines, underlining that we did not represent the long-term threat in the region and that it served no country’s interests for Hanoi to attempt to solve the question by force.

Comment: The Ambassador, though he seemed somewhat more solemn than usual, was restrained on Indochina and seemed to go through the motions. This was still further evidence of moderate Chinese response to your military actions.

⁵ See “Statement of the Government of the People’s Republic of China,” *Peking Review*, 20 (May 19, 1972), p. 6.

⁶ The PRC publicly made its displeasure known with a statement on May 9. See *Peking Review*, 19 (May 12, 1972), p. 4.

Miscellaneous

Other topics included:

—I told the Ambassador that Senators Mansfield and Scott had come back with a positive report to you on their trip.

—I proposed that my June 21–25 trip to the PRC be announced June 13 and gave the Ambassador a suggested text (Tab C).⁷

—I informed him that I would probably be going to Japan in early June.

⁷ Tab C is attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 129. In a June 3 memorandum to Kissinger, Lord reported on his brief meeting with Huang in New York. The PRC representative suggested that Kissinger’s visit be changed to June 19–23 because “there is another important visit to China beginning June 24 which cannot be put off.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 130. The White House announced the trip at 11 a.m. on June 14. (News Conference #1468; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Country Files, Far East, U.S. China Policy, 1969–1972)

228. National Security Decision Memorandum 170¹

Washington, June 8, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Treasury
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Agriculture
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

US–PRC Trade

The President has reviewed the memorandum submitted by the Department of State, with the Department of Commerce, on April 24 and the response to NSSM 149 submitted by the Ad Hoc Group on

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis; Homer. The typewritten date on this memorandum, June 10, was changed by hand. Also issued as a Council on International Economic Policy Decision Memorandum.

March 24 on the above subject.² Based on these, he has approved the recommendations for actions over the next three months contained in the April 24 memorandum for proceeding to implement the statement on trade in the Shanghai communiqué with the following modifications:

—The memorandum for Ambassador Huang should indicate that we recognize the PRC's interest in MFN but view this as a subject for later discussion.³

—The matter of alleged PRC failure to repay Export-Import Bank debt should not be raised by the PRC at this time. An interagency committee chaired by Treasury should examine this question and its effect on PRC eligibility for Export-Import Bank financing, and submit a report to the President by July 3.

—The memorandum for Ambassador Huang should place greater stress on the necessity of beginning discussions in the near future on the settlement of the claims issue.

—References to the cotton textile issue and to US anti-dumping regulations and US prohibitions on imports of "certain endangered animal species" should be removed from the memorandum for Ambassador Huang. These matters should be dealt with in separate memoranda to be presented to Ambassador Huang within the next several weeks. In his oral presentation, Ambassador Watson should indicate that we intend to provide the PRC with such memoranda shortly. Memoranda on these subjects together with recommendations as to the timing of their presentation should be submitted to the President by June 23.⁴

—No mention should be made to the PRC at this time of possible US changes in transportation regulations. The Department of State, in cooperation with other appropriate agencies, should submit to the President as soon as possible documents necessary to revise US regulations regarding reciprocal visits by ships and aircraft. A draft statement announcing such decisions as well as a statement indicating that eventual establishment of scheduled air services would be subject to US–PRC inter-Governmental discussions should also be submitted.

As to recommendations for longer term steps, the President has deferred his decision and requests that they be resubmitted with

² On April 24 Brown forwarded to Kissinger a covering memorandum and an 8-page report on recommendations for implementing NSSM 149. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US) Regarding the March 24 response to NSSM 149, see Documents 217 and 219. NSSM 149 is printed as Document 208.

³ See Document 242.

⁴ Approved by Haig in the White House and sent as telegram 150506 to Paris, August 17. (Memorandum from Hormats to Haig, August 14, with attached telegram; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris)

proposed memoranda, where appropriate, and specific recommendations as to timing.⁵

Henry A. Kissinger
PMF

⁵ On June 12 Kissinger and Flanigan sent a memorandum to Rogers, Laird, Peterson, and NASA Administrator Dr. James C. Fletcher announcing that “in the review taking place on COCOM the United States should adopt as a general principle the termination of differential treatment for the PRC as the basis for development of the United States negotiating position. In the event that there are particular items which we and other COCOM countries agree should be treated on a differential basis, we should endeavor to apply the concept of ‘disguised differential.’” (Ibid., Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV)

229. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 9, 1972.

SUBJECT

Possible Next Steps in Sino-US Relations

Following is an analysis of possible next steps in Sino-American relations. It has been worked out in close coordination with a Department of State paper.² As the State analysis is somewhat less inclusive than this version, but with an otherwise substantial degree of overlap, we will cable only this version to avoid redundancy.³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, Harold Saunders Files, Richard Solomon Chron Files, 1972. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent through Haig.

² A June 9 memorandum from Rogers to Nixon is attached but not printed. Included with Rogers’ memorandum are two attachments: Joint US–PRC Trade Commission and U.S. Representation in Peking, and Air Travel.

³ This memorandum was apparently sent as a telegram to Kissinger, who was in Japan June 8–12.

I—Where We Stand—PRC Actions since the Peking Summit

Since the signing of the February 28 Shanghai Communiqué, there have been a number of solid indications that the Chinese are living up to the spirit of that document and wish to sustain the momentum of our developing relationship.

In the field of official exchanges, the Chinese again proved to be superb hosts during the April 18–May 3 visit of Senators Mansfield and Scott, despite the increasing tension in Indochina at that time. In addition, plans are moving ahead smoothly for the June 26–July 5 visit of Congressmen Boggs and Ford.

Little progress has been made in establishing a formal framework for other exchanges, but Ambassador Watson has met three times with PRC Ambassador Huang Chen and, in Huang's extended absence, once with the PRC Chargé. Working-level contact has also been established between the two Paris embassies on a routine basis. At a non-governmental level, a PRC table tennis team made a successful tour of the United States in April—which included a meeting with the President—and a group of Chinese physicians will probably visit the US in late June or July under the auspices of the National Institute of Health and the AMA. The PRC also recently played host to Dr. Wang Chi of the Library of Congress, to Professor John K. Fairbank of Harvard, and to a group from the Federation of American Scientists.

Consistent with its pledge to facilitate trade, Peking invited 40 American businessmen to the Canton Fair in April/May for the first time and accorded them preferential treatment. Contracts were concluded for about \$5 million worth of Chinese exports. Although no US export contracts were concluded at the Fair itself, Peking has reportedly made a firm offer to buy several Boeing 707 aircraft, is negotiating other purchases from Lockheed, and has asked Hughes Aircraft Corporation to submit a proposal for a domestic communications satellite system.⁴ RCA

⁴ In a May 19 memorandum to Flanigan and Kissinger, Harold B. Scott, Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Domestic and International Business, noted that Boeing sought "approval and appropriate guidance for further negotiations with the PRC." He added that a committee of representatives from Defense, State, Commerce, and NASA agreed that Boeing should negotiate with the PRC "subject to obtaining an export license and prior CoCom clearance and provided that Boeing can satisfy the U.S. Government and (a) The end-use of the aircraft is for regularly-scheduled civilian service; and (b) The only equipment requested would be normal for such regularly-scheduled civilian service." On May 23 Hormats and Holdridge summarized Scott's memorandum for Haig and suggested that the NSC approve Boeing's negotiations. A May 26 note from Jim Hackett of the NSC staff to Jon Howe reads in part: "Commerce needs a decision urgently (the Boeing negotiators are now in Peking)." A handwritten notation reads: "Heavy pressure on this." A May 29 memorandum to Secretary of Commerce Peter Peterson, signed by Haig for Kissinger, noted that Flanigan and Kissinger approved the negotiations, subject to the two requirements mentioned in Scott's memorandum. (All in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV)

has also been asked to upgrade its temporary earth satellite station at Shanghai to permanent status and to construct an additional satellite station in Peking.⁵

It should be emphasized that these developments have occurred in a political context—particularly the situation in Vietnam—which under other circumstances might have been expected to elicit a hostile response from the PRC. The nature of Peking's behavior seems to be a firm indication of a genuine desire to further improve its relationship with the United States. Consistent with its general approach to Indochina since shortly before the President's China trip, Peking has muted its comments on the US mining of the DRV coast and its pledges of support to Hanoi.⁶ Peking also has dragged its feet in responding to Soviet and East European efforts to reroute cargoes through China. These responses may stem in part from PRC displeasure with the North Vietnamese offensive which triggered the US response. Refusal to cooperate with the Soviets also has other obvious motivations.

More importantly from our perspective, however, the Chinese low-key approach appears to be the product of a PRC assessment that the President seriously intends to disengage from Vietnam and Peking's desire not to take any action which would pose a challenge to that plan. Even in an area of extreme sensitivity in our bilateral relations—the US military presence in Taiwan—Peking has remained silent over the recent deployment of two squadrons of C-130 aircraft to CCK airbase. PRC propagandists also have foregone any derisive comment on the Moscow summit meeting, in sharp contrast to Soviet behavior during the Peking summit.

II—Possible Further Areas for Initiative

Peking's behavior suggests that the Chinese leadership may be responsive to further US initiatives in the areas of political contact, cultural exchange, and trade. Following are a series of concrete steps that might be taken in each of these general areas.

A. *Political.* It is assumed that developments in Vietnam and in US-Soviet relations following the Moscow summit are of intense con-

⁵ This equipment had been installed for Nixon's visit. In a March 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird recommended approval of the earth station in Shanghai but denial of a license to sell 18 additional "videovoice" terminals. In a March 14 memorandum to Laird, Rogers, and Peterson, Kissinger approved the sale of the equipment already in the PRC and deferred a decision on the other equipment, stating that "these should be considered within the USG anew on their own merits." He concluded: "we should reject any effort to interpret the U.S. sale of the RCA satellite earth station and related equipment to the PRC as a basic change in the U.S. policy on the embargo of strategic communications generally." (Both *ibid.*, Box 1349, NSC Files, 2 of 2, 1971)

⁶ See Document 226 and footnote 5, Document 227.

cern to the Chinese leadership (even—or particularly—if they appear indifferent or noncommittal). Beyond these issues, however, are a number of political areas relevant to progress in Sino-American relations:

1) *Korea and the UN*. While Chinese Foreign Ministry officials have expressed the view that debate on the Korean issue is unavoidable at the coming 27th UNGA, we might seek a coordinated position with Peking (and Moscow) to avoid an acrimonious public debate which would likely polarize positions just at a time when, in the light of the growing yet fragile contacts between Seoul and Pyongyang, deferment of a GA debate would be of greatest interest to the major parties concerned.

2) *A Chou En-lai Appearance at the 27th UNGA, and Meeting with President Nixon*. The Chinese may be interested in emphasizing their re-entrance onto the world political stage through a Chou En-lai appearance at the UNGA session this fall. If progress in such areas as Vietnam and Korea permits, a Chou visit to New York in the fall might be coordinated with a meeting with President Nixon which would enable him to reciprocate the hospitality of the Chinese leader and to provide an opportunity for further talks.

3) *US Prisoners in China*. During his discussions with Senators Scott and Mansfield, Chou En-lai cryptically noted that the case of John Downey was being given “added consideration”. Downey’s release in the late summer or fall would obviously be timely.⁷

4) *Narcotics Control*. We might comment to the Chinese on our gratification at the remarks of their delegate regarding the drug problem at the May 16th session of ECOSOC, and indicate our interest in working with them to solve this major world problem.⁸

5) *Ocean Laws*. We might indicate to the Chinese our satisfaction that their most recent protest over possible intrusion by US craft into areas they claim in the Paracel Islands was conveyed privately. We

⁷ See Document 223.

⁸ In a June 16 memorandum to Kissinger, Eliot noted that Nelson Gross, Senior Adviser to the Secretary and Coordinator for International Narcotics Matters, had been advised by Holdridge “that it might now be appropriate to raise several topics concerning international narcotics with the People’s Republic of China. (Egil Krogh, Executive Director of the Cabinet Committee on International Narcotics Matters, agrees.)” According to the memorandum, Gross felt that two important issues were PRC assistance in interdicting narcotics traffic around Hong Kong and efforts to control opium production and traffic in Burma. He suggested discussing these issues through the UN and pointed out two specific actions that could be taken. First was to encourage “PRC accession to the Single Convention and to the Amending Protocol opened for signature on March 25.” Second was to encourage PRC membership in the UN Commission on Narcotic Drugs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris)

could indicate US efforts to prevent reoccurrences, but explain that we are uncertain of the rules under which the PRC delimits its territorial waters. We could then suggest that experts from both our countries convene to discuss delineation of boundaries as well as to review the range of issues likely to come up at the 1973 UN Conference of the Law of the Seas.

B. *Economic*. We have received a number of CAS and State reports which indicate that PRC officials are concerned about several legal and financial barriers to the development of trade with the US, and that they would like to purchase a range of American products (particularly those embodying advanced technology). Thus we might take a number of concrete steps to facilitate the expansion of trade.

1) *Propose the establishment of a Joint US–PRC Trade Commission (perhaps based in Peking)*. Such a Commission would be devoted to the resolution of bilateral trade problems and the promotion of Sino–American trade in the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. This would follow the precedent of the binational trade commissions recently established with the USSR and Poland. As well, such a Commission—if based in Peking—would provide continuous US representation in the Chinese capital. While unilateral “official” US representation almost certainly remains unacceptable to Peking, the time may be ripe for detailed exploration of alternative forms of representation which would enable us to deal with impediments to Sino–American trade such as private claims against the PRC and the related frozen assets problem, the issue of MFN status and tariff barriers, and additional regulatory constraints.

1-a) *Propose that a Joint Congressional Commercial Delegation Visit the PRC*. If a formal PRC–US Trade Commission is unacceptable to the Chinese, we could suggest the visit to the PRC of a more informal, but authoritative Congressional group to discuss matters of mutual interest. It might be noted that Chou En-lai proposed to Senators Scott and Mansfield that the Senate Commerce Committee organize a delegation to come to the PRC for wide-ranging discussions. Senator Magnuson is in the process of following up on Chou’s lead. As well, Congressman Boggs plans to discuss commercial matters with the Chinese in late June. We suspect that PRC officials may not fully appreciate the Congressional and bureaucratic lay of the land involved in dealing with such problems as MFN and blocked assets. As matters now stand they are being exposed to US commerce in bits and pieces. Hence it would seem to be in our mutual interest to propose a unified and authoritative forum for discussing these issues.

2) *Private US Claims Against the PRC*. Seek an explicit agreement in principle to negotiate a settlement of the claims issue, either through a Joint Commission as proposed above, via talks at Paris, or in the context of a visit of a senior U.S. representative to Peking.

As emphasized in U/SM-91, NSSM-149, and the follow-up memorandum to NSSM-149,⁹ a claims settlement is a first-priority issue in the development of Sino-American trade. A settlement is essential to forestall disruption of US-PRC trade by lawsuits and attachments of PRC commercial property by private US claimants. During informal conversation with Secretary Rogers in Peking on February 23, Foreign Minister Chi indicated that the claims question was one which could be discussed between the US and PRC.

3) *Air and Ship Travel*. Seek an explicit agreement in principle to discuss reciprocal shipping and air service between the US and the PRC, either through the Joint Commission proposed above or at Paris.

This issue should be approached in accordance with the recommendations of NSSM-149 and its follow-up memorandum.

4) *Trade Exhibitions*. Seek an agreement to exchange trade exhibitions during the fall, or at least to have an American trade exhibition in China, perhaps in Shanghai before the fall Canton Trade Fair.

C. *Exchanges*. The successful tour of the US by the PRC ping pong team, and an imminent visit to this country of a group of Chinese doctors, indicates that the PRC intends to facilitate exchanges in a sustained and orderly manner. NSSM-148 and its follow-up memorandum suggest initiating discussions at Paris to regularize procedures for promoting exchanges.¹⁰ Sino-American contact at the senior level can be used to advance the progress of discussions at Paris.

1) *Propose "Regularization" of Procedures for Managing Exchanges*. Express to the PRC our pleasure at the progress made to date in the development of exchange programs. Indicate that we think it would be helpful to both sides to regularize procedures for selecting and managing exchange programs. On the assumption that they wish to continue the quasi-people-to-people approach utilized thus far, indicate that there are two private groups which the USG feels are worthy of confidence in managing exchanges: Scientific and scholarly programs would be facilitated by the Joint Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, a group that links the National Academy of Science, the Social Science Research Council, and the American Council of Learned Societies. Cultural programs would be facilitated by the National Committee on US-China Relations.

⁹ The follow-up memorandum was requested by Kissinger at the March 31 Senior Review Group meeting. See Document 218. Regarding the April 24 paper, see footnote 2, Document 228.

¹⁰ On April 24 Eliot sent the follow-up memorandum to NSSM 148 to Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 529, Country Files, Far East, Homer, US-PRC Negotiations, Paris)

Indicate that we understand the PRC has had experience in dealing with both groups in connection with the ping pong and doctors' visits, and suggest that our embassies at Paris proceed to work out the details for processing exchange proposals on the assumption that the above two groups will be facilitating organizations on our side, with the Department of State providing authoritative communication and security where necessary.

2) *Propose Specific Exchange Programs.* If PRC authorities are reluctant to regularize a procedure for managing exchanges, propose a set of specific programs in such areas as education (exchanges of advanced students), scientific research (agronomy, medicine, etc.), sports (basketball, gymnastics), or the arts (Peking opera, dance groups, etc.)

230. Memorandum From Richard H. Solomon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 12, 1972.

SUBJECT

PRC Foreign Ministry Statement Attacks U.S. on Vietnam Bombings

Two days after another official protest from Hanoi of June 10 in response to U.S. air raids of June 6 and 8, the Foreign Ministry in Peking has now issued a strongly worded statement supporting Hanoi and suggesting in terms not heard for some time that China's security is being threatened by the U.S. bombing. While Peking's statement toned down much of the political invective in the Hanoi version (for instance, Peking did not attack the President by name, only "U.S. imperialism"), the bombing was described as a "grave provocation against the Chinese people."

In the first interlinking of the matter of China's security with the Indochina war since the Lam Son 719 exercise in early 1971, Peking asserted that the U.S. "has steadily expanded the sphere of bombing up to areas close to the Sino-Vietnamese borders, threatening the security

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. IV. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. Kissinger and Haig initialed the document.

of China." And for the first time in months it was noted that China and Vietnam are "closely related like the lips and the teeth."

In a most unusual final paragraph, which seems directly addressed to high Administration officials, the statement asserts that "U.S. imperialism should know that the heroic peoples of Vietnam and the other Indochinese countries are by no means alone in their struggle."

Despite the verbal escalation in this statement, it does not imply that the PRC will take any action against the U.S. or challenge our evolving relationship.

The timing and tone of the official protest can be accounted for at a number of levels of interpretation:

—It may very well reflect PRC concern about our interdiction campaign, which has U.S. planes bombing only minutes away from their border, if that far.²

—Hanoi may have needled the Chinese for a stronger statement, given the low-key nature of recent PRC protests.

—The Chinese almost certainly feel that they have been put into an embarrassing predicament now that their efforts to normalize relations with us are so clearly contrasted with our interdiction campaign against Hanoi. As with the Chinese blast at the U.S. delivered at the Stockholm conference—where perhaps they did not want to appear less militant than the Swedish Foreign Minister—PRC officials may have felt the time was overdue for a statement reaffirming their anti-imperialist credentials.

—Finally, this statement and the Stockholm attack may be seen as an effort to "set the record straight" for all parties concerned in advance of the coming visitation.

The PRC Foreign Ministry statement is at Tab A.³

² On June 5, 10, and 11, NSC staff members traveled to New York to receive PRC protests about the intrusion of U.S. aircraft into their airspace on June 4 and 9 and the bombing of a border town on June 10. Memoranda of conversation are *ibid.*, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 131–133. In a June 9 memorandum to Kissinger, Rear Admiral Daniel J. Murphy responded to the June 5 allegations, ascertaining that "all available evidence indicates that the claimed border violation did not occur, and that Chinese radar tracking error was the most likely cause of this incident." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 849, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) On June 11 Haig telephoned the PRC representatives in New York to affirm that the U.S. Government was investigating these complaints. A June 12 message for the PRC declared that an investigation of the June 5 allegation was "inconclusive" and the June 10 allegation was under investigation. Concerning the June 11 allegation, the message apologized for "this inexcusable incident" and promised to "take disciplinary action against the personnel responsible for this flagrant violation, however inadvertent, of strict standing orders." Haig's memorandum of record, June 11, and message dated June 12, are *ibid.*, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, China, PRC Allegations of Hostile Acts. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 134–135.

³ Attached but not printed.

231. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, June 20, 1972, 2:05–6:05 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (second part only)
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Two notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: I read over the conversation between Chairman Mao and the President, and it sounded when I read it after I knew everything that happened. . . . it was like an overture to an opera.² Every theme that was later discussed was mentioned in that hour.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Lord also was very familiar with that talk.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Lord disappeared from every picture. I requested it.

Prime Minister Chou: It was said that on arriving in Moscow your President also was immediately received in the Kremlin by Mr. Brezhnev. Was Mr. Lord also there, and you yourself there, but disappeared from the pictures?

Dr. Kissinger: At the first one, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: That was also my belief, but the picture came out to be a large table with only an interpreter in between.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger sent a brief synopsis of this meeting to Haig on June 20. Haig then prepared a 1-page memorandum for the President. (Ibid.) The first meeting was held the evening of June 19. In a June 19 telegram to Haig, Kissinger described this meeting as "inconclusive." The 11-page memorandum of conversation is *ibid.* In addition to the Kissinger-Chou meetings, counterpart talks were held among Jenkins, Holdridge, Solomon, Chang Wen-chin, Tsien Ta-yung, and Chao Ch'í-hua. They discussed trade and exchanges. Memoranda of conversation for the June 21 and 22 meetings are *ibid.*, Box 87, Country Files—Near East, PRC Counterpart Talks, 1971–1973. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 140–144.

² Document 194.

Dr. Kissinger: But after that we announced the participants. I participated in every meeting between the President and Mr. Brezhnev.

Prime Minister Chou: At the beginning it was kept secret.

Dr. Kissinger: We have learned our lessons.

Prime Minister Chou: They were probably trying to copy our way of doing things.

Dr. Kissinger: They were very interested. They wanted a list of all the gifts you had given to our party before we came.

Prime Minister Chou: So that they could exceed it slightly. Including the times on which they would present presents and the amount and so forth. The only thing they could not manage was the Ilyushin–62, the airplane. Perhaps because China was using the more backward Ilyushin–18.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister knows Kosygin and knows he is very serious, so when the Ilyushin–62 was delayed in taking off he came back on the airplane to talk to the President. I said this proves objects are basically malevolent. He said, what does this mean? I said, if you drop a coin it always rolls away from you. And Kosygin said, that isn't always true—I have dropped coins that rolled toward me.

Prime Minister Chou: [laughs]³ So would you like to begin?

Dr. Kissinger: Which subject should we discuss first? The Soviets?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What aspect would be of the most interest to the Prime Minister?

Prime Minister Chou: Because before this you had already said you would like to come and inform us after your visit to Moscow, you can do it as you feel proper. We don't have any special request. And as for the brief information that Mr. Lord gave Ambassador Huang-hua, we have already received that.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps it might be most useful for the Prime Minister for me to describe our general approach to the Soviet Union, what we are trying to accomplish; then describe my visit at the end of April, the President's visit and some general impressions. I am sure that the Prime Minister knows that we do not do reciprocal things in Moscow. The reason we do it with you is because of our evaluation of the relative intentions of the two allied communist countries.

³ All brackets and ellipses in the source text.

⁴ Lord reported briefly on the Moscow summit at his June 3 meeting with PRC representatives in New York. See footnote 7, Document 227.

Prime Minister Chou: But that alliance has gone with papers.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no question that one of the results of my visit to Peking last year, as the Prime Minister foresaw, was a considerable speeding up of our relationship with the Soviet Union. This was not a case that we particularly sought. In fact we thought there was a possibility that after my visit to Peking we would confront a period of extreme hostility, and when we informed the Soviet Embassy one hour before the announcement we had decided that if their reaction was one of hostility, we would be prepared to deal with all consequences.

Prime Minister Chou: So that was your estimate beforehand.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I remember it very well. But it did not seem to us to be right.

Prime Minister Chou: That shows that we don't take a petty attitude toward such things, and we thought that if it was necessary for the President to visit the Soviet Union first it would perhaps have been better. And that happened . . . that was proved to be the truth because after you made the announcement of your President's decision to visit China . . . after the announcement they expressed extreme concern. And during your President's visit to China the Moscow newspapers were full of a lot of things.

Dr. Kissinger: You were much more relaxed when we were in Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: We were quite relaxed. We had turned our attention to other things.

Dr. Kissinger: It wouldn't have made any difference because now we have been in Moscow. And when I announced our visit here I received urgent visits from the Soviet Ambassador in any event. In fact, I have found, Mr. Prime Minister, that if I want to see the Soviet Ambassador without asking him to come, I can put some item in the newspapers about China and he will surely come.

But in any event, whatever the reason, our relations with the Soviet Union speeded up considerably after the announcement, and at Soviet initiative, not at ours. As I told you when I was here in July, we had planned a summit meeting with the Soviet Union, but for a variety of reasons we felt that a number of concrete issues had to be settled since we were in a different objective position with respect to the Soviet Union than with the People's Republic. We thought with you we were at the beginning of a historical process, and it was therefore important that it be started with the top people. With the Soviet Union we were involved in a series of concrete problems and there was no sense in involving the top people unless a solution could be reached.

The concrete issues are familiar to you because we have kept you informed scrupulously since our first meeting. But all of them acceler-

ated since our first contact, such as the Berlin Agreement, and took a broader scope than we had first asked for. After the completion of the Berlin agreement, and progress in the strategic arms limitations talks, we agreed to the summit. The announcement was in October, but we actually agreed to it in August, as I told your Ambassador in Paris at the time.⁵

At that time it seemed to us that the Soviet Union was pursuing two policies that were sometimes contradictory at the same time, which we have found is not an unusual phenomenon in Moscow. On the one hand, they wanted to make progress in their bilateral relations with us. On the other hand, they wanted to show, to demonstrate your impotence, and your impotence even combined with us, and therefore they pursued the policy in the Indian Subcontinent. And secondly, they greatly accelerated their arms into Indochina as a result of the first Podgorny visit. This is our analysis—your interpretation may be different. Actually, what happens in Indochina would not demonstrate your impotence, but would create one other Soviet dependent state around your borders. We discussed that previously—I am just summing it up.

And we also believe that they would have liked the offensive to start before the visit to Peking because that would have created the maximum amount of complications in our relationship. I am just giving you our assessment. I am sure you do not agree with every last analysis we have made.

As you know, we reacted extremely strongly to the situation in South Asia. And on one morning when we received a message that you had a message to deliver to us which was, we thought, that you had sent your troops in, we had decided that if you were attacked by the Soviet Union as a result of it, we would support you and take military measures if necessary to prevent that attack. We received that message in early December—I think it was December 11, our time, in the morning. We received word, and when we picked up that message in the afternoon, it had a different content. We also, as you remember, threatened to . . .

Prime Minister Chou: By that time East Pakistan was already unable to be saved.

Dr. Kissinger: No, no, you made the correct decision. It would have been too late, but I had had a talk with your Ambassador.

Prime Minister Chou: Because when they were in the UN at that time they were not clear about that situation. Because Mr. Bhutto himself also was not a military man and Yahya Khan had boasted about the military situation, so I believe Mr. Bhutto arrived on the 11th, and

⁵ See Document 155.

he thought that the military situation in Pakistan at that time was indeed very well. He didn't know about the coup at home.

Dr. Kissinger: I think it was about December 11. Bhutto arrived in New York on Friday the 10th our time, 11th your time. I met Huang Hua on the 10th. I first met Huang Hua the evening of Friday the 10th, then I met Huang Hua the morning of the 11th—no, I met Huang Hua the evening of the 10th and then I met . . . and then you sent us a message which we received. You called us the morning of the 12th, and we were going to the meeting with Pompidou so we sent General Haig.⁶

But between the time we got the phone call and picked up the message we didn't know what it was. And since Huang Hua had taken a very tough line, not knowing the situation, I thought your message to us was that you were taking military measures. And since we were going to the Azores before we met with you we had to give instructions. If your message was you were taking military measures, our instructions were that if the Soviet Union moved against you we would move against the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: Why was it that your newspapers later on published the full minutes it seemed, or parts of the minutes, of meetings held by the Washington Special Actions Group?

Dr. Kissinger: This part of the decision was never in the Washington Special Actions Group because it was much too sensitive. This sort of decision had been made in a much smaller group.

Prime Minister Chou: I know about that. But why did the newspapers publish what had been discussed step by step in the Washington Special Actions Group with respect to the East Pakistan situation?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, first the Prime Minister has to understand the Washington Special Actions Group is a group which implements decisions—it does not make decisions. The reason that I had to take such a strong stand in this group was because the vast majority of our bureaucracy was pro-Indian and pro-Soviet.

Prime Minister Chou: Pro-Soviet?

Dr. Kissinger: More pro-Soviet than pro-Chinese in any event. I came under the most violent attack after I threatened to cancel the Moscow summit. That was when you [to Ch'iao] were there probably, the most violent attack. But what happened was a disloyal member of our bureaucracy gave these documents to the newspapers, and they printed them in order to destroy us, and they came very close. They will not be given a second opportunity.

⁶ See Documents 176 and 177.

Prime Minister Chou: But after reading the records that were published it seemed to me the members of that group came from quite a lot of quarters.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they were almost unanimously against our policy.

Prime Minister Chou: Especially toward India.

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't understand our overall strategy. If they had understood we were getting ready to take on the Soviet Union then what happened was mild compared to what would have happened. The reason we moved our fleet into the Indian Ocean was not because of India primarily—it was as pressure on the Soviet Union if the Soviet Union did what I mentioned before.

Prime Minister Chou: And they also closely followed you down into the Indian Ocean.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but what they had there we could have taken care of very easily.

Prime Minister Chou: What they were trying to do was to create more noise in East Bengal. They openly passed through the Tsushima Straits and then through the Malacca Straits.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but not with a force that could have fought ours.

Prime Minister Chou: But you know they could surface in such a way their support to East Bengal.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, it was used for that purpose. Actually, the Pakistani army in the east surrendered five days later, so it would have been too late for you to do anything.

Prime Minister Chou: Also, Yahya Khan had already sent his order in preparation for such a measure on the 11th or the 12th.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: I would like to add a word. On the morning of Friday, the 10th, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Mr. U Thant, had already informed us that East Pakistan had informed the Secretariat through their personnel in East Pakistan . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Oh yes, the Vice Foreign Minister is absolutely correct. Speaking very confidentially, we urged them then not to do this until we had an opportunity to talk to you, and to assess the situation, and I believe your advice was the same.

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: That happened on the day that Mr. Bhutto arrived in New York, and on his arrival we told him about this news. He had originally prepared to meet U Thant, but we had a luncheon engagement with U Thant. So we went, but Mr. Bhutto upon going to the hotel immediately called Yahya Khan and advised him not to do so. That happened on the day of his arrival in New York.

Prime Minister Chou: But we must say that Yahya Khan made his efforts and contribution toward our countries, and we still mention this

when we see him. But he was a general who did not know how to fight a war. He not only was useless in war, but he did things that worsened the situation. This was something we had not expected. We had expected he would not be able to improve the situation, but we didn't know he could have done things so badly. Because he had four divisions that had not been thrown into battle, but before any fighting they began to crumble. Actually, according to our knowledge, these armed forces were able to fight in battle.

Dr. Kissinger: But he scattered them around the frontier—he put too many forces into East Pakistan. They would have done him more good if he had used them in West Pakistan in an offensive. Secondly, he should have ignored the Indians and concentrated on one place, and tried to defeat them somewhere.

Prime Minister Chou: On such things Ayub Khan was more capable than Yahya Khan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yahya Khan was a decent man, but not very intelligent, and, it turned out, not a very good general. And we are very grateful to him on our side for having arranged our contacts. I think it was the last joy in his public career—he loved secret missions. He worked on it with great passion. When I visited him just before I came here, he was beside himself with conspiratorial maneuvers. He also gave me great advice on how to deal with the Prime Minister, all of which turned out to be wrong. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

But I didn't mention it in order to go into details of this, or to discuss the Chinese aspect of the policy, but to explain our general strategy toward the Soviet Union.

After the war in South Asia and before the summit in Peking the Soviet Union began to become more conciliatory toward us again, but still very hostile toward you. But they did not take any specific steps except in atmosphere until we returned from Peking. After we returned from Peking all negotiations speeded up, similar to the time in August, in all the fields which we gave you in New York.

I had been invited in December to pay a secret trip to Moscow, and we rejected that on the ground that we had sufficient diplomatic contact to make that unnecessary. This invitation was repeated again after the Peking summit, and we rejected it again. I believe we informed you of some of this when we were here. (Prime Minister Chou nods.)

Then when the offensive in Vietnam started . . . you can generally assume that when we informed you of our readiness to take drastic steps we also informed Moscow, because we do not want you to be in a separate position in that situation. And we made a number of public comments about the degree to which arms deliveries had made the situation possible, the degree to which Soviet arms deliveries had produced that situation. It was at this point that they repeated their re-

quest for me to come to Moscow to discuss both Vietnam and preparations for the summit, and at this point, as I told your Ambassador in New York, we felt obliged to accept.⁷

Prime Minister Chou: Was that on the 20th of April?

Dr. Kissinger: April 20 to 24, if I remember correctly. Yes, 20 to 24.

Prime Minister Chou: That was when your press was saying you were resting in Camp David.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister is keeping good track of me. But I had told your Ambassador ahead of time, not the Japanese Ambassador. (Laughter)

On this occasion we had a long discussion about Vietnam. The Soviet view was that you had planned the offensive on the occasion of your visit after the Peking summit.

Prime Minister Chou: We have never interfered in either their military actions nor their political negotiations. We only get notifications from them and have often received them only after events have occurred, because that's their business. How can we intervene in their affairs?

Dr. Kissinger: Well, the Soviets made their case with great passion on the grounds that there was no offensive before the Peking summit and there was one before the Moscow summit. The Prime Minister, according to them, had been in Hanoi before the Peking summit and there was no offensive. He went to Hanoi after the Peking summit and there was immediately an offensive.

Prime Minister Chou: But I didn't go before the President's visit. I went there after your secret visit, but I didn't go before the meeting in Peking. But it was only after your President's visit to Peking that I went there the second time. I only went twice.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, officially I never knew about any of your visits. I thought you went before the Peking summit, but I never knew you went after the Peking summit. But I am only telling you about the Soviet argument.

Prime Minister Chou: How could we give our opinions or suggestions about whether it was beneficial to fight at a certain time or not? And I would like to do something here—perhaps you might agree, perhaps not. But Senator Mansfield, after leaving China recently, gave me a text of a speech he made in his hometown in Montana in May of 1968.⁸ But he gave it to me after he left China. Have you read it?

⁷ See Document 222.

⁸ Apparent reference to a speech by Mansfield published as *China: Retrospect and Prospect* (Missoula, MT: University of Montana, 1968).

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And he mentioned two things that drew our attention. The first is it should be recognized there is only one China and Taiwan is a province . . .

Interpreter Chi: Part!

Prime Minister Chou: *Part* of China. That's what Senator Mansfield said.

Dr. Kissinger: It only took me two nights to get the word "province" out of the communiqué (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: But it proved now that Senator Mansfield had already foreseen that in 1968—it seemed you borrowed from his words, but you also added that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Straits recognize there is only one China. That is your masterpiece, and we must recognize that.

And the second point he made was to say China's being aggressive could only be said in accordance with China's words, but China's deeds did not say that. And as Chairman Mao also said to President Nixon, what we did was to fire empty cannons. What we did was not to commit aggression, but we supported the movements of national liberation which Senator Mansfield also mentioned.

And the third point he made was that with respect to Vietnam the assistance the United States had given to the Republic of Vietnam greatly exceeded the assistance China had given to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. Of course, I do not agree with all of his definitions, but in his capacity of being the Democratic leader of the Senate it was not easy for him to say that at that time, and it seems that his views on these matters have not changed. So we believe your President's assessment of that man was quite correct.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, he's a fine person.

Prime Minister Chou: Honest.

Dr. Kissinger: Very honest and very sincere.

Prime Minister Chou: He has a British flavor, a gentleman's style.

Dr. Kissinger: He's of Irish stock.

Prime Minister Chou: He doesn't look very much like an Irishman.

Dr. Kissinger: He looks like a member of a monastic order, which you cannot say of Senator Scott.

Prime Minister Chou: No, they were two different characters, and it was interesting to talk to them together.

Dr. Kissinger: But I must say, Mr. Prime Minister, you managed to do one thing with Senator Scott we have not managed to do—you got him to keep confidences. They were both very much impressed by their visit to the People's Republic, and I think after their return they made

a number of constructive speeches. You will find that the Majority Leader in the House is a different person.

Prime Minister Chou: So by your advice I will have to make a bit of preparation?

Dr. Kissinger: No, I would say if he's exposed to too much mao-tai I don't know what might happen. I recommend seeing him in the morning.

Our analysis of the situation is . . . we will talk about it longer when we talk about Indochina . . . that we see no Chinese interest served by an intensification of the war in Indochina because I believe you take us seriously when we said we would react strongly. This drags us back in when we want to get out.

So, we do not believe that this is your strategy.

We discussed, as I said, Vietnam at some length along lines which I will discuss with you when we discuss Indochina.

To return, however, to one point. It's not only the Soviet leaders, but East European leaders who maintain that you have been the primary moving force in this offensive, and who got this thought into many channels so it reaches us in many ways. And it would be very persuasive if we had not had this chance to talk previously.

Now, with regard to other issues, we spent . . .

Prime Minister Chou: And I had beforehand foreseen and predicted that the Soviet Union would try to tell you that. And it has been . . . the facts are that between last year and the present, the Soviet Union has sent four delegations to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, two of which were led by Podgorny and Katushev went himself once and then Mazurov.

Dr. Kissinger: And then a general.

Mr. Negroponte: Batitsky.⁹

Prime Minister Chou: (To Negroponte) Thank you. You have a better memory than I have. He was the Vice Minister of National Defense.

Dr. Kissinger: On bilateral issues, the discussion was somewhat similar to the discussions we had here in October, that is, preparation of a communiqué, and the Soviet Union for the first time submitted a declaration of principles.

Prime Minister Chou: Because we included that in our communiqué so they had to have something like that.

⁹ Konstantin Fyodorovich Katushev, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet and member of the Central Committee; Kiril Tofimovich Mazurov, members of the Politburo and First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers; Marshal Pavel Fyodorovich Batitsky, Deputy to the Supreme Soviet.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, which had a different character, which I will explain to you in a minute. And then some precise negotiations on all the agreements which were signed in Moscow including a specific proposal on how to deal with the inclusion of submarines in the Strategic Arms Limitation talks. Incidentally, Mr. Prime Minister, if you want, some of the provisions of that agreement are somewhat technical and complex, and if you want, I will be glad to explain them to some technical person, or to you if you have time. But if you don't want it, I would be glad to explain the technical provisions of the agreements to any person you designate.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, I don't think technical matters need to be mentioned here.

Dr. Kissinger: If you are interested.

Prime Minister Chou: If you would like we can get some of our specialists. It's up to you.

Dr. Kissinger: It's up to you.

Prime Minister Chou: You also wanted to discuss something like that with the Vice Chairman of our Military Commission and his assistant. But that was one side of what you would like to say. I would like to ask one question. Of course, you already know about the things I mentioned publicly.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that you considered it partial.

Prime Minister Chou: No, I said that this is a bilateral matter and then I said "but it won't solve the problem." Because you cannot cut down your budget. Of course, if it continued without any limitation at all the budget would increase in even a greater way. Of course, now that you have a possibility of five years, then perhaps you can limit your budget in a certain way. And perhaps it will also make people feel it will be more difficult for a nuclear war to break out in the next five years.

Dr. Kissinger: It will stop the increase in the budget. Our Secretary of Defense gives the impression that we will increase the budget dramatically, but he's given to dramatic statements, as the Prime Minister remembers.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, at precisely the time when you were signing those agreements, he was thinking about what would be going on five years after, about new submarines completed by that time.

Dr. Kissinger: But the problem is if one doesn't plan now, in five years . . . I don't think it is in anybody's interest that the Soviet Union is able to work for five years and we do nothing. So he was not wrong in speaking of that—he was not wrong in thinking of that, he *was* wrong in speaking.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but I appreciate that man very much because he says some true words. For instance, while you were here

engaging in secret talks in July last year he was in Japan making public statements; and also at that time your President was making his Kansas City speech on the sixth of July at the same time Secretary Laird made his speech in Japan, and they both appeared at the same time, which I appreciated very much, which made the situation clear. Perhaps this is part of the American character.

Dr. Kissinger: It made it clear what the forces were, not necessarily what our policy was.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily. I think you can see things from there. The Soviet Union is fearful people will get to know about their doings. Actually, people know their doings. The only thing people may not know is the quantity of what they are doing. So if it is said the Strategic Arms Agreement made some advance, then it can be said in the sense that in the coming five years the danger of outbreak of nuclear war will be less but the competition will not be less.

Dr. Kissinger: The numerical competition will stop; the technical competition will not stop.

Prime Minister Chou: Because it is allowable to change old with the new.

Dr. Kissinger: If the characteristics do not change. With respect to secrecy, we achieve secrecy by saying so much that no one knows what is true.

Prime Minister Chou: But people can see a tendency.

Dr. Kissinger: Thoughtful people can see a tendency. Literal people just see the words and ask for explanations.

Prime Minister Chou: That is why I asked the five families of American friends when I met them that Senator McGovern, if he is elected, is saying he will be able to cut the military budget by one-third. I asked them whether they thought this were possible, and they could not reply.¹⁰

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, I honestly believe the worst thing that could happen to you would be if this were to happen.

Prime Minister Chou: What I do not believe is that it would be really possible to cut the budget by one-third. Of course, you probably know the majority I met were in support of Senator McGovern. I asked them that question, but they could not answer.

Dr. Kissinger: In fact, they were unanimously in support as I look over that list.

Prime Minister Chou: Fairbank wavered.

Dr. Kissinger: Fairbank, yes.

¹⁰ John K. Fairbank, Harvard University professor and China scholar, led a small group of American academics to the PRC in June 1972.

Prime Minister Chou: So I asked them to answer that question, but they couldn't. It's impossible.

Dr. Kissinger: One problem with McGovern is that he is very professorial and he . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Was he a professor before?

Dr. Kissinger: He was a professor at one time. But he is likely to try to do what he says, and the attempt to do it would have very serious consequences for everybody.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't believe that.

Dr. Kissinger: That he would do it?

Prime Minister Chou: If he is elected, it will be impossible for him to do so. Otherwise, he will have to change that slogan in the course of his election campaign.

Dr. Kissinger: It may be objectively impossible for him to do so, but the education of finding that out is what would produce the damage.

Prime Minister Chou: Your Pentagon wouldn't agree, wouldn't be able to pass what he said he will try to do.

Dr. Kissinger: That's not the major problem. The impact on the international situation of a dramatic effort by the United States to weaken itself would lead to a chaotic situation which would have a high probability of producing a war, because I do not believe your northern neighbors would resist that temptation.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyway, they always want to try to exceed you.

Dr. Kissinger: But not when we are going down. They don't compete in that direction, in reductions with us.

Prime Minister Chou: Never, never.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. There's in addition the problem that apart from whether it's possible to cut the budget, the sort of policy I describe in South Asia, for example, would be totally impossible.

Prime Minister Chou: To the word "never" I would like to add a condition. That is, if the type of leadership the Soviet Union now has would continue, that would never happen. The policies they are pursuing now, if it continues, will exceed the former policies of the Czars in old Russia. I believe it was Harrison Salisbury who said our description of the new Soviet leaders as being new Czars was exact. The Soviet leaders are dissatisfied with that description.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they have certain reservations with respect to the People's Republic of China.

Prime Minister Chou: And the greatest headache comes from the use of that term, "the new Czars," and we were the first to use it. As for "social imperialism," Lenin began the use of that term, and we are continuing.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think the Prime Minister would be elected to the Politburo from what I was told. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: They probably hate us to death. Of course, the number one target of hatred is Chairman Mao, and I who implement his policies . . .

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister is coming up in that regard. He's still number two, but gaining.

Prime Minister Chou: Very happy to hear that. Because how will it do if no one opposes a person?

Dr. Kissinger: When I was in Shanghai I was with a member of the Shanghai People's Revolutionary Committee, and he congratulated me on the communiqué. I said I will have enormous difficulties with my opponents when I get back to America. He said Chairman Mao says you should worry only if your enemies do not attack you.

Prime Minister Chou: That's true.

Dr. Kissinger: But to return to my visit at the end of April. I won't go into the agreements which are really self-explanatory—we have brought you the texts, and we can give them to you—except for the Strategic Arms Limitation talks, where the Vice Chairman can ask me questions, and I will explain it to him.

There were a number of aspects that I wanted to mention to the Prime Minister. One, the Soviet strategy was obviously to create the impression, and the reality, that one would go to Peking for banquets and to Moscow for agreements. And therefore, they were trying for the absolute maximum number of agreements. And we found it much easier to agree with them than the Vice Foreign Minister did on the border question.

Second, in the communiqué and especially in the Declaration of Principles, there were a number of aspects that we eliminated because we thought the objective import was directed at you—also against Britain and France, but I think objectively against you. For example, there was a joint appeal to other nuclear countries to join the accidental war agreement. Now France wants to do this, and we have refused. We have refused on grounds that France is an ally, and we don't need an agreement with an ally, and if it wants to make one with the Soviet Union, we don't object. They wanted to make a general agreement between all nations possessing nuclear weapons against accidental war. They wanted us to make a joint appeal that other countries should join the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And they wanted to resurrect their proposal for a conference of nuclear countries that they had made last summer. And they wanted us to make an appeal together to other members of the Security Council on a number of issues which we also refused. This is in line with our general policy that we will not join

other countries in any dealings that we have with you. If we have a request, we will make it directly.

Thus at the summit, but also at the meeting I had in Moscow, they made two other proposals, one that there should be special consultations between the United States and Soviet Union about the nuclear capabilities of other nations that are not part of the nuclear limitations agreement, and whose capacities are growing. They also made a proposal, which we have not told anybody else about, as we have not almost everything I have said to you—of course, this is all very confidential. The proposal is that we agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other. We have said that we could consider something like this only if there were some assurance that this would not . . . that they were not free to attack either our allies or other countries with nuclear weapons. Because this would not be banned. In that proposal that would not be banned.

Prime Minister Chou: Would that mean in effect that all countries should guarantee not to be the first to use nuclear weapons?

Dr. Kissinger: I know this is your proposal. The problem we have with that is we have to reserve the right, if there is a massive attack either on a major ally such as Europe, or on a country whose independence we consider vital, we have to reserve the right to use nuclear weapons. So in other words, there are some areas of the world where we cannot accept their being overrun by conventional armies. We can renounce the use of force, but we have great difficulty signing an agreement where a country is free to launch an attack on regions whose security we consider vital to peace in the world and ourselves. If conventional means are not enough, we cannot consider renouncing the use of nuclear weapons. We cannot accept a Czechoslovakia in every part of the world.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course, in a certain sense, there are only a few possibilities of such an event happening.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. Those are the ones that worry us most. In most foreseeable circumstances we would not have to worry about nuclear weapons, but I can think of two places where it would have to be considered.

Prime Minister Chou: Which two?

Dr. Kissinger: One is an attack on Europe, and the other is an attack that would put all of Asia under one European center of control.

Prime Minister Chou: There possibly would exist that ambition, but the question is whether or not it could be realized.

Dr. Kissinger: That is the problem. But speaking in this small group, I would not exclude that this intention may exist. I am not saying that it does—but it could.

Prime Minister Chou: The ambitions, of course, exist. The question is how or whether it will appear, and of course, we must closely watch the development of events.

So they only proposed that your two countries should mutually agree not to use nuclear weapons against each other, but it said nothing about consultations on a worldwide scale leading to prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons?

Dr. Kissinger: No, explicitly not. Now this is not known by anybody, Mr. Prime Minister, and it is a sign of our special confidence in you.

Prime Minister Chou: Of course we won't discuss that. We only . . . what we say is only the principles that we repeat every time we carry out an experiment. You probably already have memorized them.

Dr. Kissinger: We have never had any difficulty. If there is any further discussion of this we will tell you. At the moment there is no further discussion, but my experience tells me that your allies are very persistent, and it is certain to be resurrected. And if it is, I will discuss it with your Ambassador in New York, and we will not make any moves without discussing it with you. If you had asked your dinner guests on Friday night whether they had been in favor of such a project I think they all would be in favor of it on sentimental terms, the five Americans, with the exception of Fairbank. They would have favored it for US-Soviet bilateral relations; they would not necessarily have seen the implications of this for other countries. But you can make that experiment yourself.

Prime Minister Chou: I wouldn't do that experiment because when these questions are discussed certain people proceed completely out of naive illusions.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, and it's too sensitive anyway.

About the summit. The summit proceeded in the same way as my meeting, and we discussed essentially the same subjects except that the Soviet leaders made exactly the same proposals to the President they had made to me in April and received exactly the same answers.

We made agreements in three general areas, that is first, technical areas where we and the Soviets, as advanced industrial countries, have common interests—environment, space, health. Secondly, we spent a great deal of time on the strategic arms limitation agreement which is a technical and extremely complex issue. And, as the Prime Minister pointed out, it involves qualitative implications that will not be significant now but which should be terribly important five years from now. Thirdly, we agreed on those principles and the communiqué

which are really self-explanatory.¹¹ Fourth, there were discussions about commercial matters. We created a commercial commission, and the Soviets leaders are extremely interested in receiving credits and Most Favored Nation treatment.

Prime Minister Chou: But they don't repay their debts.

Dr. Kissinger: No, although they are very willing to do that to get credit.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but they take a rather long-range view of that, and it seems their view on this matter . . . there is still some distance between their view and yours.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but that will be solved because what they want in credit is so much more than their debt that we are really paying them to pay their debt (laughter). But I will sum this up . . .

Prime Minister Chou: But they would have to buy your equipment with the credit they got from you, with most of the credit.

Dr. Kissinger: Probably. But that I consider unimportant because what they want they can probably only get from us. And so, and this has not yet been made public, or not very much, they are extremely interested in getting us involved in a very massive development of Siberia. Our approach . . . the sums involved are very large—\$8 billion. And they want us to do it jointly with the Japanese, or alone; they are not particular. They will take it from us alone if we are willing to do it.

Now, before I give our reaction to this economic thing let me give you . . . well, let me give you first our formal reaction to this economic thing. I know at least some of your associates seem to think we are driven very much by economic considerations. This is not true, in this Administration anyway. We have . . . I remember very vividly my first conversation with the Prime Minister almost a year ago when he asked me what we had really produced by our economic assistance. On strictly economic grounds it is easy to put money into a country. It is very hard to get it back. But that I consider second order. The more important question is what do you produce objectively when you develop an area; it is not always what people tell you their intentions are, as the Prime Minister has told me often with regard to Japan.

So we are looking at these projects with great care. And we do not want to be in a position where these projects can be used either to blackmail us or to create the basis for blackmailing others. Let me sum up what our basic approach is . . . oh, two other issues we discussed—European Security Conference and mutual force reductions. With respect

¹¹ For text of the final U.S.-Soviet communiqué, see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1972*, p. 635.

to the European Security Conference, the Soviet Union has been very passionate in pushing it, but very vague in what they want to discuss once they get there.

Prime Minister Chou: Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: Without a prospect how can you enter into discussions?

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister will soon have an opportunity to meet some leading European statesmen, and he will then be able to judge for himself the degree to which precision of thinking is their outstanding attribute. As I understand the European leaders, most who are not distinguished by their capacity to see things long-range, there is the paradox that they first advocated a conference on mutual balanced force reduction for the amazing reason that they thought this would force us to keep our forces in there until this conference had taken place. They proposed mutual reductions to prevent unilateral reduction. So then when their own project assumed reality, they accepted the idea of a European Security Conference in order to stop the mutual balanced force reductions.

So they produced two conferences they don't want in order to prevent something they could have stopped by saying "no", but didn't want to for domestic reasons. I think the Prime Minister would have found that most European leaders today would not have been very good candidates for the Long March (laughter).

Our strategy with respect to these two conferences is to answer the question that the Prime Minister put to me—simply, we will go, but we will insist that there is a very concrete agenda and very concrete criteria which enable us to measure success or failure. So we sometimes appear dilatory, but in any event we will be very concrete, and we will emphasize also those elements of the European Security Conference that enhance the sovereignty of the participants, east or west.

And to sum up our evaluation of the situation, there are three possibilities in Soviet policy. One is that there will be a more peaceful evolution. If there is a more peaceful evolution, then the agreements we have signed will promote a possibility for constructive policies. And we will attempt to give every opportunity for all parties to live up to the principles we have agreed to.

But it is also possible that it is their intention to neutralize Europe and to concentrate on Asia, and to get their rear free for dealing with one problem at a time. That cannot be excluded.

And it's not impossible that their strategy is to isolate each of their principal enemies or opponents and to defeat them separately, even

though these principal opponents may not have any formal relationship with each other.

Our assessment is as follows. We have no interest in your quarrel with the Soviet Union, as I have said to you and as I have said publicly. We have never asked you to do anything against the Soviet Union, and we never shall. And you have never asked us to do anything against the Soviet Union—in fact, you have encouraged us to deal with the Soviet Union. But our assessment is, we would prefer the Soviet Union to take the first course of changing its policy in a more peaceful direction, and we will give it every incentive to do this. If it should move in the second direction, we shall pursue the same policy more strongly than we did last December.

In terms of our relations, the principal significance I see in whatever visible bilateral things we have done is not in their own terms, but to create the objective conditions to permit decisions like this to be made quickly if it should become necessary against anybody's will or intention. Leaving aside this particular aspect which is a tactical question and not decisive, we shall continue to move along the lines we have described, and we shall continue it as long as the Soviet Union pursues a peaceful policy. If the Soviet Union should move aggressively, even not against you but against countries whose independence we consider important, then we will draw the appropriate conclusions and we will not be deterred by any agreements we have made. That will be the policy of this Administration in the next term, even more strongly than now.

I should add, at the summit there was also a long discussion of Vietnam, but I am saving that for the other discussion. I am sorry I have talked so very long.

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you. I would like to ask whether the European Security Conference will be held as a meeting between two blocs, or a meeting between individual countries, or both.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it will in any event not be held before 1973 when our freedom of movement will be somewhat greater. Secondly, it will be held as a meeting between countries, though I have the impression that on the Soviet side it is being given a bloc character. It is in our interest, that is in the U.S. interest, to emphasize the sovereignty of the participants. Incidentally, I may say, we evaluate positively what we take to be the low-key Chinese encouragement of European community efforts.

Prime Minister Chou: At the same time they have a lot of internal disputes.

Dr. Kissinger: The Europeans?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: It's not their heroic age.

