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Constituency Building and Urban Community Policing

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Policing, constituencies, and social capital

The institution of policing is undergoing a shift toward greater responsiveness to the variable demands for service enunciated by subdivisions within jurisdictions and toward greater concern for strategies to prevent or reduce crime. Increasing attention is being paid to whether and how the police can contribute to the quality of life in neighborhoods through the adoption of these strategies (Bayley, 1994).

This change in policing has been gradual and fitful. Harbingers of the current ideas for community policing and problem solving first emerged in the late 1960s (Sherman et al., 1973; Toch, 1969), and current strategies are in part incremental adjustments to two decades of evaluation research that challenged the core strategies of professional law enforcement: street patrol, rapid response to calls, and expert investigation (Bayley, 1994: 3).

The current policing adjustments in organization and service strategy are not isolated innovations by one slice of government. Other public-sector institutions have also responded to criticism about insensitivity to differential demands by various segments of their service domains and to the ineffectiveness of large, centralized service bureaucracies (Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). Partnerships between neighborhoods and government have been attempted in a number of policy sectors (Hallman, 1984). The police share in the concern for greater governmental responsiveness, but they did not invent it.

Among the more common elements in new policing strategies are those that Bayley (1994: 105) summarizes with the acronym CAMPS: consultation (with citizens about needs); adaptation (through more flexible resource allocation); mobilization of citizens (to share the tasks of producing public safety); and

problem solving (to address the proximate causes of repeat disturbances).

These elements of community and problem-solving policing vary considerably across implementations. Two of these elements, consultation and mobilization, are not entirely within the control of the police. These will not be successful simply on the basis of what the police do. They will also be affected by historical patterns of citizen consultation with the police or other centralized authorities and by residents' prior experiences with mobilizing to achieve collective ends, with or against the police, and with other partners or against other targets.

Some areas in a city and some citizens are more skilled than others in the tasks of consulting and therefore can marshal more of the resources necessary for mobilization than others. Current research on new policing strategies indicates that the police are least effective in working with the neighborhoods that are most in need of greater and more effective police service, partly because typical consultation and mobilization strategies are least effective in these areas (Skogan, 1990).

Consultation with residents about neighborhood problems and preferences and mobilization of residents to implement programs are critical, civic activities (Cortes, 1993; McKnight, 1995; Stoecker, 1994), but government has had a poor track record in prior attempts (Warren et al., 1974). Government agencies, including the police, are concerned about losing control (Lipsky, 1980). They usually channel citizen consultation in ways that will be most convenient for the agency and seek to direct rather than facilitate mobilization (Weingart et al., 1994; Warren, 1976).

Whether and how the police now engage in consultation and mobilization should not be taken lightly. In any public endeavor, one must begin with the assumption that harm as well as good can be done and that

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beneficent intent may often have harmful consequences. If consultation and mobilization are critical elements in the development of an active citizenry, the police may promote more than police aims by supporting such activities. But, at the same time, they can undermine more than police goals by doing it poorly.

The police can build community, but they can also destroy it. They can destroy it directly by actions that fail to engage residents in the coproduction of public order. They can destroy it indirectly and inadvertently by providing disappointing experiences in civic partnership, thereby reducing the future supply of energy for collective problem solving, or contributing to narrow and incomplete definitions of neighborhood problems. Some of the strongest enemies of community would benefit greatly if the “community problem” were seen only as the result of residents’ characteristics and behaviors—such as criminality and crime—rather than also the result of policies that draw resources away from the communities.

This paper takes a deeper look at the community side of community policing strategies by examining whether CAMPS can contribute to community building. It examines the extent to which police encourage constituency building and constituency behavior in neighborhoods. It frames that examination by analyzing the especially difficult task of constituency building in the poorest, highest crime, urban areas.

The main argument is that the police face an uphill, but not impossible, battle in fostering constituency behavior. Arrayed against their efforts are the political economies of urban areas, which traditionally favor some city interests and neighborhoods over others. This traditional tilt in city governance is described as the “urban struggle.” Within this struggle, certain beliefs about what is normal and appropriate have been institutionalized, providing some urban actors advantage over others.

The argument is presented in five sections. This section, “Policing, Constituencies, and Social Capital,” reviews the historical context in which the police work for community order and introduces the concepts of constituency and social capital. “The Urban Struggle” outlines this issue, its key participants, and recent shifts in the urban struggle that provide potential for city government partnerships with neighborhoods. “Constituency Building in Controlled Communities” examines seven critical variables in

constituency building in poor neighborhoods. “The Police and Sustained Community” illustrates how community policing may influence those variables for better or worse. “Prospects and Strategies for Sustaining Constituency” concludes by reviewing the preferences of different parties in the urban struggle for police impact on community variables and sketches some strategies for the police that would make constituency building more likely.

Although the police are often genuinely unaware of the nature of the urban struggle, they have played a part in it. Indeed, the traditional policing strategies of patrol, rapid response, and investigation (along with centralization) were devised by police executives as their response to the demands of the more powerful, politically connected parties to the urban struggle.

The police and the rest of local government may, in fact, change their strategic plan and change sides in the struggle to define the quality of urban living. But they will not do so successfully without understanding the role urban politics has played in the last 50 years and the great forces arrayed against significant change that have been produced by that tradition (Byrum, 1992; Logan and Molotch, 1987; Skogan, 1990: 172–173).

The reconfiguration of police strategies and missions should be seen as a small but significant part of the broader struggle to reshape public and private administration. On the one side are significant attempts to be more responsive and more humane to employees and to citizens or customers (e.g., French and Bell, 1995: 236–253; Osborne and Gaebler, 1992). On the other side are major pressures for the privatization of wealth, the reduction of public services, and the minimization of the public’s bottom line (Bayley, 1994: 144; Dyckman, 1996; French and Bell, 1995: 250–251).

The outcome of these counterpressures will be the result of a long-term, not a short-term, struggle. It is doubtful that many police leaders, or city leaders in general, have sufficient staying power to adopt a long-term perspective (Wycoff and Skogan, 1993: 87–88). But without greater appreciation of the meaning of consultation and mobilization in urban communities, the police can engage in a number of short-term programmatic efforts and achieve short-term successes on measures of public order while contributing

nothing positive in the long term to the quality of urban life.

The frequent lack of connection between short-term innovation and long-term change is mainly explained by the ability of the forces that are against neighborhood livability to coopt citizen programs and steer them toward the achievement of greater private gain (Logan and Molotch, 1987; Stoecker, 1994). The sustainability of neighborhood improvements is in large measure explained by the creation, nurture, and institutionalization of constituencies that build neighborhood life (Castells, 1983).

Police constituencies

Police constituencies in urban settings can be conceived with varying levels of complexity. Some early conceptions, for example, simply designated four primary interest groups: the general public, the court work group, local government officials, and levels within the police department (Whitaker et al., 1982). The approach taken here will be broader in some respects and narrower in others.

Constituents are recognized as part of a polity and therefore have a hand in shaping policy by selecting representatives to formulate or implement policy. Constituents express concerns about the public agenda that must be taken into account. They can exercise that influence directly or indirectly, periodically or continuously, formally or informally. The constituents whose expectations are most accounted for often may not be the most visible in their exertion of influence.

Police constituencies can be identified narrowly by observing only those persons who or groups that take a direct and visible interest in police behavior or more broadly by designating those who have an interest in shaping the quality of life in urban systems, for which the police provide a primary function. This paper will take the broader approach, under the assumption that those actors who shape the city shape the police.

This discussion of police constituency will be narrower than others because it will focus on community constituencies in urban settings—the groups that shape the meaning of living in cities. Although definitions of community vary, they tend to focus on residential areas or neighborhoods in which people unrelated by family or organizational membership

carry out the tasks of daily living (Hallman, 1984; Lyon, 1987; Warren, 1978). The focus will be on the actors whose expectations shape the quality of urban living space and the role that the police are to play in contributing to that quality.

Expectations of police officers and citizens can be analyzed in terms of immediate situational cues that predict decisions in that specific encounter (Worden et al., 1995), but these are not directly relevant to community constituencies. The expectations of interest here are those that contribute to how the police participate in the definition of community. Most of these are not expectations of individuals interacting on the street but the expectations institutionalized in structural relations and cultural understandings. These expectations include those built into police roles by recruitment, training, and evaluation criteria; the expectations of mothers that their children will be safe in the neighborhood; and the expectations of real estate developers that a proposal for a new office complex will be accepted as a benefit to everyone in the city. In other words, the expectations most relevant are those built into the structure and traditions of city life.

Although expectations at this level are not as variable and fluid as those related to individual encounters, they are not set in stone. The primary actors in structuring urban communities are not simply playing out a script of preordained expectations; they act on the basis of them, but they also struggle to maintain them and interpret particular proposals or actions as consistent with their general expectations. Which expectations apply may not always be clear since cultures and traditions, particularly in diverse and open societies, may contain contradictory elements competing for enactment. Even specific actors may have difficulty articulating which expectations apply in determining what to do about particular urban issues.

It is in this context that Hope (1995: 22) and Goldstein (1987) interpret changes in crime prevention and policing strategies not as changes in scientific theories about crime control but as the outcomes of political struggles for the definition of community. For example, crime prevention strategies have varied over time in their conceptualization of offenders and victims as community members. In the 1960s, crime prevention strategies considered offenders as community members with some claims on those responsible

for shaping crime control, while more recent views are less likely to see offenders as constituents—as part of the community—with legitimate expectations of influence. Similarly, victims traditionally have been ignored in shaping crime prevention policy but have recently gained legitimacy as constituents (Hope, 1995: 66–67).

Constituency and social capital

Constituencies are not clients receiving services (McKnight, 1995), but are people actively engaged in defining the processes of their governance. Constituents have an active role in the inputs to policy. They are heard when goals are set and alternatives are weighed. People assume the obligations of constituency when they feel they are a part of local life and are connected to the rest of society (Alinsky, 1969: 40; Cortes, 1993). Putnam has argued that the quality of public life and the performance of public institutions are linked to structures for and traditions of civic engagement (1995: 3).

This general observation has appeared relevant to the control of crime since the most frequent conclusions about crime prevention activity are that they are best implemented when integrated with existing community associations and they are least successful in areas with little associational life (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 154). Whether individuals do something about crime is not related to the personal relevance of crime to them; instead it is related to their personal involvement in communal activities (Skogan and Maxfield, 1981: 226–227).

Putnam's term for the “features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and social trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefit” is social capital (1995: 4). A community organizer in Texas has defined the same concept as “a measure of how much collaborative time and energy people have for each other” (Cortes, 1993: 17).

Putnam's analysis of a wide variety of joining behavior indicates that the United States has suffered a steady and serious erosion of social capital since World War II (1995: 4). This drop can be seen in all classes of people and all regions of the country. He interprets this drop as a generational effect; people born prior to 1940 are aging out of the population, and no group since has exhibited a similar level of

associational behavior (1996). Life in many neighborhoods has become a private rather than a communal affair.

While not all social capital is invested in civic engagement, civic engagement is dependent on the stock of social capital available. A wide range of commentators have argued that the nature of public institutions, such as the police, is fundamentally changed when those receiving services are not engaged in the process of defining the nature of services to be delivered or problems to be solved (Alinsky, 1969: 55; Lipsky, 1980; Posner, 1990: 17; Putnam, 1995; Spergel, 1976: 90). One community organizer hypothesizes that any progress with poverty or other urban ills is dependent on the creation and nurturing of neighborhood-level institutions that can mediate between the private lives of neighbors and the public institutions of the state (Cortes, 1993: 23). Another experienced organizer asserts that some areas are too bereft of associations to constitute a community and that constituencies with the capacity to define or take action on community issues such as crime cannot exist in these areas (Delgado, 1986: 83).

While social capital is declining throughout the United States, it is at its lowest in poor, diverse, urban neighborhoods (Wilson, 1987). These neighborhoods contribute disproportionately to crime and victimization and are the areas most in need of new policing initiatives such as community policing (Buerger, 1994; Grinc, 1994). However, these neighborhoods are also those least able (and at times least willing) to participate with the police in the coproduction of public safety (Skogan, 1990). Without sufficient social capital, they often lack the processes and structures that support constituency behaviors (Cortes, 1993; McKnight, 1995). Policing initiatives to prevent crime in such areas are particularly problematic—often engendering no citizen involvement at all or increasing, rather than reducing, dissension within the neighborhood (Skogan, 1990). Before the police begin to engage such neighborhoods, the special difficulties of these localities must be understood. The police have traditionally played a role, albeit a minor one, in the reduction of constituency building in such neighborhoods. The difficulties of constituency building in these “controlled neighborhoods” (Alinsky, 1969; Reitzes and Reitzes, 1982) can only be appreciated in relation to the broader urban struggle in which these neighborhoods have generally been the losers.

The urban struggle

Skogan and Maxfield (1981: 238) assert that most programs, research, and theory about fear of crime and victimization have focused on the residential neighborhood as the arena for action. A more recent review suggests that policy and research attention has not changed in the intervening years (Hope, 1995).

There are severe dangers in equating the target of program goals (better neighborhoods) with the locus of effective actions toward those goals (e.g., crime prevention should focus on problems within neighborhoods). For example, if we focus on the exertion of social control within a neighborhood, we may miss processes by which some neighborhoods control crime by funneling it into other neighborhoods (Byrum, 1992).

The progenitor of much community organizing in the United States, Saul Alinsky, said that the two major failures of typical approaches to neighborhood problems were the failure to recognize the interdependence of problems and the failure to understand that neighborhood life is influenced by forces that transcend the neighborhood (Alinsky, 1969: 57). While highly critical of Alinsky's strategies for avoiding these failures, the preeminent scholar of urban social movements, Manuel Castells would agree with him about tendencies of American attempts to improve neighborhoods: (1) they tend to occur at the level where the problem is experienced without regard to the broader context, (2) they tend to focus on single issues isolated from other related objectives, and (3) they are organized locally without regard for linking neighborhoods to external agencies and resources (Castells, 1983: 123; see similar list in Boyte, 1980: 35).

Understanding the neighborhood as a product of local and nonlocal forces is critical in analyzing what a number of researchers and organizers have called the urban struggle. As Logan and Molotch put it, "Neighborhood futures are determined by the ways in which entrepreneurial pressures from outside intersect with internal material stakes and sentiments" (1987: 123). While disorder in neighborhoods has proximate, neighborhood causes, its roots are embedded in "capitalism, racism, and the emerging role of the U.S. in the international division of labor" (Skogan, 1990: 172; see also Hallman, 1984: 261; Hope, 1995: 24).

In Castells' view, the interaction of these forces in urban settings is best understood as a constant struggle because the quality of city life at any point in time is a product of different groups' interests and social values vying for influence in the use of urban space. The process of change is conflictual because some of these interests and values are contradictory, and the process is dialectical because the opposition of forces produces a trajectory of action in the struggle that is unintended by any single actor or coalition of actors (1983: xviii).

While the outcomes of the struggle are not intended by any single group, this does not mean that the problems are not the product of policies, rather than impersonal forces (Wilkins, 1991: 57–70). The primary threat to neighborhoods, say Logan and Molotch (1987: 111), is not urbanization but "organizations and institutions whose routine functioning reorganize urban space" (see also Castells, 1983: 12; Warren, 1976: 9–14). The urban struggle is not predetermined but open (Castells, 1983: 72), not inexorable but manageable (Bratton, 1995). But the openness and manageability also imply that prior failures, especially in the poorest neighborhoods, are largely the product of policy choices. Poverty and crime, or at least their concentration, have been created. Arguments to the contrary are most often put forth by two parties: the currently dominant actors in the urban struggle who enjoy the greatest benefit from the current use of urban space (Castells, 1983: xvii) and the exhausted and apathetic who have suffered the greatest costs of the current use of urban space (Cortes, 1993).

The principal competing values for the use of space are those of exchange value and use value. Exchange value operates on the premise that owners of city space or investors in city development should be able to extract as much profit as possible from the use of urban space. Exchange value therefore places a premium on high-density usage and population growth. Use value rests on the premise that those living in urban space should have accessible services to meet their needs for daily survival, enjoy networks of informal social support, and share symbols of security and trust (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 103). Use value places a premium on livability or community.

