

Soviet Union, October 1971–May 1972

Announcement of Summit Through the South Asia Crisis, October 12–December 1971

1. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 12, 1971, 11 a.m.

HENRY A. KISSINGER BRIEFING OF WHITE HOUSE STAFF

SUBJECT

Soviet Summit Announcement

Kissinger: I want to read the announcement that the President is making. Then I will make a few general comments; then answer any questions you may have.

[Reads text: “The leaders of the United States and the Soviet Union in their exchanges during the past year have agreed that a meeting between them would be desirable once sufficient progress had been made in negotiations at lower levels. In light of the recent advances in bilateral and multilateral negotiations involving the two countries, it has been agreed that such a meeting will take place in Moscow in the latter part of May 1972.

“President Nixon and the Soviet leaders will review all major issues with a view towards further improving their bilateral relations and enhancing the prospects for world peace.”]²

This will be made simultaneously in Moscow and Washington at 12:00 Noon today.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1025, Presidential/HAK Memcons, Memcon—Henry Kissinger, Briefing of White House Staff, Oct. 12, 1971. Secret; Sensitive. The meeting was held in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

² Brackets in the source text. President Nixon read this announcement at his press conference in the White House Briefing Room, beginning at 11:27 a.m. on October 12. The President then answered questions on the upcoming summit in Moscow, U.S.–USSR relations, and other issues. The press conference ended at 11:55 a.m. The announcement and the text of the press conference are in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 1030–1037.

Now, the major point I would like to get across to this group is this. While the President sometimes accuses us of not pushing him enough, in this case the danger is of overkilling. We must maneuver this between China, Russia and our allies. The danger is that if we claim too much, we will infuriate the Chinese and give impetus to feelings in Western Europe similar to Japan. And above all we lose our negotiating position with the Soviets. Success will come not from the fact of the visit, but from what comes out of it.

We have to be hard. Our experience was that the Soviets before July 15 thought they had us on the ropes; the China announcement³ has had an effect. We have had the best period with the Soviets since then.

The meeting speaks for itself; we should hold it in low key. With my interim trip to China,⁴ and beating them over the head in Vietnam, this is as much as the traffic will bear. It will help us if each thinks we have an option, but neither thinks we are squeezing them.

R. Allen: Were the Germans and the others notified? Won't there be a Nixon shock?

Kissinger: The key ones have had fair advance warning,⁵ though not all of them.

Flanigan: Some will have had more than the Japs have had.

Kissinger: There have been six months of consultation. Some of them have been travelling without telling us. The United Kingdom, France and Germany have had substantial advance notice.

Allen: Will this take the wind out of the Ostpolitik sails?

Kissinger: It is hard to tell with that government. If there is a race to Moscow, they won't win it.

Colson: Why announce it now? There will be speculation.

Kissinger: It was arranged some weeks ago; it fitted in the game plan. It is the same lead time as the Peking trip. Our judgment was to make it open, so that both sides knew.

Colson: Will it be interpreted as a delay in SALT or MBFR?

Kissinger: You have to assume the opposite: the leaders would expect to have an agreement by then. How we stage the completion is a tactical issue. In a negotiation started by an exchange of letters, you have to assume that the summit is not predicated on failure.

Colson: The speculation will be.

³ Reference is to Nixon's announcement of Kissinger's secret trip to China via Pakistan, July 1–13.

⁴ Reference is to Kissinger's upcoming trip to Beijing, October 20–26, to prepare for the President's visit to the People's Republic of China, February 21–28, 1972.

⁵ The German, French, and British Governments were informed on October 11.

Kissinger: Let Humphrey⁶ scream if it is not this year. We will do it in March.

Ehrlichman: What response do we give to questions about the domestic impact? Is it a cheap political shot, or a dumb play into Russian hands?

Kissinger: Let them compare what the President said about summits at the beginning of his term with the situation at the summit. He said there had to be progress. Progress there has been, on SALT, on Berlin, on accidental war, and so on. This is the earliest possible time. Secondly, we are engaged in an historical process and we will be judged by the outcome.

Flanigan: Why is the President going there?

Kissinger: The last time Khrushchev came here. That was the last official bilateral visit. Khrushchev issued an invitation to Eisenhower; it was accepted and then cancelled.⁷

Allen: Richard Nixon in the campaign (“Nixon on the Issues”) talked of a “series of summit meetings.” We should get that out.

Garment: Are there any theories of the likely Chinese reaction?

Kissinger: We have some idea, but I don’t want to get into that.

McGregor: The President is going to the Hill and will get a warm reception. Is this consistent with low key?

Kissinger: A good reception in Congress will be great. As long as he doesn’t get carried away. The key thing to avoid is a statement that the United States and the USSR as two superpowers can settle everything. This will drive the Chinese and our allies up the wall.

Petersen: “First China, then Russia.” Where do our friends stand? The Japs will ask.

Kissinger: We have an answer. Emperor Hirohito had to come first—this was their requirement. Second, the Japanese can’t do it in the summer because Sato⁸ will be stepping down then.

Scali: How do we answer the question: Were the Chinese advised in advance?

Kissinger: Yes.

Price: Specifically, will the Mideast be discussed?

Kissinger: Look at the text: “all major issues.”

⁶ Senator Hubert H. Humphrey (D–Minnesota).

⁷ Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev made an official visit to Washington and Camp David, Maryland, September 15 and 25–27, 1959. President Eisenhower’s scheduled June 10, 1960, visit to the Soviet Union was cancelled by Khrushchev on May 16, 1960. Khrushchev cited U.S. unwillingness to apologize for U–2 reconnaissance flights over the Soviet Union as the cause.

⁸ Eisaku Sato, Prime Minister of Japan.

Colson: Who announces in the USSR?

Kissinger: TASS.

Scali: Who arranged it?

Kissinger: Gromyko brought an invitation to the President.

Scali: And the President agreed in that meeting?

Kissinger: Yes—but we have been discussing it for a year.

Scali: Through State channels?

Kissinger: Yes.

McGregor: My wife says I believe you, sweetheart, but millions wouldn't.

Shultz: I have suppressed euphoria.

Kissinger: The building blocks are getting in shape. It is a delicate structure. If one part unravels, all of it will.

2. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to the President's File¹

Washington, October 12, 1971, 12–12:54 p.m.

SUBJECT

President Nixon's Meeting with Congressional Leaders on October 12, 1971, 12 noon–12:54 p.m. in the Cabinet Room. (List of participants is attached.)²

The President began the meeting by noting that at that moment the announcement he would shortly be reading out to the Leaders was being simultaneously published in Washington and Moscow. The President said that after reading the announcement he would provide some background and then be open to questions. He looked forward to a good discussion in this small group. The President then read out the announcement concerning his trip to the Soviet Union in May, 1972 (Tab A).³

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 315, Subject Files, Congressional, Vol. 3. No classification marking.

² Attached but not printed. Attending the meeting for the bipartisan Congressional leadership were Senators Hugh Scott, John Stennis, Mike Mansfield, Allen Ellender, Milton Young, and Congressmen Gerald Ford, Les Arends, Carl Albert, Hale Boggs, George Mahon, and Thomas Morgan. Accompanying the President were Rogers, Kissinger, Counsel to the President for Congressional Relations Clark MacGregor, and Sonnenfeldt.

³ Attached but not printed; see Document 1, footnote 2.

Turning to the background, the President recalled his first press conference in January of 1969 when the question of a summit with the Soviets was raised.⁴ At that time he had said that we should not have such a meeting unless something came out of it, otherwise it would be merely cosmetic and there would be a great letdown. This also turned out to be the Soviet view. In April, 1970, the Soviets began exploring the possibility at lower levels. But the President did not think that a meeting at the highest level at that time could serve a useful purpose. There then ensued a period of many discussions at various levels. In the last few weeks the Soviets indicated that they thought the time was ripe and Gromyko brought a formal invitation when he came to Washington.

The President continued that in fact we had made sufficient progress. He cited agreements on biological warfare, the seabeds, the hot line and accidental war. But the most important one was on Berlin. That problem was not solved totally but the United States and the Soviet Union, plus the two other countries involved, were able to reach agreement on an area where our interests clashed. Now the President drew the conclusion that it was possible to go to other areas.

The President then took up the point of why the meeting was set for May rather than, for example, next month. In the first place, he said, the Soviets set the date. In addition, we were having very intensive negotiations on strategic arms. While we were aiming for agreement this year it might not come until next year. The subject was high on the agenda. In this connection, the President referred to recent stories about the huge Soviet arms build-up, particularly on the Soviet side. While SALT had made progress on the defensive side, agreement would not be reached without the offensive side because that was where the Soviets were ahead. We cannot have an agreement based on defensive equality but freezing Soviet offensive advantage. The President was confident that we would have a SALT agreement but it must not freeze us into inferiority.

The President cautioned against euphoria in connection with this Moscow trip. There continued to be great differences: in the Caribbean and Southeast Asia, in Europe and most fundamentally as regards systems of government. Nevertheless the overwhelming fact was that if there ever was a superpower conflict there would be no victors, only losers. The Soviets know this as well as we do. Neither super power would let the other get an advantage sufficient to enable it to launch a preemptive strike. Therefore, we should explore areas where we can limit or even perhaps reduce arms.

⁴ Nixon is apparently referring to his second press conference, February 6, 1969, when he was asked about future meetings with Soviet leaders; see *Public Papers: Nixon, 1969*, p. 67.

Apart from arms, there were such problems as Europe and trade. Without listing an agenda, the President said the Moscow talks would deal with all “questions of mutual interest.” This included peripheral areas like the Middle East, where we hoped for progress before the summit; Southeast Asia and its future, where we will go forward with our two-track policy and will not wait until May; and the Caribbean.

To sum up, the President said when we look at the future of the world negotiations rather than confrontations were essential. It did not matter if we had a difference with a small country like Bolivia, but in the case of the Soviet Union it could be disastrous. The President then stressed that the two trips he was planning—to Peking and Moscow—were completely separate and independent. We were in the position of pursuing the best relations with both, but not with one at the expense of the other. The President added that we had informed Peking, the European allies and Japan of the Moscow trip, but because of the Soviet passion for secrecy, which they share with other communists, we had to be extremely careful not to risk a leak.

Invited by the President to comment, Secretary Rogers said that we had given good advance notice in this case, something we had not been able to do in the case of the Chinese trip. The Secretary commented that in his view the US-Soviet climate at the moment was the best ever, at least on the surface. The President said that we were not taken in by climate alone. The substance of relations this year differed from last year like night and day. Secretary Rogers continued that in the Middle East the maintenance of a cease-fire was very important and constituted progress in itself. He felt that the President’s trip to Moscow would give us additional time in the Middle East. The Secretary concluded that at the UN, where he had seen more than 45 foreign ministers, the most important thing was the question of US-Soviet relations. Today’s news would reassure everyone at the UN further.

In response to a question by the President concerning Peking’s reaction, Dr. Kissinger said that the President had set the tone by saying that each relationship contributed to peace. We would not collude with one side against the other nor involve ourselves in the Sino-Soviet dispute which turned on ideology and the border question. Dr. Kissinger said we were meticulous in keeping each side generally informed about what we were doing with the other. The President interjected that the Soviets had been informed of Dr. Kissinger’s forthcoming trip to Peking. Dr. Kissinger concluded that we had been completely honest with both Moscow and Peking.

The President noted that there might be forces in the Soviet Union and China which had reservations about what was happening. Their radios would undoubtedly say critical things. But he had made a command decision not to play one off against the other. The President re-

called his first NSC meeting where the decision was made against “condominium.”⁵ The President commented that just on practical grounds, it made no sense for us to join the stronger power against the weaker. In any case we have to remember that the Chinese have a great future. But we were following a delicate course and were on a tightrope. The President thought that the allies and many Asians welcomed what we were doing. Secretary Rogers added that the Europeans had all welcomed the President’s China move.

Senator Mansfield said he welcomed the information the President had given but he wondered about Peking’s reaction and whether an advisory notice had been enough. Dr. Kissinger said that the Moscow trip had been discussed in general terms when he was in Peking, although not in specifics. The President said Dr. Kissinger had been candid and had said that we would proceed with the Soviets. Dr. Kissinger commented that today’s announcement was helpful to the Chinese in that it undercut the Soviet argument that the Chinese were colluding with us. Senator Mansfield said he would like to see nothing that interfered with the Peking trip because the letdown would be very bad.

Representative Mahon asked whether the Peking trip would occur before the Moscow trip. The President said that it would. Actually, the Soviets had proposed July but this was too close to our political conventions. So the Soviet visit would be in the second half of May but before the first of June. The President added that the meeting would take place in Moscow because it was our turn to go there since Khrushchev had come here. The question of having the meeting here had not even been raised. No US President has been to Moscow while the Soviets have been here twice, counting Kosygin at Glassboro.⁶

Senator Ellender said he was proud the President was going. Ever since the President had entered office the Senator had asked him to go. The last time when he asked to see the President he had been sent to Dr. Kissinger. He now wanted to ask the President to receive him before leaving for Moscow. The President responded that he would. The Senator went on to say that he had information vital to the President and he had been instrumental in setting up the Kennedy–Khrushchev meeting in Vienna.⁷ He then recalled an incident when Khrushchev came to lunch with the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and had greeted Senator Ellender with hugs and kisses in full view of everyone.

⁵ For minutes of the January 21, 1969, meeting, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume II, Organization and Management of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1969–1972.

⁶ Soviet Premier Kosygin visited Glassboro, New Jersey, for an informal summit with President Johnson, June 23 and 25, 1967; see *ibid.*, 1964–1968, vol. XIV, Documents 217–238.

⁷ Reference is to the summit meeting in Vienna between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev, June 3–4, 1961; see, *ibid.*, 1961–1963, vol. V, Documents 82–85 and 87–89.

The Senator said that he had talked to Khrushchev and other Politburo members many times and he also had some wonderful movie pictures which he thought would be helpful for the President to see. Concluding, Senator Ellender said he had been in every part of Russia. He admonished the President to “keep the military out of this.”

The President said that he would have extensive consultations with Congressional Leaders, depending of course on what subject comes up and where things stood at the time of the meeting. Trade certainly would come up as would Vietnam. We will have extensive consultations with the Leaders and, of course, also with our allies. The President wanted to stress, however, that when you deal with Communist Leaders they have a phobia, almost a paranoia, about privacy. But he would want the fullest input before the meeting. The President noted that just as with the Chinese there were no advance understandings with the Soviets in connection with the Moscow trip.

Representative Boggs said that his Committee had had extensive hearings on East-West trade but had had no luck with legislation. Secretary Rogers said the President’s trip might help in this regard. The President commented that the Soviets were paranoid on the question of linkage of one subject to another though they themselves, of course, link everything. The fact was that trade and trade legislation were related to the situation in Southeast Asia, as the war winds down the possibility for trade goes up.

Senator Scott said that in the three years since he had been in the Soviet Union, there had been tremendous progress especially in the field of precision instruments. As an example, the Senator said he was wearing a \$150 Russian watch which only cost him \$14.40. The President pointed out that we were moving ahead on trade and had granted export licenses for the Kama River project, amounting to \$400 million. Everyone could be sure that trade would be a very lively subject.

Speaker Albert said he was happy about the President’s trips and glad that the one to Peking would occur before the one to Moscow. The President said that if he had gone to Moscow before Peking, the Chinese trip would have been blown. The Soviets did not object to the sequence. Secretary Rogers said they had no chance to object.

Senator Stennis said he was very impressed with the President’s plans. He assumed that SALT would not be stopped as a result of this announcement. The President said it would not. On the contrary, the announcement may give impetus to it. The President went on to say that with the way the Soviets were moving with their build-up, with SALT where it was and the summit coming up, he had to fight for a credible defense program in order to maintain our bargaining position. He realized that there were some who objected to the size of the Defense budget but our purpose was not to have an arms race but to stop

it. It was essential to stop the Soviets because they were moving ahead. Secretary Rogers noted that the President had said to the press that we would try to get a SALT agreement before the summit and, failing that, would talk about it at the summit. The President said that the SALT agreement at present under negotiation was only a freeze so there would be a lot more to talk about after an agreement.

Representative Boggs recalled that he had sat in the Cabinet Room when President Kennedy had reported that the Soviet missiles were being removed from Cuba, and when President Johnson had reported the first Chinese H-bomb explosion. He was conscious of how important today's news was.

When Representative Ford began to speak in support of the President's plans, the President commented that he expected support from Republicans but also appreciated the help of the Democrats. We all had the same goal. The important thing was not to miss the chance to exert influence with one superpower and one potential superpower. It might not work but we would certainly try. And it was very important to remember that we were not playing one off against the other. We were very meticulous in keeping each informed.

Reverting to the earlier discussion, Congressman Mahon said it was especially important to get the Defense budget for the President even if the Defense Department sometimes does stupid things. The President pointed out that the Soviets were not cutting back, therefore, we could not cut back.

Senator Stennis wondered why there was a better climate with the Soviets. The President said he would not attempt to speculate, but he felt there were good reasons of Soviet self-interest. For a long time the Soviets had to catch up in armaments but now there was a rough balance. They now have to make a command decision about whether to go on. They must know that if they did, they could get away with it only for a short time. There would be a new arms race and who would be the gainer? The President thought the Soviets were also concerned about the situation with respect to their neighbors and the Middle East. In addition, despite the progress they had made they were still behind economically. While the Soviets were now Mr. Big and undoubtedly still wanted to expand and hold on to Eastern Europe, their future would not be served either by an arms race with us or by a confrontation which could produce no victors if it becomes war.

As the photographers entered, Mr. MacGregor told the President that Senator Fulbright could not participate in the Leadership meeting because he was attending the 100th anniversary of the University of Arkansas, whose President he had been at one time.

While the pictures were being taken, the group talked about the World Series and the football season.

3. Notes of Cabinet Meeting¹

Washington, October 12, 1971, 4:37–5:38 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion on the economy, wage and price controls, taxes, and labor.]

The P then turned to the Russian Summit. Made the point that this did not develop out of the blue, that there have been discussions in detail over the past two years, that there could be no meeting until there had been progress in other areas to indicate that a Summit would be useful. Gromyko brought the invitation this year, and we accepted it. You have to realize what has happened up to now in foreign policy, such as the sea beds, the completion of the nonproliferation treaty, biological warfare, accidental war, hot line,² and most significant, Berlin. What about Vietnam, Middle East, arms control and trade? That all depends on the situation at the time. Those are all possible areas of discussion with the Soviets. The agenda will be determined by developments between now and May. There will be a very limited group going with the P. It'll be a working visit. Regarding China, each of these trips is separate. We're seeking new relations with China, and we're seeking to continue our negotiations with the Soviets. We're doing neither at the expense of the other. We're not playing them against each other. About our allies, on questions such as mutual balance, enforced reductions, etc., we'll discuss with them in detail first before we take any steps with the Soviets. What it really means to United States defense is that the fact of the meetings is itself a hopeful sign, but we recognize that our differences are very deep and very broad. We will continue to have different views, and we've only agreed to discuss those differences. For some to conclude naively, as they have, that the whole world has changed, and so forth, is ridiculous. None of that type of thing is true. We're aware of the differences, but we should talk about them. Re Soviet Union, now in military strength—offensive—well ahead of US and still building so US must continue its own program

¹ Source: *The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*. No classification marking. The diary is based on Haldeman's handwritten notes, portions of which are inserted below. The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files) Special Assistant to the President, Raymond K. Price, Jr., also prepared notes of this meeting. (Ibid., White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President, Beginning, October 10, 1971)

² The phrase "biological warfare, accidental war, and hot line" was excised from the published *Haldeman Diaries*. It is reinserted here from Haldeman's hand-written notes. (Ibid., Staff Members and Office Files, Haldeman Files, Box 44, Haldeman Notes, Oct.–December 1971, part I)

until have agreement on offensive and defensive [weapons] that doesn't put us [in] inferior [position].³

We welcome the opportunity to talk, it could be hopeful. It can change the relationships, but there is no reason for euphoria. There is no real change in either attitude, but the big fact overall is that the superpowers know that if there's a conflict, there are no winners now, only losers. And neither of us will allow the other to gain an advantage. So if SALT breaks down and the Soviets continue their buildup, then the United States must also build up. So the two great powers have a common interest in limiting the arms race and negotiating the areas where they rub, such as Berlin, the Middle East, South East Asia, Caribbean, etc. We look to this period to continue to maintain our strength, to continue to negotiate with the Soviets and to work on a new relation with China. We're on a very high wire. We're trying to stay there vis-à-vis the Soviet and China. Ironically, we're in the position that each of them rates the other as more of an enemy than either of them rates the United States. So we must handle the whole thing very evenhandedly.

Rogers then made the point that it's very important that no one attempt to express substantive views, that there's no need to add anything to what the P has said on the subject (*of the Summit*). He said that he felt there were four ideas that we should consider. First, that there's no time in the history of the United States where a President has undertaken such a comprehensive effort for peace. No President has ever tried so hard before. Second, the world is a more peaceful place now than it was two and a half years ago. What the P has done has been effective up to now. Third, everything the P has done is consistent with what he said since the beginning. In other words, it's an orderly foreign policy. It's hard to handle and anticipate, and the way the P has managed it has helped in being able to do this. Fourth, as a result of all this, it is an era of negotiation. So you add it all up, and it's clear that the P is the world leader for peace. People will come to appreciate this, the kind of leadership the people expect. Other country's leaders will say this, and it's time that we started recognizing it.

[Omitted here is discussion of Vietnam, prosperity, and baseball.]

³ This sentence was excised from the published *Haldeman Diaries* but is reinserted here from Haldeman's handwritten notes. (*Ibid.*)

4. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 15, 1971, 8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Soviet Ambassador Anatoli Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Dobrynin greeted me in his oiliest fashion. He called in his cook to explain the menu to me, and to say that this is the menu he had only for very special guests. Indeed it had one course more than usual.

Preliminary Matters

Dobrynin began by producing a message from Brezhnev to the President, which is attached at Tab 1.²

Secondly, he said that our warnings about the danger of an India-Pakistan war had been taken very seriously in Moscow. Moscow had made immediate representations in both India and Pakistan, and had been informed by India that Pakistan had moved 10 divisions to the Kashmir frontier. I said that our information was different; our information was that Yahya Khan had agreed to a withdrawal of his forces from the frontier provided India would do the same, and had suggested talks among the chiefs of staff. Dobrynin asked whether this applied to West Pakistan also. I told him that it did and that we would appreciate the Soviet Union's good offices in this respect. Dobrynin said he would do his best.

Dobrynin then said he had a number of other messages. One concerned a forthcoming visit by Kosygin to Cuba. Dobrynin pointed out that it was next to impossible for Kosygin to visit Canada and refuse to visit Cuba. The visit would be of very short duration and would be in very low profile.³

Finally, Dobrynin said that Brezhnev had been very grateful for the manner in which I had so far handled the Middle East discussions. They appreciated the information I gave them about the overtures to

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy. This memorandum of conversation is attached to an undated and unsigned memorandum to the President summarizing the discussion.

² Tab 1, a "non substantive message" from Brezhnev to Nixon, October 16, expressing satisfaction about the summit and suggesting that "there will indeed be plenty to talk about" is attached but not printed.

³ Kosygin visited Canada October 17–26 and Cuba October 26–30.

the Egyptians. They wanted to assure me that the matter would be kept in the strictest confidentiality, even in the conversations with the Egyptians in Moscow during Sadat's visit. (The overture he was referring to was my informing him of the proposal made by Rogers for both sides to send secret emissaries to New York.)

In response, first of all, I repeated that our information was that the Pakistanis were prepared to withdraw from the border.

Secondly, with respect to the visit to Cuba by Kosygin, I had to point out that Cuba was a subject of special sensitivity to the United States and of particular sensitivity to the President. Therefore, a demonstrative visit would not be taken well. This would be particularly true of a visit by Brezhnev, as was being reported in the newspapers. (Dobrynin interrupted to say that Brezhnev had had an invitation for a long time to visit Cuba but had so far avoided it.) I then told Dobrynin that the visit by a Soviet naval flotilla to Cuba the week after the summit announcement was not particularly helpful. The visit was not against our understandings as such, but it nevertheless could not be considered a particularly friendly act. Dobrynin said that the Soviet government suffered very much from the separation in its top ministries. He was sure that the Foreign Ministry knew nothing about this visit. He was practically certain that it had been approved several months before, since the plans of operations of the Navy are usually approved at 4-month intervals. Nevertheless, he said, he would take the point and see whether there could be some restraint on provocative actions.

I said finally, with respect to the October 12 summit announcement, that the Soviets' prior notification of France and Japan, two of our allies with whom our relations were most precarious, did not sit particularly well. Dobrynin in reply avoided the explanation transmitted to me from Gromyko. He said that he had no explanation for the Japanese case but in the case of France it must have been because of Brezhnev's imminent visit. However, he said, I should note the offer in Gromyko's communication that henceforth in cases of notification we would agree ahead of time who would be notified when, and they would keep these agreements. (Gromyko's communication is at Tab 2.)⁴

⁴ In an attached copy of a telegram from Gromyko to Kissinger, communicated to Kissinger by Dobrynin by telephone on October 12, the Soviet Foreign Minister admitted that the Soviet Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo "committed a blunder" in informing his counterpart 1 or 2 days before the announcement of the summit, but stated that since the fact was not made public, no serious damage was done. Gromyko suggested that the United States had made this kind of mistake in the past and the United States was well aware that "the confidentiality of our negotiations is strictly adhered to by the Soviet Government."

The Middle East

We finally turned to the Middle East.⁵ There was a long discussion of procedural and bureaucratic problems and a long recital by Dobrynin again of the absolute futility of dealing with Sisco. I explained to Dobrynin that before I could commit myself to engaging in these negotiations I had to know where they were going, and I also had to know whether they were diplomatically manageable. I told Dobrynin I was not sure that I could guarantee results in the present circumstances, and therefore he should understand that we should have about a month of discussions. He said he wanted to go on leave and it would be highly desirable if I could let him know by November 20th or 22nd. I said I would do my best.

Dobrynin said I had to understand the Soviet position. The Soviets had rejected urgings by the Egyptians to give them offensive weapons. The Egyptians had even offered them special facilities in Egypt in return for offensive weapons. The temptation to do so was very great. On the other hand, it also had the danger of confrontation with the United States and was inconsistent with the general approach now pursued by Brezhnev. Therefore the matter was not trivial. If we decided that we were not ready, this would not mean that the summit would fail, but it did mean that both sides would continue to pour commitments into the Middle East, and the future was unpredictable.

Dobrynin said that on the tactical level the way he visualized matters was as follows: If I told him that there was a chance to proceed, then the Soviet Union would approach the Egyptians early in January to tell them that they would try to negotiate secretly with us. He said they would take about a month for this. If Egypt agreed, we would point for an interim agreement to be concluded about the time of the summit and then a final agreement to be consummated within six months of the President's inauguration, or around July 1973. This was the time frame that Gromyko had envisaged based on his conversation with me.