Prime Minister Chou: But they believe that collectively they will have power, but how to lead that power is a question. Quite a number wish to be the leadership of that power.

Dr. Kissinger: And no one wants to make the sacrifices necessary to get it.

Prime Minister Chou: That's where the question lies. What is your assessment of the tendency of the development of the policy in your motherland, of the country where you were born?

Dr. Kissinger: It's always easy to start a policy, but if one starts it one has to think through where one will be after a few years. And speaking as a historian, the Germans have brought disaster upon themselves for the last 50 years—more than that, for this century—because they have not had any far-sighted statesmen since Bismarck, except perhaps for Adenauer.

Prime Minister Chou: It's a century since Bismarck.

Dr. Kissinger: The German problem has been that when they had a choice between two policies, they did them both. The risk they run, what they are doing now, is to belong to the western community, that is to the European community, but to run the risk of winding up like Finland. That is one risk.

Also in Germany there is a very strong nationalistic tendency similar to Japan, although the German social structure does not have the cohesion nor the strength nor the self-confidence of the Japanese. So it is not excluded that in Germany . . . Germany can go three ways. It can become part of the European community fully; it can become a Finland and objectively an outpost of eastern Europe; or it can become extremely nationalistic. And I do not exclude that when that happens the German communists may join their other colleagues on the basis of nationalism, but that would be a long time in the future. But I do not exclude that happening. But these are the three possibilities.

Prime Minister Chou: Do you believe that East Germany at this time would be even more weakened?

Dr. Kissinger: East Germany can become strong only through a very nationalistic policy. It has no objective basis except by becoming the heir of old Prussia.

Prime Minister Chou: But quite a part of the former East Prussians have now gone into West Germany.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it's not the population; it's the spirit. I have had old Prussians in West Germany tell me that when they want to be reminded of their Prussian heritage they go to East Germany. That was said to me by the son of the former head of the Foreign Ministry under the Nazis, Weiszacher, who is now a professor, and who himself is a fine man and is not at all of this type.

Prime Minister Chou: Since Germany has developed her economy to its present degree do you think it could be that Germany is also at a crossroads?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but not primarily for economic reasons.

Prime Minister Chou: Also for nationalistic reasons?

Dr. Kissinger: The countries that were defeated during the war could spend 20 years on economic recovery, and could find in that a substitute for their lack of military achievement. But now economic recovery is no longer enough and creates psychic and psychological problems.

Prime Minister Chou: Right.

(There was a thirteen minute break at this point, 4:30 p.m. The meeting resumed with the addition of Chang Wen-chin on the Chinese side.)

Prime Minister Chou: Thank you for your notification concerning the US–Soviet talks. There are not many more questions I would like to ask, because they are generally all in the documents. Only on the general Declaration of Principles there is one case which the Third World was quite displeased with—they said, “the superpowers” such and such. You know about that?

Dr. Kissinger: No.

Prime Minister Chou: The main objection is with respect to the third principle (reading): “The U.S.A. and USSR have a special responsibility . . . in their internal affairs.”

Dr. Kissinger: What is the objection?

Prime Minister Chou: It appears from that principle as if world affairs will be monopolized by you two big powers. It has that feeling. I note that from the press.

Dr. Kissinger: I have not had the opportunity to pay attention to that particular . . . or it has not come to my attention. That was not the intention on our side. This is a paragraph which in its original form we thought was directed against you. Our intention is to use it to prevent such situations as the South Asia one. And when we apply it, it will be intended to be used to prevent a situation where when tensions arise a big country will not exacerbate them by military supplies and/or by diplomatic pressures. That was our intention.

Prime Minister Chou: India seems somewhat unhappy about that. Do you have any feelings there?

Dr. Kissinger: Whether India is unhappy about it? (Prime Minister Chou nods.)

Since December India has been unhappy with us about so many things it is not easy to tell what is a special cause of unhappiness and what is a general condition.

Prime Minister Chou: But this time they were displeased not just with you but with both of you. They consider the United States and Soviet Union want to manipulate matters. That is their feeling—I don't know their reason for this.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not our intention. We have no intention of forming a condominium—it would take an extraordinary circumstance for us to do this. It is not our intention to create a condominium. We do have the intention of building walls against expansionism, either political ones or physical ones. Our primary concern with local conflicts is when a big power attempts to exploit them for its own ends.

Prime Minister Chou: In the Soviet objections to our communiqué with you it appears that they particularly expressed objection to this common principle: "Neither should seek hegemony . . ." Do they think that was directed against them?

Dr. Kissinger: They didn't say, but they seem to think it might be directed against them. We took the position it was directed only against countries that want to establish hegemony. I had an interesting query from India—I don't know whether you did. They said that since the Asia–Pacific area didn't include India, what we were saying was that we agreed to Chinese hegemony over India (laughter).

So I told them this was not true. I hope you are not offended.

Prime Minister Chou: India is a highly suspicious country. It is quite a big country. Sometimes it puts on airs of a big country, but sometimes it has an inferiority complex.

Dr. Kissinger: It's been governed by foreigners through most of its history.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, that might be one of the historical factors. And an additional one that there are such big competitions in the world.

Now let's go on to the Indochina question—I would like to hear from you.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister said he had some observations he would like to make to me. Maybe we should reverse the places and let him talk first.

Prime Minister Chou: These are questions on which there are disputes, and we would like to listen to you first to see your solutions of the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: Is the Prime Minister's suggestion that after he's heard me I will be so convincing the disputes will have disappeared, and there will be no further need for him to make observations?

Prime Minister Chou: I have no such expectations, but I do hope the disputes will be lessened.

Dr. Kissinger: I will make our candid assessment. I know it doesn't agree with yours, but I think it is useful for you at any rate to understand how we see the situation. And I will take the situation from the start of the North Vietnamese offensive on March 30.

I believe that I have explained to the Prime Minister what our general objectives in Indochina are. It is obvious that it cannot be the policy of this Administration to maintain permanent bases in Indochina, or to continue in Indochina the policies that were originated by the Secretary of State who refused to shake hands with the Prime Minister. It isn't . . . we are in a different historical phase. We believe that the future of our relationship with Peking is infinitely more important for the future of Asia than what happens in Phnom Penh, in Hanoi or in Saigon.

When President Johnson put American troops into Vietnam you will remember that he justified it in part on the ground that what happened in Indochina was masterminded in Peking and was part of a plot to take over the world. Dean Rusk said this in a statement. You were then engaged in the Cultural Revolution and not, from my reading of it, emphasizing foreign adventures.

So that the mere fact that we are sitting in this room changes the objective basis of the original intervention in Indochina. For us who inherited the war our problem has been how to liquidate it in a way that does not affect our entire international position and—this is not your primary concern—the domestic stability in the United States. So we have genuinely attempted to end the war, and as you may or may not know, I personally started negotiations with the North Vietnamese in 1967 when I was only at the very periphery of the government, at a time when it was very unpopular, because I believed there had to be a political end to the war.

So from the time we came into office we have attempted to end the war. And we have understood, as I told you before, that the Democratic Republic of Vietnam is a permanent factor on the Indochinese peninsula and probably the strongest entity. And we have had no interest in destroying it or even in defeating it. After the end of the war we will have withdrawn 12,000 miles. The Democratic Republic will still be 300 miles from Saigon. That is a reality which they don't seem to understand.

Prime Minister Chou: What they are paying attention to is your so-called Vietnamization of the war.

Dr. Kissinger: But they have a curious lack of self-confidence. What have we tried to do? Let's forget . . . they are masters at analyzing various points and forgetting the overall concepts. We have attempted to separate the military outcome from the political outcome so that we can disengage from the area and permit the local forces to shape their

future. Curiously enough, the North Vietnamese have tried to keep us in there so that we would do their political work for them.

Last May 30, for example, we proposed that we would withdraw all our forces if there were a ceasefire and the return of prisoners. May 31 it was, not 30. Where would the North Vietnamese be today if they had accepted this? In a much better position than they are. But they didn't accept it. Why? Because they want us to overthrow the government and put their government in. We are not negotiating. I am trying to explain our thinking. The practical consequences of our proposals have been to get us out; the practical consequence of their proposals have been to keep us in.

They have asked us . . . there's only one demand they have made we have not met and cannot meet and will not meet, no matter what the price to our other relationships, and that is that we overthrow ourselves the people with whom we have been dealing and who, in reliance on us, have taken certain actions. This isn't because of any particular personal liking for any of the individuals concerned. It isn't because we want a pro-American government in Saigon. Why in the name of God would we want a pro-American government in Saigon when we can live with governments that are not pro-American in much bigger countries of Asia? It is because a country cannot be asked to engage in major acts of betrayal as a basis of its foreign policy.

Prime Minister Chou: You say withdrawal of forces. You mean total withdrawal of Army, Navy, Air Forces, bases and everything?

Dr. Kissinger: When I was here last year the Prime Minister asked me that question. I told him we wanted to leave some advisors behind. The Prime Minister then made a very eloquent statement on the consequences of what he called "leaving a tail behind." Largely as a result of that, we, within a month, changed our proposal so it now involves a total withdrawal of all our advisors in all of the categories which the Prime Minister now mentioned. We are prepared to withdraw all our forces.

Prime Minister Chou: How about your armed forces in Thailand?

Dr. Kissinger: We are not prepared to remove our armed forces from Thailand, but under the conditions of ceasefire we would agree not to use these forces in Vietnam. And they would certainly be reduced to the level they had before this offensive started if peace is made.

To explain what I mean by this act of betrayal, even though I know this is somewhat painful, Mr. Prime Minister, but I want to explain: If when I first came here in July the Prime Minister had said, "we will not talk to you until you overthrow Chiang Kai-shek and put someone in there we can accept," then, dedicated as I am to Sino-American friendship, we could not have done it. It would have been impossible.

The secret to our relationship is we were prepared to start an evolution in which the Prime Minister has expressed great confidence. Such an act would totally dishonor us and make us a useless friend of yours, because if we would do this to one associate we would do it to anybody.

But to return to the question about Thailand. In every important decision, as we discussed, there are at least two aspects, the decision and the trend. At the dinner the other day with those five Americans the Prime Minister referred to the 1954 situation. And in 1954, whatever happened, whatever document we signed, the reality was that Secretary Dulles was looking for excuses to intervene, because he was convinced there was a Chinese communist conspiracy to take over Asia. We are looking for the opposite excuses.

Prime Minister Chou: The outcome of Dulles' policy was the conclusion of a number of pacts and treaties, but now you want to abide by them. Isn't that a continuation of his policy?

Dr. Kissinger: It is on one level. But on the other, when we make an agreement in Indochina, it will be to make a new relationship. If we can make it with Peking why can we not do it with Hanoi? What has Hanoi done to us that would make it impossible to, say in ten years, establish a new relationship?

Prime Minister Chou: If after you withdraw and the prisoners of war are repatriated, if after that, civil war again breaks out in Vietnam, what will you do? It will probably be difficult for you to answer that.

Dr. Kissinger: It is difficult for me to answer partly because I don't want to give encouragement for this to happen. But let me answer it according to my best judgment. For example, if our May 8 proposal¹² were accepted, which has a four-month withdrawal and four months for exchange of prisoners, if in the fifth month the war starts again, it is quite possible we would say this was just a trick to get us out and we cannot accept this.

If the North Vietnamese, on the other hand, engage in a serious negotiation with the South Vietnamese, and if after a longer period it starts again after we were all disengaged, my personal judgment is that it is much less likely that we will go back again, *much* less likely.

Prime Minister Chou: You said this last year too.

Dr. Kissinger: Last year if they had accepted our proposal it would now have been a year. If the North Vietnamese could transform this . . .

¹² See Document 226.

Prime Minister Chou: You said last year after you have withdrawn and the prisoners of war have been returned then as to what happens then, that is their affair. In principle you mentioned that.

Dr. Kissinger: In principle we are attempting to turn . . . it, of course, depends on the extent to which outside countries intervene. If one can transform this from an international conflict in which major world powers are involved, to a local conflict, then I think what the Prime Minister said is very possible. But this is our intention and since we will be making that policy, it is some guarantee.

Now, the difficulty has been that, for very understandable reasons, the North Vietnamese—for whom as I have said to the Prime Minister many times, I have great respect—are acting out the epic poem of their struggle for independence through the centuries and particularly re-enacting their experiences of 20 years ago.

Prime Minister Chou: If we counted from the end of the Second World War, 27 years, and President Ho Chi Minh died for this cause before it was completed. President Ho Chi Minh was a revolutionary, but also a humanitarian and a patriot. I was well acquainted with President Ho Chi Minh. I had known him for 50 years. I have joined the Communist Party now for 50 years and knew him 50 years.

Dr. Kissinger: I never met him, but I knew a Frenchman in whose house Ho Chi Minh lived. In fact, I sent that Frenchman to talk to Ho Chi Minh in 1967—that's how I became involved in Indochinese affairs.

Prime Minister Chou: Mr. Salisbury¹³ has also been to Hanoi. But he being a correspondent is in a different position from you.

Dr. Kissinger: It is the one place I have not been secretly.

Prime Minister Chou: That shortcoming might be the reason it hasn't been solved yet. Maybe if you had been there you might be more clear about the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: I am clear about the situation. It's the solution I am not clear about.

Prime Minister Chou: You have a new expert. Mr. Smyser had intestinal troubles.

Dr. Kissinger: But he recovered just before you served Peking Duck. (laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: He is still with you?

Dr. Kissinger: No, he went back to the university for a year, but he will come back after the year.

¹³ Harrison Salisbury, journalist and editor at *The New York Times*.

Prime Minister Chou: This system of yours is good, to have your staff go away to a university for a year and then come back.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think Smyser will work again on Vietnam problems. Maybe there won't be Vietnam problems to work on any more.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily. The Saigon problem is really too much of a headache. And this is one of the bitter fruits left over by Dulles which is not yet solved. It was a tragedy created by Dulles and you are even now tasting the bitter fruits of that.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the Prime Minister that what we face now in Vietnam is a tragedy.

Prime Minister Chou: You could shake yourselves free from it.

Dr. Kissinger: No. It depends on what the Prime Minister means by shaking ourselves free. The withdrawal we can do; the other demands we cannot do. Let me complete my analysis of the situation.

I recognize the problem is objectively extremely difficult, and I admit we have demonstrated for 20 years that we do not understand Vietnamese conditions very well, but the North Vietnamese Government has also made a solution extremely complicated.

First, I have negotiated 13 times now . . . eight times with Le Duc Tho; five times with Xuan Thuy. What is the primary use when I negotiate? My primary use is to be able to go to the essence of the problem and to get a big decision made—that is my primary use in these negotiations. I am useful for big decisions, not for a series of little moves. The little moves should be done by the diplomats.

In the 13 meetings I have had with them they have engaged me in a petty guerrilla war in which we were acting on the level of middle-level lawyers in which we were looking for escape clauses in particular phrases. Time and again I have said to Le Duc Tho—I know this is painful for you incidentally, Mr. Prime Minister, and I know you are a man of principle who will stick to his allies, but I am trying to explain—let us set an objective, say in six months we will do this and that, and then we will find a tactical solution. And time and again they have rejected this. Time and again they have done so for essentially two reasons. One is that their fear of trickery is such that they spend more time working on the escape clauses than on the principal provisions of any agreement. And it forces them to demand immediately what we might be prepared to have happen over a period of years.

And secondly, the nature of their strategy. What is their strategy? Their strategy is to pursue a military campaign designed, on the one hand, to undermine the Saigon government, which I understand, and on the other hand, a combination of a military and psychological campaign designed to undermine the American government, and that we

can never accept. They have never been able to make up their mind whether they want to settle with us or to destroy us, or at least to put us in a position where we lose all public support. And therefore, they will make no concession, or have up to now made no concession, to me or any other American negotiator, because they are afraid that if there is the solution of even the most minimal problem, we will then gain the public support and therefore they will not gain their principal objective of undermining our public support to paralyze us.

This is the real reason that the May 2 meeting between me and Le Duc Tho failed. When they thought they were winning, their real strategy was to show the American people that there was no hope, and therefore to force us into a dilemma where we had no choice but to yield to their demands. This is why they deal with us about the prisoners, not through the government or the Red Cross, but through American opposition groups whose significance they don't understand at all.

Prime Minister Chou: But it wasn't right for you either to raid their prisoner of war camp.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, first of all, I think that's a different proposition, and I would be glad to debate this with the Prime Minister, but I am not saying every move we have made in the war has necessarily been right. I am saying we are facing a situation now which needs solution. But I admit—thought I don't in this case—but we have made mistakes. This is why now they are making a tremendous issue about resuming plenary sessions, and yet any thoughtful person realizes that it doesn't make any difference whether there are plenary sessions when we have nothing to talk about. Until there is a program to negotiate at the plenary sessions, they are pure propaganda and mean nothing.

We are prepared to resume plenary sessions just to finish that particular issue, but they will fail certainly if we do not get a new basis for negotiating, and if they do not change their tactics. We attempt—and the Prime Minister will have his own judgment on this—we believe that in dealing with other countries if one does not deal with a country morally and honorably, even if one gains tactical advantage, one loses in the long run. But it is difficult to negotiate if one is engaged with a country which is subverting your authority.

Now, let us talk about the North Vietnamese offensive. Without that offensive we would have withdrawn more and more troops, and more and more aircraft. We had no intention whatever of increasing the scale of our military activities. On the contrary, we would progressively have reduced them. But the North Vietnamese offensive put us in a position in which they wanted to use the fact of an election in the United States to blackmail us into meeting a demand which we cannot meet. We can meet all others, but not that.

Now, what is the situation today? I know what has to be said in propaganda, but it is my judgment that the North Vietnamese offensive is effectively stopped and has no military prospects this year. They have not succeeded in generating this tremendous protest movement in the United States, despite the people who walk around with Vietnamese flags, which is not many. At the time of Cambodia there were 200,000 protesters in Washington, and they couldn't stop what we were doing. After May 8 they tried to get 200,000 and they got 5,000.

So where are we? The only hope for the North Vietnamese is a victory for McGovern in November. We do not believe that this will happen. The latest polls show the President 20 points ahead of McGovern.

Prime Minister Chou: Even if McGovern were to be elected, could he get rid of Thieu?

Dr. Kissinger: I am not sure.

Prime Minister Chou: Not necessarily.

Dr. Kissinger: Not necessarily.

Prime Minister Chou: My view is the same as yours.

Dr. Kissinger: And don't forget we will be in office seven more months.

Prime Minister Chou: That is another matter. Even if he were to be elected would it be possible for him to give up supporting the Saigon regime?

Dr. Kissinger: It is easier to talk about it than to do it.

Prime Minister Chou: It is a pitfall which was created by you which is difficult for you to get out of.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true.

Prime Minister Chou: Whether it be President Nixon or McGovern or Ed Kennedy. Even if you were to be President it would be difficult. But it is a great pity you are not qualified.

Dr. Kissinger: Let us run Miss Tang.

Prime Minister Chou: Even she could not get out.

Dr. Kissinger: If she ran and made me her advisor maybe we could do something together.

Prime Minister Chou: One knot tied into another, and most disadvantageous.

Dr. Kissinger: That is true. But the forces that would elect McGovern would bring about a reorientation of American policy not only on Vietnam, but certainly on the subjects of the Soviet Union, India, Japan, as you can read in the *New York Times* editorial. I don't have to explain. If you read the tendency of the *New York Times*, when I threatened to cancel the Moscow summit, for example, or during the India situation when it was impossible to get them to print any other point

of view, even in the news columns, you will get some feeling for the reality of what would happen if that happened. I will speak realistically. Everyone is in favor of a Sino-American relationship. There is no fundamental opposition to this any more. But the practical consequences that people are prepared to draw from it and the actual decisions they are willing to make other than sentimental affirmations or cultural exchange, that will differ enormously.

And therefore, any intervention in our domestic politics has two consequences. First, it forces us to react much more violently than we would have in normal circumstances, and second, it has consequences which go far beyond Vietnam and therefore make it a much more general problem than just the Vietnam problem.

And therefore, we believe that the war must now be ended for everybody's sake. If the war continues, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam will surely lose more than it can possibly gain. Its military offensive has stopped; its domestic situation is difficult; and we are forced to do things to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam that go beyond anything that is commensurate with our objective. We don't want them to be weak. And I see no prospect for them to reverse the situation. And we want to end the war because it requires now an effort out of proportion to the objectives and because it involves us in discussions with countries with whom we have much more important business.

If we could talk to them the way we talk to you, Mr. Prime Minister—I don't mean in words but in attitude—I think we could settle the war. As a practical matter, we think the quickest way to end it now is on the basis of ceasefire, withdrawal, and return of prisoners. That's the least complicated and leaves the future open. We are prepared in addition to declare our neutrality in any political contest that develops and in terms of foreign policy we are prepared to see South Vietnam adopt a neutral foreign policy.

We can also go back to our proposal the President made last January 25 and which was formally presented on January 27, and perhaps modify this or that provision and that involved political discussions also. But in practice, political discussions take forever. And the practical consequence of any political solution is either it will confirm the existing government in Saigon, which is unacceptable to Hanoi, or it will overthrow the existing government in Saigon, which is unacceptable to us. And it is almost impossible to think of a possible compromise between these two.

So we should find a way to end the war, to stop it from being an international situation, and then permit a situation to develop in which the future of Indochina can be returned to the Indochinese people. And I can assure you that this is the only object we have in Indochina, and I do not believe this can be so different from yours. We want nothing

for ourselves there. And while we cannot bring a communist government to power, if, as a result of historical evolution it should happen over a period of time, if we can live with a communist government in China, we ought to be able to accept it in Indochina.

The Prime Minister caught me on a particularly loquacious day. (Laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: So let us conclude today. As for tomorrow morning, I will first consult our Vice Chairman, Yeh Chien-ying, and then maybe tomorrow morning you will have some discussions with him. I heard that you would like to have a picnic at the Summer Palace.

Dr. Kissinger: I was asked what I wanted to see in addition to the Forbidden City. I said I thought the Summer Palace was so beautiful I would like to see it again. But the idea of a picnic is an addition which is charming but was not suggested by me. It is an idea of your protocol department. But work comes before picnics.

232. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, June 21, 1972, 3:25–6:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
John D. Negroponte, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou: You saw John Fairbank this afternoon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. He gave a very enthusiastic report about China—the interesting comparisons between the new and the old China.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972, Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. This meeting was held in the Great Hall of the People. Kissinger sent a brief synopsis of this meeting to Haig on June 21. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 1139, Jon Howe—Trip Files, HAK's China Trip, June 1972) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 143.

Prime Minister Chou: And I especially asked him to mention both the good points and the bad points when he spoke about his visit to China, because I said it would not do to mention only the good points.

Dr. Kissinger: The only bad point he mentioned was that you were not yet sending people to Harvard (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: We are willing to go but we would not like to stay for a long period as the first step. But he wants us to station permanently people there as the first step.

Dr. Kissinger: I have scolded him about this. We have suggested the best way to start would be to invite some Chinese scholars for a week and see how that works out, at some conference at some guest house. There we have the least danger of some incidents. And then they go home and a few months later other people can come.

Prime Minister Chou: One or two weeks?

Dr. Kissinger: Or two weeks.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a good way. And we can begin to use that method to get to know things. And then you will find that there might be some topics that are worth deeper research. And perhaps there might be some fields in which it might be worthy to exchange material or data about. And it may be finally we would be able to find out in that way whom it seems to be worthy to let to remain to study what problems. Otherwise, I could only let your student go there, but he is not very familiar about Chinese conditions.

Dr. Kissinger: Which student is that? (Prime Minister Chou points to Chi (Laughter)).

I would not recommend as a friend that you start by sending people for a year. Harvard has too many complicated influences. This procedure is much better.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, it seems that the President's Assistant has higher designs than ordinary men.

Dr. Kissinger: Professor Fairbank has designs on the Vice Foreign Minister. (Prime Minister Chou laughs)

If he fires too many empty cannons that may be the place to send him. (Prime Minister Chou laughs) Two points of information about yesterday's discussion. When we were in Moscow, the Soviet leaders urged the President that he send me on a visit in the fall, and we have up to now avoided an answer, but I have no doubt that the invitation will now be renewed. We will not make a decision for several months. I just wanted to tell you where it stands, and if we do it, we will let you know well in advance.

With respect to Vietnam, I told the Prime Minister yesterday that we had proposed a private meeting for June 28 and that we had not yet received their reply. We have now received their reply to the effect

that Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy will not return to Paris until the end of the first week of July. They propose a plenary session on July 13 and a private meeting on July 15 and (at this point Prime Minister Chou sends Wang Hai-jung out of the room and she returns in about two minutes) we will consider this, but I think it is reasonable to assume that some negotiations will start—if not then, in that general period. But the important thing, of course, is not the start of negotiations but the substance.

(Prime Minister Chou and Miss Tang have exchange in Chinese)

These are the items . . .²

Prime Minister Chou: Perhaps you have already read the news reports to the effect that your Secretary of Defense has spoken in the Congress as a witness about the approval and the ratification of your treaties and agreements with the Soviet Union. He spoke in the Senate. And he also mentioned that in order to get the treaties and agreements ratified, it was necessary to increase the U.S. defense budget.³ And therefore I found that your words were quite right yesterday, and we appreciate the straightforwardness of your Secretary of Defense in putting all the things on the table.

And there is also news that the Soviet Union has engaged in quite a number of experiments on nuclear weapons in order to raise their knowledge of the subject, since the signing of the agreement and the present day.⁴ And therefore it seems that there are at the same time limitations of strategic armaments and the continuation of experiments and development in nuclear arms.

And you also mentioned when you met with Ambassador Huang Hua the words I said during one of our meetings about these things. Actually when we met for the first time I said something about such matters. The thought which I expressed belonged to Chairman Mao Tse-tung, and therefore your burdens are still very heavy it seems.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, the agreement does stop numerical competition but not technological competition, and it would be extremely dangerous for everybody if we stop while the others continue.

The Prime Minister undoubtedly understands also that the Foreign Relations Committee has to approve the treaty, but the Armed Services Committee approves the military budget, and while the majority

² All ellipses are in the source text.

³ In June 1972, *The New York Times* published articles almost daily on arms control and the defense budget. See Bernard Gwertzman, "Senators Indicate Support at Arms-Accords Hearings," *The New York Times*, June 20, 1972, p. A-3.

⁴ Apparent reference to Laird's secret testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, as reported in Bernard Gwertzman, "Laird Discloses Soviet MIRV Test to Senate Panel," *ibid.*, June 9, 1972, p. A-12.

of the members of the Foreign Relations Committee are critical of Secretary Laird, the majority of the Armed Services Committee support Secretary Laird and he will have no difficulty passing his budget.

Prime Minister Chou: But Senator Fulbright, I believe, is Chairman of your Foreign Relations Committee, and he is in favor of the treaty.

Dr. Kissinger: He is in favor of the treaty and opposed to the budget.

Prime Minister Chou: But your Armed Services Committee will support the budget.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. It is already supported in the House and will most certainly be supported in the Senate.

Prime Minister Chou: And that is why he said that he doubted very much if Senator McGovern were elected he could cut the military budget of the U.S. by one-third. How could he do so?

Dr. Kissinger: A President could do so if he was absolutely determined to do it, but it would create enormous imbalances in the world.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and we are just reaffirming what we said yesterday. So perhaps by then if he wants to do that he will have to ask you to be his Assistant or adviser in such affairs so that you can explain to him that it won't do.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, it is extremely unlikely that such a thing would happen. It would require extraordinary mismanagement during the next three months to bring it about.

Prime Minister Chou: General Wheeler, your Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has already been in office for two terms, I think. Is that office affected by the Presidential election?

Dr. Kissinger: It is Admiral Moorer. He has been in office only one term, which is two years. That term is up at the end of this month. We are re-appointing him, and we will submit his name either during this week or early next week, and he will be re-appointed for two years regardless of who the President is. (Prime Minister Chou nods)

Prime Minister Chou: It already is in the papers that he was nominated.

Dr. Kissinger: It was supposed to be approved by the President on Monday. I did not know. My office sent it forward to the President on Friday, and I just did not know how quickly it would be acted upon. He will be appointed. I did not see our papers. The Prime Minister is ahead of me.

Prime Minister Chou: We probably give our press release excerpts from the foreign press very late to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I did not see it.

If I may tell the Prime Minister something in strictest confidence about personnel changes. We will appoint my Deputy as Vice Chief of Staff of the Army in September, and he will also be in office effective late in October, and he will be our link to the military.

Prime Minister Chou: Who?

Dr. Kissinger: General Haig.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't think your present Chief of Staff's term is yet up.

Dr. Kissinger: The present Chief of Staff Westmoreland is retiring July 1, and we will appoint General Abrams from Vietnam as the Chief of Staff, but speaking frankly, since General Haig has direct access to us, he will be the decisive person.

So quite a few people who have been involved in the normalization of relations are winding up in key positions—General Walters and General Haig.

Prime Minister Chou: Walters?

Dr. Kissinger: Walters in Paris.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the U.S.-Soviet talks, we don't have much to say because we have all along held the position that we are in favor of your being able to relax your relations with the Soviet Union if possible, and we think that if possible it would be a good thing.

Because you remember that upon your first visit Chairman Mao had asked me to tell you that we hoped that your President would visit the Soviet Union first so that the Russians would not get the feeling that if China and the U.S. were coming closer it would be impossible for the U.S. and the Soviet Union to come closer. Because they are extremely hysterical about such matters. That is one point. That, you might say, could be the main point.

But as for disarmament, we have always said that would be impossible. The utmost that could be achieved would be to have some limitations on certain points while others went up and became inflated, and it now seems that our views were correct.

And since it has now been declared that there must be a race in the world on long distance nuclear submarines and long range bombers, etc. and also certain products that would be turned out in 1978 must begin to be prepared now, it seems that others will be compelled to go forward.

Ch'iao: Impelled to go forward.

Prime Minister Chou: And in speaking in this sense, I doubt whether the Soviet economy will be able to shoulder the burden that is increasing in an unlimited way. And, of course, under these circumstances the credit becomes a very important thing for them. And I believe that on such matters you know much more than we do, be-

cause you have been to the Soviet Union and also studied economic matters and therefore in this field you have a more profound knowledge than we do.

Dr. Kissinger: With respect to the weapons in 1978, the Soviet Union has increased—has doubled—its capacity to produce submarines, and we had actually stopped for four years producing any. But we are now producing an entirely new type so that if we were not to do this we would be overwhelmed with numbers.

We must convince the Soviet leaders that it is too dangerous for them and indeed beyond their capacity to challenge us to a race in both quantity or quality, since our productive capacity is at least three times theirs.

With respect to credits it is a very difficult problem. Because on the one hand we would like to strengthen the peaceful elements in the Soviet Union. On the other hand there is the danger that we are making possible for them the sort of competition they could not otherwise sustain (Prime Minister Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: It is a dilemma.

Dr. Kissinger: To some extent we can regulate this if we give credits by the kind of projects to which we give credits, but this is not particularly effective because if you free these resources from one area they can use their own resources for others. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

We are now studying the problem, and we are trying to find the way if we give credit to do it in a way where we can control the rate and where we can turn it off if their political behavior becomes threatening either against us or against countries whose survival we consider essential.

We will approach this, Mr. Prime Minister, entirely as a political problem and not as a commercial problem.

Prime Minister Chou: I understand that. But it seems that with the increase of inflation throughout the world there are certain countries that will want to try to float loans in a way of gaining interest. And there is no way to stop them from doing this.

Dr. Kissinger: But you don't get much interest from the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: But we do not want to have any relations like that. We have repaid all our debts, and we will never want to ask for debts from the Soviet Union again. But only I will have to add the condition to it that I added yesterday—to the word "never." That is, the condition I added yesterday was, as long as the present type of leadership continues in the Soviet Union. But with regard to this question perhaps I shouldn't add that condition.

Dr. Kissinger: The preferred rate of the leaders of the Soviet Union is below the rate of inflation so they are getting the money for better

than nothing. They are making a profit even on the capital, not to speak of the interest. (Prime Minister Chou laughs and nods.)

Prime Minister Chou: How can things that are only in the interest of one side be done?

Dr. Kissinger: It won't be done. If that doesn't change, it won't be done.

Prime Minister Chou: We only have to see and to watch the present manner in which the Soviet Union is conducting its affairs so that you can see that when one wants to both compete and to ask for loans and get profits all at the same time—when one wants to get all the good things into one's hands at the same time—one cannot avoid crises at the end. Only I am not speaking about crisis immediately.

Dr. Kissinger: Nor can this inspire confidence.

Prime Minister Chou: And it seems that from your experience in your work and your dealings with the Soviet Union you perhaps find that it is better to have the documents prepared beforehand—before you begin to discuss this matter with them or to have a meeting with them. Is that so?

Dr. Kissinger: My experience is that it is essential to have the documents prepared and that it is essential to have the agreed documents checked several times. (Prime Minister Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and it was only because you had prepared all the documents beforehand that you were able to sign so many agreements with them this time.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is so. You remember we gave you the outline before we went to Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: But it seems that there are three documents that could not avoid small alterations at the time of the meeting: the declaration of principles, the SALT agreement, and the communiqué. You could not avoid small alterations when . . . I don't believe you could have every final word all hammered down before the meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: No. The declaration of principles was substantially composed . . . no, the declaration of principles was in outline completed before the meeting, and I gave the outline to your Ambassador. We then had to adjust it in Moscow.

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, and you also mentioned yesterday that when they first put it forward there were certain points on which you did not agree.

Dr. Kissinger: When they put it forward on my visit it included many features that would have involved an indirect form of pressure. I would think, especially on the People's Republic, along the lines that I described to you yesterday.

And it was true also of the communiqué that there was a section urging signature of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. We rejected this already in April, but they raised it again in Moscow and we rejected it again which is, as your Vice Foreign Minister knows, a very physically exhausting process. (Prime Minister Chou nods.)

On the agreement on the limitation of strategic armaments there was a very prolonged discussion, even in Moscow, in which we went through agreements in the evening and they were withdrawn the next morning; and which contained a number of unilateral proposals; and which ended only when at 4:00 o'clock on the morning of Friday I said that there would not be an agreement, and at 11:30 they accepted our proposals.⁵ You see, it was a very rational discussion (laughter).

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the unilateral statements?

Dr. Kissinger: No, there were a number of issues.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the unilateral statements, not the limitations?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to bore the Prime Minister, but they wanted to cut certain missiles . . . certain missiles they wanted to keep and therefore they said they were not strategic missiles and were outside the agreement. But since they could turn in old missiles for new ones they keep them . . . so that for missiles that were not counted in the inventory to begin with they could then build new missiles when they scrapped them. (Laughter) And we obviously could not accept this.

And so there were very many discussions, and there was another issue in which they said the size of a silo could not be significantly increased but they would not tell us what they meant by the word "significantly." So we insisted that a fixed percentage be given, 10 to 15%, because otherwise they could have put big missiles . . . replaced smaller missiles with big missiles and not violated the agreement. They finally agreed to this but it was a very long discussion. It was finally settled.

We had foreseen the agreement would be signed Friday night; then I said it could not be signed under the conditions; and then at 11:30 they accepted our proposals on these issues.

Prime Minister Chou: Was it only then when the representatives of your two countries came to Moscow from Helsinki?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I did not let the people come from Helsinki to Moscow until we had achieved an agreement in principle, because I did not want our experts running around Moscow negotiating with the

⁵ Documentation on these negotiations is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXXII.

Russian experts and creating total confusion. (PM Chou laughs.) I did not want our experts to give away our position in their desire to win the Nobel Prize. (Laughter.)

Prime Minister Chou: Would you like to take off your coats—it is so warm. Is it all right with the American lady?⁶ (All take off coats.)

And in one word, you will understand why it is that the Chinese–Soviet boundary negotiations which began on 11 September 1969 and have been continuing for almost three years now still haven't been able to reach an agreement on the provisional agreement that had already been formally agreed to.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand it very well.

Prime Minister Chou: As for the concrete terms of that, we have discussed it when your President came, so it is now still hanging in the air.

I would like to say something about the war in Vietnam and the question of Indochina.

This is the question that was unfortunately left down from history and is being very difficult to resolve. And the Vietnamese and other Indochinese peoples have undertaken something that has now become a test for them. But this is at the same time something that is also a test to both your present Administration and also the next.

And probably Mr. John Fairbank has already told you that I have on more than one occasion openly said that we believe that the Geneva Agreements of 1954 were not honest agreements and that we were taken in at that time. We admit our mistakes and would want to be able to rectify them.

And that is why there is a certain clause in the U.S. statement that is contained in the Sino-U.S. Joint Communiqué that draws my attention. It probably was ratified by your President, but also it might have been the masterpiece of Dr. Kissinger—that is, that no country should claim infallibility and each country should be able to re-examine its own attitudes for the common good. And we would want to implement that and to do that faithfully. We have on more than one occasion admitted our mistakes to the Vietnamese. Perhaps it might be said at that time among the socialist countries the role played by the Soviet Union was the greatest, but China was the one that was the closest to Vietnam and the rest of Indochina. And that is why this time we are showing complete respect for the sovereignty of Vietnam, whether it be on their positions on the battlefield or towards their positions at the

⁶ Apparent reference to one of the American notetakers.

negotiating table. In other words we only have the obligation to support them but not the right to interfere in their affairs.

But, however, the quantity of our assistance to Vietnam cannot be compared to your assistance to Saigon, and that is also a fact that was noted by Senator Mansfield back in 1968. And he was already by that time the leader of the ruling party in the Senate, of the majority party, and therefore it cannot be said that his words were exaggerated at that time. And you also admit that this has been our consistent stand.

Dr. Kissinger: I know it is true that your support has been less than ours. I don't dispute that.

Prime Minister Chou: And it now seems that your present Administration is determined to withdraw from Vietnam and the rest of Indochina and to try to create an environment in which policies of neutrality are practiced. And such an outcome can only come off the negotiation table and not out of the battlefield. Because if you try to settle the matter on the battlefield that will inevitably give rise to resistance. Because the situation is one in which the U.S. first sent in military advisers and then raised the situation to the level of special warfare and then escalated to regional warfare; this whole escalation was the result of actions done by previous, former U.S. administrations.

And with regard to the war in Vietnam, no matter what treaty you may cite, this sending of troops has been unjust and these are actions which no one can defend. And this situation can in no way be compared to your treaty obligations with other countries or other areas into which you have not yet sent troops, unless you view all the areas or countries with which you have treaties as being relations which are entirely the same as your relations with Saigon. And even if you view all those treaties as official treaties, if mistakes have been committed, then you should be prepared to reexamine your own attitudes and to rectify the mistakes.

And you have always been expressing your praise for the attitude taken by the Chinese government in taking the negotiations step by step. That is not wrong, but that is because the state of war does not exist between our two countries.

You mentioned the day before yesterday that you read later on the records of Chairman Mao's talk with President Nixon, and he had mentioned in the talk in the beginning on the items that were later discussed during the next five or six days, and this was also a point that was mentioned by our Chairman. And following the advice of your words I re-read the records this morning, and it was your President that first mentioned this matter. Of course, Chairman Mao first mentioned that no state of war existed between our two countries and it was not necessary to have a state of war exist between our two countries.

And your President also mentioned that China was not a threat to the U.S. and the U.S. was neither a threat to China. Chairman Mao also mentioned that we neither threatened Japan nor South Korea, and I added a word there that we did not want to threaten any other country. And proof of this point can be found in the fact that we have only done little nuclear experiments on the basis of self-reliance. We do not want to compete in this field.

Therefore I think that President Nixon and also Prime Minister Heath have been correct in pointing out that China is only a potential strength and it cannot be known yet whenever that strength will appear, and we know our own age and you also probably have pointed out that we probably will not be here in the 21st Century. You have the hope of being here at that time. We do not. Those seated at this side of the table have the hope. Those on the other side I cannot be sure about, but on your side all of you have the hope.

So the matter is very clear. We will not be a threat to you. And not only are we not a threat to you—take the case of Indochina. If an end can be put to the war then in Cambodia, Sihanouk will ultimately be the head of state. And in Laos the head will be King Vattana. That is the man of prestige in Laos. Perhaps you have not seen the King of Laos. I have met him. He is a very honest man.

And in both these two countries their characteristic of neutrality will be more pronounced and in South Vietnam at least for a time it will be neutral. As for the outcome of the election I cannot vouch for that, but the situation will not change very quickly. And you know that we will not reach our hands out to that area. You are very clear on that. And that area will become in a certain sense a kind of a buffer.

As for countries like Malaysia, Thailand, Singapore and the Philippines and so on, these countries would like to embark on a road of neutrality. They have asked our opinion on such matters, and we support them in doing so. Of course, there will also be the problem of mutual respect. All other countries must also respect them and not interfere in their internal affairs. We believe that this is a good tendency that is also beneficial to the relaxation of tension in the Far East. If this is to be achieved, not only our two countries but also the other two big countries in this area and the other countries in the west must not try to seek domination in this area. Only this is a complicated issue. But at least, if our two countries can have common comprehension of the matter then that will be beneficial towards relaxing the tension in the Far East.

So what is the question that we now face? The question is that the U.S. Government now feels that if it should let loose of the situation there and discontinue to pay attention to that area, then that would be losing face. And what will be the result? We have to come back to our

discussion during your first visit—that is, if such kind of face worries are to be maintained then the war will not be able to be stopped. And then the result will not be what you want nor be what we want. The war will continue along its own laws of development; there are certain things that cannot be decided by human will. But the result will be that there are certain people who will be happy about this. I believe that in one of my messages I mentioned that point, and those were true words.

Although you have heard from certain people that we are the ones who are commanding affairs in that area, how is it possible that we should be doing that? And to be honest and frank, if we were the commanders we would not fight in such a way. You are clear about how the war in Korea was conducted. And your President Eisenhower, after just being elected, went to Korea to see the situation with his own eyes, and he understood the situation. You know that finally in June 1953 we wiped out four divisions of Syngman Rhee, and we broke through in the center of the line. At that time the U.S. agreed to put its signature to the ceasefire. And by that time Stalin had already passed away and Khrushchev also agreed to the ceasefire. Since both these two sides agreed to a ceasefire, we also put our signature to the agreement.

You will recall that during your President's visit we had a discussion in the guest house in Villa 18, where your President was staying, in which I mentioned the question of the Chinese volunteers in the Korean war and how they were maltreated and the disgraceful role that India played.⁷ I will not say anything more about that today because it makes me too sad to mention such matters.

So the present situation is one in which with the turn of one's hand the matter could be settled. But you are continuing to stay now, and you are pegged down to a point that you say that you cannot give up a certain government. Actually that government was set up by yourself. It was also mentioned in the Sino-U.S. communiqué by the U.S. side that in the absence of a negotiated settlement the U.S. envisages the ultimate withdrawal of all the U.S. forces from the region consistent with the aim of self-determination for the countries of Indochina. Your attitude at the time of the drawing up of this document—that was in October last year—seemed to be more pronounced than your present one. Do you have to insist on drawing the strings of the bow so tightly and to persist in continuing the war?

And also you continue your bombing and blockade of the northern part of Vietnam. There is an old Chinese saying, "since the people are not afraid of death, how can you try to scare them with the thought

⁷ Chou mentioned the Chinese prisoners of war at the February 24 meeting held in the Great Hall of the People. See Document 199.

of death?" I would not want to engage in emotional discussions. But what you are doing now is an equivalent to a provocation against us because you now only leave the continental route as the only remaining route to Vietnam. Do you think we can watch people dying without trying to save them? If a country sent its forces to Canada or Mexico, and the situation developed into a similar stage, would you be able to sit there with your hands folded and refuse to try to save them?

Both your President and yourself are very clear, especially yourself who has come to China now four times, that our country is not a country that wants to expand abroad. We cannot even finish our own things . . . what should be done in our own country. And, of course, our strength at the present time cannot be compared to that of the Soviet Union. But do you think that in giving assistance to Vietnam we would not be able to grit our teeth and to use all our strength to assist them? And you should attach importance to the fact that it is not easy for our two countries to establish certain relations . . .

Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao: Attaching importance to the relations which has paved the way . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Because your bombing and your blockade are not directed against the Soviet Union. They are directed against China, because you are bombing us. I would like to show you some pictures later on. We have photographs of the two bomb shells that fell onto our territory. It is marked in English that they are anti-tank bomb clusters, that have a cluster of smaller bombs inside. It includes nearly 200 small bombs inside. There is no question that those were U.S. Navy bombs. It can be seen very clearly that from the various routes that were taken by those airplanes that the flight routes all finally ended in the sea. They finally went back towards the sea. But you will know that we have exercised extreme restraint on these matters. The incidents that occurred on the 4th, 9th and 10th of June, we all dealt with them in the way of giving you internal private notification. And General Haig's reply to the incidents of the 10th and 11th was extremely quick. He telephoned us in the afternoon.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: At my instructions from Tokyo.

Prime Minister Chou: And you probably also could foresee by that time that something would also happen on the 11th and that is why we haven't yet raised the incident that occurred on the 11th.

And before that, before your President's announcement of May 8, on the 7th, your airplanes also bombed two Chinese merchant ships that were at that time anchored near the island of Hon Ngu of the Dem-

⁸ See footnote 2, Document 230.

ocratic Republic of Vietnam. You said that you had already launched an investigation with regard to this but perhaps the final result will be given to us at a later time.

So why isn't the Soviet Union a target? Because they ran away. (Dr. Kissinger laughs.) One of their boats was damaged by your armed forces, but the Soviet Union did not make that public. The DRV made it public for them. Therefore we feel that such a course of action will not win the sympathy of the people of the world.

And that is why I posed the question yesterday that if you withdrew your armed forces and no political resolution could be found to the issues, and hostilities broke out again, what could you do? Of course, not hostilities between the U.S. and regional forces but hostilities between the liberation forces in Vietnam and the Saigon government. I asked what you would do in that event, and you found it very difficult to reply.

That is why the Vietnamese envisage a settlement that includes both the military aspect and the political aspect at once. We believe there is reason in their seeking such a solution and therefore we support them. Therefore, if the question of the government, no matter whether it be called a coalition government or a government of harmony, is not settled, and discussions on this do not bear results, then a peaceful situation will not be able to be brought about in the southern part of Vietnam, and therefore in the event of your withdrawal from that part of Indochina, hostilities between the two Vietnamese sides would break out again. On the other hand, if political agreement can be reached, then that would have a binding force on all. And that is also to say that the attitude that that government would take towards the U.S. would be more friendly because the political agreement would be an agreement in which you also had made a contribution. You also mentioned last July that it was easy to solve all the other points of the 7-point proposal put forward by Madame Binh, and you even expressed your appreciation of certain points of her proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: We even accepted most of them . . . which did not keep her from publicly demanding for six months after we had already accepted five of her seven points that we respond to her seven points.

Prime Minister Chou: Because your proposal did not answer the fundamental question and therefore it was a proposal that could not be realized.

Dr. Kissinger: But it was a response.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you said that there could be two governments, and the present government was one that Vietnam would not accept and a government that would be proposed by the Vietnamese would be a government that you would not accept, and therefore your two positions were opposed to each other. That is why a

means should be found and a solution should be found that could be agreeable to both sides. This should be a government that could be accepted by both sides and that also would include the forces of all sides . . . of various sides; and also a government that would not be antagonistic to the U.S. and would take a comparatively friendly attitude toward the U.S.

As to the future, that is looking a few years ahead for a period that might be agreed upon, that might be defined, if after a period of a certain time through general elections Vietnam would choose to take the socialist road, that would be something else. As for socialism in the present world, there are many various kinds of socialism. From the point of view of philosophy you have long seen that point as a point that John Foster Dulles did not see. As to what kind of socialism that South Vietnam would choose if it would turn to socialism in the future, I cannot say, and yet you are so afraid of that. Anyway, I won't see that, because they have already declared that it will be only after a certain period of time that Vietnam would seek to be reunified. Yet you are so fearful and so sure that the government that would emerge would be a communist government. And through your contacts with us you would know that it is not an easy task at all for a country to truly build up socialism and to thoroughly eliminate exploitation and to also eliminate the ideology of the exploiting classes. Chairman Mao has mentioned that the Cultural Revolution will have to be carried out many times.

I do not agree with your prediction for Germany. How could Germany be turned into a country like Finland? It is impossible. I seem to have more confidence in the Germans than you do. They wouldn't want to be a Finland. As for the other two possibilities, there might even be a different, third possibility. That is why I said that Germany was at the crossroads.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the third possibility?

Prime Minister Chou: To continue to remain split.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes. I start from that assumption. I was talking about West Germany alone.

Prime Minister Chou: It is impossible for West Germany to become a Finland. I have been to Germany for only one year and Mr. Ch'iao has been to Germany for three years. And we all of us seem to have more confidence in Germany than you, the American sitting across from us who was born in Germany. And as for East Germany, it is more than Finland—it has already become a kind of dependency, but it is impossible for West Germany to become that. As for the other two possibilities, they exist. Therefore as to the future development and prospects, why should you take so much care about that?

Dr. Kissinger: What country are we talking about? (Laughter)

Prime Minister Chou: We are turning back to Indochina.

So what is bad in relaxing the tension in the Far East for a time and to having a period of neutrality in this area? I am tempted more to agree to the attitude you took when you were drawing up the communiqué. Because otherwise there are things that would not be able to be realized. And therefore we might as well solve the military and the political aspects together and to set up a good relation that would be able to continue for a certain period of time—for several years. And perhaps in the words of your President, you might be able to attain a generation of peace, or in my words, a generation of relaxation.

Otherwise, if the issue of Indochina is not resolved, then that will affect the settlement of the Taiwan issue. It would also affect the two sides in Korea that wish to co-exist peacefully. That will also inevitably affect the direction of Japan. And Southeast Asia will continue in an upheaval, and relaxation will not be able to be realized in that area either. I don't know whether you noted that or not, but there can be seen a tendency towards relaxation—it can be seen from the recent meeting that was held of the Asian Pacific Council in Seoul. I don't think South Vietnam participated in that. I believe there were nine countries that formally took part. I believe the nine units that participated were—officially—South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Australia, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand. And there were three that might be called observers. They included South Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos.

They especially applauded the visit of your President to China and the Soviet Union which was conducive towards the relaxation of tension. I was greatly taken aback upon reading that report because I wondered how they could have put in the matter of your President's visit to China. So finally I decided that it must have come out of the hands of Aichi and the Foreign Minister of South Korea and perhaps Mr. Romulo might have taken part too. They said that your President had visited Peking and Moscow; I said that was illogical because the communiqué itself was issued in Shanghai. They had no other way to say it than that. They had to make some conciliations. They could only write it that way. And because Taiwan has now changed its so-called Foreign Minister,⁹ and he knew it would not have been easy to oppose that issue, he probably kept comparatively quiet and if Chow Shu-kai had taken part, he probably would have created a scene and the others would not have listened to him. So the present Foreign Minister thought it would be more intelligent to keep quiet. That does not mean

⁹ Foreign Minister Wei Tao-ming was replaced by Chow Shu-kai in 1971, who was replaced by Shen Ch'ang-huan in 1972.

that I appreciated the statement issued by those nine units. I only mean that this tendency has drawn our attention.

So why is it that one should get tangled up in the single knot of Indochina? Especially in view of the fact that all these nine units have expressed appreciation for your President's visit to China, although Taiwan probably did not appreciate it, but it probably could not refrain from acquiescing.

Dr. Kissinger: I had the pleasure of talking to their Ambassador, and they would not have recommended it if we had asked them to. (Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: Of course. And therefore, with regard to the issue of Indochina, we feel it would be better if you adopted an attitude that was more directed towards a settlement of the issue. Otherwise you will be placing a difficult question before us. Because you know that we would like to see a relaxation in the tension, and by doing that you are delighting the Soviet Union. You are giving them an opportunity to heap abuse upon us. They already are doing that.

After you completed your visit to the Soviet Union we kept quiet because we did not think it was necessary to create a commotion, and we also were not opposed to that. Even after the visit we only issued a very short news report—an objective report. We issued no comment.

Dr. Kissinger: We noticed that with appreciation.

Prime Minister Chou: But after your visit here they heaped abuse upon us, saying that we did not assist the Soviet Union in assisting Vietnam. There is no such thing. They are trying to pile all the burdens and the responsibilities of assistance onto our shoulders; including the things that they want to send into Vietnam, they also send them to us.

Therefore I do not understand your policy, and, according to what you told us during your visit last July, your subjective desire was to settle the issue, but it seems as if the objective tendency is to follow the laws of development that govern the war. So what are you going to do about that? What can we do about this situation? I can only ask for your opinion.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me make a number of observations, Mr. Prime Minister.

Prime Minister Chou: I wanted to get your comments. That is why I said all this. Otherwise, how can we have a discussion and for what other purpose would we welcome you to come to China? Because you know this is one of the steps that must be taken to normalize relations between the U.S. and China.

Dr. Kissinger: I am fully aware of that. First, in connection with incursions into Chinese territory. We have investigated them all, and I have this book here of the investigation. As you know, since we had

to make these investigations through military channels and since the military are not eager to admit a mistake, I have to confess that the results are sometimes inconclusive. Our military claim, and I don't say this to be vague with you, that perhaps there is some inadequacy in your radar, and I mention it only so that if this were true, and I don't ask for a reply today, it might have some consequences to you in other areas and therefore might be important for you to look into. (Chou laughs.) I am not saying this for a defense.¹⁰

Prime Minister Chou: I know.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no doubt that if bombs fell on your territory it was not caused by the imperfection of your radars. And if you could let me have the pictures, I would want them, not because I question you but so that we can take appropriate disciplinary measures when we return. At any rate it cannot be the intention of our government, in the light of all of our discussions, to challenge the sovereignty of the People's Republic or to engage in provocations against the People's Republic.

And therefore we have issued new instructions which would avoid the possibility of mistakes by keeping our planes further from your territory.

Prime Minister Chou: We can make a present of those pictures to you.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. Give me the coordinates also, where these bombs fell and the time and the date.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the bombs that fell in the morning of the 10th?

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly, and the exact place.

Prime Minister Chou: It was just south of the town of Ping Hsiang, near a railway station.

Dr. Kissinger: How many bombs?

Prime Minister Chou: Two anti-tank bomb clusters.

Dr. Kissinger: We can only extend our apologies. There is no excuse. There is no explanation. (Prime Minister Chou is handed maps.)

¹⁰ Moorer reported to Laird in a July 9 memorandum that a second investigation had been conducted, but concluded again that no U.S. aircraft entered PRC airspace and "The only plausible explanation for the few MK-118 bombs to have been dropped in the vicinity of the PRC village of Aikou, if in fact the PRC facts are accurate, is that one of the aircraft had a high altitude inadvertent release." Laird forwarded Moorer's memorandum to Kissinger on July 11. (Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 75 0155, Comm. China 1972, 000.1) On July 11 Laird also informed Kissinger that he had met with the JCS to work out procedures to ensure that U.S. aircraft did not penetrate PRC airspace. (Ibid.) This information was given to the PRC on July 26; see Document 243.