Exchange values are typically championed by interests organized in large institutions such as corporations, banks, and political parties. Use values are

typically championed by grassroots movements in neighborhoods and citizens' organizations. Therefore, the urban struggle also typically includes a conflict over the form of decision processes. Use value adherents tend to push for increased autonomy and power through grassroots democracy, while exchange value interests stress the advantages of centralized and expert decisionmaking (Castells, 1983: 12–48; Bruyn and Meehan, 1987: 24).

The primary actors in the struggle

The primary actors in the urban struggle are State authorities (including local government), citizens' movements, and exchange value interests, such as large capital interests, developers, and landlords (Cunningham and Kotler, 1983: xxi; Logan and Molotch, 1987: 47; Stoecker, 1994: 12). None of these are consistently unified groups, always acting in concerted fashion with other members of the same group.

Exchange value interests are fragmented in a variety of ways, including their relative commitment to place. Large capital can be moved with electronic speed in response to advantages in international markets and has little, and increasingly less, commitment to any particular place. In contrast, utilities and local landlords can hope to influence local markets but cannot leave (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 39). Within the same space, various capital interests will compete with each other and forge alignments with other urban actors to advance their own projects over the proposals of their competitors (Stoecker, 1994: 15). Nevertheless, all capital interests will fight to defend the dominant rules of the city game. They expect free market assumptions to be seen as natural and right. They expect the negative byproducts of capital exchange to be externalized and paid by other actors, either by the State or by neighborhood residents. They expect that most external benefits, such as the increased value of land after development, will accrue to capital. In other words, economic elites agree that acceptable debate will take place within the exchange value framework (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 64).

The American state is likewise separated into Federal, State, and local systems and a host of public authorities that buffer elected officials from direct responsibility for and criticism about many urban planning functions and services. It is the peculiar nature of American federalism that all three levels of govern-

ment operate conjointly and simultaneously in the urban struggle. Local government is not necessarily closer, in the sense of being more responsive to neighborhood interests, than State and Federal agencies (Grozdzins, 1963; Stoecker, 1994: 90–140; Warren et al., 1974). All three provide direct services as well as planning and coordinating functions. Despite competition and conflicts among and within governmental structures, government officials, like various members in the market, tend to share and defend basic underlying premises. For agents of the State, the primary expectation is their control of formal decisionmaking (Lipsky, 1980; Miller et al., 1977: 169–174). Local government is likely to respond to neighborhood pressures, capital projects, and State and Federal policies in relation to how those initiatives are perceived to enhance or constrict local decision discretion. The local government generally favors exchange value interests and defends exchange value assumptions, but it is vulnerable to counterclaims from neighborhoods because it must maintain legitimacy. If city growth strategies visibly threaten the livability of neighborhoods, the local government may become sympathetic to calls for greater attention to use value in decisions about urban space.

Citizens' groups also vary in several ways. Their objectives vary from racist and reactionary to progressive (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 37). Some citizens' groups are organized around public issues that are not place specific (e.g., Mothers Against Drunk Drivers, Ralph Nader and his consumer protection group, civil rights) but are apparently concerned with resisting corporate or government power or policies in general. Others are place specific and have been identified loosely as the neighborhood movement (Boyte, 1980: 7). The neighborhood movement, in turn, varies in its philosophy and strategies for action. Neighborhood organizations can seek to defend specific localities against encroachment of new members and lifestyles or can seek a greater share of resources for all neighborhood residents (Skogan, 1988). Neighborhood organizations can compete with each other or form coalitions to gain power against other urban actors (Boyte, 1980: 148–166).

The growth machine

Since the 1950s market forces have overwhelmed the countervailing forces in the city (Byrum, 1992; Cunningham and Kotler, 1983: xxi). In the urban

struggle, the economic elite have prevailed. As a result, the concentration of wealth has increased while the payment for infrastructure costs is less shared. The fastest growing industries pay less for labor than the declining industries. On average, real wages are down while profits are rising. The proportion of the population that is poor is increasing while the proportion that is middle class is decreasing. The proportion of tax revenues that come from corporations declined by about two-thirds between 1960 and 1984 (Faux, 1987: 28).

Capital interests have a number of advantages in the urban struggle that help explain these outcomes. In terms of understanding the expectations of constituencies in the urban struggle, the economic elite have a strategic advantage in choosing how to participate. Capital interests can participate directly in city politics by backing a particular political party or candidate, but they can also take more indirect routes, such as relying on influence in government boards and committees or leveraging favorable government policies through control of the economy. The state will usually act to please capital interests under the fear (and often the threat) that capital interests will otherwise go elsewhere (Stoecker, 1994: 12–14).

Capital interests' expectation that indirection is sufficient is often met. For example, most government urban planning has favored capital interests over neighborhood interests despite legislation to the contrary. Eighty percent of urban renewal funds have been used for economic development rather than housing, and urban renewal programs have destroyed more housing than they have built (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 147–179).

The economic elite can also coopt community organizations, such as preservation committees, neighborhood associations, and community development corporations. The efforts of these organizations to promote stability and vitality in neighborhoods can have the unintended effect of promoting profit taking, as the value of space becomes more attractive for outside investors (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 139; Stoecker, 1994: 240).

Long-term negative effects of short-term improvements in neighborhoods are particularly likely when collective action by residents is not guided by knowledge of the urban struggle and therefore does not

include limits on exchange value in revitalization plans. This oversight is frequent when neighborhoods rely on interpretations for urban problems that are consistent with the exchange value framework—that the market should determine how neighborhoods fare (Kling and Posner, 1990: 34; Boyte, 1980: 172).

The coalition of interests seeking exchange value in the use of city space has been called the growth machine (Swanstrom, 1985: 25; Logan and Molotch, 1987: 34). Growth machines can be conservative, in which case government aids and abets the maximization of profit without much regard for externalized costs. Growth machines can also be liberal, in which case government both reallocates through taxes some of the benefits from growth for the development of neighborhood services and also controls how growth will take place (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 67–69; Swanstrom, 1985: 11–34).

The United States is currently in an era of conservative growth politics, in which the prevailing view is that government social programs are too costly and government controls have failed. This includes the notion that social science understanding of community order is faulty and that city development should be left to the marketplace (Hope, 1995: 41).

Under the conservative growth machine, legitimate understandings of community problems are limited to those that concentrate on the organization and behavior of neighborhood residents. Problems are viewed as the product of internal disorganization within the neighborhood. Policies and programs that seek to enhance the internal controls in neighborhoods will be favored, while those that examine the position of neighborhoods in the larger urban system will be seen as off limits (Hope, 1995: 71–72). Consequently, conservative growth machines will favor community policing and crime prevention over changes in other policies as means to deal with community problems so long as these programs focus on resident behavior rather than on linking that behavior to the costs of conservative growth policies.

Although concentrated economic power appears indomitable, there are limits to the conservative growth machine. While a number of commentators have characterized the current economic system as unbridled capitalism, even the recognition of that system characteristic may provide some limitations to the

machine, since the power of capital interests seems greatest when it goes unrecognized and unquestioned. Dramatically visible inequality may limit continued hegemony of the conservative growth machine.

The increasing concentration of wealth and the increasing internationalization of the economy have created fissures in the growth machine. Internationalization of wealth has meant that local economic actors do not control investment decisions as they used to do. Local economic leaders have less chance to share in the wealth, and local political leaders have less chance to share in the decisionmaking (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 201–208; McKnight, 1995: 154). This trend has led to calls that corporations must evaluate moves in capital in terms of community impact (Etzioni, 1993: 127), to President Clinton's criticism of the stock market's negative reaction to higher employment, and to presidential candidate Patrick Buchanan's blue-collar, populist Republican campaign. It has also led one student of crime prevention to wonder if neighborhoods need reinvestment rather than disorder policing (Hope, 1995: 61).

Differential costs in the urban struggle

While the growth machine promises that increasing exchange value is in everyone's interest, it does not deliver on this promise. The benefits and costs for growth are differentially distributed, both within and across cities (Byrum, 1992; Logan and Molotch, 1987: 70–91). Certain neighborhoods have been increasingly isolated from the rest of their cities and separated from the rest of society as a result both of market forces and government policies (Byrum, 1992: 28–31; Hope, 1995: 73–76; McGahey, 1986: 233; Wilson, 1987).

Poor neighborhoods in older central cities are the most vulnerable to the negative changes that growth politics involves. The poor are the most likely to be displaced in renewal, and displacement is likely to break the neighborhood connections that provide the organization for resistance (Logan and Molotch, 1987: 112–113). People who have the power in inner-city neighborhoods typically live elsewhere, reducing allegiance to use values among those with the skills and resources to object to growth and leaving exchange values unrestrained (Comer, 1985: 69–72; Logan and Molotch, 1987: 132).

In neighborhoods with high concentrations of renters, living in progressively less maintained older housing stock, these trends have led to higher turnover of residents, less commitment to particular places, fewer ties among residents, and less of the social capital required for associational structures (McGahey, 1986: 244; Wilson, 1987). These personal and physical disorders may lead to increased fear, increased serious crime, further erosion of resident control of public behavior, and further reductions in neighborhood stability (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 15; Skogan, 1990: 3).

The predominating explanation of such neighborhoods in crime control circles is that they are disorganized because the informal social control once exerted by residents on each other has disappeared (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993; Skogan, 1988: 40). But attempts to aid such neighborhoods based on the disorganization premise have often failed. The attempts meet with internal resistance from residents who exert tremendous energy in organizing to survive under such circumstances (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 148–180; Reitzes and Reitzes, 1982: 343) and are understandably suspicious of expert motivations and interpretations of their problems. These attempts are also resisted by external forces for whom the devalued neighborhood is an important component of the economy of the city (Byrum, 1992: 1; Hope, 1995: 34–40).

Within the broader view of the urban struggle, such areas are not disorganized but controlled by external forces (Alinsky, 1969; Spergel, 1976). In controlled areas, residents' costs in time, energy, and money for day-to-day survival are so high that there are few resources left over for the development of social capital (Stoecker, 1994: 213–215). “[T]hose who have the most need to mobilize have the least time” (Stoecker, 1994: 215). As a result, there is a dearth of indigenous organizations that can serve as bases for constituent behavior (McKnight, 1995: 154). As the police begin to explore the meaning of community policing, such areas often lack the associational structures that might express expectations about policing (Grinc, 1994: 459). Bayley (1994) and Grinc (1994) ask whether the police should have a role in creating such structures.

Potential realignment of the local State

It is usually only in alliance with the political elite that neighborhoods can obtain the resources necessary to promote the use value of space and disrupt the growth machine. While the local State usually sides with capital interests, it does not always do so. The growth machine is not always strong enough to form a regime (Swanstrom, 1985: 36). Local city government is particularly vulnerable to counterclaims, since it must maintain legitimacy through some attention to use value or the collective consumption needs of residents (Stoecker, 1994: 14–15).

Historically, increased demands on the State to ameliorate the problems left in the wake of capital accumulation have produced other problems, such as a larger and more oppressive State bureaucracy (Bruyn and Meehan, 1987: 2; Lipsky, 1980). As State services have grown, governments have ignored or even destroyed communities in the effort to provide services to individuals (Etzioni, 1993: 1–20; McKnight, 1995; Spergel, 1976). Citizens' movements may then organize against government as well as, or instead of, against the economic elite (Boyte, 1980: 7).

Until recently, the urban police component of the expanded service State has been legalistic policing. It emerged in the 1920s and 1930s as progressive politicians aligned with capital interests sought to wrest control of city hall from ethnic neighborhoods (Haller, 1971; for a related court example, see Levine, 1972). The result, according to Kelling, has been a model of crime control that removed access to law from the citizens policed (1995: 13). While the typical portrayal of legalistic policing is that it has been removed from politics, the notion of removal has been an interpretation fostered by the growth machine. Since the progressive reforms of city government have generally favored growth machine objectives (Stoecker, 1994), legalistic policing has removed the police from the counterclaims of neighborhoods on central authority (Skogan, 1990: 86). The police job has been to maintain order without changing the dominant direction of the urban political economy toward economic growth and away from neighborhood quality of life.

Beginning in the 1970s, there have been halting but repeated attempts to make government more responsive to neighborhood constituents, often under the

notion of partnerships between neighborhoods and government service organizations with broader jurisdictions (Hallman, 1984: 272). This trend is borrowed to some extent from the quality movement in private firms and the active client movements in education and medicine (Fleissner et al., 1991: 9–10).

The police have been involved in this trend since its inception (Couper and Lobitz, 1991; Fleissner et al., 1991; Sherman et al., 1973). But the forces arrayed against the restructuring of policing (or other aspects of government) in partnership arrangements are many. These include bureaucratic standardization, the long isolation of government bureaucracies from service recipients, and professional or specialist antagonism to lay participation in deciding actions to be taken (Bayley, 1994; Hallman, 1984: 272; Lipsky, 1980).

In the police case, the internal blockages include a midmanagement trained in the autocratic, but ineffective, control of officers and wedded to particular techniques of crime control (Bayley, 1994; Kelling and Bratton, 1993; van Maanen, 1974) and a host of expectations built into police recruiting, promotion, supervision, and evaluation systems (Goldstein, 1987: 13). The external blockages include a police organization structure that is unfamiliar with the process of improving linkages with other organizations, such as neighborhood groups, in voluntary exchanges (Hall et al., 1977); a deeply ingrained association of neighborhood ties with corruption; and a tendency to grant legitimacy only to community leaders associated with the growth coalition.

The result is that “police departments have paid . . . little attention to the education and inclusion of community residents in their transition to community policing. Indeed, in most cases, community policing is an isolated police department phenomenon including neither community residents nor other city agencies” (Grinc, 1994: 441). If this assessment remains accurate, then community policing would be only another sop to the growth machine—a means to pay lipservice to the needs of neighborhoods while city business progresses as usual (Manning, 1988).

The police and other segments of government may restructure and realign with neighborhoods in opposition to the forces of centralization and capital growth. The fissures in the growth coalition, as described above, may well provide an opportunity for a different

form and function of policing than that provided by progressive urban reform and professional law enforcement.

While the political opportunity structure (Stoecker, 1994: 22–23) may be more open in many cities than in the past to alliances between neighborhoods and the State, the most likely predictions are that police bureaucracy will find a way to interpret community policing in ways that are the least challenging to its internal structure and that exchange value interests in the urban struggle will find ways to bend community policing to its objectives, contrary to neighborhood desires and independent of policing intentions.

The extent to which community policing and related efforts at crime prevention represent a true realignment of government with neighborhoods is dependent on the extent to which community policing is a part of, rather than a substitute for, reinvestment in neighborhoods, and to which community policing facilitates neighborhood constituency building, rather than simply supplying another set of services to neighborhoods.

The strength of these twin characteristics can be examined in existing community policing programs. But this search is more accurately conducted after an elaboration of the nature of constituency building in controlled neighborhoods.

Constituency building in controlled communities

What would the reorganization of controlled communities require? How can neighborhoods be less determined by nonlocal forces, have more influence over those forces (or at least how those forces will affect the neighborhood), and become more livable, or provide greater evidence of use value premises in the use of space?

A search of the neighborhood movement and neighborhood revitalization literature provides a host of desirable outcome variables—characteristics of improved livability—such as greater participation in the labor market, greater residential stability, greater access to services and commodities for daily living, and reduced disease, disorder, and crime. But the same literature provides less guidance about processes of neighborly and organizational interactions and the

structures that support and maintain these processes. Yet all community literature agrees that outcomes are dependent on altered processes and structures, first to achieve improvement on these outcome indicators and second to institutionalize their attainment—to reproduce them on a regular basis.

Unfortunately, descriptions of these neighborhood structural variables are often embedded in accounts of change in which the focal point is the end result rather than how it was accomplished. Definitions of neighborhood qualities therefore remain relatively amorphous, or defined differently by individual studies. Evidence bearing on their enactment is anecdotal rather than systematic.

One consequence of this relative inattention to neighborhood structure is an overconcern with outcomes as opposed to the means of achieving them. This is hazardous if long-term improvement is desired. As W. Edwards Deming has said of results-based management, it is like driving a car with your eye on the rear-view mirror. If that is true of organization management, it is also true of neighborhood organizing. The neighborhood remains a black box.

The deficiencies in this plan are well-known in economic revitalization efforts. Housing renovation in dilapidated areas fails to improve housing stock or long-term housing value because the area cannot compete with more attractive suburban real estate. A local economy is given a boost through luring to an area a new enterprise, which then hires from a nonlocal labor pool and later abandons that plant as less profitable than some other company line in another city (Byrum, 1992).