Dobrynin said he could not understand Israel's objections. This was the most generous offer the Soviet Union would ever make. They were offering withdrawing their forces, limiting arms shipments into the Middle East, and guaranteeing the settlement. What more could Israel possibly want? I said that, well, a lot would depend on their with-

⁵ At the President's instruction, Kissinger, during a meeting with Gromyko in Washington on September 30, suggested that he and Dobrynin use their private channel to begin "exploratory conversations . . . to test the feasibility of a bilateral understanding on a Middle East settlement." The memorandum of the Kissinger September 30 conversation with Gromyko as well as that of Nixon with Gromyko on September 29 are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

drawing their forces. Dobrynin said he was authorized to tell me that they were willing to reduce their forces in Egypt to the level of the U.S. forces in Iran, that is to say, not in organized military units. Even that, he said, was the maximum figure; they might well agree to a lower figure, and they were willing to implement this starting with the time the interim agreement was signed.

I said I proposed that we reverse the usual procedure—that instead of talking about an interim agreement first, we would try to talk the next time about the nature of the final settlement and work back from that. I said that I had the impression that if it was possible to leave some Israeli troops in Sharm el Shaikh, with perhaps some land connection of an extra-territorial nature which did not affect Egyptian sovereignty necessarily, the problem could be settled very easily. Dobrynin said they would agree to any foreign troops in Sharm el Shaikh—American, Soviet, French, or any combination of forces that seemed reasonable. But Israeli presence was out of the question and could never be sold to the Egyptians.

Dobrynin repeated that he did not understand the hesitation to accept such a settlement. As for the interim settlement, he said it didn't make any difference whether the withdrawal was 25 or 35 miles and we shouldn't even discuss the depth of the withdrawal until we were clear about the final settlement. Dobrynin said that the Soviet Union was prepared to have an embargo on arms into the Middle East or at least to limit severely additional shipments into the Middle East. As for guarantees, Dobrynin said they would agree to almost anything we proposed, and it was really up to me to make the suggestion. In short, except for the frontier, which he believed had to be the international frontier, he said that the Soviet Union would be extremely flexible in the settlement.

I said that the settlement might be easier to sell to Israel if it was decoupled from a Syrian and Jordanian settlement, that is to say, if the Israelis did not believe this was the first step in that direction. Dobrynin said that this was no problem for them as far as Jordan was concerned. They had no major interest in a Jordanian settlement. (He avoided the Syrian point.) He again stressed the importance to our relationships of making some positive progress on the Middle East.⁶

⁶ On October 16 at 10:20 a.m. Kissinger briefed the President over the telephone about this discussion with Dobrynin on the Middle East. "They [the Soviets] say they will make a commitment that will not organize units and they will have a commitment on either an arms embargo or . . . [limitation of arms?] into Egypt and this interim settlement should be stretched out and that will keep the Egyptians quiet until the end of the year." RN: "Do you think the Israelis will squirm?" Kissinger responded, "That is a decision we will have to make in December—we will have to be tough on both sides. RN: We can't give the Israelis the moon." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) At 10:55 a.m. Kissinger telephoned Dobrynin to inform him that Nixon "approves our proceeding in that way" (as described above). (Ibid.)

Conclusion

We talked briefly about the mechanics of the President's visit, e.g., what time of the day he should arrive. Dobrynin said that they preferred their foreign guests to arrive around four in the afternoon, but it was still quite premature.

I showed him the letter that the President proposed to send to Brezhnev.⁷ He said it would be very important if he could get it soon, since the Politburo was meeting in the early part of the following week.

The conversation then ended.⁸

⁷ See Document 6.

⁸ On October 16 Haig sent Kissinger a memorandum stating that Dobrynin called (Kissinger had left for Beijing) to inform him that at their meeting of October 15 he did not have a response for Kissinger on Vietnam. Dobrynin received a response from Moscow after the meeting. Haig summarized Dobrynin's remarks: "D. stated that the ideas which were brought to his Foreign Minister's attention by you were conveyed to the leadership of North Vietnam. In principle, the North Vietnamese side is prepared to continue contacts with the American side to try to find agreement on the quickest way of ending the war. The North Vietnamese side prefers to use the mechanism which already exists in Paris, especially the confidential talks with you." The memorandum was also sent as backchannel message WH10882 to Lord for Kissinger (en route to Beijing), October 16. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

5. Editorial Note

On October 16, 1971, Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger sent President Nixon a memorandum analyzing the recent trip of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat to the Soviet Union. Sadat was in Moscow October 11–13 for talks with General Secretary Brezhnev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers Kosygin, and President of the Presidium N.V. Podgorny. The analysis, drafted by Harold Saunders and Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council staff, was based only on public reaction and public statements. After speculating why Sadat went to Moscow—to pressure the United States and Israel, to obtain additional Soviet military help, and to repair damage in Soviet-Egyptian relations—Kissinger informed the President that, "Judging from the public statements and speeches, Sadat gained assurance of continued military assistance. How specific this is in terms of new equipment remains to be seen." Moving to the Arab-Israeli situation, Kissinger stated that "it is not clear what occurred in Moscow. The speeches and communiqué seem to reflect Soviet-Egyptian differ-

ences. Sadat's tough language about the use of force to pressure Israel was not endorsed in the communiqué, and the Soviets generally avoiding talking about the dangers of war." "The idea of an interim settlement was not mentioned" and the Soviets couched their statements "in terms of the UN [242] resolution and Israeli withdrawal from all occupied territories, and a settlement reached through [UN envoy] Jarring. Podgorny did say, however, the Soviets supported efforts inside and outside the UN to reach a settlement." The memorandum concluded that "the Soviets will evidently provide some further aid but have continued to hold to the position that a military solution is not feasible at this time." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VII) The condensed version of the communiqué, October 14, as well as Podgorny's speech on October 12 are in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, Vol. 23, No. 41, pages 5–8.

In a subsequent undated memorandum to the President, Kissinger reported to Nixon that Sadat had informed the Soviet leaders that he planned to initiate military action against Israel, that he needed new Soviet military equipment to respond in depth to expected Israeli retaliation in depth, but he would only do so if the Israelis made the first strike. Kissinger recounted, "Brezhnev cautioned that unpleasant propaganda would result from initiating military action and stressed the need for a political solution." The Soviet Defense Minister assured Sadat that he already had more and better military equipment than Israel and a substantial Soviet military presence including 50 Soviet fighter aircraft, 9,500 advisers, and satellite and aircraft reconnaissance capability. Nonetheless, agreement was reached to provide 10 missile carrying TU-16 aircraft (Egypt's deep strike capability against Israel), 100 MIG 21's and a squadron of MIG 23's, all having new engines, one battalion of 180 mm guns with a range of 26 miles, and 220 mm mortars with ammunition. Deliveries of bridging and minefield equipment as well as artillery pieces would be made in 1971 with aircraft deliveries stretched out to 1972. Kissinger concluded: "A reading of the full transcripts give the impression that the Soviet position is ambivalent; it could be interpreted as either extremely tough or a holding action. The Egyptian posture, on the other hand, is decidedly abject." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 637, Country Files, Middle East, UAR, Vol. VII)

6. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, October 19, 1971.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I appreciated receiving your letter of September 7.² I have reflected carefully on it as well as the very full and, I believe, constructive talks we have had with Foreign Minister Gromyko.³ I want to stress again what I already told Mr. Gromyko: my belief that our two countries have a special responsibility for peace and progress. This attitude underlies our policies on specific issues. We are prepared to subordinate tactical advantages to global concerns and we understand from Mr. Gromyko that this is your attitude also.

Now that the meeting in Moscow has been announced, both sides have a concrete goal on which to concentrate. I have asked Dr. Kissinger to begin to work with Ambassador Dobrynin in this special channel on the agenda of the forthcoming conference. Our attitude will be to reach the widest area of understanding before you and I meet so that the Moscow Summit can indeed mark a new departure in U.S.-Soviet relations. With this in mind, let me touch upon some of the issues which are of mutual concern.

I note with gratification that since I wrote to you on August 5⁴ the Four Powers completed the first important stage of an agreement on Berlin.⁵ This was a major concrete accomplishment on the road to a stable peace and demonstrated the effectiveness of cooperative efforts by our two countries. At the present stage, the Berlin negotiations are in the hands of others but it is clear that our two Governments have a direct interest in seeing the agreement as a whole completed so that it can take full effect. This will then set the stage for additional progress in removing the elements of crisis and confrontation between East and West in Europe so that relations will become increasingly constructive and cooperative in character.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. An undated and unattributed draft of this letter has handwritten revisions by Kissinger. The major substantive change made by Kissinger was to insert paragraph two of the letter. (Ibid.) On October 16 Haig sent an unsigned copy of this letter to Dobrynin. (Ibid.) A note at the top of the page reads: "Orig hand carried to Amb. Dobrynin, 10/19/71."

² The letter is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–76*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

³ Printed *ibid.*

⁴ Printed *ibid.*

⁵ The Quadripartite Agreement on Berlin, signed September 3, 1971.

I am, of course, fully aware of your interest in a conference on European questions. As I explained to Mr. Gromyko, I believe that such a conference could be of benefit if it can produce meaningful accomplishments. The necessary explorations and preparations, with the participation of other interested countries, could, I believe, fruitfully begin as soon as the Berlin agreement is complete. Meanwhile, I believe it could be advantageous for Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin to have some informal and very private talks to clarify the concrete objectives of a conference. I think that experience has shown that some mutual understanding of what a negotiating effort is intended to produce can be of considerable help for the prospects of that effort.

As you know, Mr. Secretary, the U.S. Government, together with governments allied with it in NATO, has for some time conducted the most serious and intensive preparations for possible negotiations to reduce military forces in Europe. While for objective reasons, such as the facts of geography, this is a very complex subject, I believe that the coming year could yield some significant progress in this area as well.

In my conversation with Mr. Gromyko, I outlined in some detail my view of the present status of our negotiations on the limitation of strategic armaments. We, and, I am sure, you too, are now preparing for the next round of the formal negotiations in Vienna. If, as in the past, there is opportunity for additional progress through private exchanges here in Washington I am, of course, prepared to undertake them. Much detailed work has been done on an ABM agreement and I think we should now also intensify the parallel work on measures limiting offensive weapons. I believe it is important to view this first major strategic arms agreement for which we are both striving as one whole, even if we are dealing with it in separate parts. Because it will be the first agreement—the foundation upon which further agreements and, indeed, our overall relations in the years ahead will be built—it is important that it command wide support and confidence. Realistically, it is probably not feasible in this first stage to eliminate certain disparities in the numbers, types and dispositions of the strategic forces which our two countries have come to maintain. What we should strive to do, in proceeding on the basis of the principle of equality, is to reach agreements which as a whole prevent the further growth of our respective arsenals and safeguard our relative security positions. We should, in other words, work for a “freeze” in both the major areas under negotiation. I am convinced that if we can make the political decisions required to give concrete definition to such a “freeze,” the agreements themselves can be completed quite rapidly.

Mr. Secretary, I have carefully reviewed the points you made on the Middle East in your letter and also the remarks of Mr. Gromyko on this subject. The unsolved crisis in this region remains the most acute threat to the general peace and therefore a most urgent task for

our two Governments to address. I found some of the ideas presented by Mr. Gromyko very constructive. Without repeating in detail my own views, which Mr. Gromyko will have reported to you on the basis of his talks here, let me state my conviction that progress is unlikely to be made on the basis of the total or "ideal" proposals advanced by or in behalf of the parties to the conflict. The lasting settlement of which I spoke in my letter of August 5 will, I believe, come about only if a start is made on a more limited or "interim" basis. In addition, it will be essential for outside powers, especially great ones such as ours, to display restraint in all their activities with respect to the region. At the present stage it would be desirable for Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin to review the situation as it now exists and to explore informally the ways in which our two Governments can best contribute to progress toward a settlement.

Together with the Middle East, Vietnam remains a factor complicating relations between us. I do not wish to repeat the points I made in my last letter. I would simply say that the United States is and has long been ready for genuine negotiations. That is our preferred way of concluding the Vietnam conflict. But if that road remains foreclosed, we will continue to solve this conflict in our own way.

Mr. Gromyko, in his talks with me, referred to our trade relations. As our relations generally have improved over the past year or more, the opportunities for better commercial relations have grown also. I have made a number of decisions, of which you are aware, to give impetus to this trend. While in the present world situation certain limits remain, further progress can be made in the mutual interest. I am prepared to send the Secretary of Commerce, Mr. Maurice Stans, to Moscow in November for a thorough exploration of the possibilities. To ensure the success of such a mission it would be helpful to have from you a precise indication of your interests.

Finally, I should like to repeat again that our relations with other countries will not be conducted in any sense to threaten Soviet interests. As I pointed out to Mr. Gromyko, pressure by one side can only generate pressures from the other and thereby run counter to the objectives we have set for ourselves in the development of our mutual relationship.

Mr. Secretary, we have, I believe, a large and significant agenda before us. I look forward to the opportunity of reviewing all the matters that are of common concern to us at the time of my visit to Moscow in May next year. I agree with you that the prospects are good for moving ahead in our relations and for dealing constructively with the major problems that still cast a shadow on the road to a stable peace. When that happens, all of mankind will benefit.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

7. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State¹

Moscow, October 22, 1971, 1030Z.

7916. Personal for the Secretary.

1. We seem to be enjoying something like an “era of good feeling” and I favor making the most of it. The cordial reception tendered our Incidents at Sea delegation at the professional level is a case in point.² Granted that we had an outstanding group, they have been treated with openness and warm cordiality. The same applied to the eight American governors, also a superior delegation, who were accorded generous hospitality and courtesy. The Foreign Office has gone out of its way to point to the more favorable press we have been getting.

2. The claws of the Russian bear (aptly symbolic of the political hierarchy) occasionally emerge. Speaking to our Navy men, Gorshkov, the top Soviet Admiral, realistically described US-Soviet “friendship” as a future rather than a present blessing and it seemed to me that geniality was a slightly painful gesture for some of the governors’ hosts, such as Kosygin and the new Premier of the Russian Republic (who is understood to be a Politburo aspirant). Nevertheless, the order has obviously gone out to create an appearance of improved relations.

3. There have been previous thaws. The one after Stalin’s death lasted until the Beria crisis³ restored the freeze. There was also a period of optimism and favorable press in 1959. This time, however, there is no exaggerated euphoria, since many Russians recall that improved relations and summits are vulnerable to incidents in the US and here, and to uncontrollable international crises.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL US-USSR. Confidential; Exdis.

² Reference is to the U.S.-Soviet talks on reducing incidents at sea. The talks took place in Moscow October 12–22. Under Secretary of the Navy John Warner headed the U.S. delegation and Admiral of the Fleet V.A. Kasatonov was the Chief of the Soviet delegation. On October 23 Haig sent the President an interim report of the first round of the negotiations ending in Moscow on October 22. The delegations developed agreed statements on international rules of the road, obligations of ships involved in surveillance operations, use of proper signals, avoidance of harassment and simulated attacks, measures to avoid hindering ship maneuvers—especially carriers—instructions to aircraft pilots on approaching ships and in avoiding specific simulated attacks. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 716, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XVI)

³ General Secretary Joseph Stalin died March 5, 1953. In June 1953 Minister of Internal Affairs and former Stalin supporter Lavrenti Beria was accused of trying to seize power in the post-Stalinist power struggle and was subsequently shot. He was publicly condemned in December 1953.

4. The turn-around came not immediately but some weeks after the President's July 15 announcement of his China trip and picked up momentum with Gromyko's visit to the US and the news of the President's intended visit to the USSR.⁴ It should not be forgotten of course that while the atmosphere of US-Soviet relations is improving, the Soviets have not ceased pursuing their own interests, at the expense of US interests, in Asia, the Middle East and elsewhere. Soviet policy toward other countries and regions will continue to have a dynamic of its own and will not necessarily be affected by improved atmosphere in US-Soviet relations.

5. Whatever may be the combination of Soviet motives—European détente, re-insurance against China and a desire for accommodation with the US for material and economic gain—it has produced one of those rare and perhaps transient occasions when a Soviet disposition to deal with the US can be probed for substance. One immediate benefit may be that Brezhnev's enthusiasm for a summit meeting should make him a short-term crisis manager who insofar as he is able will try to head off unnecessary troubles. By the same token, we should make use of the interval to try to clear up some of the inequities imposed upon us locally by the Soviets.

6. It is still too far from the vent to draw up detailed plans for the Soviet summit. It is bound to be influenced by the results of the President's China trip and perhaps by the eventual shaping-up of a conference on European security. It is of course the tradition in the Soviet Union for such visits to be accompanied by public statements and speeches. This would give us a unique opportunity to present our own views in the Soviet press, not merely to counter destructive and obstructive Soviet views but also to offer constructive views of our own. The Soviets presumably will offer up sets of general principles reflecting invidiously on US policies, and may also publicly or privately advance proposals based on the so-called Brezhnev peace program, consisting of some dozen propositions presented at the 24th Party Congress.⁵ We would expect economic concessions to be among Moscow's priority objectives.

7. A debate along such lines will be inevitable but we will be in the better position if we can come forward with one or two practical and well-staffed out ideas involving joint engagement and dialogue on

⁴ The text of President Nixon's July 15 announcement of his visit to China is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, pp. 819–820. Documentation regarding Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko's visit to the United States is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

⁵ At the 24th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on March 30, Brezhnev unveiled his "peace program," including proposals for European security.

issues of mutual concern and world interest. Experience teaches that reason, firmness and restraint influence the Soviets and often lead to eventual acquiescence. Brezhnev's moves toward some measure of détente are in themselves a reaction to the President's initiatives.

8. In any case, in the intervening months we should be busy paving the way for the summit by pressing with negotiations of special interest to us. The exchanges programs should of course go forward. Each thaw offers us a chance to try to circumvent or undermine the dead hand of party dogmatism by expanding every feasible type of contact and peaceful involvement.

Beam

8. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 30, 1971, 12–1 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

Vietnam & China

Dobrynin was again unusually affable. He said that he regretted the misrepresentations in the press according to which Brezhnev had attacked Chinese-U.S. collusion with respect to Vietnam. He said it was absolutely untrue; on the contrary, the precise text of what Brezhnev said would indicate that he made a general statement for North Vietnamese consumption that the war had to be settled between Hanoi and Washington.

He then asked me about my visit to China. I said we were received with extreme cordiality. There was a deliberate attempt to expose us

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Exclusively Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Lord and Rodman submitted this memorandum of conversation as well as a memorandum from Kissinger to the President summarizing the discussion to Kissinger on November 1. Both memoranda were sent to the President on November 9. (Ibid.) The President also saw the summary memorandum; significant portions of the summary memorandum are noted in footnotes below.

gradually to the public, first to the cadres and then to the public. I told him about the incident at the Peking opera,² and then gave him a lot of totally meaningless details of the sessions and technical arrangements. He asked, “Why did this have to be handled by Chou En-lai?” I pointed out that the Chinese government was extremely centralized. As to substance, I said that we just engaged in a general review of the world situation. He asked whether the Soviet Union was mentioned.³ Only in contexts that lumped us together, I said, such as the stationing of troops on foreign territory. In these discussions I had the impression that the Chinese were more concerned about Soviet troops in Mongolia than about American troops in Japan, but I couldn’t be sure, and I wouldn’t be surprised if they gave the opposite impression in Moscow. Dobrynin laughed grimly and said, “They are not talking to us in Moscow *or* in Peking.”

Dobrynin then asked me about the outcome of the President’s visit: what did I think would happen in Peking?⁴ I said that, as he knew, I wouldn’t pretend to him that I did not have some general idea of the outcome. However, there was this problem: if I could write the idea strategy for the outcome, I would concentrate our relations with the Chinese on bilateral issues, while I would concentrate the communiqué with the Soviets on global issues. The reason was that our interests with the Soviets were in a global settlement, of building a new peaceful structure, while in all honesty we could not pretend that with the Chinese much was possible except on a purely regional basis. On the other hand, if the war in Vietnam were still going on at the time of our Peking visit, no doubt Peking would insist on saying something about it. We in turn

² Kissinger is referring to his visit to the Great Hall of the People with Acting Chinese Foreign Minister Marshall Yeh Chiang to view a revolutionary opera on the evening of October 22 during his preparatory trip to Beijing October 20–26. The U.S. and Chinese parties arrived 2 hours late to find the hall filled with 500 middle-level Chinese officials. Kissinger stated in *White House Years*, that “the point was surely driven home: these Americans were distinctly *personae gratae*.” (p. 779)

³ In an undated memorandum for the President, prepared in November 1971, Kissinger reported on his discussions with Chou En-lai and other Chinese leaders. Although U.S. relations with the Soviet Union were discussed, Kissinger reported that the Chinese seemed more interested in other issues. For the memorandum from Kissinger to the President, November 1971, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 165. A complete set of Kissinger’s memoranda during the trip, including his discussion with Chou En-lai on October 22 from 4:14 to 8:28 p.m., in which the Soviet Union was one of the topics discussed, is in the electronic volume, *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E–13, Documents on China, 1969–1972.

⁴ According to the November 9 summary memorandum to the President: “Dobrynin had a number of questions about Chou En-lai’s role, about the Chinese view of the Soviet Union, and what we expected from the Peking summit.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

could not address Vietnam as the only foreign policy issue, and therefore we would insist on wrapping it up into some more global considerations. This is what I had meant some weeks before when I said that Vietnam was a distorting influence on world affairs, and this is why I believed it was crucial to settle the war. I said that the attitude towards the communiqué reflected our attitude towards the summit; as he well knew we opted for Peking first only after being turned down by Moscow. Dobrynin grimly said that he knew this was so—with the air of a man who did not wish to be reminded of his mistakes.

Dobrynin said that I might not believe it, but during the previous Administration the Soviets actively supported the Vietnamese war, and in the early part of this Administration they took a “hands off” policy, considering that it was our mess. But now they have concluded that it was time to end the war, and they had expressed this on the occasion of Podgorny’s visit to Hanoi last month. Dobrynin said that he hoped that the war would be settled certainly by the Moscow summit.⁵ I said that from our point of view it would be best if it were settled by the Peking summit, because it would enable us then to deal with the issues there on a much more regional basis.⁶

Dobrynin asked whether I was aware of the fact that Peking had given reassurances to Hanoi. Hanoi had told Podgorny⁷ that Peking had told them that they considered that the settlement of the war had to be between Hanoi and Washington—that they would not play a role in settling it. I said that this looked to me like a rather tame reassurance. Dobrynin said, “We are not going any further than that ourselves.” I said, “If our recent initiative will succeed, then I think foreign policy will return to normal relations.”

⁵ In discussing the meeting with the President in an October 30 (1:55 p.m.) telephone conversation, Kissinger noted that Dobrynin said “in the first two years we [the Soviets] have kept our hands off but now it’s time to settle.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

⁶ Kissinger described the connection between the war in Vietnam and the communiqué after the Beijing meeting in his summary memorandum to the President as follows: “I explained to Dobrynin that it was in the Soviet interest to have the war settled by the time of the Peking summit. With the war over, the Peking communiqué would probably be confined to bilateral or regional issues. But if the war were still going on, the Chinese would want to mention it. Since we would not want it to be the only non-bilateral issue mentioned, this would produce a communiqué that gave US-Chinese relations a more global cast.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

⁷ Apparently during Chairman of the Presidium Podgorny’s trip to North Vietnam October 3–8.

Middle East

We then turned to the Middle East. Dobrynin said he didn't understand what Sisco was up to. Why were we so eager to get a negotiation started that was bound to fail? I said that there was some hope that progress could be made on the interim settlement. Dobrynin said that he hoped that I had no such illusion under the present ground rules. I avoided an answer. Dobrynin then said, "We are at the point where some important decisions have to be made. The politburo has in effect accepted both the President's and your statements of July 1970 and they have told you that they will accept almost any settlement in terms of guarantees and other requirements in return for a solution.⁸ You owe them some sort of reply. If the reply is negative, we will just conclude that nothing is possible for a while and wait for another opportunity. But we think a good solution is now attainable.

I asked Dobrynin how he visualized translating our agreements into a settlement. He said that he thought that after the summit we should talk to Israel and they would talk to Egypt. I said my understanding was that we would not begin implementing the agreement on our side until after the elections; I had made this point clear to Gromyko that we could come to an understanding which of course on our side would have to be very binding, but that the actual implementation would be left until 1973. Dobrynin said that their understanding was we would tell the Israelis immediately but not implement it. I replied that if we tell them, then we might as well implement it; the price will be the same—though this is a detail. Dobrynin again urged me to give him some specific proposals on guarantees. He said that they would accept almost anything that was half-way reasonable. He was sure that Egypt was not eager for the Soviet Union to negotiate on its behalf, but still he thought the one good result of the Sisco initiative would be that it would bring home to the Egyptians the futility of the present effort.

We agreed to meet next Thursday⁹ for a review of the situation.

⁸ Apparent reference to President Nixon's remarks to television journalists about the Middle East, July 1, 1970 (*Public Papers: Nixon, 1970*, pp. 557–559), and to a background press briefing given by Kissinger at San Clemente California, June 26. (Kissinger, *White House Years*, pp. 579–580) In both instances the two men suggested that the removal of the Soviet military presence in Egypt should be a part of negotiations for a settlement in the Middle East.

⁹ November 4; see Document 10.

9. Editorial Note

At a November 3, 1971, meeting of the interagency Verification Panel, a subgroup of the National Security Council chaired by Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger and responsible for arms control negotiations and policy recommendations, Kissinger informed the panel of the relationship between Strategic Arms Limitations Talks and the Moscow summit.

“Dr. Kissinger: I have just come from the President. He has confirmed that we will have an NSC meeting on SALT next week. The President clearly understands that some of the more reflective minds in this town realize what he has done to the SALT talks by agreeing to a summit meeting in Moscow. Some people are assuming that if an agreement is reached, it will be delayed so that it can be announced in Moscow in May. The President wants us to ignore these assumptions and go ahead as rapidly as possible. If an agreement is reached in advance of the summit meeting, we will then begin discussions on phase two of the talks. The important point is that we should do whatever is needed to get an agreement we want and can live with, and we should get it as quickly as possible. On the other hand, we should not take whatever we can get simply to try to come up with an agreement by May.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals)

The National Security Council Meeting was held on November 12 and dealt primarily with the anti-ballistic missile proposals and submarine launched ballistic missiles issues. (Ibid., Box H-110, NSC Minutes, Originals)

Kissinger and Gerard Smith, head of the delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks, had a phone conversation at 2:20 p.m. on October 12, 1971, when the summit was first announced. Smith believed Kissinger and Nixon were taking over the SALT negotiations. Kissinger tried to assure Smith that SALT would be discussed at the May summit only if there was something left to be discussed. Smith suggested that by announcing that SALT would be discussed at the summit Kissinger and the President had ensured that would happen. (Transcript of a telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 369, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) Smith discusses this issue and other problems he had with the announcement in *Doubletalk*, pages 319–320.

10. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 4, 1971.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Anatoliy Dobrynin, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

The purpose of the meeting was to review the possibilities of progress on Middle East negotiations and other matters. As it turned out, the conversation concerned almost entirely the Middle East.

