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Release Date: 06/09/05 00:00:00
Rayburn House Office Building
Washington, D.C.
June 9, 2005
Rep. Tom Davis (R-VA): The committee will come to order. And I want to welcome everybody to today's hearing. And we're privileged to have Michael Chertoff, the secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, with us today. The purpose of this hearing is to get the secretary's assessment of the department's overall effectiveness in meeting its core mission, specifically its operations, management, opportunities for performance improvement, as well as discuss our concerns about how certain programs are being implemented in the department.
The Department of Homeland Security was created in response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11. The formation of the new department constituted the most massive government reorganization since 1947.
It integrated 23 separate agencies and bureaus. It employs over 180,000 people. It has a budget of $38.5 billion for fiscal year 2005 and a proposed budget of over $41 billion for fiscal year 2006. And it spends an estimated $11 billion on contracted services. It's an enormous undertaking to put together this new department and make it work. This committee has a direct interest in assessing the effective integration of the 23 agencies into one single department.
The wide-reaching mission of DHS is critical to the safety of the nation. The ultimate objective is to protect the American people from future terrorist attacks and to respond to natural disasters. The war that threatened our country, and every civilized country, has this historic combat component, and our troops show everyday just how effective the United States is in conventional combat. We have no peers in this area. But America's enemies today don't confine themselves to conventional combat alone. They target communities, schools and civilians. They fly planes into buildings and take great pride in the murder and maiming of scores and scores of innocent men, women and children.
Combat soldiers, no matter how brave or well equipped, are not the optimal weapon in this environment. This committee has responsibility for assuring that areas such as personnel management, agency organization and integration, procurement, and particularly utilization of technology, information sharing and information security, are receiving adequate attention and that congressional policies on these issues are being implemented throughout DHS.
With the huge investment of government resources and the critical nature of the department's mission, it's our job to determine how well the department is functioning to meet the terrorist threat and to provide adequate protection to our citizens. Secretary Chertoff initiated a comprehensive review of DHS' organization, its operations and its policies, shortly before he became secretary. Known as the second-stage review, this evaluation is not yet complete, but the exercise signals a recognition that additional work is needed to fully integrate and coordinate the disparate entities that comprise the new department.
I welcome the results of his view. Since the ultimate recommendations will most certainly affect issues of vital interest to this committee, I want to have further discussions with the secretary as this review progresses. I am heartened to know that Secretary Chertoff's approach to the organization and operation of DHS is to integrate the areas of intelligence, policy and operations. As we exercise our oversight responsibility on the committee, it's important to focus on all three of these areas, not just the first.
Intelligence gathering is critical, but how that intelligence is evaluated and acted upon depends on whether the department performs each of its critical missions. The optimal weapon is information: information moved to the right people at the right place at the right time; information moved within agencies and across departments; information moved across jurisdictions of government, as well, seamlessly, securely, efficiently.
The homeland security battle, therefore, is not just about intelligence, but what we do with it. We need to be able to identify terrorist threats and defeat them. Our success depends on collecting, analyzing, and appropriately sharing information found in databases, transactions and other sources.
This committee has long been concerned about the lack of information sharing and analysis within the government and among the relevant public and private sector parties. This committee was heavily involved in the information-sharing portions of the intelligence-reform legislation, requiring the president to establish an information-sharing environment within the federal government to share information and better protect us from further attacks. I'm interested in learning how the department is addressing this important issue. Although I had initial concerns, I supported the elevation of the assistant secretary for cyber security within DHS. The White House, through the Office of Management and Budget, has oversight of government-wide information policies. The assistant secretary should bring focus to the issues within DHS.
However, this individual should not sit at the center of all federal agencies and direct and control their policies on information sharing and cyber security. That has been, and should remain, in my judgment, an issue for the White House. There is an important difference between operational authority and policy authority.
Another area of committee oversight is the status of the implementation of the new personnel system at the department. In the Homeland Security Act of 2002 Congress gave the secretary and the director of the Office of Personnel Management authority to establish a new department-wide human resources management system, rather than simply cobbling together the dozens of preexisting personnel systems. I'm interested in hearing about the implementation of the new system from the secretary, including the fundings.
The committee continues to monitor DHS' integration of acquisition functions within its 23 agencies. A recent Government Accountability Office report found several successes in DHS' implementation but also a number of significant challenges. I'll be anxious to hear from the secretary about DHS' efforts to implement GAO recommendations and its strengthened centralized procurement policies and practices throughout the department.
The committee is concerned about the performance of the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, USCIS. There have been mounting issues of coordination efficiency in the many processes used by the agency to accomplish its mission, particularly in the information technology systems. I'm concerned that many legal immigrants, the people who follow the rules we've established for entering the country and the kind of people we want to welcome to America, are falling through the cracks of a broken immigration system.