The same kinds of deficiencies are reported in early crime prevention efforts. Advice about reducing victimization produces more fear of crime and less neighborhood participation (Rosenbaum et al., 1986). Neighborhood complainants about drug markets receive advice from the police to lie low. Precinct captains who successfully involve neighborhood residents in neighborhood projects are promoted out of the neighborhood and away from neighborhood building (Weingart et al., 1994).

The police can and often do create improvements in particular areas, even without significant participation of the residents in the area or longer term changes in

the structure of neighborhood life. But sustaining those gains requires that other neighborhood characteristics also change.

A tentative listing of neighborhood sustainability variables and their definitions is given in exhibit 1. These variables appear to be present in neighborhood processes and structures that increase social capital and transform it into constituency behavior—the collective efforts to maintain quality of life in a neighborhood.

The list is preliminary because of the unsystematic nature of research on neighborhood revitalization. The definitions no doubt need refinement. Particularly troublesome is that the variables in their present state do not seem mutually exclusive. But it is not clear from available research if this is because they cluster empirically or because they are partially overlapping indicators of more fundamental concepts. These vari-

ables do appear in several different research reports on neighborhood improvement, addressing different kinds of neighborhood problems in varying regions and cultures. Examples to illustrate each variable are provided below.

Internal coordination

The extent to which neighborhood groups and organizations act in concerted fashion toward solving problems has long been recognized as a critical variable in the strengthening of neighborhoods. Internal coordination, or unification, is the primary objective of locality development—self-help strategies for neighborhood improvement (Warren, 1978). It also is a critical component of social action strategies, such as those used by the Industrial Areas Foundation (IAF) (Cortes, 1993) and the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) (Delgado, 1986).

Exhibit 1. Variables Important In Sustaining Neighborhood Constituency Behavior

Variable	Definition
Internal coordination	The extent to which groups and organizations with separate functions but a common location act in concert for identified projects.
External linkage	The extent to which a locality has ties to nonlocal centers of resources and expertise.
Limits on exchange value	The extent to which development in a locality places limits on profit maximization.
Self-correcting process evaluation	The extent to which neighborhood collective action is attentive to its processes as well as its outcomes; self-evaluations are regular and concerned with renewal.
Autonomy	The extent to which a neighborhood has influence on decisions about actions taken within it; the neighborhood retains its identity when participating in nonlocal networks.
Shared culture	The extent to which a neighborhood is conscious of cultural uniqueness and shared symbols of common place.
Dialogue	The extent to which information about the area is shared and accurate; conflicts are addressed in forums in which all participants are recognized as having legitimacy to speak.

Internal coordination can also be problematic or incomplete, since some neighborhood structures can cooperate with each other without incorporating the views and the energy of other neighborhood components. In President Lyndon Johnson's "War on Poverty," for example, there was great emphasis on the coordination of the formal structures in a neighborhood, but these agencies systematically excluded the residents of the neighborhood in the decisions made by the agencies (Warren et al., 1974). More recently, crime prevention efforts have stressed internal coordination on the informal level—better communication among residents—without considering the connections of resident unification with the public agencies and private organizations in the neighborhood (Hope, 1995). Measures of internal coordination must consider both formal and informal interactions to be complete.

Internal coordination can play a critical role in the economic viability of an area. The Jamestown (New York) Area Labor Management Committee (JALMC) serves as an example. Among its various objectives was "cooperative action by union, management, and local leaders to save jobs in plant shutdowns and to strengthen the economic base of the community" (Meek, 1985: 142). In line with the strategy of cooperation, an industry-wide training program was formed through the cooperation of Jamestown Community College, the United Furniture Workers, and the Jamestown Area Manufacturers Association. The small plants in Jamestown all had similar needs, with training being one of the most pressing. The plants also shared a lack of resources to effectively meet these needs. Coordination was needed to identify mutual needs and to utilize resources in an area to meet those needs. The community college, which previously had little involvement in area economic concerns, became an active partner in the struggle toward economic viability (Trist, 1986; Meek, 1985). Cummins Engine located a new diesel engine-building plant in Jamestown in 1974, largely due to this climate of cooperation between diverse members of the community, resulting in 1,100 new jobs for area residents (Gittell, 1992).

Although Jamestown had benefited from the areawide focus on industrial needs, the mid- to late-1980s brought increased unemployment and a general downturn in the quality of life. The unemployment rate in Jamestown rose above national and State averages.

Twenty percent of its residents were on some form of public assistance (Gittell, 1992).

Problems in Jamestown were attributed to social factors that were not addressed in the focus on the needs of area industry. An Economic Development Committee was formed in 1986 with a broader mandate than that of JALMC to deal with these issues. The committee included representatives from human services, education, and downtown development organizations and attempted to view problems holistically, recognizing the interdependency among economic and social factors (Gittell, 1992).

External linkages

The extent to which a neighborhood has access to nonlocal centers of resources and expertise is critical to the viability of any locality. No neighborhood is self-sufficient. Indeed, one of the major problems with community revitalization efforts is the lingering but mistaken myth that community problems are self-generated and that solutions will be only a matter of mobilizing internal willpower and resources (Byrum, 1992). One of the major deficiencies in the neighborhoods with the highest rates of crime and disorder is that they become increasingly isolated from nonlocal resources and expertise as time passes (Wilson, 1987).

Hope (1995) argues convincingly that crime prevention efforts for the last 30 years have either ignored external linkages entirely or have failed to alter the nature of those linkages in the few instances in which they have been viewed as important. Improving external linkages is a critical component of all social action strategies for neighborhood improvement (Cortes, 1993) and one of the variables least likely to be affected by locality development or self-help approaches. Crime prevention efforts that focus on neighborhood disorganization do not by themselves provide neighbors with new connections to nonlocal resources (Hope, 1995).

External linkages are critical to the economic well-being of a neighborhood. For example, neighborhood-level economies are often dependent on the initiation of small, or "microenterprise," ventures. Butler reports that two-thirds of all new jobs are in businesses of less than 20 employees (National Council for Urban Economic Development (CUED), 1994). Neighborhood economic revitalization strategies require sources of funding and expertise for the new

entrepreneur that are not typically available locally. Those lacking collateral and a loan history have difficulty attaining the capital needed for business startup costs. Also, banks and other traditional lending institutions hesitate to extend business loans for the small amounts of money sought by microenterprises (CUED, 1994). Aside from the issue of capital is the lack of expertise to increase the chances of successful ventures. The following example shows how these needs for both funding and expertise can be met.

The Detroit, Michigan, Self Employment Project is designed to promote economic independence through self-employment and entrepreneurship among individuals with limited resources (CUED, 1994: 37). It is operated through the collaborative efforts of the Michigan Department of Social Services and Wayne State University. It is intended to help residents actualize their business ideas through assistance in a wide range of business-related skills, including market research, public relations, problem solving, and loan packaging. Training comes through courses, workshops, conferences, and problem-solving clinics. Since October 1990, 199 applicants have completed the program and 101 have started their own enterprises (CUED, 1994).

The timing of public support can be as critical as the level of support. JALMC received a \$22,500 Federal grant, which enabled it to hire a coordinator at a critical stage in its development. In this instance, the Federal Government responded in a timely manner to locally supported and engineered means of renewal. This strategically placed grant may have played a large role in the continued growth of an organization critical to the economic health of the city (Gittell, 1992).

Local development can be assisted by nonlocal allies in a variety of ways. France's Chomeurs Creature program offers an innovative means of developing entrepreneurship opportunities. Instead of collecting regular welfare payments, qualified and motivated recipients are given a lump-sum payment to cover startup costs for their own businesses. Approximately 70,000 people are involved in this program. One-third of all new French businesses get their start in this manner, and 60–80 percent have survived longer than 3 years (Meehan, 1987).

Limits on exchange value

Whyte (1985) distinguishes between profit maximization and profit as a limiting factor. Etzioni's argument for a communitarian value system (1993) includes enhancing the concern for corporate decisions' impact on neighborhoods. Stoecker (1994) and Logan and Molotch (1987) argue that exchange value premises must be limited by, if not replaced by, attention to use value premises in decisions about how urban space will be used. Byrum's analysis of housing and labor markets in Minneapolis (1992) indicates that market forces, left unchecked, will inevitably lead to the deterioration and isolation of some neighborhoods because the exchange value premises of the growth machine require some spaces to be devalued in order for profit to be maximized.

Plants can be closed not because they are operating at a loss but because profits are not sufficiently high. In the late 1970s, U.S. Steel closed 14 plants, resulting in layoffs of 13,000 workers. It then paid \$6 billion to acquire Marathon Oil of Ohio (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982). Youngstown, Ohio, was hit by the closing of U.S. Steel and other major steel mill employers. By 1984, all basic steel manufacturing in Youngstown was gone. A nearby General Motors plant also moved out. Closings resulted in an official unemployment rate of 17 percent. Considering those who were involuntarily retired, and those who were only employed part time, estimates of true unemployment were as high as 33 percent (Moberg, 1985). Studies on the impact of plant closings indicates that long-term unemployment is the result for at least one-third of those affected. Corporations such as U.S. Steel were able to operate on their own balance sheets with little need to consider the balance sheet for the neighborhood (Bluestone and Harrison, 1982).

In contrast to that balance sheet dynamic, Whyte (1985) gives the example of Bates Fabrics Company in Lewiston, Maine, an employer of 1,100 workers. The parent company had grown into a conglomerate, with increased investments outside of textiles. Corporate decisionmakers determined that a 15- to 20-percent return was possible on investments in energy and natural resources. This was compared with the 5- to 7-percent profit that could be expected from their textile operations. From the company's standpoint, profit maximization would point toward the conglomerate ridding itself of the textile plant. However, the

community saw the decision quite differently, given the possible social and economic repercussions should the plant close. Local management, union leaders, and citizens in the community were able to arrange for employees to assume ownership and to modernize the plant (Whyte, 1985).

Neighborhood economic revitalization depends on recasting economic precepts within a neighborhood orientation. Such strategies center on long-term, stable growth (Gittell, 1992). Free-market benefits can be directed toward social needs, thus avoiding both the lack of accountability of unrestrained capitalism and the lack of flexibility of State control (Bruyn, 1987).

Self-correcting process evaluation

A healthy, sustainable community requires neighborhood organizations that are conscious of their place in the urban struggle and are therefore attentive to their processes for continuing problem solving as well as for achieving specific outcomes or solutions at any one point in time. To be sustained, neighborhoods need organizations that learn, that are self-evaluative, and that are concerned with renewal.

Community development corporations (CDCs) may operate in this capacity. CDCs act as mediating structures, or “those institutions standing between the individual in his private life and the large institutions of public life” (Berger and Neuhaus, 1981). They were initiated in 1966, as part of the War on Poverty. CDCs are neighborhood-based, grassroots organizations and are funded through financial institutions, foundations, corporations, and government programs (CUED, 1994).

CDCs have the potential to expand the professional skills and financial resources available to cities for neighborhood economic development by coordinating neighborhood opinion and providing leadership to stimulate the development process within the community; packaging public and private financing; assisting city planners in development planning; investing in development projects; developing and managing development projects; providing technical assistance; and assist-

ing in directing city investment within neighborhoods to achieve their greatest impact and leverage (CUED, 1994: 4).

CDCs must be able to develop initiatives in neighborhoods that traditional funding sources typically avoid and need the competence and direct knowledge of the neighborhood to bring this about (Blakely, 1989). CDCs have traditionally been involved in housing activities. In the recent past, they have expanded their involvement to other business ventures and to social interventions that are seen as having a positive impact on the community.

CDCs are not the only neighborhood organizations with potential for self-correcting process evaluation. In traditional community organizing, social action organizations such as IAF and ACORN often provide the most attention to development of urban political consciousness on the part of their members and are most concerned with a thorough process evaluation of particular projects and meetings (Delgado, 1986; Reitzes and Reitzes, 1986). But these organizations can also become ineffective, develop rifts between leaders and members, or become too caught up in day-to-day service delivery or problem solving to retain their concern for healthy communication and member commitment.

Autonomy in decisionmaking

The viability of a neighborhood depends on its ability to define its own goals and governing structure and to control its access to, and impact from, public and private forces (Boyte, 1980). For a neighborhood to be sustained, it must have the autonomy to exert influence on nonlocal decisionmakers, rather than simply accepting services and resources from nonlocal centers of power (Cortes, 1993).

Autonomy is one of the most overlooked variables in community revitalization efforts (Hope, 1995), but a sustained community does not exist without autonomy. It is critical to examine autonomy in relation to external linkages, since autonomy, or the lack of it, indicates the directionality in those linkages. Some neighborhoods may have access to centrally financed services but no influence over how those services will be defined or allocated (Spergel, 1976). Controlled neighborhoods lack the constituency voice to act on their own behalf.

An independent resource base is a critical component of autonomy (Delgado, 1986: 204). The few crime prevention programs that included attempts to increase neighborhood autonomy failed because the neighborhood groups seeking influence over central decisionmakers lost their access to resources controlled by those resistant central powers (Hope, 1995). Neighborhood organizations such as ACORN chapters seek to increase autonomy by generating their own resources through dues and neighborhood-controlled economic enterprises (Delgado, 1986).

Trist (1986) states that JALMC's success came with its acquiring of the properties of a local organization and thereby gained influence over individuals and organizations, though it lacked formal political authority. JALMC then was able to bring about substantive rather than simply marginal changes.

According to Bruyn (1987), autonomy is obtained when the neighborhood gains more control over land, labor, and capital. Community land trusts can rescue these resources from speculation. When applied to housing, it can assure affordability for present and future buyers. Worker cooperatives help stabilize the neighborhood, since the neighborhood, as represented by the workforce, is more directly involved in company decisions. Democratization of capital can empower neighborhoods to find new means of local development (Turner, 1987).

The following is an example of increased autonomy in the economically depressed upper Great Lakes peninsula. The Lake Alternative Energy Board (LAEB), a CDC, joined with other community action agencies and a private company to bring revenue to the community, create jobs, and at the same time provide low-cost fuel to area residents. The area has extremely low winter temperatures and an annual average of 120 inches of snowfall. Fuel at affordable prices is a primary concern (Blakely, 1989).

LAEB served as a catalyst for developing solutions to these problems. The first initiative involved developing wood pellets as a fuel source. Pellets can be made from scraps from the area lumber industry, the refuse of wood-chipping operations, and trees and limbs cut down in forestry operations. Through an arrangement with a private company, a wood pellet processing plant was constructed in the area. Though the plant employs only 20 to 25 people, it is estimated that the

business activity sparked by the plant brought \$30 million into the area (Blakely, 1989).

LAEB was successful in initiating economic development to meet the needs of the community. The plant, customers, and sources of raw materials were all locally based. The product served the local need for low-cost energy and at the same time brought jobs and revenues to the area.

Shared culture

Castells (1983) writes of the destructive impact on city movements when issues are defined in a one-dimensional, ideological fashion. He terms cities reflecting these struggles as "urban shadows." They simply become political arenas for partisan organizations. Successful urban movements instead require the resolution of diverse interests and the sharing of a new value system. "[O]nly when the bureaucratic city, the merchant city, the professional city, and the working class city will agree on an alternative model of government can a city . . . rely on a stable majority supporting social change. And these very diverse interests can only be reconciled when a new set of cultural values are shared" (Castells, 1983: 255). Through the process of reconciling diverse interests and defining a common cultural heritage, a neighborhood is able to effectively deal with political forces in ways that increase rather than compromise its autonomy.

Sister Ferre, the founder of the Ponce Playa Project, in Ponce Playa, Puerto Rico, initiated a photography program for all youths in the area after a number of cameras were donated by Kodak. To Sister Ferre, the main point was not simply to teach photography skills but to develop a greater awareness of family, friends, and neighbors, the subjects of the photos. This related to the objective that "[T]he community realizes that its own full development depends on the fulfillment of its members" (Ferre, 1987: 34).

Trist (1986) relates that the JALMC initiative developed through a perceived need for change rather than through design. It was described as a gradual, cumulative, but incomplete movement toward establishing a culture based on symbiotic relationships among organizations, groups, and individuals. In such a culture, interdependence and collaboration would qualify and constrain individualism and competition (Trist, 1986: 236–237). JALMC became the symbol of a new

culture. The words labor-management were repeated liturgically on innumerable occasions in many settings (Trist, 1986: 227). The meaning gained clarity over time as specific actions were taken by the committee. Such actions collectively served as the theme of the emerging culture (Trist, 1986).