After some desultory remarks on Napoleon's strategy in 1812 and the Germany strategy in World War II, the discussion turned to current business. Ambassador Dobrynin asked whether the date for the visit to China had been set since it would help Soviet planning. He said they had had a report that the meeting would be in late February or early March, obviously quoting a Japanese report. Dr. Kissinger responded that the U.S. was aiming for February but a definite date had not yet been set.

Ambassador Dobrynin then turned to the subject of the Middle East settlement. Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin first discussed procedures. Dr. Kissinger said there were two ways of proceeding. One was for the United States to tell the Israelis and for the Soviets to tell the Egyptians that we were proceeding along this track. In such a case, of course, Dr. Kissinger noted there was a high possibility that it would surface. He could believe that President Sadat would keep matters quiet since he was getting what he wanted, but the Israelis had every incentive to focus public pressure. The other possibility was to bring the Israelis in on an interim settlement but to keep vague its relationship to an overall settlement until 1973. Dr. Kissinger observed that the first procedure was the more honorable course; the second might be the more effective course. Ambassador Dobrynin said he would check in Moscow as to their preference.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. This lunch conversation was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the meeting was held from 1:10 to 3 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) Kissinger sent a summary account of the Middle East portion of this meeting to the President on November 23 to which this memorandum of conversation was attached. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

The Ambassador then said that the Soviet Union had made major concessions. They were prepared to withdraw their forces, to have an embargo on arms into the Middle East, and to join a Soviet-American force for guarantees. In other words, they would be very flexible about anything that was within the Soviet discretion. Matters that required Egyptian approval were more complex. He therefore hoped that Dr. Kissinger would be able to concentrate in their discussions on those three items.

Dr. Kissinger told Dobrynin that the guarantees issue was really quite simple and that it would probably be settled fairly easily. If their talks were to have any chance of success, Dr. Kissinger would have to be able to demonstrate to the Israelis that they were getting something as a result of these talks that they were not getting as a result of the Rogers/Sisco approach. Ambassador Dobrynin responded by noting that the Israelis were getting the withdrawal of Soviet forces and a Soviet arms embargo.

Dr. Kissinger then said it would also help if the terms of the interim settlement were better than those now being negotiated. Ambassador Dobrynin asked what Dr. Kissinger meant. For example, did he mean that the line should be at the western end of the pass and not on the eastern end, that is on the Suez Canal side of the passes not on the Israeli side of the passes.

Ambassador Dobrynin also asked whether under those conditions it was conceivable that some Egyptian troops could cross the canal. Dr. Kissinger replied that it was conceivable but that he had no really clear idea, and that issue would have to wait.

Ambassador Dobrynin then asked for Dr. Kissinger's concept of the final settlement. Dr. Kissinger replied that he did not really believe in shooting blanks and therefore would be very careful. It seemed to him that the demilitarized zones were an essential element. Ambassador Dobrynin commented that it was very tough to get a demilitarized zone that did not include some territory on the other side of the Israeli frontier. Dr. Kissinger stated that in such a case all of Israel would be demilitarized if the zones were equal. He then proposed jokingly that the zones start equi distance [*sic*] from the capitals. Dobrynin reiterated that it would be very hard not to have a demilitarized zone on the Israeli side. Dr. Kissinger remarked that if Ambassador Dobrynin could, however, get agreement on it this would be a tremendous step forward.

Dr. Kissinger finally said that it seemed to him that the matters which could represent enormous progress would be: if the Egyptian settlement could be separated from the others, if the demilitarized zones could be kept entirely on the Egyptian side, if the interim settlement could be on terms more favorable to Israel than the present one, and a determination of concessions Sadat ought to be prepared to

make if he knew an overall settlement was coming. Dobrynin noted that he would consult Moscow but would like Dr. Kissinger to make a specific proposal at the next meeting.

Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin then went over the guarantees negotiations as they stood at the time, but Dr. Kissinger turned the issue aside, saying that this was relatively the easiest matter.

Ambassador Dobrynin then told Dr. Kissinger about his conversation with Assistant Secretary Sisco.² He said first of all that Sisco had initiated the conversation. Secondly, with respect to his being at ease about Phantoms,³ Dr. Kissinger knew very well that the Soviets wanted the United States to hold the Phantoms to fuel the Soviet-American negotiations. Therefore, Ambassador Dobrynin could not have said what Dr. Kissinger told him Secretary Sisco had reported. As for the rest, Dr. Kissinger could rest assured that Ambassador Dobrynin would proceed very cautiously until he knew the results of their conversations.

Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador [Dobrynin] agreed to meet again around November 15 to pursue this conversation.

² An account of Sisco's lunch conversation with Dobrynin was transmitted in telegram 199411 to Moscow, November 2. The "two principal impressions" that emerged were a "very relaxed Soviet view" on the question of U.S. aircraft to Israel and Dobrynin's belief that discussions on the Middle East would form an important part of the Moscow summit. (Ibid., Box 717, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XVII, November–31 December 1971)

³ Fighter aircraft.

11. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, November 10, 1971.

SUBJECT

Your Trip to the Soviet Union

Looking ahead to your visit to the Soviet Union next May, I should like to offer some preliminary thoughts on what the Soviets will want to achieve as well as certain ideas on how we may further our own purposes vis-à-vis Moscow during your visit.

I. *Setting and Scope*

Reduced Tension. For the Soviets, the summit meeting will be a major occasion to set a tone of reduced tension in US-Soviet relations with the purpose of leading the US to be more accommodating on bilateral questions and more relaxed as to the growth of the Soviet presence and influence in third areas. The first visit of an American President to Moscow will be portrayed by the Soviet leadership as symbolizing US acknowledgement of the Soviet Union's equality as one of the world's two superpowers and as representing an important success for the policy of détente laid out by Brezhnev at the XXIV Communist Party Congress last spring.

China. At the same time, the Soviet leaders will undoubtedly view your visit in relationship to your earlier visit to Peking. They will want to counter any adverse effects of the latter on their position. They will want to sound you out on your views of China's future and of the triangular relationship between Moscow, Washington, and Peking. Whether Brezhnev will go as far as Kosygin did at Glassboro in suggesting mutuality of American and Soviet interests against China is an open question; the Soviets may now wish to be more circumspect. But whatever is or is not said about China, the Soviets will see your visit—particularly as it may emphasize the theme of US-Soviet equality and US-Soviet mutuality of interest in nuclear arms control—as having the message for Peking that US-Soviet relations are more developed and

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 989, Haig Chronological Files, Nov. 4–12, 1971, [2 of 2]. Secret. Haig sent this memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a November 12 note in which he wrote that Rogers left this memorandum for the President and characterized it as “obvious ploy to get his licks in early on the Soviet Summit.” On December 10 Kissinger sent this memorandum to President Nixon with a 1-page covering memorandum summarizing it. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL-294, Memoranda to the President, 1964–1974, December 1971)

of greater importance than the incipient American initiative towards China.

Bilateral and Multilateral Issues. Putting aside the factors relating to China, I believe your visit to Moscow will provide a setting in which we can move toward the resolution of some of the many bilateral and multilateral issues between the Soviets and ourselves. In this regard, I think that some of our specific objectives should be:

- to make a decisive advance in SALT;
- to make clear that the Soviet policy of détente should be accompanied by concrete steps to ease the confrontation between East and West;
- to probe for Soviet cooperation on the Middle East and the India–Pakistan situation;
- to promote tangible progress in our bilateral relations; and
- to counteract any impression of “superpower condominium”—which would divide us from our Allies and diminish the hopes of Eastern Europeans for greater elbow-room in their relations with the West.

SALT. Whatever results may have been obtained in SALT by then, SALT will figure predominantly in the visit as the most important US-Soviet negotiation, and as the one which represents the unique capabilities and responsibilities of the USSR and US as the world’s two superpowers. The Soviets probably calculate—correctly, in my view—that both sides would find it useful to have as much tangible accomplishment on record as possible—even perhaps an agreement for signature.

The effect of such a calculation on Soviet negotiating behavior in the meantime is extremely difficult to reckon. Would the Soviets be more prone to make concessions to get an agreement? Would they reckon that they could toughen their negotiating position and force US concessions? We have no reason to prefer either hypothesis and, indeed, suspect they may in part be self-cancelling. The Soviets would not in any case be any more likely than we to make major changes in their positions on security issues for the sake of an agreement by a certain date, but they may anticipate a brisker paced discussion in SALT.

In any case, I believe we will want to press as hard as we can for an early agreement, with the summit in mind as well as the very favorable impact such agreement will have on both international and domestic opinion. If agreement in SALT is achieved prior to your visit, your discussions could appropriately center on next steps in this important area.

Europe: CES and MBFR. On European issues, the Soviets are more likely to look to the side effects of a display of American-Soviet cordiality than to specifics. They will expect thus to stimulate further West European interest in détente. In Eastern Europe, the Soviets might hope that the emphasis upon the US-Soviet relationship would tend to play

down the importance of Romania's independent policies, and perhaps make the US less prone to cultivate the Eastern Europeans in ways which Moscow tends to view as undercutting its position in that area. Your visit will also mark in Soviet eyes the end of East-West acerbity over Czechoslovakia.

Emphasis by you in your discussion with the Soviet leaders on our firm intention to maintain our security relationship with Western Europe should leave them under no illusion that détente is a one-way street. At the same time, their pretensions to hegemony in Eastern Europe can be blunted by reassertion of our desire to normalize our relations with the countries of Eastern Europe without wishing to undermine the legitimate security interests of the Soviet Union in that area. I advance further specific suggestions on both of these points below.

It is still too early to suggest how we might wish to approach other European security questions in the context of your visit. Progress on the Berlin issues and the related preparations for a Conference on European Security may have reached a point where a CES is on the distant horizon. Similar progress toward MBFR is possible. Both topics will be discussed at the December NATO Ministerial meeting. Both CES and MBFR will certainly be on the agenda at Moscow and we will be making further suggestions about their treatment.

Middle East. It is impossible now to predict where we will then stand with respect to our mediatory efforts toward an interim Suez Canal settlement. If these efforts are still in train, your discussions may be helpful in moving us toward this objective. They may also permit us to explore once again possibilities of mutual limitations on Middle East arms supply.

With respect to the broader problem of ultimate resolution of the Arab-Israeli dispute, on which the USSR can be expected to place primary emphasis, the Soviets will also want to hear your views. In this connection, Moscow might hope to persuade you to take a more active line in pressing the Israelis toward abandoning territorial claims as part of a settlement, but it is doubtful that the Soviets would expect much more than an expression of mutual concern that the problem not get out of hand.

India–Pakistan. If tensions in South Asia are still running high (although outright hostilities have been avoided), your visit will provide an opportunity to seek Soviet collaboration in bringing peace to the troubled subcontinent. The Soviets will want us to pressure Pakistan to make concessions agreeable to India, but Moscow has no interest in seeing the situation deteriorate into war between India and Pakistan and, in this sense, our interests are compatible with those of the Soviet Union. Some understanding on mutual efforts toward an improved situation

may therefore be envisaged. At the least we will have a further opportunity forcefully to urge the Soviets to greater cooperation on a variety of matters including more effective participation in relief assistance, greater pressure on India to cooperate with the UN, the need for India to pull back its military forces, and perhaps indirect encouragement of the East Pakistanis to negotiate with Yahya.

Vietnam. Any embarrassment to Moscow which might arise over seeming to treat with the enemy of a socialist country will tend to be mitigated by the fact of your Peking visit. The USSR would not, of course, wish to be in the position of publicly condoning whatever American presence remains, and most likely will look to keeping this issue out of the limelight. Your discussions, however, might well be used again to urge Soviet cooperation on the POW issue. Additionally, you may be able to explore Soviet thinking on broader security questions in Asia, such as Brezhnev's allusion to an Asian security arrangement.

Trade and Cooperation. The Soviets will most likely seek some statement in favor of increased US-Soviet trade. While they do not foresee in fact any dramatic expansion in that trade, the Soviets do have an interest in making various equipment purchases from American suppliers. They also have long been rankled by what they regard as American discrimination in the trade field. I will want to advance later suggestions on what we can do to reduce trading impediments as we approach your visit.

No doubt, the Soviets also anticipate that your visit will be the occasion for announcing some new developments in US-Soviet cooperation, but at this time we have no indication of Soviet preferences for what topics this might cover. In the past, space has been a good area for both sides, and particularly for the Soviets, because it emphasizes the primacy of the US and USSR. Environmental questions or medical research might also be fields in which a further expression of our ability and willingness to cooperate would be more desirable.

II. The Visit Itself

Aside from substantive discussion, your visit will lend itself to highly visible activities likely to create a lasting impression on the Soviet people and to further our long-range objective of opening up Soviet society.

The most effective means for direct communication with the Soviet people would be nationwide radio and television appearances. Your 1959 Moscow speech² had a great and lasting impact on Soviet popu-

² Reference is to Vice President Nixon's speech when opening the American Exhibition Sokolniki Park in Moscow, July 24, 1959; see *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1959*, pp. 881–886.

lar attitudes toward the U.S., even though it was not carried nationwide. President Eisenhower was to have made a nationwide TV speech during his visit to the USSR in 1960, just as Khrushchev had done in the US. The Soviet Government could not refuse your request for air time, and you could quite properly set forth your concept of a generation of peace in the context of improving US-Soviet relations. The novelty of hearing the American viewpoint directly and fully would help reinforce the development of Soviet attitudes in this direction.

Another possible opportunity for a public statement with good media appeal in the USSR and abroad would be the formal opening of our Consulate General in Leningrad. Your endorsement in 1959 of the idea of exchanging consulates makes it fitting that you should preside at a ceremony, which would symbolize a milestone in the implementation of the US-Soviet Consular Convention and a significant step in our political relations. The only impediment to your doing so is the slow pace of renovation of the official premises we are leasing from the Soviet authorities. It is likely that the work could be completed by May if your desire to open the Consulate General were made known to the Soviet Government. If we are to do this, we would need to inform the Soviets of your interest within the next few weeks. I would therefore appreciate receiving an early indication of your reaction to this suggestion.

Another opportunity for a symbolic act with high visibility in Moscow, to complement your formal talks with Soviet leaders, would be a ground-breaking or the laying of the cornerstone of the new American Embassy Chancery. Preparations for construction should be sufficiently well advanced by May to make this feasible. Like the opening of the office in Leningrad, the beginning of construction would emphasize to the world and the Soviet people the permanence of our commitment to improved relations with the USSR.

III. The Aftermath

To help dispel any appearance of “superpower condominium” and to counteract Soviet pretensions to hegemony in Eastern Europe, you may wish to consider two stopovers on your return from Moscow. One would be your appearance at a NATO session in Brussels, the other a visit to Poland.

Our NATO Allies are the most important category of nations keenly interested in the outcome of your visit. Prior consultations will dispel many possible doubts on their part, but I think it would also be desirable for you to stop in Brussels to report on your discussions in Moscow. Alternatively, if you prefer, this is something I could do.

A visit to an Eastern European Communist country would demonstrate the value we continue to attach to the aspirations of the peoples

of this area for greater autonomy. Your visits to Romania and Yugoslavia have already highlighted this policy, but an additional gesture directed towards the Poles would be highly desirable following a Moscow summit. This purpose could be achieved by a brief stop—perhaps a day, or even less—in Warsaw. The effect on the people of Poland and those elsewhere in Eastern Europe would be particularly positive, as was so clearly evidenced by your 1959 visit. The Soviet Government might not be overjoyed by the addition of Poland to your itinerary, but such a visit is fully justifiable in terms of the European détente Moscow is currently promoting.

IV. An Encore

The Soviets will expect an invitation for a return visit. Doubtless they will provide some signal as to which of the Soviet leaders you might invite and perhaps give some indication of a suitable time frame for a return visit. Even if the invitation for a return visit is nothing more than a dictate of courtesy, it will have the effect of adding a dimension of continuity to a dialogue which has proceeded only fitfully since the invitation to President Eisenhower went by the boards.

V. Interim Progress

The announcement of your visit well in advance should provide new impetus to progress on the wide range of issues we have outstanding with the Soviets. I am attaching a list of the matters we expect to be discussing with the USSR before your visit³ and have asked the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group for Europe to submit monthly reports on their status to your staff. As opportunities for action emerge, I shall be sending you specific recommendations.

William P. Rogers

³ Attached but not printed is "Status of Current Points of Issue in U.S.-Soviet Relations."

12. **Conversation Among President Nixon, Secretary of Commerce Stans, Secretary of State Rogers, and the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹**

Washington, November 15, 1971.

[Omitted here is an exchange of pleasantries]

Nixon: Now the other thing is, as Bill will tell you, that anyone who has talked to the Russians, our Russian friends, Gromyko and the rest, they're enormously interested in trade. That's one of the big things we've got for them.

Stans: Yep.

Nixon: It's something that we must not indicate is going to be linked with something else. But they, in their minds, know very well that if you make progress on the political front, that you'll make progress on the trade front. The way I've always described it is this: that you never say trade and political accommodation are linked. But the two are just inevitably intertwined. If you move on one it helps the other. If you move on—and it just moves like that. So—And we know that. Now I think the thing I want to do is to go out and—If you look at the situation and notice that their—I think it's \$16 billion worth of trade the Soviet Union has at the present time; \$16 billion dollars worth and we've got \$250 million dollars worth, approximately.

Stans: That's in both directions.

Nixon: That's right.

Stans: Our exports were less than—are worth about half of that.

Nixon: That's what I mean. And, so we—we've got a helluva big say in this. On the other hand, we—And frankly we have been fairly careful up to this point. I think more than anything else it's a, it's a—to the extent you can and then, Bill, if you have a different view,

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Oval Office, Conversation No. 617–18. No classification marking. According to his Daily Diary, Nixon met Stans, Rogers, and Haig in the Oval Office from 5:21 to 5:55 p.m. The editors transcribed the portion of the conversation printed here specifically for this volume. In a November 11 briefing memorandum for a meeting Kissinger was to have with Stans, scheduled for November 12 but cancelled, Sonnenfeldt suggested to Kissinger: "You might want to stress again that it [Stans' trip] is to be *exploratory rather* than conclusive, that he is to hold out *the promise* of greater trade but *not* to make specific *promises*." In particular, Stans was to be advised to say or do nothing that implied a commitment to seek Most Favored Nations legislation or Export-Import Bank loans or guarantees, both of which Sonnenfeldt suggested were the President's prerogative. Should Stans meet with Kosygin or Brezhnev, he "should *mostly listen* and generally *stay away from political subjects*." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 213, Agency Files, Commerce (1971), Vol. II)

you can express it. I think what we want is for Maury to talk to everybody; listen and learn everything you can. But I don't think we want to appear to be panting so much after. I don't think we want to be—I don't think we—I mean I don't—I think we oughta—I think—Let me put it this way: there's some things we'd like to get from them. I mean if, for example, we're still screwing around on Vietnam because [unclear] and, the arms control and the rest. Trade is something. Trade from us to them is infinitely more important than it is for us to have trade with them. We'd like—you know what I mean—I read the *Times* story about, you know, how much it would mean if we had all this and the Europeans are going to trade. But this is something that means a helluva a lot more to them than it does to us. Now you, of course, I don't think you should play it that way. That's too crude. But isn't that about what it is? And I don't want hear a blanket [unclear] as a matter of fact. Bill, do you agree?

Rogers: Mr. President, I agree to everything.

Nixon: [unclear]

Rogers: It's important to let them know that the climate for trade has improved; that the political climate is better.

Nixon: Exactly.

Rogers: The political climate will be better when the President goes there, particularly if they cooperate with us on some of these things that we're trying to accomplish—Berlin, Indochina and other matters.

Nixon: And arms control.

Rogers: And arms control. Now they need to trade a helluva a lot more than we do. They, they've got a real problem because what they're doing—some of their allies, particularly Hungary, is doing a lot better in the trade field than they are, so they're trying—

Nixon: Hungary is?

Rogers: Oh yeah. Hungary is doing very well. And, of course, Romania is building up a little trade. So they're concerned about having more trade with us. And I think we should, we should set the prospects for trade—

Nixon: Right.

Rogers: And listen and see where we can get some benefit, but not seem over-eager. If they think we're over-eager for trade, they'll snap at it. Furthermore, they've got a lot of other irons in the fire. They want this conference on European security very much.

Nixon: Yeah.

Rogers: They want discussion on mutual balance force reduction.

Nixon: Watch all of this.

Rogers: They want an agreement on Berlin, but they don't want to concede very much. Now, as the President said, the presence of trade is something of a weapon that we have. They need it. Now it will benefit us some, and politically it's always good to talk about it. But if you analyze it in real terms, it doesn't amount to a helluva a lot with us and it won't for some time, little bits and drags once in awhile.

Stans: Now I differ a little bit on that, Bill. There's a great interest on the part of American businessmen and quite a number have been over there recently—

Rogers: Oh, yes.

Stans: There's a group of 50, of a 100, including our friend Don Kendall, who's going to be over there the last day or two that I'm there.

Nixon: Let me say, let me say Maury, I think that you're absolutely right. I know Don Kendall and all this group. But what I'm suggesting that you do, to you is that you play a different game. That's our businessmen, and they're over there panting around over the Soviets so much that they're slobbering away and giving away our bargaining position. You should not go there and say—I want you to take the position, which indicates that we're going to look at this stuff. We're very interested in hearing what they have to offer. We have people, of course, who would like to do this, that, and the other thing. But you see, 'cause I think—I really do believe that on the, this business side of it—Bill, I've talked to some of these guys and, gosh, they'd give away the store.

Rogers: Yep. But we don't disagree on this thing.

Nixon: [unclear exchange]

Rogers: The total impact at the moment, for the next couple of years, isn't going to amount to a lot. We can talk about it.

Nixon: That's right.

Rogers: We should tell American business we're doing everything we can. We want to increase our trade, but if you look at it in the total, in the overall picture, it's not going to amount to a helluva a lot in the next couple of years.

Stans: Well, I think there's millions of dollars of business there. The big problem is that they have difficulty in paying for it.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stans: And the next thing they're going to ask, and I'm sure they're going to press it with me, is two things: export-import credits so they can buy more; and MFN so they ship more to the United States.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stans: These are the roadblocks. I think that the business is there. I think that we could have 4 or 5 billion dollars by 1975 if we—

Nixon: You think so?

Rogers: But think about what they'll use to give us. What have they got that we want? That's the problem.

Stans: Well, they're—they've taken a new line, which is a very interesting one. And I've spent a lot—

Nixon: You haven't said that before.

Stans: I've spent a lot of time over the last couple of weeks talking to American businessmen. They're talking about joint ventures. Not of the type that we're talking about in Romania, Yugoslavia where the American company would have a 50 percent interest in the business and a 50 percent interest in profits. They're not willing to give up title to property or define profits. But what they are talking about is having American companies come over there and develop natural resources—oil, gas, copper, other minerals, and so forth—under a deal where we put the technology and part of the money. They put in some labor. We get the product; get our money back out of the product and then have share in the product rather than in the profits. Now there's a lot of minerals—oil and natural gas—that would be a great deal to us. They're already talking with one American company about a deal for natural gas similar to the Algerian deal where there would be about a billion dollars worth of gas moving over the year beginning about 1975. And the American companies who would go in there and invest wherever they think the natural gas is, freeze it, and bring it over to the United States. Now they're talking some real big things to think you know [unclear] Real big things of that nature. And, of course, the one thing our American business has to learn is that anything we do in terms of trade is not going to be small potatoes because the Russian Government is the buyer for the whole economy.

Nixon: That's right.

Stans: They can buy 10,000 lathes at one time if they want to and spread them around to all their plants. They can buy 2,000 drill presses.

Nixon: Oh, I—what we—what—What I look upon this trip as being, which you have—Would you have—Tell the photographer I want to get his pictures of this. So that we could [unclear, pause] I think that it would be very helpful for us to know, that we just, just before the world [unclear]. What do you have in mind? What do you think? Don't you think so, Al?

Haig: Yes, sir. I think [unclear]

Nixon: And incidentally I would say that you have mentioned these other things. If they raise, and I don't know the extent to which they get it, the European Security Conference and all the rest. That should stay miles away.

Stans: I thought I would listen and ask them if they have any message for me to bring back to you. But the message—

Rogers: But, you know, if they do they're just playing games because they talk to us all the time.

Nixon: Yeah. Yeah. I would stay away from the political questions because we're not—we don't want to talk about a European security conference. We're not, but—

Stans: I'm not informed on the military—

Nixon: And I would just simply say that that's not your responsibility. That's—You'd just rather not express any opinions on it, that you're just an expert in the one area. I think that's very important to play. Why don't you shoot the picture there so that we can [unclear].

Stans: I would—I would like to look at ideas that you could develop for your May visit. I think that maybe some things could come out of this that you could use it for May.

Rogers: [unclear] that they could give us some gold [unclear]?

Stans: Well, they don't have much gold left. They only have about a billion eight.

Rogers: They've got more [unclear]?

Nixon: What? Is that right?

Stans: In reserves. A billion eight.

Rogers: No, they've got a lot in the mines.

Stans: They've got it in the ground.

Rogers: They've got petroleum and aluminum, what chrome and a few other minerals. [unclear] If they start—If they start exporting petroleum to this country, that's a whole other ball game.

Stans: That's an element of risk according to—for that to be on a minimum basis. But what I propose to do is go over the whole list of possibilities; talk to all of them; see what needs to be done. As I say, they're going to press for export credit. They're going to press for MFN treatment—most favored nation.

Nixon: I think on those things that you can, you can indicate, —the thing that we have done and the conversation we've had here with Gromyko is to indicate that there are very great possibilities in this country for improvement in those areas. But obviously they are contingent upon, they're related to improvement in political areas. Now we can't talk about the MFN, the Export-Import Bank as long as they're helping the North Vietnamese.

Rogers: Or joint ventures for that matter. You know, our large investment for joint ventures has got to be—The political climate has got to be pretty good.

Nixon: Yeah.

Stans: I think the American companies are going to want that.

Nixon: But we have a very—Our, our, our attitude toward progress on the political front is very, very open. And our attitude toward progress on the trade front is very open.

Rogers: How about manufactured goods? We could send them manufactured goods.

Stans: Well, I think they'll buy something. I don't think they'll buy much—

Rogers: See, that's what we should push for.

Stans: It's machine tools they want—

Rogers: That's what we should push for. We've got plenty of manufactured goods we can send them.

Nixon: Boy they need [unclear].

Stans: They need it.

Nixon: Exactly. Their economy has been flat for how many years? Four or five years?

Rogers: Oh, yeah, at least. What they want us to do is teach them how to manufacture them so they don't have to buy them from us—

Stans: Well—

Nixon: They want computers. [unclear] They want technology. They don't want the goods.

Rogers: Machine tools.

Stans: Right, but the American automobile companies and some of them have been pretty smart about this. Ford and General Motors have told them and told us that they're not interested in going over there and building a plant for them. They're interested in going in there and working with them if there's a longtime relationship of some kind from which they can benefit. They're not going to build a plant and walk away from it. And I, I told a group of American businessmen today that I'm concerned about selling our technology too cheap—

Rogers: You're damn right.