The committee is also launching an aggressive review of the U.S.-VISIT and immigration status indication technology, or as we call it, USVISIT program being implemented by DHS. A fully functional USVISIT system will go a long way towards securing our borders from terrorists.
During the implementation phase, we want to make sure that USVISIT will help secure our borders without disrupting the nation's travel or commerce. Balance on this is paramount.
In addition the committee has held hearings on the department's implementation of the Support Anti-Terrorism by Fostering Effective Technologies Act, or the SAFETY Act of 2002, which was enacted to provide incentives for the development and deployment of anti- terrorist technologies.
I have expressed concern about the pace of implementing the application processes and conferring designations, as well as the burdensome effect of the process of applicants and the lack of coordination in the procurement process.
I was glad to see Secretary Chertoff acknowledge that problems existed in the implementation of the SAFETY Act and that he is committed to making sure the intent of the Congress is followed.
The committee looks forward to hearing from the secretary. We are honored to have you here today, and I want to once again welcome you and thank you for being here. I would now recognize our ranking member, Mr. Waxman, for his opening statement.
Representative Henry Waxman (D-CA): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And I want to join you in welcoming Secretary Chertoff to our hearing today. Secretary Chertoff has an extraordinarily difficult job. The mission of his department is to protect the United States from terrorist attacks. This could not be more important. Yet the organization he now runs is seriously dysfunctional.
At a hearing at the national security subcommittee earlier this week I expressed my growing concerns about federal procurement policy under the Bush administration. The fact is this administration has misspent literally billions of dollars on wasteful and ineffective federal contracts.
Private contractors may be making millions, but taxpayers are getting soaked. Whether the explanation is gross incompetence or deliberate malfeasance, the result is the same: Taxpayers are being vastly overcharged. The litany of administration mismanagement of federal contracts is long and costly. The value of no-bid contracts has skyrocketed under the Bush administration. Oversight of federal contracts has been turned over to private companies, with blatant conflict of interests. And when government auditors do find abuses their recommendations are ignored.
Nearly every week the newspapers are full of stories of contract abuse. The FBI has spent $170 million on virtual case file software that doesn't work. In Iraq, Halliburton has overcharged by hundreds of millions of dollars, yet the administration continues to shower the company with bonuses and special treatment.
New equipment worth billions has been sold by the Defense Department at fire sale prices.
Some of the worst problems, however, are at the Department of Homeland Security. As a series of investigative reports have revealed, the department has spent hundreds of millions of dollars on homeland security contracts that have proven largely ineffective. In April The Washington Post reported that the government is spending over $200 million to buy a high-tech system of cameras and sensors to monitor activity on the Mexican and the Canadian borders. But the surveillance system has been plagued by incomplete installments, and doesn't work.
In May The New York Times reported that the department has spent billions of dollars on screening equipment at the nation's entry points, but the radiation devices bought by the department can't differentiate between radiation emitted from a nuclear bomb and radiation from cat litter or bananas.
And in May The Washington Post and The New York Times reported that the department has spent over $1 billion to install massive equipment to screen luggage at airports, but the equipment doesn't work right. It's been plagued by high rates of false alarms. Perhaps the largest contract being managed by the department is the USVISIT contract with Accenture to create a virtual border around the United States. Yet critics say that this $10 billion contract may turn into an enormous boondoggle that never runs effectively. And while billions are being wasted on these contracts, the department's inspector general has found that taxpayers' dollars are being lavished on perks for senior agency officials. One IG report found that the department spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on a lavish conference complete with hula dancers in Hawaii.
Another IG report found that the department spent hundreds of thousands more on a gold-plated gym for senior executives and other employees.
Secretary Chertoff, I recognize that some of these problems will be difficult and time-consuming for you to address. But there is one step you could take right away that would have immediate benefits, and that is to change the culture of secrecy that envelops the department and impedes accountability.
And I want to give you an example. Last fall there were reports suggesting that the department and your predecessor, Secretary Ridge, inappropriately awarded multiple contracts to clients of a Philadelphia law firm, Blank Rome. I don't know whether those reports are true or not, but to learn more about them, I joined with the ranking member of the homeland security committee just to request basic information about the contracts between the department and Blank Rome. That was five months ago. We still have received no information in response to our requests. And this is not an isolated example. The department is so secretive that it even tried to conceal the identity of a newly appointed ombudsman for the Transportation Security Administration, whose responsibility it was to interact with the public regarding airport security. We couldn't even get the identity of the ombudsman.