Prime Minister Chou: This is the map of the intrusion.¹¹ The coordinates are not here, but I can give them to you later. I will get the English also marked on it in the future. (Points to map.) This was the route which the aircraft incursion on the 4th of June took. It came in like that and went out. You know there is some difficulty with our boundary because it moves out—it protrudes a bit, so perhaps it is difficult for people to remember. That is Ping Hsiang and that is the Aikou railway station. So this is the road in Vietnam that you bombed and you went up to [town]¹² which is nearer and that is the reason for the first intrusion on the 4th. On the 9th there were three groups of intrusions. One came in here and went out there. One came in first here, went out, and then came in again and went out there.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no possibility that any of these were North Vietnamese planes? If they are fighting up there.

Prime Minister Chou: We have the type. I think maybe perhaps all of them are F-4s. This was the bomb of the plane that bombed our territory on the 10th.

Dr. Kissinger: Where did the bomb drop?

Prime Minister Chou: (Points) Here. (Chou takes pictures.) That is the panorama of the Aikou area. This is where one of the bombs fell. We will mark the place. That is what was marked on the bomb. That was a whole picture of the shell.

Dr. Kissinger: Which is the 4th of June? Can I have these pictures?

Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but I will ask them to put some marks on them where exactly the bombs fell. We will give the whole thing to you later after we get the coordinates in English. So we will leave it at that.

Dr. Kissinger: I have all these reports from our military people about these. Of course they deny everything, and I can read them to you, but I don't know what good it would do.

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe you could read a paragraph. For instance, what do they say about the 10th?

Dr. Kissinger: Bombs on PRC structures. The PRC charged that two planes entered into the PRC airspace with guns in the area of Pingshan (?). They just refute the charge. CINCPAC Air Force has confirmed that the 7th Air Force had no aircraft operating above 21 degrees north latitude in North Vietnam within four hours of either side of the time period in question. Why don't you read it yourself (to the interpreter)

¹¹ Not found. Documentation on alleged intrusions and communications between the White House and the Department of Defense is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OASD/ISA Files: FRC 330 75 0155, 373.5, Communist China.

¹² All brackets are in the source text.

to the Prime Minister? That would be easier. If you can understand his English you are better off.

Mr. Negroponte is shocked. He doesn't understand my method of operation. They don't teach this in the Foreign Service Institute. (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: This is a more convenient way of conducting things.

Dr. Kissinger: Here. This is all of it.

(Miss Tang reads document at Tab A to Prime Minister Chou.)¹³

Prime Minister Chou: There are a lot of small bombs that were included in the cluster.

Dr. Kissinger: Well since they have denied that they have dropped a cluster it is not very fruitful to discuss what was in it. (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: Maybe they would like to see it.

(Miss Tang continues reading.)

Dr. Kissinger: (To other interpreter who is copying from document) If you could avoid making a word for word record of it, it would help me.

(Interrupting Miss Tang:) This is a very long military report. Here is the Laird version of it. (Dr. Kissinger hands over sanitized Secretary Laird report, attached at Tab B.)

Miss Tang: *Long Beach* radar?

Dr. Kissinger: That is the cruiser from which these planes are launched. That is an American cruiser that keeps track of all our planes.

(Miss Tang reads more, then stops, puzzled.)

Dr. Kissinger: What is it in English?

Miss Tang: None of the aircraft identified above are operated at a speed of 192 knots, which is the speed indicated by the time and distance factors resulting from the unidentified *Long Beach* radar fixes.

Dr. Kissinger: The *Long Beach* picked up some airplanes that were moving at a speed of 192 miles, and the argument is that none of our planes fly that slowly.

¹³ Tabs A or B are probably an undated report entitled "10 June Allegations (Bombs on PRC Structures)" and a copy of a June 16 memorandum from Laird to Kissinger subject: "PRC Allegations and Possible Airspace Intrusions." Both are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 851, President's File—China Trip, Memcons, HAK China Visit, 19–23 June 1972. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 136 and 137. Messages and memoranda concerning alleged intrusions into PRC airspace or territorial waters are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, PRC Allegations of Hostile Acts (ca. 1972).

(Miss Tang continues reading.)

Miss Tang: What is POWT?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't know. I just noticed that myself. I will ask Commander Howe. But at any rate it is after the event. I will find out and let you know. (*Note: It was misprint that should have read "post" for "post-strike."*)

Dr. Kissinger: (After Miss Tang finishes reading document) I won't argue this point. I also have longer reports on them by the Secretary of Defense. The major point is it is not authorized. It is not encouraged, and we have given new orders which in our judgment should prevent it by keeping the airplanes a further distance from your territory.

Secondly, the purpose of our actions was not to provoke the People's Republic. As a matter of fact, before we took the decision on May 8 we foresaw that one objective result of that decision might be to strengthen the influence of the People's Republic in Hanoi, and we did not consider that a disadvantage.

As we have told you on previous occasions, we have no interest in encouraging the spread of Soviet military presence all around your borders and therefore to the degree that the Soviet Union has withdrawn some of its influence from North Vietnam and you have increased yours, we did not intend that as a provocation to you.

Third, I am not sure whether I understood the Prime Minister correctly when he spoke about "gritting your teeth" and giving assistance. I remember that the Prime Minister told the President that unless the People's Republic was attacked, was directly attacked, it would not use its military forces in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: But we must continue the transportation and our people will die in that course.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Prime Minister Chou: Transportation by ships, by cars, and even by shoulder poles or train. Since you have cut off all other routes we still have to send things. Because you know that our two countries, that China and Vietnam are linked by both land and water and sea, and you know that we cannot just sit here and see them lacking food, because you know that you are now attacking even their food supplies. The two boats—more than two—that you attacked that went to the [name] Island and another the [name].

Dr. Kissinger: I know what you mean.

Prime Minister Chou: The Honshi ships including the ships that were attacked, all the [name] ships that went to those two islands were carrying grain and you could see the grain being carried off the ships. The new island and the Honla Island. So this will inevitably incur the death of large numbers of people.

Of course, the Soviet Union will not go there to try to send supplies in (Chou laughs). It is very clear. What you meant by saying that our influence had increased in North Vietnam could only be that our assistance had increased. But originally before that our assistance was already greater than that given by the Soviet Union because they only gave certain military assistance while we gave all-round assistance including all kinds of commodities. Anyway, if you continue the bombing that will inevitably incur more deaths. And to try to solve the question by killing people will not bring about a settlement.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, this gets me to the most important problem. It is in a sense absurd that you and we should have tension over an area from which we are attempting to withdraw and which you are not attempting to enter.

Prime Minister Chou: It is absurd.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree also with the basic objective of the Prime Minister that we should try to create an area of relaxation of tension. I also agree with the Prime Minister that neutrality of many of these countries can be achieved through an understanding between our two countries at least. Because if we both showed a strength and if we both oppose outside intervention, it will be very difficult to have outside intervention.

So we are in the curious situation, and finally I agree with the Prime Minister that a continuation of the war will have the consequence in Southeast Asia, in Korea, in Japan and unfortunately on our relationship, that he predicts and for no sensible objective. What then is the problem? In our view the problem is the inability of a government that has fought 30 years, or 27 years, to think in political terms, and its impatience to settle everything in one negotiation and in one time period. And couple that with a certain pride that they want to be able to say that they can defeat the U.S.

Prime Minister Chou: It cannot be put that way. It is you that has compelled them to fight like that.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, it is our different interpretation.

Prime Minister Chou: Because you imposed armed forces into that area, and then you armed the Saigon regime.

Dr. Kissinger: But we are talking about the current situation. We have withdrawn 500,000 troops.

Prime Minister Chou: That I admit.

Dr. Kissinger: And we want to withdraw the remainder.

Prime Minister Chou: And since you have withdrawn your troops to its final remainder, then why do you want to leave that "tail" there and try to expand the war with the tail?

Dr. Kissinger: But the Prime Minister knows, because I told him yesterday, that we are prepared to withdraw the tail. If the North

Vietnamese accept a ceasefire we will withdraw all our forces in return for our prisoners.

Prime Minister Chou: Does that mean that your air and naval forces would also withdraw?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: So then since you will have by that time withdrawn all your forces and have all your prisoners of war repatriated, then if the political issue cannot be solved and a civil war breaks out again, you shouldn't go back to take care of that. Because we wouldn't take care of that, so what reason is it for you to go back to take care of that situation?

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, you have more experience in international affairs than I so you know there are certain situations in which it is very difficult to give a formal answer, because one does not want to create a legal obligation for what may be taken care of by reality. I believe if a sufficient interval is placed between our withdrawal and what happens afterward that the issue can almost certainly be confined to an Indochina affair; and if there is no other outside intervention. From your own analysis of the American situation it should be self-evident that in a second term we would not be looking for excuses to re-enter Indochina. But still it is important that there is a reasonable interval between the agreement on the ceasefire, and a reasonable opportunity for a political negotiation.

Prime Minister Chou: The present regime in Saigon is receiving large quantities of U.S. armed military assistance, and therefore it is not possible that the Saigon government will recognize a reasonable settlement that might be the outcome of negotiations between the Vietnamese people.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not certain that in the absence of American forces and of the American air and naval power the Saigon government might not prove to be more reasonable in negotiations.

Prime Minister Chou: They have their own armed forces, and they have blind confidence in their own armed forces. And they also are convinced that although you have left, if even you may not go back in, you would not resist giving them the military assistance that they wanted.

Dr. Kissinger: We offered last year to limit military assistance to South Vietnam in the same proportion that North Vietnam limited assistance it received in the military field.

Prime Minister Chou: So the outcome of your logic is that the war will continue?

Dr. Kissinger: No, the outcome of my logic is that for the time period . . . I am not trying to win debating points because I agree with

the Prime Minister that we have a difficult problem to settle. The outcome of my logic is that we are putting a time interval between the military outcome and the political outcome. No one can imagine that history will cease on the Indochina peninsula with a ceasefire. And I believe that if the North Vietnamese had confidence in themselves they should have a better chance this way than through a continuation of the war.

The Prime Minister referred to what President Eisenhower did in Korea. If we had that opportunity, we would settle the war very quickly.

Prime Minister Chou: The situation was different.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Prime Minister Chou: Because at that time the people in South Korea had not arisen. So there was only the two sides. North Korea was the one side and South Korea was the other. So there was a tie between the strength of the two sides and that settled the issue. And as a result we withdrew all our Chinese peoples' volunteers in 1958, but you haven't responded to this yet. The situation that prevailed in that time was different.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree with the Prime Minister. The Prime Minister also said that the issue is that we do not want to give up a certain government. That is not correct. What we will not do is ourselves to overthrow the government. We will agree to an historical process or a political process in which the real forces in Vietnam will assert themselves, whatever these forces are.

Why should we be afraid of socialism in Vietnam when we can live with communism in China? (Chou laughs)

Prime Minister Chou: That is the point that I don't understand.

Dr. Kissinger: And therefore what we are trying to do, Mr. Prime Minister, and what is not against your own interests, is not to end this war with an act of betrayal. We do not want to overthrow this government. We will agree to a process in which the people of South Vietnam have an opportunity to express themselves. That we can agree. But we cannot agree to ourselves overthrowing them.

Now we have made some political proposals. I have not mentioned them only because they will lead to very complex and therefore very time-consuming negotiations. We have offered elections which would be supervised and run by commissions in which all three parties are represented. And we have offered that President Thieu would resign a month before the election and if extending this period somewhat would make the problem of the Democratic Republic somewhat easier we can do that probably.

So there is a possibility for a political negotiation. The reason we cannot accept this government of national conciliation is because its

objective consequence will be to overthrow the existing government and bring into power—it is a very thinly disguised formula for bringing into power the DRV. And therefore we believe that the most rapid way of ending the war would be to concentrate on the military issues and permit us to disengage from Indochina, and after that permit the local forces to work it out, either through negotiations or other means.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the local forces in Vietnam?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: But if the issue cannot be solved at the present existing negotiation table then the local forces will continue in conflict. This can almost be said to be certain.

Dr. Kissinger: Then at least the outside forces will be disengaged.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean there should be a ceasefire during the period of time in which the negotiations are being held?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: I think that that probably could not be done. Would the Saigon government—regime—agree to that?

Dr. Kissinger: At this moment with great reluctance, because they believe they are winning, but we would see to that.

Prime Minister Chou: You could only see to that by continuing to give them arms and assistance.

Dr. Kissinger: We would certainly not increase our arms and assistance during a ceasefire, and we would almost certainly reduce the quantity during the ceasefire. Since less equipment would be destroyed, we would almost certainly reduce it . . .

Prime Minister Chou: For a time.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not . . . it is senseless to believe that we are looking for an excuse to be permanently involved in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: But according to our experience in China, although a ceasefire may have been signed before the civil war broke out again in China, we had documents and usually even had agreements and both sides signed the agreements, but later on when Chiang Kai-shek felt that he had strength to launch a civil war he went on.

Dr. Kissinger: The Prime Minister explained to me once that if Chiang Kai-shek had observed the ceasefire in 1946 he might have lasted six years longer.

Prime Minister Chou: The question was that his subjective desire would not allow him to abide by its agreements. He thought that he could do it. That is the same case with you.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe that the danger of Thieu breaking the agreement is much smaller than the danger of the Democratic Republic

breaking the agreement. Because if Thieu broke a ceasefire there would be a good chance that he would lose American support.

Prime Minister Chou: It is very difficult to say that. I cannot answer for them.

Anyway, in a word, why is it that the DRV insists on having a political settlement at the same time as a military settlement? It is because they believe that if the political side can be resolved, that would be better, truly towards relaxing the tension in Indochina, and also better towards solving the question for the time being.

Dr. Kissinger: If I may make one suggestion for the Democratic Republic, and in which your advice to them could be helpful since they are so suspicious of us. They should look not just at the words of the agreement but at the trend. No matter what the words of the agreement in 1954 would have been, Secretary Dulles was determined to go into Indochina. No matter what the words of the agreement in 1972, or whenever this Administration makes it, there is no reason for us who are seeking to normalize relations with you to remain in a position of tension with Hanoi. When we were attempting to build barriers against you, there was one policy. But now that we believe that your vitality is a factor to peace in the Pacific, why should we build barriers to you in Indochina, and if not building barriers in Indochina what is our interest there either one way or the other? So after the agreement is signed the value will be that there will be an increasing American disinterest in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: That is to say that there should be a political solution to the question. But as for your proposal, what the DRV believes your proposal to be is an attempt to set up a Thieu government without Thieu. Because you remember that they held so-called elections a year before, and if elections of a similar type are still to be held then he will be the outcome again. And therefore the question of political settlement will have to be discussed between your two sides, because we are not very clear about the concrete details and specific organization matters, and therefore we do not wish to enter into any detailed discussion on this. I expect that you will say that the new government you propose is not a new edition of Thieu. But they will say that what will be the outcome of an election that is held in a situation in which Thieu's military forces are in control of the areas in which the elections are held; and also in their having superior forces in that area it will not be possible for a true coalition government that includes the three sides to be elected.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand their point.

Prime Minister Chou: And the country of Laos is a precedent, because in that country we even had an international agreement at that time. But finally if they wanted to phase certain people out they still phased them out and the situation turned into a civil war.

Dr. Kissinger: I believe a political solution will be much easier 18 months from today than today if we can get the war stopped. But we are prepared to discuss political negotiations also, but I predict it will end as badly as all previous negotiations for the reasons I gave you yesterday.

Prime Minister Chou: Oh. Did not you say there was a bit of hope?

Dr. Kissinger: In the negotiations? It depends. We are prepared, and we have offered, to go systematically through all of their points if they are willing to go systematically through ours to see if we can find a reconciliation. That will be our attitude. We believe that the war should be ended this year, because a continuation of the war runs counter to all the positive tendencies that we have described; and it will involve a degree of interference in our domestic politics which is becoming intolerable; and which will strengthen those forces whose practical convictions are against the policies I have . . .

Prime Minister Chou: Your previous sentence was illogical.

Dr. Kissinger: Why?

Prime Minister Chou: First of all, what strength of force does North Vietnam have to interfere in your domestic politics? You have interfered in their domestic politics to such a degree that it is becoming disgraceful, and they have no way of interfering in your domestic politics. For instance, I don't believe that if McGovern would come to office he would be able to solve the question. Did not you read the interview between Chairman Mao and the President?

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: I also read it. And it seems to me that if you were willing to settle the issue then, it would be comparatively easier for you to do it than for McGovern.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but why should we not be willing to settle it? We have accepted every proposal. There is one we cannot accept, and I have told you we will not accept. But we will accept . . .

Prime Minister Chou: So things will remain in a stalemate and the war will continue.

Dr. Kissinger: No, we will try to find a way of dealing with it.

Prime Minister Chou: (laughs) But you just now said that your next meeting would be the same as the previous meetings were.

Dr. Kissinger: It depends with what attitude the North Vietnamese approach us. They have never yet dealt with us on any other basis except through ultimatum.

Prime Minister Chou: You say that they don't understand you. I think that you don't understand them either.

Dr. Kissinger: It is probably true. I agree with you.

Prime Minister Chou: I believe you entered political life from a previous position of carrying out research on issues, not like us who began to take part in the revolution from our youthful days. And if you can understand that, then you perhaps will be able to understand how Vietnam which has been fighting for nearly 30 years, 27, from out of such bitter experiences have been tempered to the extent that if the issue is not settled the only thing that remains for them is to resist and to resist to the end. Because their environment, the land on which they live, is a long strip, and if you are going to cut it in two how can they agree to that?

The situation is different with regard to Taiwan. They are boasting they have a population of 15 million. If it is counted as being 15 million, then on the mainland we have 750 million so we can afford to wait and to wait to persuade those 15 million. Isn't that so? So it is easier for us to . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Prime Minister Chou: For this it is easier for our two sides, for our minds to meet on this matter. But you cannot ask the Vietnamese to do that. To ask for that would be unfair. You have a population of 220 million, maybe 230 million, but they only have something a bit more than 30 million, and since you admit that your predecessors did commit political errors, why could you want to take a bit of the responsibility? You said that in your part of the communiqué.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I remember.

Prime Minister Chou: That no country should claim infallibility. And you should be familiar with the spirit in which Chairman Mao conducts affairs, and I would never say that we would claim infallibility. Never have I heard him say that.

Dr. Kissinger: No, but we are not claiming infallibility either.

Prime Minister Chou: That is why . . . the mistake was not begun by you—why are you not willing to take a bit of the responsibility?

Dr. Kissinger: We are taking a great deal of the responsibility; we have withdrawn a lot of our forces.

Prime Minister Chou: Algeria was a problem of France, but finally since Algeria should be allowed to become free, France did that. Since you are seeking a generation of peace, why do you obstinately remain in this place and are so unwilling to let it go? You also know that we have no ambition whatsoever in Vietnam, and you also know that we do not wish to dominate Vietnam; they would not accept that nor do we have such a desire at all. Since you consider them to be a heroic people, then you should assist to fulfill their desire to be independent. It seems to me that the honor that would result from doing this would be much greater than what would result in continuing to

destroy their land until they were finally torn to tatters, but still remain to resist.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I think we are getting off the basic issue because there is no sense in attempting to persuade us that we should not stay in Vietnam, since I have told the Prime Minister that we intend to leave Vietnam. The only issue is whether the change should result from a political process or from American decision. We would like to start a political process by which the Vietnam people are finally free to determine their own fate. That is the only issue. The North Vietnamese have asked us to set up their government by political action. That is the one thing we cannot do. That is the only issue. We want to leave. We do not want to stay. We do not want to tear apart North Vietnam. We were forced into it this year. We are not obstinately staying in Vietnam. It is contrary to what we want to do. We should not spend most of our time in Peking talking about Vietnam. (Chou laughs) It is contrary to what we really want.

Prime Minister Chou: But if we say nothing about this here and you go back and implement your old policy then the war will continue.

Dr. Kissinger: No. I appreciate the discussion, but we would like to have a situation in which it became unnecessary.

Prime Minister Chou: So let us leave that situation alone for a time. So the question will arise if the war will continue, then our two countries should try to attempt to still maintain relaxation in our relations.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Prime Minister Chou: So we must try to find the means to do so. If you continue your bombing like you have, that will become very dangerous. You were saying that Vietnam is interfering in your internal domestic politics while you are bombing their country—do you not consider that to be interference in their internal politics? It is interference to such an extent that it cannot but give rise to sympathy in the other countries of the world.

It is time we know each other's basic policy. Before coming you read the records of the meeting between Chairman Mao and the President. And this morning I specially took it out to read it twice. I also re-read our communiqué. These documents should be considered to be our basic stance, and both our common points and our differences come out very clearly in them. And the tendency is to seek relaxation of the general situation, and first of all, in the Far East, isn't that so?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, and that is our basic settled policy.

Prime Minister Chou: And the possibility of this happening is greater than otherwise. And during your present trip to Japan you also have been persuading your Japanese friends that a relaxation would be better for them too.

Dr. Kissinger: Exactly. That was partly a result of our discussion.

Prime Minister Chou: And so if the Soviet Union itself all alone wants to create a tense situation how can they do that? That is why they are now trying to create a great atmosphere of relaxation in Moscow. In Moscow they are saying to their people that China is doing this or that, but in our country they are trying it by stories of relaxation and . . . That is not what we do. If there is tension, there is tension. If there is not, there is not. We don't mix it up.

233. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Beijing, June 22, 1972, 3:58–6:35 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Prime Minister Chou En-lai
Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Vice Foreign Minister
Chang Wen-chin, Assistant Foreign Minister (4:40 p.m. to conclusion)
Wang Hai-jung, Assistant Foreign Minister
Chi Chao-chu, Interpreter
Tang Wen-sheng, Interpreter
Two Notetakers

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Prime Minister Chou: I read your President's article which was published recently in the *U.S. News and World Report*.² Have you read it?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit June 1972 Memcons (Originals). Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at a "Guest House (near Villa #5)." Kissinger and Chou also met from 7:10 to 7:35 p.m. on a boat near the Summer Palace. They discussed the first Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, the history of imperialism, and the Communist Party in China. A final meeting was held from 11:03 p.m. on June 22 to 12:55 a.m., June 23. During this meeting, Kissinger and Chou largely reiterated the points made in their earlier meetings. These memoranda of conversation are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 145 and 146.

² Reference is to Richard M. Nixon, "The Real Road to Peace," *U.S. News and World Report*, June 26, 1972, pp. 32–41.

Prime Minister Chou: So you have come for your discussion in accordance with this article of your President. Isn't that so?

Dr. Kissinger: More or less. Do you read these articles in English, Mr. Prime Minister, or do you get them translated?

Prime Minister Chou: Chinese. We got it in English originally, and then it was translated into Chinese. Also I read the draft of the announcement which you drew up.³

Dr. Kissinger: It is just a tentative proposal.

Prime Minister Chou: I will discuss that with you after we get to the Summer Palace.

Dr. Kissinger: All right.

Prime Minister Chou: There is another question which I originally planned to discuss—the question of the Subcontinent. We will first go into that. We believe we should do this rather quickly because there is still some more about Vietnam we want to discuss.

Dr. Kissinger: All right. Also I want to say a word about Germany to the Prime Minister. Let's talk about the Subcontinent first.

Our assessment is that India is pursuing at the moment a quite aggressive foreign policy. (Prime Minister questions translator's translation.) And it is in some respects becoming obviously, whatever its own intentions, an extension of some aspects of Soviet foreign policy.

For example, the Prime Minister no doubt knows that India has offered to both Indonesia and even to Japan treaties which are word for word the same as its own treaties with the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right.

Dr. Kissinger: So that if this came to be, it would be in effect an alliance with India which in turn would be linked to the Soviet Union.

And I believe also that Indian interests extend as well to Southeast Asia.

Prime Minister Chou: That is so. Mrs. Gandhi has taken over the legacy of her father in his work, *The Discovery of India*.⁴ That was the ambition of Nehru—the ambition of discovery.

Dr. Kissinger: He did not have the energy to carry it out. He was more theoretical.

Prime Minister Chou: Anyway he showed the direction of his ambitions.

³ Apparent reference to a draft statement on Kissinger's visit to the People's Republic of China. The memorandum of conversation for the short meeting between Kissinger and Chou En-lai on the evening of June 22 (see footnote 1 above) contains no reference to an "announcement."

⁴ See footnote 6, Document 197.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And when we spoke yesterday of a zone of relaxation in Southeast Asia, I want to say to the Prime Minister as far as we are concerned, we would also look with disfavor on an attempt by India to establish hegemony in that area. The Prime Minister may also be aware that when I was asked in Japan about the various proposals for Asian collective security arrangements I stated—not publicly, but since there is no such thing as a private conversation in Japan, I suppose it became public—that we would join no arrangement which objectively was directed against the PRC. If he is not aware, I am telling him now.

I think we agree in our analysis of the situation. The immediate problem is that the ability of India to pursue these policies depends to some extent on its ability to gain freedom of action on the Indian Subcontinent. We believe that the strategy of India is to do to West Pakistan what it has already done to East Pakistan by disintegrating it, by bringing about the succession of the Northwestern frontier and Baluchistan. Indeed, when Mrs. Gandhi was in Washington in November and talked with the President she stressed that she did not even talk much about East Pakistan any more.⁵ She talked about the betrayal that was involved in West Pakistan. Therefore the problem is whether it is possible to save West Pakistan and thereby absorb some of India's energies on the Subcontinent rather than free them all for expansion. I'm saying this cold-bloodedly; it's our analysis.

To preserve West Pakistan there are two aspects—one is economic; the other is military. On the economic side we have been able to do quite a bit. We have given \$150 million in direct aid and about \$180 million through international institutions—that is, the U.S. share of it.

Prime Minister Chou: That is recently—after the war.

Dr. Kissinger: I am talking about since the war, and we are somewhat handicapped because we refused to give any economic assistance to India so we have a complicated Congressional problem with which I will not bore the Prime Minister. But we have not given any aid to India. This is not so much of a punishment because India owes us \$3.5 billion and it will simply refuse to repay. (Chou and Ch'iao laugh.)

Now the big problem is military assistance to the Pakistanis. We have been prevented by the Democratic Congress from giving aid directly. I wanted to tell the Prime Minister in strictest confidence that when we were in Iran we asked the Shah to organize a consortium of Greece, Iran, Turkey, maybe Jordan, to establish military assistance to Pakistan with American weapons. We did some of this illegally

⁵ Memorandum of conversation printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, Document 179.

during the war, as the Prime Minister knows. To do it legally we will have to start a small arms program to Pakistan because there is a provision in our law that American weapons can be transferred to third countries only if those countries are eligible to receive American weapons directly. (Chou asks Mr. Chi a question. He answers. Miss Tang also speaks.) We think we can solve that in the next few months.

Prime Minister Chou: I don't want at all to interfere in internal affairs. However, I want to make a suggestion. I think it would be best that Jordan does not take part in this.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. That will not happen.

Prime Minister Chou: Because Iran and Turkey are somewhat different; there is the question of CENTO. But Jordan is not quite in the Arab world.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Prime Minister Chou: In December when you went to give them 12 planes by Jordan it was not easy nor did it give any good influence, impression.

Dr. Kissinger: But at that time we had to do it because the Soviet Union was bringing so much pressure on Iran. There was a complicated arrangement. We flew Iranian planes to Jordan and Jordan planes to Pakistan. It was an emergency. This won't happen again.

So in this I wanted to tell the Prime Minister our intention, but something depends on what your intentions are, because if you should have come to the conclusion nothing can be done for Pakistan in the military field then it will be very difficult for us to do it all. But we can and we are prepared to give certain types of equipment that you will find it difficult to supply, and to see whether there can be a combination of Iranian and Turkish tanks and modern airplanes. And we have also encouraged France to sell airplanes to Pakistan, and they are doing it now.

Prime Minister Chou: We have not stopped our aid to Pakistan. Our aid to Pakistan is continuing. As for our tanks to Pakistan, they are, of course, light tanks. The planes we supply Pakistan are renovated versions of MIG-19s. In fact, to be very honest with you, the renovated MIG-19s we have been giving Pakistan are greater in numbers than those we have been giving Vietnam. We haven't been giving so many MIG-19s to Vietnam. So what is there so bad about stopping the war in Indochina? Why must we test our weapons on the Indochina battlefield?

Dr. Kissinger: I agree. We don't want to continue the war in Indochina.

Prime Minister Chou: We will discuss it later. And once the war in Vietnam comes to a stop then we can supply Pakistan even more quickly with our weaponry. We have already agreed to give so many things to

them, but we are not able to complete their orders to us. Because East Pakistan lost two divisions of equipment without even fighting.

Dr. Kissinger: That was a very stupid deployment.

Prime Minister Chou: But we said nothing. Because we have made it clear that once we have given those weapons to them they have full freedom to make use of them as they like. We have no right to interfere in their affairs. We have not a single adviser there. We don't want any such prerogatives of interfering in their sovereignty.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no interest in Pakistan except to maintain its independence. We have no other purposes there.

Prime Minister Chou: It is not possible for you not to mind yourself about the Subcontinent because the Soviet Union is attempting to exercise hegemony.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, this is what we are trying to . . .⁶

Prime Minister Chou: Britain is already expressing her dissatisfaction.

Dr. Kissinger: But Britain contributed to this in December.

Prime Minister Chou: To Secretary Home we say, why do you come to realize these things afterwards? And also Foreign Minister Schuman.

Dr. Kissinger: It would be very interesting if you would tell the Europeans about your situation because the Vice Foreign Minister knows last December they made our life very difficult.

Prime Minister Chou: Of the 104 votes in the General Assembly Britain and France were not included, and the Vice Minister openly criticized them about that. But only on 20, 21 December at the Security Council meeting they agreed on the rules of ceasefire after Dacca had fallen, but that was too late already. The General Assembly also voted on December 7. Actually if action was taken at that time, then Dacca would have been saved.

Mr. Ch'iao: The greatest procrastinations came about in the Security Council on the 11th and 12th.

Dr. Kissinger: I was just going to say that. The British were particularly bad, as the Vice Foreign Minister knows.

Prime Minister Chou: Then the situation was rather clear to some, but it was already too late.

Dr. Kissinger: The art in foreign policy is to be right before it is self-evident.

Prime Minister Chou: That is right. You need foresight.

Dr. Kissinger: So if I may say so, I think a clear analysis of your point of view to both Schuman, who is less steady, and to the British

⁶ All ellipses are in the source text.

would be very important when they come here. Because Britain is no better off with India for having tried to curry the favor of India than we for having opposed India (Chou laughs).

Prime Minister Chou: The British think they are still in the days of Lord Mountbatten, but those are days long gone.

Dr. Kissinger: And they try to substitute maneuver for substance. And that can't be done. But I believe our government, at least this Administration, believes that the Indian extension of Soviet foreign policy can be very grave throughout Southeast Asia. In the last five years India received one billion two hundred million dollars of military equipment from the Soviet Union.

Prime Minister Chou: So very expensive.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. And produced \$1 billion worth of its own. During that same period Pakistan received not quite \$500 million, of which most came from you. That includes the domestic production which isn't great. That explains . . .

Prime Minister Chou: India gets her military aid in the form of loans from the Soviet Union?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Very low interest loans. I have promised the Vice Chairman to give him some further details, and I will do that if you tell me where I should do it.

Prime Minister Chou: You think it will be all right to have it conveyed through Ambassador Huang Hua?

Dr. Kissinger: I will do that next week. As you know they have given India—they plan to produce MIG-21s in India.

Prime Minister Chou: The characteristics of the MIG-21 actually are not very good. Their maneuverability is even worse than that of the MIG-19 and inferior to planes of the same calibre of your country.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We are speeding up giving Iran more modern planes so that some of their planes can be free to go to Pakistan. They will still be very good. But they are producing some F-14s and F-15s. And we are speeding that up so that they can give some of their F-4s to Pakistan. That is what I wanted to tell you about our attitude on the Subcontinent.

Prime Minister Chou: What is the Soviet attitude towards Iran?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union is trying to surround Iran, partly with the pressures on Baluchistan—if India succeeds in creating a Baluchistan insurrection then this will bring pressures on the eastern front of Iran. You will remember, Mr. Prime Minister, that there are Soviet moves towards Iraq so that they are attempting to bring the Kurds in the northern part of Iraq under their influence so that the Kurds can begin organizing the Kurds in Iran. So they are beginning to bring pressure on Iran from three sides.

The Shah—I don't know whether the Prime Minister had an opportunity to deal with the Shah—the Shah is a very far-sighted leader. Very energetic.

Interpreter (Mr. Chi): No, the Premier hasn't seen him before.

Prime Minister Chou: No, I haven't seen the Shah himself. I have seen his two sisters and the Queen, and the Prime Minister is coming to China this year.

Dr. Kissinger: The Empress.

Interpreter: The Empress.

Dr. Kissinger: He is attempting to gain a much greater degree of popular support by major reforms, especially the distribution of land to the peasants. On the military side he has a very effective army and a very substantial air force. And none of his neighbors would be capable of defeating him except the Soviet Union. He would easily defeat the Iraqi army, even with Soviet equipment. And the Soviet Union could not attack him without a major fight. And, of course, he has an alliance with us which we would honor in such a case. Iran is an essential pivot for this area.

Prime Minister Chou: How about Turkey?

Dr. Kissinger: Turkey is also important, but it has some significant domestic difficulties right now.

Prime Minister Chou: And the Soviet Union has some influence in Turkey?

Dr. Kissinger: The Soviet Union has attempted to gain some influence in Turkey but there is an historical distrust so that when Podgorny was in Ankara he proposed a treaty of consultation, and the Turks refused him. The Turks are prepared to pursue the same policy as the Iranians, but they do not have the same freedom of maneuver.

Prime Minister Chou: Well, Turkey has a dual relationship of alliance with you.

Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: They are in NATO also.

Dr. Kissinger: In case of attack there is no question that we would support Turkey, but their capacity to influence other countries and bring pressure on other countries that may not come under Soviet influence is less than that of the Shah. But after the election it will be our strategy to link these two closer together.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean Turkey and Iran?

Dr. Kissinger: Turkey and Iran.

Prime Minister Chou: And Pakistan is still remaining a member of CENTO?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, it is still technically a member of CENTO. But the major strategy is to give Pakistan enough strength so that India will

not be able to attack it; or that it turns itself into a vassal of India and therefore frees India to move into Southeast Asia or other parts.

Prime Minister Chou: Has your diplomatic representative gone to East Pakistan?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: The situation in East Pakistan is not good.

Dr. Kissinger: The situation in East Pakistan is very bad. In the long term I think this will be a cancer for India.

Prime Minister Chou: I think so.

Dr. Kissinger: Because if the situation remains chaotic, it will absorb Indian resources and if the situation improves it will be a magnet for West Bengal (Chou laughs). But our impression is that the government in Dacca is so incompetent that the effective administration is in the hands of the Indians.

Prime Minister Chou: It really has the flavor of a colonial regime.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And actually some Indian forces are still remaining in Pakistan.

Dr. Kissinger: As police.

Prime Minister Chou: And officers.

Dr. Kissinger: And also it is surrounded by Indian forces.

(At this point, 4:40 p.m., Chang enters.)

Prime Minister Chou: And so that is about the Subcontinent. As for the Subcontinent we will continue to support the independence of West Pakistan. That is a responsibility that we will continue to carry out. At the same time we shall say West Pakistan is a friendly country to us. And in fact the period of friendship is longer than that with India. But the Pakistanis are rather worried because Mrs. Gandhi has been over the past three months saying everywhere she wants to improve relations with China. Naturally, we haven't paid any attention to her. As for exchange of Ambassadors with India, we think even that we can wait somewhat. In fact up till now that is the only country with which we have relations but have no Ambassadors. Just petty maneuvers on the part of the Indians.

Dr. Kissinger: Their freedom of action is circumscribed by their dependence on Soviet military aid.

Prime Minister Chou: The Indians also have tremendous domestic difficulties. As President Nixon said on his visit here, all the loans to India, including those by the World Bank, amount to \$10 billion. So India adopts the policy of not repaying.

Dr. Kissinger: Not yet, but I am sure that is what she is going to do. (Chou laughs.) So far they have only made difficulty about repaying \$100 million. (Chou laughs.)

Prime Minister Chou: But don't you have in your hands some of the rupees—the Indian rupees?

Dr. Kissinger: In counterpart funds.

Prime Minister Chou: They buy grains from you with Indian rupees.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they do. But we can't take them out of the country. We can spend them only in India.

Prime Minister Chou: I have probably told you about the history of the story about the situation of my visit to India in 1960 for talks with Nehru, my final visit and my last talk with Nehru. Did I tell you that?

Dr. Kissinger: I don't remember. Perhaps the Prime Minister can tell me again.

Prime Minister Chou: That is, in 1960 for the last time I went to New Delhi to have negotiations with Nehru on the Sino-Indian border question. After a week of negotiations, towards the end, I just copied principles cited by Nehru at various periods in the past and said, "let's agree on those principles." And even this Nehru refused to agree to. Not a single word of agreement was reached.

And then after the breakdown of the negotiations I went to Nepal the next day. On the eve of my departure from Delhi I received some foreign correspondents. At that press conference an American correspondent reminded me, "do you not know the Indian Minister of Food is now in Washington." I said, "Now I know. Thank you for reminding me of that fact." And then on the next day in Nepal I saw in the papers that an agreement of a loan on food grains to India, in the amount of 15 million tons of food grains, was signed in Washington to supply India two or three times a year, which was to be repayed in rupees. That was the encouragement on your side to Nehru.

And on the other side was encouragement given to him by Khrushchev. That is, Khrushchev in order to obtain the so-called Spirit of Camp David—a spirit which you never recognized—Khrushchev tore up in 1959 a treaty he entered into with us on cooperation in the economic field.

At that time, in October 1959, the Indians made a military provocation against us at the Natula Pass on the border with India. The Pass is on the top of the plateau. The Indians when they went up to the Pass they had more casualties, and because the Indians suffered more casualties they [the Russians] said it was China which launched the attack against India. And from that time the Indians believed what Khrushchev told them. Afterwards Neville, the British correspondent, made that clear.⁷

⁷ See footnote 3, Document 197. All brackets are in the source text.

Dr. Kissinger: I read that. I must say from my experience of Soviet leaders I don't think they need our encouragement to be anti-Chinese. (Chou laughs.) It comes naturally.

Prime Minister Chou: But at least at that time it was something, because at that time they wanted to curry favor with you. You know the atmosphere at that time was quite different.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: For instance, at the banquet that night, you said that Chancellor Adenauer told President Kennedy that Dr. Kissinger agreed with him, and President Kennedy was quite surprised. That was in 1961.

Dr. Kissinger: 1961.

Prime Minister Chou: The situation at that time was different.

Dr. Kissinger: Totally different.

Prime Minister Chou: So from this we can see that you have a point when you praise Adenauer. I remember you said in 1957 Adenauer told you the U.S. was going to improve relations with China, but at that time you couldn't agree.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe that the People's Republic and the Soviet Union would ever split. I was wrong.

Prime Minister Chou: I told what you told me to Chairman Mao, and he immediately recalled it and said that Adenauer had a point there; he had grounds for thinking so. Because it was in 1955 when the Soviet Union established diplomatic relations with West Germany and Khrushchev told Adenauer the Chinese are very fearful people—the Yellow Horde is about to come again.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right. That is why Adenauer believed it.

Prime Minister Chou: The Chairman immediately recalled that. At that time I was Foreign Minister. So Chairman Mao, who remembers very accurately every crucial moment in history . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe it in 1957, but by 1961 I did believe it.

Prime Minister Chou: But it shows Adenauer had his grounds for saying that in 1957.

Dr. Kissinger: I did not believe that two communist countries could split so completely.

Prime Minister Chou: Because at that time you were still a professor and not a Presidential Adviser. If you did not take part in Presidential affairs it is not easy to understand this.

There is not so much difference between us on the question of Pakistan. But there is one thing. On the one hand, we do consider it is necessary that we should help them, but on the other hand, they should

be able to solve their own problems by themselves. Only then can they be tempered.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think it would be helpful, Mr. Prime Minister, if we kept each other informed if one of us had a radical change of policy so that neither of us would be too exposed there.

Prime Minister Chou: Looking at it from now over quite a long period from now to the future, I don't think we will change our policy of helping Pakistan unless something changes in Pakistan itself; for instance, they come out openly to oppose China. But I don't think that is foreseeable in the future because the friendship between the peoples of Pakistan and China is quite deep. All of our Pakistani friends blame us for not giving them more advice with regard to their domestic and political affairs, but that is our principle not to interfere in the internal affairs, and that is the principle which Chairman Mao has taught us and which we are persisting in.

Dr. Kissinger: We will not change our policy as long as President Nixon is in office.

Prime Minister Chou: That I understand.

Dr. Kissinger: There may be tactical moves towards India, but we will always keep you informed and get your opinion. But we do not plan any now.

Prime Minister Chou: Nepal appears to be also in some difficulties now. Isn't that so?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Prime Minister Chou: And Sri Lanka too.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Indians make use of the Tamirs to make trouble, just like the Bengals. And the Prime Minister made several overtures towards us, and we are very sympathetic toward her to maintain her independence, and we will support her as much as we can.

Prime Minister Chou: Good.

Dr. Kissinger: She has wanted units of our fleet to visit in Ceylon, and we will do that from time to time.

Prime Minister Chou: Has your fleet already visited Sri Lanka?

Dr. Kissinger: Once. We will increase our fleet in that area in any event, especially after the war in Indochina is over.

But Germany—I wanted to make a comment about the observation of the Prime Minister yesterday. I believe that the recollection of the Prime Minister and of his two colleagues of Germany is of a Germany which no longer exists. I believe that Japan remained, emerged psychologically unimpaired from the Second World War and only physically destroyed. And therefore I have tended to agree with the Prime Minister that certain tendencies in Japan are quite possible, even though they are not now visible.

I told the Chancellor the other day about the observations which Chancellor Adenauer made to me about one of his colleagues when he deplored the fact there were no strong men left in Germany, and I said, what about Mr. so-and-so, and he said, "my dear Professor, you are confusing energy with strength." I think this is true of many of the current German leaders and of Germany, and when I say that Finlandization is one of three possibilities, it is particularly so if the Socialist Party remains in office for an extended period of time. The policy of the Social Democratic Party is so dependent on the good will of Moscow that after some time Moscow may achieve a considerable veto over its actions. Even today the Soviet Union could bring about the destruction of Brandt by adopting a policy of coolness towards him. Therefore for domestic German reasons, if this party continues for a long time, which I don't happen to believe, then I believe Finlandization is a possibility, even though the German people are economically in good shape.

Prime Minister Chou: But even Finland herself is not so pro-Soviet—I mean the people.

Dr. Kissinger: The people are anti-Soviet. But my definition of Finlandization is if the Soviet Union has a veto over major elements of domestic and foreign policy and that is, I believe, the case in Finland, even though it is a very brave people.

I must say the possibility is reduced to the degree that German leaders feel they have others for freedom of maneuver in the world, and therefore I believe the visit which the Prime Minister mentioned to me [Scheel] is a very positive step. That party in any event is in a more independent position.

Prime Minister Chou: But the so-called vetoes which the Soviet Union may exercise with regard to actions taken by the Social Democratic Party are not taken to bring pressure on the Social Democratic Party but to make concessions to the SDP. For instance, the fact that the West Berlin question was resolved so quickly was because of China and the U.S. coming closer. Immediately after the announcement of July 16 last year—immediately after the announcement was made public—Gromyko went to East Berlin to talk about the negotiations and made such quick concessions, which even you did not expect.

Dr. Kissinger: There were two treaties—the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union, and also the treaty on relations between Germany and Poland, and then the treaty about Berlin. In the treaty between the Federal Republic and the Soviet Union all the concessions came from the German side, and it is very difficult to find *quid pro quo*s from the Russian side. On the other treaty they, the Soviet Union, made many concessions because we made it a condition for the summit, and therefore it was a symptom of our strength and perhaps

our discussions, although the negotiations had started before. But the German government had nothing to do with it.

Prime Minister Chou: The treaty with the FRG was before the treaty with West Berlin?

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Prime Minister Chou: But it couldn't have been put in that way. Because one effect of the Berlin Agreement is that henceforth it will be easier for West and East Germans to make contact with each other, and that is a tremendous change because the Soviet Union had made it hard. And which Germany will have the greater influence—West Germany or East Germany? That is one aspect.

The second thing is about the ratification of the treaty this year. If the opposition party in West Germany wanted to veto that treaty they could have done it, but as you said yourself, it would not have been approved by the mass of the people because the people of West Europe want to see a relaxation. East Europeans, too, would like to see a ratification of this treaty because they feel quite terrorized about the possibility of another big war. So it would not be to the benefit of the opposition party to veto that treaty. But in the very end it was still proclaimed a common declaration, and that common declaration was the result of the proposition of the opposition party. When Brandt signed the treaty with the Soviet Union in Moscow it was before that memorandum, but they had to agree to a memorandum too. So that gives the Germans the consideration that there will really come the time in the future when Germany will be unified even if the two Germanys would both join the UN. Do you approve or not of the two Germanys joining the UN?

Dr. Kissinger: I will tell you directly. As a government, we have no objections to the two Germanys joining the UN. As a tactical question, we will not express an opinion until the Federal Republic has indicated that it is willing to do so. As soon as they say they are prepared to have both Germanys join, we will support it, and we believe this will happen in the next six months. But that is a tactical question.

Prime Minister Chou: You mean the Socialist Democratic Government in Germany?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think so.

Prime Minister Chou: When Schroeder comes do you think he will express to me true views?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, I think so. He is very vain, and he thinks he is excessively intelligent, but eventually he will express to you his true views, yes.

Prime Minister Chou: As you see it at the present state, what is the thinking in Germany? They must think about their future.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Prime Minister, you will find that clarity of thinking is not the outstanding attribute of present German political leaders, and that what they say is not necessarily what they will do.

The great strength of Adenauer was that he had a great concept and he did not deviate or maneuver, and he kept steadily on his course. Almost all of the present German political leaders have the tendency to believe there is some magic trick by which they can solve all their problems. The one with the clearest views—not necessarily that I agree with him—but the one with the clearest views is Strauss. But he has an inadequate political base, and he would not have been the best man for you to talk to. So after him, Schroeder in terms of political views, but Schroeder is better because he has a better base.

Prime Minister Chou: Is Strauss representative of Prussian thought?

Dr. Kissinger: No, Strauss is a Bavarian and he has more of the South German. He is less nationalistic in the sense he can live with a divided Germany, and he is more pro-European. But he is more nationalistic in the sense that whatever country he represents, even if it is only half a Germany, he wants to be very powerful and influential. Schroeder wants to unify Germany.

Prime Minister Chou: And Schroeder is from what part of Germany?

Dr. Kissinger: Schroeder is from the Rhineland, the old Prussian part of the Rhineland. You asked me what does Germany want. Their national disease is that even when they were unified they did not know exactly what they wanted except that it was big.

Mr. Ch'iao: Deutschland Uber Alles.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, Schroeder would like Germany unified.

Prime Minister Chou: In history Germany has not remained a unified nation for a long period except the Bismarck state.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right.

Prime Minister Chou: So there is probably a historical reason. During the Thirty Years War Germany was divided up into many states.

Dr. Kissinger: And it has lost a great deal of what really should be part of Germany: Switzerland, Luxembourg, Austria should be theirs. So there is really no separate Italian-speaking state or French-speaking state, but Germany is at a cross-roads because it has to make up its mind between its national ambitions and its European interests.

Prime Minister Chou: When the Rhineland area was being developed, East Prussia was still economically undeveloped. In the 18 and 19th centuries. So the development of different parts of Germany was uneven.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but it also proves that the economically successful part does not necessarily take over the poorer part. It is a matter of discipline and direction.

Prime Minister Chou: That is a question of policy, the question of direction and line. But during their period of Bismarck, and Germany was divided under Adenauer. Of course, it is unfortunate that after the First World War there appeared Hitler. But if there appeared a Bismarck, if there appeared an Adenauer, why is it not possible for some talented Germans to appear in the arena? How can you estimate them so low? And I don't believe that when a nation has developed an economy to such an extent that a person who can represent his people will not emerge—it is a matter of possibility.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't exclude the possibility, Mr. Prime Minister. I know all the German leaders very well, not because I was born there but because I had many activities there. I don't see anybody of such stature now, not among the present leaders or in the next generation. And speaking as a philosopher, if I may, it may be true as the Prime Minister pointed out to me, unless you have had some experience of suffering and of hardship you cannot produce great men.

Prime Minister Chou: That is true.

Dr. Kissinger: Precisely because the Germany economy is so advanced they can no longer produce great men. All the great men in Europe since the war, DeGaulle and Adenauer, had their formative experiences before the war.

Prime Minister Chou: You have a point there. I am not against that way of thinking. Germany, being close to you, is quite far from us, while Japan is a country with whom both of us have concern. And the Japanese nation wants to maintain their unity and that is decided by their geographical position. And it is true that in Japan's history they were never fully occupied by an outsider. Japan was a defensive power too. After the war her economy developed very rapidly. It was you who flattened them. But what great men are emerging in Japan?

Dr. Kissinger: Japan is a different phenomena. Japan does not produce great men. You look at their leaders. It is like asking whether an ant is impressive by looking at one ant.

Prime Minister Chou: But if you look at the ants as a collective, that is quite formidable.

Dr. Kissinger: The strength of Japan is in its social cohesion.

PM Chou: The ants in southern China are formidable. They create even mountains. They make their homes in the root of a tree. I don't know whether you have such ants in your country. They are called white ants. They eat their way into trees and they also dig their hills. That is where they store their food.

Dr. Kissinger: I am saying the Japanese are very impressive, but not because their leaders are impressive. Any one Japanese I talk to I

find quite unimpressive. I don't know what your experience is. But it is an impressive people as a group.

PM Chou: You know ants have queens (Chou laughs). But any nation must have its leaders.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they change their queens quite frequently (laughter).

PM Chou: I wonder whether your feeling towards the Germans is maybe because you yourself had a period of persecution there.

Dr. Kissinger: I did, but I look at things cold-bloodedly.

PM Chou: Maybe that is why you look upon the Germans as you do now.

Dr. Kissinger: No.

PM Chou: Karl Marx discovered scientific socialism but his teachings are not in German.

Dr. Kissinger: I can't afford sentimentality in one direction or another. But I think the Germans are well worth your attention, Mr. Prime Minister, because they will be one of the key factors, and I believe they are the most dynamic people in Europe despite what I have said.

PM Chou: (Nods) But are there still some differences—or do you look upon the whole of Germany as a Finland? East Germany is not a Finland. It is more than that, a dependency. But look on the whole of Germany. East Germany is actually a Czechoslovakia—a vassal. But for the whole of Germany to be a Finland—I doubt it.

Dr. Kissinger: I said there are three possibilities.

I don't say a Finland is their most likely outcome. It depends. If the U.S. were to withdraw from Europe; if the McGovern policies were carried out, if European unity would not work; if we withdraw from Germany—then the two Germans feeling abandoned, could move in the direction of Finland. If we remain in Europe, if European unity continues—then I think Finlandization is unlikely, and it will be either nationalism or European community.

PM Chou: That is what I was about to say—is the U.S. planning to abandon Europe?

Dr. Kissinger: In this Administration, as long as President Nixon is President, it is inconceivable.

PM Chou: Nor do I conceive it possible if the Democratic Party would take power that they could really abandon Europe. Even Mansfield says they will not withdraw from Europe.

Dr. Kissinger: They may withdraw from Europe and think this is not abandoning it.

PM Chou: How is that possible? And once they really—if they are really to take office—I don't think they can do that. We won't go too much into that.

Dr. Kissinger: I know all the leading Democrats, and my own political position has been that of an Independent rather than as a Republican. I did not know President Nixon when he appointed me. I had never met him. My assessment is that any Democratic candidate would say the same thing, but that only McGovern would try to do it because he has a professorial nature. He is somewhat doctrinaire. (Chou laughs).

Ch'iao: Woodrow Wilson was also professorial, wasn't he?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: But in the Senate his 14 points fell through.

Dr. Kissinger: It required Congressional action. But withdrawing forces from Europe requires no Congressional action. That can be done by a Presidential decision.

PM Chou: The President has such great power?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he can determine the deployment of troops. He may not be able to send them to Europe . . . he can even send them if he can get the money. But he can certainly withdraw them.

But as I said to the Prime Minister, it is a very improbable event that this will come to pass. So for the next five years there is no possibility of withdrawal of forces from Europe.

PM Chou: That is also my view. I also look at it this way.

Let's come back to the East. Because our knowledge of Western Europe cannot be compared to your knowledge.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very impressed by the Prime Minister's knowledge and insight into the European situation.

PM Chou: Please do not commend me. What are your own views toward the trend in Korea?

Dr. Kissinger: I believe the talks which have started between the two sides of Korea are very positive. We are encouraging the South Koreans to continue them.

As I told the Assistant Minister in the car this morning informally, some of the tactics of the North Koreans are sometimes self-defeating. They made a rather bad impression on the American journalists over there. I tell you this in confidence because I think to some extent we have similar objectives there. I spoke to some Japanese leaders who had visited both Peking and Pyongyang who had been very impressed by being in Peking and who before they went to North Korea were in favor of withdrawal of American forces from South Korea. After they went to North Korea, they changed their minds and were in favor of keeping our forces in South Korea.

I say this for your information. This is not an Administration view. The Administration view is that we will encourage political contacts

between North and South Korea and that we will go along with any agreement that the two Koreas make with each other.

PM Chou: In the end North and South Korea should have a peaceful reunification, but this is not the time. The time is not yet ripe.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: What should be done now is that it should be that the relations between North and South Korea should not be saber rattling but there should be somewhat more conciliatory contacts between the two.

Dr. Kissinger: We will be prepared to use our influence in this direction.

PM Chou: With regard to these three divided states: East and West Germany; North and South Korea; and North and South Vietnam, we must not treat them as if out of the same mold. That would not be fair nor in accordance with developments of history.

And the most split is Germany. Even Berlin itself is split. So, so far as Germany is concerned, under present circumstances, we don't think it is possible for you to withdraw from West Germany. So the question of the proportionate reduction of forces in East and West Europe is a matter for negotiations now.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but I can tell the Prime Minister for his information in our thinking, this will be a very small proportion of our forces. We are not thinking of any large withdrawal.

PM Chou: I believe that. As you said, the Soviet Union is very close to East Germany. And now Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary.

Dr. Kissinger: Our studies show the maximum we can do on both sides is something like ten percent in that area. It could be 15 percent but it is not going to be very more than a small fraction of the forces.

PM Chou: As for the situation in Korea, that was something produced by another set of events through the Korean War. That was something after the Second World War. There was an armistice agreement, but there was no peace treaty, and that was most disadvantageous. And that is so in this respect we support the proposal put forward by the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea that a peace agreement between the Democratic Republic of Korea and the Republic of Korea should take the place of the present armistice agreement. The two sides are meeting two times a month just for the sake of quarreling. The inevitable consequence is that there is a constant quarrel. So far as our side is concerned, our People's Volunteers withdrew in 1958.