Nixon: You're so right.

Stans: Three per cent patent and license fee and so forth doesn't give us much of anything.

Nixon: No. Oh boy.

Stans: If we can't get more than that out of it. If we can't—

Nixon: It will do absolutely no harm at all for you to be a very shrewd trader—Yankee trader—with the Russians. That's the way they are. They expect it and they'd be very surprised—But, well, you know, as you would, of course, with a very, very—We're very interested in this, but as you know this is the way our guys look at it. It's something

we may want to do. If you'd like to help on this sort of situation, but we've got some real problems and what can you do? And they come. They come that way. The Russians are a tough bunch of bastards.

Rogers: Sell them campers and television sets and radios.

Nixon: Any day, any day.

Stans: They're probably buying those from the Japanese right now.

Nixon: Have you been there before?

Stans: I've never been in Russia before, no.

Nixon: What cities are you going to visit?

Stans: Well, it's still pretty indefinite. We've—We will go to Leningrad the first weekend, on Sunday, and spend a day there. The second weekend I suggested that we go south to Georgia. They're suggesting Baku and Tbilisi and possibly—

Nixon: [unclear]

Stans: —Samarkand and Tashkent. Which is—

Nixon: Samarkand?

Stans: Strictly sightseeing.

Nixon: Go.

Stans: Really?

Nixon: Beautiful place.

Stans: Never been there.

Nixon: Well, Samarkand has—you know that's one of Genghis Khan's residences. It has those magnificent little temples.

Stans: It sounds heavenly.

Nixon: Oh yeah, yeah. Oh you go. Go.

Stans: Well, I'd love to do that. I think—

Nixon: That's worth going [unclear] out there, but I'd go.

Stans: They're making quite a thing of this because—

Nixon: And you'll see Asians out there. That's the interesting thing. You see you'll get out there and you realize that Russia is not a country of Russians. There are all sorts of Asians. You go down the [unclear]—which is right near—

Stans: I'd like to see that—

Nixon: —the Chinese border—

Stans: It looks pretty fun.

Nixon: —You'll see the valley of apples. And, by God, they're all Chinese. They're all slant eyed. It's a fascinating thing to see this.

Stans: Well, they're putting out the red carpet because they say is an ordinary expense. They want me to stay even longer. We'll probably stay longer [unclear]

Nixon: Are you going to—how about to one city—for example, I wonder if they'd want you to see it. How about Sverdlovsk? Are they going to have you to go there?

Stans: They haven't mentioned it—

Nixon: It's a huge steel complex place. Novosibirsk, in Siberia, how about there?

Stans: They offered to take us to Lake Baikal, but that's so far. It's 7 hours outside Moscow on the fastest jet. It's farther than across the United States.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Moscow summit.]

Stans: Well, Mr. President, I'm going to stop over in Sweden on the way over to rest a day.

Nixon: Oh, for Christ's sake—

Stans: And—

Nixon: —Why did you have to stop in Sweden?

Stans: Well, they're a big customer. They buy a lot of goods from us.

Nixon: Fine. All right, fine. Sell them something they don't want. [laughter]

Nixon: All right, that's fine. That's fine. Have you ever been there before?

Stans: No.

Nixon: Neither have I—

Stans: We're going to stop in Warsaw on the way back. We're—I didn't realize [John A.] Volpe had been there, but the Embassy [unclear]—

Nixon: That's all right.

Stans: —the Embassy and then a press conference—

Nixon: That's all right.

Stans: Is there any special message in Warsaw?

Nixon: You get your message [unclear]?

Rogers: Yeah. We—I told them "Be cool. Be polite but cool." —

Nixon: What? Yeah. They've done an awful lot for us—[unclear exchange].

Nixon: We respect their—We respect their people. They've contributed so much to this country. But basically we, we're not too damned happy about the way they kick us around the world. But that's fine. Let them do it. That's their choice. Warsaw is another matter. I think there, we do want to play the line of—the more—and all the rest. They are—

Rogers: Yes they are.

Nixon: They are already [unclear]—

Rogers: But we also have good, good relations with them. And they've improved some in the last year—

Stans: Warsaw, oh, excuse me.

Rogers: And the people, of course, particularly Poles, very much—

Nixon: They love Americans.

Stans: Warsaw doesn't have [unclear] credit, and they're actually going to press for that. I would guess from all the discussion [unclear] that they'll come after Romania. Possibly fairly soon.

Nixon: Well, what—

Stans: They're—

Nixon: Well, let me say this. I think what the Russians, and all the rest, I'd hold it all out there. Hell, [unclear] hold it all. This is something you'll look into and so forth. Don't you think so, Al?

Haig: Yes, sir. I think [unclear] sympathetic with us—

Nixon: Yeah.

Haig: And with that we can—

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Moscow summit.]

Nixon: You have to remember that Khrushchev—Incidentally, you can also recall, [he] wrote in his book,² he bragged that he helped to defeat Nixon in 1960. And we're quite aware of that. That may come up. You might bring it up. See? And at this time, we're, we, —It's just an interesting little point. That just shows how much they care about our politics.

Rogers: Be a little careful with him, Maury, if you raise this. They'll—They leak things all over, hell. Particularly Dobrynin. So we wouldn't want to be in a position of asking for any help for the President.

Nixon: Oh, God no.

Stans: Oh, no. No.

Nixon: [unclear exchange]

Rogers: The thing that we really need to do is convince them that he [Nixon] is going to be the sure thing.

Nixon: Yep.

Rogers: Because that's what they pay more attention to than anything else. I think they've come around to that point of view. I think that's one of the reasons they're anxious for the President's visit.

Nixon: I think that's probably why they agreed to it. The—I think there might be a, a—Basically, they'll want to know what kind of a man

² *Khrushchev Remembers*, translated and edited by Strobe Talbot (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1970).

is this—another point, Bill, I think you would agree—what kind of a man is the President? And so you tell them [unclear] is like that. But particularly emphasize, though, that he's a man you can make a deal with. But he's a, I mean a—Eyes totally open; You know, he's a pragmatic man.

Stans: Analytical.

Nixon: Analytical and far-seeing. You know, give them all that crap. Because they—I think this is the important thing. I noticed that when I talked to Tito he was very interested in telling me what kind of a fellow Brezhnev was. And, and he compared Brezhnev to Kosygin. The Communists are quite interested in men. I mean in the—

Rogers: In what sense? In how they get along?

Nixon: That's the point. In their personalities. You could say, "Here he is and—" You could say—I must say—I mean I have to be because we deal with a Democratic Congress and I'm naturally conciliatory all the time.

13. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, November 18, 1971, 8:30 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Anatoliy F. Dobrynin
Henry A. Kissinger

The dinner lasted three and a half hours. It was marked by great cordiality.

Advance Trip to Moscow

Dobrynin opened the conversation by saying that he had been asked by his government to find out in an informal way whether there was any possibility of my visiting Moscow. Gromyko had been very much impressed by his conversation with me, and he felt that it would advance the Summit significantly if I could go there. He said I could arrange it either secretly or openly, and, of course, a secret visit would be guaranteed to remain so. He said the issue was all the more urgent because the Secretary of State had already asked twice to be invited.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The dinner meeting was held at the Soviet Embassy.

Dobrynin said there was no particular desire to invite Rogers to Moscow, but there was a great interest in seeing me.

I said that we had thought, on the whole, existing channels were working very well and that it was not a situation comparable to the one we faced with Peking where there really were no channels of communication. I therefore did not see too much point in a visit by me to Moscow. A secret visit would compound the problem because it would leave an impression of collusion that would be totally unwarranted by the facts.

Vietnam

Dobrynin then wanted to return to the Middle East, but I interrupted him to tell him that I wanted to discuss Vietnam. I began by reciting the events that had led to the Vietnamese cancellation of the meeting,² adding to it my conversation on September 29 with the Soviet Foreign Minister.³ (See note to North Vietnamese at Tab A.)⁴ I said I wanted to make it absolutely clear that we were reaching the end of our patience. If present methods continued, we would have to reserve the right to take whatever action was necessary. We would not tolerate the humiliation of the President, and if the North Vietnamese thought that they could bring about a military solution, they would confront the most violent opposition from the United States. In fact, I wanted the Soviet leaders to be aware that we reserved the right to take strong action to bring about the release of our prisoners in any event.

Dobrynin said he was very surprised. He could understand, of course, that we would react strongly to an attack. This would not be approved in Moscow, but it would be understood. But we had always said that we would end the war either through negotiation or through

² On November 17 the North Vietnamese informed Kissinger that Special Adviser Le Duc Tho was "ill" and could not meet secretly with Kissinger in Paris on November 20. (Kissinger, *White House Years*, p. 1040)

³ The memorandum of conversation is scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations*, 1969–1976, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

⁴ Attached but not printed at Tab A is an undated U.S. note to North Vietnam recalling that on October 11, the United States made a "comprehensive proposal" to end the war "on a basis just for all parties," taking into account the concerns raised at the last Kissinger–Le Duc Tho meeting of September 13. The note expressed U.S. willingness to take into consideration other points discussed in the secret channel and reviewed how the meeting for November 20 had been agreed upon and then cancelled by North Vietnam. The note stated: "The U.S. side regrets this illness. Under the circumstances, no point would be served by a meeting." It concluded: "the U.S. side stands ready to meet with Special Adviser Le Duc Tho, or any other representative of the North Vietnamese political leadership, together with Minister Xuan Thuy, in order to bring a rapid end to the war on a basis just for all parties. It will await to hear recommendations from the North Vietnamese side as to a suitable date."

Vietnamization. Had we lost faith in Vietnamization? If we escalated the war without provocation by the other side, then the reaction in Moscow might be very serious, and Moscow might have to take certain preparatory steps in any event to make clear its position in advance.

I said that I wanted to sum up our views. If there were a North Vietnamese attack, then we would respond without restraint. If there were no North Vietnamese attack, then we nevertheless reserved freedom of action. If we went substantially beyond the existing framework on such matters, e.g. operations approaching Laos and Cambodia, the Soviets would have some advance indication that methods like this were being considered.

Dobrynin then asked whether I was disappointed in the Chinese efforts to end the Vietnamese war. I said that I had never expected any significant Chinese effort to end the Vietnamese war, and therefore I was not. Dobrynin said that he knew that Hanoi had brought Peking back into line by threatening a public attack on Peking's policies and by taking its case to the Communist Parties around the world, on the ground that Peking was betraying their revolution. I said there was no cause for it because we had never expected Peking to intervene directly in the negotiating process.

Middle East

We then turned to the issue of the Middle East. Dobrynin said he had answers to two of my questions.⁵ The first question was whether Moscow insisted on the settlement of all the Arab/Israeli border issues. He said that while the Soviet Union had to insist on the fact that all these settlements were connected, de facto it was prepared to proceed with an Egyptian agreement alone.

The second question was with respect to my point that some Israeli presence in Sharm El-Sheik was essential. He said a military presence was out of the question, but that the Soviet Union was prepared to explore some other type of presence and wanted some specific proposals from me along that line.

I told Dobrynin that I had explored the possibility that the White House might enter the negotiating process with Rabin, without going into any specific Soviet proposals that might have been made to us. In response to a question, I said Rabin had been very intransigent and indicated no particular willingness to yield, but had indicated a desire for me to enter the negotiating process which was slightly inconsistent.

⁵ Dobrynin is referring to issues raised at the previous meeting with Kissinger; see Document 10.

Dobrynin asked me what I thought Israel wanted. I said Israel might accept Egyptian sovereignty over the Sinai, but it would ask for some presence beyond its borders. Dobrynin said it would be difficult but not impossible to negotiate on this basis. I asked Dobrynin what the Soviet reaction was to my proposition that perhaps the Middle East negotiations might be concluded secretly and not surfaced with respect to the Israelis until 1973. Dobrynin said that he construed the silence on the Soviet side to mean that they agreed to this procedure.

Dobrynin then asked how we might proceed. I told him that Golda Meir was coming, and that we expected to have full talks with her.⁶ This would give us an idea of what was possible. Dobrynin asked whether I thought it might be possible to have a settlement by the time the President was in Moscow. I said it was conceivable that there could be an interim settlement then, and some agreement on what steps might be taken during 1973 and 1974, but that of course could not be published.

Dobrynin said that he would try to add a vacation to his visit to Moscow for a Central Committee Meeting and that, in that case, he might not be back until after the first of January. I said this would not be inconsistent with the schedule that I outlined.

SALT

We then discussed SALT. Dobrynin asked me what possibilities I saw. I said it was important that we concluded an agreement. Was it his understanding that it would be finished by the time of the Summit? Dobrynin said it was the firm intention of the Soviet leadership to conclude the agreement in such a manner that it could be signed at the Summit.

Dobrynin asked about my view with respect to defensive weapons; specifically, whether I could imagine a compromise. What was our reasoning for rejecting the Soviet proposal of September 7th?⁷ I replied that the practical consequence of it might be that it would give them three sites as against one for us. They would defend two missile fields plus Moscow while we would have to destroy our defense at one missile field but would get the right to defend Washington, for which we could not get any money. Dobrynin said he believed this but no one in Moscow would believe that the American Government could not get money for the defense of its capital, and therefore this was considered a weak argument in Moscow.

⁶ Israeli Prime Minister Meir made an informal visit to Washington December 2.

⁷ Apparent reference to the Soviet proposal that the United States have one ABM site to defend its national capital area and retain another ABM site to defend one of its ICBM sites where ABM construction had begun. The Soviet Union would deploy ABM sites to defend an equal number of ICBM silo launchers. (Smith, *Doubletalk*, p. 268)

I pointed out that the Moscow system already defended 400 missiles. He said, “Yes, but it is only one point, while the American system has two points and thus provided a basis for area defense.” Dobrynin asked whether I thought we would accept a two-for-two trade—one missile field in the Soviet Union, even if it had fewer missiles, for NCA. I said it was premature, but I did not think so. He said “let them talk another few weeks, and we will reconsider it in January.”

We then turned to offensive limitations. He said that the record of the discussions prior to May 20th was unclear, but he had to say that it concentrated, in his mind, mostly on ICBMs. I said that the situation seemed to me to be as follows: Legally, the exchange of letters certainly left us free to include SLBM’s, and there had even been some discussion of it in our conversations.⁸ At the same time, I had to grant him the fact that we were more concerned at that time with ICBM’s, and the thrust of our conversations dealt with them. I was not concerned with the legal argument, but with the substantive one. It would be difficult to explain to the American people why ICBM’s should be constrained but a race at sea should continue. I had to tell him frankly that there were many in our government who were not particularly eager to constrain SLBM’s because it gave us an opportunity to relaunch a new weapons program at sea. Therefore, if the Soviets rejected our SLBM proposal, our Joint Chiefs of Staff would in my judgment not be a bit unhappy. On the other hand, it seemed to me it would be best if we did limit it. Dobrynin asked why, if we insisted on maintaining superiority at sea, would we be willing to settle for 41 modern submarines for each side? I said I was not sure, but this was not an unreasonable proposition, though I recommended that they surface it through his channel first so that I could make a final check.

Dobrynin said that when he came back from Moscow, he would have an answer, but he hoped we had until March.

Dobrynin then asked how all of this would be affected if China started developing a large nuclear arsenal. Did we think that China could have 50 nuclear submarines while we were constrained to 41? I said that, of course, if we agreed on SALT, we would start an evolution of a common approach to the whole issue of strategic arms that would have to take into account an evolving threat by other nuclear

⁸ On May 20 President Nixon announced that the United States and Soviet Union would work out an agreement for the limitation of ABMs during the year as well as agree on “certain measures with respect to the limitation of offensive strategic weapons.” The text of the announcement is in *Public Papers: Nixon, 1971*, p. 648. President Nixon and Premier Kosygin also exchanged letters, negotiated by Kissinger and Dobrynin, that mirrored the President’s statement but also provided that replacement and modernization of weapons would not be precluded in measures to limit strategic offensive weapons, which are scheduled for publication in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

countries. We could not use SALT agreements to give other countries an opportunity to outstrip us.

Dobrynin then suggested very strongly that the chief Soviet reason for an ABM buildup was Communist China. I said, on the other hand, we are told by Smith all the time that you really want a zero ABM. Dobrynin said, "I wish Smith would stop playing games. We are only dealing with him on this basis so that we do not have to bear the onus of rejecting a zero ABM, but please do not propose it to us."

China

The conversation then turned to China. Dobrynin said that he found the long-term trend of our China policy hard to understand. He said that my trip to Peking to some extent, and certainly the President's visit to Peking, is giving the Chinese status that they could not have achieved through years of effort on their own. In return for that, what were we getting? A little publicity and the uncertainty of all of our allies. Was it really such a good bargain? Moreover, he said that he had noticed that the Chinese speech at the UN was really more hostile towards us than towards them.

I said that our China policy had to be seen in a general context—that is to say, it was all very well in the abstract to speak about long-term and short-term interests, but one had to keep in mind the circumstances. As I had told him, there were two conditions that made the trip to China inevitable: first, the Vietnamese war; secondly, the rather ungenerous reactions of the Soviet Union to our repeated efforts to bring about a fundamental change in our relationship. In the face of these conditions, we had no choice but to get ourselves freedom of maneuver. If Dobrynin asked what we had achieved with the China initiative, it was freedom of maneuver.

As for the benefits China was supposed to derive, one had to remember that many of those could have been achieved—most of those, in fact could have been achieved—no matter what we did. If one remembers the tremendous publicity for the invitation of the table tennis team, and if one considers that the next Chinese move might have been to invite leading Democratic politicians, the impression would have been created in every country, in any event, that the People's Republic's rapprochement with the United States was to all practical purposes inevitable, and then the consequences he described would have occurred. We may have speeded up the process a little bit, but that had to be measured against the increasing freedom of action.

Dobrynin said then one had to ask oneself what the freedom of action would consist of. He said he hoped we didn't consider Communist China a superpower, because it wasn't a superpower. It was very weak. I said I could only repeat what I had told him last time, that the

Vietnamese war introduced distortions out of proportion to any possible benefits. If we could deal with Asian problems on their merits, we could then deal with Communist China as a reality in terms of its real power.

Dobrynin said he did not mind telling me that my visit in Peking had produced consternation. Moscow had had a few days advance warning that I was in Peking, but they had no idea that I would come back with the announcement of a Presidential trip. Now Moscow was watching warily. Of course, China could not be a threat for five years, or even ten years, but it was a major long-term danger as he had already pointed out to me with respect to the SALT negotiations.

South Asia

We then had a brief discussion on the situation in South Asia. Dobrynin said that he saw no reason why we should be competitive in that area and that the Soviet Union was urging restraint on India. I said the shipment of arms was not restraint. He responded that the shipments had been kept at very low levels. I told him it would make a very bad impression if Soviet actions produced a war.⁹ He said there was no danger of that, though their assessment was that there were many elements in India which wanted war.

Miscellaneous

We talked briefly about the Stans visit.¹⁰ Dobrynin asked whether there was any possibility for Most Favored Nation treatment. I said there was a chance that this might come along if the Summit proved successful.

The meeting ended with a general exchange of pleasantries dealing with the life of Cossacks and the beauties of Siberia.

⁹ On November 15 at 12:33 p.m., Kissinger had telephoned Dobrynin to remind him that “we are extremely concerned about the South Asia situation. India–Pakistan. We will not put it as rudely in diplomatic cables. We think India is determined to have a showdown. When I see you I will tell you what we suggested for a reasonable solution if someone could encourage them.” Dobrynin responded that “Both sides play down.” Kissinger answered: “In our view sending arms into India is adding fuel.” Dobrynin retorted, “I doubt that. I think it’s publicity. I will check.” (Transcript of a telephone conversation; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 369, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

¹⁰ Reference is to Commerce Secretary Stans’ trip to Moscow for trade talks and a meeting with Kosygin on November 20; see Document 14.

14. Editorial Note

During the last 2 weeks of November 1971, Commerce Secretary Maurice Stans traveled to the Soviet Union for trade talks with Soviet officials. On November 20 Stans met in Moscow with Chairman of the Council of Ministers Alexei Kosygin. Their discussion was summarized in telegram 8649/Stansto 05 from Moscow, November 20.

“1. Major development in full, friendly three-hour twenty minute talk with Kosygin latter expressed strong desire for greatly enlarged commercial relations with US and made expected pleas for end of US ‘discrimination’ against USSR in economic matters. He avoided other contentious matters. No specific political matters mentioned.

“2. Stressing that Stans’ visit should leave ‘notable trace’ for President’s visit, Kosygin proposed exchange of aide-mémoires in which two sides would envisage setting up four expert working groups to consider elements of a new economic relationship. These would draw up arrangements and propositions in 3 and 4 months which might be signed before or at summit and announced at that time. Aide-mémoires, Kosygin twice stressed, would not imply legal or legislative commitments.

“3. Experts would deal with

“(1) general legal/legislative issues such as MFN

“(2) various financial issues

“(3) ‘pure trade’, i.e. all commodities other than ‘equipment’, which presents more complex problems. (Kosygin subsequently clarified that ‘equipment’ also included in trade.)

“(4) general economic ties such as joint development of Soviet natural resources and major manufacturing projects, also schemes involving third country marketing.

“4. Kosygin suggested experts could meet in Soviet Union and US and he himself prepared to meet them from time to time to help move matters along and same might be done on US side.

“5. Stans indicated interest but reserved specific response pending further discussions with Patolichev. Indicated desire to work with Patolichev on aide-mémoire idea and go as far as we able to at this time.

“6. Kosygin later suggested adding experts group on science and technology.

“7. Rest of discussion ranged widely over economic issues. Specific item of interest was Kosygin’s reference to Soviet interest in five-year agreement to buy 2–3 million tons of corn per year provided credit available. Also suggested possibility of immediate order for synthetic leather technology.

"8. Stans noted inter-relationship between progress in political and economic relations and need for US public opinion to be sympathetic to improved economic relations. Kosygin said political relations should be even better by time of summit. On basis of own experience he thought most political and business circles in US now oppose tensions and confrontations, though some probably will always exist who advocate tensions." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 7 US STANS) Also printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972, Document 349.

On November 22, 1971, Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger sent a memorandum summarizing this discussion to President Nixon who saw it. Kissinger wrote on the November 22 memorandum transmitting the summary the following directive apparently from the President: "Instruct Stans to reserve final decisions to Washington." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 213, Agency Files, Commerce, (1971), Vol. II) On November 26 Deputy Assistant to the President Alexander Haig sent a message to Stans which reads: "The report of your conversation with Chairman Kosygin has been reviewed by the President with appreciation. As to the specifics of the program outlined by Kosygin and other proposals Soviets may make during course of your visit, President prefers to reserve final decisions until after you have returned to Washington. He wishes to review substantive findings of your mission in their entirety." (Ibid.) On November 25 Stans met with Soviet Minister of Trade Patolichev, a report of which was transmitted in telegram 6231 from Moscow, November 25. (Ibid.)

On November 29 National Security Council staff member Helmut Sonnenfeldt prepared an analysis of the Stans trip for Kissinger, noting at the beginning that the trip "is a good example of what happens to American negotiators, under pressure of atmosphere, the need to be successful and domestic pressure." At the end of the memorandum, Sonnenfeldt assessed the damage:

"I think when all is said and done, Stans avoided concretely committing the President; and with one major exception (the "Watershed" comment to the press) confined his remarks to economic matters. On the other hand, his mission has obviously generated enormous momentum to move ahead in trade matters and does create *implied* commitments—both to the Soviets and the American business community—that (1) we will continue to liberalize export controls, and (2) seriously consider and perhaps grant in the next several months EXIM credits and guarantees. He is also committed to some form of follow-on to his trip, though for now only on matters within the jurisdiction of Commerce; and that this work will produce some concrete results by the time of the summit.

“He is less committed, though not excluding it, on MFN and on a possible umbrella trade agreement (for which the Soviets are very anxious). He also showed sympathy, but without commitment, to Kirillin’s proposal for a formal agreement on scientific and technological cooperation.

“Stans did an effective job in impressing on the Soviets the need for better facilities for US businessmen.

“He also made a cogent statement on the need for trade to be based on a constructive political relationship (no contradiction from the Soviets), but diluted it in public with cliches about how trade will breed understanding which ‘diplomats’ are unable to produce.” (Ibid.) Additional documentation on Stans’ trip is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume IV, Foreign Assistance, International Development, Trade Policies, 1969–1972.

15. Editorial Note

On December 1, 1971, the National Security Council met to discuss the related issues of Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions in Europe (MBFR) and the Conference on European Security (CSE). While the upcoming Brussels meeting of the North Atlantic Council, December 8–10, 1971, was the immediate reason for the discussion, the role and motivation of the Soviet Union were a principal concern. Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger summarized the work of the Senior Review Group on MBFR and CSE as culminating in their meeting of November 23, 1971. The record of that meeting is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. At the National Security Council meeting, Kissinger stated:

“First, MBFR. The idea goes back to the 1950s, when it was called ‘disengagement.’ It has been taken up in recent years for a variety of reasons, which have consequences for determining the strategy for dealing with the issues. It was initiated by the previous administration as an argument against pressures from the Congress for force reductions. Secretary General Brosio then picked it up as a means of forestalling unilateral reductions by the U.S. The Soviets, for some reason not entirely clear, became interested.

“But until your administration, Mr. President, there was no systematic analysis done. There was no idea of the impact of mutual reductions on the military balance. In the interagency group we have done several studies in depth. We reviewed 15 cases of possible

combinations of reductions, with such elements as limits on stationed forces, limits on indigenous forces, and various combinations.

“We have studied four categories:

“—First, small symmetrical reductions, of say 10 percent.

“—Second, larger symmetrical reductions of 30 percent.

“—Third, a common ceiling.

“—Fourth, a mixed package, though in this case we have not done as much work as in the others.

“The following conclusions have emerged from our analysis: Though there is considerable debate over methodology, the conclusions do not differ. A reduction on the order of 10 percent or less cannot be verified. We would not know if the other side had actually reduced. This size of reductions would minimize the deleterious military effects. There would still be a deleterious effect, but not a major one. Any other percentage reductions will make the situation worse; the larger the cut the worse the effects.”

After Kissinger distributed charts showing the relative strengths of the NATO and Warsaw forces under these categories, he suggested that both the mixed package and the common ceiling were not negotiable, but stressed that it was not necessary to choose one solution since the Soviets were not yet prepared to negotiate. He then stated:

“The major point to stress to the Allies is to analyze what the effect is on security. If the work is driven by a desire for negotiations, there will be a consensus for a percentage reduction, but this is the most deleterious. The danger is that MBFR will become a political debate. We have done serious work in analyzing the effects, but the others want MBFR for détente, for a bargaining chip, or because of their own internal domestic opinion. It is in our interest to force the European Allies to focus on security in order to have an understanding of the military consequences; otherwise we are in a never-never land. At the NATO meetings, Secretary Rogers could say that we will follow up our studies with more presentations, including models submitted by Secretary Laird.