Secretary Chertoff, your department may be able to succeed in keeping this kind of information secret. After all, I'm a member of the minority party. And I don't have the power to issue subpoenas or call hearings. But I am a member of Congress. And your department should be giving out information to all members of Congress, and particularly those on the committees that have oversight jurisdiction. You may be successful in keeping this culture of secrecy going, but I hope you will realize that your department won't succeed if you do. Our system requires checks and balances. The surest way to stop wasteful spending and improve performance is to encourage, not resist, oversight and accountability.
Your appearance at this hearing today is a good first step, and I look forward to your testimony at this hearing. Thank you.
Representative Christopher Shays (R-CT): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Chertoff, welcome to the committee. Before you even say a word, your presence here this morning is powerful testimony to the fact that homeland security reaches into every aspect of American government.
The committee on government reform with oversight jurisdiction over all federal programs and unique purview over inter-governmental relations can help you implement the department's unfolding mission.
The first hearing on a bill to create a Department of Homeland Security, DHS, was held in this room. We saw the need to unify and coordinate scattered functions to confront a new, lethal, post-9/11 security paradigm. But the truth be told, we created a fairly blunt instrument to wield against an agile subtle foe. In effect we built a four-headed octopus and asked the behemoth to perform brain surgery the next day. We know there has to be a learning curve on both sides of these tables. Mr. Secretary, we look forward to the results of your review of DHS structure and operations. The disparate elements of the department have begun to fuse into a force as nimble and discerning as our enemies.
The full committee subcommittee on national security, emerging threats and international relations oversight has raised some issues that merit your sustained attention. The alert system, bleach out the colors. The current system is not consistent with good risk communication principles. People deserve to know all they can about specific threats and what they can do about them. That takes words targeted to specific audiences, not just colors splashed coast to coast. Radiation detection, the technology may not be ready, and we shouldn't indulge a false sense of security about its capabilities. Plutonium or highly enriched uranium give off very little in terms of detectable radiation, and are easily shielded. Intelligence is still our best portal monitor against those trying to import radiological terror.
Technology triage, the department's technology assessment process seems without consistency or clear priorities. Developers who try to give innovative concepts to DHS are rebuffed, while the department spends millions buying marginal technology from big defense contractors.
Exercises, federal counterterrorism training and exercise programs still offer first responders a confusing smorgasbord rather than a cohesive curriculum. Local exercises can lack realism, and lessons learned are not consistently captured and sent back into the system.
Standards, we'll never know if preparedness is improving if first responders can't answer the basic question, prepared for what? Efforts to define essential capabilities to meet specific threats need to be accelerated so states and localities know what to do, not just what to buy. The focus on equipment standards over functional benchmarks invites wasteful spending.
Mr. Secretary, we know that this is a new job for you. And the challenges that I've outlined are challenges that we know you are trying to address and not certainly created by you or even your predecessor. It's just the task of getting such an important department to function the way it needs to. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Davis: Thank you very much. I asked members to try to limit opening statements. I know Mr. Souder has one on our side as the subcommittee chairman with some jurisdiction on this.
The gentleman from Maryland.
Representative Elijah Cummings (D-MD): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And welcome, Secretary, glad to see you here. Mr. Chairman, I do thank you for calling today's vitally important hearing to evaluate the effectiveness and efficiency of the Department of Homeland Security's operation and management. Following the tragic events of 9/11 the DHS was created representing one of the most significant transformations of the federal government in 50 years. The central mission of the DHS is to, quote, "lead the unified efforts to secure America, prevent and deter terrorist attacks, and protect against and respond to threats and hazards to this nation, ensure safe and secure borders, welcome lawful immigrants and visitors and promote the free flow of commerce," end of quote.
To carry out this important mission, the DHS employs approximately 180,000 employees and manages a budget of $38.5 billion for fiscal year 2005. In light of the need to better protect the homeland in the post- 9/11 world, I was deeply troubled to learn that DHS' own office of inspector general found that the department has much to do to establish a cohesive efficient and effective organization. That's what they said. While the department's massive jurisdiction makes it impossible to discuss all my concerns in this statement, I would be remiss if I failed to mention several challenges that I believe particularly undermine the ability of DHS to fulfill its mission in addition to those things that were stated by Mr. Waxman.
To begin, DHS recently unveiled a new personnel system that would needlessly undermine our nation's long-standing commitments to employee protections, independent arbitration and collective bargaining rights. Specifically DHS issued regulations that would substantially restrict what issues are covered by collective bargaining. As described in the new regulations the DHS is no longer mandated to bargain over, quote, "the number, types, grades or occupational clusters and bands of employees or positions assigned to any organizational subdivision, work project or tour of duty" end of quote.