Quality of dialogue

Possibly the most subtle aspect of bringing about neighborhood revitalization concerns the manner and quality of communication. Are various actors talking past each other or is there instead an equal sharing of ideas across differing perspectives and positions? Leadership skills can be essential in pointing out mutual interests and in empowering others, rather than focusing on one's own powers and interests.

Stanley Lundine, the mayor of Jamestown, New York, in the 1970s, played a critical role in the formation of JALMC. What had been an industrial environment marked by severe conflict was transformed to an atmosphere of cooperation. Lundine's credibility as the initial leader of this effort was based on his strong stand for government activism in solving Jamestown's economic problems. With the support he had from both labor and management, Lundine set a tone where both sides could talk and feel like they were being heard by the other (Meek, 1985). It was in this climate of trust that the ceremonial activities, such as dinners, conferences, and picnics, paved the way for labor and management agreement in project-oriented activities (Trist, 1986).

Pittsburgh was able to avoid economic disaster following the steel plant closings of the 1980s, largely due to the tradition of constructive dialogue and cooperation between the public and private sectors. The city was able to quickly form the necessary alliances and structures to enable it to rebound from the loss of 100,000 manufacturing jobs. Pittsburgh invested in its universities, hospitals, and advanced technology firms and was able to regain many of the lost jobs. This economic strategy was undertaken concurrently with a strategy to preserve the neighborhoods (Fainstein, 1990).

The mayor of Pittsburgh during the 1970s, Peter Flaherty, was attuned to neighborhood groups and insisted that city officials retain an open dialogue with them. Such groups became an important part of city politics. This attitude was seen as instrumental in establishing the partnerships necessary for the eco-

nomical transformation required after the collapse of the steel industry. Those with different perspectives and interests were able to work together toward a common goal and resisted the tendency to pursue their own factional interests (Fainstein, 1990).

Enhancing the level of dialogue in a neighborhood requires multiway communication and a willingness of all parties to be influenced by others. Particularly in the early stages of community building, dialogue building will include the ability of parties to endure messy and angry meetings (Weingart et al., 1994). In the Cedar Riverside (Minneapolis) neighborhood redevelopment efforts, neighbors were so committed to dialogue that they were willing to meet all night to reach consensus, rather than settle for compromises and vote taking (Stoecker, 1994).

One of the major threats to community building is the frequent association in American culture of community with cooperative, peaceful communication. Many central authority officials will short-circuit communications with a neighborhood if the initial meetings are full of anger and resentment. Such impatience simply leads to continuation of one-way communication. At other times, nonlocal officials with a commitment to due process and inclusion may need to urge some neighborhood groups to include other local groups that are being ignored. Dialogue can break down both within a neighborhood and between the neighborhood and critical outsiders.

The police and sustained community

Prospects for community policing will depend on the structure of the urban struggle in a particular city, and even a particular neighborhood, at a particular time. Expectations abstracted from this context will not make a great deal of sense. Expectations about community policing can be seen as pressures for local police departments to manifest or support particular values toward the use of space in the urban struggle. In other words, community policing, or any other form of policing, is likely to be only one more negotiation in an ongoing struggle to define community.

Community policing is not invented out of whole cloth. Expectations for community policing will be partially shaped by institutional memories of the urban struggle as implementation unfolds. Therefore,

the interpretation of community policing, by both the police and others will include the:

- Particular variations of professional law enforcement in any specific city, as interpreted by both those who have benefited and those who have not.
- Previous experiments by the department with getting closer to neighborhoods and the results of those attempts.
- Particular traditions of urban growth that have surrounded the police department.
- Status of the local growth machine in competition with other locations and whether the local political opportunity structure is relatively closed to pressures from neighborhoods or, instead, has been opened to coalitions between government and neighborhoods because of visible failures for growth politics to pay off as promised.

In relation to these local dynamics, additional factors in determining how and whether community policing unfolds in a particular place will be the pressures for adoption of programs highly touted in the media, by national experts, or by other levels of government. Some of these pressures are part of the institutionalized environment of police departments, to which departments may respond with formalized and ceremonial acquiescence more than with substantive change in how officers work (Crank and Langworthy, 1992; Manning, 1988). Other pressures are, or become, contractual obligations, as when police departments join a State or Federal program initiative in exchange for resources and perhaps for more exacting expectations and standards about performance components in implementation (Grinc, 1994).

Neighborhood interests will be only one of myriad forces which may lead toward or away from adoption of community policing or toward greater or lesser sincerity in the commitment to constituency building as part of the community policing initiative. The police will also find considerable variation in demand both within and among neighborhoods (Whitaker et al., 1982). Some neighborhoods will be more interested in community policing than others, and not all neighborhood demands will be informed by systematic understandings of the urban struggle. Indeed, most will not.

Those that are not are far more likely to take their cues from the police about what is appropriate to

expect of any form of policing. In most neighborhoods where there is some organized request for police response, the most typical overture is the relatively unsophisticated and unspecific demand for greater police presence (Whitaker et al., 1982; Podolefsky, 1983) rather than for different forms of policing or more involvement by neighborhood residents in control activities.

Most police departments have no systematic protocol by which to assess and prioritize interactions with community groups (Weingart et al., 1994: 11). While community policing might theoretically include the development of such a protocol, that innovation will itself depend on the initial meanings attached to community policing both in and outside the department. Unless a particular police department develops a sophisticated, critical sense of urban structures and learns to assess the status of various neighborhood overtures within that framework, there will be tremendous pressures to adopt a version of community policing that promises the department the least departure from current practice.

Community policing is generally presented as a realignment of police with neighborhoods (Bayley, 1994). But is it a way of extending the influence and dominance of the growth machine, by providing a new approach to paying for the externalized costs of growth? In other words, do neighborhoods get more policing, or even more responsive policing, as a tradeoff for continuing to suffer the negative effects of economic isolation and profit maximization? Or is community policing a way of providing neighborhoods with more power to impose use value premises on the structure of city space, by supporting the process of constituency building in controlled neighborhoods? Is policing used to pacify neighborhoods or does it become an active part of the process of constituency building?

Unfortunately, the available community policing research does not permit more than preliminary, and perhaps inaccurate, answers to these questions. Despite exhortations that the neighborhood position in the urban system must be specified to set the context of police and citizen actions about crime issues (Taylor, 1995) and that accounts of police interactions in the community must be disaggregated to the neighborhood level to make much sense of means and ends connections (Blumstein, 1995), most community policing evaluations provide little if any direct

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evidence of conscious concern for the political economy of neighborhoods (Hope, 1995; McGahey, 1986). Additionally, accounts of police practices give insufficient detail about the nature of neighborhood organizations to allow for systematic comparisons of structure, activities, and mobilization strategies (Skogan, 1988: 42–43). Under these limitations, the current assessments of the process and objectives of police-neighborhood interaction are little more than suggestions for further study. Exhibit 2 lists the seven dimensions of neighborhood sustainability and provides examples of their relationship to existing community policing projects.

Internal coordination

Internal coordination in a neighborhood can be improved through the linkages community policing

officers establish with other municipal and government agencies. These linkages facilitate residential referrals to social service agencies and help to coordinate quality of life and law enforcement activities. The community policing program at the Stonegate housing community in Fairfax, Virginia, for example, required community policing officers to make referrals to social service agencies as a part of their problem-solving activities. These officers were assisted by the availability of counselors and other social service providers at the project site. Establishing working relationships with these service providers enabled community policing officers to give residents information on available drug treatment programs, as well as family counseling, education, and health and child care services (Baranyk, 1994). Similar coordination is reported in Spokane, Washington (Giacomazzi et al., 1993: 97).

Exhibit 2. Examples of Police Effects on Neighborhood Sustainability

Variable	Program
Internal coordination	Increased planning and coordination among police and social services in Fairfax, Virginia, Austin, Texas, and Spokane, Washington; among police and city agencies in Brooklyn, New York, and Baltimore, Maryland; among residents and businesses in Seattle; but increased conflict in Houston and Minneapolis.
External linkage	Connection of neighborhoods to each other and to city central offices in Seattle; negative effects in Lawrence, Massachusetts; no change in Madison, Wisconsin, and Richmond, Virginia.
Limits on exchange value	Pressure on landlords and drug dealers in many cities; police and business planning merged in Portland, Oregon.
Self-correcting process evaluation	Seattle SSCPC works on inclusion; Fairfax and Fort Worth, Texas, concerned about group satisfaction; Madison loses concern for problem solving.
Autonomy	Seattle institutionalizes neighborhood planning councils, but in Philadelphia neighborhood-oriented managers are transferred; in Lawrence and Boston, neighbors urged to be eyes and ears for the police.
Shared culture	Shared concern for environment in Austin; lack of concern for place reduces control efforts in Philadelphia.
Dialogue	Two-way planning in Flint, Michigan, and Seattle; no conflict resolution in Lawrence; no sustained groups in Madison.

Similarly, in Austin, Texas, the simultaneous adoption of Total Quality Management (TQM) by both the police department (as an integral part of its community policing program) and all city agencies brought about a high degree of cooperation and coordination among the police department and other city agencies. With these linkages, the Austin community policing project could incorporate into their customer service model an array of services that were outside of traditional law enforcement activities. They then also had the capacity to assess the effectiveness of problem-solving strategies that took advantage of other interventions than the choice of arrest or nonarrest. Designers of the community policing program in Austin believed that the simultaneous adoption of TQM by the police department and other city agencies would cultivate a shared vision of what the city should be doing and where it should be going. This shared vision was also viewed as increasing the effectiveness of services to Austin residents (Barton, 1993: 22).

Linkages with other municipal agencies also helped to coordinate quality of life and law enforcement activities. Linkages with city agencies enabled community policing officers in Spokane to take action against conditions in the neighborhood that contributed to its deterioration. Community policing officers surveyed the neighborhoods for boarded-up buildings that might invite exploration by children and accommodate transients, areas in need of sidewalks, and streets and alleys in need of repair (Giacomazzi et al., 1993: 98). This information was forwarded to the appropriate city agency, and requests for services were tracked over time to verify that improvements occurred. Similarly in Brooklyn, New York, and Baltimore, Maryland, community policing officers worked closely with city sanitation departments to remove abandoned and derelict vehicles (Pate, 1994: 405) and to seal empty buildings (Skogan, 1994: 169).

Internal coordination is not limited to tightening the exchanges among agencies in a neighborhood. In Seattle, the initial impetus of community policing came from a particular set of neighborhoods through an organization dominated by their business elite. Process evaluation data indicate that the police were instrumental in community unification by insisting that the original business group seek minority resident members. The business group responded with a suc-

cessful, more inclusive membership drive (Fleissner et al., 1991).

There is evidence from other community policing efforts that coordination has not always worked so well. Some departments have expended tremendous energy and thought in attempts to implement new policing strategies in controlled neighborhoods. Studies of a few of these (Newark, New Jersey, Houston, Texas, and Minneapolis, Minnesota) suggest that these programs were more likely to involve middle-class residents than the poor and sometimes created dissension within the neighborhood (Sherman, 1986; Skogan, 1990). In Seattle and elsewhere, police pressures on other city agencies, on behalf of the neighborhood, resulted in resentment from the other agencies and concerns that some neighborhoods would receive special treatment.

External linkages

The external linkage most likely to be affected in policing efforts is between the neighborhood and the police department itself. However, the level and effects of that linkage may vary considerably. The literature indicates that the process of involving the police in neighborhood organizing is limited, superficial, and in numerous instances, demoralizing for both the police and citizens.

Goldstein (1987: 24–25) suggested that involvement could range from citizens serving as eyes and ears for the police, through citizens providing consultation and advice, to active citizen participation in determining how the people are to be policed. This potential range appears to be truncated in practice to the lower end of the continuum, with a few notable exceptions, such as Seattle (Fleissner et al., 1991). Buerger (1994: 416) indicates that even when citizens expend considerable energy, their involvement is limited to meeting traditional police objectives.

A recent examination of community policing in Richmond, Virginia, where there is apparently greater concern on the part of the department than in many other cities for changing the police-neighborhood linkage, still concluded that officers “who embraced community policing responded, not as delegates of the community, but more like trustees of the neighborhood welfare” determined by their own standards (Worden et al., 1994: 556–557).

A number of studies have found that, despite rhetoric about greater community responsiveness by departments, police are often resistant to stronger connections with neighborhoods. They have understandable concerns about losing control of internal resource allocation decisions and trepidation that uninformed and overzealous community groups will demand behavior from the police that is unconstitutional. But departments may hide behind such excuses rather than seek greater linkage. In several accounts, the police were prodded to respond only when the neighborhood group threatened to embarrass the police in the media (Fleissner et al., 1991; Weingart et al., 1994).

Despite these problems, there are instances of increased linkage and increased resources in both directions. For example, the police may provide resources for local neighborhood organizations. In Newark, community policing officers made their storefront substation available to neighborhood block organizations for meetings. Neighborhood meetings at the storefront gave community policing officers an opportunity to interface with neighborhood groups. (Pate et al., 1986: 7) In Portland, Oregon, the chief of police reported that selecting the site for a new precinct station included neighborhood involvement in choosing the site and in designing the structure to include space for new neighborhood businesses.

In return, neighborhoods have the potential to generate new resources for the police, such as in residential tax increases earmarked for the police. In Flint, Michigan, for example, the success of the neighborhood foot patrol prompted residents to approve a special tax to continue the foot patrols at the expiration of the community policing experiment. The citizens were not prepared at that time to end what they viewed as a successful crime prevention program (Trojanowicz, 1986: 174).

Limits on exchange value

Policing initiatives may have small but direct and important effects on limiting profit maximization and inserting use value in the use of space. In Seattle and elsewhere, civil abatement programs involving the police and neighborhood organizations have placed pressure on landlords who were careless in tenant selection or oblivious to drug dealing on their properties. Direct assault on illegal profit taking is also

important. Citizen groups, especially those with police support, have been successful in disrupting and closing drug markets (Weingart et al., 1994).

Self-correcting process evaluation

An example of how to increase the self-reflective quality of neighborhood organizations can be seen in the community policing program undertaken in Flint, Michigan, Fairfax, Virginia, and Fort Worth, Texas. In Flint, community policing officers were expected to encourage citizens to work together in neighborhood associations or citizens' watch groups for their mutual support and protection (Trojanowicz, 1986: 160). A more hands-on organizing approach by community policing officers occurred in Fairfax and Fort Worth.

In Fairfax, community policing officers held regular meetings with core residents of the Stonegate housing community. These residents were viewed as having some degree of social influence. At these meetings, they were given an opportunity to express what they believed to be the most pressing issues in the housing community. After a number of meetings, the community policing officers helped to organize residents into an informal tenants' association. This group was then encouraged to solicit the support of other residents in addressing neighborhood problems (Baranyk, 1994: 31–32).

Similarly, in the Fort Worth neighborhood crime watch groups and citizens' patrol project, a process goal was to simulate a small-town feel and involvement of community residents by making information available to organized blocks and neighborhoods as events occurred. It was believed that this would enable residents to participate more fully in their own protection and security (Givens, 1993: 9).

In general, however, police organizations are themselves poorly equipped to deal with organizational health and renewal (Bayley, 1994; Couper and Lobitz, 1991; Wycoff and Skogan, 1993), and their members are poorly trained to instill self-corrective processes in neighborhood organizations. They are likely to provide more attention to the crime and disorder objectives faced at the moment than to whether the means of reaching these objectives also builds a sustainable neighborhood organization. Not only are the police underconcerned with important morale, belonging, and satisfaction issues, but they also may demand

that neighborhood organizations adhere to stifling bureaucratic procedures (Hope, 1995: 47–48; Grinc, 1994: 442).

Autonomy

Consistent with the general theory of neighborhood organizing about noncrime issues (Bursik and Grasmick, 1993: 150), there is some evidence that attempts to increase involvement of citizens in community policing is far more superficial and has more negative consequences for neighborhood autonomy when the initiative is undertaken by the police department rather than by the neighborhood (Grinc, 1994: 445–451). Police attempts to initiate contact are often limited to information dissemination sessions about the proposed (and preplanned) program, during which the police misinterpret large audiences as increased citizen participation (Grinc, 1994: 451). The most thorough account of citizen-initiated community policing (Fleissner et al., 1991) suggests that citizen involvement is more multidimensional and includes more mutual decisionmaking when the citizens are pulling rather than the police pushing.