“Let me turn now to the European Security Conference.

“This is a nightmare. First, it was started with the idea of including all security issues. Then Berlin was broken out; then MBFR. Now the Soviets want an agenda with three issues: (1) renunciation of force and respect for frontiers, (2) expansion of economic, cultural and other contacts, and (3) establishment of some permanent machinery. On our side we are proposing similarly vague general principles. The good paper developed by State opens the way to addressing the security issues, to give concreteness to a conference.

“If we look at the enormous effort the Soviets have been making for a conference—including Gromyko’s talks with you, Mr. President—and compare their effort with the conceivable results, there must

be some objective beyond trade and cultural relations. They will use a climate of détente to argue that NATO is unnecessary. A permanent security organ would be offered as a substitute for the alliances. Now, Brandt is already in hock to the Soviets, to show progress in Ostpolitik. The French have two motives: first to outmaneuver the Germans in Moscow, and second to take the steam out of MBFR. The danger is that we will get both CES and MBFR.

“The problem of the substance of a Conference is whether in addition to the general topics we can incorporate security issues. The pro is that it makes the conference more concrete; the con is that a conference is probably not the forum to deal with issues of monitoring force movements, for example.

“Before dealing with an agenda, however, we have the question of how rapidly to move. The French and Germans are committed. The Soviets are pressing for preparatory talks. Normally, preparatory talks could be used to delay, but the issues do not lend themselves to delay. Up to now we have said that a Berlin agreement is a precondition for preparatory talks. But once the inner-German talks are finished, this may be a tough position to hold. But we can say Berlin must be completed. There will be enormous pressures if we say this, because this will bring pressure on the Bundestag to ratify the treaties.

“In summary, we can use Berlin to delay further preparations, and we can use the argument that we need a unified Western position and should have a Western Foreign Ministers’ meeting. Third, we can delay in the preparatory talks, but there are divided views on how to string out these talks.

“It is premature to debate what would be in a conference until we decide how to string out the timing.”

The President then asked how long before the Berlin talks were wrapped up. Secretary of State Rogers answered that it would take the Bundestag 2–3 months to ratify the Moscow treaty and the United States could be dilatory. Rogers stated that he told the Soviets “it was unrealistic to think of a conference in 1972. There are pressures for preparatory talks, but we can fend them off.” Kissinger suggested that, “The Soviets are playing into our hands in linking Berlin and the treaty.” Rogers suggested that after the President’s visit to Moscow, “We could show interest in holding talks, but hold a Deputy Foreign Ministers meeting some time after signing the Final Quadripartite protocol.” The President asked if the United States could do nothing and delay beyond 1973. Rogers replied affirmatively, noting that he already told the Soviets there could be no conference in 1972. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-110, NSC Minutes, Originals, 1971)

As a result of this meeting, the President issued National Security Council Decision Memorandum 142 on December 2, which stated that

the United States was not prepared for decisions on MBFR or CES and should proceed slowly with the principal criterion for any MBFR proposal being the maintenance of Western military security. The United States could not support any single approach to reductions, but would tell the Allies that it supported the concept of a sequential approach to negotiation. The Allies should also be assured that there would be no negotiations with the Russians on bilateral reductions and that an exploratory phase was required before multilateral reductions. As for CES, the United States insisted that the final Quadripartite Protocol on Berlin be signed before any preparations for a conference which would be preceded by a meeting of NATO Deputy Foreign Ministers. Western preparations were not developed enough for multilateral East-West contacts and the United States had no interest in a conference before 1972. Finally, the United States maintained its position of keeping MBFR and CES separate. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 364, Subject Files, National Security Council Decision Memoranda)

16. Note From President Nixon to the Soviet Leadership¹

Washington, December 3, 1971.

1. The President wishes to inform the Soviet Government that his talks with the Israeli Prime Minister² enable him to continue careful

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. No classification marking. A note on the first page reads: "Handed by K[issinger] to Vorontsov at 6 p.m., Fri, 12/2/71." The President and Kissinger discussed this note and the deepening crisis in South Asia on the telephone beginning at 10:45 a.m. on December 3. Kissinger told Nixon: "I think I should give a brief note to the Russians so that they don't jump around about conversation [see footnote 3 below] yesterday and say we are going on your conversation with Gromyko [September 29]. A strong blast at their Vietnam friends and behavior on India. We are moving on our side but they are not doing enough on theirs. P: On India certainly but on VN I wonder if it sounds hollow. K: We will crack them [the North Vietnamese] in a few weeks anyway. P: You may hear from them. It's hard to believe that with everything going our way why we didn't hear from them. They must be asking for it and they must know it. Maybe it's what they want. K: It won't hurt to show the Russians that we can pick the topic. P: Say we are in accordance with the President's statement that we are coming through on our side of the bargain and very distressed that no reciprocal action on their side." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File) The September 29 conversation between Nixon and Gromyko is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XIII, Soviet Union, October 1970–October 1971.

² Nixon and Kissinger met with Golda Meir and Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin from 3:05 to 4:53 p.m. on December 2. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary) A record of the conversation is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XXIII, Arab-Israeli Dispute, 1969–1972.

consideration of the Middle East question along the lines of the conversations between the President, the Soviet Foreign Minister, Dr. Kissinger and Ambassador Dobrynin. A final answer will be given to Ambassador Dobrynin when he returns to Washington in January. In the meantime, the President wanted the Soviet Government to know that his current evaluation of the prospects for direct U.S.-Soviet talks is positive.

2. At the same time, the President wishes to convey his extreme disappointment about the Soviet actions on Vietnam. No reply has been received to the proposal outlined by Dr. Kissinger to Foreign Minister Gromyko on September 29 and formally submitted to the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in Paris in October.³ The direct private negotiations which the Soviet message of October 16⁴ said were preferred by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam have failed to materialize. If this situation should indicate a decision by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam to rely on a military solution, the President wishes to leave no doubt that he is prepared to take appropriate measures regardless of the impact on other policies. If the road to a negotiated settlement is closed, the President will reconsider the advisability of continuing the private Paris talks. It goes without saying that in this channel the U.S. is not interested in pro forma talks but in serious negotiations by qualified representatives at the highest level to bring about a rapid and just solution of the war.

³ See footnote 4, Document 13.

⁴ See footnote 8, Document 4.

17. Editorial Note

At 4 p.m. on December 5, 1971, Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger met Soviet Minister Counselor Yuli M. Vorontsov, acting for Ambassador Dobrynin, who was on leave in the Soviet Union, to discuss the undeclared war between India and Pakistan. For over a year, natural disaster, Bengali demands for autonomy, a local guerrilla war in East Pakistan, a refugee crisis, and Pakistan's anti-guerrilla campaign had steadily escalated the crisis to the point of conventional war. India invaded East Pakistan on November 22; Pakistan attacked India on December 3. Although the Department of State maintained a neutral position, President Nixon insisted that the United States "tilt" toward Pakistan. Kissinger passed the following oral message for Secretary

General Brezhnev to Vorontsov, noting that he was doing so at the instruction of President Nixon:

“—The President did not understand how the Soviet Union could believe that it was possible to work on the broad amelioration of our relationships while at the same time encouraging the Indian military aggression against Pakistan. We did not take a position on the merits of the developments inside Pakistan that triggered this sequence of events. We have, indeed, always taken the position that we would encourage a political solution. But here a member country of the United Nations was being dismembered by the military forces of another member country which had close relationships with the Soviet Union. We did not understand how the Soviet Union could take the position that this was an internal affair of another country. We did not see how the Soviet Union could take the position that it wanted to negotiate with us security guarantees for the Middle East and to speak about Security Council presence in Sharm El-Sheikh, while at the same time underlining the impotence of the Security Council in New York. We did not understand how the Soviet Union could maintain that neither power should seek special advantages and that we should take a general view of the situation, while at the same time promoting a war in the Subcontinent. We therefore wanted to appeal once more to the Soviet Union to join with us in putting an end to the fighting in the Subcontinent. The TASS statement which claimed that Soviet security interests were involved was unacceptable to us and could only lead to an escalation of the crisis. We wanted to appeal to the Soviet Union to go with us on the road we had charted of submerging special interests in the general concern of maintaining the peace of the world.

“—The President wanted Mr. Brezhnev to know that he was more than eager to go back to the situation as it was two weeks ago and to work for the broad improvement of our relationship. But he also had to point out to Mr. Brezhnev that we were once more at one of the watersheds in our relationship, and he did not want to have any wrong turn taken for lack of clarity.”

After listening to the oral message, Vorontsov told Kissinger he hoped that the United States and the Soviet Union “were still at this good point in their relationship” as they were 2 weeks ago. Kissinger told Vorontsov that “we were developing severe doubts, both because of the Subcontinent and because of developments in Vietnam.” Vorontsov then asked Kissinger if he could convey to the Soviet leadership something positive from the United States about a political settlement in the Subcontinent. Kissinger stated that if there was a cease-fire and a withdrawal of Indian troops, the United States would be prepared to work with the Soviet Union on a political solution that could include “substantial political autonomy for East Pakistan.”

Kissinger stated that “the major thing was to get the military action stopped and stopped quickly.”

The two men then discussed a Soviet proposal for Kissinger to visit Moscow in January to discuss issues, especially the Middle East, in preparation for the Moscow summit in May. Kissinger responded:

“Vorontsov asked me what was happening on my invitation to Moscow. The Soviet leaders, he said, were really looking forward to seeing me at the end of January. I said, ‘There are major bureaucratic obstacles, but now there are major substantive ones as well.’ Vorontsov said, ‘In a week the whole matter will be over.’ I said, ‘In a week it will not be over, depending on how it ended.’ He said he would transmit this immediately to Moscow.” (Memorandum of conversation, December 5; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8) The invitation handed to Kissinger on December 1 by Vorontsov is *ibid.*

On the evening of December 5, Kissinger telephoned Vorontsov and returned to their conversation of that afternoon:

“K: I am sorry to call you on a Sunday, but I was just talking to the President to report our conversation and I mentioned that at the end of our conversation you said that in a week or so it will be over and he said that he would like you to report to Moscow that in a week or so it may be ended but it won’t be over as far as we are concerned if it continues to take the present trend.

“V: Yes.

“H: He wants it to be clear that we are at a watershed in our relationship if it continues to go on this way.

“V: I understand.

“H: We cannot accept that any country would take unilateral actions like that.” (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

On December 8 at 3:50 p.m., Haig called Vorontsov on Kissinger’s behalf to remind the Soviet Minister that the “watershed” term that Kissinger relayed in his telephone conversation with Vorontsov “was very, very pertinent, and he [President Nixon] considers it a carefully thought-out and valid assessment on his part.” Vorontsov told Haig: “I will have this in mind and transmit it to Moscow.” (*Ibid.*)

18. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, December 5, 1971, 11 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion between Nixon and Kissinger about guidance the President should give Secretary Rogers for the upcoming UN Security Council meeting on South Asia. Kissinger suggested that there would be a cease-fire and withdrawal resolution put forward that the Soviet Union would veto, and then the danger was the Council would move towards a cease-fire resolution alone “that would leave half of East Pakistan in Indian hands.”]

K: I must underline, Mr. President, if we collapse now in New York, the impact on this international situation, we’re going to do away with most of the gains of the last two years. The way Rogers keeps putting the issue—the Russians are playing for big stakes here. When all the baloney—all the *New York Times* editorials are said and done if the Soviets and Indians get away with this, the Chinese and the United States will be standing there with eggs on our faces. And they will have made us back down and if we have ordered [watered] down our own Resolution from yesterday that had an 11 to 2 majority so that it becomes a pretty insipid thing, our only hope in my judgment, we’ll never get it through State, is to become very threatening to the Russians and tell them that if they are going to participate in the dismemberment of another country, that will affect their whole relationship to us.

P: Um-hmum.

K: Right now they still want the Middle East from us.

P: Um-hmum.

K: And other things. If we just play this in this nice incipit way, we are going to get through this week all right then but we are going to pay for it—this will then be the Suez '56 episode of our Administration.

P: Um-hmum.

K: That is what in my view is at stake here now and that’s why the Russians are playing it so toughly and if we have made any mistake in the last two weeks it’s this—if we had over-reacted in the first two or three days as we wanted to in the White House, it might at least have scared the Russians off, not the Indians, but it might have scared

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 396, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

the Russians off. We are pretty well committed anyway, we can't take the curse off it now. The problem—I know it will always be put on the ground that we want to save the China trip but these people don't recognize that without a China trip, we wouldn't have had a Moscow trip.

P: No, that's just small stuff. I know what they have put in on that—that's just sour grapes crap.

K: If the Chinese come out of this despising us, we lose that option. If the Russians think they backed us down, we will be back to where we were in May and June.

[Omitted here is discussion on Security Council resolutions on the South Asia crisis; for text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 229.]

19. Letter From President Nixon to Soviet General Secretary Brezhnev¹

Washington, December 6, 1971.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I address this urgent message to you because of my profound concern about the deepening gravity of the situation in the Indian Subcontinent.

Whatever one's view of the causes of the present conflict, the objective fact now is that Indian military forces are being used in an effort to impose political demands and to dismember the sovereign state of Pakistan. It is also a fact that your Government has aligned itself with this Indian policy.

You have publicly stated that because of your geographic proximity to the Subcontinent you consider your security interests involved in the present conflict. But other countries, near and far, cannot help but see their own interests involved as well. And this is bound to result in alignments by other states who had no wish to see the problems in the Subcontinent become international in character.

It had been my understanding, from my exchanges with you and my conversation with your Foreign Minister, that we were entering a new period in our relations which would be marked by mutual re-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. No classification marking. A draft of this letter by Sonnenfeldt is *ibid*.

straint and in which neither you nor we would act in crises to seek unilateral advantages. I had understood your Foreign Minister to say that these principles would govern your policies, as they do ours, not only in such potentially dangerous areas as the Middle East but in international relations generally.

I regret to say that what is happening now in South Asia, where you are supporting the Indian Government's open use of force against the independence and integrity of Pakistan, merely serves to aggravate an already grave situation. Beyond that, however, this course of developments runs counter to the recent encouraging trend in international relations to which the mutual endeavors of our two governments have been making such a major contribution.

It is clear that the interests of all concerned states will be served if the territorial integrity of Pakistan were restored and military action were brought to an end. Urgent action is required and I believe that your great influence in New Delhi should serve these ends.

I must state frankly that it would be illusory to think that if India can somehow achieve its objectives by military action the issue will be closed. An "accomplished fact" brought about in this way would long complicate the international situation and undermine the confidence that we and you have worked so hard to establish. It could not help but have an adverse effect on a whole range of other issues.

I assure you, Mr. Secretary, that such a turn of events would be a painful disappointment at a time when we stand at the threshold of a new and more hopeful era in our relations. I am convinced that the spirit in which we agreed that the time had come for us to meet in Moscow next May requires from both of us the utmost restraint and the most urgent action to end the conflict and restore territorial integrity in the Subcontinent.

Sincerely,

Richard Nixon

20. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) and Secretary of Commerce Stans¹**

Washington, December 7, 1971, 10:07 a.m.

K: I want to talk to you a minute before the meeting with the President.² He will repeat it. You know we have presented these Russian licenses to fit in with foreign policy situation. We said we would open it wide when conditions good and they were when you were there. But they are taking a tough line on South Asia. Can you calm down your eager beavers? Call it off so they notice it but not forced to explain it?

S: Certainly will. Nothing is on.

K: It will open in a couple of months. It might not take that long but we want them to notice something quickly.

S: I am seeing the President at 3:00. Your timing was absolutely right. They had laid the red carpet for us. We are ready to go. I came back with an ambivalent viewpoint there. Lots of opportunity there but a lot of reservation on what should be done. We should make a constructive move or offer some and tie it to something we want them to do.

K: Like what?

S: I would offer to extend export-import credits provided that your lend-lease tied (?).

K: Now we can consider it on conditional basis if they behave better. We don't exclude that. Will you sit on the other one? I have to run see the President before his Head of State arrival.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Stans met with President Nixon, Peterson, and Haig from 3:12 to 4:15 p.m. to report on his trip. Stans reported that the Soviets expected to do \$2 billion in trade with the United States by 1975, and they hoped for a 5-year grain agreement. Stans then stated that the Soviets were especially interested in most-favored-nation status, additional credits, relaxation of export controls, a trade agreement, and scientific and space cooperation. Stans pushed for export-import credits as a way to enhance and expand U.S.-Soviet trade. The President thanked Stans for his report and undertaking the mission, but he noted "it was essential that the U.S. attitude with respect to increasing trade with the Soviet Union be governed completely by the state of our political relations." (Memorandum for the President's File, undated; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 213, Agency Files, NSC, (1971), Vol. II) The time of the meeting is from the President's Daily Diary; *ibid.*, White House Central Files. A tape recording of this meeting is *ibid.*, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Stans, Kissinger, Haig, and Ziegler, December 7, 1971, 3:55–4:49 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 631–4. For Kissinger's assessment of Stans as the leading proponent of trade with the Soviet Union, see *White House Years*, p. 901.

21. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 8, 1971, 8:05 p.m.

[Omitted here is discussion unrelated to the Moscow summit.]

P: What I was thinking about with regard to the options—maybe we have to put it to the Russians that we feel under the circumstances we have to cancel the summit.

K: No, I think it is too drastic at this early stage.

P: I want you to know we are prepared . . . Do you have a minute now?

K: Yes.

P: The things that we have to consider now are the cost of letting this go down the drain and then doing the other things. On the other hand, we have to figure we may not be around after the election. On the other hand being around after the election may not matter if everything is down the drain.

K: If we play it out toughly we can get some compensation. Then you can go to Moscow and keep your head up. After all the anguish we have gone to setting it up, nobody wants to jeopardize it.

P: I could send a letter to Brezhnev—I'll write it. Say I was pleased with Secretary Stans' conversations; with the conversations you had on the Middle East; SALT, etc., and it is hard for me to believe all of this can be jeopardized by this area of the world.

K: The major problem now is that the Russians retain their respect for us. If they are going to play into an absolute showdown then the summit was not worth it.

P: The thing here is what we want as a way out—what do we say to them? What is the method of settlement? We can't say go back to status quo ante. We can say get out of Pakistan, etc.

K: We have to prevent Indian from attacking West Pakistan. That's the major thing. We have to maintain the position of withdrawal from all Pakistan but we have to prevent West Pakistan from being smashed. But it is a little premature to make the move to the Russians. They still owe us an answer to your previous letter.² Therefore we have to hold

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² Document 19.

it up a little bit. I believe, Mr. President, we can come out of this if they maintain their respect for us. Even if we lose we still will come out alright.

P: You mean moving the [military?] and letting a few planes go in—maybe.

K: Right now we are in the position where we are telling allies not to assist another ally that is in mortal danger. We are in a situation where Soviet stooge uses Soviet weapons to attack a country that we are legally obligated to defend and we do nothing.

P: The Chinese thing I still think is a card in the [hole?]. If they just move a little.

K: I think if we move absolutely nothing we will trigger the Soviets into really tough actions and if we can scare somebody off—it may open the Middle East solution again.

P: Don't underestimate that if Congress gets off this week and we smack North Vietnam that it will be a message to these people.

K: If we send a message to China we should leave an interval so that they won't think we used it as a pretext to getting to Vietnam.

P: That's right. I think message to the Soviets is more important now.

K: That's right.

P: Although they must be agonizing now.

K: But they are so weak. They had a semi-revolt in the military. A million Russians on the northern frontier . . .

P: A movement of some Chinese to the border would scare those Indians to death.

K: (Something re talking to the Chinese—I missed it) I would plan to do that on Friday when I see Golda Meir.

P: If we could enlist them it would be something. I think the delivery of a few planes to them would certainly help. What time do you want to be ready to talk tomorrow?

K: I have a WSAG meeting in the morning. I am seeing Connally at 11:00. I could do it anytime after 11:00.

P: Let's get together around 12:00.

K: Fine, Mr. President.

22. **Note From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, December 9, 1971.

HAK

*Brezhnev Reply*² to President's December 6 Letter.³

The tone is moderate. The letter sidesteps the points concerning our basic relationship made in the President's letter and instead continues to deny any element of US-Soviet confrontation and to suggest "parallel action".

Although the letter denies Soviet one-sidedness it details what are in fact basically pro-Indian positions regarding a settlement in the pre-hostilities period. It ignores, naturally enough, the objective encouragement given the Indians to take military action by the Soviet-Indian treaty and Soviet arms and equipment supplies (after the US cut off such supplies to Pakistan).

The letter does not take up our point about Pakistan dismemberment and on its face suggests continued Soviet commitment to some kind of Pakistani integrity (e.g. the references to "East Pakistan"). However, the proposed Soviet solution (identical to the one advanced December 7)⁴ can have no other effect than the dismemberment of Pakistan under present circumstances.

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Secret; Sensitive.

² Vorontsov handed Kissinger an unofficial translation of Brezhnev's December 8 letter on December 9 at 8:20 p.m. (Ibid.) Brezhnev agreed with Nixon that neither side should seek unilateral advantages in crises like the one in South Asia, but also suggested that the United States and Soviet Union act to resolve the crisis and bring about peace. For text, see *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 253.

³ Document 19.

⁴ On December 7 at 11 p.m., Vorontsov delivered to Kissinger a message on South Asia from the Soviet leadership dated December 6. In a December 7 note to Kissinger, Sonnenfeldt suggested that the Soviet leaders' message of December 6 was clearly written before Moscow received President Nixon's letter of December 6 and was in response to Kissinger's conversation with Vorontsov on December 5; see Document 17. Sonnenfeldt characterized the December 6 Soviet message as follows: "The thrust is that we have a little misunderstanding which is only natural and we are wrong to suggest that this should be made a federal case of. In line with this, the tone of the message is moderate. As regards substance, there seems to be some slight movement though not of course enough (no withdrawal)." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8) The Soviet message of December 6 is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 241.

Thus there is no reference to withdrawal of forces.

Moreover, the suggestion of resumed negotiations between “The Government of Pakistan” and the “East Pakistani leaders”—even accepting the qualification that negotiations should be resumed at “the stage where they were discontinued”—at least requires further explanation under conditions when India has already recognized a separate government in East Bengal. In fact, I think *this proposal is a phony*—and the Soviets either know it or the news has not caught up with them. I do not see how Yahya will negotiate with anybody in East Pakistan when the place is practically occupied by India; and I do not see how the East Pakistanis will negotiate with Yahya when they see victory in their grasp.

What Next?

1. I see no point in another letter from us. If the President sees Matskevich,⁵ that is a better channel right now, anyway.

2. However we elect to talk to the Soviets—you with Vorontsov, President with Matskevich (maybe supplemented by yourself later), or whatever, I think these should be the points to make:

—there must be categorical guarantees that the Soviets will not support the dismemberment of Pakistan, *de facto* or *de jure*;

—there must be a cease-fire⁶ *plus withdrawal* as part of any settlement effort;

—there must be convincing evidence that the Soviets are working to restrain the Indians, in word *and deed*;

—we will be glad to work for the resumption of negotiations provided the real status quo ante is restored; this is the only basis for “parallel” US-Soviet action;

—in any case, matters will take an even more serious turn if the Indians move against the Paks in the West;

—we reiterate what we consider the broader implications for our relations if the dismemberment of Pakistan proceeds.

Sonnenfeldt⁷

⁵ See Document 23.

⁶ Haig crossed out the word “plus” and added the following handwritten revision: “after very categoric assurances there will be” at this point in the note. Haig then wrote the following comment at the end of this note: “HAK—Hal [Sonnenfeldt] is now drafting talking points along foregoing lines. He will soften conditions and language in recognition of our weak position and diplomatic niceties. You should let us know if you want substance changed. AH.”

⁷ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

23. Memorandum for the President's File¹

Washington, December 9, 1971.

SUBJECT

The President's Meeting with Soviet Minister of Agriculture Vladimir Matskevich on Thursday, December 9, 1971 at 4:00 p.m.

PARTICIPANTS

The President
Minister Matskevich
Soviet Chargé Yuly Vorontsov
Dr. Henry A. Kissinger

The President received Minister Matskevich in order to impress upon the Soviet leadership the seriousness of his concern over the India/Pakistan conflict and its potential implications for US-Soviet relations.² The meeting was held to 15 minutes, and there was no press or photo coverage.

Minister Matskevich opened the conversation by conveying orally an official communication from General-Secretary Brezhnev to the President. Brezhnev looked forward to seeing the President in Moscow in May and believed the President's visit would further the cause of peace. Brezhnev expressed the hopes of the whole Central Committee of the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Special Files, President's Office Files, Box 86, Memoranda for the President, Beginning December 5, 1971. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Sent for information. Drafted by Kissinger. Kissinger sent the President a December 9 briefing memorandum, which stressed that the point of the upcoming meeting was to "convey to the Soviet leadership your view of the India/Pakistan conflict and its potential implications for US-Soviet relations." A stamped note indicates Nixon read it. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8) In his diary, December 9, Haldeman noted that "Henry then made an urgent pitch that the P see the Soviet agriculture minister who was here today, because he's a strong personal friend of Brezhnev's and has a message from Brezhnev, and also the P can give him a message back, laying it out very sternly." Haldeman also stated that he, Haig, and the President agreed that Kissinger was so "physically tired, that he doesn't realize that he is at fault in the failure in India-Pakistan to date and doesn't like that feeling. Also Haig pointed out that Henry basically is bored. He's just tired of fighting the bureaucracy on all these things." (*The Haldeman Diaries: Multimedia Edition*)

² President Nixon prepared handwritten notes apparently in anticipation of this meeting. They read: "Our relations are at a critical turning point; 1. Stans—trade, 2. Berlin, 3. SALT, 4. Mideast. Based on mutual restraint—no advantage. Now: we decide—What happens Pakistan 1. What happens to Russ[ia] & Asia—could be disastrous for World. 2. We can't allow dismemberment by force of a friendly country. 3. Must be a ceasefire—negotiations within Pak framework—withdrawal. You [Soviet Union] gain with India. You beat China. You imperil relations with U.S." (Ibid., President's Personal Files, Box 70, President's Speech File, December 9, 1971 Meeting)

CPSU that the Moscow summit would have a beneficial impact on the future, and added a personal word that he looked forward to his meetings alone with the President.

President Nixon responded that he, too, looked forward to his meetings with the General-Secretary. These could be the most important heads-of-government meetings in this century. Minister Matskevich could assure Mr. Brezhnev that President Nixon approached the summit meeting in the same spirit as he did.

The President then told the Agriculture Minister that he wanted to discuss a current and urgent problem very frankly. "We are in correspondence with General-Secretary Brezhnev. I want you to know how strongly I personally feel about this issue. You can convey a sense of urgency, that may help lead to a settlement. Great progress has been made in US-Soviet relations. No one would have said two years ago that such progress was possible. I told your Foreign Minister, Mr. Gromyko, when he was here that our meeting at the highest level had to be on the basis of equality. There must be total mutual respect. I respect the Soviet leaders. The United States and the Soviet Union have made progress in SALT and on Berlin; we have agreed to a spring summit. We have also discussed the possibility of a European Security Conference, and have begun discussions on the Middle East. We have an opportunity for a totally new relationship between our two countries. We won't agree on everything, but if we can progress in all these fields we'll be as close as our two nations were in the war. All this is possible."