The new personnel system also fails to establish an independent entity to resolve labor management disputes and establishes a performance-based pay system that can provide a means for politicization and cronyism within the DHS without the necessary safeguards and clear standards needed to measure employee performance. I do not believe that the new personnel system supports an efficient and inclusive relationship between employers and employees at the DHS. Specifically, the type of relationship needed to keep morale high, support retention and attract skilled and capable prospective employees to serve at the DHS.
Furthermore, congressional investigations and increasing instances of terrorists or alleged terrorists illegally entering into the United States have left me seriously questioning the DHS' ability to secure our southwest border. Weaknesses in our border system undermine our efforts to protect our homeland from terrorism and drugs. As ranking minority member of the subcommittee on criminal justice, drug policy and human resources, I've seen first-hand how the terrorism fueled by the drug trade can be just as destructive as the terrorism fueled by religious extremism.
We cannot lose sight of that fact, that nearly all of the cocaine consumed in the United States, and most of the heroin consumed on the East Coast, originates in Colombia. The customs and border protection office within DHS is therefore essential at identifying and stopping terrorists and drug traffickers before they enter our nation. Unfortunately, the president's budget for fiscal year 2006 makes it more difficult to address these concerns by inadequately funding the hiring of new border patrol agents and immigration and customs officers.
Related challenges the DHS must address is the Transportation Security Administration's troublingly high failure rate in detecting weapons, a homeland security threat advisory system that is unsophisticated and vague and a poor distribution of limited resources. Finally, Mr. Chairman, in no uncertain terms, the American people anxiously look to their government to ensure our efforts at protecting the homeland and making sure that those efforts are effective and efficient and driven by a commitment to common sense.
In the end, they expect us to protect their communities from those that seek to do us harm. Sadly, there is much work yet undone if we are to achieve this worthwhile end. I look forward to the testimony from today's witnesses, and with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Representative Mark Souder (R-IN): Thank you, Chairman Davis. I want to thank you for the opportunity for holding this important hearing. I'd also like to thank Secretary Chertoff for his willingness to come today and to join. And I thoroughly support your goal of improving the operations and efficiency of the Department of Homeland Security and look forward to hearing the results of your second-stage review.
While the department has made major strides, much unfinished business remains, and I do not envy your job. It is no secret that the American public has become increasingly exasperated about the government's inability to control our nation's borders. I have seen that impatience and anger at numerous border security hearings, in many border communities, both rural and urban, and even in my home district in northwest Indiana, at every meeting I go to. If there is one thing that your department must get better at, and soon, it is border control. Our constituents know what we know, namely, that it is quite easy to cross our borders illegally and to bring in all kinds of contraband. Well organized, large-scale smuggling organizations are going on at every hour of every day along our borders: Alien smuggling, terrorist smuggling, narcotics trafficking and weapons smuggling are not random acts of aggression, but rather well-planned, well-executed, well-funded ventures. The networks that support these smugglers are international in scope and rival our own security agencies in sophistication.
Smuggling takes its toll throughout the country in ways that might surprise most people. Elkhart County law enforcement officials in my district recently took down two operations that produced fake green cards. In Ft. Wayne, my hometown, yet another fake green card operation was taken down.
At a wedding reception Saturday night, a doctor told me that every single doctor in his practice has had their Social Security number stolen, resulting in financial hardship and legal hassle. Yet another person at the same table told me their identity had been stolen. Four different people had their Social Security number. Most of this is being used to produce fake IDs.
This is a national network in scope, along with the coyotes who plan the trips in, who arrange the vans, who move them through the different states, who then bring them into our states who provide the networking for the jobs. These are massive networks. The public expects us to take action. Congress, of course, needs to do its part. For example, we need to enact tougher laws to prosecute the human traffickers along the borders whose agents are often called coyotes and these networks that go there.
It's one thing to pick on an individual worker; it's another to say, who are these huge networks that are bringing in hundreds of thousands of illegal people fronted often by drugs and other contraband. But I also believe the department needs to get its own house in order. Organizing the numerous agencies that were put in DHS is a difficult task, but in some cases the department not only hasn't improved coordination and efficiency, it's actually made them worse.
In fact, your department's lack of organization is impacting the entire federal government. The most glaring example of this is the current division between Customs and border protection, CVP and Immigration and Customs Enforcement, ICE. Congress put the old INS and Customs Services and DHS back in 2002. The department then decided to break these agencies apart and split the border inspectors and the patrol agents away from the investigators.
I have met lots of inspectors and investigators at the border, in every single southwest border state, in almost every single northern state, and I can't remember a single one of them who believes that this is working.