You have read again the note of the proceedings of the discussions between Chairman Mao and President Nixon.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: After Chairman Mao said neither China nor the U.S. should engage in a war with each other and threaten each other, then Chairman Mao said nor will China threaten Japan, nor South Korea. The actual situation was the Chairman first said China and the U.S. should not engage in a war with each other. President Nixon said the two countries should not threaten each other. Then Chairman Mao said China will not threaten Japan nor Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: I remember that.

PM Chou: So it is very clear we will not encourage a military reunification of Korea. So we say to you, as a matter of principle, your armed forces should be withdrawn from Korea. By withdrawing you should also guarantee that after you withdraw from South Korea you should not let the Japanese go into South Korea soon. A period of time is required. On this point alone it is similar to that of Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ch'iao: But according to reports from the Japanese press, it is said that on the Joint Communiqué between President Nixon and Sato stipulating that the situation of Korea involves Japan's security, after President Nixon's visit to China the Taiwan clause should no longer be valid. That was when you were visiting Japan. But the Japanese paper said Dr. Kissinger—it did not directly quote from you but it had something to do with you . . . indirectly—said that the South Korean clause remained in effect.

Dr. Kissinger: The Japanese said that to me. I did not say it to them. They said to me, almost every faction I spoke to, the view that while on Taiwan they are confused, on Korea they expressed the view to me that their security was very closely bound up with the security of Korea and that therefore this was a very special case. I expressed no view to them. And as I told the Prime Minister, we will not encourage the Japanese to play a military role in Korea. Indeed, we will oppose it. For that reason it is also important that, while we can accept the principle of an ultimate withdrawal from Korea, the Prime Minister's formulation is understood, that there should be a period of time, because otherwise the Japanese will almost certainly move in.

But we will keep our understandings. We will not encourage the Japanese into a military role outside their territory.

PM Chou: And at the same time you should not encourage the South Korean authorities to make military provocations against North Korea but encourage the peaceful contacts.

Dr. Kissinger: We will discourage military provocations and encourage peaceful contacts.

PM Chou: So far as we know, South Korea is quite strong militarily now. And they are tempered in battle. You have withdrawn 20,000 forces but leave your weapons behind; thus they are becoming further

strengthened. And so is it not possible for you not to give them too much arms? Because if you were to do so the result would be we would also have to give more weapons to the Democratic Republic of Korea and wouldn't that result in arms competition then?

Dr. Kissinger: I will look into that question. We have a current program which is difficult to change. There is two more years to go. But we can avoid making new commitments, particularly if we have an informal understanding of mutual restraint in giving arms.

PM Chou: Yes, and in that way we could encourage them in their peaceful contacts. And then about—we discussed the question of the UNCURK. That Commission could be abolished because every time it appears in the General Assembly we have a quarrel, and if it appears in the Security Council we veto it.

Dr. Kissinger: What is the Prime Minister's idea with respect to Korea in the UN this year?

PM Chou: I think it would be best if the UNCURK could be abolished this year. Because otherwise the Republic of Korea observer comes.

Dr. Kissinger: What is your position if the Korea question would appear this year on the agenda?

PM Chou: It is on the agenda every year?

Dr. Kissinger: Last year it was postponed, and we believe actually it would be useful to postpone it for another year because it would work counter to encouraging a peaceful contact if the two Koreas engage in a tremendous brawl at the UN, as well as if you and we did. And we could look after the election into the question of abolishing UNCURK.

PM Chou: Our tendency is to abolish the UNCURK this year. Is that possible?

Dr. Kissinger: It would be very difficult especially if the debate is . . . I think it would be very difficult.

PM Chou: Because with that UNCURK existing it is an object of hostility toward one side. And countries who sympathize with the Democratic Republic of Korea will put forth resolutions to oppose it.

Dr. Kissinger: If it appears before our election, we will have no choice except to make a major opposition.

PM Chou: We will stand on opposite sides.

Dr. Kissinger: The Assembly goes until Christmas so the item could be postponed until November. (laughter) Or it could be after November 10 (Chou laughs). I suspect he [Ch'iao] is going to fire a lot of empty cannons (laughter).

PM Chou: It is good to know about your intentions. But it does prove that from last year until now it is beneficial to see to it that the atmosphere of Korea is not so tense.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, that is one of the good results of our encounter.

PM Chou: So you shouldn't give too much encouragement to Taiwan to be so arrogant.

Dr. Kissinger: Where?

PM Chou: The authorities on Taiwan.

Dr. Kissinger: How are we giving them encouragement?

PM Chou: Because in your various pronouncements when you mention the so-called Republic of China.

Dr. Kissinger: I personally?

PM Chou: No, not you personally. For instance, when Chiang Kai-shek was re-elected so-called President and your President sent a message of congratulations. We have no objection to that. We do not mind your President sending a cable of congratulations. That is not the same as in the Soviet and Hungarian press with the publication of that election and having photos and press. That is utterly absurd. But in pronouncements by your President or in reports by your Administration you mention the Republic of China in one breath and the People's Republic of China in the other. Then the state of two Chinas appear. Maybe we can ignore it on one occasion, but if it constantly appears, then we cannot.

Dr. Kissinger: Can you point out one specific occasion to me?

PM Chou: It was in your President's article.

Dr. Kissinger: That is what I suspected.

PM Chou: You knew that I was going to cite this example. You have it.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't actually have the text.

PM Chou: The part on the summit conferences, President Nixon said this is even more important because this part is under the subtitle *Summit Conferences*. President Nixon said it was most important that we obtain common views on the basic principles of national conduct. These principles will reduce the danger of confrontation or war in Asia and the Pacific. We are opposed to hegemony in the Pacific region. We agree that international disputes should not be solved by the use or the threat of armed forces. "In obtaining such understandings between our two sides we did not give up any obligations which we had undertaken before with regard to the Republic of China or our other friends."⁸

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

⁸ See footnote 2 above. The actual text on page 33 of Nixon's article reads: "We agreed that international disputes should be settled without the use or the threat of force, and we agreed to apply this principle to our relations with one another. And we reached these understandings without giving up any of our previous commitments to the Republic of China or to our other friends."

PM Chou: In Shanghai you said that to the press as well, but in a more diplomatic way.

Dr. Kissinger: I told you that in advance and we have to say this, Mr. Prime Minister, and we have said it with great restraint in documents which I control closely. This was more public relations.

In any event, I understand your point and it will be taken very seriously, Mr. Prime Minister. We understand what we have agreed upon, and one of them is that we will not encourage in any way the two-China solution, and we will take special care on this.

We cannot avoid these particular statements on occasion, but we can avoid speaking of you and the Republic of China in closely approximate sentences and in the same general context, and that we will do.

PM Chou: But you know in this, this reference was made under the general heading of our summit meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand your point and this document was prepared at a time when there were many other pressures on us, and I must be quite honest with you, it did not have the detailed attention from me that a normal Presidential statement receives. (Chou nods) But I understand your point very well, and there is no disagreement. It is also important for you to know that in many ways that are not apparent to you, such as in deliveries of arms, we have shown very great restraint and resisted many pressures.

PM Chou: And those are points on which they complain to you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and publicly too. Their supporters also.

PM Chou: (laughs) Well, they can well try to come to the Mainland and test it for themselves. But they don't want to. So they, too, are only firing empty cannons. They just want you to give them more things.

Dr. Kissinger: Couldn't you keep him [Ch'iao] home until November 15? There will be nothing but trouble during our election campaign. (Laughter)

PM Chou: I am not so clear about Taiwan. After the Taiwan authorities get weapons from you, do they engage in some smuggling?

Dr. Kissinger: On the Mainland?

PM Chou: On the Mainland or some other place. We do have information to the effect that in arms supplies you give to other countries they engage in smuggling.

Dr. Kissinger: Which countries?

PM Chou: That is most frequently in Indochina, the arms smuggling; not only in Indochina.

Dr. Kissinger: They are not smuggling arms with our permission. (Chou laughs)

PM Chou: Certainly not with your permission.

Dr. Kissinger: It could be they are doing something for some intelligence reasons with our permission that would look like smuggling to you. But that is not the case. Let me check what we know about this, and I will tell your Ambassador in New York. It has never come to my attention, but that doesn't prove anything because unless it was very large, it wouldn't come to my attention.

PM Chou: What I mean is that under Chiang Kai-shek's rule the arms smuggling there might be even less than in some other places.

Dr. Kissinger: I think much less. That is my impression.

PM Chou: That is so.

Here I would like to say that in the UN just recently there was a good result of our mutual consultations, that is on the mutual position on hijacking of planes. Your Ambassador consulted on this matter with ours.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

PM Chou: And it has already been passed in the Security Council, yesterday. That is a good result. And I would like to take this opportunity to say something related to this matter. Because you just inferred that on some occasions the CIA might be engaged in some arms transactions which might look like smuggling, which might look like intelligence work. But there is some matter that you must not do, that is the hijacking of planes.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't.

PM Chou: Particularly with relation to our country.

Dr. Kissinger: I can assure you that we have never hijacked a plane, and I can give you total assurance that this cannot happen with any authority of the U.S. Government, official or secret. I can give you a flat assurance.

PM Chou: But still I would like to have you check on this when you get back. And also for you to make this formal announcement to us here.

Dr. Kissinger: I can make that now. I don't have to check this in Washington. I will reaffirm it to your Ambassador, but I know I speak for the President.

PM Chou: Because you know Prince Sihanouk is on a state tour of various countries riding our special plane.

Dr. Kissinger: I can give you a flat assurance we will make absolutely no effort to interfere with the movements of Prince Sihanouk.

PM Chou: Because that is a matter of mutual confidence.

Dr. Kissinger: I can absolutely guarantee this.

PM Chou: Prince Sihanouk is just going to five countries: Romania, Albania, Algeria, Mauritania, Yugoslavia . . .

Dr. Kissinger: I will go further than this. When I go back I will instruct our intelligence agents in each place he visits to collect any information they may be able to get about any attempt at interference with Prince Sihanouk, and I will pass it on to your Ambassador.

PM Chou: Thank you. I mentioned the five countries, Romania, Albania, Algeria . . .

Dr. Kissinger: Our capabilities in Algeria are very limited.

PM Chou: Mauritania, and then finally Yugoslavia. And then the Prince will come back to China via various countries from Yugoslavia to Romania to Turkey, Iran, Pakistan and then China. Just the route you took during your first visit.

Dr. Kissinger: We can be particularly helpful in places like Iran and Turkey.

PM Chou: Thank you.

Dr. Kissinger: But we will in every country instruct our people to let us know what information they have, which probably will be none.

PM Chou: Thank you. And then about the charts showing the American plane intrusions. We have it drawn and we would like to show it to you. The purpose of us doing that is to enable you to see that it indeed happened.

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate it. These are our charts.⁹ This is our chart for the 9th of June (shows chart). This is our chart for the 10th of June. This is the boundary line. (Chinese look at map and interpreter points out boundary and highway to Chou.)

Dr. Kissinger (to Howe): What is the red?

Cmdr. Howe: This indicates the target area they were hitting along the route. And this indicates the northernmost delivery point.

Dr. Kissinger: They claim this was the northernmost delivery point.

PM Chou: But that was bombed very heavily. That is Long Son. Let's show you our map.

Dr. Kissinger: I tell you honestly I believe you because if you wanted to provoke us you would do it publicly.¹⁰

PM Chou: That is right.

Dr. Kissinger: I see no point in your making a private protest about your being bombed.

PM Chou: And you bombed there, but also over here.

⁹ Not found.

¹⁰ The PRC publicly criticized U.S. bombing of North Vietnam near its border but did not directly address the alleged intrusions. See "China Calls Raids Threat to Border," *The New York Times*, June 13, 1972, pp. A-1, 9. See also Document 230.

Miss Tang: You have one spot left on the map. You should have another red spot over there.

Dr. Kissinger: This is the 9th. (to Howe): What is this green?

Cmdr. Howe: This indicates an unidentified aircraft which was seen twice on radar close to the time of the incident. (Miss Tang explains to PM Chou.)

PM Chou: That is the 9th?

Dr. Kissinger: This is the 9th. These are the MIG planes, and these indicate all the planes that were opposite ours.

PM Chou: That is the bombed area.

Cmdr. Howe: This is the bombed area.

Dr. Kissinger: And that is how they flew.

PM Chou: They were further south then. But Long Son and _____¹¹ (another town near North Vietnamese border) were indeed heavily bombed. Not only the 9th or 10th—but other times as well. Constantly bombed. It was not bombed after the 12th, but now maybe they are back there now.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly not since the 12th. Has there been any bombing that close to China since the 12th?

PM Chou: No. There were none after the 12th.

Dr. Kissinger: After we sent the message we established procedures which make it absolutely impossible to bomb that close to China. Has there been any bombing?

Interpreter: We have no information up to this point.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't believe there has been because we have established new procedures.

(Party adjourns to nearby room where charts are.)

Dr. Kissinger: Can I take these back to America with me?

PM Chou: They were drawn up for you. Because the former one did not have coordinates or latitudes. It has them now.

Dr. Kissinger: Let's wait for Howe. Take a look at these, Jon.

PM Chou: That was June 4. You saw last time we had a bad map. It was very badly bombed. The bridge there was also bombed. Of course it was repaired. This is where the two main areas of the bombing were.

Dr. Kissinger: Once, Mr. Prime Minister, when General Haig first worked for me, he was a Colonel, and when he was promoted to General, I told him I have known very many intelligent colonels and very

¹¹ As on the source text.

few intelligent generals and I was going to watch for his deterioration. (Chou laughs) He is not responsible for this.

PM Chou: You see how close this is to the border. That is how the planes went on the 4th. On the 9th there were two different ones: that is one; and that is the other.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't have any tracks near that one.

PM Chou: and this was the bombing on the 10th. One plane went that way. The other went that way.

Dr. Kissinger: We don't show it. This was where they bombed Aikou.

PM Chou: Yes. This is Aikou. This was the different times at which the two planes came in on the 10th. They bombed Aikou, and there was also the incursion on the 11th. Because we had already received the telephone call from General Haig, we did not mention the intrusion on the 11th. These are where the bombs dropped on Aikou.

(Showing bomb cannisters.) This is what it looked like in the morning. We recovered the shell—the container. A fragment of the container. Half of it. You know it split open. This was where the smaller bombs inside the others fell. That was what it looked like. One small bomb did not explode and sunk into the ground. This is the small one with its tail on it. That was the writing outside the container. This was the name.

Dr. Kissinger: Show Howe.

PM Chou: This was one of the small bombs. That was the writing on the small bomb.

Dr. Kissinger: We will take this back. I think we have new procedures that make this impossible.

PM Chou: The large view that shows the smaller one, this is the largest one of Aikou.

Dr. Kissinger: Where were the bombs dropped?

PM Chou: There were about 400 small ones. This is the state boundary.

Dr. Kissinger: And this is the road?

PM Chou: Yes. And that is the railway.

Dr. Kissinger: All I can say, Mr. Prime Minister, it was totally against orders and not intentional. I think we have taken . . .

PM Chou: This is the bomb. Commander Howe probably has seen this thing certainly before. Dr. Kissinger probably has not seen such things before.

Dr. Kissinger: Would it do any good to take these?

PM Chou: You could.

Dr. Kissinger: I was wondering if it had any marks that would enable us to trace it. (to Howe): Why don't you take some of these?

Cmdr. Howe: The stock number would be the same.

[Following are markings taken off the bombs:

MK 20 MOD 2 ANTI-TANK	MER 7
Bomb Cluster DL 2603379 Rev. D	TER 4
FSN 1325–133–9266–E173	TER 7
P.O. 1–2044 NADC	AERO 3A
LOT NO 34–C–71	MK 51
INSP. DATE 3/71	AERO 20A
AERO 14	AERO 7A
MER 4	MAU 9A

Second bomb was same as first until Lot #

LOT NO 48–C–71

INSP DATE 5/71

AERO 14	MER 4	MK 51	AERO 20A
	MER 7		AERO 7A
	TER 4		MAU 9A
	TER 7		
	AERO 3A]

Fuze

MK 339 Mod O Ser 36731

LD 549439 Lot 23

General Tire Corporation

Space and Systems Division

234. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, June 27, 1972.

SUBJECT

Atmospherics of My Visit to Peking

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's June 1972 Visit. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. The President wrote on the first page: "K—an excellent account. In the long run this is more important than day to day substance." Kissinger also forwarded to Nixon a June 27 16-page memorandum that reviewed the substance of the trip. (Ibid.) Nixon wrote on that memorandum, "Superb job—covers all the bases with expert tactics." He also underlined much of the text. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 147. Summary memoranda by Holdridge and others who accompanied Kissinger on the June trip are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files–Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's June 1972 Visit.

The mood of our Chinese hosts throughout the visit was extraordinarily warm and friendly—especially considering the circumstances. It was very apparent that the Chinese were determined not to let the Vietnam situation stand in the way of an improvement in US–PRC relations; it was obvious that the rapport established during the past year was intact and that they wanted to build it.

We could tell the attitude of the Chinese from the very beginning. As before, Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin and others met us in Shanghai and flew in our plane. At Peking we were greeted by Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, Deputy Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua plus several other ranking Foreign Ministry officials, all wearing broad smiles of welcome. When I emerged they briefly formed a semi-circle and started applauding. (This group was essentially the same one with which you dealt in February.) To underscore the Government's support of our visit the names of those meeting us were meticulously listed in the *People's Daily* the following day.

Following the drive to the guest house area and the first of many outstanding Chinese meals, the tone of the visit was firmly set when Prime Minister Chou En-lai called on us within an hour of my arrival. He chatted informally and very pleasantly with me and my staff for some forty-five minutes, recalling those who had been in Peking before and expressing pleasure at meeting new arrivals. He also asked us for suggestions on what we wanted to see. In the course of the conversation he extended Chairman Mao Tse-tung's personal regards to you, suggesting that the Chairman remains on the political scene. Later that same evening Chou and I began the first of many hours of substantive discussions.²

In the ensuing days there was no variation from the courteous, and genuinely friendly treatment which we received. The Chinese went to some lengths to show us parts of the Forbidden City which we had not seen before and maintained their aplomb when some of us asked to revisit other parts which we had previously visited, causing them to change arrangements. Because one of my staff members had ex-

² The President and Kissinger met on June 23 and discussed the trip to the PRC, and Kissinger reiterated many of the remarks he would include in his June 27 memorandum. Kissinger described how Chou En-lai "met with my whole team for about half an hour, just greeting them, saying a friendly word, you know how he is." Nixon responded: "He's a helluva guy." In discussing Vietnam, Kissinger observed, "He [Chou] said, these are his direct words, the People's Republic of China, if we asked, would approve the course of action of the President's May 8 speech. The Chinese understand and approve this policy, but Vietnam is reluctant to rely upon it. Now, it's enough for people to say that that's further than the Russians went." (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation Between Nixon and Kissinger, June 23, 1972, 6:48–8:40 p.m., Camp David, Conversation No. 194–1)

pressed an interest to Prime Minister Chou in seeing Chinese acrobats, our whole party was taken one morning to the Institute of Physical Culture outside Peking, where, accompanied by the Minister of Sports, the Director of the Institute and the Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs, we watched youthful acrobats, gymnasts, swimmers, and ping-pong players perform. The students applauded warmly upon our arrival, with no signs of reservation or animosity. Two of my staff members played ping-pong with the Chinese, and this gesture was very well received.

Chinese Attitude and Approach

In my judgment there were three particular highlights of the visit which were indicative not only of the friendly attitude of the Chinese but of their political intent:

—At the banquet he gave on the evening of the day after our arrival, Chou in his toast expressed the belief that the goal of normalization of US–PRC relations would be attained, though gradually, on the basis of the Shanghai Joint Communiqué. This toast was significant in that it was made before senior officials of the PRC, and contained no reference to Vietnam. Thus he was telling them that the Vietnam war would not be allowed to detract from the goal of normalization, at least under present circumstances. (Incidentally, Marshal Yeh Chien-ying, who had met me at the airport on previous occasions, was present at this banquet; as you know, he is in effect Minister of Defense. The Chinese also printed a photo of us all, which was taken just prior to the banquet, on the front page of the *People's Daily*.)

—The Chinese put on a cultural presentation for us the next evening, a “revolutionary” Peking opera, which, as was the case in my October visit, turned out to be a command performance. The hall was filled with some 500 or so cadres, or people in leadership positions, drawn not only from the Government but from farms, enterprises, and factories around Peking. As my associates and I appeared, accompanied by the Foreign Minister and other senior PRC officials, the audience clapped loudly. We, of course, joined in. The same thing occurred after the performance. The applause lasted for a much longer period than on the first such occasion in October. This incident was indicative of a Chinese desire to get the message out to selected middle-echelon political leaders that US–PRC relations will grow warmer despite recent events in Vietnam.

—Finally, on our last evening, Chou En-lai made what I consider an extraordinary gesture of friendship by inviting my whole party to a picnic at the Summer Palace. The evening began with our boarding boats for a ride on the lake before the startled eyes of several hundred Chinese bystanders who applauded vigorously and with every sign of enthusiasm when they saw the Prime Minister and me. Later we landed

and dined at a pavilion where the Empress Dowager had watched the Peking Opera. We then strolled to our cars for the return to Peking with Chinese and American officials intermixed, again in front of Chinese bystanders. Knowledge of these events must then have spread fairly widely via the Chinese who watched us, ordinary people to whom the Summer Palace is a popular place to visit, and who must have had some idea of the nature of Chou's guests from the items carried in the *People's Daily*. I doubt that the Chinese bystanders knew in advance that we were coming, or that their applause was rehearsed.

US-PRC Relationship

There were a number of other indications that an extraordinary relationship has built up between our two countries:

—Chou En-lai spent a great deal of time asking my advice about various personalities around the world—especially West European leaders.

—Chou ran over a list of American personalities to be invited to the PRC—again showing a degree of confidence rare in state-to-state relations.

—They even asked my advice on Robert Williams, a radical black, on whom an official of a Republican Administration should not be considered a good witness.

—Chou engaged in extraordinarily candid discussions about their views on Vietnam.

—At the banquet, newly-promoted Assistant Foreign Minister Chang Wen-chin, who had helped draft the Shanghai Joint Communiqué, remarked that the Chinese people felt the Communiqué was largely drafted by the Americans. This, he said, was due to the use of expressions and formulations not typically Chinese. Two inferences may be drawn from Chang's words: first, the Chinese went to great lengths to meet our needs, which they in fact did; and second, there is evidently some feeling among the leaders that we got the better of the deal, especially in the Taiwan section.

—Our visit ended on the same note of cordiality on which it had begun. We were seen off by the same group which had met us, and there were many remarks—apparently genuine—that they hoped they would see us again soon.

The Chinese attitude can perhaps best be summed up in comments to me by Vice Chairman Yeh Chien-ying along the following lines at the conclusion of our special session:

—This meeting is of great help to us and very important. Even more important it demonstrates the friendship of our two peoples. The friendship of our two peoples is more weighty than all this material. This also indicates further progress toward the normalization of our state relations.

—If we say the world faces dangers, it is not due to our two countries (US and PRC). You (US) on the east side of the Pacific, we (PRC) on the west side of the Pacific, separated by 10,000 miles, can live in peace together. We can become a strong stable force for world peace.

—In making such great efforts in Europe and Asia, Dr. Kissinger is making great efforts to normalize state relations, and not just for our countries alone.

—On behalf of the Chinese armed forces I would like to thank Dr. Kissinger again for this discussion. As I understand that President Nixon asked Dr. Kissinger to discuss this with us. I would like also to thank President Nixon.

—When you go back please express our thanks to President Nixon and wish him good health and long life. Also congratulate him in advance on his victory in the election because that also involves the world. The re-election of President Nixon is of major importance not only for relations between our two countries but for the world as a whole.

—I would like to say further that not only is there no conflict of interests between us but rather a history of long-standing friendship between our two peoples. Peace on the two coasts of the Pacific will guarantee world peace.

The Political Atmosphere

The following is relevant to the condition of Mao Tse-tung, and the general mood in Peking:

—After Chou's reference to Mao's greetings to you on the first night, Mao's name did not enter the conversation as frequently as had been the case on my earlier trips. There have, of course, been rumors about Mao being in ill health or even dying, and the decrease in references to him could have been a case in point. However, during the Summer Palace picnic Chou restored the balance somewhat by giving an eloquent and moving account of how Mao had come to write a certain poem, and referred to Mao very much in the present tense. He also invoked Mao frequently in the course of our last private meeting, insisting that the final announcement had to be cleared by him.

—Chou asked that our meetings be conducted with significantly fewer participants than before, perhaps on the grounds of political sensitivities. This could reflect some high-level political tension. On the Chinese side, Chou was generally accompanied only by Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua and an interpreter, and I, at his insistent request, limited my party to one or two staff members. I found this situation puzzling, and can account for it only on the grounds that Chou was unusually reluctant to have too many people on his side fully aware of the nature of our talks, especially on the Soviet Union and Indochina. Perhaps policy differences still exist at top PRC echelons, especially on the topic of Vietnam. But, as noted below, there are no visible signs of tension in Peking, nor are there any obvious grounds for assuming our relationship will not progress.

—Life in Peking seems more relaxed now than it seemed in February or on my previous visits. The army was largely off the streets, and the numerous traffic policemen were now wearing a distinctive white jacket and peaked hat which was quite different from an army

uniform. The people in general, especially the young, were much more colorfully dressed. They did not appear to be under as many constraints as before, and a common sight in the evenings was family groups sitting on the curb of the main street to watch the passing show. From what we saw from our motorcades, they were under no injunctions to keep from looking our way when we passed, or to avoid showing curiosity. We received many stares, none unfriendly. (Being the only show in town at the time, we were probably known for what we were when we traveled.)

In conclusion, this latest visit to Peking has reinforced the conviction I reached following your visit to the PRC four months ago: we have established a unique bond between ourselves and the Chinese which both sides highly regard and want to strengthen further. For our part we have been able to do this because we have cut out many of the diplomatic niceties and subtleties and have spoken our minds to the Chinese as equals. We have made it plain that we are willing to listen to their points of view in the same spirit, and that to the extent the differences between us will permit, will do everything we can to find common ground. For the Chinese, who are a proud people with a rich culture and enormous historical continuity, any other approach would have been unacceptable.

No other country today has either the strength or the will to treat the Chinese as equals. Our having done so has wiped out much of the Chinese ill-feeling toward us of the past two decades. It has made it possible for both parties to focus upon the common ground between us and, as in the case of Vietnam, to play down our contradictions. I see no reason why this situation cannot continue, provided we avoid the kinds of minor but insensitive acts which inevitably generate Chinese resentment and continue our basic approach.

235. **Memorandum From John A. Froebe of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, June 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

Recent NIE Study of Taiwan's Prospects and State Analysis of Recent Governmental Changes There

At Tab A is a recent NIE study on Taiwan's prospects,² the chief conclusions of which are:

—Taiwan is likely to preserve a separate existence well into the 1970s, provided that it not lose confidence in continuing U.S. support, especially as regards the defense commitment.

—Taiwan's economy should remain prosperous, Mainlander-Taiwanese collaboration should increase in the face of the danger from Peking (and this collaboration in turn depends heavily on the confidence in U.S. support), and internal stability should continue during and after the succession—with President Chiang's elder son, Chiang Ching-kuo, being somewhat more flexible, but no less committed to preserving the Republic of China's separate identity than his father. [The speculation in paragraphs 10–11 postulating a limited Taiwanese interest in a deal with Peking outruns any evidence we have seen. Given their deep-seated distrust of Mainlanders—on the mainland and on Taiwan—and their appreciation of the situation on the mainland—politically, economically, and socially—the Taiwanese would almost certainly want to observe a decided moderation of the political situation on the mainland (and probably be stimulated by a deterioration of their relationship with Mainlanders on Taiwan or a withdrawal of U.S. support) before they would move in the direction of a deal with Peking.]³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 361, National Intelligence Estimates—part 3. Secret. Sent for information. Kissinger initialed the memorandum indicating he had seen it.

² Attached but not printed is National Intelligence Estimate 43–72, May 11, entitled "Prospects for Taiwan and the Chinese Nationalists." According to an April 12 memorandum from Moser to Green, the "CIA began on this NIE in late 1971 in the hopes of putting it into the hopper for the Presidential trip." He added that earlier drafts of the paper were out of date, but that "CIA is anxious to get the paper on its way." (Ibid., RG 59, EA Files: Lot 74 D 471, Memoranda for Mr. Green, April 1972)

³ Brackets in the source text.

—The Government, while continuing with its present formal identity, will probably gradually mute its claims to the mainland, and concentrate more on matters directly related to Taiwan.

—As regards the Peking–Taipei relationship, there is no evidence that Peking will try a military solution of the Taiwan problem; Peking will undoubtedly continue to push toward the diplomatic and economic isolation of Taiwan; and Taipei is unlikely to show interest in negotiating a political solution with Peking, even after President Chiang goes.

At Tab B is a memorandum to you from State commenting on the late May reshuffle of top leadership in Taipei.⁴ The highlights are:

—The changes can be expected to mollify somewhat the Taiwanese and younger educated elements, while leaving fundamental political control firmly in the hands of the same mainlander group. The number of Taiwanese in the 18-man cabinet was doubled from three to six (including the Vice Premier), and a Taiwanese was appointed Governor of Taiwan Province—long a basic Taiwanese demand.

—The shifts presage no policy changes, and do support Chiang Ching-kuo's commitment to policies associated with Taiwan's economic development.

—A surprising change among Mainlander leaders was the ousting of Chow Shu-kai as Foreign Minister (until a year ago the ROC Ambassador here, he has now apparently been put on the shelf as Minister without Portfolio). He was replaced by Shen Chang-huan, who had previously served in this post from 1960–1966, and since then has been the ROC Ambassador to the Vatican. Chow may have been penalized for some of the ROC's serious diplomatic reverses of the past year, as well as for his advocacy earlier this year of increased ties with East European countries.

⁴ Apparent reference to "The Republic of China's New Cabinet—New Faces and a New Image," a 2-page report with a list of all cabinet members, which Eliot forwarded on June 1 under a covering memorandum to Kissinger. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, POL 15-1 (a), Cabinet Members) In addition, INR produced Intelligence Note REAN-46, June 21, "Republic of China: Chiang Ching-Kuo's Taiwanese." (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL 15-1 CHINAT)

236. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, June 28, 1972, 6:45–8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Ambassador Huang: Did you just arrive?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. The People's Republic is the only country where there are no technical breakdowns.

Ambassador Huang: You are lucky. (laughter)

Dr. Kissinger: At least the airplanes take off in your country.

The President has written a letter to the Prime Minister thanking him for the reception that we were given. It is in his own handwriting. (He hands it to Ambassador Huang attached at Tab A.)²

Ambassador Huang: We will forward it.

Dr. Kissinger: His calligraphy is not exactly the same.

We had a number of items I promised the Prime Minister to let you know about, and since I am going to the West Coast I thought we should meet today. I wanted to thank you on behalf of all my colleagues for the really courteous reception that we received. It added to the warm feelings we already had towards your country.

The Prime Minister raised with me the safety of Prince Sihanouk when he travels and asked me whether we could see whether there is any information on plots to kidnap him. I promised him to do so. Here is an interim report which I received from the Central Intelligence Agency which you can read and I have to have back. (He hands over

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. No summary memorandum for the President has been found.

² A copy of the 2-page handwritten letter is attached but not printed. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 148.

the memorandum at Tab B.) It is only a preliminary report. (Ambassador Huang and Mrs. Shih read the memorandum.)³

We have instructed our people that if they find anything, first, to inform us and then to use all their influence to prevent it from happening. Your Ambassador in Paris will remember him (referring to General Walters who signed the memorandum).

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: We have to infiltrate a few pro-PRC people in our government.

Secondly, your Prime Minister told me that German Christian Democratic Union leader Schroeder had been invited to the People's Republic. Because I know him very well I told the Prime Minister I would establish contact with him and advise him to be as honest as possible when he talks to the Prime Minister. I have been in contact and I will see him. I have to do it somewhat delicately so that he requests the appointment with me rather than my inviting him. But it's been done. I just wanted the Prime Minister to know.

Ambassador Huang: You have not met him yet?

Dr. Kissinger: I will inform you when I meet him. I will meet him in the next couple of weeks, and in any event before he comes to the People's Republic.

When we were in the People's Republic, we went to see again some treasures in the Forbidden City which you showed us.

On my last day Assistant Minister Chang mentioned to me that you were concerned about the listings for the ground stations by Intelsat.

Apparently they are listing the Taiwan station as the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the Shanghai station as the People's Republic of China (Shanghai). You know the problem. He asked me if there is something I can do to change this to China (Taiwan) and China (Shanghai). Officially we can do nothing since it is an international organization, but unofficially we can do something. It may take a month or two so that it looks like an administrative decision and not a government action, but it will be done in the very near future.

³ Attached but not printed is an undated memorandum from Walters to Kissinger that reads in its entirety: "Reference is made to Prince Sihanouk's present trip to eastern Europe and Africa. A thorough search reveals no information of any sort, not even rumor, that anyone is planning to initiate hostile action against the Prince or interfere with the progress of his trip. A requirement has been sent abroad to areas where such information might become available to report intelligence or rumor that might reflect hostile intent against the Prince or an immediate precedence. Any information received will be passed on to you immediately."

Then you have a visit this week from Congressmen Boggs and Ford. You will have a merry time with one of them when you serve a lot of mao tai.

Ambassador Huang: They are already in Peking.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We gave some very general information about my trip. They may imply that they know a lot, particularly if you treat them as well as you did us. They don't know anything of any consequence. We told them nothing. In fact we told them less than what I said in my press conference (June 24). Do you have it?

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: I said nothing in a half an hour. (He hands over a transcript of the June 24 press conference.)⁴ They were told less by far than what is in this.

The Prime Minister raised with us the question of arms smuggling, including from Taiwan. We are checking into that. We don't have any report yet.

(For the next 15 minutes there was a discussion of some special matters which are reported in a separate memorandum of conversation. The discussion then picked up as follows.)⁵

Dr. Kissinger: I want to go over two other things before I leave. Could I interrupt this discussion for a minute?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: One, we understand that there are some negotiations going on between the Boeing Company and your government for the sale of airplanes. It requires some export licenses. We have done this and are doing it quietly without a public announcement. But the licenses will be published in a register and we cannot exclude that someone going through the register will find it, and I wanted you to be aware of this. This is not done in order to create an embarrassment to you, if it does happen, and I am not sure that it will happen.⁶

⁴ Not found.

⁵ The supplemental memorandum of conversation has not been found. Kissinger's talking points for this meeting, attached but not printed, contain a short entry: "6. J. Howe Material (separate)".

⁶ In an undated attached memorandum, Hormats informed Haig that the Commerce Department would publish information on the export license. In a June 27 memorandum to Haig, Hormats reported on a meeting attended by himself, Froebe, and three representatives of Boeing. Boeing was negotiating with the PRC to sell 10 707 aircraft, with delivery scheduled to begin in August 1973. The Boeing representatives were also meeting with Representatives Ford and Boggs. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 525, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. IV)

Secondly, we . . . a member of the Rockefeller organization, has been approached by Henry Liu.⁷ Henry Liu has approached the Rockefeller organization and said that your government might look with some favor on an enterprise between him (Liu) and the Rockefeller interests in China. Before the Rockefeller people do anything, they asked me whether Liu was operating on his own or whether he is being encouraged by you. If you tell me that you have no interest we will tell the Rockefeller people to ignore him. If you do have an interest we will then go ahead, and they will deal with it by their own criteria.

Ambassador Huang: We have no information on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no hurry. Would you like to check into it?

Ambassador Huang: Yes, we will check it.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not dealing as the government, but simply as a personal friend of the Rockefeller family. We just didn't want to embarrass you or him.

Ambassador Huang: What was Mr. Liu's suggestion?

Dr. Kissinger: He didn't make any suggestions except to say that he has approached a Mr. Warren Lindquist. Here, you can read this. (He hands over the memorandum at Tab C. Ambassador Huang and Mrs. Shih study it carefully and write down notes.)⁸

I am not raising this as a governmental matter. (Mr. Lord signals Dr. Kissinger that they are also reading the telcon attached to the memo.) What is this? (He takes back the memo.) That's just my conversation.

Ambassador Huang: Well, we will check it.

Dr. Kissinger: There is no need to give me an answer. You can let nature take its course. We are not interested. But if you want to say something to me or to let Mr. Marshall know, either way.

Ambassador Huang: Up to now we know nothing about this, I personally.

Dr. Kissinger: We have no interest. We'll just leave it alone. The only reason I raised it is on the off chance that you are interested and then we will encourage it.

There are two other things.

The evening before I left, looking through my notes, while we were on the boat ride with the Prime Minister at the Summer Palace, he made some remarks about the need to accelerate the normalization of our relations.⁹ Since it was in a social context it didn't permit discus-

⁷ Ellipsis in the source text.

⁸ Attached but not printed is a June 24 memorandum from Lord and Rodman to Kissinger that discusses Henry Liu and Rockefeller.

⁹ In the memorandum of conversation of Chou and Kissinger's June 22 meeting at the Summer Palace, Kissinger stated: "After the election actually would be a good

sion. When I thought about it, frankly I don't know what he was talking about. If he has any specific proposal we will look at it very sympathetically. We have made all the proposals that we can think of, but if the Chinese side has any specific project we will be willing to discuss it.

The second problem has to do with Vietnam.

Ambassador Huang: The other matter came up on the boat trip?

Dr. Kissinger: In a general discussion. It had nothing to do with Vietnam.

We had a full discussion on Vietnam, and I can add nothing to our general position. Since my return there was an enigmatic broadcast from Hanoi that new forces were entering their country. What that means we don't know.

Ambassador Huang: New American forces?

Dr. Kissinger: No, new allied forces. And I feel duty bound to point out that we understand the requirement that you feel to give support and we have never raised any question about that. But if any organized Chinese units appeared in Vietnam, even if only support units, that would put us in a very difficult position in terms of our relationship. We have no evidence that this is the case, nor did the Prime Minister indicate this could happen. I raise it only because of what Hanoi said, not what you said, and they were not referring to you.

(To Mrs. Shih) You don't have to translate it.

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: Finally, again with respect to Vietnam, you might tell the Prime Minister we are checking the evidence he gave us very carefully and are tracing the fragments of the bombs. We have traced one as far as the Philippines. Now the next step is to see what carrier it was on. If we find responsible people then they will be punished.

I might also call the Prime Minister's attention to the *New York Times* yesterday which called attention to the specific regulations on operations in proximity to the Chinese border that our planes now fly

time to have more talks. Prime Minister Chou: Yes, that will depend on your efforts. Dr. Kissinger: In the election? Prime Minister Chou: Including that. I had a double meaning. One is that you should make your efforts to get your President re-elected. The second is your efforts to normalize relations between China and the United States. Because if you consistently refuse to normalize relations and then if I follow you at the Palace, the masses will be cursing me—they won't applaud me when I come if that happens. You understand, of course, the sentiments of the people. Dr. Kissinger: Oh, yes, but I think we are making major efforts to normalize relations. Prime Minister Chou: Yes, but they haven't been enough yet." A bracketed note indicates that Prime Minister Chou then switched the discussion to the scenery there and in Hangchow. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, Country Files—Far East, China, Dr. Kissinger's Visit July 1972 Memcons Originals))

in order to avoid unfortunate events.¹⁰ And that is the result of the phone call we made to you. I didn't give him the exact details, but you might call his attention to it. That is all I have. (He indicates that Commander Howe will continue the discussions.)

We will be on the West Coast for two weeks, but Commander Howe will be in Washington. General Haig will be with me. You can call Commander Howe. If there is any urgent reason simply call the White House and you can reach Mr. Lord, or General Haig or me on the West Coast. They are in direct contact with us.

One final Vietnam matter I wanted the Prime Minister to know about. We have agreed after internal study to resume the plenary sessions with North Vietnam on July 13 and the private meetings a few days afterwards. We will do so on our side with a constructive spirit and an attitude of bringing the war to an end. Our discussions in Peking were one factor leading us to this decision.

Ambassador Huang: I will relay all this.

Dr. Kissinger: Certainly. At this point only North Vietnam knows about this decision though it may be public in the next few days.

I can tell you again that we all have the warmest memories of our visit in the People's Republic. They made us all feel very comfortable as always. Will you be able to go back on vacation?

Ambassador Huang: I am still waiting for instructions from Peking.

(Dr. Kissinger then left the meeting and Messrs. Howe/Lord remained behind to continue the discussion.)

¹⁰ Craig R. Whitney, "Hanoi Said to Make Use of U.S. Bomb-Free Zone," *The New York Times*, June 27, 1972, pp. 1, 15.

237. Memorandum From John Holdridge, Mel Levin, and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, June 30, 1972.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the International Financial Institutions

The immediate policy problem is trying to preserve continued participation by the Republic of China in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's) through avoiding or parrying a challenge to its position in the IFI's at the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund late next September.²

Under Secretary Johnson and Treasury Under Secretary Volcker sent you a memorandum³ recommending (a) that we support World Bank President McNamara's study committee proposal on this question, and (b) that you approve detailed strategy and tactics covering contingencies both under which the study committee was formed and under which it was not formed. The McNamara proposal would create a Study Group in the Bank's Executive Board of Directors within the next month to study the Chirep question in the Bank and the Fund. Prior to broaching his proposal formally in the Board, McNamara would (a) canvass its members to be sure he had the requisite support,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. Secret. Sent for action.

² This issue was discussed briefly in NSSM 141. See Documents 171 and 175. In December 1971 the Departments of State and Treasury provided Embassies in the capitals of major U.S. allies background information on the U.S. position on Chinese participation in IFIs to enable them to respond to inquiries on U.S. policy. The message instructed diplomats to "undertake no initiative unless further instructed." (Telegram 225181 to selected diplomatic posts, December 15, 1971, approved by Hormats and Holdridge; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) On January 22, 1972, Samuels and Volcker sent a memorandum to Haig requesting approval of instructions to selected diplomatic posts on supporting the ROC's continued membership in IFIs. (Ibid.) On the first page of a summary of this February 11 memorandum prepared by Wright and Holdridge, Kissinger wrote: "Take up as soon after we return as possible. HAK." (Ibid.) On March 1 Wright asked Kissinger to clear the telegram, noting that "the attached cable for which your approval is being sought, is addressed only to those three organizations [IBRD, IMF, and ADB], and does nothing but authorize our Embassies quietly and in a non-pressuring way to ascertain views of the principal member governments of those organizations." Wright concluded, "the attached cable is nothing but an authorization for our Embassies to enter into quiet palaver." (Ibid.) Kissinger approved the draft telegram. (Ibid.)

³ Attached but not printed is the June 23 memorandum.

and (b) attempt to secure IMF Managing Director Schweitzer's agreement to the proposal.

Attitudes Toward Continued ROC Participation in the IFI's

McNamara. McNamara's principal concern is that of the prudent banker: he feels vulnerable to criticism that on his own responsibility he has been continuing disbursements on outstanding loans to the ROC. He would therefore like to clarify the ROC's status, but believes this should not be left to the highly political atmosphere of the September meeting.

IFI Members. All of the 20 key members whom we have recently surveyed strongly hope that a public debate and a vote on the ROC question can be avoided.

ROC Position. Taipei has decided to go along with the McNamara proposal, although it is motivated in part by a reluctance to oppose Mr. McNamara.

PRC. Peking has expressed no interest in assuming the obligations of membership in the IFI's, which would include the free convertibility of its currency, something it is most unlikely to accept. Its objective in seeing the issue raised would therefore be to see the ROC expelled. Peking so far has not indicated it will mount an effort in this direction. That it did not try to stimulate a challenge in last April's Asian Development Bank meeting is encouraging, but gives no assurance as regards its intentions toward the September meeting.

Our Recommendations

1. *McNamara proposal.* Given the real chance of a challenge to the ROC position at the September meeting, we believe we should support the McNamara Study Group proposal as involving fewer risks than trying to counter a challenge if it arose at the meeting or shortly before. The Study Group once formed should help deter a challenge and meet any challenge procedurally and substantively that might be raised. It is also low-profile and unprovocative as regards the PRC and its supporters, both in the manner of its being established and in that it does not outwardly prejudge the outcome. We believe that we will be able to influence the Study Group toward a favorable report, as well as the IFI's toward a satisfactory disposition of the report.

2. *Detailed strategy and tactical guidance for the September meeting.* We do not believe that a need exists at this point for such detailed guidance, the annual meeting still being three months off. Further, we do not believe that the situation we will face in September is now sufficiently clear to chart such strategy and tactics in detail. We would suggest that State and Treasury come back with further recommendations in August, by which time we will know the fate of the McNamara pro-

posal, which in itself will have a substantial bearing on the situation in September.

The urgency in a decision on this matter results from Marshall Green's wanting to discuss the question with ROC officials in Taipei July 4,⁴ and from Mr. Volcker's wanting to give Mr. McNamara a response following up the preliminary views given McNamara by Marshall Green on June 15.

At Tab A is a proposed memorandum from you to Under Secretaries Volcker and Johnson embodying our recommendations as stated above.⁵

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Under Secretaries Volcker and Johnson at Tab A.

⁴ Green met with Foreign Minister Shen and Vice President Yen on July 4. (Reported in telegrams 3369, 3436, and 3472 from Taipei, July 5, 7, and 10; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, ORG 7 EA) Green and Chiang Ching-kuo met on the morning of July 5 to discuss the ROC's military equipment requirements, U.S. policy toward East Asia, tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Taiwan's economic development. Green noted that ROC "attendance at meeting late this year in U.S. on foregoing subject [wildlife conservation and endangered species] could well result in key countries like Kenya and Tanzania deciding not to attend which would undermine the conference and GRC would be blamed." According to a report on the meeting, "On the other hand, Green reiterated our strong desire to do that which was effective in retaining GRC membership in international financial institutions. This was obviously far more important to GRC and its friends than an issue like participation in conservation of wildlife and endangered species issues. CCK nodded understanding but made no comment." (Telegram 3434 from Taipei, July 7; *ibid.*, POL 15-1 CHINAT)

⁵ According to a July 10 memorandum to Kennedy from Davis, Kissinger sent the drafts back from San Clemente. (*Ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) The final memorandum to Johnson and Volcker, signed by Kissinger on July 11, reflected the recommendations detailed in this memorandum. (*Ibid.*)

238. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, July 7, 1972, 8:50 p.m.

SUBJECT

Conversation with Mrs. Shih

As instructed, I called Mrs. Shih and informed her that because of the urgency and seriousness of the matter concerned we would like them to take a message by telephone and assist us in transmitting it as fast as possible to another party. The reason for the urgency and our concern would become obvious from the text of the message.

We were also asking our regular contact to inform the North Vietnamese but we were not confident that our man would be able to get through or be received. We were asking their assistance because of the time sensitivity. I then read the following text which we were asking be transmitted to the North Vietnamese.

Begin Text:

“We have learned from absolutely trustworthy battlefield reports that the 284th Artillery Regiment of the North Vietnamese Armed Forces operating in Quang Tri Province of South Vietnam has been ordered to execute 10 American prisoners on July 8. The U.S. Government urgently demands that this order be immediately countermanded. NVA field commanders must be ordered to escort these and any other American prisoners to safe areas and treat them humanely, as required by international law and as promised by the DRV. The Hanoi authorities and NVA commanders will be held responsible for the execution or mistreatment of these or any other American prisoners.”

End Text.

I emphasized the date and the matter of lives as being the factors requiring immediate transmission of the message. I also stated that we were not making this matter public because of our desire not to do anything that would impede progress in negotiations in Paris. Mrs. Shih insured that she had transcribed the text properly and stated that they

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret; Eyes Only. Prepared by Howe.

would transmit our message to their government and then we would see what would happen.²

JT Howe

² A note in the files dated July 8, 8:30 p.m. reads in its entirety: "The matter alleged in the U.S. telephone message of July 7 is a matter which involves the Vietnamese and U.S. sides. The Chinese position in such affairs is total non-interference. Therefore, the Chinese side will not undertake to convey the U.S. message." A notation at the bottom of the note reads: "(Rec'd in San Clemente via Secure Voice phone from Howe, 7/9/72, 10:10 a.m.)" (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 110 Geopolitical Files, China, Chronological Files)

239. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge and Robert Hormats of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, July 17, 1972.

SUBJECT

Export-Import Bank Financing for the Republic of China

Alex Johnson (Tab A)² comments that it is his understanding that some concerns have been expressed, especially by Treasury, at the additional Ex-Im Bank financing for the Republic of China that is now under consideration: \$57.4 million for steel mill equipment, \$300 million for equipment for two nuclear power plants on Taiwan. Johnson strongly feels that this financing should be approved for the following reasons:³

—Refusal of the USG to approve the loans—the application for which has already been approved by the Ex-Im Bank Board—would be interpreted as a dramatic expression of a lack of confidence in the economic future of Taiwan, thus undermining Taiwan's economic

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret. Sent for action. The memorandum bears a handwritten comment: "Thru Haig" in unknown handwriting and "ASAP" in Kissinger's handwriting.

² Attached but not printed is a July 7 memorandum to Kissinger from Acting Secretary of State U. Alexis Johnson.

³ The following four points are taken from Johnson's memorandum.

strength. It would also undermine our ability to maintain the position of Taiwan in international financial institutions.⁴

—The Republic of China has ample financial capability to service the loans.

—A reasonable degree of internal political stability for some time to come seems assured.

—It does not seem likely that Taiwan will be incorporated into the PRC by force during the 15-year period of the loans. If Taiwan were incorporated by agreement between the two entities, it is not a foregone conclusion that the Republic of China's international obligations would not be honored.

Treasury's earlier concern, since withdrawn, was that a steel mill will increase Taiwan's steel capacity resulting in increased exports to the US to the detriment of US steel producers. (*Comment*: However, Austria will proceed with the project with or without US participation. In the latter case, the US would probably lose those exports which were to have been financed by the Ex-Im credits.)

We have two concerns:

—That the announcement of these loans not be handled in a way which would call undue attention to the issue of US financial support for the ROC and thereby cause us problems in keeping her in the IMF/World Bank.

—That we not jeopardize the Administration's efforts to improve relations with the PRC. We believe that these dual concerns can be met by *announcing the two atomic power loans* individually, with an appropriate interval between the two announcements. The steel mill need not be announced at all. This would minimize the publicity given to these loans and lower our posture with regard to financial support for the ROC.⁵

Therefore, we share Johnson's view that although these loans are not free of risk, failure at this stage to make the loans would present greater risks. Accordingly, if you approve, we plan to inform the agencies involved that we have no objection to these loans, but ensure that they are given minimum publicity and separately announced.

Recommendation

That the Ex-Im Bank loans to Taiwan be approved on the basis of the above scenario.⁶

⁴ See Documents 237 and 245.

⁵ A handwritten correction changed the incorrect "PRC" to "ROC."

⁶ Kissinger initialed his approval. In an August 2 memorandum, Davis informed Eliot that the Ex-Im Bank financing had been approved. She noted: "However, if a public announcement is required, the two atomic power loans should be announced individually, in a low-key manner, with appropriate interval between the two announcements. We believe the steel mill loan need not be announced at all." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI)

240. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 13–3–72

Washington, July 20, 1972.

[Omitted here is the Table of Contents.]

CHINA'S MILITARY POLICY AND GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES

Note

This is the first estimate on Chinese theater forces to appear in the enlarged format for military estimates. [6 lines of source text not declassified]

Optimism regarding our knowledge of Chinese military affairs, however, is tempered by the fact that the circumstances surrounding the 1971 purge of the top military leadership and many of its implications remain obscure. The purge has obviously altered the prospects for the succession to Mao Tse-tung and it has produced at least a temporary return to the pre-Cultural Revolution norm of the Party “controlling the gun”. It may have important consequences for military morale, for military priorities, and for military policy.

The Problem

To assess Communist China's general military policy and to estimate the strength and capabilities of the Chinese Communist general purpose and air defense forces through 1977.

Conclusions

Policy and Strategy

A. Chinese military policy has been strongly influenced by Peking's aspirations to reclaim a leading role in Asia and to gain recognition as a major world power, and by acute concern to deter attack or invasion by the great powers. Taken together, these considerations have caused China to maintain a substantial military establishment and to bear the heavy costs of modernizing its general purpose forces and of developing an independent strategic nuclear capability. Nonetheless, Mao's insistence on a basic policy of self-reliance and China's limited technical and industrial base have insured that the process of modernizing the People's Liberation Army (PLA) would be a protracted one.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 361, National Intelligence Estimates—part 3. Top Secret; [codewords not declassified]. Also available in Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R1012, NIC Files. Representatives of the CIA, the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The representative of the FBI abstained, as the subject was outside his jurisdiction. The full text of NIE 13–3–72 is printed in *Tracking the Dragon*, p. 678

B. Mao's primary concerns have been with the progress of the revolution in China, and the long-term development of modern military forces has taken place within the context of this overriding goal. Mao's willingness to subordinate defense and purely military considerations to the higher priority goals of politics and the continuing revolution—as in the Cultural Revolution—has had an impact on military professionalism, on combat readiness and morale, and even on military production programs. The PLA, in playing a "vanguard role" in the revolution, has been drawn deeply into politics and has been exposed to the inevitable rewards and penalties. The purge of Lin Biao and the top military leadership in 1971 is only the latest, if most dramatic manifestation of the PLA's continuing involvement in vital issues of national policy.

C. The policy of the People's Republic of China with respect to the use of force has been generally cautious. It has limited the use of combat forces beyond China's borders to circumstances where Peking has seen real and imminent threats to Chinese territory or to vital Chinese interests. In the 1960s, the increasingly hostile nature of Sino-Soviet relations radically altered China's strategic problems. Although the Chinese were careful not to show any sign of weakness, they were at pains behind this brave front to control the risks of direct military confrontation with either of the two superpowers, and, as might be expected, their military stance remained essentially defensive.

D. China's strategy for defense against a possible Soviet invasion follows Mao's principles of "luring deep" and "people's war". In the face of the much superior firepower, air support, and mechanized mobility of the Soviet Union, the Chinese have chosen not to position large forces close to the border where they might easily be cut off. The Chinese strategy seems to be to hold back their key main force units until the invading forces are overextended and weakened by the resistance of local defense forces and guerrilla harassment. In contrast to the northern border regions, the coastal areas of China have important concentrations of population and industry, and in these areas the Chinese are prepared for a forward defense employing air and naval forces. If an enemy force landed, it would be met at once by both local defense and main force army units.

E. Another example of Peking's defense-mindedness and awareness of China's vulnerability to attack from the air is the immense effort that has gone into passive defense. The Chinese are building a large portion of their new factories—especially those for military-related industries—in interior regions and have dispersed some of them in out-of-the-way valleys and canyons. Perhaps to a degree unmatched elsewhere in the world, the Chinese are building civil defense facilities, ranging from simple shelter trenches and bunkers to large tunnels with sophisticated life-support equipment in some large cities. Large tun-

nels now in existence or under construction at 75 or so of China's airfields will be able to shelter most of China's fighter force, and other underground facilities built or under construction will be able to shelter all of the navy's existing submarines and missile boats.