"Now, speaking quite frankly," the President continued, "a great cloud hangs over it—the problem of the Subcontinent. Six-hundred million will win over 60 million. Pakistan will be cut in half. In the short range, this may be a gain for the Soviet Union and a setback for China. It is certain to be a tragedy for Pakistan. What is far worse is that if we continue as we are it will poison the whole new relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union. What I want to suggest is that you ask whether India's gains—which are certain—are worth jeopardizing your relations with the United States. I don't say this in a threatening way. Let the US and the USSR find a way to work together.

"The first requirement is a ceasefire. The second requirement is that India desist from attacks in West Pakistan. If India moves forces against West Pakistan, the United States cannot stand by. The key to a settlement is in the hands of the Soviet Union. If the USSR does not restrain the Indians, the US will not be able to deal with Yahya. If the Indians continue their military operations, we must inevitably look toward a confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Soviet Union has a treaty with India; we have one with Pakistan.

You must recognize the urgency of a ceasefire and political settlement of the crisis.

“Let us not let our differences on this issue obscure the great opportunities before us for improving our relations,” the President concluded.

Minister Matskevich replied that he was grateful to have the President’s frank appraisal of the situation and would convey this message to the Soviet leadership.

After a brief exchange of leave-taking formalities, the meeting ended.

24. Editorial Note

Between December 10 and 12, 1971, the military crisis in South Asia reached a climax. Assistant to the President Henry Kissinger and Soviet Minister Counselor Vorontsov as well as President Nixon and Soviet leaders exchanged multiple messages in an attempt to bring an end to the fighting and resolve the crisis.

On December 10, at 11:59 a.m., Kissinger met with Vorontsov and outlined a newly modified U.S. proposal for a settlement of the war that no longer required Indian withdrawal, but instead a cease-fire and standstill agreement between India and Pakistan monitored by United Nations representatives in East and West Pakistan. After the cease-fire took effect, negotiations would lead to troop withdrawal and satisfaction for Bengali aspirations in East Pakistan. (Kissinger’s Record of Schedule; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–1976, and *White House Years*, page 905) In describing the meeting to President Nixon, Kissinger reported that he told Vorontsov that the United States had a secret treaty with Pakistan (actually a secret understanding, see *Foreign Relations*, 1961–1963, volume XIX, Document 100, and footnote 6, Document 191) and characterized his informing the Soviet Minister Counselor of it as a “veiled ultimatum.” Nixon responded, “If Brezhnev does not have the good judgment not to push us to the wall on this miserable issue, we may as well forget the summit.” Kissinger assured the President that there would be an acceptable cease-fire by December 12 or 13 supported by the United States, the Soviet Union, and China. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Conversation between Nixon and Kissinger, December 10, 1971, 12:47–1:01 p.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 635–17) Also on December 10, Nixon sent Brezhnev a letter responding to Brezhnev’s letter of December 8; see Document 22 and footnote 2 thereto. Nixon’s letter proposed a joint US–USSR ap-

peal for an immediate cease-fire. Nixon suggested that if the Soviet Union was unwilling, the United States would conclude: "there is in progress an act of aggression directed at the whole of Pakistan, a friendly country toward which we have obligations." Nixon asked Brezhnev to use his influence and take responsibility to restrain India. (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/ Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

At 7:30 p.m. on December 11, Kissinger telephoned the President and discussed taking the issue to the UN Security Council the next day. Nixon insisted that "we have to use the word aggression—naked aggression." Kissinger agreed: "And if this continues, now that East Pakistan has practically fallen there can no longer be any doubt that we are dealing with naked aggression supported by Soviet power." Kissinger suggested informing the Soviet leaders what the United States planned to do in the Security Council the next day. Nixon was at first dubious about "telling the Russians before we hear from them," but then agreed that Kissinger should inform Vorontsov that night. Kissinger suggested: "We will then take public steps, including the Security Council steps, in which we will publicly have to say what their [USSR's] role is." The President responded, "Well, I would rather it be stated in which it will be clear what their role is—that the steps would inevitably show what their role is unless they cooperate in a policy of stopping aggression at this point." Next Kissinger and Nixon discussed China's probable reaction, with the President doubting they would do anything and Kissinger suggesting they would support Pakistan. Kissinger then complained, "Bleeding hearts are saying that we are driving India away and that no one mentions what the Russians are doing." The President then authorized Kissinger to call Vorontsov. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Soon after this telephone discussion (there is no time on the transcript), Kissinger called Vorontsov and informed him of his discussion with the President. Kissinger told Vorontsov: "He [Nixon] has asked me to tell you that if we don't hear from you by tomorrow morning that we will proceed unilaterally. We have now waited for 48 hours and in a matter that affects the peace of the world in these circumstances we will proceed unilaterally and if we do we will have to state our view about the involvement of other countries." Vorontsov replied "Kuznetsov [Soviet First Deputy Foreign Minister] is embarked on a mission to India now; and I have reasons to believe that that's in direct connection to whatever we have discussed here." After confirming when Kuznetsov left—that morning, Moscow time—Kissinger told Vorontsov, "I cannot stress to you sufficiently seriously how gravely we view the situation." The Soviet Minister Counselor said he understood, that Kuznetsov's trip also showed the Soviets' serious view.

Vorontsov suggested that he might have something from Moscow the next day. Kissinger responded, "Well, I understand it, you have to understand that we have not made a move for 72 hours in order to give us a chance of moving jointly. We cannot in all honor wait any longer." Vorontsov asked what Kissinger meant by unilateral action. Kissinger answered: "We will of course move unilaterally in the UN, but we may also take certain other steps which were not irrevocable [but which] would be preferable if we did not have to take them." Kissinger added that, "We again want to underline that this is something that we prefer to do." Vorontsov said he understood and "in Moscow they understand that." Kissinger was referring to U.S. plans to move an aircraft carrier task force into the Bay of Bengal, but he did not specifically inform Vorontsov of that fact. Vorontsov promised to transmit Kissinger's message to Moscow. (Ibid.)

The morning of December 12, President Nixon and Kissinger, later joined by Deputy Assistant to the President Haig, had a long meeting on South Asia in which they agreed to send a "hot line" message to Moscow, the first use of that channel by the Nixon administration. Nixon outlined the message as follows: "Basically all we are doing is asking for a reply. We're not letting the Russians diddle us along. Point one. Second, all we are doing is to reiterate what I said to the Agricultural Minister and what you [Kissinger] said to Vorontsov." Nixon and Kissinger agreed this was a good plan and a bold move. Most of the meeting was taken up with discussing China's potential reaction, especially after Haig informed the President and Kissinger that the Chinese wanted to meet with them. The three men discussed the likelihood of Soviet military action against China in the event of Chinese military moves to threaten India. Kissinger stated: "If the Soviets move against them and we don't do anything, we'll be finished." The President asked: "So what do we do if the Soviets move against them? Start lobbing nuclear weapons?" Kissinger suggested that if the Soviets moved against China it would be "the final showdown" and if the Soviets succeeded "we will be finished." After tentatively considering restraining the Chinese, Kissinger suggested, "I think we can't call them off frankly" Kissinger continued, "If we call them off, I think our China initiative is pretty well down the drain." The three men then discussed the crisis at length in ever increasing disastrous scenarios. Kissinger suggested, "If the outcome of this is that Pakistan is swallowed by India, China is destroyed, defeated, humiliated by the Soviet Union, it will be a change in the world balance of power of such magnitude that the security of the United States may be forever, certainly for decades—we will have a ghastly war in the Middle East." The President then suggested that China and the Soviet Union would not go to war, but Kissinger demurred. Finally the President agreed with Haig and Kissinger that if the Chinese moved against India, the United States

would tell the Soviets that war with China was “unacceptable.” (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig, December 12, 1971, 8:45 a.m.–9:42 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–3)

At 10:05 a.m., Vorontsov called Kissinger and read him the text of a message from the Soviet leadership, which Vorontsov then gave to Haig at 10:45 a.m. The message read: “The first contacts with the Government of India and personally with Prime Minister I. Gandhi on the question which was raised by President Nixon in his letter [December 10] testify to the fact that the Government of India has no intention to take any military actions against West Pakistan. The Soviet leaders believe that this makes the situation easier and hope that the Government of Pakistan will draw from this appropriate conclusions. As far as other questions raised in the President’s letter are concerned the answers will be given in the shortest of time.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

At 10:27 a.m., Kissinger and the President met again in the Oval Office to discuss the hot line message in light of the interim Soviet message read to Kissinger at 10:05 a.m. They revised the hot line message. The President and Kissinger alternated between optimism and fear that the crisis could take a dangerous turn, especially if the Chinese supported Pakistan. The overall assessment was one of optimism that the Soviet Union was unwilling to move towards military confrontation with the United States. (Ibid., White House Tapes, Recording of conversation among Nixon, Kissinger, and Haig, December 12, 1971, 10:27–10:37 a.m., Oval Office, Conversation No. 637–6) At 11:30 a.m., the White House dispatched the “hot line” message to Brezhnev drafted earlier that morning by Kissinger and the President. It read: “Mr. General Secretary: I have just received your interim message concerning the grave situation in the Indian Subcontinent. However, after delaying for 72 hours in anticipation of your reply to my conversation with Minister Matskevich and Counselor Vorontsov I had set in train certain moves in the United Nations Security Council at the time mentioned to Counselor Vorontsov. These cannot now be reversed. I must also note that the Indian assurances still lack concreteness. I am still prepared to proceed along the lines set forth in my letter of December 10, as well as in the conversations with your Chargé d’Affaires Vorontsov, and my talk with your Agricultural Minister. In view of the urgency of the situation and the need for concerted action I propose that we continue closest consultations through established confidential channels. I cannot emphasize too strongly that time is of the essence to avoid consequences neither of us want.” (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President’s Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

Kissinger then called Vorontsov at 11:45 a.m. to inform him about the “hot line” message and to chastise him about not receiving a

message from the Soviet leadership until after 10 a.m. despite Kissinger's earlier insistence to Vorontsov that the United States would move in the UN Security Council that morning unless they received a Soviet response by 9 a.m. Although concerned about trouble in the Security Council, Vorontsov suggested there would be an agreement from India by the time the Council met. Vorontsov then hoped that "maybe everything will fall into place." Kissinger responded: "We can still make it fall into place." "We need an agreement," Vorontsov said. "I hope you will not be insistent on a fist fight in the Security Council because we are in agreement now. All that is needed now is the tactical things. The terms will be acceptable to you." Kissinger responded: "You will find us cooperative. Make sure your leaders understand this." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

Before leaving for the Azores with the President to meet with French President Pompidou, Kissinger called Vorontsov at 12:30 p.m. and gave him the following message: "Yuli, I just talked to the President again. I reported our conversation to him and he asked me to tell you that we will work it out in a spirit so there are no winners or losers. And so we are not looking for any public humiliation of anybody. We also believe—and we will use our influence in the Security Council as it evolves to come up with a compromise so far as the UN is concerned in which everybody gives up a little. We are also prepared to proceed on our understandings on which you are working. We want to make sure that you approach us first so that for [from] now on we will not take any additional steps beyond what we have told you . . . and then work out a strategy and tactics and then work toward a solution as rapidly as possible. That is the spirit in which we will approach it as soon as we get confirmation from you." (Ibid.)

The afternoon of December 12, Haig met with Chinese Permanent Representative to the United Nations Huang Hua in New York and discovered that China was not prepared to support Pakistan militarily, but rather wanted a cease-fire, mutual troop withdrawal, and settlement brokered by the United Nations. The full text of the conversation between Haig and Huang Hua, which was sent to Nixon and Kissinger en route to the Azores, is in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume XVII, China, 1969–1972, Document 177.

Haig called Vorontsov at 7:40 p.m. on December 12 to inform him that he had just spoken to the President and Kissinger in the Azores. Haig stated the President and Kissinger were holding up the movement of the U.S. Seventh Fleet into the Bay of Bengal for 24 hours to give the Soviets time to nail down an agreement with the Indians and to avoid publicity. Vorontsov responded: "During this 24 hours we might have good results." (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

25. Memorandum for the Record¹

Washington, December 14, 1971, 6 p.m.

SUBJECT

Meeting between Henry A. Kissinger, Soviet Minister Vorontsov, and Brigadier General Haig, Tuesday, December 14, 1971, 6:00 p.m.

Dr. Kissinger informed Minister Vorontsov that the President had asked him to meet with the Minister to again reiterate and expand on some of the items that General Haig had discussed with him earlier that day.² Dr. Kissinger noted that when the crisis in the Subcontinent became acute, the U.S. Government delayed initiating unilateral action or action in concert with other governments with the hope that the U.S. could work jointly with the Soviet Union in the established confidential channel in a search for a constructive and peaceful solution to the dilemma. It was specifically for this reason that the United States held up military moves and other actions which it might otherwise have undertaken in its own interest and in the interest of world peace. Despite this fact, the prolonged time that lapsed between Mr. Vorontsov's discussions with Dr. Kissinger on Sunday morning (December 12)³ and the receipt of a formal Soviet response early Tuesday morning⁴ resulted in certain unilateral actions by the U.S. Government. These same delays were experienced following Dr. Kissinger's earlier discussions with Minister Vorontsov during the outbreak of the fighting.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. No drafting information appears on the memorandum.

² Haig's memorandum for the record of his conversation with Vorontsov at 12:40 p.m. on December 14 is *ibid.* and printed in *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, vol. XI, South Asia Crisis, 1971, Document 303.

³ Regarding the Kissinger–Vorontsov telephone conversations on the morning of December 12, see Document 24.

⁴ At 3 a.m. on December 14, Vorontsov delivered to Haig a message from the Soviet leadership to President Nixon. The Soviet leaders called for a "calm, weighed approach" to the crisis. The leaders stated: "We are in constant contact with the Indian side. . . . We have firm assurances by the Indian leadership that India has no plans of seizing West Pakistani territory. Thus as far as intentions of India are concerned there is no lack of clarity to which you have referred. In the course of consultations the Indian side has expressed willingness to cease fire and withdraw its forces if Pakistani Government withdraws its forces from East Pakistan and peaceful settlement is reached there with the lawful representatives of East Pakistani population, to whom power will be transferred and conditions will be created for return from India of all East Pakistani refugees. At the same time the Indians have no intentions to impose their will on the East Pakistani people who themselves will determine their lot." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8)

Dr. Kissinger stated that he noted with satisfaction the Soviet Government's assurance that the Government of India had absolutely no territorial designs on West Pakistan, and he wanted it clearly understood that he was referring to a return to the status quo ante or the existing dividing lines between India and West Pakistan and that efforts would not be made to modify these dividing lines in the current crisis. Mr. Vorontsov replied that this was precisely the Soviet view and their understanding of the assurance provided to the United States Government; in other words, that there should be a precise return to the status quo ante which existed prior to the current crisis. Dr. Kissinger stated that Mr. Vorontsov may have noted the press reports coming from Air Force One during the return of the Presidential party from the Azores.⁵ Mr. Vorontsov indicated that he was aware of those remarks. Dr. Kissinger stated that these remarks were somewhat overplayed by the press and they should be interpreted as confirmation of the U.S. view that there was no longer any justification for failing to settle the conflict on the Subcontinent. Further delays of the kind we have been experiencing constitute a temporary irritation in U.S./Soviet relationships and the remarks on the plane were designed to note the U.S.'s concern. Should the situation continue to deteriorate, it must have an impact on future U.S./Soviet relationships. Soviet actions thus far are not consistent with the United States Government's conception of joint U.S./Soviet action in search of an improved environment for world peace.

Dr. Kissinger noted that the United Kingdom now had a resolution before the United Nations.⁶ While this resolution appeared to be changing hourly, it is in the general framework of the kind of resolution that the U.S. believes the Soviet Government and the U.S. Government should support. The United States Government is not aware of the view of the People's Republic of China on this resolution, but if all parties could get behind such a resolution then the situation on the Subcontinent could be settled tomorrow. If this is not the Soviet Government's view, how should the United States then interpret the communication from the Soviet leaders? Mr. Vorontsov asked why the

⁵ Apparent reference to Kissinger's remarks on December 13, as reported in *The New York Times*, that President Nixon regarded the Soviet Union as capable of restraining India and if it did not do so, the President would reassess the US-USSR relationship including his decision to attend the Moscow summit.

⁶ In a December 15 memorandum to Kissinger, Harold Saunders of the NSC staff summarized the British resolution as a "simple ceasefire on all fronts," with "enough said about a political settlement to hint that it could be what India wants," and a mechanism whereby "a UN special representative sorts out political and humanitarian problems." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 573, Indo-Pak War, South Asia, 12/14/71–12/16/71)

United States Government would not be willing to go beyond a resolution calling for a simple ceasefire since this was not adequate in the Soviet or the Indian viewpoint. Dr. Kissinger stated that the resolution might be expanded to include withdrawal since Indian forces have penetrated much Pakistani territory. Thus far, Soviet reactions have been slow and characterized by delaying tactics. The U.S. has observed the Soviet bureaucracy move with the greatest speed when it chooses to do so. Minister Vorontsov stated that the complication arose when the United States Government changed on Monday the proposals it had made the previous week to the Soviet Government.⁷ This was a cause of great concern to the Soviet leaders. Of particular concern was the fact that the United States Government dropped reference to a political solution which was contained in the language given by Dr. Kissinger to Minister Vorontsov earlier. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was true but that the reasons that it was necessary to do so was the failure on the part of the Soviet Government to respond promptly to the U.S. proposal. Minister Vorontsov said the problem is obviously not a question of Soviet or U.S. ill will but one of the complexity of the problem. Dr. Kissinger stated that he was less concerned about the immediate handling of the situation but could not help but blame the Soviet Union for letting the situation develop in the first instance. For example, the provision of massive amounts of modern military equipment to the Government of India, and threats to China which served as a guarantee and cover for Indian action had to be considered as the cause of the difficulty. Minister Vorontsov replied that the Paks had U.S. armament, some Soviet armament and some Chinese armament. The real problem was the result of grievous errors made by Pakistan in the East. Dr. Kissinger stated that we are now dealing with reality which must receive urgent attention. The U.S. is prepared on its part to give up its demand for withdrawal and it has asked that the Soviets on its part give up its demands for a political settlement. This poses an obvious compromise. Minister Vorontsov noted that the U.S. departure from its earlier language is what has caused the problem. Dr. Kissinger reiterated that this was forced on the U.S. side because the Soviet Government gave no answer over a prolonged period. Thus, the U.S. was forced to move based on the principles to which it adhered. There was no Soviet response even after the President's departure for the Azores. Thus, the United States had no alternative but to adhere to the moral principles associated with the issue. Minister Vorontsov said it should be noted that when the United States dropped the three essential points contained in its initial proposal, Moscow was

⁷ Apparent reference to the message sent by Nixon to Brezhnev on Sunday, December 12; see Document 24.

greatly disturbed. Moscow had originally been very pleased by the U.S. move in Dacca which the President noted in his letter to Mr. Brezhnev but then a sudden departure from the political initiative caused great concern in his capital. The problem now is that it is time to prevent a bloodbath in East Pakistan. It is essential that all parties act now. A viable resolution can only transfer power to the Bangla Desh. Dr. Kissinger said that the U.S. Government cannot go along with this kind of resolution. Mr. Vorontsov replied that the question was now academic since he had seen on the news that the East Pakistan Government had already resigned. Dr. Kissinger stated that he would now like to summarize his understanding. This understanding was that:

—The Indians would not attack the West.

—The Indians would not seek to acquire Pakistan territory and would return to the territorial limits that existed prior to the crisis—in other words to a status quo ante.

Minister Vorontsov said that that would also be the Soviet Union's understanding. Dr. Kissinger stated the issue is now to get a settlement in East Pakistan. Minister Vorontsov agreed noting that a means must be found to prevent the bloodbath which will follow. Dr. Kissinger stated that the original U.S. statement was an objective one not suitable for a U.N. resolution. Minister Vorontsov agreed. Dr. Kissinger stated that continual haggling between parties in the Security Council could only lead to sterile results. If it continues, it cannot sit well with the United States Government. For this reason, something like the U.K. resolution, which the United States side does not like either, appears to offer the best compromise. On the other hand, if the Soviets continue to seek a *fait accompli*, then the U.S. Government must draw its own conclusions from this reality. Minister Vorontsov asked what Dr. Kissinger considered an ideal solution. Dr. Kissinger stated that the U.S. Government knows that East Pakistan will not go back to the West. On the other hand, the U.S. cannot legally accept an overt change in status at this moment, and efforts within the United Nations to force the U.S. Government to do so must be vetoed. The U.S. considers that a *fait accompli* has occurred in the East and the problem is to proceed from that point. On the other hand, India seeks not only to break East Pakistan away from the West but to do so under a mantle of legitimacy. This is more than the United States can accept. Just two weeks ago, Madame Gandhi said that the situation in East Pakistan was an internal Pakistani problem. Thus, steps from this point on should be to stop the fighting. Why should the United States struggle with the Soviet Union at costs in its relations with the Soviets on an issue like the Bangla Desh, especially when there are such great issues like the Middle East to be settled between the two sides? Furthermore, the United States is not anti-India as some would infer. Certainly, the Soviets know what the real problem is. Minister Vorontsov stated that the real problem in

Moscow is concerned that the United States continually airs its complaints in the press. Statements like the Summit statement earlier in the day cause real problems in Moscow. Dr. Kissinger stated that General Haig had advised Minister Vorontsov that we had waited for an extended period for a Soviet response but none was forthcoming. The U.S. had informed the Soviet Government that we were prepared to take parallel action and was confident that the Soviets would join with us. There is no way that the U.S. could permit Pakistan to be dismembered officially in the United Nations framework. It was the U.S. view that an agreement could be worked out between the two governments quietly in the confidential channel. Certainly, the Chinese would oppose such a solution in the United Nations. President Nixon interpreted the Soviet response as a delaying action. Minister Vorontsov noted that the U.S. neglected to reiterate the West Pakistan concession made in Dacca. Dr. Kissinger stated that the President did not focus specifically on that issue. For that matter, Dr. Kissinger himself did not. The U.S. now appreciates this and therefore both sides could wind up the matter without further delay. Minister Vorontsov said that the Soviets would need some help with respect to the Summit statement as soon as possible that would tend to limit the damage in Moscow. Dr. Kissinger stated that the U.S. side would calm public speculation on the issue. Dr. Kissinger directed General Haig to insure that Press Secretary Ziegler modify the exaggerated play that was given to the statement on Air Force One. Dr. Kissinger continued that since Friday, President Nixon had been concerned that the Soviet leaders were not doing all possible to arrive at a settlement. On the way to the Azores, he commented that it would have been most helpful if he could tell the French that the U.S. and the Soviets had concerted to arrive at a settlement. In the face of continued delays, however, the President began to believe that the Soviet Government was providing words only with the view towards letting events on the ground dictate the ultimate outcome. It is not President Nixon's style to threaten. Certainly he hopes that the U.S./Soviet Summit will work but in this context, President Nixon has long sought a genuine change in U.S./Soviet relations. Despite his desires, however, the Soviets proceed to equip India with great amounts of sophisticated armaments. If the Soviet Government were to support or to pressure other foreign leaders to dismember or to divide an ally of the United States, how can the Soviet leaders expect progress in our mutual relationships? This is the source of the President's concern. He has never questioned mere atmospherics but intends to make major progress in U.S./Soviet relations.

The meeting adjourned at 7:00 p.m.

26. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 15, 1971, 11:30 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

Dr. Henry A. Kissinger
Soviet Chargé Yuly Vorontsov

I met with Vorontsov at my request to hand him a draft letter to Kosygin (attached) on the need to put an end to hostilities.²

Vorontsov said that I had to believe him that a major effort was being made to induce the Indians; however, they were not being very reasonable. I said that there was no longer any excuse; the President had made any number of personal appeals, all of which had been rejected, and it was time to move. Vorontsov asked me whether it could be dealt with in the United Nations. I told him yes, we were prepared to support the British Resolution³ if the Soviet Union would. Vorontsov said that the British Resolution was not very agreeable; the Soviets were trying to promote the Polish Resolution.⁴ I said I wanted him to know that we would not agree to any resolution that recognized a turnover of authority. There was a question of principle involved. It was bad enough that the United Nations was impotent in the case of military attack; it could not be asked to legitimize it. However, as I pointed out, we were prepared to work in a parallel direction.

Vorontsov said that the letter presented some difficulties. The Soviet Union was prepared unconditionally to guarantee the United States that there would be no Indian attack on the Western front or on

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House.

² The draft letter was attached. A handwritten note at the top of the first page reads: "Draft shown to Min. Vorontsov by HAK, 11:30 a.m., 12/15/71." The draft letter noted that the military conflict in East Pakistan was moving to a conclusion and the remaining task was to end the bloodshed there and end fighting in the West. Since UN efforts had not yielded progress, Nixon asked: "Is it not therefore urgently desirable that our two countries should take prompt and reasonable steps to ensure that the military conflict does not spread and that assurances be given against territorial acquisition by either side?" The President hoped that the United States and Soviet Union could "cooperate to achieve an end to all the fighting, to remove the concern that the war will become one of conquest, and to eliminate the threat to peace that has arisen." Nixon's draft letter added, that this "would, of course, not prejudice anybody's position with respect to an ultimate political solution."

³ For a summary of the British resolution, see footnote 6, Document 25. The resolution is UN doc S/10455.

⁴ UN doc S/10453.

Kashmir, and that when they referred to West Pakistan they meant the existing dividing line. However, to do this publicly would mean that they were in effect speaking for a friendly country. After all, India was not a client state. I said that the course of events was obvious: Either there would be a ceasefire soon in the West anyway through the UN or through direct dealings with us, or else we would have to draw appropriate conclusions.

Vorontsov said, "In a little while we will go back to where we were." I said, "I have told you for two weeks now that this is not the case." On this note, we left.⁵

⁵ At 5:55 p.m. on December 15, Kissinger reported on this conversation by telephone to President Nixon who was vacationing in Key Biscayne, Florida. Kissinger said: "I never had a chance to give you a report from Vorontsov. I gave him the draft letter to Kosygin asking him for joint action to stop the fighting. I told him we put it forward not to get any additional confrontations. I also said they could support the British Resolution which is really at the very edge, well beyond the edge of what is tolerable." The conversation then dealt more generally with the South Asia crisis, with Kissinger telling the President of reports that the Soviet Union was encouraging India to take Kashmir, but with both hoping that it might not happen. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File)

27. National Security Study Memorandum 143¹

Washington, December 15, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Secretary of Commerce
The Director of Central Intelligence
The Administrator, National Aeronautics and Space Administration

SUBJECT

Review of US–Soviet Negotiations

¹ Source: National Security Council, NSSM Files, NSSM 143. Secret. Copies were sent to Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Richardson, Chairman of the JCS Moorer, Chairman of the Council on Environmental Quality Train, the President's Assistant for International Economic Affairs Peterson, Director of ACDA Smith, and Director of USIA Shakespeare.