To the contrary it is roundly criticized wherever I go. The -- (inaudible) -- has broken down the old working relationships between cops on the beat and the detectives without putting new ones in place. In addition, the department has created one agency completely focused on the physical border, CVP, and another one physically cut off from the border, ICE. Theoretically they are supposed to cooperate, but as a practical matter, they are doing it less so than they used to.
It means that no operational agency at DHS is looking holistically at border security. It has also left several agencies, which are central, particularly in the narcotics war, that worked well both at the border and beyond the border, like Customs, air and marine, and the Shadow Wolf Native American Custom patrol officers in Arizona without any logical place, because they do both things.
The fact is that the different narcotics trafficking groups, human trafficking groups, contraband trafficking, terrorists, do not work in isolation. In fact, the reason they don't cross anymore at San Ysidro as much in El Paso, the large groups are going in between -- the only reason they haven't -- we don't hold them anyway. So unless they have another type of a crime, we don't detain them more than just a few hours. We send them right back. So the only ones that are working through are parts of large organizations, and what I've been told is that if there are 20 or more people, they can't afford to delay -- because we do a fairly good job of catching them the first time and then sending them back.
But if you're moving a group of 20 to 50, then it becomes inconvenient because you get two here and two there, and if they want to move them in a group, they're now saturating Arizona and Texas. And we have to have - a picket fence isn't going to do that. They're working behind the border, past the border. You have people in your department working in Colombia; you have them working inside, and you don't have a logical place to do it if you don't merge the two things.
Meanwhile, this lack of organization has been reflected in the lack of coordination. Here are some questions that I hope you'll address, if not directly today then in writing back. Are you at least considering merging the enforcement components of CBP and ICE? What specific steps are you taking to improve the coordination and cooperation on intelligence and information sharing within the department? The stove-piping has gotten worse, not better, and it's (less coordinated ?) than it was before.
Do you support the House-passed legislation that moved the Shadow Wolves to ICE, and will you expand the program to include other Native American reservations along the Northern border, because this is one of the most effective, sensitive type of things that's worked, and it's being disbanded, in effect, by making them a picket fence.
Fourthly, are you going to dedicate specific funds to the Office of Counternarcotics Enforcement to allow it to carry out the coordination and oversight responsibilities that Congress gave it? The administration continues to try to zero it out and not provide any actual dollars and instead just detailed employees. Thank you. Thank you for coming here. I look forward to working with you in the future, both here and on the Homeland Security Committee.
Secretary Chertoff: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, Ranking Member Waxman.
I actually have a fuller statement for the record, which I respectfully request be included. I'm just going to make a few brief points before I make myself available for questions.
I appreciate the opportunity to make my first appearance before this committee to talk about where I see us going at the Department of Homeland Security.
As has been observed by the chairman, two years into the establishment of the department, I've initiated what we are calling a second-stage review to identify where we've been, where we're headed, and what course corrections we need to make. Now this process, of course, builds on the very fine work done by my predecessor, Governor Ridge, and his deputy admiral, Jim Loy. They had the enormous challenge of launching the first stage of the department - as someone observed, the largest reorganization of departments in the government since 1947. And so we now have the chance two years into the process to look back and see where we can make some improvements.
My basic philosophy is this: Our structures and our programs have to be outcome-oriented, not the reverse. We don't drive the mission and the outcome by the structure; we drive the structure and operation by the mission and the outcome. And so the second-stage review is designed to take a close look at the mission, see how we can achieve our goals, where we have gaps, and what we can do to bridge between where we are and where we need to be.
The philosophy of risk management is the template for our decisions. And so the review is examining nearly every area of the department to identify ways in which we can better manage risk in terms of threat, vulnerability and consequence. This will help make sure that we have a coherent set of priorities about how we deal with homeland security. And of course, Congress can help in this by making sure that in the distribution of funds and other activities we are driven by risk management as our principal template. Now I'm very pleased to say the first phase of this review, which entailed an overarching effort to gather information on the policies, operations and organizations, was completed ahead of schedule. One of the things I wanted to do was to get us in the habit of setting deadlines and meeting deadlines. I set a deadline for the gathering of information of May 31st, and I'm pleased to say it was beaten by one day, which I think was an important message. And now I'm beginning the process over the next month of sitting down with the various action teams and discussing the specifics of what they have found and what they are going to be recommending we do to move forward.
I anticipate that I will begin to be able to discuss the first set of recommendations that we're going to have based on this review in approximately a month. Our objective is to develop a model agency for the 21st century that supports a unified national effort to secure America. I am well aware of the fact that the department was not created simply to assemble 22 agencies in a big tent.
It was created to enable the agencies to operate in a unified and coordinated fashion.