The police, like any other agency of the state, have considerable control over one nonfinancial resource critical to neighborhood organizations: the ability to take them seriously. These organizations become constituencies for the police only if they are taken seriously. Signs of constituency status include the department granting access to senior officials, departmental willingness to share decisionmaking, and departmental efforts in providing information (Duffee, 1984; Fleissner et al., 1991: 15; and Weingart et al., 1994: 14). Granting such access enhances the autonomy of the neighborhood group because its influence is increased.

Increasing the autonomy of neighborhood groups does not necessarily reduce the autonomy and influence of the police organization. Indeed, some reports suggest it may increase it (Fleissner et al., 1991: 70–80). When the autonomy of the neighborhood is enhanced, neighborhood groups engage in partnership roles, and residents may have greater access to the media, legislators, and public and private businesses. In Seattle, the partnership established between the police and the South Seattle Crime Prevention Council (SSCPC) not only helped decentralize the Seattle Police Department (giving the South Precinct more control over its activities)

but also provided the department with additional clout to influence crime legislation and the municipal budget (Fleissner et al., 1991: 96). Consequently, autonomy for neighborhoods may increase police influence over other central actors who are sympathetic to the neighborhood rather than to the police.

Shared culture

By recognizing the cultural and environmental uniqueness of the neighborhoods they work in, community policing officers help to establish a shared identity that can in turn facilitate the development of shared goals and objectives. In Austin, the environment provided a quality of life that is viewed by its residents as their most precious resource. This shared view of Austin facilitates citizens' involvement in preserving their neighborhoods. The citizens in Austin vigorously defend any intrusion on the quality of the environment and on the safety and security of their neighborhoods (Barton, 1993: 21). Recognizing these sentiments, the community policing effort in Austin is attempting to utilize them to maintain the quality of life.

Dialogue

Establishing mutually beneficial communication between residents and the police is one of the primary goals of community policing. Information received from police can help neighborhood residents best utilize their local resources to assist in crime prevention activities. Information received from residents can help the police target problems that are of the greatest concern to neighborhood residents. In addition, information from residents helps police identify individuals or groups engaged in criminal activity.

The quality of dialogue between neighborhood residents and police departments about community policing may become an issue before the initiation of a new strategy in a neighborhood or during its implementation. In the planning stages, the issue is whether the residents have influence in the design of the effort. During implementation, the issue becomes the level of ongoing participation in policing decisions. Do the police welcome only eyes-and-ears information, or are they prepared to engage in two-way communication about problem solving and evaluation?

Examples of communication between the neighborhood and the police prior to implementation are found

in Seattle, Washington, Madison, Wisconsin, and Flint, Michigan. In Seattle, for example, prior to implementing community policing, members of SSCPC and the precinct commanders from the South Precinct met regularly to discuss ways to improve police services (Fleissner et al., 1991: 61). These meetings eventually built trust and cooperation among the police and members of SSCPC. Police discussions with residents included sharing information that was traditionally viewed as sensitive and highly confidential.

In Madison, neighborhood residents and the Madison police department had a 15-year history of negotiations and discussions about ways to improve policing. Madison residents have always been concerned with quality of life issues (Couper and Lobitz, 1991: 86). Immediately preceding the implementation of community policing in Madison, community meetings were set up to give residents some input into identifying and prioritizing neighborhood problems (Couper and Lobitz, 1991: 86). However, in the implementation of the experimental police district, dialogue did not seem to carry over to implementation. Police reported too little time to engage in problem solving, and the police tended to engage the community as individual customers rather than as organized neighborhoods (Wycoff and Skogan, 1993).

In Flint, many efforts were made by the police department to avoid imposing a program on the population (Trojanowicz, 1986: 160). Citywide meetings were held for 2 years prior to the start of the program. The goal was to solicit the neighborhoods' views on how the program should function and to keep neighbors informed on the program's progress.

A more frequent approach is reported in Lawrence, Massachusetts. Discussions primarily focused on information provided by neighborhood residents on the criminal activities of specific individuals or groups. The newly created citizen advisory committee was ostensibly designed by developers of the community policing project in Lawrence to provide residents with a forum to communicate their concerns with the community policing officers. Instead, its role was limited to providing the police of Lawrence with information on criminal activities in the area. Members of the advisory committee essentially functioned as the eyes and ears of the Lawrence police department (Bazemore and Cole, 1994: 132).

In contrast, the most successful case in maintaining real dialogue appears to be Seattle. There, neighborhood committees have been organized throughout the city, supported by tax dollars, with the expectation that citizen groups will engage actively in target selection, tactical choices, and evaluation of control efforts (National Institute of Justice [NIJ], 1992). This kind of organization was not developed without conflict. The project's evaluators ask whether both the police and community groups are prone to interpret conflict as lack of community and to give up on dialogue rather than engage in conflict resolution. Neither community participants nor the police may be well equipped with sufficient time, knowledge about structural sources of conflict, or skills in conflict resolution, to remain committed once conflict is heard (Fleissner et al., 1991).

In summary, there are numerous anecdotal accounts suggesting both positive and negative impacts of community policing efforts on internal coordination, external linkages, limits on exchange value, self-corrective process evaluation, autonomy, shared culture, and dialogue. Since no existing accounts of community policing conceptualize these impacts on specific dimensions of community, it is impossible to tell how multidimensional any one implementation effort is or to compare one city to another on common dimensions with a uniform measure. Moreover, we cannot assess whether the positive impacts on neighborhood sustainability variables are more frequent than the negative impacts. The process evaluations, however, do provide strong evidence that the implementation of community policing can be conceptualized as a complex process in which police and neighborhoods interact along all seven of these dimensions.

Prospects and strategies for sustaining constituency

The police must provide services, enforce the law, and control, if not reduce, disorder regardless of the direction in which a neighborhood is moving and of whether the policing efforts are complemented by other efforts to strengthen community or operate in isolation from other urban policies and practices. One of the most critical problems, then, in any attempt to alter police strategy, is that the police do not control all the elements crucial to the success of a strategy

and must proceed despite counterproductive trends among the elements they do not control. The police may be sincere in efforts to improve community but find little community with which to work.

Despite this difficulty, cynicism about the potential for reinvention of policing and significant increases in police effectiveness are mistaken. The conclusion that nothing works is itself an action prescription—to leave the desperate to their own devices much to the benefit of the winners of the urban struggle. The examination of the variables that renew and sustain neighborhoods indicates that urban improvements are possible, if difficult. The review of police effects on those same neighborhood variables suggests that all of them can be increased or improved through police action. But the same review indicates that most policing programs involving community often ignore whether the neighborhood is restructured. On occasion, there are negative rather than positive effects on these variables.

How community policing will fare as a strategy will ultimately depend on whether neighborhoods improve rather than on whether the police perform well. Therefore, the police must become more cognizant of these neighborhood characteristics, on the trends among them across and within neighborhoods, and on the most effective time to deploy one policing strategy or another in each neighborhood, contingent on the developmental position of each locality. One size will not fit all.

Because of the typical dynamic of the urban struggle and the fact that the police department is a part of that struggle, affected by the same forces as other units of the city, the police will covertly and explicitly be pressured to be more concerned with some neighborhood characteristics than others. The growth machine and the professional law enforcement bureaucracy that developed as part of growth politics will both benefit from particular values on these variables. For example, they would prefer that:

- Internal coordination be incomplete and limited to improving informal coordination among neighbors, rather than also coordinating public and private agencies and policies. Too much attention to policy coordination could demonstrate that many urban policies do not benefit neighborhoods, especially poor neighborhoods. Attention to any policies other

than law enforcement itself will be criticized as nonprofessional.

- External linkages be limited—the police should concentrate on police-neighborhood relationships. Linkages among neighborhoods will be seen as politically threatening to the power of downtown corporate interests and to the control by central offices of State agencies.
- There be no limits on exchange value and no threats to competitive claims on urban space that would limit extracting value from it. Economic policies that are responsive to neighborhood effects of economic decisions will be criticized as bad for growth. Police concern for quality of life in neighborhoods will be criticized as social work.
- Self-corrective process evaluations be limited. Crime control should focus on immediate crime and disorder objectives. Neighborhood groups should not become more conscious of the relationship of neighborhood politics and crime. Neighborhood organization, sustained beyond its crime control rationale, may become politically active and critical of centralized power and resources.
- Autonomy be kept on the lower end of the spectrum. Control efforts should be organized for the convenience of the experts in central administrations. Greater services for neighborhoods may be begrudgingly granted, but greater influence of neighborhoods over the defining of service will be resisted. No other dimension of city life is more threatening to bureaucracy than autonomy of constituency groups in neighborhoods.
- Shared culture be the focus of neighborhood improvement. The growth machine and professional law enforcement will stress the culture-based solution to crime and disorder, since it is consistent with the notion that neighborhoods cause their own problems. Political or economic steps, which alter external linkages and autonomy, to facilitate and nurture shared culture will be resisted.
- Dialogue be limited. Central powers should plan and neighborhoods should accept the well-crafted ideas of planners. A dialogue that requires interactive and responsive policing will be resisted as too cumbersome and expensive. Dialogue that includes venting of frustration and anger will be used as

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evidence that the community is deteriorating, not improving.

The current evaluations of community policing implementations suggest that these kinds of limiting effects on neighborhood sustainability are not only possible but common. However, there is also evidence that, in some neighborhoods, development of partnerships between the police and neighborhood groups is also possible. When partnership is actively sought, there would appear to be more conscious attention paid to these positive variables and more conscious attempts to increase them. In this case, the values preferred are that:

- Police interact with other city agencies and the private sector to promote holistic attention to life in a neighborhood. There is evidence that the police can occasionally provide encouragement for residents in neighborhoods to be more inclusive themselves and to form organizations that represent most neighborhood interests.
- Neighborhoods should be linked to share common concerns and problem strategies and should have greater access to a variety of State services.
- Quality of life in neighborhoods may need to include setting limits on the exchange value that space might represent to individuals. Not all negative effects of growth can be externalized and paid for by resident bystanders or by the State.
- The self-correcting evaluation capacity of neighborhood organization should be improved. Partnership includes concern not only for what was done but how it was done: Did the neighborhood learn from this project how to solve other problems? Did neighbors become more committed through participation? Did they end up angry and exhausted?
- Autonomy of neighborhoods should be increased, and the quality of State services should be judged by neighborhoods, not the bureaucracy. Increased autonomy for neighborhoods can actually enhance the ability of State officials to do their work.
- Shared culture is necessary but not sufficient. Opportunities for shared culture should be identified in all neighborhood undertakings; processes for achieving specific objectives (such as crime or disorder control) must also include time for social

rewards and celebration of belonging to a place. Culture without restructuring is fragile.

- Dialogue must be pursued, even if less time-consuming means of dealing with particular issues appear to be available. Improved external linkages without dialogue decrease chances for autonomy. Internal coordination without dialogue reduces chances of shared culture.

The prospects for achieving the higher rather than the lower values on these variables are not good, but they are not bleak. To take community seriously and to take steps to empower neighborhoods represent commitments and actions that are contrary to 50 years of urban politics and policing tradition. But history does not write the future.

Police departments can take some independent steps to enhance sustainability, but they cannot do very much on their own. They also need to encourage independent action by other components of the State, by the private sector, and, very importantly, by neighborhoods. If neighborhood sustainability is left to the police, it will not endure.

Some research, planning, and policing strategies may increase the chances for increasing rather than decreasing the values of these variables.

First, a serious, sustained effort is necessary to obtain reasonably valid, reliable, and feasible measures of these neighborhood characteristics. While interest in the measurement of neighborhood indicators and police investment in gathering nonarrest data have increased, it would appear that greater attention is still given to police-relevant outcomes (fear, disorder, crime) than to measures of how the police, or the neighborhood with the police, achieved or failed to achieve those outcomes. Investment in measuring structures and processes will be important for outcome precision to have any strategic meaning.

If measures for these neighborhood variables can be developed, then it is critical to also develop an assessment of their prevalence in policing programs. As policing evaluations stand now, it is possible to find illustrations of police effects on these variables, but it is impossible to gauge prevalence. Left to their own devices, the police are less likely to be concerned about these neighborhood effects than the neighborhoods themselves. Empowering neighborhood organi-

zations to employ measurements of neighborhood effects from policing and other urban programs is more likely to institutionalize commitments to these neighborhood qualities where they matter most, in the neighborhoods themselves.

Since the police, like any other agency of the State, have jurisdiction over many neighborhoods that will differ considerably on these variables, the chief police executive will be faced with constant pressures to “do something now,” even though what can and should realistically be done will vary from neighborhood to neighborhood. The tendencies among police agencies will be to adopt programs jurisdictionwide despite the varying qualities of neighborhoods or to target neighborhoods most in need, as defined by the department. Both tendencies pressure police to predetermine how to interact with a neighborhood and, only after services are planned, to disseminate the plan to the locality. These approaches have rarely worked in the past, but they relieve the pressure to do something and failures can be blamed on specific neighborhoods. If the police recognized the multidimensional character of neighborhood-building processes and could measure these dimensions, they could use these data in deciding which neighborhoods were ready for what and in explaining those choices.

The data on police-neighborhood interaction, while presently sketchy, suggest that the police cannot build neighborhood constituency but can take constituency behavior seriously when it occurs. If the police want to take neighborhoods seriously, they can include a means to scan the neighborhoods continuously for trends in sustainability, and they can be ready to respond when invited. A neighborhood’s attempts to influence policing should be read as one indicator of readiness for partnership, even, or perhaps particularly, when those influence attempts include criticism, however rancorous.

Finally, the review of the research on the urban context of community policing suggests that the police, as a city agency, will be affected by many of the same forces in the urban struggle that affect urban neighborhoods. An important task in community policing research would be the construction of a theory about how the political economy of cities affects the form and substance of community policing. In this concluding section, we have sketched in broad strokes two different scenarios: one where the growth machine is strong and police are likely to give superficial atten-

tion to neighborhoods and to stress the causes of crime and disorder that arise from within the neighborhood, and another where the growth machine is weaker or has been replaced by a quality of life regime and the police are more likely to treat neighborhoods as important political constituencies that have influence over city policies and reshape urban services. Clearly, the variations in community policing are much finer and more complex than this sketch can capture. But if we can specify more systematically how police interact with neighborhoods, then we can also begin to examine the urban forces that affect the quality of that interaction. Only at that point can we begin to sort out the noise from the melody in the huge variety of sounds that are now considered community policing.

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Community Policing: What Is the Community and What Can It Do?

Warren Friedman and Michael Clark

Even perfect partnerships between the community and police are only part of the answer to the crime that haunts many of America's neighborhoods. Nevertheless, belief in the power of collaboration is more than just an article of faith. Over the past decade, it has become clear that urban communities can and will mobilize against crime and drugs. Despite decades of serious tensions and hostility between police and residents in many neighborhoods, serious effort can forge bonds of cooperation, mutual respect, and trust even in the most crime-ridden communities.

Progress, however, has not been even. Hostility between communities and law enforcement continues in many areas. Many cities have failed to join the movement toward improved police-community cooperation, while others appear to have only adopted the rhetoric of community policing as a way of accessing Federal funds.

At the same time, hundreds of urban neighborhoods have organized fresh anticrime efforts and discovered new, more effective ways of working with local law enforcement. Many police and prosecutors who are responsible for these neighborhoods have adopted more results- and community-oriented ways of tackling such tough crime problems as open-air drug trafficking and gang violence. In the best of cases, these efforts have led to community-police collaboration that has permanently closed crack houses, eliminated drug markets, and sustained long-term reductions in violent crime levels.

Today, it is broadly accepted that, working together, community, police, and other institutions can reduce neighborhood crime. There is widespread acceptance—and even praise—of community-police collaboration. This is clear from the lists of reasons provided by scholars, elected officials, and police chiefs for the recent declines in most crime categories. Along with changing demographics and stabilized crack markets, almost everybody's list mentions smarter policing and the role of the community.

Nevertheless, progress in forging police-community collaboration remains fragile and reversible. There is little agreement about exactly what community policing is or what should be expected of it. Nor is there consensus about what the community is or what can be expected of it. Little wonder, then, that there is confusion about why and how progress has been achieved.

Expectations

In cities where community policing has been aggressively pursued, community expectations of police have shifted over the past decade. In the early 1980s, it is fair to say, one of two attitudes prevailed among many urban residents, especially community leaders. Many had come to see local crime and disorder as products of large forces beyond the reach of local law enforcement. Coupled with tensions and mistrust left over from the 1960s and 1970s, city residents often were grateful if local police simply did not make things worse. On the other hand, many saw public safety as the job of the police alone. "We pay taxes, we pay their wages, let them do it," were refrains in many communities that focused narrowly on government accountability. In either case, "partnership" and "collaborative problem solving" were not the slogans of the day.