F. While the main focus of China's strategy is defensive, this is not to say that Peking has given no thought to contingencies involving offensive operations. In any case, a military force which has been developed to defend against the superpowers inevitably has a considerable offensive capability against lesser foes. China could, for example, conquer all of Southeast Asia if opposed only by indigenous forces. If Peking decided to take Taiwan, a considerable redeployment of its forces would be required, as well as extensive amphibious and airborne training. Once these preparations were made, China could almost certainly take Taiwan in the absence of US military intervention. If the Chinese were to participate in a major attack against South Korea, which we think unlikely, they could effectively commit as many as 35 divisions in the narrow peninsula. In the case of South Asia, the Himalayas and the vast reaches of the Tibetan Plateau would severely limit China's offensive capabilities; long and difficult supply lines would prevent the Chinese from sustaining any offensive into India beyond the Himalayan foothills. But in any of these contingencies, Peking would be constrained by the necessity of providing for defense needs elsewhere, particularly vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, and by the requirements of internal security.

The Forces

G. The greatest relative weakness of the Chinese vis-à-vis the US and the USSR is in the field of strategic weapons, and Peking has assigned first priority to ambitious and costly programs aimed at providing China with a credible deterrent against nuclear attack. After strategic programs, air and naval modernization has had the higher claim on resources; modernization of the army seems to have received a somewhat lower priority.

H. Even so, the ground forces remain the dominant element. The size of the force (at 3.0 million men, the Chinese Army is the largest ground force in the world), the toughness and discipline of the Chinese soldier and the quality of small arms with which he is equipped are impressive. The Chinese Army for its size and by US and Soviet standards, however, has relatively little armor, and is only moderately well equipped with artillery. Tactical air support for ground troops is limited, and shortages of vehicles and transport aircraft restrict mobility and logistic support. In a non-nuclear war on its own ground against any invader the Chinese Army would be a most formidable force. In these circumstances it would be able to capitalize upon its vast manpower reserves, its ability to mount a large-scale guerrilla effort, and

its ability to use China's terrain and territory to advantage in fighting a prolonged war. In contrast, the Chinese Army would experience great difficulty in trying to push very far beyond China's borders against the opposition of a modern force. Here the weakness in transport, logistics, firepower, and air support could become critical.

I. While its inventory of some 4,000 combat aircraft is the third largest in the world, China's equipment is far below the standards of US or Soviet aircraft. Air defense is the primary mission of this force, with 37 of the 53 Chinese air divisions assigned to this role. The air defense system suffers from serious weaknesses because of its reliance on relatively outmoded aircraft, a very modest level of surface-to-air missile (SAM) deployment, limited air surveillance capabilities, and the lack of automatic data-handling equipment.

J. China's ground attack fighter force consists of Mig-15/17 jet fighters and a growing number (currently about 185) of F-9 fighter-bombers (a Chinese-designed aircraft somewhat larger than but resembling the Mig-19). About three-quarters of China's 540 or so bombers are obsolescent Il-28s. The Chinese also have deployed about 43 Tu-16 jet medium bombers, but we believe Peking intends to use the Tu-16s mainly as part of China's force for peripheral nuclear attack.

K. The Chinese have invested heavily in naval programs, and this effort is beginning to pay off. The fleet now includes about 53 attack submarines, 16 destroyer escorts (including 8 that are equipped with cruise missiles), about 55 missile patrol boats, and several hundred motor gunboats and torpedo boats. The coastal patrol type vessels are prepared to play a significant defensive role; the larger ships and submarines further enhance Chinese defensive capabilities but have not yet ventured any extended operations into deep waters. The Chinese Navy has only a limited air defense capability, and its antisubmarine warfare capability is rudimentary. The Chinese have only a limited sealift potential, have no amphibious shipbuilding program and have conducted no large-scale amphibious training.

Prospects

L. Peking's cautious attitude respecting the use of force seems likely to continue for some time, partly because the Chinese see no advantage in risking a military confrontation with the vastly stronger superpowers, and partly because Maoist doctrine continues to hold that revolution cannot be sustained by external forces. We do not rule out a shift in this generally defensive and cautious policy on the use of force as China's conventional and strategic power grows and in circumstances in which nationalist sentiments may have gained ground at the expense of Maoism. But there is little in the current situation to suggest that such a shift would be likely in the next few years.

M. We cannot foresee any weakening in the basic drive to develop China as a major military power. As in the past, however, progress in modernization and in developing military professionalism is likely to come into conflict with Maoist political and ideological goals. Moreover, because of China's limited technical base, the modernization of the PLA will necessarily be protracted, and the process will undoubtedly require numerous compromises concerning the balance of effort between strategic and conventional forces, and between near-term results and longer-term progress. While the Chinese could probably step up their efforts at military modernization somewhat, they are much nearer the margin of their capabilities than either the US or USSR.

N. Thus the outlook for the next five years is one of continuing improvement along current lines based on programs now underway. A continuation of this persistent effort to build a formidable military establishment is unlikely to produce any spectacular breakthroughs or developments in the PLA. It will, however, permit Peking gradually to operate in the international arena with somewhat less concern for China's military weaknesses and shortcomings.

O. The Chinese Army is receiving newer and better equipment—including improved light and medium artillery, light amphibious and medium tanks, armored personnel carriers, more modern communications equipment, and increasing numbers of trucks—that will gradually upgrade its firepower and mobility. Training is being conducted on a larger and more elaborate scale, and there may be other changes in process—e.g., more attention to arming and training paramilitary forces—that will enhance the military usefulness of China's virtually unlimited manpower. While these improvements will not be sufficient to enable Peking to project its forces much beyond China's borders against first class opposition, the PLA should be able increasingly to contest an invasion more effectively and in somewhat more forward positions than is now the case, especially on the northern and northwestern frontiers. In short, the already formidable defensive capabilities of the Chinese Army will increase, and the prospect of engaging this force will become a more and more unattractive proposition for any potential adversary.

P. The outlook for air and air defense forces is one of substantial increases in size with qualitative improvement proceeding at a more modest pace. Peking may decide to phase out production of Mig-19 fighters in favor of Mig-21s. Chinese-produced Mig-21s evidently have not yet entered the force, but we expect this to occur in the near future. The availability of this aircraft would mark the beginning of major improvements in intercept capability, particularly as the Mig-21s would probably be armed with air-to-air missiles and be equipped for all-weather operations. The Hsian-A interceptor, a native-designed

follow-on to the Mig-21 currently being tested, may be available for deployment in the mid-1970s.

Q. SAM deployment will probably proceed at a faster rate than in years past, and deployment of the Chinese version of the SA-2 may be supplemented by a low-altitude weapon during the period of this Estimate. Radar coverage will improve and expand, and new communications equipment now becoming available will improve the command and control of China's air defense system. Despite this growth and improvement, however, China will continue to be vulnerable to a large-scale attack by planes employing the latest equipment and technology.

R. The new F-9 fighter-bomber represents a significant improvement in China's ground attack capability and is likely to be deployed in fairly substantial numbers. Peking may soon conclude that the cost of building and deploying the outmoded Il-28 jet light bomber is not warranted and that production should cease. Although the Chinese will probably use the Tu-16 bomber primarily as a strategic weapon carrier, some will probably be assigned to reconnaissance and other nonstrategic roles.

S. China's naval programs clearly attest to an ambition to become an important naval power. Production of attack submarines, destroyers, destroyer escorts and guided-missile patrol boats is likely to continue to be substantial. The evidence suggests that China now has one nuclear-powered attack submarine; if so, several more will probably enter the fleet during the period of this Estimate. At this point, however, the Chinese Navy's level of operational experience has not kept pace with additions of new units and advances in technology. Given the complexity of learning to operate as a deepwater navy, this situation is likely to persist throughout the period of this Estimate. Although there is a good chance that the Chinese will begin to "show the flag" in foreign waters with some of their newer units, there is little likelihood of their establishing a major naval presence in waters distant from China for some years.

T. China's nuclear program has given first priority to the development of high-yield thermonuclear weapons for strategic attack. But the Chinese have an obvious requirement for tactical nuclear weapons, and Chic-13, which was tested in January 1972, could have been a step in filling this requirement. [6 lines of source text not declassified] Thus we feel that it is too early to conclude that China has developed a nuclear weapon for delivery by fighter aircraft. Nevertheless, we think it likely that the Chinese will acquire a tactical nuclear capability during the period of this Estimate. A bomb is the best candidate for an early capability. Somewhat later, toward the end of the period of this Estimate, the Chinese will probably be capable of deploying tactical nuclear missiles or rockets.

[Omitted here are the 103-page Discussion section which was divided into the following sections: I. China's Military Policy; II. The Armed Forces; III. Strategy, Capabilities, and Prospects; Annex A: The Ground Forces; Annex B: Chinese Communist Air Force; Annex C: Chinese Communist Navy; and Annex D: Military Research and Development and Production Programs.]

241. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, July 25, 1972, noon.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador James C.H. Shen, Republic of China
Mr. Henry Chen, Political Counselor, Chinese Embassy
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Mr. John A. Froebe, NSC Staff

Ambassador Shen said that he had three things to take up with Dr. Kissinger on instruction from Taipei. The first was what the U.S. can do to slow down Japan's efforts to normalize relations with Peking.²

Dr. Kissinger said that during his June visit to Tokyo he had advised Sato, Fukuda and Tanaka that Japan should not become separated from the United States on this question.³ Tanaka in response said that Japan would stay in step with the United States. Dr. Kissinger noted that Japan has, as a matter of fact, stayed with the U.S. on this problem. He said he also told Tanaka that the United States does not want to see its rights to use of bases in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty compromised. Dr. Kissinger said he could not predict just

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X. No classification marking. Drafted by Froebe on July 26. Kissinger and Shen met from 12:12 to 12:40 p.m. in Kissinger's office. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² On July 19 Japanese Prime Minister Kakeui Tanaka publicly announced his willingness to modify his nation's relationship with the PRC. On August 11 the PRC and Japanese Governments announced that Tanaka would visit the PRC in the near future. The two governments announced on September 21 that Tanaka would visit September 25–30. During this visit, Chou En-lai and Tanaka announced the impending restoration of normal diplomatic relations, causing the ROC on September 29 to announce that it would break relations with Japan.

³ The record of the conversation among Kissinger, Fukuda, and Tanaka is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

what Prime Minister Tanaka would do in the immediate future on relations with Peking, but thought he would probably visit Peking. He noted that the President would be meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka on August 31, at which time the U.S. plans to take a strong line.

Ambassador Shen said that his government was quite fearful that Japan would abrogate its 1952 peace treaty with the ROC, and that this would start a chain reaction in Asia that would undermine the ROC's diplomatic position. Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. has heard nothing officially as to Japan's intentions regarding the treaty, but added that Ambassador Shen could be assured that the U.S. would try to persuade Japan to move carefully on this problem. Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger if it was his understanding that Chou En-lai might not insist that Japan abrogate the 1952 treaty as a pre-condition for beginning normalization talks, leaving this question to be resolved during the negotiations. Dr. Kissinger replied that this was his impression. He added that the U.S. would take this question up during the President's discussions with Prime Minister Tanaka late next month. Ambassador Shen asked if Japan was unlikely to do anything on the treaty in the meantime. Dr. Kissinger said that Japan was unlikely to do anything on the treaty that the U.S. might be able to affect, and reiterated that the U.S. would be taking a strong position with Japan as regards use of bases in Japan under the Mutual Security Treaty.

Ambassador Shen said that the second problem Taipei had asked him to raise was that of the ROC's position in the International Financial Institutions (IFI's). Dr. Kissinger said that the United States was supporting the ROC's continued participation in the IFI's very strongly. Ambassador Shen said that the problem now was to work out contingency plans for the September annual meeting of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought that Mr. McNamara's study committee proposal seemed to be an effective way of meeting that aspect of the problem.⁴ Mr. Froebe noted, however, that Mr. McNamara has recently had decided second thoughts about the advisability of this approach because of a lack of support in the Board of Executive Directors and from the IMF.⁵

Ambassador Shen said that his government's basic concern was that it not see a replay of the Chirep defeat in the case of the IFI's. Dr. Kissinger responded that the two were quite dissimilar, adding that we do not expect the same outcome in the case of the IFI's. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought the best approach to this problem was for the ROC to continue to maintain a low profile in order to avoid any challenge

⁴ See Document 237.

⁵ See Document 245.

to its position in the IFI's. Ambassador Shen asked what U.S. agencies were following this situation, to which Dr. Kissinger said that Mr. Holdridge was the responsible officer on the NSC Staff. Dr. Kissinger stressed that the U.S. intends to avoid a repetition of the Chirep experience. He mentioned that he would also discuss this with Treasury Secretary Shultz since Treasury has much to say about this problem, and asked Mr. Froebe to check into the situation for him.⁶

Turning to his third question, Ambassador Shen asked if there was some reason for the seeming delay in the approval of the Ex-Im Bank loans for the ROC's planned third and fourth nuclear power plants.⁷

Dr. Kissinger asked Mr. Froebe to check into this also, and said that he saw no reason for the delay and intended to expedite the matter.

Dr. Kissinger said that he had not seen Ambassador Shen following his June trip to Peking, given the fact that the Taiwan question had not really come up. Ambassador Shen expressed some surprise that the Taiwan question seemed to have been avoided, and asked if this had been because the Taiwan question was now considered settled. Dr. Kissinger said that this was not the case, and that as a matter of fact Chou En-lai had at one point commented that further progress remained to be made on the Taiwan question.

Ambassador Shen asked if Peking is still worried about the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger said that he thought that there had been no major change in Peking's view on that problem. Dr. Kissinger reminded Ambassador Shen after the President's China visit that the Taiwan issue had given rise to considerably more consternation in some quarters than had been justified. Ambassador Shen interjected that Chou En-lai, however, has suggested that Peking will not agree to any large exchanges with the United States so long as there is a GRC Embassy in Washington. Dr. Kissinger replied that this is of little consequence to the United States.

Ambassador Shen suggested that if Chou does not get the movement he wants on the Taiwan question he may stop Americans from going to the mainland. Dr. Kissinger said that he was highly skeptical of this, explaining that Chou would act in accord with Peking's basic national interests. He noted, for example, that Peking has not reacted against

⁶ Froebe forwarded a memorandum through Holdridge to Kissinger on August 2. He noted: "As regards the question of protecting Taiwan's continued participation in the IFI's, World Bank President McNamara has decided not to try to proceed, in advance of the Bank and IMF annual meeting next month, with his plan to set up an ad hoc study committee in the Bank's Board of Executive Directors." Froebe also noted that the Departments of State and Treasury would be forwarding further recommendations shortly. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI)

⁷ See Document 239.

the U.S. bombings of North Vietnam. Responding to Ambassador Shen's query about the prospects for U.S. trade expansion with the mainland, Dr. Kissinger said he believed the same basic consideration would apply. Applying the same concept to Peking relations with Japan, Dr. Kissinger said that the maximum that Peking could do for Japan in the trade field would be less than Japan was already doing with Taiwan.

Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger his opinion as to why the Japanese were acting the way they were on the China issue. Dr. Kissinger said that it seemed to be in the Japanese character to do things in a somewhat unbalanced way. He said that he himself as a basic principle did not believe it efficacious to acquiesce in pre-conditions to negotiations. He said he could tell Ambassador Shen in the strictest of confidence that he was thinking of sending Mr. Holdridge to Tokyo to talk to the Japanese about the whole problem.

Ambassador Shen again stressed that if Japan abrogates its 1952 treaty with the ROC, all of Southeast Asia will take another look at its relationship with Taiwan. Considering what his country had done for Japan at the end of World War II, the present Japanese actions were nothing less than gross ingratitude. Dr. Kissinger commented that unfortunately gratitude is not a dominant factor in foreign relations.

Dr. Kissinger asked what had happened in Taipei's recent Cabinet reshuffle to Ambassador Shen's predecessor, Chow Shu-kai. Ambassador Shen said that he was now a Minister without Portfolio, noting that this made him the second former Foreign Minister to occupy that position in the Cabinet, the other being George Yeh, who also is a former Ambassador to Washington. Dr. Kissinger observed that no one has had such a difficult job to perform as Ambassador Shen had in the year that he had been here.

Ambassador Shen asked Dr. Kissinger's evaluation of the general situation in Asia and particularly that in Vietnam. Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. is in a strong military position and that that of the North Vietnamese would get worse. The U.S. therefore can afford to wait. Answering Ambassador Shen's question as to what Hanoi is waiting for, Dr. Kissinger said he thought Hanoi probably wanted to see how the U.S. election campaign would go in the next month or two. Asked if Hanoi might try to hold out until after the November elections, Dr. Kissinger said that North Vietnam could only get worse terms after the election, assuming the President is re-elected. Asked if he thought the U.S. could end the war before November, Dr. Kissinger said it was impossible to tell at this point.

John A. Froebe⁸

⁸ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

242. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in France¹

Washington, July 26, 1972, 0033Z.

134912. For Ambassador Only. Subj: US–PRC Trade—Memorandum to be Left With Ambassador Huang. Ref: State 134911.² The United States notes that there are a number of highly technical and specialized subjects relating to the facilitation of trade between the United States and the People's Republic of China which could be the topic of discussion in Paris at times to be determined by mutual agreement.

We would welcome an opportunity for early discussion of the following subjects in particular:

1. Settlement of outstanding claims between the US and the PRC. There are many issues regarding claims which the US wishes to discuss with the PRC. It may be that the PRC will wish to raise issues of its own with the USG. For example, we are aware that China may wish to assert claims for assets blocked in the US since 1950. In the spirit of raising at this stage those issues which are capable of solution at present, we suggest that the problem of the claims of US private citizens be resolved in the near future by meetings between expert teams of the two sides. (US claims have been adjudicated as to validity and amount by the US Foreign Claims Settlement Commission pursuant to US law. The findings of the commission are a matter of public record and we will supply a copy to your Embassy in approximately one week.)

2. We recall that Secretary of State Rogers raised the problem of private claims in informal conversation with Minister of Foreign Affairs Chi P'eng-fei in Peking and that the Minister indicated that this was a matter which could be discussed by the two sides.³ It was also

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, FT 1 CHICOM–US. Secret; Nodis; Homer; Immediate. Drafted by Freeman and W. G. Metson, and approved by Brown, Hummel (EA), J. L. Katz (E), and Kissinger.

² In telegram 134911 to Paris, July 26, the Department instructed Watson to “seek an early appointment with Ambassador Huang to inform the PRC of a number of concrete actions the US has taken or is taking to implement the trade sections of the Shanghai Communiqué.” These actions included a Sino-American trade organization and lists of items with “the greatest potential for US–PRC trade.” It also instructed Watson to pass telegram 134912 on to the PRC representatives. (Ibid., POL CHICOM–US) In telegram 232422 to Paris, December 27, the Department informed Chargé Jack B. Kubisch of its intention of organizing the non-governmental trade council. In telegram 24970 from Paris, December 29, Kubisch reported that he had informed the PRC representatives on December 29. (Both telegrams are *ibid.*, FT CHICOM–US) Watson left post on October 30; his successor, John N. Irwin II, was not appointed until February 2, 1973.

³ Apparent reference to the February 22 meeting between Rogers and Chi. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 91, Country Files–Far East, China, Memoranda of Conversation between Secretary Rogers and PRC Officials, February 1972)

raised in the more recent “counterpart” conversations in Peking this June.⁴ We remain concerned that private claimants may attempt to attach by means of lawsuits Chinese commercial property or ships which come within the jurisdiction of US courts. We would be unable to prevent such suits despite the adverse impact that they would have on the progressive development of mutually beneficial trade between the US and China. We believe, therefore, that it is important for our two countries to begin negotiations soon to reach an equitable settlement of private claims. We propose that the two sides agree to hold meetings between expert teams to discuss these matters, either in Paris or Peking, starting September 15, 1972.

3. Scheduled air service between the two countries. One obvious way of facilitating trade might be to inaugurate scheduled air service between the United States and the People’s Republic of China. Action by the US Civil Aviation Board would be necessary to determine which US airlines would be authorized to serve air routes which might be established by mutual agreement between our two countries. We would welcome an expression of the Chinese view of inauguration of reciprocal scheduled air service at an appropriate time.

4. In the talks in Peking the Chinese side raised the issue of Most Favored Nation status and the effect that the lack of it would have on the development of trade relations between our two countries. The US side has agreed that the question of Most Favored Nation status can be taken up as a matter of principle at an appropriate stage in the development of our economic relations.

5. The problem of industrial protection. We note that the People’s Republic of China is not a signatory of the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (Paris Union). Nevertheless, we are prepared to facilitate Chinese registration of trademarks and patents in accordance with our laws and regulations. We would welcome reciprocal treatment for our citizens by the People’s Republic of China.⁵

Rogers

⁴ See footnote 1, Document 231.

⁵ As reported by Watson in telegram 14499 from Paris, July 28, he met with Huang on July 28 and passed along this message, along with lists of proposed trade items. “Huang listened but did not comment” on Watson’s presentation. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) The PRC response was presented in a September 12 meeting between Watson and Huang in Paris. Watson reported: “Meeting was held at PRC request and strikes me as intense effort to be responsive to our proposals, moving ahead on simpler steps, such as expanding attendance at Canton Fair, while deferring for further study more complex issues.” The PRC response is in telegram 17171 from Paris, September 12; Watson’s report is telegram 17209 from Paris, September 12. (Both *ibid.*) PRC officials met with Watson on October 14 to request more detailed information on private claims against the PRC. (Telegram 19630 from Paris, October 16; *ibid.*)

243. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, July 26, 1972, 4:15–7:15 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Jonathan T. Howe, NSC Staff

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

There was a brief exchange of amenities at the beginning of the conversation.

Dr. Kissinger: I have a number of items I would like to discuss with you, and Commander Howe has some answers to questions that were asked during earlier sessions. The Ambassador's English is getting so good that you get a double chance in these conversations.

Ambassador Huang: It is said that is supposed to be the advantage of an interpreter. You can bring an interpreter next time [said jokingly].²

Dr. Kissinger: It wouldn't do me any good since I still wouldn't be able to understand the Chinese.

I will discuss one major thing, but first I want to discuss items of somewhat lesser importance.

Secretary Peterson is in the Soviet Union now meeting on commercial matters. The U.S. side wants to keep the Chinese side informed of what they are doing in Moscow. In essence, there are three subjects being discussed: settlement of lend-lease; finding the Soviets eligible for credits, which depends on settlement of lend-lease; and the possibility of Most Favored Nation status. These subjects were discussed at Moscow [Summit] and therefore, in that sense, they represent nothing new.

The Soviet Union is extremely interested in a large-scale American investment in Siberia, particularly to support natural gas development. The U.S. policy is that if the lend-lease is settled we will find the Soviet Union eligible in principle for credit but reserve a determination on each individual item. Therefore we will maintain control. We will not give a flat sum. We will require individual requests. On the natural gas issue it is not our present intention to extend government credit. We will leave this to private companies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Talking points for this meeting are *ibid.*

² All brackets are in the source text.

The U.S. is prepared—I have said this before—to put the PRC on the exact same footing as the Soviet Union. So anything we do for the Soviets, that opportunity remains for the PRC.

On the question of natural gas we constantly receive inquiries from American companies concerning drilling offshore. We want you to know that we would be willing to put you in touch with recognized operators, including some companies that are not so well known, if this is of interest. This is entirely up to you. This is all I have on the Peterson visit. Do you have any questions or comments?

Ambassador Huang: No questions.

Dr. Kissinger: Secondly, I have been asked by Senator Mansfield to intercede on his behalf concerning a possible return visit to China. He would like to leave on our election day and get there three or four days later, I guess, for an individual visit. This will give you some idea of his estimate of the outcome of the election. But I wanted you to know that we do not insist that it be matched by a Republican, and if you don't do it we would understand it.

Mrs. Shih: You said, "not insist that this visit be matched by a Republican"?

Dr. Kissinger: We believe that there are recognized reasons why he should want to go and therefore we would not insist as in the past that both political parties be represented. It might be best if discussion about Senator Mansfield is kept in this channel. He doesn't want to be embarrassed about publicity concerning his plans during this campaign.

Ambassador Huang: Well, we will convey this.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course.

Another matter concerning visits—Congressmen Boggs and Ford were very happy about their visit to China.³ I understand they have talked too much on their return. But I warned you before they left that they are not as discreet as Senators Mansfield and Scott.

With respect to Mr. Schroeder, as it turned out, I didn't see him because his visit here was canceled. I want your authorities to know that we are still going to carry out what I indicated to the Prime Minister concerning a cooperative spirit. This was mentioned in Peking. I'll see him in September and I will encourage him in the direction that the Prime Minister and I discussed.⁴

³ Congressmen Hale Boggs (D-Louisiana) and Gerald Ford (R-Michigan) visited the PRC for 10 days in late June and early July. See Document 223.

⁴ At an August 4 meeting in New York, Huang Hua read the following message to Kissinger: "First, the Chinese side appreciates Dr. Kissinger's indication of a desire to

On Vietnam matters there are three items. First, with respect to the intrusions on Chinese territory we have a number of reports and I will ask Commander Howe to go over them with you. There is one covering memorandum from the Secretary of Defense which I wanted to read to you. [Dr. Kissinger then read the sanitized memo from the Secretary of Defense at Tab A.⁵ In reading the memo, he explained that CINCPAC meant Commander in Chief Pacific and also explained that he was reading what Secretary Laird said in his report. He also noted that the attached report was from the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs since the Chairman was up in Alaska. Dr. Kissinger also noted that Commander Howe should read the follow-up report on the June 10 incident.]

This will not satisfy you but it will let you know that we will make a very serious effort to find out as well. At any rate, I believe these new measures will make it impossible for these incidents to occur. None has occurred since July 10 except one which I will mention to you in a minute.

With respect to the so-called buffer zone we do reserve the right if important military targets develop to penetrate it, without of course going into PRC territory. But we will not approach the PRC borders. Our normal procedures are not to approach PRC territory within a certain distance.

Ambassador Huang: Have you now doubled that distance?

Dr. Kissinger: It was 10 miles. Now we have gone to a greater distance.

You have not mentioned it, but I wanted to inform you about an incident which occurred on July 15. [Dr. Kissinger explained that a pilot had intruded into Hainan Island at 150006Z. He asked Commander Howe to explain what Zulu time was.]

As soon as the pilot saw land he turned and exited the area. I apologize for this incident. We are reporting it based on the new procedures.

promote contact between China and West Germany. During Mr. Schroeder's visit to China, he conducted useful talks with the Chinese side. Mr. Schroeder expressed the desire of various quarters concerned in West Germany for the establishment of diplomatic relations with China at an early date, and the Chinese side responded positively to this. As the West German government has no relations with the Chiang Kai-shek clique, it is possible for China to establish diplomatic relations with West Germany." The memorandum of conversation, August 4, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 148. Schroeder was in the PRC July 14–28. West Germany and the PRC announced the establishment of diplomatic relations during a visit to China by Foreign Minister Walter Scheel October 10–14, 1972.

⁵ Attached but not printed is Laird's July 16 memorandum. He noted: "The alleged incidents have been investigated by CINCPAC and the component commanders. As in previous cases, no evidence has been found so far to support either allegation [June 20 bombing of a PRC fishing vessel and July 5 violation of PRC airspace]." See *ibid.*, Document 149.

It was not a military plane, or I mean not a combat plane. It was a tanker.

We have a difficulty about your ships off Vietnam which we wanted to mention to you. We have given strict orders not to damage your ships but, as you know, we are going to attempt to prevent the transfer of their cargoes. There have been four incidents in the last month where your ships fired their weapons at our planes without being attacked. Your ships apparently have machine guns. I can show you pictures. It does make it difficult for us not to respond if our planes are shot at. Commander Howe will give you details of the firings and the times.

With respect to a recent article carried by NCNA commenting on the bombing of dikes, I understand you are under certain necessities to support your ally publicly, but I want your government to understand it is not our policy. If it was our policy the damage would be much more extensive. We do not exclude that occasionally a bomb has hit a dike. We think that probably has happened but no dike has been breached by American bombs and it is not our policy to bomb dikes. We can survive occasional press attacks, but I wanted you to be aware of the facts in making your judgment. I wanted you to know what the facts were; for your own information I wanted you to know the facts. (This sentence was in answer to the interpreter's request for a clarification of the last phrase of the previous sentence.)

I have two other points. One concerns Korea. For many reasons we prefer to avoid a Korean debate in this year's General Assembly. We do not think it is helpful to have a direct confrontation between our two countries if it can be avoided, particularly if your eloquent Vice Foreign Minister comes to head your delegation to the General Assembly, [The Ambassador smiles] although Mr. Bush's boiling point is higher than that of Mr. Malik.

Secondly, we want the negotiations between North and South Korea, which we believe are a good result of our relationship, to have a good opportunity to develop.

Ambassador Huang: Do you mean our bilateral relations?

Dr. Kissinger: I think that relations between Peking and Washington helped start negotiations between Pyongyang and Seoul.

Thirdly, I wanted to tell you if we avoided a debate in the UN this time we would use our influence to bring about a dismantling of UNCURK. This would have to be an understanding.

How is the senior Vice Foreign Minister? He and I spent many nights together. If he comes you and he will have to come to a dinner with me [Ambassador Huang smiles]. He has already agreed.

Ambassador Huang: Well, as to whether our Foreign Minister comes, we haven't received any instructions. If he comes he will be very glad to meet you.

Dr. Kissinger: Our two ambassadors will talk in Paris. They can discuss these other issues. [To Commander Howe:] I don't see what we can contribute here on this. (Referring to suggested item on trade and exchanges.)⁶

One other matter concerns our relations with the Soviet Union. I want to discuss it on a particularly confidential basis. You are the only government with which we have discussed it and in our government only the President and I and my close associates know about it. You remember, I believe, it was you I told that the Soviet Union proposed to us a nuclear non-aggression treaty. This is a treaty containing an obligation not to use nuclear weapons against the other. We avoided this with the argument that it did not cover other countries and did not prohibit the use of nuclear weapons by super-powers against other countries. They have now made a new proposal to us on a very confidential basis, so we must again point that out. Now it has a provision—actually three major provisions—the rest is technical:

—The first is that the U.S. and the Soviet Union will not use nuclear weapons against each other.

—If others use nuclear weapons the U.S. and the Soviet Union should avoid using them against each other.

—Third, that this treaty does not affect existing alliance obligations of the Soviet Union and the U.S. In other words, nuclear weapons can be used in defense of allies.

When this was presented to me, I asked the Soviet Ambassador if we attacked India would it bar the Soviet Union from using nuclear weapons in defense of India. He said yes. We obviously have no intention of attacking India. I was only raising a hypothetical point. The Soviet interpretation is that if a super-power attacks a third country not covered by the treaty, others can't use nuclear weapons in defense of the country not covered by the treaty.

Ambassador Huang: What you said was that if the U.S. attacks India the Soviet Union will not use nuclear weapons because India is not covered by a treaty of alliance.

Dr. Kissinger: That is right, it is not covered by a treaty of alliance.

Ambassador Huang: What is the U.S. attitude?

Dr. Kissinger: First, as I have told you, you know of course what I was really saying, India is of no strategic value to us. In case of an attack on the PRC we want to reserve our freedom of action, not because we have an obligation but because we are convinced that international peace requires it. We will not accept the distinction between countries covered by the treaty and countries not. We will not have

⁶ See Document 242.

two different categories of military conflict. We are looking for a formulation that expresses nuclear non-use as an objective rather than as an obligation. We would appreciate having your reactions before we reply to the Soviets.

Ambassador Huang: We will report this back.⁷

I have another question. Is it the U.S. intention to extend the treaty to include other nuclear powers?

Dr. Kissinger: So far we have not agreed there would be a treaty at all. We would like to have it in a form that would include other powers.

Ambassador Huang: Is that all about this question?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. That is all about this.

Ambassador Huang: I ask you this because this involves disarmament at the 27th General Assembly. These two items remain on the agenda for the 27th General Assembly. It seems that the Soviet side is ready to fix a date and set up a preparatory organ. We don't agree to such a proposal.

Dr. Kissinger: What forum are you talking about?

Ambassador Huang: The World Disarmament Conference proposed by the Soviet Union.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: We are in no hurry.

Ambassador Huang: How would the U.S. deal with the question in the General Assembly?

Dr. Kissinger: We will treat it in a most dilatory fashion. We will do our best to prevent any concrete results without opposing it directly. This is our general strategy, but I have not looked into our tactics. Our

⁷ At their August 4 meeting in New York, Huang Hua read the following message to Kissinger: "First, the Chinese side considers the Soviet proposal to be nakedly aimed at the establishment of nuclear world hegemony. Secondly, the Soviet proposal only stipulates that the Soviet Union and the United States should not use nuclear weapons against each other or allies. This is obviously an attempt, following the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, to go a step further and monopolize nuclear weapons, maintaining nuclear superiority and make nuclear threats against countries with few nuclear weapons, non-nuclear weapons, and countries in which the production of nuclear weapons is barred, and force them into spheres of influence of either this or that hegemony so that the two hegemonies may have a free hand in dividing up the world and manipulating the destinies of countries of the world at will." Other points in the message emphasized that U.S. acceptance of the Soviet proposal would violate the principles of the Shanghai Communiqué and that the problem of nuclear weapons could only be solved through an agreement to ban the use of such weapons. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 148.

⁸ For information on the non-use of force and permanent prohibition of nuclear weapons and the World Disarmament Conference, see *Yearbook of the United Nations, 1972*, vol. 26 (New York: Office of Public Information, 1975), pp. 1–20; and *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume V.

general policy is not to participate in any move to isolate you and to avoid disagreements with you if possible. It really depends on how many empty cannons the Vice Foreign Minister has. This is all I have. Do you have anything for me?

Ambassador Huang: I appreciate what you have told me and I will put it to my government. I suppose you know our stand on the question of Korea.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. We are talking about this.

Ambassador Huang: We welcome the new developments in Korea. We consider it a good beginning. The Korean side hopes the UN will create favorable conditions for an independent Korea. That is why we participate in inscription as a co-sponsor of the item on the agenda for the General Assembly. After such a long time since the armistice the UN ought to terminate the role of intervention in Korea. The presence of UNCURK in Korea is increasingly an irony of the UN. If the UN can extract itself from this embarrassment it will be favorable overall.

Dr. Kissinger: But not necessarily in 1972, from our point of view.⁹

Ambassador Huang: I have exchanged views with Ambassador Bush on this question.

Dr. Kissinger: Did Ambassador Bush initiate this?

Ambassador Huang: We had a general discussion of the agenda of the 27th session. We touched upon this question.

Dr. Kissinger: What did you conclude?

Ambassador Huang: Ambassador Bush said we could discuss this at a later period.

Dr. Kissinger: That's what he is supposed to do. I am glad we have one ambassador who carries out his instructions. You don't have this problem.

I left Washington early this morning and I have not seen the Ambassador's report. [Turning to Commander Howe]: Have you seen it?

Commander Howe: Yes. I have a copy.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me see it. [Dr. Kissinger then read the reporting cable to himself.]¹⁰

I hope you will consider this question—you probably know, in fact I know you do, that I met with the North Vietnamese last week and will meet with them next week. I am sure they will keep you informed, but if the Prime Minister has any questions on the negotiations we will

⁹ At their August 4 meeting in New York, Huang Hua informed Kissinger that "we hope the U.S. side will reconsider its idea of postponing discussion of the Korea question until the 28th Session of the United Nations General Assembly."

¹⁰ Not found.

be happy to answer them for you.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have anything to convey to the Prime Minister?

Dr. Kissinger: We are approaching the negotiations with an attitude to bring an end to the war. We have taken seriously many of the things the Prime Minister said to us in Peking. We will make some proposals, including political proposals, but we have not yet gotten them in final form.¹¹

Ambassador Huang: Is there any progress?

Dr. Kissinger: I thought I detected some Chinese advice as to the method of proceeding. Their behavior this time was much more polite than at any previous period [said lightly]. Their initial discussions were substantially procedural. We took the first step toward negotiations. The two positions were laid side by side and explained, and so it could be said we made procedural progress. This had never been done before. We will know in two more meetings; I will be able to tell better then how it will go.

[Mr. Kissinger then excused himself and asked Commander Howe to go over the additional information. Mr. Kissinger remarked that the Ambassador would be having some very interesting newspaper reading over the next three months and the Ambassador responded that he had had some interesting evenings recently watching television.]

Commander Howe then proceeded to review the following documents:

—Sanitized version of the July 12 report of the Acting Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the Secretary of Defense concerning allegations contained in the Chinese note of July 10, 1972 (Tab B).¹²

—Secretary of Defense's covering memo and follow-up report from the Chairman, JCS, to the Secretary of Defense, concerning the June 10, 1972 bombing incident (Tab C).¹³

Commander Howe reiterated what Dr. Kissinger had said, that the Chinese might not be entirely satisfied with the findings and noted that Dr. Kissinger had directed that further investigation be made into the June 10 incident as a result of the report. In reading portions of the re-

¹¹ At their August 4 meeting in New York, Kissinger provided Huang Hua with a 12-point proposal from the United States to the DRV and a 12-page opening statement for talks in Paris. Copies were attached to the August 4 memorandum of conversation. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 152.

¹² Attached but not printed. A complete set of PRC protests and DOD responses from mid-1972 is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 97, China, PRC Allegations of Hostile Acts (ca. 1972). See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 153.

¹³ Attached but not printed. See *ibid.*

ports, Commander Howe explained some of the military terms and clarified that these were reports to the Secretary of Defense from the military commanders.

—Detailed information on the four incidents in which Chinese ships fired at U.S. aircraft (Tab D).¹⁴ [Commander Howe omitted any reference to the fact that no damage was caused to U.S. aircraft.]

Around 7:15 the meeting concluded and Commander Howe apologized for the length of the session, but indicated that each of the very detailed explanations in the reports was relevant to those investigating the incidents.

¹⁴ Attached but not printed. See *ibid.* Murphy provided this information to Kissinger in a July 13 memorandum. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, PRC, Vol. V)

244. Memorandum of Conversation¹

I-26378/72

Washington, August 10, 1972, 12:20–12:45 p.m.

SUBJECT

Call by Ambassador Shen, Republic of China, on the Secretary of Defense

PARTICIPANTS

Republic of China Side

James Shen, ROC Ambassador to the United States
S. K. Hu, Minister, Special Assistant to the Ambassador
MGen Pat Wen, Head of the GRC Purchasing Commission

United States Side

Melvin R. Laird, Secretary of Defense
G. Warren Nutter, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA)
Dennis J. Doolin, DepAsst Secretary of Defense (EAPA)

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA Files: FRC 330 75 0125, China, Rep. of., 1972, 333. Secret. The meeting was held in Laird's office at the Pentagon. Prepared by Doolin and approved by Nutter on August 15.

Letter from MND

Ambassador Shen handed Secretary Laird a letter from the Minister of National Defense Ch'en Ta-ch'ing.² After reading the letter the Secretary stated that it covered the items that he had discussed recently with the Chief of the General Staff, adding that most of these items are moving forward.³ The Secretary said that he hopes we won't have to make our military assistance allocations by country this year. He complimented the Ambassador on the ROC's utilization of LS&E and said we had been able to make some very good transfers via this program.

The Chinese Air Force (CAF)

The Ambassador expressed great concern over the state of the CAF, adding that the GRC was "hoping against hope" for F4Ds. He noted that his government would like to see F5Es co-produced on Taiwan. Mr. Nutter noted that we have enough F5E sales to keep the program going for quite a while. The Secretary added that Iran has placed a big order, and both Holland and Saudi Arabia are also interested in the aircraft. The Ambassador inquired whether the F5Es can be made available under MAP in toto. The Secretary replied that the funds currently available do not permit this and that if the F5Es are to move rapidly and in any large numbers, the matter must be handled as a FMS case. He noted that the level of funding granted by Congress has meant that the MAP program for Taiwan is almost all eaten up by O&M costs. The Ambassador said that the operational readiness rate of the ROC armed forces is reduced due to the large amounts of new equipment being produced in the PRC. The

² The July 14 letter from Ch'en requested a wide array of military equipment. He asked that the CAF's 13-year-old F-100As and 10-year old F-5As be replaced by F-5Bs and F-5Es, either purchased from the United States or coproduced in Taiwan. For the navy, Ch'en requested replacement destroyers and two submarines with surface-to-air missiles. He also asked to replace the army's World War II and Korean War era equipment with 415 M-48 tanks, 152 M-42 40 mm. self-propelled automatic weapons, 48 TOW missiles, and 272 Red Eye missiles. Finally he added that the ROC hoped to use MAP support to upgrade its communication and ECM capabilities. (National Archives, RG 59, EA/ROC Files: Lot 75 D 76, Pol 17(c), Ambassador Shen's Calls on White House and State Officials) According to an August 28 memorandum from Moser to Green, the Department of Defense reply "(1) congratulates Ch'en on his new office; (2) states that the Secretary of Defense is in favor of doing what is possible to maintain the present defense posture of the ROC; and (3) reminds the ROC that U.S. support will also be limited by the fiscal restraints of available resources." (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL CHINAT-US)

³ No record of this discussion has been found. In telegram 2599 from Taipei, May 26, McConaughy reported: "CHMAAG has received written request dated 15 May from Chief of General Staff Lai Ming-ting for grant MAP assistance to coproduce 45 F-5Bs and 100 F-5Es in Taiwan." McConaughy noted that although staff at the Embassy could evaluate the ROC's ability to undertake coproduction, they could not judge "potential congressional reaction" to the ROC proposal, which was "to some extent competing with US domestic industry." He added: "we doubt very much that they expect full grant coverage and assume that they have in mind FMS support." (Washington National Records Center, OSD Secret Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Nats), 400.137-800, 1972)

Secretary acknowledged that aircraft production on the mainland is proceeding very rapidly but pointed out that the Foxbat is not a good attack aircraft but more a recon vehicle like the SR-71. He noted that the Foxbat cannot be used as justification for production of F-15s as our present aircraft can handle the Foxbat. The F-15 has to be ready to deal with an even more capable enemy aircraft in the 1980 time-frame.

GOJ/PRC Relations

The Secretary asked for the Ambassador's views as to the current state of GOJ/PRC relations. Ambassador Shen said that Mr. Tanaka will not listen to the GRC and the GOJ is moving "too fast for our comfort." He noted that the GOJ has said that the timing on this question must be left to Tokyo. He said that Chou En-lai has been very astute in extending an invitation to Tanaka to visit Peking and that the meeting will probably take place after Tanaka's meeting in Honolulu with President Nixon.

F5E Funding and MAP

Ambassador Shen returned to the question of the F5E, asking again whether there was any other way to handle the purchase than as a FMS case. Mr. Laird said that there was not because the GRC is presently using almost all of the MAP just to maintain its present capability. When the visitors mentioned the size of our program for Korea, the Secretary responded that we cannot reduce the five-year program just because talks are going on; that would be the best way to work against the negotiated settlement in Korea. Talks do not necessarily mean agreement, the Secretary noted, and said that this is not the time to back away from any of our programs including our program for the ROC. He urged Ambassador Shen to compare our present assistance to the ROC with our assistance during the 1965–68 timeframe and not the 1953–1960 period. Ambassador Shen said that he was glad to hear the Air Force briefing team on the F5E will be coming to Taiwan in September.⁴ The Secretary said the reason for the visit is to provide the GRC with as much information as possible. The meeting concluded with a final request from the Ambassador that we continue to explore alternative ways to fund purchase of the F5E aircraft.

⁴ In a July 19 memorandum to Kissinger, Laird requested permission to send a "USAF team to the Republic of China to discuss F-5E performance data and production thresholds." He noted that the Department of State concurred with this visit. In an August 7 memorandum to Kissinger, sent through Haig, Holdridge summarized the ROC's military equipment requests. He noted that the problem was not whether to provide the aircraft to the ROC, but the "financing, phasing, and public affairs treatment of the transfer of F-5E's, primarily in order to minimize the political costs to our evolving relationship with Peking." Kissinger wrote on the memorandum: "Don't refer to July 19 request, just do it blankly." He also noted: "I phoned approval to Col. T. L. Ridge, DOD/ISA/EAPR on 8/28/72. HAK" Both memoranda are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI.

245. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs (Johnson) and the Under Secretary of Treasury for Monetary Affairs (Volcker) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

Chinese Representation in the International Financial Institutions

In your memorandum of July 11, 1972,² you advised us that the United States Government could support Mr. McNamara's proposal to convene, prior to the annual meetings (September 25–29), an ad hoc committee to study the Chinese representation question in the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. U.S. support was subject to the provisos that Mr. McNamara's preliminary inquiries indicate key country support for the proposal, and that Mr. Schweitzer³ concur as well. Because he was unable to obtain support from several key countries, Mr. McNamara decided not to take this initiative.

At this point, there is general agreement among the ROC, Bank and Fund managements, Executive Directors of several key countries, and ourselves, that any further pre-emptive action with respect to the China question before the annual meetings is inadvisable. Our attention, therefore, is focused on possible responses to the tabling of a resolution at the annual meetings which would have the effect of expelling the Republic of China (ROC). We do not have any further information that such a challenge will in fact be made, but the general consensus remains that it is a possibility. However, contacts with Executive Directors of key member countries, as well as responses from our Embassies on continued contacts in capitals, indicate the strong desire among the major developed countries and several lesser developed countries to avoid any debate or vote on the China question at the annual meetings.

In light of this background, Mr. McNamara currently believes that the best way to avoid a substantive vote on China representation would be to respond to any challenge resolution at the annual meetings with a proposal to establish a committee to study the problem. The committee would be given a general mandate to study legal and financial implications of the question, with its report scheduled for late spring of 1973.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret.

² See footnote 5, Document 237.

³ Pierre Paul Schweitzer, former Deputy Governor of the Banque de France, was Managing Director and Chairman of the Executive Board of the IMF from 1963 to 1973.

The committee could conclude that the status quo should remain unchanged in the absence of an expressed PRC intention to assume the obligations of Fund and/or Bank membership. The committee could also reach conclusions about the financial implications of the problem, which avoid the representation issue and permit the ROC to continue its participation in the Fund and the Bank. The committee could also conclude that the Bank and the Fund have been dealing with a member which in effect is a currency area in which the New Taiwan dollar is the legal tender, and that this member should continue to participate in the Fund and the Bank. Ideally, under any of the foregoing possibilities, the report of the committee would be presented in a way which would not require any vote. It is, of course, also possible that the committee will be pressured to expel the ROC, which is why its composition is crucial and a low key report desirable. In any event, formation of a committee would buy time.

The study committee proposal is favored by the ROC. Several Executive Directors, including the French, Belgian, British, Canadian and New Zealand, have initially responded favorably to the idea of forming a study committee, but need to check with their capitals to confirm their reactions. The German ED indicated that his Governor would probably abstain if the study proposal were put to a vote. The Japanese ED personally is inclined to favor the idea, but doubts whether a decision will be forthcoming at this time from the new government. In the next few weeks, we hope to have a clearer picture of the degree of support for this idea.

We understand that Mr. McNamara is currently concentrating on a strategy whereby the study committee would be created by a resolution which would be offered immediately after submission of an exclusion resolution. This resolution could take the form of an amendment to the exclusion resolution or it could be presented as a separate resolution coupled with a motion for priority in voting. Assuming majority support for this resolution, we would not anticipate a serious procedural problem over such issues as voting priority.

We intend to support this strategy.

We are also considering other strategies which could result in the creation of a study committee without public debate or a vote on the question. One such strategy would have the Chairman of the annual meetings, Mr. Ali Wardhana of Indonesia, rule, provided there was no objection from the floor, that the complexity of the representation question requires it to be submitted to a study committee. Alternatively, he could refer the matter to the Joint Procedures Committee, which might then recommend creation of a study committee. The Chairman would then attempt to have the Committee's report accepted without objection. Of course, a PRC supporter could challenge either the ruling of

the Chairman or the report of the Procedures Committee, and thus precipitate a vote on the question.

Although it is possible that circumstances may change by the time of the annual meetings, our soundings lead us to believe currently that an alternative form of counter-resolution, proposing that the question be shelved until the PRC expresses an intention to assume the obligations of membership, would have significantly less chance of success than the study committee proposal.

Against this background, we intend to take the following specific actions in the coming weeks before the annual meetings:

1. We will maintain close contact with Mr. McNamara and Mr. Schweitzer to learn the results of their further discussions with Executive Directors.

2. We will follow on our already established contacts in key capitals to ascertain the exact degree of support of these governments for the various proposals.

3. We will approach Chairman Wardhana to explore his own feelings and discuss procedural tactics.

4. In the event a counter-resolution is required, we would prepare for this and, if necessary, the U.S. would offer it, although we would support Mr. McNamara's efforts to get a "neutral" country to take on this task.

5. Assuming success in forming a committee, we would be prepared in advance to deal with the question of its composition.

We will continue to keep you apprised of the situation as it develops.⁴

U. Alexis Johnson
Paul A. Volcker

⁴ Froebe prepared an action memorandum on this issue for Kissinger on August 31, which included a memorandum to the President for Kissinger's signature. Apparently the memorandum was not forwarded to Nixon. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) The attached NSC Correspondence Profile sheet contains the notation: "No further action necessary," dated September 21. On October 19 Rogers wrote to the President that "To the surprise of many observers, no challenge was raised to the Republic of China at the World Bank/IMF Annual Meetings on September 25–29." Rogers noted that they had persuaded the ROC to "lower its profile in the World Bank and IMF." He added that the Department of State had contacted key member governments and obtained support for a counter-resolution to refer the China issue to the Executive Directors. He concluded: "Knowledge of our strength may have discouraged Peking and its friends from raising the issue." (Ibid.) In an October 25 memorandum to Davis, Hormats noted that the President was already aware of these facts through other memoranda, and that the Rogers memorandum need not be forwarded to him. (Ibid.)

246. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, August 21, 1972, 6:05–6:50 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, you are getting no vacation at all.
Ambassador Huang: It will come after the summer.

Dr. Kissinger: I would like to have you tired for the General Assembly. Your Delegation has not been selected yet?

Ambassador Huang: It has not yet been finally decided.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to see you because I am going away tomorrow, and I have a number of items. They are not of world-shaking importance. Since I won't be able to see you for several weeks, I wanted to bring you up to date. I am going to Miami tomorrow; from there to San Clemente and from there to Hawaii for the meeting with the Japanese; and I will be back in Washington on September 4. All of your other contacts will be either on leave or with me in San Clemente. If you have any message to deliver, you should call the White House operator; that is connected with me in San Clemente. Mr. Lord and Mr. Rodman will be with me there. We will then arrange to pick up any message. We will send somebody up from Washington, and we have very good communications. So you do not have to hold up the delivery of any message.

So much on the technical side. I wanted to tell you about my Japanese visit and where we stand on this proposal with the Soviet Union. Before that I want to tell you something else.

When we were in Moscow for the Summit, it was agreed between the President and the Soviet leadership that some months after the Summit I would go back there for a general review of the situation, just as I did in Peking. The Soviets have been urging this meeting, and we have now accepted it for the period September 10 through 13. We will make this announcement on September 5. (He hands over the text

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only.

of the draft announcement at Tab A.)² And we agreed on this only today. No other government knows about this, and therefore we ask you to treat this with your customary discretion.

There will not be any significant decisions taken there. We will have some further discussions on economic problems, on preparations for the European Security Conference, and we will probably delay our answer to this nuclear treaty proposal until then.

Ambassador Huang: When you are in Moscow you will give them a reply?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but we will tell you ahead of time. I will plan to see you either on September 5 or 6 before I leave. And I will give you a detailed agenda of what we plan to discuss. It is not worked out yet, but we do not foresee any new major departures. We will do as in the past, and I don't think you have ever had any surprises on our dealings with the Soviet Union.

With respect to the nuclear treaty, we gave you the text last time.³ I can tell you that we cannot accept a treaty and cannot accept a reciprocal obligation not to use nuclear weapons or anything that defines specific obligations for the nuclear superpowers. What are we exploring, within our own government, is whether we can find a general formula which constitutes what you told me about the general abstention by all countries from using nuclear weapons. But we have not made a decision, and we will show you our specific answer before we deliver it. But it will not be in treaty form. (Ambassador Huang taps his hands on his knee.) I can assure you now there will be no treaty and no reciprocal obligation.

Now with respect to my trip to Japan. As you will find out when you deal with the Japanese seriously, you will read everything in the newspapers, including things you did not say. (Ambassador Huang smiles.) So I wanted to tell you what our attitude is, and what I told them.

² Attached but not printed is a note entitled "Visit of Dr. Henry A. Kissinger to Moscow," which reads in its entirety: "In accordance with a previous agreement, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President of the United States for National Security Affairs, will visit the Soviet Union between September 10 to 13 for an exchange of opinions on matters of mutual interest to the Soviet Union and the United States."

³ On August 14 Howe traveled to New York to deliver the following message to Huang Hua: "1. The U.S. side has considered carefully the Chinese comments, conveyed on August 4, 1972, concerning the Soviet proposal for an agreement on nuclear weapons. Enclosed for the confidential information of the Chinese side is a copy of the text of the recent Soviet proposal. The U.S. side will not accept this proposal. It will fully inform the Chinese side of the U.S. response which will certainly reflect all the considerations raised by the Chinese." Attached to this was a draft treaty on the "non-use of nuclear weapons." The note also discussed Kissinger's forthcoming trip to Saigon and Tokyo. (Memorandum of conversation and message for the PRC, August 14; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges) At this meeting Ambassador Huang Hua read a statement on Sino-German relations, Sino-Japanese relations, and the Soviet-American nuclear treaty. (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 151.

First—I did not tell this to them, but I wanted you to know—we appreciated the Prime Minister’s message to us with respect to U.S.-Japanese relations. Based on this, we told them that we had no objection to an early visit by the Japanese Prime Minister to Peking at a time which is mutually convenient to the Chinese Government and to the Japanese Government. Specifically, we have no objection to their visiting Peking during the American election period. There is some advantage in their beginning to talk simultaneously, or before they start talking to the Soviet Union about their peace treaty.

The other subject discussed concerns bilateral U.S.-Japanese relations in the economic field and are of no direct relevance to your relationship with us.

On my way to Russia, I will stop in Munich and on September 8 or 9 I will meet with Chancellor Brandt and also with the leader of the Christian Democratic Party, Barzel. I will talk to both of them in the sense I previously indicated to you.

As a subsidiary issue, when I was in Peking I was asked about the listing of the Shanghai earth station and the Taipei station in the Intel-sat directory. We have now arranged it so that next time the directory appears it will be listed as you requested. But we have to do this indirectly, and we will not tell it to the Ambassador from Taiwan until a few days before it happens. So it might be useful if you made no further formal efforts until we have it accomplished.

Ambassador Huang: At what time will this take place?

Dr. Kissinger: I will let you know. I will have Mr. Lord call you, just to say the time period is two months, one month, or whatever. My recollection is that they appear every two months, but I may be wrong. But it is not a long time anyway.

One word about my Paris meeting, simply for the information of the Prime Minister without any request for action. The North Vietnamese have made a ten point proposal to us now of which we have accepted nine in principle, and we are trying to find a formulation for the political proposal which would cover neutral ground between our two positions. They are in the position that they would like to present the impression of stalemate in order to maximize pressure on us at home. They would like to make progress in private meetings and continue to lacerate us in public meetings. (Ambassador Huang smiles.)