So as the chairman observed, what we need to do is integrate intelligence, policy and operations across the department so that each component is directed from a department-wide perspective with a clear focus on the outcomes we need to obtain. That means we have to eliminate bureaucratic stovepipes and we have to learn to share information. And part of that, of course, is the technical process we have under way of deploying IT systems to allow, for example, for complete e-mail and network consolidation.
Within the management arena, we are making important strides, although we have more to do, in the area of functional integration, procurement and human capital. And through the management directorate of the department, we're developing leadership and guidance on our integration efforts. And as the chairman observed, we were recently praised by GAO in terms of the progress we've made on our functional integration efforts, and we view that as a spur to continue to complete this task. In specific areas, such as procurement, we see marked improvement. After consolidating acquisition support throughout areas of the department, we are achieving more effective and efficient acquisition of resources. But we're still not there, and we still need to do more. I remain committed to ensuring the credibility of the procurement process and for developing strategies to enhance a department-wide- driven procurement process.
One thing I want to observe, since I think the inspector general was mentioned. Within a - actually before I was confirmed, I identified as one of the things I wanted to do upon my arrival was to use the IG as a better management tool, to identify for us what we need to do to adopt the best practices in acquisition and procurement across the government, both from an ethics standpoint and from an operational standpoint. And within a matter of a few weeks of being on, I met with the IG, tasked him with carrying out this. He has come back and we've begun discussion. I have had several meetings with the inspector general, and I have been personally interested and have given my personal stamp on the effort to make sure we are bringing our practices in line with the best thinking on procurement ethics and procurement strategies.
Now as we make important changes in the department, we have to continue to support our employees and to provide the necessary tools to recognize their accomplishments and build on their successes. Through Max HR, the new human resource management system, we will foster a culture of integrity, accountability and effectiveness that enables each employee to achieve mission goals and be rewarded for excellence. A major goal of the system is to unite managers and employees to ensure that all are coordinating to achieve and accomplish the DHS mission.
We also want to be competitive with the private sector in terms of attracting the best talent. And one of the things we want to build with this new performance-based system is a reward for operating in joint and coordinated fashion. Just as in the military, part of the process of advancing a career requires you to work with other components and to learn how to operate in a joint environment. We have got to build that same effort and that same set of incentives into our backbone if we are to complete the process of integrating our department. I appreciate the support of this committee, and I look forward to working with you on these and other matters as we seek to achieve our shared goal of a safe and secure homeland. Thank you, and I'd be delighted to answer questions.
Representative Davis: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for that statement. I'm going to start the questioning on our side with members who didn't make opening statements.
Mr. Gutknecht, you're recognized for five minutes.
Representative Gil Gutknecht (R-MN): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you, Mr. Chertoff, for coming. And I echo the comments of some of my colleagues on both sides of the aisle as they made their opening statements.
One of my concerns really has been and continues to be is that when we started this department, we were told that by consolidating these 22-odd different departments into one department that we would eliminate duplication, and at the end of it all, it would actually be more efficient and may not be any more expensive to run this big department. And I don't have the number in front of me right now, but as a former member of the Budget Committee it strikes me - and I think I'm correct that the budget actually now has more than doubled what it was when the department was created. And when you combine that with some of the other stories that we hear daily or read regularly in the papers, I guess the real problem is there is developing almost a problem of confidence, not only among the general public but I think among members of Congress, that we see ourselves spending lots of money and we continually hear that things are not like they were supposed to be. And so it seems to me that you have a very, very difficult job.
First and foremost, I think you have to restore confidence among the American people that this department is really doing what we thought it was going to do. And then I think it - almost as important, you have to restore the confidence among those of us who, in effect, sign the checks on behalf of the American people that their money is being well spent. And that's not really a question as much as it is a comment, but I think that really is the mission that you have, and we wish you well. But I think it's important that as we go forward that this committee and others get regular reports in terms of the kind of progress that is really being made, because as I say, and as our colleagues have said, that we hear reports in the news media and from our constituents that things aren't really getting better; they're actually getting worse.
I'll give you one example. We have, particularly in rural parts of America, we have real problems with a drug called meth. And we have meth labs where people are actually making this drug, but we're learning more and more that an awful lot of that drug is not being made in the United States; it's actually coming across the border from Mexico. And apparently, it's very easy to get it across the border.
And that's just one example of how we're not really getting the job done. We're spending an awful lot of money, and there's a growing at least suspicion that things are not getting better; they're actually perhaps getting worse. And so that's not a question so much. You may want to respond to it. But we do want to wish you well, because in some respects, we all have a huge stake in making sure that this department succeeds.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, I appreciate the opportunity to talk about this a little bit, because I am very sensitive about the fact that everybody as a citizen has a real stake in our doing our job efficiently and achieving the result of bettering American security. We are stewards of the public fisc. We have to be responsible in the way we spend money.