As part of the process of planning for his meetings in Moscow, the President has directed that all bilateral issues that may be subject to discussions or negotiations with the USSR between now and the summit meeting be reviewed by the Senior Review Group. Multilateral negotiations, other than on major international issues (e.g. SALT, Berlin, MBFR, CSCE, etc.) will be included in this review.

To initiate this review each agency should prepare a brief status report of those issues within its jurisdiction which are currently under discussion with the USSR as well as any questions that may be discussed or negotiated in the next five months. All issues will be included even though they may be the subject of separate NSSM study. These status reports should include a description of the issue, its current status, prospects for agreement and the possible interrelationship with other questions being discussed with the USSR.

The agency status reports should be submitted through the Chairman of the NSC Interdepartmental Group for Europe not later than December 29, 1971 for consideration by the NSC Senior Review Group.² The Chairman, NSC-IG Europe will assure a uniform format, and will submit, along with the agency reports, a brief summary of the interrelationship among the various issues reported. For the purposes of this special project, the Senior Review Group will include representatives of the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of the Treasury, and NASA; other agencies will participate if there are matters concerning the USSR in their area of responsibility that are likely to arise between now and the summit.

The President has directed further that no agreements with the USSR will be initialed or otherwise concluded without his approval.

Henry A. Kissinger

² See Document 34.

28. **Backchannel Message From the Chief of the Delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (Smith) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Vienna, December 15, 1971, 1807Z.

32. Dear Henry:

In post-plenary December 15th, I expressed personal concern to Semenov that events in the subcontinent could have a prejudicial effect on the prospect for improvement in Soviet/American relations in which I thought SALT progress had had a part.² I asked if he shared this concern.

He referred to the no-linkage understanding and to earlier situations during SALT when there had been international strains. He said that there were other contacts between our governments to go into matters such as this. I said that it was clearer than ever before to me that in SALT we were not working in a vacuum.

Semenov said that on a suitable occasion when we were not as busy as now he would present his views about the subcontinent situation in a personal way. He did not believe this question could influence the development of relations between our countries. Our governments had different positions on certain aspects of this problem, but he did not believe that these differences were any deeper than differences between us on some other questions which had not affected our negotiations; therefore, he personally did not share Smith's concern. Of course, the question in itself was important and he would not be averse to holding an exchange of personal views, but not at the present moment.³

Warm regards.

Gerry Smith

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 427, Backchannel Files, Backchannel Messages, SALT, 1971. Top Secret; Eyes Only.

² In backchannel message WH11135 to Vienna for Smith, December 13, Kissinger stated: "The situation in South Asia is such that it is most important that the U.S. Delegation maintain a cool and somewhat more reserved attitude towards their Soviet counterparts. This demeanor should be adopted immediately and maintained until further notice. President of course leaves up to your best judgment the manner in which this perceptible shift in U.S. attitude should be conveyed but he anticipates your complete cooperation in this endeavor until situation in South Asia clarifies." (Ibid.)

³ On December 15 Kissinger sent WH11186 to Vienna, informing Smith that President Nixon "was alarmed that you raised directly the issue of South Asia with Semenov." Kissinger stated that the President's intent was a shift in demeanor, not that Smith should raise the issue directly. Kissinger instructed Smith not to engage in further private discussions, but "rather initiate a stalling procedure in your SALT discussions without attributing the shift in any way to events in South Asia." (Ibid.) Smith defended his action in backchannel message 34 from Vienna to Kissinger, and expressed puzzlement that his action "alarmed" the President. (Ibid.) Smith mentions this series of telegrams in *Doubletalk*, pp. 341–342, and notes as soon as the crisis was over in South Asia, it was back to business as usual.

29. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 15, 1971.

SUBJECT

Moscow Visit

I thought you might be interested in reading the attached report from the NSC staff member who accompanied Secretary Stans on his recent trip to the Soviet Union.² The report states that:

—For a variety of reasons the Soviets made the trip into a major event.

—It was obvious that the Soviets want more trade with us, particularly US technology and credits.

—The Soviets want the May summit to produce a number of agreements.

—Brezhnev is plainly the top leader and still moving. Kosygin was impressive both in his manner of presentation and his command of substance.

—You can expect to be received with effusive official hospitality but a strictly controlled public reception.

Tab A

Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)

Washington, November 30, 1971.

SUBJECT

My Visit to Moscow

The Soviets were obviously intent on making Secretary Stans' trip³ a major event. Atypically, *Pravda* covered it daily, as did radio and TV. Hospitality was effusive and all the talks were to the point and un-polemical, even when the Soviets raised their long-standing grievances

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box CL 294, Memoranda to the President, December 1971. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information.

² Tab A.

³ Regarding Commerce Secretary Stans' trip to Moscow, see Document 14.

about US “discrimination.” The public attention was, of course, in large part intended for the Chinese but it could not help signaling to the Soviet public that there is a warming trend in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we know from the numerous orientation lectures which our Embassy people attend that Party propagandists are putting out the line that the US motivation, including the President’s, is colored by current domestic politics and it is therefore subject to change.

The Soviets obviously want more trade with us; they want our technology and our credits. And they are talking about projects running 20 to 30 years—like the exploitation of their natural gas deposits—implying a more or less stable political relationship. Of course, their concept of stability still involves strong elements of competition (as Kosygin indicated when he revived the notion of an economic race with us). The chief American expert in the Soviet Foreign Ministry made clear to me in a private talk⁴ that a major strand in the present Soviet mood is that the Soviets are historically entitled to a period of ascendancy after a quarter century in which the US was Number One. I tried to point out the dangers of their pressing excessively since we were bound to respond.

Secretary Stans effectively made the case that long-term trade relations must be rooted in stable political relations and require broad American public support, which is only now developing. He stressed, too, that American firms and their representatives require normal working facilities in the USSR; the Soviets said they understood but avoided commitments. Obviously, some of the activities to which American business representatives are accustomed are incompatible with the rigidities of Soviet life.

Secretary Stans will be reporting fully to the President,⁵ so I will not go into details on the Stans mission. He reserved major political decisions for the President—i.e., on MFN and EXIM credits—but held out promise of substantially increased commercial relations. I think we can anticipate that American firms will be encouraged by the Stans mission to pursue intensively contract negotiations with the Soviets in many fields. Because the only way the Soviets can finance large imports is by credits and improved access of some of their goods to the US market, we can expect mounting pressure on the President to move on MFN and EXIM credits. This will come not only from industry but from the farm States since Kosygin will take care that his proposition to Stans for annual billion dollar grain purchases on credit will become public knowledge. I think we should recognize that MFN and credits

⁴ The account of this conversation is at Tab B, which was attached to a covering memorandum from Sonnenfeldt to Kissinger, November 30, but was not sent to the President.

⁵ See footnote 2, Document 20.

remain useful political tools for us in our relations with the Soviets and decisions should not be driven by domestic concerns alone.

It is clear from my talks that the Soviets want the May summit to be productive. They are formalistic and like documents that can be signed. This is also important for them *vis-à-vis* China. They mentioned a trade agreement, a science and technology agreement, an agreement on space cooperation and the agreement on preventing naval incidents now being negotiated. And we know of their interest in a maritime agreement, the moon treaty, an environmental agreement and medical cooperation. They also want to get their German treaty ratified and are now bargaining with Scheel about a compromise on the linkage of that treaty to the Berlin agreement. They would undoubtedly like to be on the way to a European conference by May and get the President's firm commitment to it. I did not get a clear feeling whether they want a SALT agreement before May—their latest offensive proposal has many flaws and suggests a bargaining posture; they might hope to extract some key concession from the President.

In any event, we should probably be responsive to some degree to Soviet desires for signed documents when they accomplish something specific and concrete. Vague "umbrella" agreements play into Soviet hands by arousing the Chinese and our Allies and creating euphoria. Moreover, they usually solve none of the practical problems of implementation which always dog relations with the Soviets.

My impression from my talks is that the Soviets are groping for ways to defuse the Middle East and India/Pakistan, but they remain committed to their friend's position in each case. Just how helpful we can expect them to be in a positive sense is difficult to say.

I can only comment superficially on the leadership from my observations. Brezhnev figures so prominently in the press that he is plainly at the top of the heap and still moving. At the Supreme Soviet, he was the only one made up for TV (powdered face and neatly dyed hair and eyebrows) and the only one who got up and took a break during Kosygin's long speech. At one point when applause began to rise to what the Soviets call an ovation, Brezhnev stopped clapping and everyone else took the cue.

Kosygin in the meeting with Stans was, as always, impressive in his command of the subject. He used no notes and spoke systematically and authoritatively, though obviously on instructions. Interestingly, the lesser ministers seemed not to know what he would say; they took copious notes and subsequently referred to them religiously. He was also psychologically shrewd, interspersing his substantive pitch for US concessions with genial and flattering personal remarks and even a winning smile. He showed no signs of any health problem, though I found it curious that his hands trembled nervously as the

meeting with Stans began. Later he was composed. At the Supreme Soviet, he stood up for two hours and spoke with a deep, resonant voice from beginning to end, not stopping for water or stumbling over the complex terminology and interminable statistics typical for a Five Year Plan presentation. (Incidentally, his interpreter, who worked for Khrushchev and undoubtedly will translate for Brezhnev in May, and is known to the President from 1959/60, is more idiomatic than precise. We should take care to keep a check on him.)

While I was in Moscow the Central Committee was meeting and there was the usual speculation about leadership tensions. The Germans, according to their Ambassador, are convinced that Ukrainian party boss Shelest, who was listed as the first speaker after Brezhnev's secret foreign policy report, leads opponents to the Brezhnev line. It was noted that the recently resigned, reportedly anti-Brezhnev, prime minister of the Russian Republic (RSFSR) was not removed from the Politburo while his pro-Brezhnev successor was only elected a candidate member. The conclusion was that Brezhnev is as yet unable to manipulate top leadership fortunes at will.

In conclusion, the President on present form can expect to be received with effusive official hospitality but a strictly controlled public reception. I am sure a night in the Kremlin will be offered and a comfortable guest house after that. The streets are wide and the people will be kept well away from the VIP center lane. We have enormous limitations as far as setting up secure working quarters is concerned, but communications should be adequate. I am sure the Soviets will be helpful on our press needs. But we should get an advance team to Moscow at least two months before the summit to make the physical arrangements. On substance, we need to keep tight White House control over all on-going negotiations so that we can pace them in a way that best suits the President's wishes.

Tab B

Memorandum From Helmut Sonnenfeldt of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)⁶

Washington, November 29, 1971.

SUBJECT

Private Talks in Moscow

⁶ Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only.

At a lunch arranged for me by our DCM, Korniyenko, the American expert in the Foreign Ministry, asked me if I could delay my departure by some hours to have a private lunch with him on Friday, November 26. I told him that I would have to check the air schedules and also asked whether it might be possible to see Aleksandrov. At dinner that evening, Dobrynin pulled me aside to urge me to have the private lunch on Friday. I asked him whether I could assume that Korniyenko was informed about the state of US-Soviet relations and various exchanges. Dobrynin said this assumption was correct except for a very small fraction which went “directly to the top.” He said that Korniyenko was charged with making preparations for May.

At the DCM’s lunch the two Soviets present were Korniyenko and the Foreign Office disarmament chief, Timerbayev. I have known both for a dozen years. The conversation dealt entirely with MBFR and ESC. On the former, the Soviets complained about the Brosio mission on the ground that (1) it made MBFR a bloc-to-bloc affair, (2) Brosio is identified with the Cold War, and (3) the mission is a scheme for delay.⁷ I said these objections sounded formalistic. Brosio has a very substantial brief to talk from and Soviets would find it worthwhile to talk to him. I went on to say that the European troop question affected the interests of many of our allies and we would therefore be meticulous in consulting with them and preparing jointly with them for negotiations. It was therefore hard to avoid a certain “bloc” connotation to these negotiations on our side, just as I assumed Soviet consultations with affected Warsaw Pact states would give them such a connotation on their side. Moreover, if troops were ever cut, they clearly would be from the two alliances. This argument, therefore, struck me as artificial. As regards delay, I said we had made a start to get talks underway with the proposed Brosio mission but the Soviets were stalling on a reply. I said that they should make up their mind whether and how to get moving; if they had an alternative opening formula they should say so. Korniyenko then said that they had not rejected Brosio yet and were still considering their response.

I said that they would make a mistake if they thought they could sit back and wait for the US Congress to cut troops unilaterally. If the Congress did so—which I thought unlikely—an opportunity for constructive negotiations would have been missed. Korniyenko complained that we used Soviet statements on MBFR and diplomatic conversations for domestic political purposes; I said that on this as on other issues domestic and foreign aspects were closely intertwined, as the Soviets very well knew. The main thing was to get an idea whether the

⁷ Manlio Brosio, former Secretary General of NATO, appointed by NATO to represent the organization at MBFR talks with the Soviet Union.

Soviets wanted serious negotiations. We should worry less about forms since the substance was complex enough already.

On ESC, the Soviets registered their objection to the linkage to Berlin which, they said, we had engineered to block the conference. I said they were misinformed since the Belgians and Germans had written the linkage into the NATO communiqué.⁸ Our position was that we were neither violently opposed to nor enthusiastically in favor of a conference; we just wanted to know what it was supposed to do. Korniyenko said it should register the post-war status quo on the pattern of the Soviet-German treaty. I said this seemed superfluous since with the German treaty all the formal registering that the Soviets could want had been done; but if the Soviets felt more secure if Portugal and Iceland also underwrote the Soviet-Romanian and Soviet-Polish frontiers we would not expend our capital to prevent it. Reverting to the linkage with Berlin, I said this was a reality which the Soviets would have to live with; moreover, what sense was there to talk about European security as long as the one specific issue that could endanger it remained unresolved. I added that I was confident that there would be a satisfactory conclusion to the intra-German-Berlin talks, that the other linkage problem—Berlin/Soviet-German treaty—would be acceptably solved and that then the explorations of an ESC could go forward on a multilateral basis, as proposed by NATO. Korniyenko asked why they should accept our sequence of events. I said because that was the only way they could get a conference if there is one at all.

At our private luncheon meeting on Friday (only the two of us), I asked Korniyenko whether the Soviets intended to pursue the avenue opened in the President's talk with Gromyko to have private, informal bilateral exchanges on the ESC. He said not until Dobrynin returns at the end of the year.

The first part of the private lunch dealt briefly with technical aspects of the President's visit. Korniyenko said the normal practice was for an advance party to come about six weeks before the event, but no later than four weeks before. If we wanted it, the advance party could come earlier than six weeks before. (I think this would be very desirable.) I asked whether the Soviets would invite the President to stay in one of their houses. Korniyenko said this was not yet decided. De Gaulle had stayed in the Kremlin one night.

We then talked about who the President would see. Korniyenko said there might have to be one or more meetings with the top (three) leaders but these would be more of a formality. There might also have

⁸ Apparent reference to the NATO Communiqué, June 4, 1971. (Department of State *Bulletin*, June 28, 1971, pp. 819–821)

to be a ceremonial call on Podgorny as president. The main conversations would of course be with Brezhnev, probably alone with interpreters, but perhaps with Kosygin and someone from our side. He indicated this could all be worked out to our satisfaction.

Korniyenko asked whether the President would be mostly conceptual and philosophical in his conversations or would he touch on concrete questions. I said both: the President probably would want to lay out his general approach to our relations and world affairs, but then discuss particular problems. Korniyenko said he assumed that the Middle East and India–Pakistan would come up but he said it was hard now to predict the status of these problems. I agreed.

I said the President had already indicated he expected to talk about SALT, though the nature of the conversation would depend on where the negotiations stood. If agreement had been reached on a first phase, the conversation would presumably be about how we can best go about the follow-on negotiations; if no agreement had yet been reached, there presumably would be an effort to solve the remaining problems.

I then said that if Soviet strategic forces continued to grow at their present pace the President would begin to have increasing difficulty to hold back on new programs of our own. Korniyenko said that the Soviets had long lived under a crushing US superiority and we should get used to the reverse situation. I said the past was over with. It was quite possible to design Soviet forces which would give the USSR the same capacity to damage the US as we had vis-à-vis the USSR with a good many fewer delivery vehicles than the Soviets were now acquiring. Korniyenko said they need more SLBMs than we because they lacked forward bases and their route of approach was longer. I said they already had more SLBMs operational and under construction. In any case if we were going to operate under conditions of parity the standard ought to be capacity to do damage. A gross numerical imbalance, particularly when SS-9s, once MIRVed, would pose a greater threat to our land-based forces than our ICBMs posed to theirs, would lead to new weapons decisions on our side and then we would both be wasting our money to maintain the same ratio of forces. Korniyenko said we should not worry because we would always have 31 Poseidon boats for assured destruction. I said only a portion of these were on the line at any one time and could become vulnerable to ASW if the Soviets chose to concentrate on that. So we simply could not stand idly by. I concluded that the best thing would be to get a good offensive agreement in SALT so we could at least get numbers under control.

I asked how Korniyenko saw the Middle East. He said Rogers and Sisco were much too optimistic; there could not be an interim agreement unless the Israelis agreed to the goal of evacuating all occupied territory. I said that without getting into details it seemed to me that

insistence on assurances concerning ultimate goals would produce no breakthrough. I then said we had an additional problem: we could not underwrite an agreement in the Middle East, as we and other great powers presumably would have to do in some form, if it legitimized a permanent Soviet military presence in Egypt. Moreover, I doubted that the Israelis would ever accept an agreement under such circumstances. Korniyenko said we had bases in the Western Mediterranean, why then did we object to Soviet military presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. I said the point was that we would not guarantee a Middle Eastern settlement of whatever kind if it means that we thereby underwrote a Soviet military presence in the area. Korniyenko said we should remember the circumstances that brought the Soviet military presence to the Middle East. If these circumstances changed so might the situation regarding Soviet presence. I said that the Soviet presence was not only connected with the Arab-Israeli problem but served Soviet unilateral purposes and I hoped that the Soviet military would not carry so much weight that the political leadership would be unable to do something about it.

I then asked Korniyenko whether Brezhnev ever got independent advice on the validity of claims made on him by the Soviet military-industrial complex. Korniyenko said we could be sure that Brezhnev got all the advice he needed but that in any case there were no groups in the USSR interested in the arms race since they could gain no personal profits from it as in the US. I said there were ministries and managers that deal with armaments and as a result obtain all the best resources and privileges; this must result in vested interests. Korniyenko said these groups included those in the civilian aircraft industry—now no longer, he said, simply an offshoot of the military aircraft industry—and some other high priority civilian industries. The line was thus not a clean one. I said in any event it was to be hoped that political leaders in the USSR examined military programs with the utmost care so that in a period when the US was clearly braking the momentum of its programs the Soviets would not be leaping ahead to higher and higher levels. This could only result in a reversal of the trend in the US because the President has a strong constituency that would insist on it, quite apart from the objective requirements with which Soviet efforts would confront us.

I asked whether Korniyenko thought China would come up at the summit. He said not directly but of course it would figure indirectly. The Soviet view remained that normalization of US-Chinese relations was alright but collusion against third countries was not. I said we had made our motives clear.

I said I assumed Vietnam would come up in some way. I wanted to be sure Korniyenko understood our position. It was that we would

prefer a political solution through negotiations and would be pleased to see a Soviet contribution toward that end. But if present DRV/VC negotiating tactics continued we would simply continue on our present unilateral course. The other side should recognize that if it sought to take military advantage of us we always had open to us the kind of course we took in Cambodia. Korniyenko said we should not believe those who argue that the USSR likes the Vietnam war because it ties down the US. The Soviets want it to end because they recognize it complicates their relations with us. I said one could make a case that the Soviets saw some advantages in the continuation of the war. Korniyenko said perhaps one could in logic, but politics did not always follow the dictates of logic. I said this did not sound unreasonable.

I wondered whether the Caribbean might arise in the May meetings. Korniyenko said he could not see why “Secretary Laird” made such a fuss about the Soviets extending the period on-station of their Yankee Class submarines when we did the same thing by means of Rota and Holy Loch. I said he should not pin this concern on Secretary Laird. The point was we were in a new period and neither side should push forward to new military positions. I assumed the understanding of last fall remained valid and there would be no reason to discuss the matter further.

Korniyenko then said that we should try to reach some formal agreements on lesser matters, like space cooperation, so that there would be concrete results in May. I said there seemed to be several matters of this sort now under negotiation—incidents at sea, the forthcoming maritime talks, space, etc.—and I saw no reason why we should not try to move ahead on them. Whether the President would wish to sign any of them personally in Moscow I could not say at this point. I asked whether the Soviets would insist on completing the second phase of the incidents-at-sea talks before they would agree to formalize the understandings reached on the first. Korniyenko said the Soviets definitely wanted to go beyond the memorandum resulting from the first phase to the other matters (i.e., air activities) that interested them.

On India–Pakistan, Korniyenko said the Soviets are doing what they can to stop the fighting and prevent major war. I said it seemed to me that no doubt for different reasons, the US, USSR and China each wanted to see the situation subside.

Korniyenko said in conclusion that an answer to the President’s letter to Brezhnev would be sent in due course but that one aspect of it, i.e., the Stans trip, had of course already been acted on.

Addendum. At the luncheon with the DCM the Soviets said that their judgment was that the question of a new UN Secretary General would become deadlocked “because the US refused to back a good

candidate like the Chilean Herrera” and that then U Thant would agree to serve another year. I said this was not our impression.

At the private lunch I noted that the Soviets in Vienna had started unveiling their position on offensive measures. I asked whether they would provide some details on how to handle replacement and modernization. Apparently misunderstanding, Korniyenko said it had always been agreed that this would be allowed. I said what I was interested in was precisely what would be allowed under the Soviet concept, replacement and modernization of missiles or of silos. If the latter, I said, there could be some verification problems and questions about whether the freeze was being adhered to. Korniyenko did not answer directly but seemed to imply that the provisions would apply to missiles.

30. National Intelligence Estimate¹

NIE 11–10–71

Washington, December 15, 1971.

THE USES OF SOVIET MILITARY POWER IN DISTANT AREAS

Note

This Estimate assesses present and prospective Soviet capabilities and intentions with respect to using military forces in areas distant from the USSR. It is concerned with situations short of general war and with the Soviets’ use of these capabilities to enlarge the sphere of their global operations and to expand their influence among the non-aligned countries of the underdeveloped world. Accordingly, North Korea and North Vietnam are largely excluded from the analysis. They are, however, occasionally referenced since the substantial involvement in both has had implications for the subject of this paper. However, it is impossible not to refer to another Communist state, Cuba, because it has been a central factor in the USSR’s unfolding role in Latin America and is an indispensable prop to its naval operations in the Caribbean.

While the Estimate alludes where appropriate to the military implications for the US, NATO, and China of the USSR’s military

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79–R01012A, NIC Files. Secret. The Central Intelligence Agency, the intelligence organizations of the Departments of State and Defense and the National Security Agency participated in the preparation of this estimate. The Director of Central Intelligence submitted this estimate with the concurrence of all the USIB members except the representatives of the AEC and FBI who abstained because it was outside their jurisdiction.

involvement in the Third World, it does not address Soviet strategic or general purpose forces as such, which are the subjects of other Estimates. And the emphasis is as much on the USSR's political purposes as on military purposes since it is clear that Soviet forces, advisors and assistance in distant areas serve both purposes, and as often as not the former are more important.

A word of caution is in order concerning the use of some terms. Soviet involvement in Third World areas has different aspects in different cases; a frequent manifestation is military aid, usually accompanied by some training or technical assistance to the recipient country. This form of aid is an important part of the total Soviet effort in the countries concerned; it does not, however, amount to a "military presence" or "distant military capabilities". The latter terms are reserved for cases where Soviet combat forces or personnel are present or may be deployed in some numbers with some military capability of their own. A military presence, in turn, is not limited to Third World countries; the most extensive military presence in distant areas is on ships at sea.

Summary and Conclusions

A. Despite setbacks and frustrations, the USSR has made impressive progress in the last decade and a half in developing political influence in the Third World. It clearly assigns great importance to its position in certain parts of the Third World; is prepared to accept high costs and some risks to defend and advance this position; and has significantly increased the size and flexibility of its military forces which are capable of conducting distant operations.

B. There have been several instances of direct Soviet military intervention in Third World countries (most notably, and currently, in Egypt). But Moscow has generally preferred to use diplomatic instruments and economic and military aid programs to promote its interests. It has, of course, been greatly helped by intense anti-Western sentiments in many areas and by the existence here and there of the kinds of trouble and conflict which create eager customers for Soviet assistance (e.g., Egypt and India).

C. The Soviets must feel that, over the past 15 years, they have accomplished a great deal in the Third World. They have broken the ring of containment built by the West and opened many areas to their own influence. They have seen a number of states—e.g., Egypt, Syria, and Iraq—become largely or almost totally dependent on Soviet military equipment and support. They have exposed many of the nationals of these countries to Communist ideas and techniques and have developed close relationships with military men who hold or may hold key positions in their countries. They have established the USSR as the most influential great power in most radical Arab states, have gained ac-

ceptance of their right to concern themselves closely with the affairs of all the Middle East and South Asia, and have extended their influence into parts of Southeast Asia, Latin America, and Africa.

D. Still, Soviet activities in remote areas have not met with unqualified success and there are a variety of circumstances which impose constraints on Soviet policies. The USSR has encountered many disappointments—in Cuba in 1962, in the Middle East (e.g., the Arab-Israeli war in 1967), in Africa (Ghana, Sudan), and in Southeast Asia (Indonesia). Aid programs have been expensive—only a quarter of the \$5.4 billion of arms aid drawn has been repaid to date. The recipients of aid have often been ungrateful, most of them resist Soviet tutelage, and only Cuba has joined the Soviet camp. And in some areas, Soviet efforts have been complicated by the appearance of the Chinese as alternate sources of aid and as bitter competitors for influence.

E. As a consequence of frustrations such as these, the Soviets have continuously had to revise their expectations and adjust their tactics in the Third World. They have not, however, lost their ambition. On the contrary, they are now anxious to demonstrate that, as a world power, the USSR has legitimate interests virtually everywhere. And, indeed, Moscow now has the ability to support policies in distant areas and the capability to extend its military presence in one form or another considerably beyond the negligible levels of the 1950s and early 1960s.

F. Since then, new multipurpose naval ships, better suited to distant operations, have entered the Soviet Navy. Naval infantry and amphibious shipping have doubled in size; the Soviet merchant marine has tripled its tonnage, and now includes nearly 400 ships suited to the needs of military sealift. Soviet military transport forces have been re-equipped with new turboprop aircraft with greater capacity and range, and civil aviation has expanded overseas. Command and control capabilities to support distant military operations have also been improved.