Today, much grassroots activity still remains based on outmoded, incident-driven strategies. In most American communities, ordinary citizens report crime and act as witnesses, but they play little further visible part in preventing or reducing crime. These roles as "eyes and ears" of the police are not insignificant. But in some communities, grassroots activity has been far more proactive, creative, and courageous.

The existence of active community anticrime work—often, but not always, undertaken in sync with so-called community policing—is a reality check on the common charge of community apathy in America.

The best of this work challenges the common casting of the police as the sole agent of positive change. Throughout the United States, community anticrime efforts serve as a source of information about what most concerns a community: what kinds of roles the community has and will continue to choose for itself, and who must be negotiated with if policing is to have a progressive future.

In cities where it has been enthusiastically marketed, community policing has led to a shift in attitudes and rising expectations. Urban residents in many cities today expect the police to be visibly present on their streets, problem oriented (that is, to try to eliminate crime problems, not just respond to complaints and make arrests), available for and interested in working with local residents as partners, accountable through periodic updates for what is being done to solve problems, and concerned with the prevention of crime.

In well-informed and well-organized communities, police departments are increasingly expected to understand the community as a partner, prepare department personnel for their part in the partnership process, and support officers in the process. Veteran community organizations expect the police to know them and understand that they have the capacity to solve crimes and other problems. Vacant lots can be cleaned up, housing problems addressed, young people reached, services provided, serious criminal activity checked, and opportunities expanded through organized community efforts.

Veteran community organizations, many of whom have years of experience in anticrime work, have begun to recognize and demand significant departmental commitment to community policing, including: (1) a focus on serious crime-solving results, (2) periodic, practical training for police officers, (3) support for the training of community leaders, (4) a focus on behavior change and measurable results, (5) involvement of the community at the most decentralized level, (6) outspoken policy support from departmental leaders and the city administration, and (7) a voice in policies that set the department's direction so that community policing evolves to match the needs of neighborhoods.

Community roles

The literature, promotional materials, and discussions of community policing are full of phrases like “problem-solving partnerships,” “coproduction of safety,” “working together,” and “democracy in action.” But, despite the rhetoric, members of the community remain generally cast in relatively passive roles as “eyes and ears” of the police, reactive sources of information about crime. They are still primarily viewed as potential witnesses, much as they were under traditional policing. Partnerships are too often operationally defined as a few people chosen by police officials to sit around a table and advise, usually those who have the time and inclination and with whom a department is comfortable. The division of labor in the relationship often assigns crimefighting to the police and neighborhood cleanup to the community.

A great deal of potential progress is lost in this minimal view of the community role in anticrime work. Police officials and criminal justice researchers seem to have little sense of community traditions of self-help and mobilization as they relate to community policing. This passive view of citizens ignores widespread examples throughout the country—and throughout American history—of people taking responsibility and launching their own efforts against crime. In fact, during the 1980s and 1990s in urban America, side by side with the development of new problem-solving methodologies by law enforcement and new theories of community policing, there has arisen a deeper and broader grassroots tradition of active community anticrime work.

Yet, the new community sophistication and activism regarding crime is in danger of disappearing. Most of the dialogue on public safety continues to be carried on without the actors and initiators of this activity, those who are most knowledgeable about communities—community leaders, professional organizers, and ordinary neighborhood activists. As a result, practitioners on both sides of the potential partnership continue to have an unclear view of community-police collaboration as a strategy or of its particular targets, strengths, and weaknesses.

The danger is that victories that are not understood are unlikely to be replicated. Today, when urban police and community residents team up to solve serious neighborhood crime problems, the history of those

victories is too often misunderstood. As a result, those who care deeply about making inner cities safer usually do not fully understand the success stories or know how to repeat them.

When neighborhood residents and police work together successfully to resolve a high-priority crime problem, a variety of explanations are offered publicly, usually by a law enforcement spokesperson:

- **The “officer friendly” explanation.** The police are getting more sensitive to the feelings of the community. Since they are friendlier, people trust them and will work with them. Police officers smiling, attending church breakfasts, helping kids or the elderly, and attending large numbers of community meetings are generally cited as evidence of progress. The underlying logic is: When community residents trust the police more, residents will support them, acting as good witnesses individually or occasionally playing an organized eyes-and-ears role regarding a specific crime. The police can then do their job better.

This explanation confuses community policing (police and community working together to reduce crime) with community relations (police better communicating what they do to improve public opinion and support). It also fails to recognize that, over time, trust in the police is usually an outcome of reducing crime and increasing genuine collaboration rather than public relations gimmicks.

- **The “more is better” explanation.** There are more police, or they are smarter and better equipped. New technology, new enforcement tactics, new management strategies, and additional or reinforced personnel are the sole reasons for success. Although police organization and management certainly matter, such explanations unfortunately evoke the image of the cavalry riding to the rescue, whether the cavalry is new managers, new officers, new computers, or new management approaches. This explanation focuses exclusively on the “better policing” side of the equation, ignoring new resources, strategies, and tactics brought to the table by organized communities.
- **The “beat cop is back” explanation.** The spread of new police-community collaboration in hundreds of urban neighborhoods is nothing more than a return to older traditions in policing. According

to this explanation, before the mid-20th century, one cop walked (or cycled or motor scootered or rode) around a fairly small geographic neighborhood on a regular beat until everyone on the beat knew and respected him. (It was almost always “him.”) “My granddad did community policing,” can frequently be heard from adherents of this view.

All these explanations, while containing some truth, are misleading in their exclusive focus on new styles of policing. Sadly, little systematic analysis has been devoted to digesting the significance of new styles of community action and organization or new forms of police-community collaboration, which together constitute the “other half” of community policing success stories.

Occasional triumphs, therefore, are not turned into conditions for sustained, citywide collaboration. Few know how to create community policing departments in which partnership with the community is routine.

Community policing

Community policing is more than a collection of tactics, more than storefront offices, more than officers on beats or on bikes, more than friendly relations between police and residents. On the other hand, community policing is not a general method for improving the quality of life. It is something more than the sum of these tactics and something less than community development. It is, as we see it, a specific strategy for fighting crime based on a working relationship between the community and the police. The purpose of the work, in which each has an active role, is to improve the quality of life by reducing crime, disorder, and fear.

One of the precepts that should guide police work is to do things in such a way that the community does for itself as much as possible—that it develops the habits and skills of doing. At the community level, this requires that police see their work in a longer term context, that they enter into the relationship understanding and supporting the goal of developing capable communities. It means less doing *for* and more doing *with*. This does not assign the task of organizing communities or community capacity building to the police; that is work for local leaders and community organizers. But it does ask for police support of such capacity building.

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The hope is that the partners will work together to prevent some future crimes and help build a more cohesive community. But without clarity about goals and mutual expectations, there will be no sustained partnerships that can generate healthier, revitalized communities.

Identifying partners in community policing

Much time is spent attempting to define the “community.” People mean many things when they use the word. “Community” is used to describe not only specific geographic areas containing residents who live, work, and socialize together but also entire ethnic or national groups (such as the Jewish community or the African-American community), groups with common interests across vast geographic areas (such as the user communities of the Internet or the artistic community), and even the entire planet (the global community).

The civilian, nongovernmental partner for the police will be one group, for instance, in the case of hate crimes against members of a group that are geographically dispersed. It will mean another group when the people are direct or indirect victims of crimes by virtue of where they live.

The job is to identify the most productive partner for the problems. Pattern analysis studies in Minneapolis, New York, and elsewhere confirm what patrol officers and community residents know firsthand. Problems are not evenly or randomly distributed across communities. There are locations known as hot spots where problems concentrate that account for a disproportionate amount of a neighborhood’s crime and disorder.

Both *crime* and *disorder* are important. Kelling and Wilson’s classic treatise, “Broken Windows,”¹ underscores the point that visible and disruptive signs of disorder are symbolically important to communities and may be viewed as bellwethers of how seriously a community cares about crime. (See “Urban Residents Rank Crime Problems.”)

But few communities will mobilize for long or pay sustained attention even to serious crimes involving violence or serious property loss if the crimes seem more or less randomly distributed and do not threaten community life. The reality of crime’s geographical distribution provides a critical first step in answering

who, in the context of community policing, the appropriate community partners should be.

A chronic, visible problem sets the stage for community organizing. It convinces people that it will not just go away. It often leads to frustration, anger, fear, and impulses to flee or fight. These are the conditions that can lead neighbors to get organized, to conclude that “something has to be done.” But a problem’s persistence only provides one of the necessary conditions for organizing. The impulse to flee must, if possible, be redirected. The impulse to fight must be mobilized.

The bulk of urban community anticrime efforts occurs in relatively small geographic areas within the larger city at the level of individual neighborhoods or even single blocks or buildings. These are places where participants share some common identity or common problems distinct from others in the city and where they engage in some regular activities in common. The principal actors in these efforts are those who have deep stakes in the maintenance of a neighborhood’s order and safety. Usually, they include local residents, community-based organizations, and other not-for-profit groups.

The residents and institutions based in an area differ significantly from those who travel in and out. While transients may share concerns about safety, they are generally far less willing or able to work intensively on crime problems over the long run. Residents are the actors most affected, most concerned with, and most likely to volunteer to solve problems that disrupt the neighborhood, create fear, and reduce the quality of life. They are the most likely partner in combating community-based crime.

To become effective partners, however, neighbors not only must become aware of each other’s concerns, they must also develop some mutual trust before they will undertake what may appear to be a risky project. They must develop skills at conducting meetings and recruiting neighbors. They must learn to analyze, select among, and prioritize the many problems that they might work on. They must learn how to work with each other and the police. They must develop enough trust in their allies to know they will not be abandoned. Finally, they must develop the capacity to organize from victory to victory so that the number of involved local residents increases over time.

Urban Residents Rank Crime Problems

As communities differ widely in socioeconomic status, ethnicity, level of organization, and local history, so do their crime priorities. Ultimately, this means there is no substitute for sitting down with representatives of each neighborhood to ask them about these priorities. Nevertheless, survey data and experience suggest that crime problems often are ranked by urban community residents roughly as follows: (1) serious crimes that cause community disorder—either directly (as when

streets or hallways become unusable), or indirectly by grossly escalating local fear of crime and inhibiting normal community activities (like the use of streets, parks, or playgrounds); (2) less serious crimes that cause disorder—such as widespread graffiti, street prostitution, illegal parking, misuse of parks and other public spaces, loitering, and vandalism; and (3) isolated crimes that do not appear to persist over time.

Even when well organized, however, most community residents will need to learn the basic elements involved in tackling crime problems safely, effectively, and in collaboration with law enforcement. How do you report crimes confidentially and without exposing yourself or neighbors to unnecessary risks? How do you reach out to, and work closely with, local police and prosecutors against serious crime conditions? How do you organize from victory to victory so that the number of involved local residents (and your strength) increases over time? How do you use your neighborhood's own unique resources?

Creating successful partnerships with organizations

Organized people are more likely to safely and simultaneously implement a variety of crime-reduction activities like civilian patrols, community rallies, marches, positive loitering, and other forms of direct action, as well as civil and criminal legal strategies, court monitoring, and legislative actions. (See “What Can the Community Do?”)

Organizations are more capable of focusing on problems that affect a large number of people in the community. They are better able to get the attention of agencies and institutions important in a coordinated process of solving a community problem. Organized groups have greater staying power than individuals.

It is important, however, to understand that not all kinds of community-based organizations are equally effective as partners. Critical to having an impact on locations with chronic crime is an organization that

has a collective problem-solving perspective and a commitment to reach out to and involve neighborhood residents. The organization can be a block club, community organization, church committee, school or youth group, or social service agency. The organization can be formal or informal, have a big budget or no budget, or have a staff or be totally volunteer.

An agency that looks at people in the neighborhood only as individual clients or consumers is likely to have difficulties reaching out to significant numbers of people and coordinating and sustaining their efforts. On the other hand, purely volunteer organizations often have trouble maintaining ongoing activity over the long term without support from staffed organizations. Block clubs, for instance, are more effective if they have the support of umbrella organizations. In the most strongly organized neighborhoods, block or building organizations are linked with larger neighborhood or civic organizations.

Communities with weak organizations, no organizations, or organizations that serve only individual clients—especially those communities that face serious crime—should not be ignored or abandoned to traditional reactive policing just because they do not make the most effective partners for police. They need to be brought to the point that they will make effective partners. They need to be organized. But this is not a job for the police. It is a task for local leaders, assisted where possible by professional community organizers who know about crime, the police, and community policing. These organizers need to know how to involve residents in collaboration to develop neighborhood leadership, establish organizations, and design actions to solve community problems.²

What Can the Community Do?

- **Identify, analyze, and solve problems.** An informed, organized, and involved community can work with police to identify, analyze, and implement solutions to community problems. As Herman Goldstein has written, “A strong commitment to consulting with the affected community is inherent in problem-oriented policing.”* Citizens not only have unique knowledge of their own community but also may have skills and contacts that facilitate problem solving.
- **Mobilize the community.** Members of the community are best positioned to organize their neighbors to safely combat crime and related problems. Groups often get started through neighborhood meetings, rallies, and recreational events. Door-to-door surveys serve as both information-gathering and community outreach efforts. Community organizations, by their very nature as continuing organizations with rosters of members and regular meetings, can help sustain community involvement in community policing over time.
- **Share information with police.** Citizens often help by gathering information. Community organizations can organize community meetings on how to safely provide police with useful information (license plate numbers, detailed descriptions, brand names of street drugs, and code signals used to alert drug dealers of police presence). Standard forms for recording information can also be distributed.
- **Deny criminals access to space.** No matter how dedicated community policing officers are, they cannot be everywhere all the time. Community organizations can help by conducting antidrug patrols and initiating block watches in neighborhoods, in apartment buildings, and along school routes.
- **Influence city agencies.** A group of organized citizens are much more likely than individual citizens or police officers to get a response from city agencies. Community organizations can request meetings with mayors or city council members to support effective community policing practices, adequate street lighting, towing of abandoned cars, and additional social services in their neighborhoods.
- **Educate the media.** Neighborhood groups are well positioned to provide information to the media about crime and disorder problems and the effectiveness of problem-solving and community policing approaches. Leaders of neighborhood and citywide community organizations can write letters to the editor, appear on local radio or TV shows, and organize press conferences.
- **Take legal action.** Citizens can pressure landlords to evict drug dealers and maintain and improve building security by improving lighting, door locks, intercoms, and roof doors. Legal actions can be taken, in concert with local officials, to close down bars or other establishments that tolerate illegal activities. Civil actions can be used in lieu of, or to complement, criminal proceedings.
- **Monitor court actions.** After arrests in the neighborhood, community members can monitor and track the progress of cases and encourage prosecutors to seek and judges to give appropriate sentences. Neighborhood organizations can also encourage prosecutors’ offices to develop drug courts, community courts, and alternative sentencing programs.
- **Develop prevention and treatment programs.** Community groups can draw on private and public resources as well as their own “people power” to establish youth centers; mentoring, tutoring, or parenting projects; and Alcoholics Anonymous, Narcotics Anonymous, or other substance abuse prevention or treatment programs for neighborhood residents.
- **Partner with neighborhood-based institutions.** Churches, synagogues, mosques, and temples as well as private businesses and schools can be recruited to help combat crime and recruit volunteers for community-based programs.
- **Rebuild social cohesion.** Community organizations, through their neighborhood activities, can help communities rebuild social control and increase citizen accountability for the actions of residents and their children.
- **Create a constituency for community policing.** Independently organized communities, partnering with police and other agencies, not only help prevent and control crime in particular neighborhoods, but also collectively build and sustain a jurisdiction’s long-term commitment to community policing.

* Goldstein, Herman, *Problem-Oriented Policing*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1990.

The Chicago example

Partnership requires the development and implementation of coordinated activities. This requires meetings, the collection and sharing of information, planning, and exchanges about the effectiveness of implementation. Police and community must regularly report to each other. Of course, anticrime activity goes on in every community without involving any police time. But true problem-solving partnerships cannot develop without regular exchanges and some meetings.