I have to say, frankly, a lot of the increase in the budget reflects an increase in the substance of what we need to protect the country. For example, in the area of the Coast Guard, we've requested substantial funding because we need new ships, new planes, new physical assets which will give us the capabilities to do exactly what you want us to do: intercept drugs, protect our ports, protect our maritime area, protect out fisheries. So that's an area where increases we're requesting in money are not about bureaucracy or about process; they're about real stuff that we actually deploy.
We're also making some substantial efforts to do some consolidation. And I know it's a long process; it's something that's going to take a little while. But we have - you know, we came in with 22 separate human resources agencies. We're now down to seven offices servicing the 22 components. Eight payroll systems have been consolidated to two. Nineteen financial management centers have been consolidated to 10. I'm not saying we're at the end of the process, but I do think it's fair to tell the American people we have made some progress in that direction.
I'm acutely aware of the issue that we have at our borders. That is a very significant problem from a variety of standpoints, not only security but because we need to assure the American people that if we have borders and we take them seriously we are going to get control of them. And we are in the process now of working out what our border strategy is. A couple of years in a row now we've had an Arizona Border Control Initiative, which has really paid off in terms of increased apprehensions of people and bad things coming across the border. And one of the lessons we've learned from that is that the best way to address the problem is with a comprehensive combination of technology and people - better awareness of who's crossing, some infrastructure to block vehicles from coming across, and then an ability to direct the border patrol where they need to go. So I think based on those lessons, we are now looking across the entire span of the border to see how we can most efficiently use technology and people to get us control.
Representative Waxman: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Chertoff, I want you to know that I have a lot of confidence in you personally. You have an excellent record and I am encouraged by what you've had to say today. But I've always felt that one of the ways to make sure that the government is functioning the way it should, every department is functioning the way it should, is to make appropriate oversight, both from within the department and from outside the department. And Congress has that responsibility. And there have been, unfortunately, a number of incidents that have raised questions regarding whether the department's leadership encourages such oversight.
And I want to ask you some questions about these incidents. Last year press accounts raised questions about the relationship between former Secretary Ridge and his aides and an outfit called Blank, Rome, which is a Philadelphia law firm. According to these accounts, two top aides of Secretary Ridge left government soon after the department was established to work for Blank Rome. And the secretary himself was a personal - close personal friend of the chairman of Blank Rome. Blank Rome reportedly lobbied DHS on behalf of 29 firms, and Blank Rome clients have been awarded major DHS contracts.
Well, to examine whether there was any impropriety - and I am not suggesting there was, but I think it ought to be looked at, this relationship between Blank Rome and top DHS staff - I joined in a letter with the ranking Democrat on the Homeland Security Committee in the House, and we requested all the communications between Blank Rome and top DHS political appointees and staff. In a follow-up meeting shortly thereafter between my staff and my office and Representative Thompson's office - Bennie Thompson from Mississippi is the ranking Democrat on the Homeland Security Committee - DHS agreed to provide this information in several batches, the first one encompassing communications specifically with DHS management. Yet five months after our request, we've yet to receive any information. I'd like to know whether you would commit right now to providing us with copies of all communications between Blank Rome representatives and DHS management by the end of June 2005.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, first of all, let me say that I'm not obviously personally familiar with this nor has anybody brought to my attention any allegation of impropriety. In terms of the information, my understanding is that we had offered some information, and we will certainly - in fact, I was informed in fact that the offer was not acted upon. I will certainly commit to furnishing what we offered to provide promptly - I mean within a month.
Representative Waxman: Well, I appreciate that. That would be the first batch which the department agreed to give us many months ago. And I'd also like to suggest that we get the remaining batches of the responsive materials by the end of July. I think this is a straightforward request. It was made close to half a year ago by us, and there ought to be - that ought to be sufficient time to get that second batch of information to us as well. Are you prepared to give me that commitment?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, not knowing what the information is, as I said - I mean, what we've previously agreed to give we should certainly give. I'm not in a position to tell you right now if there are legal or other constraints on giving other information. We will certainly address the request promptly and make available what is appropriate to be made available.
Representative Waxman: Okay. On March 1 Chairman Chris Shays - I wrote to Chairman Chris Shays as the committee launched an investigation into the growing use of secrecy, particularly with respect to non-classified information designations. These are rapidly proliferating. And these designations are called things like sensitive but unclassified or for official use only, and then the information is not given out.