G. Not surprisingly, then, the frequency and extent of Soviet military operations in the Third World have picked up considerably. The expansion of the USSR's presence in the Mediterranean and the Middle East (including some 50 surface ships and submarines in the Mediterranean Squadron and some 16,000 Soviet military personnel stationed in Egypt) owes much, of course, to the Arab military weaknesses exposed in 1967. But it is also evident that Moscow has for some time had military interests in the Mediterranean (including the US Sixth Fleet) which extend beyond the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict. Since 1967, these two sets of interests have by-and-large coincided, so that Egypt has been strengthened vis-à-vis Israel and the USSR has not only gained influence in the area at the expense of the West, but has also obtained facilities for its Mediterranean Squadron's forward deployment in defense of the USSR.

H. The USSR's increased visibility in the Indian Ocean includes not only its modest naval presence, but also its civil air routes, arrangements for facilities for the Soviet fishing fleet and increased diplomatic and trade relations. As for the Caribbean, the Soviets are not likely to attempt to use the naval facilities in Cuba for forward basing of their submarine launched ballistic missiles so long as they have reason to anticipate strong US opposition. But they will probably continue to probe US reaction to different levels and types of naval deployment by, for example, deploying other types of submarines as well as missile ships and submarine tenders to Cuba.

I. The Soviets have substantial ground, air, and naval forces which can be used effectively to establish a presence in distant areas. This capability enables them to support political forces friendly to their policies and influence. It may make it possible in some situations to preempt the actions of others or to deter their intervention. But Soviet capabilities to use force at long range to establish themselves against opposition are limited. Against a submarine or surface ship threat, Soviet naval forces in distant waters could be increased substantially over present levels for short periods, but a sustained augmentation would require additional logistic support and ships to defend that support. The USSR still has only small numbers of naval infantry and amphibious ships, and it lacks long-range tactical aircraft and aircraft carriers. And the Soviets would need to make a substantially greater effort in developing these forces than is now evident if they were bent on establishing substantial capabilities for military action against opposition in countries remote from their borders.

J. Indeed, the growth in the USSR's capabilities for distant operations has not followed the course that might have been expected if the Soviets were interested principally in direct military intervention in Third World countries. The expansion of their forces can, in fact, be attributed in large part to other causes. Increasing Soviet naval deployments to distant areas were, in the first instance, in support of potential general war missions; once begun, the USSR found in these activities opportunities to buttress its claim to a world power role equal to that of the US. The growth of the merchant fleet has been in line with the increasing requirements of Soviet foreign trade. Most of the transport aircraft added to military transport aviation are designed to improve airlift capabilities in theater operations. The capabilities of amphibious forces have improved but continue to be oriented primarily toward the support of theater forces on the flanks.

K. Nevertheless, continued improvement of Soviet capabilities for distant action can be anticipated. Some of this improvement will be a by-product of the expansion of naval, merchant marine, and airlift forces in support of their separate primary missions. Naval programs

now underway will, by 1975, bring forth new surface ships and submarines capable of distant operations.

L. Soviet military requirements for foreign bases are more likely to grow than diminish. Prospects for Soviet antisubmarine warfare and strategic attack forces, as well as the trend in increased out of area operation of general purpose forces, both point in this direction. Soviet bases in the Third World are not easily acquired but the Soviets have been seeking additional facilities ashore and the search can be expected to continue. In general, however, for political and economic reasons as well as military, the USSR is most likely in the next few years to favor a gradualist approach in seeking to expand its influence in the Third World. And Soviet efforts abroad will continue to be aimed more at increasing Soviet influence than at establishing Communist-dominated regimes.

M. If the Soviets should again involve themselves militarily in a Third World country, as they have in Egypt, it would probably come about as an outgrowth of a Soviet military aid program. But circumstances leading to the establishment of a Soviet military presence in distant areas are unlikely to arise frequently. Virtually all Third World leaders are ardent nationalists and hence little disposed to inviting Soviet forces to be based on their territory. Only in exceptional circumstances, such as a compelling threat, would one of them be disposed to accept that kind of Soviet help. Moscow for its part would have to make its own calculation of risks and advantages before granting it. The record of recent years shows the Soviets are capable of bold decisions when they consider the stakes high enough or their interests and prestige sufficiently involved—as in Egypt.

N. The Soviets may feel that with their attainment of rough strategic parity with the US, they will in the future have wider options to project their influence in distant parts of the world. Given only a gradual accretion of forces useable in distant areas, there will be more instances in which the Soviets can, if they choose, try to use such forces to exploit opportunities—particularly if one or another government in the Third World should ask Moscow for assistance. The Soviets will be inclined to exercise caution in areas where US interests are deeply engaged, but even in these circumstances the Soviets may calculate that an assertive policy will entail fewer risks to themselves than in the past.

[Omitted here is the body of the estimate, which contained the following sections: "I—Introduction; II—Development of Soviet Interest and Influence in Distant Areas; III—Expansion of Soviet Military Power to Distant Areas; IV—General Posture in Areas of Major Interests; V—Current Soviet Capabilities for Distant Action; VI—Longer Term Outlook: Constraints and Options; and VII—Epilogue." Also omitted are

Annexes A–I, “Soviet on Distant Station General; Pattern of Soviet Naval Port Visits; Indian Ocean Operations; Caribbean and West African Operations; Oversea Base and Facilities Arrangements; Amphibious and Merchant Marine Sealift Capabilities; Capabilities of Military and Civilian Airlift to Support Distant Operations; Soviet Military Aid.”]

31. Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

December 16, 1971, 9:30 a.m.

[Omitted here is discussion of the press reaction to Nixon’s meeting with French President Pompidou in the Azores, December 12–14, the prospect of India agreeing to a cease-fire with Pakistan, and prospects for preventing India from receiving U.S. aid already in the pipeline.]

P: If the Indians continue the course they are on we have even got to break diplomatic relations with them. Don’t you agree, Henry?

K: I agree. There is already a strong victory statement and an unbelievable setback for the Chinese which is none of our business but they have certainly humiliated them.

P: And also let it be known they have done nothing.

K: That is right.

P: In the event they [crush?] West Pakistan, is there anything more that can be done? Are they going . . .

K: They gave us flat assurances there wouldn’t be. If that happens we will have to reassess our position with the Russians. We will have until Saturday morning to see that.

P: What are they doing?

K: I said to Vorontsov if you don’t do it at the UN, do it as a bilateral exchange of letters.

P: And they have not responded?

K: No, it is a little early. They could have if they wanted to.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking. The President was in Key Biscayne, Florida, from December 15–18; Kissinger was in Washington. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, White House Central Files, President’s Daily Diary)

P: The question is . . .

K: Well, the question is—let's look at objectively. So they put it to us and they saw because you acted in such a [omission in the source text] way here, we are going to drop the summit . . .

P: Well, dropping the summit is not the first thing I would do.

K: Well, you have to look to see how much we are willing to pay in terms of where we are going.

P: To keep ourselves in perspective we have to realize the Russians have put it to us previously in other parts of the world so we have to just grin and bear it, right?

K: But not you, Mr. President.

P: No, but my point is we try everything that we can, but we have to realize the Russians—we have to let them know our options.

K: Our options are limited.

P: They are limited, but even with them we can't deal with those Soviets and continue to talk about sales and various other problems.

K: Our options are not all that good.

P: They are not good but they will get results. If after all these appeals and . . .

K: They are going to continue to butter you up.

P: My view is this: I won't let them do this. Did the Jordans [*Jordanians*] send planes.

K: 17.

P: Well, my point is so we have done a check of these little things. Now in the event we are going to end up by saying to the Russians you proved to be so untrustworthy we can't deal with you on any issues. Let's use that card now.

K: We have pretty well told them that.

P: Well, we told them that privately, they may not believe that.

K: Well, if they don't believe the President of the United States in a private meeting . . .

P: You don't understand. We threatened it. Let's do it.

K: No, for that it is premature, Mr. President. That we cannot do because they still may get us a ceasefire. If they don't get a ceasefire, what do we do then?

P: Cut off the Middle East talks, pour arms into Israel, discontinue our talks on SALT and the Economic Security Council can go [to] the public and tell them what the danger is. It is a risk group but the right one. It is pretty clear. I would go further. We have to stop our talks on trade, don't let Smith have any further things on the Middle East and stop seeing Dobrynin under any circumstances.

K: That is right. Break the White House channel.

P: And be very cold in our public statements toward them. What I am getting at is if we are prepared to go and have the card to play where we would not talk at all. Another thing I would beef up the Defense budget plans then.

K: The Defense budget is being worked on.

P: You will have that done by Friday night?²

K: Yes.

P: Now, Henry, I am not satisfied and I am really mad that this assistance report is not down here. LDX it down here in two hours—Indian aid for next year and last, how much PL-480, how much economic assistance, unilateral assistance—I want to see it.

K: We have got it, but we will get it down.

P: I know the bigger game is the Russian game, but the Indians also have played us for squares here. They have done this once and when this is over they will come to ask us to forgive and forget. This we must not do. If they want to be dependent on the Russians, let them be, but when the chips are down India has shown that it is a Russian satellite. What I am really saying here is and what I am proposing to do—if India pursues this course, then we will reevaluate their program of aid and cut it off. Has anybody told them that?

K: We would, but remember you have got to realize everything is being done out of this office. We have a bureaucratic system to deal with. I think it would be better if State told them.

P: Call Sisco. He is to call in the Indian Ambassador and tell him that the U.S., under the circumstances, if there is not a ceasefire we will have no choice and all Indian assistance of all types will be taken out of the budget and call me in an hour.

K: Yes, Mr. President.

[Omitted here is additional discussion of cutting off U.S. aid to India.]

² December 17.

32. **Transcript of Telephone Conversation Between President Nixon and his Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)**¹

Washington, December 16, 1971, 10:40 a.m.

K: The Indians have just declared a unilateral ceasefire in the West.² We have made it.

P: What's it mean?

K: Ordered forces to stop fighting.

P: What's territory? From what you said yesterday—taken Kashmir?

K: In West have [taken?] some desert and Pakistanis have taken a bit of Kashmir. Major [objective?] is to stop defeat of Pakistan army.

P: What's the source?

K: Official announcement.

P: It's the Russians working for us. We have to get the story out.

K: Already a call from State. Until this morning we were running the UN thing. Now they are and say they will go over resolution. They are pulling off the British Resolution. You pulled it through and should take credit. I will give a backgrounder tomorrow afternoon.

P: Get people in and set story for the weekly news magazines.

K: Can't do it today. We have to clean it up.

P: Any other thing—in view of *Time* Man of the Year thing get [Jerry] Schechter in. He will understand it. Or who at *Time* would know more about this subject?

K: I will start with Schechter. He has been decent.

P: *Time* might write best analysis of crisis. You really feel that they mean—let me come back to it. You were bearish last night.

K: I felt nothing [would] happen until Dacca fell. Soviets were dragging their feet because Indians took longer on taking Dacca than they figured. So this morning I said next 24 hours will tell.

P: If Soviets have cooperated on this I think we have got to play on an arms-length deal.

¹ Source: Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 370, Telephone Conversations, Chronological File. No classification marking.

² On December 16 at 2:30 p.m. Indian local time, India announced the surrender of Pakistan forces in Dacca and a unilateral cease-fire to take place in the West the following day. India also indicated that it had "no territorial ambitions in the conflict" and expected an immediate response from Pakistan.

K: We have to get straight what they did.

P: What they did in '67 June war.

K: 60% instead of 100%.

P: June war.

K: Except they lost.

P: They got credit for bringing peace to the M.E. Agreed to peace after defeat of their army. And they were responsible for the war. Not a public statement but internal relations with Soviets. You handle that. [Omission in the source text.] You agree?

K: Absolutely. So far they have not done anything. Indians did official doing. But I am sure it's Soviets that produced it.

P: On unilateral ceasefire what?

K: UN resolution making it official. When in [omission in the source text] for weeks they want to come out and mastermind it. We have agreed to the British. Chinese are set with it. I will say I have talked with you and it is what you want done.

P: The President is committed to it. We have told the British and Chinese. Will the Russians accept it?

K: Probably.

P: Might not. If they do it's done.

K: One way or other there will be a resolution to put it together. State is trying to scavenge on your agony. Put it together with a UN resolution.

P: The average person doesn't understand about this. Pick the real movers and shakers. Ask [John] Scali and let him sit in. Ask him who and Ziegler. Make it small enough to be powerful. I don't care if they are friends or enemies. Maybe [Joseph] Kraft. It's very important to do *Time* people and maybe a couple of network people.

K: [John] Chancellor.

P: Anybody. You sit down there. Work it out. Get hold of Scali. A cold, blooded deal. On other levels let Scali carry the line. And Ziegler.

K: That would be good.

P: It's good to hear.

K: The record will show again that you were ready to go the whole way this morning.

P: I almost called at midnight last night to say to Russians we are putting the summit on the line.

K: India would have taken Kashmir and [omission in the source text].

P: Shastri got India's victory wings. Only 30% of them.

K: 30% more than we expected.

P: You think the Russians did it? India would not have done it for us.

K: For us they would have done it (?).

P: I want strictest—President make own decision. Hannah, Sisco, Rogers. I don't want Indian aid to leak out but I will decide it. Shultz to examine budget and no Indian aid in it.

K: \$300 million for S. Asia. \$200 million to Pakistan and rest we will hold.

P: Give it to Ceylon.

K: Then we don't get argument we are cutting it. We can give agricultural stuff to India for economic relief.

P: They have to pay for aid.

K: Congratulations, Mr. President. You saved W. Pakistan.

P: Go off to other. No backgrounder until tomorrow.

K: As soon as it's cleaned up. I will get on it.

P: Don't do it pre-maturely.

K: Get Sunday papers.

P: *Time* and networks.

K: Congratulations!

33. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Some Indicators of Soviet Behavior

Soviet conduct in the Indo-Pak crisis has been deeply disturbing, but it can be explained to a large extent by their calculation of their

¹Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 717, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. XVII, November–31 December 1971. Secret; Sensitive. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it. Sonnenfeldt sent this memorandum to Kissinger under cover of a December 17 memorandum with a recommendation that he sign it. Sonnenfeldt noted: "It is a catalogue of diverse activities which struck me as disturbing. No sweeping conclusion should be drawn from the listing, but it seems worth bearing in mind that whatever their motives for wanting a better relationship with the US, other Soviet interests (including internal Soviet politics) will continue to work in the other direction."

regional interest in the subcontinent and relations with China. We cannot conclude that there has been some fundamental change in Moscow in their interest in a limited improvement in their relations with us. Nevertheless, reviewing a number of diverse Soviet activities underscores that Soviet policy continues along lines that are inimical to our interests, could become highly dangerous, and cut across our own efforts to reach a more durable relationship with the USSR.

The following is a catalogue of some disturbing Soviet actions and attitudes though there is no certain pattern in them.

Middle East

Within the last month we have seen (a) the shipment of medium jet bombers, armed with air-to-surface missiles; (b) the reported remarks by the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo that if the solution chosen by the UAR is war, then “we support you so that it is a war with minimum losses”; (c) a tour of the Middle East and Persian Gulf by Minister of Defense Marshal Grechko, and there are unconfirmed reports that one of his purposes is to nail down an agreement on a Soviet naval base in Somalia. (There has also been a report of renewed Soviet support of the guerrilla movement against Portuguese Guinea.)

Cuba

Castro’s provocative seizure of the vessel off the Bahamas might suggest he has some Soviet support, or at least feels that he can embark on such dangerous actions with impunity. Moreover, while remaining within the technical limits of the understanding of last year, the Soviet flouts its spirit by (a) sending a cruise missile submarine to Havana; (b) prolonging their current visit of an attack submarine and cruiser and conducting almost daily exercises from Cuba.

A recent CIA report² claims that the Soviets accepted a Cuban offer in 1970 to establish a base in Cienfuegos, but planned to use it sporadically to give us the impression that it was only a rest and relaxation stopover. The Soviet plan called for visits to be increased to the point where there would be a Soviet flotilla constantly in port.

Criticism of the US

During his visit to Denmark, Kosygin is reported to have told the Danish Prime Minister that he knew of no country where domestic conditions play so important a role in foreign policy as in the US. In commenting on your visit to Moscow, Kosygin added that he saw US domestic factors as the chief motivating force. Reports from the Embassy in Moscow on public Soviet orientation lectures concerning Soviet for-

² Not attached and not further identified.

eign policy reiterate this theme. In other words, the Soviets view our policy not as motivated by intrinsic national interests but by calculations of domestic political expediency.

While the Soviets have not sharply increased their accusations against us for “collusion” with China, nevertheless, this theme has become more prominent as the public explanation for various events, especially in the UN. The Soviet Ambassador in Tokyo, while taking a moderate line in general, told our Ambassador that Moscow believed your trip to Peking would be a failure. If this is actually the operative estimate in Moscow, the Soviets may feel they have less reason to build up your trip to the USSR. (A sidelight on Soviet attitudes was the menacing tone of Kosygin’s remarks in Norway, where he is reported to have warned the Norwegians against permitting any increase of US naval activities off their own shores.)

SALT

There has been no abrupt change in the negotiations, but the tone seems to be degenerating somewhat. The Soviets persist in putting forward their proposals in the most one-sided fashion, in terms they can be virtually certain we will resist. Moreover, they make claims about the status of their forces (i.e., that we both have approximately the same number of ICBMs) that we know to be wildly inaccurate. Most important, one suspects that the Soviets may have made a decision to proceed with the expansion of their ABMs, and want to codify this in SALT under the guise of insisting on equality (this too could be another Soviet bargaining ploy).³

The Soviet Press

Usually, the Soviet press is some guide to the intensity of Soviet policy. While not unusually different in its treatment of the US, there does seem to be very little effort to credit our good will or intentions,

³ On December 20 Director of Politico-Military Affairs Ronald I. Spiers sent Rogers a memorandum outlining the unresolved issues from the just completed SALT session at Vienna. Spiers summarized the month-long session: “Although the USSR acceded to our demand that there be a serious discussion of offensive limitations as a first priority at Vienna, significant differences remain with respect to both ABMs and the offensive freeze.” (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 18–3 AUS (VI)) On December 23 the Verification Panel met to review SALT policy. The Panel agreed that Kissinger should seek from Nixon “some interim guidance for the Delegation prior to its return on January 2. This will include, at a minimum, a decision whether the ABM agreement should be a treaty and the modification of our position on SLBMs to permit the replacement of old SLBMs with new models.” The SALT working group would prepare an options paper on modifications to the U.S. ABM position, whether inclusion of SLBMs was “make-or-break proposition,” and the duration and withdrawal propositions of both proposed agreements. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-107, Verification Panel Minutes, Originals, 1969 thru 3/8/72)

even prior to the Indo-Pak crisis. You personally, are excluded from criticism, but by various euphemism the Administration is belabored almost daily.

The Soviet Leaders

The Kremlinologists are satisfied that Brezhnev is still out in front, and the recent party and government meetings on the new five year plan seems to confirm this. However, since last Wednesday, all of the politburo has been out of Moscow in various cities participating in unusual regional meetings. This has only occurred three times since 1964. Almost certainly, the participation of the top leaders in regional briefings means the subject is one that either is quite complicated, or likely to create unease or resistance from the rank and file. No one knows exactly what is involved, but my guess would be the subject is foreign policy and probably China.

Summing up, it seems fair to speculate that Soviet interest persists in better relations with us, as manifested in both Berlin and SALT and even evident to some extent in handling of their contacts with us in the Indo-Pakistan crisis, but is offset by other interests which can draw them into dangerous situations. Moreover, China is so predominant in Soviet thinking that one wonders whether another Sino-Soviet crisis similar to the border incidents in 1969 is not almost certain in the wake of the Pakistan crisis and in light of what the Soviets may see as an internal weakness in Peking. (CIA has at least one report⁴ that there were some in Moscow who would have welcomed Chinese intervention on Pakistan's side so that Moscow would have had a pretext for "delivering a blow" against China.)

In addition, there is the chance that having acquiesced, if not encouraged, the war in the subcontinent, the Soviets will find that they cannot very effectively argue against the use of force in the Middle East.

In both instances—a deliberate Sino-Soviet crisis or a Middle East confrontation—the Soviet leaders would have to weigh seriously the effect on the summit or on our general relations with them. In doing so, they may now attach somewhat less importance to their relations with us than three or four months ago.

⁴ Not attached and not further identified.

34. Summary Prepared by the Interagency Group for Europe¹

Washington, undated.

SUMMARY OF INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG ISSUES

The issues on which discussions or negotiations with the Soviet Union are taking place, or are likely to take place, before the President's visit reflect the breadth and complexity of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the political, military, and economic spheres. Where there are specific, close relationships between an issue and other U.S.-Soviet matters, this has been indicated in the description of the issue.

The issues under discussion below fall into four categories:

—*Diplomatic and Political.* Disarmament issues are a prime example of diplomatic and political matters in the multilateral sphere, as are the many questions that come before the United Nations. Narcotics control, law of the sea, and the international environmental conference scheduled for Stockholm belong in this category. In dealing with Moscow on these matters, we must reconcile the conflicting objectives of accomplishing our purposes and avoiding the appearance of collusion.

This category also includes a number of subjects relating to the conduct of our relations with the Soviet Union, such as the construction of new chanceries, regulating the travel of diplomats, and access to the public in the other state through activities under the exchanges agreement. The cardinal principle governing such bilateral diplomatic questions is reciprocity. In dealing with the closed and highly controlled society of the Soviet Union, strict observance of this principle has given us our only effective leverage in carrying out tasks that are routine in most foreign countries.

—*Military.* These issues extend from efforts directed at stabilizing the strategic balance between the two countries (which are not treated in this study) to measures designed to prevent incidents between our navies on and over the high seas. In addition, there are

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-188, NSSM Files, NSSM 143. This summary response to NSSM 143 was prepared by the Interagency Group for Europe under the chairmanship of Hillenbrand. The response itself is a series of status reports on issues, comprising 57 pages and prepared by the agencies responsible. In a covering memorandum to Kissinger, December 30, Hillenbrand noted that the major interrelated issues (SALT, Berlin, MBFR, CSCE) and certain bilateral issues (consulates in Leningrad, and San Francisco, jamming, Soviet Jewry) were not included in keeping with Kissinger's instructions in NSSM 143 (Document 27).

military implications in many of our other dealings with the USSR, e.g. disarmament, law of the sea and space cooperation.

—*Economic*. Volume and composition of trade, credit and payments, shipping, aviation, and fisheries are some of the issues. Certain of the economic issues may be examined in military-strategic terms, but this is rarely the controlling factor. The main consideration is the relatively high degree of economic self-sufficiency of both nations.

—*Scientific and Technical*. There is no firm distinction between this category and the economic one. The exchanges agreement is relevant here, along with some specific endeavors undertaken under it, such as those in the fields of space, atomic energy, health research, conservation, and environment. Because of the gap between U.S. and Soviet capabilities in many fields of science and technology, agreements in this category are sometimes relatively advantageous to the USSR. Nevertheless, this is not universally the case and there are usually net gains to both sides. Not the least of these is the personal bond established between the scientific intelligentsia of the two countries.

Mutuality of Interest

These issues can be assessed according to the degree of mutuality of interest between the two countries. This assessment of mutuality can be only tentative, and there are always contending interest groups within each country which would assign different priorities to agreement on any given issue. Bearing in mind these caveats, we would judge mutuality of interest to be high, medium, or low as follows:

—*High Mutuality*. There appears to be a high congruence of interest in space cooperation, including a joint docking mission. Substantial common interest also exists in cooperative research and exchange programs in the health and atomic-energy fields. Both countries have a strong interest in renewing the exchanges agreement, stemming from the balance between the scientific and technical benefits sought by Moscow as against the political and social objectives pursued by the U.S. Finally, there appears to be a strong common interest in developing measures to avoid naval incidents.

—*Medium Mutuality*. A second group of issues shows a more mixed pattern. In the trade area, the Soviet appetite is generally large, while the U.S. interest varies according to commodity, credit terms, and other factors. Disarmament issues similarly present a mixed pattern. The Soviet desire for politically visible agreements is to some extent in conflict with the U.S. view that the contents of a proposed agreement must be the foremost consideration. The two countries have similar objectives with respect to law of the sea but differ on related issues concerning ocean resources. Agreements concerning conservation of natural resources, e.g., fisheries agreements, and protection of the natural

environment, are generally more attractive to the U.S. than to the USSR, owing to the different levels of economic development in the two countries and the resultant gap between national perceptions of the problems of modern industrialized societies.

—*Low Mutuality.* Finally, there are some matters on which U.S. and Soviet interests diverge considerably. The Soviets would very much like enhanced civil aviation rights in the U.S. and improved access to the U.S. for the commercial shipping, but have comparatively little to offer the U.S. in these fields. Cooperation in certain multilateral endeavors, such as the control of narcotics and dangerous drugs, is of great interest to us, but concerns the Soviet leaders little. There are other such issues, not treated in this study because only one side is interested.

Trade-Offs

There is a practical limit to the trade-offs that can be made. Neither country is likely to yield on matters closely linked to its national security for the sake of economic or political concessions. Nor can either country be expected to compromise basic political principles for the sake of cooperation in science and technology. Categorizing issues by type and by mutuality of interest, however, allows some preliminary consideration of possible trade-offs.

—*By Type.* Our general assumption is that the Soviets wish specific and formal bilateral agreements in as many fields as possible. Any U.S.-Soviet agreement is of interest to the Soviets not only because of its intrinsic merits—for example, the acquisition of technology—but also because it would enhance the détente image which Moscow is seeking to foster. Thus, the Soviet interest lies in fragmenting U.S.-Soviet negotiations into discrete compartments. In contrast, the U.S. interest lies in keeping all the negotiations within a single framework, giving us more leverage over the final mix of agreements.

This unitary approach also recommends itself because in many instances the U.S. desiderata—for example, the cessation of jamming of U.S. broadcasts into the Soviet Union or the issuance of exit visas to Soviet citizens with relatives in the U.S.—are not subject to formal negotiation. The U.S. side will be in the best negotiating position if it can say that the conclusion of certain key agreements, as well as of a series of relatively minor agreements, is dependent upon Soviet positions not only in the key negotiations but also in certain areas outside the field of formal negotiation.

Within the four major categories under which the issues are grouped, the advantages of agreement are greater for the Soviet Union in the scientific-technical field, and greater over the long run for the U.S. in the political-diplomatic field. Certain advantages would accrue to both sides in the economic field, and also in the military-strategic

field, varying from issue to issue, although in the specific case of a U.S.-Soviet economic agreement the Soviet side may feel the need of an agreement keenly enough to make this one of its major goals. Looking at the overall balance, therefore, there is the possibility of a trade-off between the scientific-technical and political fields. The U.S. can also insist upon parallel progress in the trade and political fields.

—*By Mutuality of Interest.* Within the second conceptual framework, we could delay agreement in certain areas of strong mutual interest as an incentive to reach agreement in areas of lesser mutuality. We could also attempt to develop a balance of mutual concessions on unrelated issues where the congruence of interests is small. The latter approach has been used in biennial renewals of the Exchanges Agreement, which serves as an umbrella for a host of contacts.