The importance of an organized and trained community and the potential for a wide and effective impact in creating safer neighborhoods is clearly illustrated by the experience in Chicago. Responding to community pressure and police support, the city invested several million dollars in citywide training of the community for its role. The Joint Community Police Training Project (JCPT), which trained nearly 12,000 people, was run by a community-based organization, the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety (CANS). Twenty-five outreach organizers spent more than a month in each police beat (average population 10,000 residents) knocking on doors; making presentations to block, church, school, and other community groups; and inviting them to training sessions and further involvement.

The orientation on Chicago's version of community policing and on problem solving was delivered to people invited by the outreach workers. A team of community and police trainers working with the organizers then spent weeks supporting residents in actual problem solving.

Evaluators of Chicago's policing strategy and training point out that "People have turned out by the tens of thousands to get involved in training, participate in beat community meetings [with police], and take responsibility for neighborhood problem solving."³

The evaluators also found that the likelihood of citizen participation in crime-and-disorder reduction activities is related to participation in traditional community-based organizations. Residents involved in a neighborhood's community, religious, civic, or charitable organizations, with their developed habits of participation and the organizational support for maintenance of these habits, were roughly four times more likely to attend and participate in meetings and

get involved in problem-solving activities. They participated in rallies, positive loitering, and meetings with landlords and businesspeople to make their neighborhoods safer. Those with no organizational affiliation participated in problem solving 48 percent of the time. Those who indicated affiliation with four or more organizations got involved in problem solving more than 80 percent of the time.

Those most likely to participate in the training live in high-crime neighborhoods. "In the safest fifth of the beats," the authors report, "attendance averaged 25 per 1,000 adults, while in the most unsafe fifth of beats (where the personal crime rate was five times higher) attendance averaged 53 per 1,000, more than double the lower rate." This training attracted people in high-crime, low-income, minority neighborhoods where it proved useful in improving the quality of life.

Among participants surveyed 4 months after they received training, attempts had been made to solve 63 percent of the problems they listed. To make their neighborhoods safer, 17 percent of JCPT graduates participated in positive loitering, 15 percent joined a community policing-related rally or demonstration, 41 percent met with property owners to address crime, and 25 percent met with local businesspeople to address crime. On average, 26 percent of all problems were partially or completely solved during the 4-month followup period covered by the study.

Forty-four percent of the regular beat meetings with the police were run by a resident or community organizer. Another 14 percent were run collaboratively by a community person and an officer. These community-run or collaborative meetings were more likely to prepare an agenda, call for volunteers, and distribute sign-in sheets for other activities. At these meetings, discussion was evenly divided among police and residents at 60 percent of the meetings, and civilians took on a dominant role at another 25 percent. When area residents or community organizers chaired beat meetings, police dominated crafting of solutions only 34 percent of the time. When police ran the meeting, they took the lead in proposing solutions 77 percent of the time.

Beyond solving a problem

Beyond the education and mobilization of participants for problem solving, the capacity to sustain efforts must be embodied in ongoing community-based

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organizations that do not have to be reorganized to deal with every new crisis. This is important because the critical issue for the success of community policing generally is consolidation of victories, once achieved, over time. Without consolidation, communities will permanently increase the tax burden and assign hundreds of thousands of new police officers to the streets. With consolidation, active, informed community organizations will do their part to maintain safe and livable communities.

The time horizon in thinking about community policing and problem solving must extend beyond the initial declaration of victory over a particular problem. If we want to improve the quality of life in troubled neighborhoods, sustaining solutions for months and years matters. Community-based organizations are important in solving problems, and they are critical in consolidating improvements over time.

Neighborhood safety and the quality of life are not significantly improved by suppressing a problem temporarily. Although intensive efforts can reduce a problem—e.g., community groups can apply prolonged and intense pressure on a drug house and have a dramatic impact—once an initially defined problem is solved and the situation becomes less pressing, it can become far more difficult to maintain the capacity and readiness to bring pressure on that problem if it begins to return. To go through a process that cannot secure long-term improvements will recreate the principal shortcoming of incident-driven policing: “Bust them today, and they’re back tomorrow.”

If, on the other hand, people who are affected by a chronic crime problem organize, work with the police and others to reduce the crime, and stay organized and involved after crime is reduced, they have a better chance of keeping things safer.

Building partnerships

Police and community each come to the partnership table with their own traditions and culture as well as their own myths, half-truths, and misperceptions. These play out within the context of the still-dominant model of policing that casts the community as passive and police as active. The more the process is driven by established habits, the more likely it is to bring community and police together in a face-to-face variation of a 911 call, premised on merely transferring information and delegating the responsibility for

action to police. Genuine partnership should expect to break this mold.

For most urban residents, even those who have participated in successful anticrime activities, expectations of the police are a vague and often contradictory mixture of old and new; of incident-driven, problem-oriented, and community policing; and of phrases without clear content. Even if they have followed closely in the press the advent of police reform in their city, they are likely to have read that community policing is foot patrols, motor scooters, storefront substations, nonemergency numbers, or some combination of these tactics.

Both the community and the police must learn that problem-solving partnerships are often labor intensive. But both parties should also understand that for every hour of paid police time spent on the process, dozens, sometimes many hundreds of hours of volunteer time are invested. The reward for all this effort: the greater the mutual expectation to coordinate police and community action, the more likely an active community will develop on which police can depend and in which neighbors can hold each other, as well as the police, accountable.

If community policing partnerships are to develop and succeed, police and the community also must understand the different organizational contexts within which each operates and the constraints and opportunities created by these contexts. Community and police often come to the collaboration with false expectations.

Community residents sometimes expect too much of the police: a cop on every block, rapid response to every call, intensive and exhaustive investigations of every incident, and great community relations skills. The community must learn the constraints on an officer’s time and decisionmaking latitude—that, whatever the rhetoric, when a police officer is on the job, he or she is not one of them. If they are to work together, police processes must be clear to the community. Agreements made at meetings with the community may have to be cleared with supervisors before an officer can commit to participation. Community participants must understand that, for example, their desire for support from a special unit, even with an officer’s concurrence, is no guarantee of that support.

Conversely, many police often expect too little of community residents. Police officials and representatives with low expectations of community roles in crime prevention and reduction generally base their skepticism on work with unorganized and uninformed citizens. Perhaps experience has taught them that the best that can be hoped for in such cases is an eyes-and-ears role.

Individual police officers can come to community meetings expecting too little or too much. Often impatient, under pressure from a supervisor to get back “in service” and fearful of being swallowed by the dynamics of neighborhoods and their organizations, it becomes increasingly critical for police officers to understand those dynamics and values of community organizations. Among the most cherished values and an important determinant of the dynamics in many volunteer-based community organizations is participatory decisionmaking. Especially in the case of a community’s actual and potential leaders—those who can move their neighbors into action and set the direction of that action—participation in decisionmaking is key to buying in or having a stake in the process. Having a stake is key to sustained activity. To maintain volunteer involvement, organizations need to engage people in selecting the problem they will work on, fashioning the strategy to solve it, and implementing that strategy.

This participatory nature of decisionmaking in many community organizations is foreign to police departments. It can be frustrating to professionals who have become used to a paramilitary chain of command. Yet such participation is critical to the community-police collaboration. Police must come to meetings in the community with the expectation of negotiating with volunteers with whom they hope to be involved. Resident volunteers are neither passive resources nor paid employees: It is their neighborhood, and they must live with whatever decisions are reached on a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week basis.

Often, what is uppermost for the police department does not match what concerns the community. Like the community, officers must be prepared to take as well as give leadership. They also must understand that follow-through is critical, that losing momentum loses volunteers.

In the problem-solving process, both parties can expect initial venting, passing of the buck, and defensiveness. Police may blame the courts, personnel on another shift, the command structure, or community apathy for the persistence of problems cited by the community. The community may blame the police, city services, the kids, or neighbors not getting involved. Both may blame the decay of the family, the absence of jobs, and other root causes. All these accusations may contain elements of truth, and some venting and finger pointing is inevitable. But it is critical that someone at the meeting have the skills to keep the focus on the targeted problem, and what participants will do to solve it.

Inevitably, there will be testing throughout the process. If the recruitment of neighborhood residents has been successful, it will have reached beyond those comfortable with the police. These residents will have come because they have felt the urgency of a crime problem in their neighborhood. But they also will bring their doubts and bad experiences to the collaboration, and their defenses will be up. Doubters will look for bad attitudes and signs that an officer is not doing his or her part. They will need to be convinced that this is worth their time, that the police care and are reliable. (This will be especially true among young people.) If a problem is solved through cooperative work, former doubters become a voice in the community for future collaboration. Their doubts are worth working through because their word-of-mouth advocacy is powerful.

To accomplish its mission, community policing must build on the shared traditions and objectives of the partners. Both have much to learn from each other. Both share the goal of safer neighborhoods, and hidden beneath the partners’ specialized vocabularies is a core of shared concepts. On the police side, there is problem-oriented policing as a methodology for looking at and responding to crime. On the community side, there are community organizing and anticrime activity as community-building activities. Both the police and community traditions are, to a large degree, geographically focused and involve the ideas of sustained, purposeful effort and concepts like targets, patterns, repeated occurrences, and coordinated activities. Both call on research and analysis before action, and both encourage evaluation of results.

Measuring what matters

While problem-solving partnerships are the foundation of community policing, what matters most is how the goals are selected, how the participants work together to accomplish those goals, whether the goals are accomplished, and whether community capacity is developed.

Some of the assessment or evaluative questions that need to be asked include:

- Is the collaboration target-oriented? What kinds of targets were selected? Did the community and the police both have roles in selecting the problem and designing the strategies? Did both play a role in implementing the strategy? What was the division of labor? What kinds of support, training, and technical assistance did each receive (and should each have received) for their part in problem solving?
- Were the goals realistic? Was the strategy a success? Were the desired outcomes actually realized? Did trust between police and community improve? Were previously inactive residents enlisted in the work?
- Did participants understand the process in which they participated? Did they gain a new understanding of collaboration? Did attitudes toward the use of 911 and incident-driven policing change? Did community residents know what to expect from officers and how to assess whether they were getting it?
- Did organizational skills such as setting agendas and running meetings improve among community participants? Did collaboration continue over time, from problem to problem? Did collaborative work expand across communities?

Conclusion

Measuring the problem-solving interaction of community and police is measuring something that matters deeply to the future of America's cities. Focusing on community self-help and the development of its capacity to solve neighborhood problems is not to deny the major influence that issues at the national, State, and city levels have on neighborhoods. The Nation's deeply entrenched divisions of race and income, and recent rises in the numbers of youth living in poverty,

affect the prevalence of crime and are mostly beyond the reach of local activity.

Focusing on community-police partnerships does not diminish the importance of community development. Community action against crime will obviously have a greater effect if it takes place in the context of a concerted effort to produce locally accessible jobs, decent education, and hope for young people. The impact of community action would also be greater in the context of efforts, for instance, to improve housing stock, business investment, and transportation in poor and at-risk communities. But even in the absence of broader efforts, local anticrime action is valuable. It can raise people's sense of efficacy and increase community cohesion, reduce crime, improve the quality of life, and heal a tiny part of the rift between government and citizens.

Getting communities organized and maintaining community organizations cost money. If the police can't produce neighborhood safety by themselves, if they need community partners, if improving the general welfare and domestic tranquillity of our neighborhoods requires 100,000 community organizers to match the 100,000 police, then the community has a right to expect public support from police and other law enforcement leaders for the resources they need to fulfill the community role effectively.

Notes

1. Kelling, George, M., and James Q. Wilson, "Broken Windows," *Atlantic Monthly* 249 (3) (March 1982): 29–36.
2. The "how to's" of community action against crime have been translated by support organizations that work with neighborhood residents—such as the Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, the American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities (now the Center for the Community Interest), the Citizen's Committee for New York City, the National Crime Prevention Council, and others—into practical guidance materials in basic skills and strategies. The citywide Citizens Committee provides technical assistance, publications, small grants, and a Neighborhood Safety Leadership Institute. The Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety also offers technical assistance and training. See also Kirby, Felice, Alex Kopelman, and Michael E. Clark, *Drugs: Fighting Back!*, New York: Citizens Committee for New York City, 1995; Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, Attorneys at Law, *A Civil War: A Community Legal Guide to*

Fighting Street Drug Markets, New York: Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, 1993; and Conner, Roger, and Patrick Burns, *A Winnable War: A Community Guide to Eradicating Drug Markets*, Washington, DC: American Alliance for Rights and Responsibilities, 1992.

3. Skogan, Wesley G., et al., *Community Policing in Chicago, Year Three: An Interim Report*, Chicago:

Illinois Criminal Justice Information Authority, November 1996. See also Friedman, Warren, *Building on the Promise: Reason for Hope/Room for Doubt*, Chicago: Chicago Alliance for Neighborhood Safety, 1996, for a community perspective on the status of Chicago's version of community policing and what must happen to sustain and enhance community participation.

Americans' Views on Crime and Law Enforcement: A Look at Recent Survey Findings

Jean Johnson, Steve Farkas, Ali Bers, Christin Connolly, and Zarela Maldonado

Americans from every walk of life, in every community in the country, routinely make decisions that strengthen or hinder the country's ability to fight crime. Citizens elect the governors, mayors, and legislators who shape crime-fighting policy. When citizens choose not to report crimes or press charges, when jurors decide to accept or discount police testimony for any reason other than merit, they profoundly affect the quality of law enforcement and justice in this country.

At the request of the National Institute of Justice, Public Agenda, a nonprofit, nonpartisan research organization, analyzed recent public opinion data on crime, the criminal justice system, and the role and effectiveness of the police. This paper summarizes our key observations based on an analysis of surveys from the past 5 years.¹ Unless otherwise noted, the surveys cited here are national random sample telephone surveys conducted in 1995 or later.

Crime and law enforcement are areas where attitudes often vary sharply between African-Americans and whites, and we have reported the views of these groups separately where the differences are significant. Unfortunately, most national surveys are not large enough to allow us to report with any confidence on the views of Hispanics or other minority groups.

Falling crime rates: rooted fears

Despite falling crime rates and remarkably good news from some of the Nation's large cities, crime remains an urgent issue for most Americans. Crime routinely appears at or near the top of surveys asking Americans to name the most important issues facing the country. Ninety-two percent of Americans, for example, say the issue of crime should be a priority for Congress (The

Gallup Organization for CNN/*USA Today*, October 1997). Just 24 percent of the public believe the country is making progress on crime; 44 percent say the country is losing ground (Princeton Survey Research/Pew Research Center, November 1997).

The public's concerns about crime seem to be somewhat independent of the actual crime rate, a phenomenon that may discourage law enforcement professionals but underscores just how frightening this issue is for most people. Public concern about jobs and unemployment often shows a similar pattern, remaining high even in times of comparatively low unemployment. Crime and unemployment can devastate people's lives in ways that a far-off foreign policy crisis or long-term environmental threat cannot. Deeply held public fears about crime—developed over decades—may be slow to dissipate even in the best of circumstances.

Public attitudes in New York City, which has experienced dramatic and highly publicized decreases in violent crime, provide a case in point. Polls in New York City show a remarkable jump in the New York City Police Department's approval rating, which rose from 37 percent in 1992 to 73 percent in 1996 (Empire Foundation, April 1996). Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, former Police Commissioner William Bratton, and current Commissioner Howard Safir have earned good marks for their efforts in fighting crime (Quinnipiac College, April 1996 and February 1997). Although half of New Yorkers (51 percent) say the city is now safer, almost two-thirds (65 percent) say they worry about being a victim of crime (Quinnipiac College, February 1997).

Many observers have suggested that public fears about crime are driven by media coverage rather than by any real knowledge of crime rates in their area. And 76 percent of Americans themselves say this is

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true: They get their information about crime from the news media (ABC News, May 1996).

Almost 6 in 10 Americans (57 percent) say their own community has less crime than the country as a whole (*Los Angeles Times*, January 1994); 8 in 10 say they feel safe in their own community (*Los Angeles Times*, October 1995). Even in New York City, where 81 percent of residents say crime is a “big problem,” only 38 percent say crime is a “big problem” in their own community (Quinnipiac College, February 1997).

But people’s fears are nevertheless real, and they may be intensified by the conviction of many Americans that the crime problem is getting worse, not better. Sixty-five percent of Americans say they think there is more crime in the United States than a year ago (The Gallup Organization for CNN/*USA Today*, July 1997); 62 percent say they worry “a lot” about an increase in crime in their own community (Yankelovich Partners for *Time/CNN*, January 1995).