I am sure you will understand that there is a limitation beyond which this cannot go. And the great danger is that they will once again miss the opportunity for a favorable settlement. After we have presented our new proposal, we will let you have it for your information. But I wanted the Prime Minister to know that we are very serious about finding a solution on a just basis.

The only other item I have concerns Senator Mansfield. You remember I mentioned to you some weeks ago his desire to come to China again. Can he submit a formal letter or how should we handle it? (Pause.) Perhaps you can let me know about this.

Ambassador Huang: We haven't gotten any reply from our government yet.

Dr. Kissinger: Perhaps you could . . .⁴

Ambassador Huang: So he still intends to leave on election day? That is what you told us last time.

Dr. Kissinger: If you make the condition that he can come only if he votes Republican or doesn't vote at all. (Laughter.) But I don't think we need his vote. (Laughter.)

Ambassador Huang: I won't interfere in your internal affairs.

Dr. Kissinger: I wish your allies to the south of you adopted the same policy.

These are all the items that I have.

Ambassador Huang: Well about Mr. Mansfield's visit to China, we will make some inquiries. How do we communicate the answer to you?

Dr. Kissinger: Then we will send somebody here. He will only be authorized to receive messages. He will not be able to discuss them with you.

Ambassador Huang: Well, you have talked about the treaty between the U.S. and the Soviet Union on the non-use of nuclear weapons, and you mentioned that you would not accept to sign the treaty; neither would you accept a reciprocal obligation on nuclear weapons.

Dr. Kissinger: Nor will we sign a treaty on any formulation.

Ambassador Huang: You talked about the non-use of nuclear weapons, but you didn't mention in your formulation your attitude toward other questions, such as non-nuclear countries and non-nuclear zones.

Dr. Kissinger: The only thing . . . We are against the use of nuclear weapons by nuclear countries against non-nuclear countries. We will not make an agreement with the Soviet Union to establish non-nuclear zones. In any event, I will not make any agreements in Moscow. I will come back here, and we will have a chance to discuss them. But our intention is to make a negative answer in a non-insulting form.

Mrs. Shih: What?

Dr. Kissinger: In a form that is not offending, and to turn it into something quite different. (Ambassador Huang and Mrs. Shih discuss in Chinese.)

⁴ All ellipses are in the source text.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have a suggestion in what channel we should discuss the visit of Senator Mansfield—at Paris or elsewhere?

Dr. Kissinger: If you let me know in principle what your reaction is, then perhaps we should let him write a letter to Paris. But it would be better not to let him write a letter unless we know the answer will be positive.

Ambassador Huang: Yes. I understand this.

Dr. Kissinger: To get back to the nuclear treaty for a minute. Our approach is not to make it significant, but to make it insignificant. And not to express a specific position for two countries, but to speak of a general set of principles for all countries—if we can find [a formulation] at all.⁵ Nor will we move with extraordinary speed. And we will show you once we have agreed among ourselves, once we have developed an answer, we will discuss it with you. But now there is not much that will happen until September 10, and then there will only be a general discussion.

Ambassador Huang: Today I don't have any message to convey to you. I will immediately convey what you said to the Prime Minister.

Dr. Kissinger: I will see you either on September 5 or 6, and then again within a day or two of my return from Moscow. And you will remember that this trip is not going to be announced until September 5.

Ambassador Huang: Yesterday we received a call from General Haig concerning the press story in Miami.⁶ What was the news?

Dr. Kissinger: Secretary Rogers delivered himself of various opinions on the Vietnamese war, one of which was that he thought the Chinese Government also favored a negotiated settlement. Normally, when one says a statement is not authorized, it is not believed. We wanted you to know that we were surprised by the statement, and it won't be repeated.

Ambassador Huang: It was not authorized?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. Sometimes our people get carried away with enthusiasm, which is not true for your foreign service. We have no intention of embarrassing you. At any rate it will not happen again. The press didn't cover it widely. I didn't see it in any newspapers. (To Mr. Kuo): Did you see it in the papers?

⁵ Brackets in the source text.

⁶ Reference is to statements by Rogers (originally reported in the *Miami Herald*) that both the PRC and Soviet Union favored a negotiated settlement in Vietnam. The White House quickly disavowed Rogers' prediction of a rapid settlement with Chinese or Soviet backing. See Hedley Burrell, "Rogers Predicts Peace Near Election," *Washington Post*, August 21, 1972, p. 1, 20.

Mr. Kuo: Yes, I saw it in the *Washington Post*. Also the *Christian Science Monitor*. There was no *New York Times* today. They are on strike.

Dr. Kissinger: I read the morning paper in the evening. I have a special perspective, that is only to find out which of my associates have leaked what to the press. (Laughter.)

(The meeting then broke up. Mr. Lord gave Mrs. Shih the White House switchboard number and explained the procedure; she confirmed that she already had this White House number. Mr. Lord also gave her a copy of a letter from Bob Hope to the PRC Ambassador in Ottawa, Canada, asking for assistance in filming scenes of China for television shows. Mr. Lord explained that this was not an official government request, but only a courtesy. The U.S. Government did not take a position on the matter, but would appreciate Mr. Hope's receiving a personal reply.)⁷

⁷ Attached but not printed is an August 17 note from American entertainer Bob Hope to Kissinger, to which Hope attached a letter intended for the PRC Ambassador in Canada.

247. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Key Biscayne, Florida, August 24, 1972, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Shen
Henry A. Kissinger
R. P. Campbell (Notetaker)

Ambassador Shen: I understand that you have very little time so I will be brief. What happened in Tokyo?²

Dr. Kissinger: Not much happened. They talked about the arrangements for the President's trip. They were not eager to tell me what they are going to do.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Top Secret; Sensitive. Drafted on August 30.

² Documentation on Kissinger's conversations in Japan is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

Ambassador Shen: Did you talk about us?

Dr. Kissinger: Obviously, they are going to sever relationships with you but it is not yet clear whether they are going to modify the security treaty.³

Ambassador Shen: With you?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they would risk their whole relationship with us if they do it. We told them we would stand by what we told them last year.

Ambassador Shen: Did they want to change the security treaty?

Dr. Kissinger: They wanted to set up a confrontation with us. I won't give them the satisfaction. The talks will continue between the President and Tanaka.

Ambassador Shen: Will the President talk again on the matter?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, absolutely.

Ambassador Shen: Even within the ruling party itself there is some controversy over whether to sever relations with them.

Dr. Kissinger: In June, they said that they would not sever relations without our approval but it is obvious they are going ahead.

Ambassador Shen: They are going to sever relations anyway?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Shen: You can do nothing?

Dr. Kissinger: No, but they want to keep commercial ties open.

Ambassador Shen: Yes, they want to have their cake and eat it too. The balance of trade has always been in their favor.

Dr. Kissinger: I wouldn't break off trade relations. You will have done everything if you do.

Ambassador Shen: What was the atmosphere?

³ ROC leaders had also expressed opposition to Japan's possible recognition of the PRC through Ray Cline, former CIA Station Chief in Taipei and Director of INR since 1969. On August 9 Cline forwarded to Holdridge an August 1 letter from Chiang Ching-kuo detailing concerns over Japanese policy. Holdridge then summarized the letter for Kissinger on August 11, noting the ROC's fears that "Japanese recognition of the PRC would set off a chain reaction in which other Asian nations would follow suit. This would result in an acceleration of PRC infiltration and subversion in Asia. The basic consequence would be to destabilize the situation in Asia—precisely the opposite of what Tokyo is claiming its move would have. The ROC's more basic concern, of course, is that Tokyo's recognition of Peking could lead not only to a quickening of Taipei's diplomatic isolation, but also to a contraction of its economic ties to Asia as well." Chiang's letter and Holdridge's memorandum are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Chiang Ching-kuo sent an August 7 letter to Nixon, reiterating these concerns. (Ibid.)

Dr. Kissinger: I think we are partly responsible because of last year.

Ambassador Shen: Recently a representative of our state traveled to Southeast Asia and found that it would be the beginning of an unraveling of relations if they break relations with us.

Dr. Kissinger: It is not unreasonable.

Ambassador Shen: Is there anything you can do?

Dr. Kissinger: I talked with Tanaka. You know the Japanese, they do everything in extremes. We can't stop them from recognizing the PRC, but maybe we can stop them from turning against you.

Ambassador Shen: Is there anything Asian countries can do?

Dr. Kissinger: I'll have to check that. Those countries your Minister has visited we would be in favor of. I told the Vietnamese "don't give up old friends." They can't afford to do that. I've not talked to Thailand, Cambodia, the Philippines or Korea.

[Ambassador Shen called after the meeting asking that Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia be added to the list of countries to be contacted.]⁴

Ambassador Shen: It will be a serious thing for us and a very emotional issue for us.

Dr. Kissinger: This has been one of the most brutal things I have seen. I understand the political maneuvering. In the next five years Mao and Chou will die. We must be prepared to carry on at that time.

Ambassador Shen: How much of this is out of spite to show their independence from your government?

Dr. Kissinger: Frankly, very little.

Ambassador Shen: The President will talk more on this?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes.

Ambassador Shen: Will it stop them?

Dr. Kissinger: I doubt it.

Ambassador Shen: Two weeks ago I was instructed to see the President. You were away and I found that it did not get to the President until just last week.⁵

Dr. Kissinger: The President was at Camp David and was not seeing anyone, not even Cabinet members.

⁴ All brackets are in the source text.

⁵ In an August 11 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge noted that Shen had requested a meeting with the President. Holdridge concluded that "I believe that it is important for the President to receive Shen in order to reassure his Government that we understand their concerns on this score." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) Shen did not meet with the President.

Ambassador Shen: What do I tell my government?

Dr. Kissinger: It was not a reflexion on your government. He was not using anger. He never sees Ambassadors. In fact, he sees you far more than any other.

Ambassador Shen: Yes, I know.

Dr. Kissinger: He will see you the week of Labor Day after his return.⁶

Ambassador Shen: You would advise continuing trade relations?

Dr. Kissinger: I would be tough now. I think the Japanese would like to get in on domestic Taipei economics. I would not ruin that thought.

Ambassador Shen: You advise us to be as tough as we can?

Dr. Kissinger: Before they announce.

Ambassador Shen: Why?

Dr. Kissinger: You want to be in the best bargaining position at the announcement. Until then, I would be tough.

Ambassador Shen: This will be tough.

Dr. Kissinger: You have been Ambassador here for some time and it is a tragedy that you have been so mistreated.

Ambassador Shen: Some of our friends have said that we should become an independent state.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't think you should do that. After the election, things will change. That would cause a massive problem here. I would wait. The PRC may change their position. There may be a Sino-Soviet war. I'm just talking history now. This is just between you and me.

Ambassador Shen: We are always quiet. We have never leaked anything. Even when things are the roughest, we are quiet.

Dr. Kissinger: You have always been reliable.

Ambassador Shen: Even when DeGaulle was here, we never exchanged harsh words with them.

Dr. Kissinger: Mr. Ambassador, we will do what we can in Hawaii.

Ambassador Shen: Whatever the joint communiqué says, please make it not seem that Japan is proceeding with your full endorsement.

Dr. Kissinger: We will.

Ambassador Shen: Can you see that Taiwan is kept informed of progress.

⁶ In an August 31 memorandum to Kissinger, Froebe wrote: "I understand that during your meeting with Ambassador James Shen August 23 [*sic*] you told him that a call on the President for him might be arranged for sometime in the week of September 4–8 after Labor Day. At Tab A is a draft memorandum from you to the President recommending a call on him by Shen during that week." Kissinger wrote at the bottom of the memorandum: "Nonsense—I said no such thing." (*Ibid.*)

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I will that it is done.

[Meeting broke up. At the door:]

Ambassador Shen: Any movement in Paris?

Dr. Kissinger: Nothing significant. I really don't want to talk about it.

248. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, August 28, 1972.

SUBJECT

Some Areas of Concern Regarding the Trend of PRC–U.S. Exchanges

A number of recent developments impel us to raise with you the matter of the current direction in which “people-to-people” exchanges with the Chinese are developing. The key issue is whether we should leave all initiative to Peking to control the participants and channels as exchange programs develop, or whether we should take certain low-key initiatives which will encourage the PRC to rely at least to some degree on facilitating organizations that we already have recommended to them and to urge them to give greater “balance” to the Americans involved in contacts with China. The present situation indicates several trends in the development of exchanges which we do not feel are favorable to our interests of having responsible, mainstream groups and individuals involved, and in the Chinese interest of developing a public image in the U.S. of being hands-off involvement in our domestic politics.

The Current Situation Regarding Exchanges

It is clear that at present the Chinese exercise almost complete control over the pattern of exchanges. This is done by their picking and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. Initialed by Holdridge and Solomon. Kissinger wrote on the top of the first page: “Let me take letter of Academy to Burkhardt. See note.” No note was attached. Frederick Burkhardt was Chairman of the American Council of Learned Societies.

choosing among various American individuals and groups to invite to visit the PRC, and then—once a “friendly relationship” has been established by a visit—they suggest to preferred individuals or groups that they “reciprocate” by inviting a Chinese group to the U.S.

We have recently reviewed the list of American individuals and groups that have visited the PRC since the “ping pong” visit of April 1971. The Chinese appear to be keying in on three groups, at least as far as numbers and frequency of visits are concerned: Chinese-Americans, Black groups, and the “left” in the intellectual community—both students and established academics. At the same time the PRC has hosted representatives of the “establishment” in the form of the Presidential party and Congressional leaderships, certain representatives of the major media, and some science and business groups. Their objectives appear to be to undercut support for the Chinese Nationalists among Chinese-Americans, maintain their credibility (to “revolutionaries” in the PRC and abroad) as an anti-imperialist power by hosting such groups as the Black Panthers and Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars, and at the same time gain access to the mass media and to advanced American technology.

At an official level, as you know, we have suggested to Peking two non-governmental and non-exclusive channels for promoting exchanges which we have confidence in and which will avoid political problems. One is the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC; the other is the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. The Chinese have on several occasions “acknowledged” these two groups.

Most recently, in the Paris exchanges, the Chinese told Ambassador Watson’s staff that they would give favorable consideration to these two groups—even as in fact they are working to promote a press exchange and a scientific visit through other organizations (see the most recent report from Ambassador Watson at Tab A).² The media group is being handled by Thomas Manton’s America-China Relations Society, and Manton is definitely not one in whom we could have confidence. The scientific delegation is likely to be hosted by an organization formed recently by the Federation of American Scientists at the initiative of Jeremy Stone. While this latter group is more acceptable than the Manton organization, the Chinese, by encouraging Stone, are

² Attached at Tab A is telegram 15834 from Paris, August 21, describing a meeting between the PRC’s First Secretary to the Embassy in France, Ts’ao, and Watson, at which the PRC responded to a series of suggestions made by Watson on August 3 (telegram 14856 from Paris), based on instructions he received on August 2 (telegram 140058 to Paris). These messages described general approaches to exchanges between the U.S. and PRC, as well as the activities of specific delegations. (Both *ibid.*, Box 1037, Files for the President—China Material, China—Paris Channel, March 10, 1972–April 1973)

effectively undercutting the Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC, a group we have recommended to Peking. As well, Stone is lacking in staff, funds, and experience in handling visits.

We suspect that there may be divergencies of opinion with the Chinese leadership over how to promote exchanges with the U.S. While the present pattern of contacts may only reflect a desire by Peking to push as far as official U.S. sentiment will allow in dealing with “anti-establishment” groups, we do get indications of changes of mind by Chinese officials over decisions about who to deal with, and these may be a result of pressures from “leftist” elements in the leadership, or at least of the desire of Chou En-lai’s Foreign Ministry staff to avoid criticism at home that they are too “establishment oriented.”

A recent example of Chinese behavior regarding exchanges quite at variance with the Chou line is a letter received by Frederick Burkhardt, Chairman of the American Council of Learned Societies. Burkhardt had invited Kuo Mo-jo to send a Chinese delegation to an international conference on Taoism to be held in Japan this fall. Burkhardt recently received a reply to his invitation (at Tab B)³ from a Red Guard group in the Chinese Academy of Sciences which threatened to “smash his dog head” if he persisted in an alleged scheme of trying to poison the minds of the Chinese people with feudal Taoist thought. Such a letter would be laughable if it did not work against the spirit of the Shanghai communiqué in this country, and perhaps reflect the continuing influence of groups in China who are hostile to the Sino-American rapprochement.

What Might Be Done

We are still at a stage in the matter of exchanges where the present pattern has not fully hardened into precedent for the future. It seems likely that a number of official, low-key initiatives on our part could indicate to the Chinese that we have some concerns about the manner in which exchanges are developing, and perhaps stiffen the spines of those in the Peking leadership who are more inclined to promote relations with us in a balanced manner.

³ Tab B was attached to another copy of Holdridge’s memorandum. The July 25 1-page letter to “Burkheart” begins “We have received the two letters you sent us on behalf of the American Council of Learned Societies. We the Chinese people are very dubious about your purpose and intention of you sending the two letters to us.” The letter concludes, “The aggressive ambitions and schemes of the United States can never be concealed before the devil-finding mirror of Mao Tsetung thought. Here we would solemnly warn you that if you dare to play any schemes or tricks, we will certainly smash your dog head. Long live down with U.S. imperialism! Long live Mao Tsetung Thought!” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1317, Richard H. Solomon Chronological Files, February 1972)

—We might remain aloof from Jeremy Stone's current efforts to gain USG backing for his new organization. (He recently went to State in an attempt to get a guarantee on paper that the government would provide security if his organization hosted a visit by the Chinese scientists. He was given a non-committal reply. You now have before you a request from the Rockefeller Brothers Fund for your judgment on whether Stone should be given financial support.)

—You might receive sometime during the fall a small group of leaders from the Committee on Scholarly Communications with the PRC and the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. They have already requested an opportunity to meet with you. A "laying on of hands" would probably strengthen their ability to operate as effective intermediaries between the USG and private groups and individuals in promoting exchanges. (You now have before you proposed replies to the request from these two organizations for a meeting.)⁴

—You might, through your own channels, express to the Chinese in a low-key way our concern about the present trend of events relating to exchanges, and perhaps raise a question about the usefulness of the Burkhardt letter in promoting the spirit of the Shanghai Communiqué. You could also note that the Chinese, via the Paris channel, recently indicated that they are planning exchanges in the areas of science, medicine, and journalism, and also that they may send an acrobatic team to the U.S. this coming winter. You might then express the hope that at least some of these programs will be facilitated through organizations in which we have already expressed our confidence.⁵

⁴ Kissinger wrote "OK" beside this paragraph.

⁵ In a September 8 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge noted: "We have *just* learned that PRC authorities, after much waffling, have agreed to have the Committee on Scholarly Communication, the American Medical Association, and the Institute of Health of the National Academy of Science, host the visit to the U.S. later this year of a group of Chinese doctors." He added that Huang Hua had written recently to Burkhardt, stating that the letter to him was a "fake." He concluded, "these two recent developments suggest a Chinese effort to develop 'people-to-people' contacts more along the lines we have been hoping than earlier indications implied." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

249. National Security Decision Memorandum 188¹

Washington, August 30, 1972.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Chairman, NSC Under Secretaries Committee

SUBJECT

PRC Blocked Assets and Private Claims

The President has approved the Under Secretaries Committee recommendation contained in its memorandum of January 13, 1972² concerning the settlement of PRC blocked assets and private claims. Specifically, the President directs:

—That the United States should explore first, with the People's Republic of China, a lump sum settlement of the claims of American citizens for property nationalized by the PRC, to be paid either as a single payment in full or in annual installments over a period of years, in return for which the U.S. would unblock all PRC assets.

—That if the foregoing course proves non-negotiable, the U.S. should propose a settlement under which it would retain the blocked assets now under its control using them to compensate U.S. citizens for properties nationalized by the PRC.³

The President has directed that the Secretary of State, in cooperation with the Secretary of the Treasury, should prepare a negotiating

¹ Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Reds) 092, 1972. Secret; Nodis; Homer. Copies were sent to Laird and Helms.

² Document 185.

³ The administration issued one more NSDM related to China in 1972. NSDM 195, October 30, reads in part "The President has considered recommendations of the Under Secretaries Committee in its memorandum of January 13, 1972 and decided that Transportation Order T-2 should be amended to permit U.S. flag-vessels and U.S.-registered civil aircraft having a validated license from the Department of Commerce to visit the People's Republic of China." (National Archives, RG 59, General Files on NSC Matters: Lot 73 D 288, NSC-U/SM Memoranda, 1972) This information was passed to Watson in telegram 209488 to Paris, November 16. (Ibid., Central Files 1970-73, POL CHICOM-US)

scenario based upon the foregoing decision which should be submitted for his approval by September 15, 1972.⁴

Henry A. Kissinger

⁴ In a September 29 memorandum to Nixon, U. Alexis Johnson, signing for Rogers, provided both negotiating instructions, which he noted had been approved by the Secretary of the Treasury, and a list of potential members of a delegation to meet with PRC representatives. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 526, Country Files, Far East, People's Republic of China, Vol. 5) In an October 26 memorandum to Kissinger, Hormats and Holdridge suggested that he approve a cable to Watson instructing the Ambassador to approach Huang Chen about holding "a general exchange of views on this problem." The United States hoped to avoid discussing individual cases early in the negotiations. (Ibid., Box 529, Homer, US–PRC Negotiations, Paris) After being approved without change by Kissinger, telegram 198579, November 1, relayed the instructions to Watson. After presenting the U.S. proposal to Huang Chen, Watson reported in telegram 21031 from Paris, November 8, that the "PRC appears in no hurry for early meeting and may ask for more information before agreeing to face-to-face discussions." (Both *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US)

250. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, September 7, 1972.

SUBJECT

Impending Chinese Wheat Purchase from the U.S. and Possible Snags

The Chinese seem to be actively buying foreign wheat at this time for their own domestic use, and one nearly-consummated purchase consists of 400,000 tons of U.S. wheat via a French trading firm. The Chinese have indicated to the French firm, however, that they are very concerned about possible publicity surrounding the purchase. The present memo reviews this particular transaction on the assumption that you might wish to raise the matter of publicity about the sale with the Chinese via your own channels in order to minimize misunderstanding.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Secret. Initialed by Holdridge and Solomon and concurred in by Hormats.

The Sale

Representatives of the U.S. firm of Louis Dreyfus Corporation of New York met with Secretary of Agriculture Butz and Dick Solomon of your staff on Thursday September 7.² They said that the Chinese had approached their sister firm in France, Louis Dreyfus et Cie., Paris, about a wheat purchase of up to a million tons. Representatives of the French firm went to Peking (where they have now been for three weeks) and indicated to the Chinese that a purchase of that magnitude would mean buying wheat from the U.S. The Chinese said that they wanted to buy the wheat, but indicated in a variety of ways that they wish to sweep under the rug the fact that it was produced in America. They have requested more costly shipping arrangements and unusual procedures in documenting the sale which would tend to obscure the fact that the wheat was shipped from the U.S.

At the point at which the negotiation was near consummation, a Chinese political official entered the discussions in Peking and complained to the French trading representatives that, 1) the PRC is annoyed at the recent change in U.S. subsidy policy, which they claim was done purposefully to harm their interests; 2) they are upset at what they claim was an August 20 statement by Secretary Butz circulated in the press impugning the veracity of Chinese claims about their level of grain production; and 3) PRC authorities are concerned that President Nixon will give highly visible publicity to a grain sale to the PRC for domestic political purposes.

Subsequent to this political intervention, a sale of 400,000 tons was nevertheless consummated with the French firm, which through its American sister firm has now purchased most of the volume of wheat in the U.S. Representatives of the French firm have been asked by the Chinese to remain in Peking, apparently because additional purchases are desired. According to Department of Agriculture procedures, the sale—to be eligible for governmental subsidy—must be registered at the USDA within 5 business days after its conclusion. Such registration, which will take place next Monday (September 11), will make the deal public information, although it is not certain that the press will pick up the fact of the transaction right away.

Raising the Matter with the Chinese

On the basis of the fragmentary information available to us about this sale and the negotiations associated with it, it is difficult to gauge PRC concerns about publicity. Perhaps they are hypersensitive about the impact of such a transaction on their friends and allies; perhaps

² No other record of this conversation has been found.

they don't want to appear to be "me-too-ers" with a wheat purchase so shortly after the Soviet grain sale; or perhaps they fear the implication that American wheat is saving starving Chinese. You may wish to explore with PRC authorities a number of options regarding managing the publicity about the sale. (The utility of some understanding on this matter with the Chinese is heightened by current interest on the domestic side of the White House in publicizing the wheat sale for political purposes. See the memo from John Whitaker to the President at Tab A.)³

1) Do not raise the matter with PRC authorities; let the Chinese work out their own press arrangements with the private firms involved. [*Comment*: The representatives of Dreyfus Corp. are fearful that an approach by USG officials to the PRC may sabotage the grain sale, inasmuch as formally the Chinese are negotiating with a French firm, and because they have shown great sensitivity to the publicity issue. While this concern of the American trader is understandable, we think it is naive to assume that the PRC does not believe the USG is aware of the purchase. Perhaps the various complaints which Chinese officials raised with the representatives of Dreyfus et Cie. were intended to reach USG ears. Your *not* raising the issue with the Chinese might lead to uncontrolled and offensive publicity which would damage future trade prospects.⁴

2) Work out with PRC authorities a mutually agreeable press position on the transaction. This could involve a commonly agreed upon statement at various levels of formality:

—A description of the purchase is to be issued by low-level USG authorities only if the sale becomes a visible press item. [*Comment*: Given the magnitude of the sale, and public interest in such an event in an election year, it is most unlikely that the sale would not become headline news. You might take this opportunity to educate the Chinese about the difficulties of working with our press, and urge them to be reasonably open about the purchase.]

—A low-key statement which could be issued either unilaterally in the U.S. or by both governments at a common time and at a mutually agreed-upon level.

—A Presidential statement about the sale, identifying it as a further indication of the progress being made in normalizing Sino–American relations. [In the September 7 meeting Secretary Butz expressed a preference for a Presidential statement. In view of apparent Chinese sensitivities about the matter, however, you may wish to weigh the immediate domestic advantages of such an announcement against our longer-term commercial and political relations with the PRC.]⁵

³ Attached at Tab A is an August 30 memorandum from John C. Whitaker, through John D. Ehlichman, to the President. It described the possible wheat purchase and its domestic economic and political impact.

⁴ All brackets are in the source text.

⁵ See Document 252.

251. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1972.

PARTICIPANTS

James C. H. Shen, Republic of China Ambassador to the United States
Hengli Chen, Counselor, Republic of China Embassy

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
John H. Holdridge, NSC Senior Staff Member

SUBJECT

Mr. Kissinger's Conversation with Ambassador Shen Concerning President Nixon's Meeting with Prime Minister Tanaka in Hawaii²

Mr. Kissinger explained that he was pressed for time and couldn't tell Ambassador Shen a great deal. As the Ambassador could see from the newspaper accounts of the Hawaii meeting, we had made a very strong case about our relations with Taiwan. As Mr. Tanaka had said publicly afterwards, we considered our defense treaty with the ROC as important as NATO. Mr. Kissinger commented at this point on the dubious nature of the Japanese motives, observing that the Japanese were polite but went their own way.

Ambassador Shen asked, were the Japanese polite enough to listen to what the U.S. side had to say? Mr. Kissinger replied affirmatively. What the Japanese wanted was for the U.S. to defend Taiwan, which we were happy enough to do, so that they themselves would be left alone with Peking. In that way they got the best of everything, and their investments on Taiwan would be protected. We had urged them to keep economic and cultural ties with Taiwan even if diplomatic relations were severed.

Mr. Kissinger again questioned Japanese motives in seeking to normalize relations with Peking. What they were doing was immoral. The Chinese would use them, but at the same time despise them. Also, the more they kept their connection with Taiwan, the more their reputation for unreliability would be encouraged. Mr. Kissinger indicated that he didn't know what the ROC itself wanted out of this. As for us, we had made a strong case with the Japanese on their retaining ties with Taiwan.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret; Sensitive. Kissinger and Shen met from 3:30 to 3:44 p.m. in Kissinger's office. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, Record of Schedule)

² The President met with the Japanese Prime Minister on August 31. Documentation on the meetings in Hawaii is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIX.

Ambassador Shen commented that the U.S. had evidently not tried to tell the Japanese *not* to go ahead with normalization, and had not said enough to discourage them on this score. Mr. Kissinger declared that we had, in fact, said that they were going too fast. We had tried very hard to slow them down—Secretary Rogers and the President had both brought this aspect up—but they (the Japanese) were going all out.

Ambassador Shen raised the question of whether or not the Taiwan clause had been discussed. Mr. Kissinger said that the Japanese hadn't raised it, and we ourselves had thought that we shouldn't raise it either. There had been no discussion of this subject. We felt that the Taiwan clause remained in force, and did not believe that it was a good idea to raise a question about something which was not challenged.

Ambassador Shen asked, could U.S. bases in Japan be used to defend Taiwan in an emergency? Mr. Kissinger replied that he didn't want to lie to the Ambassador and did not know the answer to this question. However, we could defend Taiwan without Japan from our aircraft carriers and from our bases on Taiwan. It was not impossible, either, that we would be able to defend Taiwan from Japan. Legally, we certainly could, and as a practical matter probably could also.

Mr. Kissinger stated that he didn't believe there would be an attack on Taiwan within the next three to five years. He did not wish to set any particular time frame; it was just that if one looked beyond five years it was impossible to predict anything. Mao would certainly die within that time span, and Chou, was who 74, would be likely to die too. Mao's death would create the most tremendous confusion, which the ROC knew very well. Chou might now be running the government, but he did not have Mao's prestige.

Ambassador Shen wondered just what kind of game it was that the Japanese were playing with Peking. Would the two work together in the nuclear field? Or by going to Peking, was Tanaka trying to improve his bargaining position with the Soviets on negotiating a peace treaty? Mr. Kissinger replied affirmatively on the latter question, but added that Tanaka was asking for something which the Soviets would not give him. Ambassador Shen asked, and Mr. Kissinger confirmed, that by this he meant the four islands to the north of Japan which the Soviets had taken after World War II.

Ambassador Shen questioned Mr. Kissinger as to whether any other countries would recognize Peking when the Japanese did so. Mr. Kissinger noted that we had even told them the concerns of leaders such as Thanom and Marcos, and had even read to the Japanese their letters expressing this concern.

Ambassador Shen wondered, had Tanaka given the impression that by having relations with Peking, Japan was absolved from its Treaty obligations with respect to the U.S.? Mr. Kissinger said no,

Tanaka had conveyed just the opposite impression. Tanaka had stressed that he would maintain Japan's treaty relationship with the U.S. But we ourselves had to be realistic, for if Japan could treat one ally in this way (the ROC), it could treat another ally similarly.

However, Mr. Kissinger continued, the Japanese had assured us that their treaty obligations would be maintained. There was no reason to doubt their words. Mr. Kissinger added that in his experience the Japanese never had anything long-range in mind—they would tell you what they wanted to do now, but didn't know what they would want to do next year.

Ambassador Shen asked, would Tanaka accept Chou En-lai's terms for normalizing relations with Japan? Mr. Kissinger expressed the opinion that Tanaka would not accept Chou's terms the first time. He would keep his cool. When Ambassador Shen surmised that the Chinese in Peking might frighten Tanaka away, Mr. Kissinger declared that it would take a lot to frighten Tanaka. He, Mr. Kissinger, wanted to assure Ambassador Shen that whatever the Japanese did, though, we would stand by the ROC.

Ambassador Shen asked, why was Tanaka plunging ahead? Mr. Kissinger speculated in reply that it was partly due to the Japanese feeling that China was their territory and partly a matter of domestic politics. The Japanese were also trying to take advantage of a commercial possibility. He felt, though, that in a few years the Japanese would surely become disenchanted with Peking.

Ambassador Shen remarked that by this time the harm would already have been done. Moreover, Tanaka was telling the Japanese people that he was going ahead without any weakening in the ties with the U.S.—that is, with the understanding if not the exact endorsement of the United States. This was his way of pacifying the disobedient elements in his own Party.

Mr. Kissinger stressed that we were not happy with the way the Japanese were treating this matter, as we had made very clear to them. They carried accounts in their press of events which never happened. Some distortions were to be expected, nothing like those which came from the Japanese. For example, in his press conference after the Hawaii meeting, Ohira had said that we had maintained Taiwan could not be defended without our bases in Japan, but nothing like this had actually happened.

The conversation closed when Mr. Kissinger was obliged to leave for another appointment.

252. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, September 8, 1972, 6:15–7:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua, PRC Mission to the UN
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Chinese Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC Staff

Dr. Kissinger: You won't believe this, but our car broke down at the airport.

Mr. Rodman insists on coming up here so he can see Mrs. Shih. [laughter]²

Ambassador Huang: He is one of your good students.

Dr. Kissinger: I wanted to review with you a number of things and also to review your latest communication, if that is agreeable to you.

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: First, I plan to tell you what I plan to discuss in Moscow.

I'm sure your allies will raise this issue of the *nuclear treaty*. I want to inform you of where we stand and what I know will happen.

When they submitted this draft to me, I asked a number of questions, which were frankly very sarcastic. To my astonishment they handed me a reply yesterday, preparatory to my visit. My questions were:

—What if there is an attack on our allies in Europe? What is the effect of this treaty?

—Second, what is the effect of this treaty if there is a war among other countries with which there is no treaty obligation but which involve a US or Soviet interest?

—Third, what is the effect of the treaty in case of an attack by the Soviet Union or the US on a country whose defeat would affect the global balance of power?

Sarcastically I said, what if we wanted to move US troops into India?

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed are talking points for this meeting.

² All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

You remember I mentioned this to you.

With respect to the first question, in the case of an attack on our allies, nuclear weapons could be used in their defense but not on the territory of the Soviet Union! I suppose this means that on the territory of allies of the Soviet Union they can be used. It was stated in a neutral form: "If such a situation arises, then both the US and USSR should proceed from the necessity to localize the use of nuclear weapons and undertake nothing that would increase the danger of our two countries mutually becoming objects of the use of nuclear weapons."

In the second situation, with respect to the defense of countries towards which neither the Soviet Union nor the US has a direct treaty obligation, the use of nuclear weapons would be totally excluded.

With respect to the third situation, and I am quoting, "which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical. . . ."

Mrs. Shih: Slowly please.

Dr. Kissinger: I don't want you to get the precise words [laughter], because I'm doing something irregular [laughter].

No, I'll repeat: "In the third situation, which the American side termed as seriously upsetting the global balance and to illustrate which a most hypothetical example of introduction of Soviet or US troops into India was used—if we assume that nuclear weapons might be used, this would devalue our treaty. The treaty should exclude this possibility. Otherwise it would be totally pointless."

They give a fourth example which we didn't ask about: when one of our allies attacks one of the Soviet Union's allies—in which case the argument will be they can use nuclear weapons against our ally!

What I will say is, we will undertake no mutual obligations. We will not make an agreement that implies a condominium. We will make no agreement which implies that only nuclear war is wrong but conventional war is acceptable. We will make no agreement which permits an attack by a major nuclear country against any other country or which limits our actions in that respect. But we are prepared to discuss universal measures to prevent war, which apply to all countries.

I do not expect that anything will occur, except a dilatory general discussion.

So I think your Government can know that the considerations you put before us have been taken seriously, and there will be no counter-proposal by us of a specific nature.

I'm covering the topics that will be discussed there. Or do you have any questions?

Ambassador Huang: Last time you mentioned that the US side is considering a "general formula" as an answer to the Soviet Union. I

wonder if what you said just now constitutes your answer, or will there be another formula?

Dr. Kissinger: This will generally be our answer.

Ambassador Huang: And what is the implication of “universal measures to prevent war, that will apply to all countries”?

Dr. Kissinger: The implication is that one cannot consider a bilateral agreement not to use nuclear weapons unless there are conditions in which there can be no attacks by major countries against smaller countries, by nuclear countries against non-nuclear countries—in short unless there are conditions that guarantee universal peace.

My personal judgment is that this is now going to end the discussion. But if they want to pursue it, we will steer it in the direction of general principles like the Shanghai Communiqué.

But in any event I will discuss it with you after I return. We will not agree to anything there.

We cannot agree to the implication of this formulation that was handed to us under any circumstances, because it would in effect give complete immunity to the chief aggressor in every circumstance that concerns us—an attack on Europe, an attack on the Middle East, or an attack on China.

The reason for the formulation about which you asked me is to have a delaying method for the discussion; it may not be heroic but it will be effective. And it will shift the subject away from what we’ve talked about here. And indeed in view of this explanation there is no need for us to make a counterproposal.

Ambassador Huang: This is all I want to ask.

Dr. Kissinger: The next subject I will discuss is *SALT*.

We will discuss on this occasion the procedures and approximate timing for the next sessions of *SALT*: we are aiming for the middle of November.

On substance, the only subject that is likely to come up is how to make the interim agreement permanent, what measures would be required.

We will also discuss the *European Security Conference* and *mutual force reduction* in Europe, primarily from the procedural point of view. And the degree to which the two should be related to each other. I think I explained it to the Prime Minister once before. We are using these negotiations on mutual force reductions primarily as a device to keep the Senate from cutting our forces unilaterally. So we are thinking of a preparatory meeting at the end of January next year, to be followed by a conference in September, which we estimate to last at least two years.

Ambassador Huang: Two years.

Dr. Kissinger: The Conference. And if your Foreign Minister comes here for the UN General Assembly he can give me advice on dilatory tactics and we can perhaps stretch it out to three years. [laughter] Two years I can do on my own!

So we do not expect any major changes in our forces in Europe until late '74 or early '75, at the earliest. And as I told the Prime Minister, we are thinking in terms of ten to fifteen percent as the maximum.

We will also discuss the *trade* issues. The Soviet Union has now made a new proposal to us on settlement of its World War II debts which is more acceptable than the previous discussion. This will make it possible to negotiate other trade arrangements, and will make it possible to find the Soviet Union eligible for some credits. If this eligibility is achieved, it will still enable us to approve individual projects, as I explained to you once before. These issues are very technical and complex, and if you are interested I will explain them to you when I return. I don't think they involve matters of high policy.

Each side of course is free to raise topics it wishes.

On *Indochina*—I think you know our views on this, and we will repeat the same views in Moscow.

This is all on our side on the Soviet trip. When I return here—I will return the evening of the 15th. I have to be in New York on the evening of the 19th, and I will be prepared to meet with you then to give you details. [He nods.]

I am going to Munich tomorrow. I had intended to attend the Olympics, but cannot now. But I will meet with the German leaders. I will see Brandt, Bahr, Barzel, Scheel, and Strauss. I will recommend to Brandt, whom I know very well, and to Scheel, what I told you—what our experiences with the People's Republic have been and that from our point of view normalization of relations would be desirable.

I understand that Scheel is coming to Peking early in October.

Ambassador Huang: I've got information that the negotiations will start very soon, but as to the specific time I am not informed. The negotiations will start in the near future.

Dr. Kissinger: Knowing Scheel and knowing your side, I do not think he will tax your abilities excessively. [The Chinese laugh, and make comments to each other.]

Ambassador Huang: "Tax your abilities"—it is difficult to translate.

Dr. Kissinger: But you understand. [They nod.]

It is not yet announced, but I wanted to tell you I will stop in London on the way back for one day, to see Heath and Home. The next day I will go to Paris to meet with the North Vietnamese. And after the meeting with the North Vietnamese I will meet with President Pompidou and then I will return home.

On Vietnam, I have read your communication with great care.³ And I personally believe that your account of the events is correct, and we regret it. Our difficulty is we have found no way of making our investigation except by asking the culprits to do the investigating. We also have to point out that—we understand the location of your ships—but it is a different situation from what is found on your borders. And an inherently more dangerous one. But we have explained this before.

With respect to the general comment at the end of your paper, we agree with the Chinese view and we are prepared to withdraw all our forces. The obstacle is not the refusal to withdraw our forces but that the North Vietnamese are demanding that we solve their political problem for them. We will make another proposal to them when I meet with them next week, on which we have worked very hard and which we have had a great difficulty in getting agreement. I will give it to you on the 19th—for your information, without any request for doing anything. We do believe that the North Vietnamese are taking a very narrow view and that this is the best time for them to settle the war. And that continuing the war can only be in the interests of countries with expansionist desires. And in that sense it is not a purely Indochinese problem.⁴

Have you any questions?

³ Huang Hua gave Peter Rodman two short messages on the evening of September 6. One message was a short inquiry about a possible visit from Senator Mansfield. The longer message reads in part: "From the U.S. messages [of August 28 and 30] it seems that the U.S. side thinks it has the right to blockade and bomb the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and attack vessels or vehicles of all kinds transporting supplies to Viet Nam. This stand cannot possibly be accepted by China." The message continued: "We recognize that the U.S. Government has made investigations on all the incidents raised in the charges and protests lodged by us. But the answers have generally been words of regret from above but allegations from below that there was cause for raising the matters but no conclusive evidence after investigations." The August 28 and 30 messages for the PRC and the message attached to Rodman's memorandum of conversation with Huang Hua, September 6, are in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Documents 152–154.

⁴ Attached but not printed is a message delivered by Kennedy to Ambassador Huang in New York on August 28:

"I have been asked to convey to you the following message for the Prime Minister in addition to our written note. There comes a time in international events when the long view must be taken. The United States side questions seriously whether it is in the Chinese interest to see the Indochina conflict seriously complicate the position of the United States Administration in light of all that it has done and is prepared to do in a global context. There are more fundamental considerations involved given this Administration's constant awareness of the dangers of modern imperialism. Accordingly, the United States side hopes that the Prime Minister would carefully consider the problem of Indochina in a broader framework. The United States will continue its earnest search for a rapid conclusion of the war on a just basis for all parties. It is clear at this point that other countries, too, have a responsibility to help speed the end of the conflict whose continuation only serves to distort the international situation."

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: The next issue is our meeting with the Japanese in Hawaii.

I have read with interest and astonishment some of the newspaper accounts which came from the Japanese side.

Ambassador Huang: You mean Prime Minister Tanaka's press conference?

Dr. Kissinger: And Ohira's. Both. You will soon have the pleasure of experiencing it yourselves.

We did not raise the issue of the Mutual Security Treaty's application to Taiwan—at all. Nor did they. We did not raise the Sato communiqué of 1969—at all. And neither did they. So all the news stories that explained that we said Taiwan is as important to us as Europe—as NATO—and that they did not agree with us, are pure invention.

Given our experience with the Japanese press, we will explain our views on Taiwan to you, and not through third parties. And they will be consistent with the Shanghai Communiqué, and with the private understandings we have.

Our position—on which you can rely—is that we will place no obstacle in the way of normalization of relations between Japan and the People's Republic. We have not asked them to delay their visit or the conclusions they want to draw from their visit. Our view is, within the framework of the communications you have sent us, we will not place any obstacle in the way of the policy that is developing unless it should take an anti-American direction—which we do not believe it has now. We believe that you conduct a long-range policy, and so do we. And we are not interested in the tactical moves that so fascinate the Japanese press.

There was also a news report that when I was in Japan I raised the issue of Korea. When I met the Foreign Minister there were ten other officials there, and when there are ten officials I say nothing.

But I shall watch the evolution of your relations with interest, especially the press relations.

Do you have any questions on this subject?

Ambassador Huang: No.

Dr. Kissinger: As a general proposition, I think in relations between us and Japan, I think it is important for both of us to not take advantage of tactical situations. We didn't, you didn't. This isn't a comment on you. It's our attitude.

I have only a few more items.

With respect to Senator Mansfield . . .

Ambassador Huang: Regarding relations between China and Japan, our side has expressed its views in former messages.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, and they are satisfactory to us.

With respect to Senator Mansfield, we understand the question which was asked from Peking. And looking into the longer future, we can see the advantage of not having individual leaders come at your invitation. On the other hand, Senator Mansfield is one of the leaders of the Senate, and very well disposed towards Chinese policy. We would therefore be prepared to send him on an official mission, so it would not be your invitation but on a mission that we could define. We would have to define the subject in such a way that it does not concern immediate foreign policy decisions.

With respect to his seeing Sihanouk, I have talked to Senator Mansfield. He will leave it up to you whether there should be a meeting with Sihanouk. He will not request it. And if he were to see Samdech Sihanouk, he would not raise the subject of his talk. Which he could not do in any event in an official capacity, since it is not our official policy.

On a similar level, a Harvard friend of mine, Professor Galbraith,⁵ is now in China. And while he is a fanatical supporter of Senator McGovern and I do not share his political views, he is a very intelligent and good man, and I would appreciate any courtesies that could be shown. And if it could be mentioned to him that I mentioned his name, it would be a courtesy.

We will replace Ambassador Watson in Paris with a good man, after the election, and a man we can rely upon.

One other rather complex problem. We hear indirectly that there are some purchases of wheat from an American corporation in France which result in increased purchases here.⁶ We welcome this. But we have a concern about the publicity. We have the following choices:

—We could leave it in the hands of the private companies and not treat it as a governmental concern—but this leaves us with no control over the publicity.

—Or we could respond in a governmental capacity. But then there is the question of what to say and at what level. We will respect your wishes in this.

[To Rodman]: Make sure no cables on this go out. Tell Butz to keep his Department shut up. Have Haig do this.

I repeat: We have no interest in this except to be sure there is correct treatment of your concerns.

⁵ Harvard University economist and former Ambassador to India (1961–1963) John Kenneth Galbraith.

⁶ See Document 250.

Ambassador Huang: On this question I have no instructions from Peking. I doubt whether the said trade item would be carried on.

Dr. Kissinger: We are not recommending it or the opposite. We are only concerned with [what happens] if it occurs. If it does and it is an indirect purchase, we will not volunteer anything in any event.

We will do nothing further if we hear nothing from you. There is no particular need for a response unless you need to.

While I'm gone, Mr. Lord and Commander Howe are with me on the trip. Peter Rodman and General Haig are in Washington. And we have immediate communications.

I'm keeping Peter home from Moscow so the next time I go to Peking he can go with me.

Ambassador Huang: I hear that General Haig is promoted.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he will be made Vice-Chief of the Army.

Ambassador Huang: At the same time he will still be your assistant?

Dr. Kissinger: No, for two more months he will be my assistant. It will be a terrible loss to me. But I was instrumental in obtaining this for him. So it is for the good of the country.

Ambassador Huang: Please convey my personal congratulations to him.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you. It will leave a big hole in my staff.

Those are all the items I have for you today.

Ambassador Huang: Do you leave today?

Dr. Kissinger: I leave tomorrow morning.

Ambassador Huang: I will report what you said to Prime Minister Chou En-lai.

I know how busy you are, so I won't keep you any longer.

Dr. Kissinger: When is your UN delegation coming?

Ambassador Huang: In a couple of weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: You'll have a vacation afterwards?

Ambassador Huang: I hope so. Will you?

Dr. Kissinger: We will be organizing a new administration.

Ambassador Huang: Are there any new developments in the Middle East?

Dr. Kissinger: I think until the election things will be fairly quiet.

I don't think the Soviet Union knows exactly what to do. In fact I think precision of thought is not an attribute of anyone in the Middle East.

[The meeting adjourned with warm handshakes.]

253. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, September 19, 1972, 6:17–7:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the UN
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman, NSC

Dr. Kissinger: I thought, as I indicated to you, I would give you a brief summary of my trip to your ally.

Ambassador Huang: Ally!

Dr. Kissinger: First, you have seen the communiqué, I'm sure. It was printed in the *New York Times*. You must have read it. But I have a copy here for you. [Tab A]²

Ambassador Huang: I have read it.

Dr. Kissinger: Let me talk about the major item first, that is not in the communiqué. First, on that nuclear treaty we have been discussing, I handed over a paper which listed all our objections—of which this is a copy. [Hands over paper at Tab B.]³ It says we will do nothing that creates a condominium. We will do nothing that creates a right to attack others with nuclear weapons. We will do nothing to legitimize

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

² Attached at Tab A but not printed is the joint announcement made at the conclusion of Kissinger's September 10–14 visit to the USSR. The text is in Department of State *Bulletin*, October 9, 1972, p. 398. All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

³ Attached at Tab B but not printed is an undated paper entitled "Prevention of Nuclear War," as well as a copy of a September 13 "Soviet note" discussing a resolution for the "non-use of force in international relations and on the prohibition for all time of the use of nuclear weapons." See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 155 and 156. The PRC responded in a message given to V. James Fazio, Deputy Director of the White House Situation Room, on September 26. The four-part statement reads in part: "1. The Soviet proposal is a hoax aimed at hoodwinking public opinion and masking its policy of nuclear monopoly and nuclear threat. 2. The Chinese side has always stood for strict differentiation between the aggressor and the victim of aggression, and opposed sweeping generalization on the non-use of force." Point three declared that the Soviet goal was to "keep nuclear weapons permanently in their hands and develop them continuously." Point four noted that the PRC intended to "expose and refute" the Soviet proposal in the United Nations General Assembly. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 159.

conventional war. And we will do nothing to undermine existing security arrangements.

They had given me answers to some questions, which I gave you last time. This led to a very passionate discussion on their part. And at the end, on my last day there, Gromyko told me they would submit to the UN a proposal in this field, and that they hoped we would not join you in opposing it. We said we didn't know your position, and didn't know what you would do, but we would almost certainly oppose it. And we would not agree at the UN to something we wouldn't agree to bilaterally. But we only received the formal proposal yesterday, as you did.

I don't know what position you will take, but we will not support it. That is where we stand on this nuclear discussion with the Soviet Union. As far as we are concerned, we will take no further steps.

On a European Security Conference and mutual balanced force reductions: As you know, we had taken the position that a European Security Conference should not take place in isolation from mutual balanced force reductions. We took this position because we did not want to take the position that tension in Europe could be dealt with by mere abstract discussion, and because we thought focusing attention on actual Soviet forces in Europe would bring home to our allies the extent of their danger.

The Soviet leaders then handed me a note in which they made a concrete proposal:

—that a preparatory conference for a European Security Conference begin in Helsinki November 22 and that the Conference itself begin work in Helsinki in late June 1973.

—that a preparatory conference on Mutual Force Reduction should begin in late January 1973 and that the Conference itself should start in September or October 1973.

We are now discussing that with our allies. We are disposed to accept it, because it has the practical consequence that there will be discussions on force reductions not before September 1973 and therefore it will keep our Congress from making unilateral reductions throughout 1973. And we don't anticipate that the Conference will have results in less than one or two years.

And in any event, as I told the Prime Minister and as I told you last time, the maximum we are considering is 10 or 15%.

[At this point Dr. Kissinger asked that additional cups be provided so that tea could be served. Mr. Rodman brought the cups and hors d'oeuvres, and Dr. Kissinger poured.]

We also had some discussions on strategic arms limitations, and we agreed tentatively that this conference starts on November 15. That date will not be announced until about October 15. So don't tell it to

the Japanese before then. [The Ambassador chuckled.] Because they always talk to the press; you don't.

The first phase of the conference will discuss general principles, and no precise proposals. The general problem we will discuss—which we have not yet decided in our own government—is whether to concentrate on numerical limits or whether to include limits on technological improvements. But frankly, we did not think they were very well prepared.

And as our own thinking progresses, we will keep you informed on how our attitude develops. We have not yet decided whether to concentrate on numerical limits or whether to include qualitative limitations.

On trade, we settled in principle the issue of Soviet wartime debts. We agreed in principle on a figure of \$500 million plus interest of about 3%, which will bring it to a figure of about \$725 million—to be paid by the year 2001. It will not reduce our national debt significantly! There are many other technical provisions which I don't think are of any interest to the Ambassador.

In the field of trade, we will find the Soviet Union eligible for Export-Import credits and Most Favored Nation status, and they will grant us business facilities and normal international machinery for arbitration of disputed claims, and some provision against market disruption.

Some Soviet journalist said we will give credits of \$5 billion. That is total nonsense. The first credit will be \$150 million, and no significant increase is planned. But I think we both know who Victor Louis works for.

They expressed very great interest in investment in their natural gas fields and other resources. We will set up a mechanism to study this problem, but we will not invest any substantial governmental funds.

This is an outline of the trade agreement which I think we will conclude within the next month.

There was some discussion on the admission of the two Germanies to the United Nations. Our position is that if the two German states make an agreement with each other to settle their relationships, then after the signature of the treaty we will agree to observer status for the German Democratic Republic, and then after the treaty is ratified we will agree to the membership of the two German States. This is the position of the Bonn Government, and we are supporting that.

We also discussed Vietnam, which followed familiar lines.

There was a discussion on the last day on our relationship with China, initiated by the Soviet Union. They asked us whether we were

cooperating with you against them, and what our position was on the border question. We said that you had never raised the border question with us, and therefore we had no occasion to take a position on the border question. And secondly, that our relationships concerned primarily bilateral issues.

They expressed some concern that you and Japan might concert together against white people. We said we had no evidence of that, and indeed evidence of the contrary, and that with respect to Japan existing relationships should be maintained. They said that if they increased their activity in Japan, it would not be directed against the United States. And they also engaged in a long discussion of the Mongolian air accident of last year, and that you wanted them and us to engage in conflict.

That was the extent of that conversation.

We said we had no news about your internal situation because we dealt only with one group of leaders and didn't know about anybody else. And that you had never urged us to be in the position of conflict with the Soviet Union. On the contrary.

The discussion didn't have any particular point. I mean, they didn't ask us to do anything.

Now, leaving Moscow, I talked with German leaders about their relation with you. But I gather that is in good shape and requires no extensive discussion with us.

On Vietnam, as you know, I had another meeting with the Vietnamese in Paris. As I told you last time, I am giving you my opening statement as well as our formal proposal we made to them. [Tab C]⁴ For the information of the Prime Minister.

Now we believe this proposal goes to the absolute limit of what we can do. You probably have your own judgment of our domestic situation and you will be able to report it to Peking, but we are not under the impression that we are under any domestic pressure on this issue.

You will see from this proposal we are prepared to withdraw very rapidly all our forces, that we agree to the creation of committees to supervise elections in which the NLF has equal representation with the Saigon Government, and that this same committee can review the Constitution, and revise it.

This is one way of approaching it. Of course, the simplest way of approaching it would be a ceasefire, which they tell us is only a military act—but in fact it would create de facto control by the NLF in their

⁴ Attached at Tab C but not printed is the 8-page opening statement and the 10-point proposal. See *ibid.*, Document 161.

areas and by the Saigon Government in its areas, and would constitute a de facto allocation of political power. What we cannot do and in no circumstances will do is for us to destroy the people we have been associated with. We will agree on a natural evolution but we will not engage in such an immoral act.

We are now beginning a very intensive period of discussions. I am meeting with them next week. If they were Chinese I am certain we would reach an agreement. I'm quite serious. When we settled with you, we agreed on things that could be settled immediately and on things that could happen over a period of time. And we're prepared to do the same with them. I shall meet, as I said, next week, and maybe for two days. And if they would accept some approach like this, we would settle very quickly.