Some groups in the population voice even higher levels of concern. More than two-thirds of women (68 percent), compared with just over half of men (56 percent), say they worry “a lot” about an increase in crime in their community. Seventy-six percent of African-Americans, compared with 60 percent of whites, voice a high level of concern. Two-thirds (66 percent) of low-income Americans (those earning less than \$20,000), compared with only half (51 percent) of those with incomes above \$75,000, worry a

lot about an increase in crime (Yankelovich Partners for *Time/CNN*, January 1995). Since crime statistics show that blacks and low-income Americans are more likely to be victims of crimes, the concerns of these groups have a factual base (see exhibit 1).

Causes of crime: complex and multifaceted

Americans identify a wide variety of social, economic, and moral conditions as the causes of crime. Fifty-six percent cite illegal drugs as a chief cause of crime; 38 percent name a lack of religion and morality in families; and 36 percent point to economic problems and lack of jobs. More than a quarter (28 percent) say the way judges apply the law is an important cause of crime (CBS News/*New York Times*, June 1996).

People back a variety of approaches they view as effective ways to fight crime—some designed to remove dangerous criminals from their neighborhoods, some to prevent youngsters from falling into a life of crime, some to express society’s outrage at those who disdain its laws. Public views on fighting crime do not fall neatly into either a liberal or conservative political framework. Sixty-nine percent of Americans want to make it more difficult for individuals to own handguns or assault weapons. A virtually equal number (71 percent) want to make greater use of the death penalty (Hart and Teeter Research Companies, December 1996).

Exhibit 1. Concern About Crime

“People all have different concerns about what’s going on in the world these days, but you can’t worry about everything all the time. Will you please tell me for each of the following whether right now this is something that worries you personally a lot, a little, or not at all? . . . An increase in crime in your community.”

	General Public %	Women %	Men %	Blacks %	Whites %	<\$20K per year %	>\$75K per year %
A lot	62	68	56	76	60	66	51
A little	27	23	32	17	28	22	38
Not at all	11	10	12	7	11	11	11

Yankelovich Partners for *Time/CNN*, January 1995. National survey of 1,000.

Note: Table percentages may not add to 100 due to rounding.

The public considers “mandatory life sentences for three-time felons” and “youth crime prevention programs” equally effective as crimefighting measures (*Los Angeles Times*, April 1994). Asked about the best overall approach to reducing crime, 30 percent of Americans want to emphasize punishment, 18 percent want to address the causes, and 51 percent want to emphasize both (Hart and Teeter Research Group, January 1995).

Research on prison overcrowding and alternative sentencing by Public Agenda for the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation also strongly suggests that most Americans believe in a mixture of approaches.² For youngsters in particular, people want the preventive approach—“stop them before they start, if you can.” But for most Americans, the worst possible lesson for young offenders would be to not to get caught or to receive the “slap on the wrist” of probation. Indeed, the Public Agenda studies found that the most popular sentence for young offenders is boot camp. Most Americans are convinced that the young person who “gets away with it” is all the more likely to continue a life of crime.

Opinion research strongly suggests that, for the public, the concept of justice includes both protecting the rights of the accused and redressing wrongs done to victims and society. The vast majority of Americans appears to believe that the balance between these two goals has tipped too far in favor of the accused. Eighty-six percent of Americans say the court system does too much to protect the rights of people accused of crimes and not enough to protect the rights of crime victims (ABC News, February 1994). Only 3 percent of Americans say the courts deal too harshly with criminals; 85 percent say they are not harsh enough (National Opinion Research Center [NORC], May 1994).

The police: on the front lines

Putting more police on the streets as an effective way to fight crime is broadly supported. Nine in ten Americans (90 percent) say that increasing the number of police is a very (46 percent) or somewhat (44 percent) effective way to reduce crime (ABC News, November 1994). And, given the general skepticism people feel about many institutions and most of government, Americans voice substantial confidence in law enforcement. Sixty percent of Americans say they have a “great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence in the police; another 29 percent say they have “some” confidence in the police; only 12 percent

express very little or no confidence (The Gallup Organization for CNN/*USA Today*, May 1996).

In a 1996 Gallup survey, only one major American institution rated higher than the police: 66 percent of the public have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the military. The police score about as well as “organized religion” (56 percent), and many groups—business corporations, Congress, the news media—do much worse. The police also score significantly higher than “the criminal justice system” as a

Exhibit 2. Public Confidence in Selected Institutions

“I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Would you tell me how much respect and confidence you, yourself, have in each one—a great deal, quite a lot, some, or very little?”

Institution	Percentage of general public saying “a great deal” or “quite a lot” of confidence
Military	66
Police	60
Organized religion	56
Supreme Court	45
Banks	44
Medical system	42
Presidency	39
Public schools	38
Television news	36
Newspapers	32
Organized labor	25
Big business	24
Congress	20
Criminal justice system	19

The Gallup Organization, 1996. National survey of 1,019.

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whole; only one in five Americans (19 percent) voices strong confidence in it (The Gallup Organization, 1996). (See exhibit 2.)

But confidence in law enforcement is one area where African-Americans and white Americans differ dramatically. While 66 percent of whites say they have a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in the police, only 32 percent of African-Americans feel the same way. Perhaps even more important, while only a handful of whites (8 percent) say they have very little or no confidence in the police, 25 percent of blacks make this statement (The Gallup Organization, May 1996). (See exhibit 3.)

Incidents that shape perceptions

Much of the recent opinion research on police bias and brutality has focused on two widely publicized incidents in the past 5 years: the trial of four Los Angeles police officers in the beating of Rodney King and the role of retired Los Angeles detective Mark Fuhrman in the murder trial of O.J. Simpson.

Public attitudes about these two incidents suggest the basis for some of the public's thinking about what constitutes appropriate police behavior and the degree to which people believe most officers act professionally most of the time. Surveys conducted during periods of extensive press coverage and heightened public debate can, of course, show levels of concern or anger that recede in quieter times. Mark Fuhrman, for example, has written a bestselling book and made numerous media appearances in the wake of the civil judgment against O.J. Simpson. Public attitudes about him personally may shift somewhat with time. But the initial public reactions to these two incidents as people understood them at the time are revealing.

Surveys of public reaction to the Rodney King beating—undoubtedly shaped by repeated broadcast of a videotape of the incident—show that the overwhelming majority of Americans did not like what they saw. Just 6 percent of Americans surveyed after the officers' initial acquittal said they thought the verdict was "right" (CBS News/*New York Times*, May 1992). Only 9 percent said they "sympathize[d]" more with police than the beating victim (Yankelovich Clancy Schulman for *Time/CNN*, April 1992.)

Exhibit 3. Confidence in the Police

	General Public %	Blacks %	Whites %
Now I am going to read you a list of institutions in American society. Please tell me how much confidence you, yourself, have in each one. . . . The police? ¹			
A great deal/quite a lot	60	32	66
Some	29	43	25
Very little/none	12	25	8
Don't know (volunteered)	<.5	0	<.5
How much confidence do you have in the ability of the police to protect you from violent crime? ²			
A great deal/quite a lot	50	37	53
Not very much/none at all	48	61	46
Don't know (volunteered)	1	2	1

¹ The Gallup Organization for CNN/*USA Today*, May 1996. National survey of 1,019.

² The Gallup Organization for CNN/*USA Today*, September 1995. National survey of 1,011.

Note: Table percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

Reactions to the tape-recorded comments of Mark Fuhrman played during the Simpson criminal trial show a similar public recoil against an officer who did not seem to fit commonly held standards for appropriate police behavior. At the time, 87 percent of Americans, with blacks and whites agreeing in roughly equal numbers, said they had an “unfavorable impression” of Fuhrman (The Gallup Organization, October 1995), although Americans were split largely along racial lines about whether he actually planted evidence in the Simpson case (CBS News, September 1995).³

Regardless of their differing perceptions about what Fuhrman actually did or did not do, there is one area where blacks and whites agree overwhelmingly: Only 9 percent of either group said that watching the

Simpson trial gave them more confidence that “police officers perform their duties in a professional and ethical manner” (The Gallup Organization for CNN/ *USA Today*, October 1995).

The exception or the rule?

For many white Americans, these kinds of incidents are mainly viewed as regrettable exceptions to the rule. Only 15 percent of white Americans think that “the kind of improper behavior by police described on the Fuhrman tapes (racism and falsification of evidence)” is common among their local police (Princeton Survey Research Associates, August 1995). But black Americans see things very differently. More than half of African-Americans (53 percent) think that the racism and falsifi-

Exhibit 4. Opinions About Police Behavior

	General Public %	Blacks %	Whites %
From what you know, is the kind of improper behavior by police described on the Fuhrman tapes (racism and falsification of evidence) common among members of your police force, or not? ¹			
Yes, common	20	53	15
No, not common	64	32	70
Don't know (volunteered)	16	16	15
For each of the following, please indicate how serious a threat it is today to Americans' rights and freedoms. . . . Police overreaction to crime? ²			
Very serious threat	27	43	24
Moderate threat	40	27	42
Not much of a threat	32	28	32
Don't know (volunteered)	2	1	2
Do you think blacks and other minorities receive equal treatment as whites in the criminal justice system? ³			
Yes, receive equal treatment	36	12	41
No, do not receive equal treatment	55	81	49
No opinion	9	7	10

¹ *Newsweek*/Princeton Survey Research Associates, August 1995. National survey of 758.

² The Gallup Organization for America's Talking, June 1994. National survey of 1,013.

³ ABC News, May 1996. National survey of 1,116.

Note: Table percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

cation of evidence described on the Fuhrman tapes is common among the local police (Princeton Survey Research Associates, August 1995). Almost twice as many blacks as whites (43 percent compared with 24 percent) consider “police overreaction to crime” a very serious threat (The Gallup Organization for America’s Talking, June 1994). (See exhibit 4.)

Moreover, concern among African-Americans about their chances of being treated fairly extends beyond law enforcement: While 41 percent of whites say that racial and other minorities receive equal treatment in the criminal justice system, only 12 percent of African-Americans say they are confident that this occurs (ABC News, May 1996).

Common standards, different experiences

Interestingly, there is substantial agreement among black and white Americans about what constitutes appropriate police behavior. Nine in ten Americans (90 percent)—with no significant differences between blacks and whites—disapprove of an officer striking a citizen who is being vulgar and obscene. A roughly equal number (92 percent) disapprove of an officer striking a murder suspect during questioning—again with no significant differences between blacks and whites. Ninety-three percent say a police officer *should be* allowed to strike a citizen who is attacking the officer with his fists, with blacks and whites again in agreement (NORC, 1994).

But judgments differ widely about what actually happens in most communities regarding police behavior. Middle-class whites generally have only positive interactions with the police, and most experience a sense of relief at seeing police officers out and about. In contrast, a study by the Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies (April 1996) reports that 43 percent of blacks consider “police brutality and harassment of African-Americans a serious problem” in their own community.

The level of distrust obviously affects the degree of support law enforcement can expect now and in the future. While 72 percent of whites think the police generally are fair in collecting evidence, only 47 percent of blacks believe this (Yankelovich Partners, June 1995). Even prior to the Rodney King incident, African-Americans were more likely than whites—

82 percent compared with 65 percent—to think that charges of police brutality are likely to be justified (CBS News/*New York Times*, April 1991).

Although blacks and whites agree on how police officers should behave when the situation is relatively clear-cut, there are important differences when the situation is more problematic. Seventy-eight percent of whites, compared with only 57 percent of blacks, would approve of an officer striking a suspect attempting to escape custody (NORC, 1994). Given a Rorschach survey question capturing the most immediate first thoughts of the respondents, the racial differences are marked: More than three-quarters of whites (76 percent) say they can “imagine” a situation in which they would approve of a policeman striking an adult male citizen, but less than half of blacks (45 percent) give the police this kind of benefit of the doubt (NORC, May 1994). (See exhibit 5.)

The fault line

There are some issues, such as affirmative action, where policymakers cannot easily accommodate the anxieties both blacks and whites bring to the issue—fears among blacks that they will be the subject of discrimination if affirmative action is curtailed; fears among whites that they will be the subject of reverse discrimination if affirmative action stands.

But concerns about police bias and brutality are different. Although blacks and whites disagree about how widespread these problems are, neither group finds such behavior acceptable. Both blacks and whites disapproved of the Rodney King beating, at least as they saw it. Both groups were repulsed by the attitudes and behavior depicted on the Fuhrman tapes.

Indeed, those concerned that police officers behave—and are perceived as behaving—in a professional manner should not be overly consoled by the judgments of whites either. Americans of both races seem dubious that police departments will act forcefully to address problems of racism, dishonesty, or brutality to the extent that they exist in police ranks. Only 14 percent of white Americans and 15 percent of black Americans think it is “very likely” that the controversy surrounding detective Fuhrman will lead to “significant improvement in the way police in this country treat blacks” (The Gallup Organization for CNN/*USA Today*, October 1995).

In a decade when many Americans seem to think that “government” can do no right, law enforcement is viewed as an essential public service, and the police enjoy a robust vote of confidence from most of the public. But support for law enforcement has a fault line. Far too many black Americans are disaffected and suspicious. They are not confident that the police

will be fair. They are not confident that the police will be professional. They are not confident that the police will “protect and serve.” And while the personal encounters most whites have with police officers may be positive, white Americans have witnessed some graphic, highly publicized examples of police behavior that, in their view, are entirely unacceptable. They

Exhibit 5. Approval/Disapproval of Police Behavior

	General Public %	Blacks %	Whites %
Would you approve of a policeman striking a citizen who had said vulgar and obscene things to the policeman?			
Yes	9	5	9
No	90	94	90
Not sure (volunteered)	1	1	1
Would you approve of a policeman striking a citizen who was being questioned as a suspect in a murder case?			
Yes	7	6	7
No	92	93	92
Not sure (volunteered)	2	1	2
Would you approve of a policeman striking a citizen who was attempting to escape from custody?			
Yes	75	57	78
No	21	36	18
Not sure (volunteered)	4	7	4
Would you approve of a policeman striking a citizen who was attacking the policeman with his fists?			
Yes	93	90	94
No	6	9	5
Not sure (volunteered)	1	1	1
Are there any situations you can imagine in which you would approve of a policeman striking an adult male citizen?			
Yes	71	45	76
No	26	48	22
Not sure (volunteered)	3	7	3

National Opinion Research Center, General Social Survey, 1994. National survey of 2,992.

Note: Table percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.

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may regard these incidents as exceptions, but not ones to be glossed over as “the cost of doing business.”

Over the past 5 years, Public Agenda has looked closely at public attitudes about teachers, another group of government workers whom the public likes. Teachers, like police officers, are seen as performing an essential public service and are generally regarded with respect. But Public Agenda research also shows a rising frustration with teachers—and their unions—for seeming to tolerate and protect the few incompetents among them. Focus groups erupt in anger when discussion turns to teacher tenure. The stories pour out about the one bad teacher the school cannot seem to get rid of. Anger against the few infects attitudes about teachers overall.

Law enforcement may now be in a similar position. Police departments that are seen as tolerating racist, brutal, or corrupt officers—or police unions that are perceived as protecting them—could slowly and incrementally jeopardize the strong support for law enforcement overall. It is fair to ask how long police departments can tolerate widespread lack of confidence among the black community—an outlook that must daily undermine police effectiveness in fighting crime. Public confidence in law enforcement is, for the country and for law enforcement itself, a priceless

asset, but it is not indestructible nor a cause for complacency.

Notes

1. In preparing this paper, we have relied extensively on data from the Roper Center Public Opinion Location Library (POLL), a resource housing survey data from many of the Nation’s most respected opinion research firms—ABC News, The Gallup Organization, Louis Harris and Associates, National Opinion Research Center (NORC), Princeton Survey Research Associates, and others. POLL is operated by the Roper Center at the University of Connecticut and can be accessed through NEXIS. The service can provide full-question wording, complete responses, and, in most cases, demographic breakdowns for the surveys cited here, along with other findings about crime and criminal justice that could not be discussed in this brief overview.

2. Public Agenda has conducted three studies on public attitudes about incarceration and alternative sentencing in Pennsylvania (1993), Delaware (1991), and Alabama (1989). The research was sponsored by the Edna McConnell Clark Foundation.

3. The poll found that 78 percent of African-Americans think it is likely that Fuhrman planted the glove as evidence. In contrast, only 33 percent of whites think it is likely he planted the glove.