The only other issue I have is, you have asked us about keeping Bangladesh off the agenda of the UN. We will reply to you formally, but we cannot do that because of our position of favoring the admission of Bangladesh. But we will handle it in a low key, with a minimum of drama, and we will work to keep it from being a very active issue. During the debate, first, we will stress that it should be handled routinely, and secondly, we will emphasize the great importance we attach to prompt implementation of last year's Security Council resolutions.

That is all I have.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for what you have told us. We will convey this.

[The Ambassador took out a paper and began to read.]

In our past conversations, the Chinese side dwelt on the question of Korea. The Chinese side understands the complexity of the Korean question, as well as the peculiar situation in which the United States finds itself this year, and does not intend to embarrass the United States. It is China's policy and wish to see the situation in the Far East as a whole, and move towards relaxation. The US side may note that there are essential differences between the 28-nation draft resolution and previous similar draft resolutions, and that the present draft resolution takes into account the new situation that has emerged in the Far East and on the Korean peninsula, and strives to bring the two different sides closer.

If there are any questions that are not clear, the US may raise them at any time.

The Chinese side believes that discussion of the new draft resolution on the Korean question at the current session of the UN General Assembly would help to ease the atmosphere and promote mutual understanding between the parties concerned. However, if there should be insistent opposition to the inclusion of the new draft resolution on

the Korean question in the agenda, it would most probably give rise to controversy right at the beginning of this session, and thus benefit a certain big power which is unwilling to see the easing of the situation in Asia.

As for concrete arrangements, the Chinese side takes a flexible attitude. If discussion at an early date should cause certain inconveniences to the US side, arrangements for the discussion to be held at a time after November could also be considered. By then, the worries on the US side would no longer exist, and it would be able to take the initiative in advancing its positive propositions. It is hoped that the US side will give earnest consideration to the above views and take the necessary corresponding actions.

I am instructed to tell the US side . . .

Dr. Kissinger: May I ask a question? Concretely, what does it mean? Does it mean you would agree to a postponement of the discussion only if we agree to a discussion? Or does it mean you would agree to postpone the discussion and we would remain free to take any position we wanted?

Ambassador Huang: Our consideration is that if an early discussion will cause inconvenience to the US side, then arrangements can be made to hold the discussion after the November election.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Ambassador Huang: By then the worries on the US side will no longer exist, and you would be able to take the initiative in advancing positive propositions.

Dr. Kissinger: I won't embarrass you. I understand.

If there is a discussion now, we will take the position that the whole discussion should be deferred to next year. If the discussion is postponed to November, we might still take the position that it should be deferred. This of course we would prefer.

Ambassador Huang: We have told you our position.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. Let me take this up with our Ambassador. I will not take it up with anyone other than the Ambassador and he will be in touch with you. We understand your point, and we appreciate the spirit in which it is advanced.

Ambassador Huang: Our view is that discussion of this question should no longer be deferred.

Dr. Kissinger: I understand.

Ambassador Huang: The timing of the discussion, it can be held until after November. If the US side has positive proposals, you can raise them.

Dr. Kissinger: We understand. We will have to consider.

Ambassador Huang: The above is the first item I'm instructed to convey.

The second item: Not long ago, Prasit Kanchanawat, Deputy Director of the Thai Division of Economics and Finance, accompanied . . . [Mrs. Shih stops and spells the name again slowly.]

Dr. Kissinger: I was afraid our planes had flown over a Chinese town named that!

Ambassador Huang: . . . accompanied the Thai table tennis delegation to Peking, where he met Premier Chou En-lai and other Chinese officials. Both sides expressed the hope that relations between China and Thailand could be somewhat improved. Although it is not possible to restore state relations at the moment, trade contacts may start first. The Chinese side welcomes people from Thai economic circles to visit China, and holds that this is not only in the interests of the peoples of China and Thailand but also conducive to the relaxation of the situation in Southeast Asia.

The third item: The small amount of wheat recently purchased from a French company is for the adjustment of our grain varieties, and we had not thought of making it public. It is reported that there are some in the United States who have utilized and played up the matter, and deliberately put the agricultural situation in China on a par with that of the Soviet Union. This will only bring harm to such normal trade contacts. It is hoped that Dr. Kissinger would use his influence to forestall or minimize recurrences of such things. We also have trade contacts with American businessmen. We still believe that with the progressive development towards normalization of Sino-US relations there will be corresponding development in trade between the two countries.⁵

Fourth . . .

Dr. Kissinger: May I make a comment? The first time I heard about this agricultural deal was the day before I took it up with you. It is not our governmental judgment to make your agricultural situation on a par with that of the Soviet Union. It is not, however, our governmental situation to know about these matters. If you can let us know in advance, it will help prevent such in the future. It is not a formal request. Just in order for us to be helpful. It is not in our interest to give publicity to these matters.

Ambassador Huang: The fourth item: Having been kindly notified that Senator Mansfield would come to China for a formal visit in an official capacity, we still hope to be informed in concrete terms of the tasks for Senator Mansfield's visit.

⁵ See Document 250.

The above are the four items I am instructed to convey to you.

Now I would like to tell you in a personal capacity about the exchanges between our two countries—the people-to-people exchanges. The Chinese side has informed the US side through the Paris channel that the Chinese medical delegation intends to visit the United States in October. The Chinese scientists' delegation plans to visit this country in the latter part of November or the beginning of December. And the Chinese acrobatic troupe may visit the United States by the end of December.⁶

Dr. Kissinger: Have we been notified of all these?

Ambassador Huang: Yes, already. Well, when I got the information, I knew you were already informed through the Paris channel. At the beginning, probably Ambassador Watson was absent.

Dr. Kissinger: I will catch up with this.

Ambassador Huang: We will continue to contact the US side through the Paris channel on the concrete details for the visit of the three delegations to the US, and the US Government is again requested to assist in insuring their security during their visit.

And Dr. Kissinger might know that the visit to the United States of the Chinese scientists' delegation was agreed upon between the two sides when the delegation of the Federation of American Scientists extended an invitation to the Chinese scientists during the visit of the Federation delegation to China last summer. The Federation has already made some preparations. However, as the US side has recommended the US Committee on Scholarly Communication with the PRC as an organization for regular reception of visiting Chinese science and scholarly delegations, the Chinese side will not get involved in the internal relations between various US organizations. The Chinese side wishes to know if it is practicable for the Federation and the Committee to collaborate in receiving the Chinese scientists' delegation, or if it is convenient to the US side for the Federation alone to receive the delegation. For the Chinese side, both ways are acceptable. The Chinese side hopes to hear the views of the US side as soon as possible, either in Paris or in New York, so as to give a formal reply to the Federation of American Scientists.

Dr. Kissinger: We appreciate this personal information, Mr. Ambassador.

First, with respect to security, we will make the maximum effort, and in addition we will make every effort to see that every courtesy is extended.

⁶ See Document 248.

I would appreciate it as a personal courtesy if the Ambassador could let me know any recommendations he may have for how to make our Chinese visitors more comfortable here. This is not an official request, but on a personal basis. But we will take it extremely seriously.

Ambassador Huang: We will respect the arrangements by the US side for the visit, for the reception of the visit.

Dr. Kissinger: We will have an answer on the scientists' visit within a week and we will let you know through this channel.

Ambassador Huang: Just now we discussed the Korean question and I'd like to give you a copy of the draft resolution sponsored by 28 nations. [Tab D]⁷ This is just for your information.

Dr. Kissinger: [reads it] I don't think we will agree to every paragraph.

Ambassador Huang: Just now you mentioned Gromyko's proposal for inclusion in the agenda for renunciation of force and prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. We also received it very late and have not made a study of it. They have a very bad habit—always a surprise attack!

Dr. Kissinger: We will keep you informed but I can tell you now we will not support it. We have not decided on our tactical procedure but we will not agree to the substance.

Ambassador Huang: That's all.

Dr. Kissinger: Two things. You know that everything we do bilaterally with the Soviet Union we are prepared to do with you. We are not requesting it, but you should know there is no discrimination. We are prepared to do exactly the same thing with you. After the election we would be prepared to have a long range discussion of what we see as the problems over the next three-to-four years, before we freeze our policy.

Secondly, speaking of Gromyko, he will come to Washington as he does every year, for one day, on October 2.

You have a standing invitation too, but you won't come!

Ambassador Huang: It is not very convenient.

Dr. Kissinger: I was at a press party the other night and someone said to me, don't you speak kindly of anyone except the Chinese?

Ambassador Huang: On Bangladesh—tomorrow at 3:00 p.m. will be a meeting of the General Committee.

⁷ Attached at Tab D but not printed is the "Draft Resolution: Creation of favourable conditions to accelerate the independent and peaceful reunification of Korea." See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 158.

Dr. Kissinger: My people tell me you'll lose the vote. But my people told me last year we would win a certain vote!

Ambassador Huang: If it loses in the General Committee, it will come up again in the plenary meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: Before or after November?

Ambassador Huang: On the 22nd, immediately after.

Dr. Kissinger: Will you fire many cannons?

Ambassador Huang: Not many.

Dr. Kissinger: We will tell our Ambassador not to use any adjectives. [Laughter]

You will not have reinforcements in the first part of the General Assembly?

Ambassador Huang: I want to tell you that Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua will arrive in New York either the 30th of September or October 1. The information we've got now is he will arrive the 30th of September.

Dr. Kissinger: I will not mention it.

Ambassador Huang: We've already informed the US delegation.

Dr. Kissinger: I hope I can invite him to dinner when he's here, on some occasion, and of course, the Ambassador as well.

Ambassador Huang: I will certainly convey this to him.

Dr. Kissinger: We can renegotiate the Shanghai Communiqué! We spent many nights together.

[Word was received that the Ambassador's car had arrived. The group got up and shook hands.]

Dr. Kissinger: I wish I could wish you a productive session. Let us hope for an amicable session.

Ambassador Huang: There will be controversy.

[The meeting ended.]

254. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 3, 1972, 8:30–9:20 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Huang Hua
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua
Notetaker

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Peter W. Rodman

Dr. Kissinger: Did you give us hell today in the General Assembly? [Laughter]² Please give my best regards to your Vice Foreign Minister.

Ambassador Huang: I have already conveyed your regards to him.

Dr. Kissinger: He was very kind to my friend Professor Galbraith.

If he is free sometime while he is here, I'd be glad to invite him to dinner.

Ambassador Huang: On the 5th, the Vice Foreign Minister will have an informal dinner on the invitation of Secretary Rogers.³ Ambassador Bush will also take part. Tentatively, he'll stay here 10 days or 2 weeks.

Dr. Kissinger: So he won't be here very long.

Ambassador Huang: He appreciates your invitation very much. As to the concrete time, we can discuss.

Dr. Kissinger: We have not fully normalized relations with the State Department, so I may not be able to attend that dinner. But we will have our Cultural Revolution after the election. [Laughter] And we will not let 100 flowers bloom before then! [Laughter]

I am sorry I made you come at a bad time for you. But I'm going to Paris soon, so it's very busy for me.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

² All brackets except those indicating declassification decisions are in the source text.

³ A record of the October 5 dinner for Vice Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua is in telegram 3725/Secto 65 from USUN, October 6. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CHICOM–US) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Document 160.

Ambassador Huang: We have a message. It's nothing particular. It's about the visit by Prime Minister Tanaka.⁴ The message is [reading]:

"The results of the Sino-Japanese high-level meeting can be seen from the September 29 Sino-Japanese Joint Statement and the Foreign Minister's interview with the press. The Foreign Minister wanted to hold an interview as Dr. Kissinger had done in Shanghai. As pointed out in the Joint Statement, the normalization of Sino-Japanese relations is not directed against third countries. Neither should seek hegemony in the Asia-Pacific region. It not only is in the interests of the two peoples but is also conducive to the relaxation of tension in Asia and the safeguarding of world peace. We trust that the U.S. side holds the same view.

"The Sino-Japanese talks embodied the spirit of the August 14 message sent by the Chinese side to Dr. Kissinger. The Chinese side expressed that it respected the relations between Japan and the United States. Although the Chinese side has its own views about the Japan-U.S. Security Treaty, it did not make any demands.

"In his September 19 message, Dr. Kissinger mentioned the Soviet side's concerns over Sino-Japanese relations. Actually that was merely a pretext used by the Soviet Union to sow discord between Sino-U.S., U.S.-Japanese, and Sino-Japanese relations. The U.S. side has probably noted these Soviet intentions.

"With regard to the question of Taiwan, besides severing its diplomatic relations with Taiwan, the Japanese side pledged that it would not support the Taiwan independence movement and that it had no ambitions towards Taiwan. The Chinese side expressed appreciation for this. The Japanese side expressed the hope that its economic links with Taiwan would not be cut immediately, and the Chinese side answered that allowance could be made on the matter but that there should be advance consultations.

"The Chinese side wishes to point out here that under the new circumstances of the establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Japan, it appears that the Chiang Kai-shek clique may not dare to create major troubles but there will be minor ones. We believe that since the U.S. troops in Taiwan have not yet been withdrawn, the

⁴ A September 28 memorandum for the record by Lord reads in full: "At 10:50 p.m. this evening, Mrs. Shih called me from New York and read me the following message: 'The Chinese and Japanese sides have already reached an agreement on the normalization of relations between the two countries, and the ceremony for the signing of the Sino-Japanese Joint Statement was held at 10:00 a.m. Peking time, September 29, in Peking. The full text will be published immediately thereafter. Neither the agreement nor the statement is directed against 3rd countries.' I thanked Mrs. Shih for her message and said I would transmit it immediately to my leader." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges)

United States will still be responsible for actions taken by Taiwan. The Chinese side has noted that during the September 8 meeting Dr. Kissinger reaffirmed the pledges the U.S. side has made on the Taiwan question.

“Besides, the Japanese side expressed concern over the Soviet attempt to expand its spheres of influence into this region. The Chinese side pointed out that Taiwan Province belongs to China, that China will liberate Taiwan, and that of course the Soviet Union cannot be allowed to reach out its hands.”

That’s all of the message I am entrusted to convey.

Dr. Kissinger: We appreciate the message and the spirit which it reflects. As I told you before, we have placed no obstacles in the way of normalization. And in the spirit of understanding of each other’s requirements, we see no long-term danger to us in this normalization. Indeed, Japan is traveling on a road which it is our intention to take ourselves.

Now, as long as we are here, let me raise a few additional matters.

First, about the visit of Foreign Minister Gromyko. We have had a number of formal requests to inform the Soviet leaders what we know about the Tanaka conversations in Peking. And what attitude we would take in case of a Sino-Japanese alliance. We have answered that the second issue does not arise, that is, the alliance, and that with respect to the first, we thought the communiqué covered the subject.

Secondly, Gromyko brought yet another version of this nuclear treaty. Every time we turn it down we get another version. It’s the same as the old one except that it includes a phrase that there should be no attack on third countries. I’m assuming your position remains the same. We have not replied.

We expect to conclude a Maritime Treaty with the Soviet Union this week, and a trade agreement next week or the week after, but it will contain the provisions I’ve already told you. I think I gave you the package—it’s a combination of Lend-Lease, technical facilities, and certain credit arrangements.

I want to make a comment at the end about Vietnam, but let me first raise a few other items.

We have some very sensitive intelligence information in which a very senior Indian official made the following comment: “China should not forget that the Tibetan question has not been resolved and that dissident movements in this vast plateau are still numerous. The refugees we have welcomed from these icy and inhospitable highlands adjust poorly to the heat of the large tropical valleys of India.”

This is an extremely sensitive comment of a very high Indian official.

Ambassador Huang: That is like the language of a writer.

Dr. Kissinger: I give it to you exactly as we received it.

I had a talk with Sir Alec Douglas-Home and he is looking forward to his visit to the Prime Minister. I've explained to him what I believe Chinese concerns are about maintaining the strength and unity of Europe and he is prepared to talk to you in a forthcoming spirit.

With respect to Senator Mansfield: If we send him to the People's Republic, we'd like him to discuss our longer-term relationship, from a philosophical point of view, especially the field of exchanges and the general atmosphere of our relations. We believe it would be useful on the other hand that we conduct a more detailed exchange of views on concrete aspects of our relationship in our channel, by whatever method you would prefer. Because as we begin a second term we want to discuss the long term issues—relations with the Soviets, and so forth. And we wouldn't want Mansfield to get into that.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have any views on the manner in which we would exchange views in this channel?

Dr. Kissinger: We're prepared to send another mission to China—or any other proposal you might care to make.

Ambassador Huang: Do you have any concrete ideas of that mission?

Dr. Kissinger: This is informal now. I think that the first set of talks we had, except the last one, really dealt with the immediate issue of normalization. This time, as we think longer ahead, as we see Soviet moves and other things taking place, before we settle our policy we would like to exchange views with the Prime Minister or whomever he designates. I think in early January—or any time before the inauguration—we would send a group of the same nature as the previous groups—except that Peter Rodman will be part of the group!

Ambassador Huang: So you will go there personally?

Dr. Kissinger: I'd be prepared to go there, yes. Assuming I'm reappointed. [Laughter] I would be prepared to go there personally, yes.

Ambassador Huang: We will convey this back.⁵

⁵ On October 12 the PRC representatives in New York handed over the following message. "1. The Chinese side agrees in principle to the idea put forward by Dr. Kissinger on October 3 about the U.S. side sending a mission to China to discuss the prospects of the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations. Premier Chou En-lai welcomes Dr. Kissinger to come personally again on this mission to China. The specific date of the visit can be discussed and decided upon through this channel after being suggested by the U.S. side. 2. The U.S. side is aware of the position of the Chinese side on the Viet Nam question. The Chinese side hopes that the U.S. and Vietnamese sides will be able to reach an agreement on the settlement of the Viet Nam question." The message is attached to James Fazio's memorandum for the record, October, 13, *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 161.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Prime Minister has other ideas, we will of course examine them carefully.

Ambassador Huang: What is Inauguration Day?

Dr. Kissinger: January 20. It doesn't absolutely have to be before then but there are certain advantages.

Now a word about Vietnam. We have had a two-day meeting last week. I'm returning for a three-day meeting next Sunday, Monday, and Tuesday. And as you know, my deputy General Haig is in Saigon now. We will make, on this occasion, the most generous offer of which we are capable. But it is absolutely our last offer. And if this offer is rejected then we have to conclude, reluctantly, that a political solution is impossible.

We will maintain all the proposals with which you are already familiar, and expand some portions of them.

On Sunday we will convey our proposal to you after we have conveyed it to Hanoi, so you will see it.⁶

Mrs. Shih: On Sunday?

Dr. Kissinger: On Sunday we'll call.

We're seriously interested to end the war. Not because of the elections—we do not need it for elections. But we have also our principles. And it cannot be in anybody's interest that we adopt the position that we will betray our friends or other countries completely, or at all. We have in our relations started a process the implications of which were quite clear to us when I visited Peking in 1971. But you gave us an opportunity to maintain our honor and our principles.

I do not know what your relationships are with North Vietnam, and as I told the Prime Minister, we prefer closer relations between you and North Vietnam than for the Soviet Union to have a major influence there. But this is the decisive moment for peace. They have made some proposals which go in a positive direction, though not far enough. If this opportunity is now missed, I can only see expanded conflict. And after the elections, you know as well as I do that we are domestically in a very strong position.

I go there in a constructive spirit, in order to end the war and to start a new relationship. And you are in a position to judge what advice if any you may want to offer in these circumstances.

We will call you Saturday to fix a time for delivering this document.

⁶ Fazio delivered a message to New York on Sunday, October 8. The materials delivered to PRC diplomats have not been found. The message is attached to Fazio's memorandum for the record, October 9, in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 165.

Ambassador Huang: All right.

Dr. Kissinger: That is all that I have, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: Will you return back to the U.S. on the 10th of October?

Dr. Kissinger: About the 10th.

If there should be a very important development, I might go on to Saigon. But my plan is to return here the 10th. In my absence, you can call Commander Howe, because I have Mr. Lord with me. And I may take General Haig with me this time too.

Ambassador Huang: I appreciate that you have arranged this meeting, and we will certainly convey what you gave us, and we will convey your regards to the Vice Foreign Minister.

We will have to arrange a time after you return, for a meeting.

Dr. Kissinger: I call him "Mr. X" because I can't pronounce his name.

Ambassador Huang: The sounds in it are like German!

Dr. Kissinger: I always confuse the nuance between his name [Chiao] and the Prime Minister's [Chou]!

A word about your meeting with the Secretary of State. For a number of reasons he knows nothing at all about our exchanges, nor about the details of the Vietnam negotiations. So if there should be a discrepancy between what I have said and what you may hear, you should guide yourselves by what I have said. But you have experience with this situation already.

Ambassador Huang: There's no fixed item for the talks. The two sides haven't raised any questions to talk about.

Dr. Kissinger: I will look into it.

Good. Can we call the car? [The car is called.]

Were there any films made of my June visit?

Ambassador Huang: I don't know. I will check.

Dr. Kissinger: I showed the film of my July visit to the Soviet Ambassador. It was not one of his best moments!

We have found it impossible to turn down this treaty. We have had four versions now! I thought when we turned it down in Moscow we would end it.

With respect to their proposal at the UN, by the way, we will oppose it.

Ambassador Huang: In today's speech by our Vice Foreign Minister, Mr. Chiao Kuan-hua, he made a clear exposition of our position.

Dr. Kissinger: How did Mr. Malik behave? Was he calm?

Ambassador Huang: We'll see his reaction tomorrow.

Dr. Kissinger: He will speak tomorrow?

Ambassador Huang: He has not entered his name yet.

Dr. Kissinger: The Vice Foreign Minister has the ability to raise the blood pressure of the Soviet Ambassador.

Mrs. Shih, is your husband here in New York?

Mrs. Shih: Yes. He speaks French.

Dr. Kissinger: Your mission is getting larger.

Ambassador Huang: We need many interpreters, because many comrades, colleagues, don't speak a foreign language.

Dr. Kissinger: When we arrange a meeting with the Vice Foreign Minister, let us know whether we should have other people there or just have a small working group.

Ambassador Huang: Who would you have in mind?

Dr. Kissinger: It is up to you. We could invite my friend Governor Rockefeller. I would check with you first. I would not invite anyone without checking with you first.⁷

[The Ambassador's car then arrived and the meeting ended with friendly handshakes.]

⁷ Kissinger and Nelson Rockefeller hosted a dinner for Ch'iao Kuan-hua, Huang Hua, and other PRC diplomats on the evening of November 13 in New York. A memorandum of conversation is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 166.

255. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, October 6, 1972.

SUBJECT

Transfer of Submarine to the Republic of China

Secretary Laird has asked your approval of the transfer of two submarines to the Republic of China (Tab B).² Secretary Laird refers to your

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for action. Concurred in by Pinckney. Written by hand above Kissinger's name are the words "Haig for."

² Attached at Tab B but not printed is Laird's September 13 memorandum.

memorandum of July 10, 1972 asking him to bring the question up again in September (Tab C).³

You told Ambassador Kennedy in your memorandum of last July 24 that we intended to honor the commitment which he made, on the President's authority, to the ROC a year ago to transfer a submarine (Tab D).⁴ Secretary Laird, we understand, committed us to the Congress to transfer a total of two submarines to the ROC.

Secretary Laird states that the U.S. Navy has earmarked two active fleet submarines which would otherwise be retired for transfer to the ROC: the first for formal transfer on December 31, 1972 (although it would be available for ROC use in October), and the second on June 30, 1973. Although the first ROC submarine crew will be ready to begin training on the first craft this month, Secretary Laird states that the crew's training in the current classroom phase of its course could be extended until late November. This extension would also require that we ask the ROC to delay the arrival of its second crew until late November, given the limited classroom facilities at the submarine school.

I recommend that we delay beginning the on-board phase of the first crew's training until late November.

I also recommend we stipulate as a condition of the transfer that the ROC agree that the submarines are to be used for anti-submarine warfare (ASW) training only—the only military purpose for which ei-

³ Attached at Tab C but not printed is Kissinger's July 10 memorandum to Laird, in which Kissinger noted that the President "appreciates the problems involved in not proceeding at this time. He continues to believe, however, that the transfer should be deferred for a period of several more months, during which an evaluation could be made of additional political and military factors which might have a bearing on the matter." The July 10 memorandum was in response to Laird's June 16 memorandum to Kissinger requesting that the submarine transfer go forward. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) Laird was acting on the advice of Nutter, who outlined conflicts over obtaining approval for the submarine transfer, and recommended that Laird sign the June 16 memorandum. This memorandum and other documentation on the Department of Defense effort to supply the submarines, is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Nats), 400.137–800, 1972. See also Document 224.

⁴ In a July 18 memorandum to Kissinger, Kennedy remarked that he had been asked about the commitment made to the ROC Government during the textile negotiations in 1971 to provide a submarine. See Documents 133 and 134. Kennedy noted: "As it turned out, the only item we made a firm commitment on to Taiwan was the submarine. As you recall, I cleared this explicitly with the President and was authorized to notify Chiang Ching-kuo which I subsequently did personally." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. X) Tab D, the attached memorandum from Kissinger to Kennedy, is dated July 27, not July 24. In it, Kissinger wrote, "You may be assured that the United States does intend to honor the commitment in this regard you made to then Vice Premier Chiang Ching-kuo last year." He added that this will occur in the "near future."

ther the ROC or State and Defense have justified the transfer. (State's memorandum at Tab C strongly recommends that we include this understanding.)⁵ If the Chinese agree to this stipulation but then go ahead to use the subs for other purposes, we will at least have on the record our word to them not to do so.

I believe we should ask State and Defense for draft press guidance to cover both the commencement of the on-board phase of the training as well as the formal transfers.

To derive maximum political benefit in the ROC, we could have Ambassador McConaughy upon his return to Taipei October 10⁶ convey the news of the transfer to the ROC leadership, [2 lines of source text not declassified]. To avoid the risk of a leak within our own bureaucracy, I suggest that we inform Defense and State of our decision at the time that we instruct Ambassador McConaughy to deliver this message in Taipei.

At Tab A is a draft memorandum from you to Secretary Laird approving the transfer of two submarines under the conditions mentioned above.⁷

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum to Secretary Laird at Tab A, the memorandum to be transmitted to Defense (with a copy to State) at the same time that Ambassador McConaughy is instructed to inform the ROC.

⁵ Also attached at Tab C but not printed is a September 28 memorandum from U. Alexis Johnson to the President.

⁶ McConaughy did not discuss submarines in the October 13 meeting with Chiang Ching-kuo, as the decision on their transfer had not yet been made. (Telegram 5181 from Taipei, October 19; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, CHINAT–JAPAN)

⁷ Attached at Tab A but not printed is an October 16 memorandum from Kissinger to Laird.

256. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in the Republic of China¹

Washington, October 20, 1972, 0045Z.

192357. Subject: Enhance Plus. Strictly Eyes Only Ambassador.

1. You should immediately² approach highest available level GRC which we assume to be Prime Minister, and in the name of the President seek his immediate agreement for the transfer to USG, which will immediately transfer to GVN, all F-5A's in possession of ROCAF. As GRC is aware, USG is now engaged in all-out effort to achieve settlement in VN consistent with the principles that have previously been announced by the President. It is too early to say whether this effort can or will be successful. However, in event it is successful, we want to place GVN in strongest possible military position prior to coming into effect of any agreement. As part of this effort we desire immediately to deliver to GVN maximum possible number of F-5 aircraft (which is type of aircraft for which VNAF is trained and equipped). In order to achieve this we are asking ROC and some other countries which hold F-5A's for this major contribution to achievement of peace and strengthening of GVN military capabilities. We recognize unprecedented nature of this request which is done only for reasons of unparalleled importance.

2. We will, of course, credit GRC with value of aircraft and will be prepared promptly and on extraordinary basis to work out method of replacements, including possibility of F-5E co-production scheme. In meanwhile, we will, if GRC desires, be prepared to discuss deployment of US F-4's and US pilots to Taiwan to fill gap this creates GRC defense.³

¹ National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT. Top Secret; Nodis; Flash. Drafted and approved by U. Alexis Johnson and cleared by Eliot. Repeated to Saigon strictly eyes only for the Ambassador.

² Telegram 191868 to Taipei, October 20, strictly eyes only for the Ambassador, reads in its entirety: "Pending further instructions, you should keep yourself immediately available to carry out urgent instructions which will require your seeing highest available GRC official, whose whereabouts you should seek to determine without in any way alerting GRC or any member of your staff." (Ibid.)

³ In telegram 5209 from Taipei, October 21, McConaughy reported that he met with Chiang Ching-kuo that morning. "His [Chiang's] reaction was essentially favorable with certain qualifications based on questions which could not be fully answered at the first meeting." Chiang wanted to know when the F-5's could be transferred to the ROC, when the United States would deploy F-4's to Taiwan, and would the F-4's stay on the island until the F-5's were provided. (Ibid.) The Department responded in telegram 192705 to Taipei, October 21, that the United States hoped to supply the F-5E's in FY 1974 and would try to deploy the F-4's with U.S. pilots within 90 days. "We would do our best to cover gap but would have to be able to respond to unexpected emergencies elsewhere." (Ibid.)

3. We very much need reply during course of Saturday, October 21, Washington time.

4. Request you stress importance of tightest security on this matter, at least up to time of delivery of aircraft.

FYI. In event subject comes up or you feel it would be useful, you may inform Prime Minister that US is prepared to make transfer to GRC of two ASW configured diesel submarines and the 60 M–48 tanks which we have had under review. Also it may be necessary to request help of some GRC pilots to deliver aircraft.⁴ End FYI.

5. Taipei also repeat response to Saigon.

⁴ In telegram 5218 from Taipei, October 22, McConaughy reported that he informed Chiang Ching-kuo at their October 21 meeting that the United States was willing to transfer two ASW submarines and 60 M–48 tanks. (Ibid.)

257. Memorandum Prepared for the 40 Committee¹

Washington, October 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

China Covert Action Program

CIA has finally come up with a proposal for its China covert action program which accommodates the “new look” in U.S.–Sino relations.² It has been three years since the 40 Committee approved a program which included “black” and “grey” radio broadcasts from Taipei and Seoul, propaganda sent to the China mainland via balloons, media operations in Hong Kong and Tokyo, and activities worldwide to denigrate and obstruct the People’s Republic of China (PRC).³

¹ Source: National Security Council, Nixon Intelligence Files, 303/40 Committee Files, China. Secret; Eyes Only. Although no drafting information appears on the memorandum, Holdridge initialed his concurrence.

² Attached but not printed is a 10-page CIA report to the 40 Committee, October 10, 1972. A handwritten notation on the bottom of page 1 of this report reads: “Telephonically approved by the 40 Committee on 26 October 1972.” In a December 1, 1971, memorandum to Kissinger, Helms noted: “We have attempted to draft a China Covert Action program but found it most difficult to do so in the absence of more specific guidance.” (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 80–B01086R Executive Registry Files)

³ See Document 30.

Broadcasts from the [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] facility were terminated in mid-1972 as were two of the three “black” radio legends broadcast from Taipei. With attention to avoiding a reaction from Taiwan which would endanger continued [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] activities, it is proposed that other blatant anti-mainland China operations be terminated.⁴

All support to Taiwan’s propaganda and psychological warfare against the PRC will be terminated during FY 1973. Selective support to Taiwan’s efforts to enhance its position overseas will continue. The unilateral radio facility in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be maintained on a standby basis. Media capabilities in [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] will be maintained. The primary goal will be to support the initiative toward better relations with the PRC with priority to operations which put covert action assets into direct contact with individuals who might persuade the PRC to improve relations with us.

Funds budgeted for this phase-out year total [*dollar amount not declassified*]. This contrasts with [*dollar amount not declassified*] budgeted for last year and the [*dollar amount not declassified*] approved for FY 1969.⁵

⁴ In a September 7 meeting with Nelson, Green stated that “he wished to see us move as fast as possible to get out of any connection with GRC activities directed against the PRC. Such association was inconsistent with our policy of improving relations with both powers. It was perfectly appropriate and indeed desirable to support GRC attempts to bolster its image with the rest of the world, particularly overseas Chinese.” The minutes of the meeting continue: “Mr. Nelson said that rigorous pursuit of this approach would reduce our [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] activities against the GRC itself.” (Memorandum from James R. Gardner of INR to Cline, September 8; Department of State, INR Historical Files, Subject Files, China, 1971–1977) On September 12 Gleysteen wrote that he agreed with the need to terminate these activities: “However, to cut off all or almost all activities immediately, would seem unnecessary, and to make the cut precisely at the moment the GRC is uptight over the Japanese issue might prove ill-advised.” He suggested informing the ROC Government “between the completion of the Tanaka visit and the end of this calendar year.” (Ibid.)

⁵ The CIA was considering other changes to its operations on Taiwan in late 1972. During in a November 6 meeting with Green, Nelson divulged that “it would be necessary to close the Air America headquarters on Taiwan for reasons of economy, move some of the functions to the Washington office and disperse others to other East Asian locations.” He and Green agreed that McConaughy would inform Chiang Ching-kuo of this immediately, and defer notice of changes to the propaganda programs until early December. (Memorandum from Richard K. Stuart of INR to Cline, November 6; *ibid.*) McConaughy met with Chiang Ching-kuo on December 13 and stated that the change was “a logical consequence of the previously announced U.S. policy aimed at improving relations with the PRC and lowering tensions in the Far East.” McConaughy added that the activities would terminate by March 31, 1973, but offered several “palliatives,” such as a subsidy payment and spare parts for radios. “According to the Ambassador, the Premier seemed somewhat taken aback by the suddenness of this termination date but did not argue the point.” (Memorandum from Nelson to Green, December 14; *ibid.*)

258. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, October 24, 1972, 6:55–7:45 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

Ambassador Huang: You must be tired. You spend half the time on the ground and half the time in the air.

Dr. Kissinger: After my last stop, I enjoy being in the air more than being on the ground. (Ambassador Huang smiles slightly.)

I have achieved the unity of the Vietnamese—both of them dislike me, North and South. (Ambassador Huang laughs.)

I haven't had the opportunity to follow the Ambassador's and Vice Foreign Minister's speeches in the United Nations as much as usual. Is the Vice Foreign Minister still here?

Ambassador Huang: Yes. Yesterday evening he met with Senators Mansfield and Scott and Senate Secretary Valeo.

Dr. Kissinger: Was that here or in Washington?

Ambassador Huang: Here.

Dr. Kissinger: Because if they had come to Washington, my feelings would have been hurt. Did Senator Mansfield have a chance to discuss our problem with you?

Ambassador Huang: No, he didn't go into details. He indicated in general terms that he would like to have a chance to visit China.

Dr. Kissinger: Well, we have done all we can on our side.

I don't want to take too much of your time, but I asked to see you shortly after my return because I want to ask something which we have not asked before—and that is whether the Prime Minister might be willing to use his good offices in the rather complicated state that our negotiations have reached with the Vietnamese. And I believe it is in their interest. We are really not asking this for ourselves.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

As you probably know from both us and Hanoi, the North Vietnamese and I reached substantial agreement in Paris in the middle of October.² I told them at the time, after getting the approval of the President, that I would go to Saigon and after I had the approval of Saigon I would go to Hanoi, and we would complete the agreement. And I said I would do this by October 30.

Now I have to say on behalf of your allies that they have behaved very correctly and they have made significant concessions. I went to Saigon, but it has not proven possible to obtain agreement in every respect. The Vietnamese people have not survived for 2,000 years under foreign pressures by being easy to deal with. We can make our influence felt over a period of time, but not in three days.

And secondly there are some aspects of the agreement that have to be slightly adjusted without major changes, partly because of different nuances in the Vietnamese and English languages, partly because the agreement has to be adjusted for four party signature, and similar matters.

To give you an example of nuances in the language, we agreed in the text on a body which should be called with a certain name in English, an "administrative structure," something other than a political body or a bureaucratic body. In Vietnamese this has a somewhat governmental meaning, so we would like to restore the original meaning. I would just like to give an example of the problems.

We propose that Le Duc Tho return to Paris, but also we are prepared to meet in any other place, and this would take two days, I think three days at the most.

We have also told him that once we have revised the text it would be considered final, and no additional changes would be required, and we would make ourselves responsible for our allies. This may still require, in order to get an agreement with our allies, some weeks after the agreement is approved.

² On October 16 Fazio delivered a message to the PRC's representatives in New York that reads in part: "The U.S. side considers that an agreement is near in its negotiations with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam with respect to the conflict in Southeast Asia. The one remaining issue in the effort to achieve a negotiated settlement of the conflict relates to the question of restricting military supplies to both North and South Vietnam by outside powers." The note concluded, "the U.S. side would welcome some indication from the Government of the People's Republic of China as to what policies it will pursue in regard to military supplies to North Vietnam in case a rapid peace settlement is arrived at. Such an indication from the Government of the People's Republic of China would do much to accelerate agreement between the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. As soon as a settlement is arrived at, Dr. Kissinger will be prepared to explore other outstanding issues of Indochina, especially the problem of Cambodia." The message is attached to Fazio's memorandum for the record, October 17, *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 167.

The North Vietnamese take the position that we must sign the agreement by October 30. But this is insanity. We cannot sign an agreement on behalf of an ally who disapproves and the only result of that would be a total impasse.

Mr. Ambassador, you know the United States. You know that between now and elections we cannot have a public confrontation with Saigon. This I say to you personally. So we have also told Hanoi that we will stop bombing north of the 20th parallel while these negotiations go on.

Ambassador Huang: The 20th parallel.

Dr. Kissinger: I mean all the Red River Delta where 90 percent of the population lives. Here is a note that we have sent them today, which sums up our position. It is the exact text. (He hands over the message to the DRV at Tab A.)³

What we would like to ask the assistance of the Prime Minister is to convince Hanoi that this is not a trick. We have kept every promise we have made to you, and we would keep a promise made to them, but it must be a realistic promise. (Ambassador Huang begins reading the message.) If they agree to this procedure there would certainly be peace during the month of November, and we would make an obligation towards them, but also towards you, whose relations we value so highly. And we would undertake that obligation not only towards them but towards you. If they insist that we sign on October 30 an agreement whose first article says the U.S. with the concurrence of South Vietnam, whose concurrence we don't have, then we are engaging in an empty exercise which cannot succeed.

Now this is the situation in which we find ourselves. All issues are settled in principle. The changes we shall propose will be mostly on language and one of some symbolic importance. It would enable us to return to Saigon and claim we have taken their views into account. It would certainly be considered a very important gesture by us if the Prime Minister would indicate his experience with our reliability. Because it is obvious that the war is nearly concluded, it would be tragic if negotiations broke down now. Perhaps I made a promise somewhat too optimistically which we cannot fulfill for reasons which are out of our control.

I am sure that you have no instructions on this subject, Mr. Ambassador.

Ambassador Huang: No. I have gotten this information firsthand from you.

³ Attached at Tab A but not printed is a 4-page message to the DRV. See *ibid.*, Document 168.

Dr. Kissinger: I am not asking for any comments, but there is some urgency because I think there is great excitement in Hanoi. They are feeling perhaps that they were tricked, and I want to assure you that this was not the case.

One trouble with Vietnam is that one side always thinks it is winning and the side that thinks it is winning absolutely refuses to negotiate. That is a personal comment. (Meanwhile Ambassador Huang keeps reading the message. Dr. Kissinger pours the Ambassador tea.)

Ambassador Huang: We will promptly convey your oral information as well as your note to the DRV to Premier Chou En-lai. Certainly I cannot make any comment here.

Dr. Kissinger: Of course not. I understand.

Ambassador Huang: It seems to be the last one in a series of exchanges and communications.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, but they all say more or less the same thing. They always say that we must sign October 30. They do not explain how we can sign a document whose first paragraph says that the United States, with the concurrence of the Government of the Republic of Vietnam, etc.; they don't explain how we can sign such a document when we don't have the concurrence.

Ambassador Huang: What is the position of the Saigon side?

Dr. Kissinger: I will be frank with you. I should not have agreed to this procedure to begin with. I did it to show my good will. I did not think the DRV would take it so absolutely literally, and I did it to speed up the procedure. Many of the changes that they want are very technical—when it lists the names of the four parties they simply want to say the four parties of the Paris Conference—but they are prepared to sign the document. They don't want the names of all the parties in the document. I am not asking you to support the changes—I want to give you examples.

Ambassador Huang: You mean the Saigon side . . .⁴

Dr. Kissinger: Wants this. Many changes are of the same type that I discussed with the Vice Foreign Minister in Hangchow on the last night, when our bureaucracy raised objections after we had already completed the agreement, and he was generous enough to discuss them with me, and we agreed to 80 percent of them. Many of these changes will be forgotten a week after the agreement is signed. It is merely a question of face. (To Mr. Kuo and Mrs. Shih who do not understand the word, Ambassador Huang repeats "face.") Someone once told me that westerners are conscious about face.

⁴ Ellipsis in the source text.

There are two questions of substance, one of which I think is quite easily solvable. We have agreed that the two parties of Vietnam should negotiate to create something called a National Council of National Reconciliation and Concord. We have said an “administrative structure.” In English, as you know, “administrative structure” is below the governmental level. In Vietnamese the translation is something like a political structure. So I would like to find a word that translates differently with the same English meaning, or a different English word.

The other point is more difficult, and I always raise it with them. It is the question of North Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam (Ambassador Huang indicates understanding and looks at the text.) I have expressed it a little bit more delicately in this note, but they will understand it. They take the position that (a) they don’t have any forces, and (b) they won’t withdraw them. We have offered a practical proposal which is not to mention it in the agreement at all, but that prior to an agreement being signed, they should withdraw some forces from the northernmost part of the country, 20 kilometers to North Vietnam, which we would pick up through intelligence sources. They wouldn’t have to admit their forces are in the South nor change the military situation very much, because it is very close, but it would satisfy the political requirements of the situation. This would not be written into the agreement. It would be a unilateral gesture.

So we will not reopen the agreement. The issues are not major ones. Psychologically they are extremely important because they would give Saigon a psychological feeling of having participated.

Now if Hanoi makes a public issue of it, we will be forced to emphasize all our differences and a settlement would be delayed indefinitely. (Ambassador Huang drops his matches.) And that would be a pity when most of the issues have been settled. It is really a question now of procedure, a little bit a question of prestige, and somewhat a feeling of confidence. We thought that if someone could make clear that our tendency is to keep our promises this would have a helpful influence. And you would be helping to bring peace and not interfere when war is going on. (Mr. Kuo explained to Ambassador Huang.)

Ambassador Huang: If there is nothing else you would like to tell us, we will take our leave.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make a proposal to you about my visit after the elections, but we appreciate the invitation. It guarantees that Mr. Lord won’t resign until after the visit.

Ambassador Huang (to Mr. Lord): Are you going back to scholastic life?

Dr. Kissinger: I hope he doesn’t leave at all.

Mr. Lord: I have no firm plans.

Ambassador Huang: The last time you mentioned the film from your June visit. I have word that they are already making efforts on your film.⁵

Dr. Kissinger: I appreciate that. Is the Vice Minister free next week or is he leaving?

Ambassador Huang: He is not leaving next week.

Dr. Kissinger: Can I propose some engagement by phone?

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I would be delighted to see him again. What would be his feeling with my inviting one or two other people, or would he rather do it alone?

Ambassador Huang: He won't reject your friends.

Dr. Kissinger: Alright, I will make a proposal in the next few days and perhaps we will do it at my club, or do you go to a restaurant? (Ambassador Huang indicates with his hands that it is up to Dr. Kissinger.)

Dr. Kissinger: It's up to me.

Ambassador Huang: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: I will make a proposal next week. Then we can start negotiating the Shanghai communiqué all over again (laughter). He (referring to Vice Minister Chiao) was the toughest negotiator I ever dealt with, but also very honorable.

(There was then some discussion standing up while the Chinese were waiting for their car. Ambassador Huang noted that the quicker the war was over the better. Dr. Kissinger replied that this should happen by the end of November, if we could get over the present situation of hurt feelings. Hanoi thought that the U.S. was trying to trick them by getting by the elections and then attacking them. We had told Le Duc Tho we would settle before the elections, but we needed two to three weeks afterwards. Ambassador Huang inquired if there couldn't be a complete settlement before the elections. Dr. Kissinger responded that in a blow-up before the elections the U.S. would have to choose Saigon over Hanoi. After elections it would be just the opposite. Furthermore a blow-up would make people think the opponents of the Administration were right all along, and in western countries at least this was not a good thing before an election. Ambassador Huang said that by "opponents" Dr. Kissinger meant Mr. McGovern. Dr. Kissinger confirmed that this was the case. The car then arrived and the Chinese departed.)

⁵ Reference is to a request made by Kissinger at the end of his October 3 meeting with Huang Hua. See Document 254.

259. Message From the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Government of the United States¹

New York, October 25, 1972.

It is learned that complete agreement has been reached at the Vietnam-U.S. Paris talks on the settlement of the Vietnam question, and that it will soon be signed by the two sides. The Vietnamese side has made maximum efforts and exercised the utmost patience for this.

Now is an extremely opportune time to end the Vietnam war. Obstructions from Saigon were expected, but in the evening of October 24 (Saigon time) just after Dr. Kissinger had left, Nguyen Van Thieu went to the extent of making a public speech through the networks, in which he poured out torrents of vicious abuse against northern Vietnam, and even cast reflections on Dr. Kissinger. His aim is obviously to sabotage the ceasefire, troop withdrawal, P.O.W. repatriation and the return of Indochina to the status of non-alignment, that is to say, to oppose the Vietnam-U.S. negotiations. Thus it may be asked why then did the Saigon authorities participate in the Paris talks and permit the Vietnamese and U.S. sides to hold the secret talks on behalf of the two sides of southern Vietnam respectively?

The Chinese side believes that so long as the U.S. side is determined to effect a ceasefire and troop withdrawal, it is fully capable of halting Saigon's sabotage schemes. Otherwise, failure to resolve at the right moment, to maintain consistency in its stand and to abide by the agreements already reached with the Vietnamese side would not only result in losing credence before the world, but may also lead to unforeseeable consequences.

Although the Chinese side could trust that the difficulties and sabotage come from Saigon, how can the world be forbidden to have its doubts?! Since the U.S. side has been representative of one side in the bilateral negotiations, why can't the United States manage the actions of that side on its own?

We deeply believe that this is the crucial moment and hope that the U.S. side will consider the problem in a broader framework, take the long view and act resolutely.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A typewritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to J. Fazio by Mrs. Shih, October 25, 1972, New York." At this meeting, Fazio handed over a copy of a 3-page note entitled "Message to the Government of the DRV on Behalf of the President of the United States," which was a response to a DRV message of October 24. Fazio also extended an invitation from Kissinger to Ch'iao Kuan-hua and Huang Hua for dinner in New York on November 1. Fazio's memorandum for the record of the October 25 meeting and the U.S. message are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 165.

As for the questions of the three countries of Indochina, only by solving them separately can progress be made according to order. We will not elaborate on this point as there is an identity of views here.

260. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, October 27, 1972.

The U.S. side has studied most carefully the Chinese message of October 25, 1972, and respects its motivations. At the same time, the Chinese side will understand that the U.S. side must adhere to its principles. The U.S. position was explained by Dr. Kissinger on October 26, 1972: "We will not be stampeded into an agreement until its provisions are right. We will not be deflected from an agreement when its provisions are right."

The current situation arose from the U.S. side's attempt to accommodate the DRV side by accepting an accelerated and arbitrary schedule which proved to be unworkable. The U.S. side is now earnestly engaged in bringing about the rapid conclusion of a settlement that can be signed and implemented. It shall use its maximum influence to this end, but the task requires as well the cooperation of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. The changes that are necessary in the agreement do not touch its essence and can all be accommodated within its present framework. In this regard, Dr. Kissinger in his October 26, 1972, press conference publicly reaffirmed the U.S. commitment to its essential provisions.²

The need now is for the immediate end of public harassment, one final negotiating session in Paris, and then a brief interval to enable the U.S. side to accomplish the objectives mentioned in the Chinese note.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to Mrs. Shih by Fazio, 8:45 p.m., 10/27/72." This meeting was held in New York. Fazio also gave the PRC representatives a 2-page message responding to a DRV message of October 26. The U.S. message reads in part: "The U.S. side wishes to point out that Dr. Kissinger will not be available between November 4 and November 9." (The Presidential election was November 8.) This message and Fazio's undated memorandum of record are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 166.

² Kissinger's October 26 press conference is printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, November 13, 1972, pp. 549–558.

The cooperation of the DRV is essential in this effort. Public pressure must have the opposite consequence and indefinitely delay a solution.

Attached is a message which the U.S. side has sent to the DRV side on October 27, 1972, proposing a concrete schedule to complete the agreement and reaffirming unilateral U.S. undertakings with respect to that schedule.³ With mutual good will and a cooperative attitude the remaining obstacles to a settlement can certainly be surmounted in a matter of weeks.

It would be greatly appreciated if the Chinese side would use its considerable influence in a positive direction so as to help bring about the peace that now is so near.

³ See footnote 1 above.

261. Message From the Government of the People's Republic of China to the Government of the United States¹

New York, October 31, 1972.

The Chinese side has on many occasions made clear its consistent stand on the Viet Nam question. It has been closely following and seriously studying the recent developments and the public documents of the various sides. Now it further has the following comments to make on Dr. Kissinger's conversation of October 24 (EST), the U.S. message of October 27 and the three messages of the U.S. side to the Democratic Republic of Viet Nam that were delivered to us:²

The nine-point agreement made public by the Vietnamese side has been confirmed by Dr. Kissinger. After repeated consultations and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to J. Fazio by Mrs. Shih, 10/31/72, NYC." According to Fazio's memorandum for the record, at the October 31 meeting Mrs. Shih announced that Ch'iao and Huang would not be able to attend the November 1 dinner, "Since the invitation came on short notice, the Vice Foreign Minister had made other plans." (Ibid.) See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 167. Ch'iao and Huang attended a dinner with Kissinger and Rockefeller on November 13. (See footnote 6, Document 254)

² See Documents 258, 259, and 260.

amendments, the Vietnamese and U.S. sides had reached agreement on all the provisions of the agreement and mutually agreed on the schedule for its signing. However, on October 24 Nguyen Van Thieu came out with violent abuse and refused to accept the agreement. The U.S. side followed with further demands for amendments in the provisions and unilaterally upset the original schedule, so that the already worked-out agreement cannot be signed. This is the root cause of the present state of affairs.

The U.S. side says that the changes that are necessary in the agreement are “minor”, “procedural”, and “do not touch its essence, and can all be accommodated within its present framework.” But in fact this is by no means the case. For example, what is termed the demand that northern Viet Nam withdraw its “troops” from southern Viet Nam, that the ceasefire in Viet Nam be made more nearly simultaneous with ceasefires in other parts of Indochina, etc., are all pretexts deliberately created by the Saigon authorities to disrupt the agreement. The U.S. side has taken over these unreasonable demands and is trying to make people believe that such changes do not touch the essence of the agreement. This can in no way hold water.

The U.S. side stresses that it must adhere to its principles, and that any agreement must be discussed with and approved by Saigon before it can be signed. But Saigon has made statements openly rejecting the nine-point agreement. Then how can the U.S. side guarantee that the final text can be completed in only three or four more days of negotiation and make itself responsible for the fact that no additional changes will be raised? If the U.S. guarantee is not empty words, it can only serve as proof that the U.S. side was able to negotiate and sign an agreement on behalf of Saigon in the first place, but it did not wish to do so.

Although we are willing to believe that the U.S. side has the tendency to keep its promises, we cannot but note that the U.S. side twice proposed on October 24 and 25 that a meeting be held on any day of the Vietnamese side’s choosing during the week of October 30, yet only two days afterwards, it changed to say that the meeting should be held beginning on November 1 and would last as long as required, but Dr. Kissinger would not be available between November 4 and 9. Dr. Kissinger will naturally understand that such practice is of no help to the increase of mutual trust.

The issue is quite clear. As Dr. Kissinger has said, the Vietnamese side has made very significant concessions. According to statements by the Vietnamese side, President Nixon also expressed that the agreement had solved all outstanding problems. The Vietnamese side has abided by the agreement already reached, but the U.S. side has gone back on its own word, created offshoot issues, reached out for a yard

after taking an inch and continued to put forward new demands. It is only natural for the Vietnamese side to express indignation at this.

The Saigon authorities are wantonly pouring out abuse, openly creating trouble and bent on sabotaging the agreement. If the U.S. side does not put a firm stop to this, but on the contrary exerts pressure on the Vietnamese side, prolongs the war and consequently sacrifices all that has been achieved in the negotiations, then how are people to view the U.S. statements about its preparedness to make efforts for the relaxation of tension in the Far East?

Please give earnest consideration to the above views.

262. Message From the Government of the United States to the Government of the People's Republic of China¹

Washington, November 1, 1972.

The U.S. side, as always, has given earnest consideration to the views of the Chinese side as conveyed in the message of October 31, 1972. It wishes to state its position once again.

The record is absolutely clear that the U.S. side told the DRV side on many occasions that it could not proceed without consultations with the Republic of Vietnam. The transcripts of the meetings fully testify to this fact. The U.S. side, while constantly pointing out the possibilities for delay, agreed to the accelerated schedule proposed by the DRV because of its interest in achieving a peaceful settlement as rapidly as possible.

The U.S. side made maximum efforts to adhere to the schedule, but its task was greatly complicated by many actions on the DRV side. These included the interview given to an American journalist by the North Vietnamese Prime Minister while the most sensitive consultations were underway in Saigon which claimed an agreement and the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File–China Trip, China Exchanges. No classification marking. A handwritten notation on the first page reads: "Handed to Mrs. Shih by J. Fazio, 4 PM, 11/1/72, NYC." Attached but not printed is Fazio's undated memorandum of record, which reads in full: "Following is a report of a meeting with Mrs. Shih at the Chinese Mission in New York on November 1, 1972. I entered the Mission at 3:45 p.m., was greeted by Mrs. Shih, and escorted to the second floor. Tea was served and pleasantries exchanged. I presented the note to Mrs. Shih (attached), which she read very carefully. She had no questions and said she would pass it on. Mrs. Shih immediately changed the subject and small talk followed. I departed the Mission at 4:10 p.m."

intent to overthrow the government with which negotiations were being conducted; the obvious preparations made by the DRV side to have the ceasefire coincide with maximum military activity in South Vietnam; and the North Vietnamese exploitation of its translation—never agreed to by the U.S. side—of the English phrase “administrative structure” which the DRV side itself proposed. The Vietnamese term suggests a governmental body which is totally inconsistent with the meaning of the agreement as recognized by both sides. This represents an ambiguity that must be rectified and provides a clear illustration of the need for another meeting.

But no point is served in cataloging accusations. Only two explanations are possible for recent events. Either the US is seriously engaged in attempting to bring about peace. Or it is engaged in a trick to thwart an agreement. The U.S. side recognizes that the DRV side may suspect that the U.S. is undertaking a maneuver designed to renege on the agreement after the elections. The U.S. side wishes to reiterate that it wishes to bring about peace in the most rapid manner, that its policy will not change after the elections and that it will maintain all its commitments. Therefore, if temporary obstacles are encountered, whatever the reason, there is a need for understanding and not the constant reiteration of one-sided charges. All countries have an interest in ending the war in Vietnam.

As for the specific allegations in the Chinese note, Dr. Kissinger is unavailable between November 4 and 9 because of longstanding commitments, the nature of which cannot be hard to understand. This, of course, in no way changes the undertaking to meet promptly and for as long as necessary with the DRV to complete the agreement.

With respect to the argument that if it is possible to gain the acquiescence of Saigon after another session this proves that this has always been possible, surely the Chinese side must know the difference between presenting a plan without consultation in three days and a program worked out over a period of weeks after intensive consultation and sense of participation.

There is a more fundamental point with respect to U.S. relations with the Republic of Vietnam. The Chinese side, considering all the conversations it has had with the U.S. side about respecting basic principles, must surely understand that the U.S. cannot treat an ally as a puppet. This would accord neither with reality nor principle. The constant assumption and public reiteration by the DRV that the U.S. has complete mastery over its friends has been one of the root causes of present difficulties. The U.S. side would like to remind the Chinese side of the many conversations between Dr. Kissinger and the Prime Minister in which Dr. Kissinger expressed understanding and respect for the Chinese meticulous treatment of Prince Sihanouk, a friendly leader

who was a guest on Chinese soil. The U.S. side points out that its problems with its friends are no easier and its principles no different.

In any event it is not true that the U.S. side has adopted all its ally's objections as its own positions. This was made amply clear in Dr. Kissinger's October 26, 1972 press conference and is obvious as well from the list of unresolved questions that the U.S. has outlined to the DRV side.

With reference to the question of North Vietnamese troops in South Vietnam, the U.S., as a very great concession, agreed that this issue would not be mentioned in the agreement. The U.S. will continue to respect this point. Nor is the U.S. endorsing the Republic of Vietnam's position that all North Vietnamese troops be withdrawn from the South. The U.S. is simply reiterating its previous proposal, made at every private meeting and never withdrawn, for a practical solution, namely that some North Vietnamese divisions in the northernmost part of South Vietnam be moved relatively short distances across the demilitarized zone. This would be done as a unilateral North Vietnamese action, would not be part of the agreement, and would thus fully take account of DRV principle. Rather than being criticized, the U.S. side believes that it should receive understanding for its very flexible approach.

With respect to more nearly simultaneous ceasefires in Indochina, the U.S. side is certain that with good will this issue will be resolved. The other changes being proposed are essentially technical and procedural and should present little difficulty.

The U.S. side wishes to reemphasize that once these issues have been resolved, the United States will assert itself fully to consummate the agreement and ask for no further substantive changes.

The U.S. side informs the Chinese side as solemnly as possible that if the DRV side resumes negotiations in Paris with its serious attitude of the October sessions, the final agreement will be rapidly settled. With understanding for the ensuing process of U.S. consultations with its ally to prepare for implementation, there would be a final signature of the agreement no more than two to three weeks later. In the interval the U.S. would stop the bombing of DRV territory.

If in this process the U.S. side fails to gain the concurrence of its ally, which it considers improbable, the U.S. side would then be prepared to discuss implementation of a bilateral agreement.

The U.S. side is willing to undertake as an obligation to the Chinese side the schedule and commitments with respect to the bombing of North Vietnam that it has proposed to the DRV side. The Chinese side surely knows the value that the U.S. side attaches to its relationship with the PRC toward whom the U.S. side has never violated the letter or spirit of its commitments.

The Chinese side must now decide the best road to peace. The U.S. side has made, and will continue to make, maximum efforts to complete the agreement. The urgent task now is to follow a program which will enable the parties to move as rapidly as possible toward the ending of the war and the restoration of peace.

With mutual good will and understanding all difficulties will be surmounted. The alternative is continuation of the conflict with all its consequences. If current pressure tactics continue the US will have no choice but to continue the war which can then only grow in violence. The US side reiterates that it far prefers a solution which will establish a new relationship with the Democratic Republic of Vietnam and accelerate the improvement in its relationship with the People's Republic of China.

263. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, November 3, 1972, 6:55–7:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations

Mrs. Shih Yen-hua, Interpreter

Mr. Kuo, Notetaker

Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

Winston Lord, NSC Staff

(While waiting for Dr. Kissinger, the Chinese party and Mr. Lord engaged in amiable small talk. Topics covered included the General Assembly session at the United Nations which the Ambassador called quieter and duller than the previous year; the social demands on the Ambassador; the families of Mrs. Shih and Mr. Kuo; and the various Chinese groups that were visiting or were about to visit the United States. This lasted for 20 minutes until Dr. Kissinger arrived and the meeting began.)

Dr. Kissinger: I am sorry to keep you waiting. They never take into account New York traffic. My apologies.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. Attached but not printed were Kissinger's talking points.

I wanted to see you because I am going away tomorrow and because we noticed some of the references in the Chinese press to the present state of affairs and also some of the adjectives that were used in relation to our action which did not meet our full agreement. So we wanted to take this opportunity to tell you once more what our policy is so that if there should be a strain in our relationship we will know exactly the reasons and this strain is not caused by misunderstanding.

First, we admit that we made a mistake in accepting too optimistic a time schedule. We did that in good faith and with every intent of maintaining it. If we had wanted to delay we could have found innumerable excuses for delay in going through the text. We wanted to make a rapid settlement so we took a chance. It's one thing to say it was a mistake. It's another thing to assume that there was "foul play" and "crooked dealings."

Now we also believe that the North Vietnamese side contributed to the present impasse, but I don't see much sense in going through that list again. (Ambassador Huang interrupted the translation, and there was clarification of the word "impasse." Dr. Kissinger said, "difficulties".)

I want to read you two statements I made on October 17 when I saw them last so that you can see that I warned them. When I left Minister Xuan Thuy I said: (reading almost verbatim from the excerpt from the transcript) "Well there are two problems. I will have to consult the President, and I will have to see what the possibilities are in Saigon. Our most important objective now is to settle this war, the quicker the better. We maintain every agreement we have made here. We should not tie ourselves to one particular time schedule. I am certain that if we cannot do it this week we will settle it in a matter of weeks." (Ambassador Huang again helps with the translation.)

And there was another statement I read to him. This was on October 17. (Again reading from the transcript excerpt.) "We had agreed to the schedule—which was perhaps unwise because of the impatience to make peace. We maintain our offer to finish the document in the most rapid time possible and to meet the Special Advisor in some neutral place to complete the document. We are not talking of the delay of a long time. We are talking about a brief delay. It is not unreasonable to want to discuss with our allies the making of the peace, to get an agreed document."

But we are not engaged in trying a legal case. We are engaged in a very practical problem now. The North Vietnamese believe that we have done all of this as a trick to maneuver with Thieu to gain time until after the election. And they are afraid that if we come to another meeting we will overthrow the whole agreement. Our intention is exactly the opposite. It is one thing for us not to insist on the present

agreement, which our ally had never seen, in a period of three days. It is another to insist on an agreement which follows a procedure which we can morally justify. (Dr. Kissinger pours tea for the Ambassador.)

After November 7 we will have freedom of action, not against Hanoi because we have that now, but against Saigon. On the other hand, the changes we are seeking, it is not correct to say that we are making Saigon changes our own. We have accepted maybe 10 percent of their proposals and none of their most important ones.

There are four changes of substance that we want in the agreement. There may be eight other technical ones, but they are unimportant and won't be crucial. The four substantive ones are as follows.

First, we want the section on ceasefire to be independent of other provisions of the agreement. This is now implied. We want to have it stated explicitly. (Mr. Kuo indicated he didn't fully understand.) This agreement is in chapters. There is a chapter on ceasefire, and we want the chapter on ceasefire unconditional and not related to other provisions of the agreement. This is now implied. We want it explicit. This works both ways. It means we cannot use the excuse of other sections to come back in.

Second, in the section on political conditions, in paragraph 9(f), the word "administrative structure" was given to us by the Vietnamese in English. It is not our translation. We want them to use the Vietnamese term that uses the word "administrative" as we understand it. We would never have accepted their word. That was an unresolved issue.

And paragraph 9(g) of the agreement . . .²

Mrs. Shih: 9(g)?

Dr. Kissinger: Also in paragraph 9(f) we want to put in a sentence that says that the members of the Council are appointed by the two parties. This is now an understanding. We want it as an explicit provision. They agree with this. It's just an understanding now. I'm giving you only the important changes.

In paragraph 9(h) there is now a provision that the two sides should demobilize some forces. We want to add a sentence that these forces are to be demobilized on the basis of equality of the two sides and that the demobilized forces should return to their homes.

In another section on the reunification of Vietnam, where we mention a number of paragraphs of the Geneva Agreements³ that are ap-

² All ellipses are in the source text. Apparent reference to a draft of what would become the Paris Peace Accords on Vietnam.

³ The text of the Geneva Agreements of 1954 is in *Foreign Relations, 1952–1954*, vol. XVI, Part 2, pp. 1505–1520.

plicable, we also want to mention Article 24 which is against military pressures of one side against the other. It is now there in language. We just want to say “consistent with Article 24.”

The only other thing we want . . . there are two other things. One is that the international inspection machinery to which they have already agreed should operate on the day that the agreement is signed. This just requires the signing of a protocol which is not in dispute.

And secondly, a position that we have never given up; that is, outside the agreement prior to the signing, North Vietnam should withdraw some of their troops from South Vietnam. After all, it is not easy to tell an ally that its neighbor has the right to keep its entire field army on its territory. What we want is the withdrawal of a few divisions in the northernmost part of the country.

If these conditions are met there are a number of technical changes that are really not important or substantive. They are almost entirely a question of form, such as turning the agreement into a four-party agreement. But they would bring about sufficient changes so that we could have discharged our obligations toward our ally. In these circumstances we would take a very flexible view on the proposal of simultaneous ceasefires in Laos and Cambodia. This is the framework now.

The situation is getting very serious on two levels. One, by the constant repeating of the same charges the North Vietnamese are making it a matter of prestige. And to the extent the Chinese side repeats these charges this will in time affect our relations which as you know have been one of the central elements of our foreign policy.

And we simply wanted you to know that we genuinely want to make an agreement with the Vietnamese. We would like to do so as soon after the election as possible. We have no interest in humiliating the Democratic Republic of Vietnam. On the contrary, we would like to normalize our relations to prevent other big countries further away from having a foothold. We are prepared to help reconstruct the DRV. We consider this present misunderstanding as an interlude.

We are embarrassed by some of the things that have happened; and we will move with great determination to bring about peace within the framework already agreed. If we are pushed against the wall, we will have to resist, and then we will resist immediately and decisively.

I wanted to assure the Prime Minister, and we will assure the North Vietnamese, that after the election we will return to making peace. We have no interest in stepping up the war unless absolutely forced to do so. We want peace. We maintain the essential agreement. We need some assistance. We are caught in a dilemma between our honor and our intention. There is no sense trying to force us into acting dishonorably. Our interest is to normalize relations in Indochina and to accelerate dramatically the normalization of our relations with the

People's Republic, and we know the two are linked. (Mr. Kuo indicated he didn't fully understand.) We know the two are related.

This is nothing new. I have told you only what we said before. I wanted to say it personally because I believe you know how interested I am in relations with the People's Republic and how much we would like to accelerate that. And now that we are heading into a new term we don't want to have to begin it with a war in Vietnam and with disagreements between us. I am saying this in a spirit of understanding, not in a spirit of criticism. I know you have no instructions to reply to me.

Ambassador Huang: We are prepared to convey the message.

Dr. Kissinger: Thank you.

Ambassador Huang: The attitude of the Chinese side has been stated in the recent two messages.

Dr. Kissinger: I know.

Ambassador Huang: And the Chinese government has also issued a statement on the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: That's what I was talking about.

Ambassador Huang: And apart from this I have nothing to add.⁴

Dr. Kissinger: I have one other thing I wanted to inform you of, which concerns Taiwan. As the result of a number of developments we have borrowed from the Taiwanese some airplanes that we have given them, F-5A's.⁵ And while we are borrowing these planes we have put two American squadrons of F-4's on Taiwan. These are only temporary, and they will be removed as soon as we can replace the airplanes that we have borrowed. I again wanted to inform your government that all the understandings that we have with respect to Taiwan will be rigorously carried out as soon as the war in Vietnam is concluded.

⁴ On November 14 Kissinger discussed with the President the previous evening's dinner with Rockefeller, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and Huang Hua in New York. Kissinger observed, "Then they talked about Vietnam and said of course we won't interfere and we are in favor of a quick settlement without the humiliation of either side, and we'll use our influence in that direction. And it's the softest I've ever heard them on Vietnam, no particular support for the North Vietnamese." Kissinger added, "They as much as said they would use their influence to keep things quiet in Cambodia." Kissinger also noted that he emphasized to the Chinese that "we may have to make some tough decisions in resisting hegemony around the world in the next four years. And it cannot be in anybody's interest that the United States is put into a difficult position in Southeast Asia after the war ends." Nixon replied: "As a matter of fact, sucked into a peripheral war anywhere, Henry, that's the real thing, Africa or anywhere." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, November 14, 1972, 9:00–9:36 p.m., Camp David Study Table, Conversation No. 153–5)

⁵ See Documents 256 and 264.

(Mrs. Shih has some difficulties translating “F-5A’s” and Ambassador Huang helps her.)

There are 36 airplanes. But we will be removing within the next few weeks other American planes put there. We will give you the details. We will let you know. They have to do with the war in Indochina and will be removed in the next few weeks. They are related to the war in Indochina, and they will be removed regardless of the peace negotiations. We will let you have a list of those planes.

We will do our utmost to conclude a Vietnam settlement by December 1. That is really all I wanted to see you about.

You must know the reason I didn’t meet the Vietnamese [November 4–November 9]⁶ is that I long since promised to accompany the President who is leaving tomorrow for the West Coast. I have avoided participating in the campaign but I must do something in the last three days. This is the reason. This is simply for the information of Peking, because you had referred to it in your last message.

(While the Chinese were waiting for the car Mr. Lord reminded Dr. Kissinger of the new communications set-up. Dr. Kissinger then explained to the Chinese that we have set up a new system in which we can send a message to deliver and pick up messages from the Chinese Mission, and they would be put in a teletype code which can only be read by us. This would be faster and save time. If the Chinese would call us we would send somebody to pick up the message. He was talking about messages that did not require a personal communication. Mr. Lord pointed out that the couriers would be people with whom the Chinese are already familiar. Ambassador Huang said it would be helpful if they were told the name of the messengers. Dr. Kissinger said this would be done in each case. He added that, of course, any time that the Ambassador wanted to see him personally he would come up for that. Ambassador Huang indicated agreement with the new system. There was then brief small talk until the car arrived and the Chinese departed.)

⁶ Brackets in the source text.

264. Memorandum From John H. Holdridge of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, November 3, 1972.

SUBJECT

U.S. Air Deployments to Taiwan in Connection with Operation ENHANCE

As you know, as part of our efforts to provide South Vietnam with F-5A aircraft under Operation ENHANCE, we have requested the Republic of China (ROC) to provide 48 F-5A's by November 10. In return, and in order to assure that the air defense of Taiwan is not weakened, we are sending in two U.S. squadrons of F-4's and loaning the ROC 28 T-38 training aircraft to maintain the flying proficiency of the ROC pilots. The agreement is as follows:²

—GRC to provide 48 F-5A's.

—As temporary replacements to fill air defense gap, U.S. to provide:

—Two U.S. F-4 squadrons to be based on Taiwan.

—Up to 28 T-38 aircraft on loan, in good condition, as soon as possible.

—U.S. F-4's can be withdrawn to meet U.S. worldwide defense commitments.

—First 20 GRC F-5A's will be subject to replacement by returning like number of similar aircraft from Vietnam as soon as available.

—Next up to 28 GRC F-5A's to be "eventually" replaced by F-5E's subject to appropriations of funds by U.S. Congress.

—U.S. to give sympathetic consideration to co-production/co-assembly of F-5E's in Taiwan, from which source F-5E replacements in preceding paragraph may be manufactured.³

—The two U.S. F-4 squadrons will under normal circumstances remain in Taiwan, with first to withdraw when first 20 F-5A's returned, second to withdraw when next up to 28 F-5A's replaced as agreed. Similarly, loan of T-38's will terminate when second F-4 squadron is withdrawn.

This augmentation of U.S. air strength on Taiwan is against a back-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Entirely Out of System. Sent for information.

² The agreement is in telegram 5424 from Taipei, November 4. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–8 US–CHINAT) Telegrams between Taipei and Washington detailing the course of the negotiations with ROC officials are *ibid.*

³ See Document 268.

ground of an earlier increase of two C-130 transport squadrons and 22–24 KC-135's which were relocated from Clark Field due to the floods in the Philippines. However, the KC-135's will be withdrawn very shortly once a movement of A-7 aircraft from the U.S. to Thailand in connection with our buildup there is completed. This should be in a matter of only a few days, following which the KC-135's will return to Clark Field. The two C-130 squadrons of course can be removed once a Vietnam settlement is achieved.

The authorized figure for U.S. military personnel on Taiwan at the end of June 1972 was 7900 in round numbers. This is down from 8950 as of June 1971. There may be some variations in the actual number of military personnel present under the authorized strength. The 7900 figure does not include the temporary stationing of the two C-130 squadrons and the KC-135's. Personnel included in these units amount to 650 and 540 respectively.

The personnel augmentation in connection with the movement of the F-4 squadrons to Taiwan is 850,⁴ including a wing headquarters, 36 aircraft will be involved.⁵

⁴ A handwritten correction in the source text changed 600 to 850.

⁵ A handwritten comment written below this paragraph reads "+ two submarines in press."

265. Memorandum from Richard K. Stuart of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research to the Director, Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Cline)

Washington, November 6, 1972.

[Source: Department of State, INR/IL Historical Files, EA Weekly Meetings, 1971–1974. Secret. 3 pages of source text not declassified.]

266. Special National Intelligence Estimate¹

SNIE 43–1–72

Washington, November 16, 1972.

TAIPEI'S CAPABILITIES AND INTENTIONS REGARDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT²

The Estimate

Background

1. Late in the 1960s, the Government of the Republic of China (GRC) initiated an ambitious program for the procurement and operation of nuclear power facilities on Taiwan. Foreign sources have extended over half a billion dollars in loans and guarantees for this power program, and two reactors are now under construction on the island.

2. The evidence suggests that the generation of electric power is not the only serious interest that the GRC has in the nuclear field. Most of this evidence involves activities at the Chung-shan Science Institute (CSSI), established by order of Chiang Kai-shek shortly after the People's Republic of China (PRC) detonated its first nuclear device in October 1964.

I. Activities at the Chung-shan Science Institute

3. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] the Institute's charter called for military research in nuclear, electronics, chemical, and missile areas. The Institute is funded largely by the military, but there are ties to the government's Committee for Science Development, to its Atomic Energy Council, and to Tsing-hua University. From the beginning, there has been a careful effort at CSSI to maintain security and secrecy, to the degree that our information on activities there is far from complete. [*less than 1 line of source text not declassified*] however, indicates that experimental projects at the Institutes have applications to a nuclear weapons program.

4. In 1969, the GRC signed an agreement with the Canadian Government for the purchase of a 40 megawatt (MW) research reactor. This

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Subject Files, Box 361, National Intelligence Estimates, part 4. Secret; Sensitive. Representatives of the CIA, the Departments of Defense, State, and Treasury, AEC, and NSA participated in the preparation of this estimate. The representative of the FBI abstained, as the subject was outside his jurisdiction.

² A handwritten note on the first page reads: "An accumulation of intelligence reporting has made it appropriate to examine the intentions of the Government of the Republic of China with respect to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The evidence bearing on this subject is discussed in the following paragraphs and is offered in paragraphs 20–21."

Taiwan Research Reactor was placed under the control of the CSSI where its installation is nearly complete, and it should become operational in early 1973. Similar in design to the CIRUS reactor supplied earlier to India, it is heavy water-moderated and fueled with natural uranium.

5. The significance of a heavy water reactor is, of course, its particular suitability for the production of plutonium, using natural uranium as the fuel. As a result, and in view of the other evidence available, we interpret the GRC's procurement of this CIRUS-type reactor as an indication that its interests extend beyond nuclear power and other peaceful-use applications.

6. The Taiwan Research Reactor can probably produce about 10 kilograms of plutonium a year once it becomes operational. The reactor is still nominally subject to safeguard inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), an agency of the UN. But the future of such inspections is in doubt because Peking has already demanded that the IAEA sever all ties to Taiwan,³ and the Canadians do not have a bilateral safeguards agreement with the GRC to serve as a fallback. Since Canada no longer officially recognizes the GRC, the chances that a bilateral safeguards agreement will be negotiated are essentially nil. Thus, assuming that unsafeguarded supplies of natural uranium and heavy water can be purchased from foreign sources, the GRC may be able to operate this reactor entirely free of safeguard restrictions.

7. The GRC has purchased sufficient fuel from Canada to operate the reactor for peaceful research purposes for about four years. It has also received some 12 tons of natural uranium (or the equivalent in uranium concentrate) from South Africa, which would provide fuel for another year or so. If the reactor were operated for the production of weapons-grade plutonium, the fuel presently available would last only for about 18 months. But it seems likely that the GRC will have access to additional supplies of natural uranium—either safeguarded or unsafeguarded—particularly so long as it does not actually detonate a nuclear device. The GRC could even build its own plants to process uranium ore, thus avoiding all problems of safeguards on uranium metal. The same judgments apply to the heavy water needed to moderate the reactor.

8. To extract the plutonium from the irradiated fuel of its research reactor, the GRC would need a chemical separation plant. Taipei will

³ We note that IAEA did make inspection of this reactor in October 1972 and that IAEA has made a unique arrangement to provide for inspections in another non-member state, East Germany. [Footnote in the source text.]

probably not encounter great difficulty in purchasing, without safeguard restrictions, the necessary facilities and technology from foreign sources to build at least a small plant. Chemical separation plants are normal components of any nuclear power program, and the technology is openly available. Negotiations between the GRC and a French firm for such a plant are in an advanced stage. If these are not successful, other possibilities include West Germany, Belgium and the UK.

9. *Timing.* Assuming the GRC is bent on fabricating a nuclear device, it is still some years away from the attainment of this objective. While the Canadian-built 40 MW reactor will be producing plutonium next year, it may require as long as three or four years to build a plant that can successfully extract the plutonium from the spent fuel of the reactor. Assuming that design work on a nuclear device proceeds during construction of the chemical separation plant, it might be possible for the GRC to fabricate a nuclear device as early as 1976. Testing and weaponization could require another two or three years. Thus, we see little prospect that the GRC could achieve a weaponized nuclear device earlier than 1978. Foreign technical assistance might facilitate the achievement of results on the illustrative timetable outlined above, but there seems to be practically no chance that the GRC could get the kind of restricted information that would be necessary to compress this timetable. Indeed, these dates are quite optimistic considering all the problems that remain to be solved.

10. *Size of the Program.* Taiwan is now in the process of negotiating for additional power reactors. It appears that military authorities have been applying pressure on Taiwan's commercial power company to procure reactors which are optimal for the production of plutonium from natural uranium. These pressures appear not to have prevailed in the case of negotiations for the purchase of Taiwan's third and fourth power reactors during this past year. There are plans for procurement of two more reactors; if the decision once more goes against the heavy water type, it would suggest that the GRC is interested at most in a small weapons program; i.e., about two weapons a year based on the output of the Taiwan Research Reactor.

11. *Delivery Capabilities.* At this stage, there is no evidence of GRC efforts to develop a nuclear delivery system which would pose a credible threat to mainland targets. The GRC has purchased a short-range, surface-to-surface missile (the Israeli Gabriel Mark II), but this program would have little application to the development of a strategic missile. Jet fighter-bombers on Taiwan could reach the mainland with bombs weighing up to 2,000 pounds, but it is uncertain that the GRC could achieve a weapon this small in the early stages of a weapons program. Payload constraints might also rule out arming the Nikes on Taiwan with nuclear warheads for use as a surface-to-surface weapon against invasion forces in the Taiwan Strait. (This missile has a surface range

of about 110 miles with a 1,000-pound warhead.) There are a few Boeing 707s and 727s in commercial use on Taiwan which might conceivably be used to deliver nuclear weapons. These aircraft would naturally be vulnerable to the PRC's air defense system.

II. Intentions

12. We have no reliable information on the military and political calculations behind the GRC's activities in the nuclear field. What we do know points to a relatively ambitious nuclear power program and a smaller effort to develop a capability to design and produce nuclear weapons. There is no evidence that Taipei has a firm scenario on how to use such a nuclear weapons option, assuming it can be developed. We can only speculate about how Taipei expects to use any such capability.

13. *What Taipei May Hope to Achieve.* Chiang Kai-shek's initial reaction to the PRC's nuclear test in 1964 may have been only an expression of his determination not to be left behind by Peking's technological achievement. He may also have felt an urgent need to counter the new potential for nuclear blackmail from Peking. Perhaps he also felt a need to demonstrate—if only for his military leaders—a determination to resist the communists independently if necessary.

14. Certainly, in the eight years since the Gimo made his decision, Taipei's concern over standing alone has grown. While the nuclear umbrella of the US is still implied by the Mutual Defense Treaty, some on Taiwan may be questioning how long they can count on all-out US support. In this perspective, a nuclear weapons option may be seen by the GRC as one of the few feasible deterrents to communist attack in an uncertain future.

15. It seems doubtful, however, that Taipei has worked out any detailed plan on how such an option might be exercised. More likely, Chiang Kai-shek's initial stimulus has probably gathered momentum as the military-scientific bureaucracy expanded to meet his request, and it is unlikely anyone would suggest cutting back what now looks like a feasible enterprise. Moreover, the cost for the kind of modest program now underway is readily manageable.

16. *Arguments Against Fabricating and Testing Nuclear Weapons.* While we know of no opposition within the GRC to developing a capability for producing nuclear weapons, we believe there is an awareness in Taipei of the risks involved in moving on to actual tests, which could not be concealed from world-wide attention. This attitude is indicated in part by the GRC's continuing care to preserve secrecy, in the first instance to deny information to the PRC. Taipei can not help being concerned over Peking's reactions to a weapons test. In its propaganda, Peking would no doubt treat such evidence of a nuclear weapons capability on Taiwan as a threat to peace, not only in East Asia but in global terms. The GRC's eviction from the UN has reduced

its opportunities to answer any such charges effectively, or to muster any substantial support from its few remaining friends. It could anticipate further alienation from them, a particularly serious development in the case of Japan.

17. Taipei's secrecy is also rooted in concern regarding US reactions. Almost certainly there is fear that exercising a nuclear weapons option might endanger the further support of the US. Taiwan's security is so heavily dependent on the continued adherence of the US to the Mutual Defense Treaty, that any move on Taipei's part which might imperil that relationship would not likely be taken without long and careful study.

18. Moreover, before Taipei actually decided to test a nuclear device it would have to consider the almost certain consequence that disclosure of this fact would lead to world-wide pressure to cut off fuel supplies and technical support for its nuclear power program which, the GRC is acutely aware, cannot be pursued with its own resources.

19. Perhaps most important, Taipei would have to consider whether the existence of a small number of nuclear weapons would really serve to deter Peking, rather than provoke it to action. Moreover, the GRC can be under no illusions about the cost of developing an effective delivery system for nuclear weapons. It clearly lacks the resources to compete with Peking in the area of nuclear weapons.

III. Conclusions

20. We estimate that the GRC will continue to work toward the capability to design and produce nuclear weapons. At this point, Taipei may see such a capability as a potentially useful hedge for the unknown exigencies of the future, when Taiwan may be alone and facing great risks. We believe, however, that Taipei will take pains to conceal its intentions, and will cover activities which are necessarily overt by associating them with research in the generation of nuclear power for peaceful uses.

21. We believe Taipei's present intention is to develop the capability to fabricate and test a nuclear device. This capability could be attained by 1976; two or three years later is a more likely timeframe. The GRC is likely to establish this foundation in order to be able to proceed with the fabrication and stockpiling of nuclear weapons should that seem advisable. In particular, further decisions would depend on such considerations as the state of relations with the US, the posture of the PRC, and conditions on Taiwan itself. So far, Taipei's prudent and cautious response to its series of international upsets over the past few years suggests no intent to risk provoking Peking or alienating the US and Japan. Thus, from our present perspective, Taipei does seem determined to keep its weapons option open, but we would doubt that a decision would be made to proceed with testing or with the fabrication and stockpiling of untested devices.

**267. Joint State–Defense Department Memorandum for
President Nixon**

Washington, November 16, 1972.

[Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 330 77 0095, China (Nats), 471.61, 1972. Top Secret. 8 pages of source text not declassified.]

268. Memorandum From the Under Secretary of State for Security Assistance (Tarr) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and the Director, Office of Management and Budget (Weinberger)¹

Washington, November 24, 1972.

SUBJECT

F-5B/E Aircraft Proposal for the Republic of China

The GRC under project “Enhance Plus” provided 48 F-5A’s to South Vietnam. We agreed to return 20 of these aircraft and replace the other 28 F-5A’s with 28 F-5E’s. We also agreed that: “The United States will give sympathetic consideration to the coproduction/coassembly of F-5E aircraft in Taiwan, from which the F-5E replacements mentioned above . . . may be manufactured.”²

Since a coproduction/coassembly aircraft capability is something President Chiang has long sought and since we stated we would give “sympathetic consideration” to the F-5E project, we have examined a proposal for direct procurement of 15 F-5B’s (trainers) and the coproduction/coassembly in Taiwan of 100 F-5E’s (memorandum at Tab A).³ After taking into account our relations with the PRC, the costs of the proposal and its effects on US and ROC economies, likely Congressional reaction, and our understanding with the GRC under Enhance Plus, we have concluded that coproduction/coassembly of F-5E

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI. Top Secret; Sensitive; Nodis.

² See Document 264.

³ Attached but not printed is a 7-page review of ROC requests for F-5 aircraft, Congressional and economic issues, financing, and recommendations.

aircraft in Taiwan would be a reasonable and sound project and would fulfill our obligations to the GRC under Enhance Plus.

Accordingly, I propose to:

—Approve the 100 F-5E coproduction/coassembly project, limiting eventual fabrication/subassembly in Taiwan to the nose and tail sections, and the procurement of 15 F-5B's in the US.

—Limit total financing of this project to no more than it would cost to purchase 15 F-5B's and 100 F-5E's direct from US production (\$225.3 million).

—Finance the F-5E coproduction/coassembly project with \$45.9 million in US grant funds (the flyaway cost of 28 F-5E's from US production) and the balance—\$179.3 million—through FMS credits to be negotiated and disbursed over the production period.

—Approve the obligation of grant funds of not less than \$17.6 million this year from FY 1973 MAP funds as a temporary financing measure to be reimbursed from the \$45.9 million to be sought in an overall supplemental request for funding the entire Enhance Plus program.

Unless you have objections, I intend to approve this project in time to meet our oral commitment to the GRC to provide a response to them by December 1, 1972. I would of course be grateful for your reactions and comment.

The Department of Defense concurs in this proposal. Ambassador McConaughy has been consulted and also concurs.⁴

Curtis Tarr

⁴ Documentation on the Department Defense's position is in Washington National Records Center, RG 330, ISA General Files: FRC 330 75 0155, China, Rep. of, 1972, 0001; and *ibid.*, OSD Secret Files: FRC 330 77 0094, China (Nats), 400-137-800, 1972. In telegram 5684 from Taipei, November 22, McConaughy wrote: "[W]e had virtually committed ourselves to the program during our negotiations with the Premier and there is considerable urgency to achieve a preliminary understanding. I am also confident that the proposal you are about to send to Under Secretary Tarr is very fair and will prove acceptable to the GRC." (Telegram 5684 from Taipei; National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 12 CHINAT) In a December 15 memorandum to Kissinger, Holdridge and Kennedy suggested that Kissinger approve the recommendations in the Tarr memorandum. A December 15 memorandum signed by Kissinger to Tarr reads in its entirety: "The F-5 aircraft proposal contained in your memorandum of November 24 is approved. Our representatives should make clear to the GRC that this is not an initial step toward development of an independent jet aircraft production capability on Taiwan. Please arrange the necessary advance notification of Congress." (Both memoranda are *ibid.*, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 523, Country Files, Far East, China, Vol. XI) Telegram 230192 to Taipei, December 21, informed McConaughy that he could notify ROC officials of this decision. (*Ibid.*)

269. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Paris, December 7–8, 1972, 11:25 p.m.–12:15 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Major General Alexander M. Haig, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Winston Lord, NSC Staff
John Negroponte, NSC Staff
Huang Chen, PRC Ambassador to France
Mr. Tsao, Political Counsellor, PRC Embassy
Mr. Wei, PRC Embassy
Mr. Lin, PRC Embassy

Dr. Kissinger: (Looking at the Chinese snacks) You are going to destroy me.

Ambassador Huang: You have just finished your conversations?

Dr. Kissinger: There are always two sets of conversations, one with the North Vietnamese and after that with the South Vietnamese. And they are unanimous, both of them, in disagreeing with me. I have united them.

Ambassador Huang: It is very important. That's the way to resolve the problem.

Dr. Kissinger: I have asked, Mr. Ambassador, to see you, even though you are not our normal channel for this sort of conversation, because matters are at a very critical point. You were our original contact but not the normal one now for Vietnam matters. Because the consequences will be extremely serious, I want to talk to you frankly and not diplomatically. I have even brought a General [Haig]² in order to impress you.

Ambassador Huang: We are alike.

Dr. Kissinger [to Haig]: You know the Ambassador is a General.

The situation is as follows. I will not bore you with all the details. I am certain you have no instructions to debate with me so I will understand if you say nothing. [Ambassador Huang nods slightly]

In October when the North Vietnamese made certain proposals to us, we agreed to accelerate the procedure, perhaps unwisely. We have explained all this to Peking and there is no sense in repeating it here. The basic problem was we had no opportunity to consult our allies

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Embassy.

² All brackets and ellipses are in the source text.

before these negotiations. Our allies violently objected to the agreement as you know. We have accepted only a very small percentage of their criticisms. At the same time, we told them, the President told them, last week we would make an agreement alone if necessary and that we would apply all pressures to bring about such an agreement, pressures on South Vietnam. That included even threatening with respect to economic and military assistance. This is a very serious decision for us and a very painful one. And we can do that vis-à-vis our own people only if we can demonstrate that Saigon refused a minimal reasonable program.

Last time I was here [in November] there were some changes and there were only four issues left. We agreed on certain changes.³ We had proposed what we considered a very generous solution. We conceded everything that it is in American power to concede, for America to concede. The rest is in the control of South Vietnam. Today Mr. Le Duc Tho has refused every proposal and withdrawn every change that was agreed to last time. And he has demanded that we return to the old agreement without change or to a new agreement in which he proposes so many significant changes that it will be worse than the old one. We cannot accept either. After two months of additional negotiations we cannot return to what was already considered inadequate then and what the North Vietnamese even admitted needed change by the fact that they were negotiating with us. And we can, of course, not accept a worse agreement. The President cannot begin a new term after he has been elected with a majority of 61 percent by surrendering his principles. The consequences are very great. We are four issues away from an agreement. If North Vietnam maintains its position, we will certainly break off the negotiations and we will take whatever action is necessary to defend our principles. If we agree with North Vietnam it will mean the end of any strong American foreign policy.

The Interpreter: You mean a policy of force.

Dr. Kissinger: No. I mean a long-range, anti-hegemonial policy.

The Interpreter: Please repeat in English.

Dr. Kissinger: Anti-hegemonial. With respect to the last sentence—if we agree to this position of the North Vietnamese it will destroy any possibility for a long-term anti-hegemonial policy for the U.S., and it will destroy the policy and the personalities.

³ Kissinger and Huang met on November 25 from 12:35 to 1:30 a.m. in the PRC Embassy. At this meeting, Kissinger reviewed recent developments in Sino-American relations and U.S. talks in Paris with the Chinese and Vietnamese. The memorandum of conversation, November 25, is in National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's Files—China Trip, China Exchanges. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E-13, Document 169.

What is at stake now is not a few clauses in a treaty but the whole orientation of our policy. And therefore before we take the grave steps that will be taken we wanted to put the issue before the Prime Minister.

The Interpreter: The Prime Minister?

Dr. Kissinger: Your Prime Minister. I am assuming that the Ambassador will report to the Prime Minister. I came here with absolute instructions from the President to settle. We were prepared to settle even without the agreement of Saigon. But we will never give up our honor. And therefore we have delayed the meeting tomorrow until the afternoon, and I will probably postpone it until Saturday morning.⁴

Mr. Tsao: Saturday morning?

Dr. Kissinger: It will be the first time that we are the hosts. We intend for the Vietnamese to come to our place tomorrow. We were going to give them some Chinese food. It will give me an excuse to eat Chinese food. [Ambassador Huang laughs.]

So very often when one talks about ordinary policy problems one uses standard phrases. This is not an ordinary problem. It will lead to a disastrous course. It will not help Vietnam because we have conceded everything possible to concede. If you read the newspapers you will find that even our opponents on the left criticize us for conceding too much. And it must affect not only our relationship as a result of our actions but our ability to do the things we promised to do, and even more important, the things events will probably force us to do.

Let me repeat that in short sentences. It will affect first our ability to carry out many things we promised and wanted to do. More importantly, it will affect our ability to do those things which the hegemonial desires of others should require us to do over the next few years.

So this is the situation we now face. And therefore we wanted to see whether it was possible for the friends of Hanoi to convince it that we have no designs in Indochina except a decent way to end the war. [Mr. Tsao and the Ambassador discuss among themselves.]

If this opportunity is missed, we will face a very grave situation. This is not a maneuver. This is not a trick. We have proposed a schedule whereby the treaty could be signed by December 22.

Interpreter: A schedule?

Dr. Kissinger: December 22. I am authorized to agree to settle while I am here, today or tomorrow. We are asking nothing new or unfamiliar to North Vietnam.

[At this point more food was brought in, and Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Huang laughed.]

⁴ Saturday, December 9.

So this is the situation. I will propose a postponement of tomorrow's meeting. I do not expect a reply, but you can reach me at the Embassy. But it is one of those moments where there is a choice, a very brief time between peace and a war that can have no quick ending.

Ambassador Huang: Are you going to have another talk tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: I will cancel tomorrow in order to permit . . . If we have talks tomorrow it will break up.

Ambassador Huang: Your intention is to have another talk on Saturday?

Dr. Kissinger: I will postpone tomorrow's talk until Saturday.

Ambassador Huang: The next meeting starts Saturday morning, or is it limited to Saturday morning?

Dr. Kissinger: I understand. If the North Vietnamese do not change their position on Saturday morning, I will have to break off the talks.

Ambassador Huang: So we understand that if North Vietnam rests on the same position on Saturday you will break off the talks.

Dr. Kissinger: That is correct. We are not asking for them to accept our position. We made very significant concessions today. This is the situation, Mr. Ambassador, and I am sorry to have disturbed you. [Ambassador Huang shrugs.] It was a personal pleasure to see you.

Ambassador Huang: I am also happy to see the Doctor and General Haig.

Dr. Kissinger: He was in China.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for the information on the negotiations between you and Vietnam.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm like the Ambassador. I understand everything.

Ambassador Huang: Like I said last time, the position of China is clear to you, and I won't repeat that. We have said that the world's people watch closely the evolution of the Vietnam problem and wait only for a peaceful solution to come soon. As you know, the solution of the problem would not only conform with the wishes of the U.S. and the Vietnamese people but also contribute to the relaxation of tensions in Asia. We hope still that this can lead to good results and there will be a try to find a peaceful solution and an agreement. I must repeat that we hope you will find a peaceful solution through negotiations on this problem.

Dr. Kissinger: We know your sentiments, and we respect them. This is one of those critical moments where the standard approach will not help, and therefore before something irrevocable happens, I wanted to have an opportunity to talk to our Chinese friends.

Ambassador Huang: Like I said last time, sincerely and completely frankly, if one cannot have an agreement that can only help the one who seeks hegemony.

Dr. Kissinger: I am in complete agreement with you. That we are trying to prevent not only in Indochina, but on a global basis.

We will postpone tomorrow's meeting to permit some calm thought to develop. [Ambassador Huang nods.]

Ambassador Huang: I hope that Dr. Kissinger and the General will continue to make efforts. All the world's people follow closely the negotiations on Vietnam and hope that you will arrive at a peaceful solution by negotiations.

Dr. Kissinger: That's our hope also.

I always see you very late in the evening.

Ambassador Huang: You are always welcome no matter what the hour.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't you negotiate for the North Vietnamese? We would settle the problem in one afternoon.

Ambassador Huang: It is the business of North Vietnam. It is a sovereign country.

Dr. Kissinger: I keep my staff by promising trips to China.

Ambassador Huang: You're thinking of a trip to China?

Dr. Kissinger: I am planning one very soon. Will you come again?

Ambassador Huang: It's possible.

I will see Ambassador Watson tomorrow evening.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, he is a great admirer of yours.

Ambassador Huang: I will give him his visa personally.

[Dr. Kissinger then explained how the Chinese had delicately turned down visa applications in the Ottawa Embassy and he called this "très elegant." The Ambassador laughed and said it was very diplomatic.]

Ambassador Huang: You will invite the Vietnamese to a meal at your place?

Dr. Kissinger: We have been meeting at a Vietnamese home. So Saturday we will meet in an American home but will serve them Chinese food because they are more used to it than American food.

Ambassador Huang: You have a cook who can do Chinese cooking?

Dr. Kissinger: Not as good as here, but we will find somebody.

Ambassador Huang: When you get a peaceful solution of the problem, I will invite you here to celebrate.

Dr. Kissinger: I am very pessimistic now. I don't think it will succeed.

Ambassador Huang: I have always said that the Doctor is always optimistic. Why this new pessimism?

Dr. Kissinger: But today I became pessimistic and for that reason I came to see you.

Ambassador Huang: We only hope that the two parties can bring to a successful conclusion the negotiations and try to sign an accord as soon as possible.

Dr. Kissinger: We will make one more effort. That is all we can do. We have gone beyond the limits.

Mr. Ambassador, please give my warm regards to our friends in Peking.

[There were then mutual declarations of stronger friendship between the Chinese and American peoples and cordial small talk as the Ambassador escorted Dr. Kissinger and his party to the door. He and his staff remained on the steps and waved goodbye as the Americans drove away.]

270. Memorandum of Conversation¹

New York, December 16, 1972, 6–7 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Huang Hua, PRC Ambassador to the United Nations
Mr. Kuo, Notetaker
Mrs. Shih Yen Hua, Interpreter
Mr. Winston Lord, NSC Staff

(Mrs. Shih met Mr. Lord at the entrance to the Mission, took him to the elevator and they went to the second floor reception room where meetings are usually held. Mr. Kuo was there as well. The Ambassador came in shortly and there was brief small talk. Mr. Lord noted the attractiveness of the new front to the building and explained the reasons for his delay in getting to the meeting because of airplane difficulties. Mr. Lord then noted that the Ambassador must be busy and immediately began the business discussion.)

Mr. Lord: As our note to you said we have reason to believe that the North Vietnamese have been giving other governments an inaccurate version of the negotiations in Paris.² We wanted you to have a cor-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President's File—China Trip, China Exchanges. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the PRC Mission to the UN.

² A message with the handwritten notation, "12/15/72, China Exchanges," reads in its entirety: "The U.S. side has reason to believe that the Democratic Republic of Viet-

rect, updated account. Dr. Kissinger would have liked to come personally but he must remain in Washington today with the President.

Ambassador Huang: I saw that he had a press conference today.

Mr. Lord: Yes, I brought a copy of the transcript for you. Here it is. (He hands over transcript of Dr. Kissinger's December 16 press conference.)³

We want your government to have a true picture of the negotiations and the North Vietnamese tactics which represent bad faith and have prevented an agreement.

I am giving you two documents which help explain the situation. At Dr. Kissinger's press conference this morning he explained the situation in general terms to give the trend and the pattern of the negotiations and to let the American people know where these negotiations stood. He purposely did not get into specific matters of substance. I have as well for you a summary paper which gives in specific terms the remaining issues in the negotiations. (Mr. Lord hands over the paper at Tab A)⁴

You can read these documents later. You will see that there are very few specific issues left. But this is highly misleading. The central problem is not any particular issue but the obvious North Vietnamese intent to stall and delay a settlement.

The remaining issues in the negotiations could have been solved in one session any of these few days. But the attitude of the DRV during this last round was not serious. Whenever we got down to one or two issues, they would reopen ones that were already solved, or they would raise new ones, or they would take an issue that had been resolved in the Agreement in exchange for concessions on our part and try to make it part of an understanding which would carry equally binding obligations.

Let me give you a general rundown of the December negotiations to indicate the pattern. I will give you some examples, which are important not primarily for their substance but as a reflection of the tactics that the North Vietnamese were using.

nam has been giving inaccurate accounts of the recent negotiations in Paris to other governments. If the Chinese side so desires, Dr. Kissinger would be prepared to provide an updated, correct version of these negotiations to Ambassador Huang. It is the U.S. side's view that the North Vietnamese have been deliberately delaying negotiations by raising technical objections of an occasionally even frivolous nature. These negotiations could certainly have been concluded this past week if there had been reciprocal good will and serious intent." (Ibid.) The message in telegram form from Haig to Hood, December 16, is *ibid*.

³ Printed in Department of State *Bulletin*, January 8, 1973, pp. 33–40.

⁴ Not found.

We had made good progress in the negotiations in November, and we were down to a few issues. At the beginning of this last round, they withdrew all the changes of November. So we spent several days getting back to where we were on November 25. We finally got down to one issue, concerning the Demilitarized Zone. On this issue we were only asking them to agree to language they had accepted in November. They had agreed to a sentence which said that North and South Vietnam should respect the Demilitarized Zone. However, in this round they were trying to add additional language which would take away this concession and in our view effectively abolish the present status of the DMZ. We were only asking them to go back to where we had been in November.

Ambassador Huang: What language were they trying to add?

Mr. Lord: They wanted to add a sentence along the lines of among the issues to be negotiated between South and North Vietnam are modalities or regulations for movement across the Demilitarized Zone. We believe this would effectively abolish the present status of the zone.

When we were down to this one issue, Dr. Kissinger sent General Haig back to Washington to stand by with Vice President Agnew, who had already been waiting for several days in order to undertake a trip to Saigon to present the completed Agreement to our allies. Vice President Agnew had been waiting for some time and the North Vietnamese knew it. This was an intolerable procedure.

Another issue arose in the last couple of days, concerning the procedure for signing. In October, the North Vietnamese had proposed that there be a two-party signature and we had reserved on whether to make it a two party or four party signature, depending on the views of our ally. Now the North Vietnamese wanted a four party signature. We are prepared to have the agreement equally binding on all four parties with identical obligations, but there is a problem with respect to mentioning the titles of the two South Vietnamese parties in the preamble, thus implying recognition.

On December 11, the North Vietnamese suggested a compromise which we thought could be workable. They suggested that the US and the DRV jointly sign one document including the preamble which mentions the titles of the government, and that the two South Vietnamese parties each sign a separate document which would include all the obligations. If the North Vietnamese proposal meant that the documents to be signed by the two South Vietnamese parties would not include the preamble and, therefore, the titles of the two parties, we thought this would be a workable solution. It would mean that all four parties would be equally bound by the agreement, and we would get around the problem of implied recognition through the titles. However, on December 12, the North Vietnamese withdrew their proposal of the pre-

vious day. Thus instead of being down to one issue there were two issues remaining of substance.

Again I am giving you the specifics on these issues, but the primary problem was the North Vietnamese attitude and tactics. Whenever we got down to just the one or two issues, they would continually raise new issues or reopen ones that had already been solved. Let me give you some examples.

On the morning of the final day, before the principals met, the two sides' experts met to go over once again the Vietnamese and English texts. This was designed merely to conform the two texts and reconfirm mutually agreed changes that had been made of a technical nature by the experts in two other sessions that week. However, the North Vietnamese introduced several new issues, some of them of substantive importance. And this was on the final day when we thought we were down to just two issues.

Another example concerns the membership of Indonesia on the International Control and Supervisory Body. Without getting into the merits of their being a participant, the fact is that both sides had agreed that Indonesia would be on the Commission in October. No objections had been raised since then. During the November round of negotiations, Dr. Kissinger went to Brussels to see President Suharto, and the North Vietnamese knew this. Indonesia had agreed to serve and, as I said, there had been exchanges on the Presidential level. In the last two or three days of our negotiations this time, the North Vietnamese suddenly raised objections to Indonesia's participation. This, of course, puts us in an impossible position.

Another example has to do with Article I. This article calls for respect for the Geneva agreements of 1954.⁵ There had been original language which singled out the US, which we considered highly invidious. However, we agreed to return to language which included both the US and other countries on Saturday in exchange for their dropping one of their demands, namely that all US civilians associated with military tasks be withdrawn in a specific period. After we had agreed to go back to the unfortunate language of Article I, the next day, the North Vietnamese proposed the withdrawal of US civilians in an understanding which would be equally as binding as in the agreement. Thus they cancelled out effectively the concession they had made in return for the Article I language the previous day.

Still another example of the North Vietnamese tactics concerns the protocols. These are supposed to be technical documents which would help implement the provisions of the agreement, such as ceasefire. We

⁵ See footnote 3, Document 263.

gave the North Vietnamese our drafts of the protocols several weeks ago. They did not give us their drafts until the second to last day and there had been no discussion on the protocols at all up to that time, despite our constant request for their documents.

We found their drafts, instead of being technical documents reflecting the substance of the agreement, instead reopened issues already settled or tried to introduce obligations that had been left out of the Agreement itself. For example, the North Vietnamese had agreed in November that the National Council would have no role in implementing the ceasefire. In their protocol, however, the Council was given a major role in implementing the ceasefire. Also, as I have indicated, they had agreed to leave out of the agreement itself the obligation that we withdraw all US civilians in military tasks. In one of their protocols they reintroduced this obligation and said that it had to be completed within six months.

I want to emphasize again the important thing is not so much the substance of these various issues, but the unacceptable North Vietnamese tactics, of which these are examples.

Let me conclude by just commenting on two issues of concern to the North Vietnamese that are now being discussed in the framework of understanding.

First, there is the question of withdrawing US civilians that I have mentioned. We offered to write into the agreement that there would be no civilians working on military operations or operational military training, and that civilians would not perform tasks that they were not already performing on October 15. We would also undertake to gradually withdraw our civilians from South Vietnam. This would meet whatever legitimate concern the North Vietnamese might have with regard to civilians performing roles that the military personnel that we were withdrawing used to perform. However, the North Vietnamese would not accept our proposals. They continued to demand that we withdraw all civilians connected with military tasks totally in a specific period. This would lead to the collapse of our ally's defense establishment, and this we will not do.

The other issue of concern to the North Vietnamese is that of the civilian prisoners in South Vietnam. We are prepared to use our influence on this question, and it would be easy to settle if they would give us assurances on a schedule for demobilization and redeployment. But they can't expect us to allow them to keep 150,000 of their troops in the south and then add 35,000 more in the prisoners being released.

I want to thank the Ambassador for listening so patiently to my long explanation, but of course this is an extremely important question. We wanted to give you a specific rundown so as to show you the tactics and the attitude and the techniques of the North Vietnamese.

As I said we could have solved the remaining issues with mutual good will in a very short period. But we were unable to do so because of the North Vietnamese approach which we consider frivolous and unacceptable. Therefore, we wanted your government to have the true picture as we see it. Thank you.⁶

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for your briefing us. I have another question. During the past negotiations the US side proposed that there be some military movement in the northernmost part of South Vietnam in the framework of an understanding.

Mr. Lord: It was left that redeployment and demobilization would greatly ease our problems and make the question of civilian prisoners easier to resolve. (There was brief discussion among the Chinese.)

Ambassador Huang: In the past you once proposed that the North Vietnamese make some token troop movements in northern part of South Vietnam.

Mr. Lord: I do not believe that “token” is the correct word. We have always wanted a significant number to be redeployed. There is no firm understanding on this as yet, and we were not able to have a discussion of figures. We have indicated that movement in this area would be very helpful concerning South Vietnamese civilian prisoners.

Thus, we remain very interested in redeployment and we think it would be very important.

⁶ On December 18 Kissinger ordered William Hood to deliver to the PRC representatives in New York a copy of a U.S. message to the DRV. (Message from Kissinger to Hood, December 18; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 850, President’s File—China Trip, China Exchanges) On December 22 Haig instructed Hood to deliver to the Chinese a message of that date for the DRV. An attached message for the Chinese began: “The President would like to bring to the personal attention of the Chinese leadership the latest US proposal to the DRV. The US side wishes again to reiterate its readiness to settle rapidly and its conviction that this is a major contribution to easing tensions all over Asia.” (Haig’s instructions and message for the DRV, December 22; *ibid.*) Also on December 22 Fazio gave the PRC representatives a transcript of Kissinger’s December 13 meeting with DRV representatives in Paris. (Fazio’s memorandum for the record, December 29; *ibid.*) On December 23 McManis provided to the Chinese a transcript of Kissinger’s December 11 meeting with DRV representatives. (Memorandum for the record, December 29; *ibid.*) On December 28 McManis delivered to the Chinese a copy of a message for the DRV which would be given to the Vietnamese on December 29 at 9:30 a.m., which reads in part: “The U.S. accepts the following propositions: 1. Experts of the two sides will resume meetings on January 2, 1973. 2. A private meeting of Special Adviser Le Duc Tho and Minister Xuan Thuy with Dr. Kissinger will take place on January 8, 1973 in Paris.” According to a handwritten note, this message was also given to the Soviets on December 28. (*Ibid.*) The final exchange of messages in 1972 included a December 29 complaint from the PRC about a U.S. missile hitting Chinese territory and a December 30 U.S. expression of “regret” over the incident. Both messages, relayed through Hood and Haig, December 29, are *ibid.* See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. E–13, Documents 172–175.

Ambassador Huang: Thank you for your explanation.

Obviously the Vietnamese people and the American people hope that the Agreement on a ceasefire and restoration of peace in Vietnam will be signed at an early date. The present delay is disappointing. I will report your explanations and send your documents to our government.

Thank you for coming today at our request. We know that Dr. Kissinger has just gotten back and is very busy, and we understand that he could not make it. We have finished our conversation now.

(There was then brief small talk, during which Ambassador Huang apologized that there were no refreshments beyond the tea being served and said that this was impolite. Mr. Lord rejoined that the Chinese are never impolite. Mr. Lord then said that he had to leave to get back to his Chinese wife. Ambassador Huang asked whether Mrs. Lord spoke Chinese, and Mr. Lord replied that she spoke Mandarin fluently. She had forgotten how to read and write Chinese and was in the process of relearning this. Ambassador Huang offered some text books but noted that they were elementary. Mr. Lord thanked the Ambassador and said that his wife was beyond that stage, but that it was an extremely thoughtful offer on the part of the Ambassador.)

The Ambassador, Mr. Kuo, and Mrs. Shih then took Mr. Lord down the elevator and to the front door where there was a cordial exchange of farewells.)