For example, in February 2002, the Department of Homeland Security concealed the unclassified identity of a newly appointed ombudsman for the Transportation Security Administration, an official whose responsibility was to interact with the public. Well, in response to my request for this investigation, Chairman Shays agreed, and together we sent a letter to your department on March 4th. Just to be clear: This request was sent to you, not Secretary Ridge. Chairman Shays and I asked for you to provide the committee copies of reports and other documents that the department issued in two forms, in a public version and in what's called sensitive but unclassified version. That way we as an oversight committee could compare these documents and evaluate the propriety of your department's redactions.
It's now been over three months since this bipartisan request. However, we've received no response whatsoever. We haven't even received a letter saying you're working on this. Would you commit to providing this information by the end of this month so that when we - so that we can get the information that we've requested?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, I can certainly tell you we're working on it. Not knowing what the volume of information is or how difficult it is to assemble, I would be hesitant to make a timeframe commitment. What I can tell you is that I will ask that we - that I get a report as to where we are in the process of responding to this and that we come back with a - by the end of the month - timeframe within which we think we can do what's appropriate.
Representative Waxman: I appreciate that. Let me just tell you what's involved. We have statements that there were redactions given to us, and the redactions were not classified information but information that was called sensitive but unclassified. And so members of Congress on the appropriate committees are now requesting that we get the original information that was redacted out so we can see on what basis this information is now, what kind of information is being withheld. This is not national security. These are not classified documents. There's this new description that's being used to hide information, not just in your department but in others as well, where they are labeled sensitive but unclassified or for official use only. There's no legal standing to it. Thank you very much, and we'll look forward to working with you.
Representative Charles W. Dent (R-PA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning, Mr. Secretary.
To what extent do you support the use of state and local law enforcement to supplement immigration enforcement activity, and do you support the repeal of the memo of understanding requirements for federal immigration training and assistance to states and localities?
Secretary Chertoff: I don't think I heard the last piece of the question.
Representative Dent: Do you support the repeal of the memo of understanding requirements for federal immigration training and assistance to states and localities?
Secretary Chertoff: I'm not sure what - I will say, I generally support the idea where states and localities want to assist we have under 287G. We have the ability to have them properly trained in order to assist us in terms of enforcing the immigration laws. That's not something that we compel states and localities to do. Some want to do it; some don't want to do it. They obviously need to be trained properly. So I'm unequivocally in support of that.
Representative Dent: Thank you, sir. According to DOJ's inspector general, DHS officials expect to check approximately 800 people out of roughly 118,000 visitors a day who should be screened against the FBI database. Is this accurate information?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, I've never heard that figure. I'm not sure of the context in which it's been publicized, so I can't really respond. I mean we do check - under US-VISIT we have the capability and we actually do check everybody who comes in against both the - (inaudible) - and the relevant FBI database.
Representative Dent: With respect to the REAL ID Act, which we just enacted a few months ago, the legislation established minimum standards for federal acceptance of driver's licenses and state-issued identity documents and provides rulemaking through your department to enact reforms. Do you believe that DHS is - how are you taking action in this area?
Secretary Chertoff: Within a day or so after the act was passed, I told my acting general counsel that I wanted him to put together for me a map about what we need to do to go forward in terms of implementing the necessary rules and regulations to make the act effective.
Representative Dent: Okay, now, finally, with respect to the so-called Minuteman Project, what are your thoughts about that organization and whether or not there should be any utilization by those folks through your department?
Secretary Chertoff: No, it's a free country and people are, of course, entitled to go peacefully wherever they want and demonstrate or raise issues. What people cannot do, of course, is take the law into their hand or interfere with either law enforcement authorities or, in fact, try to engage in self-help to interfere with people coming across the border. We are committed to have a professional system of controlling our border. And that means a system that involves well-trained people who know what the rules are and who are properly backed up with equipment. And our strategy is to go forward and find the best mix of personnel and technology to give us control of the border.
Representative Dent: Would that include the temporary placement of National Guard on the border until these new Border Patrol agents are trained?
Secretary Chertoff: I don't know that the National Guard is in a position, from a training standpoint or a resources standpoint, to play that role. There are issues of appropriate legal authorities to be exercised against people coming across the border, which, frankly, do require a certain amount of training and a certain amount of supervision, which is typically something we accomplish by putting Border Patrol agents through training and is not, as I understand it, typically a part of the training you get in the National Guard. So, I would hesitate to suggest that that's a solution.
Representative Dent: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Davis: Gentleman has a minute remaining, I know Mr. Cannon would like you to yield to him because -- (inaudible) --
Representative Chris Cannon (R-UT): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I do have a question. In the first place, welcome to your new job, Mr. Chertoff. I'm a big fan and I hope things -- I know you're going to do a great job there. In the Federal Protection Service is a component of the Department of Homeland Security, and that's been transformed into a proactive law enforcement agency in the aftermath of September 11, 2001. I'm concerned that the officers and the agents of the FPS are not allowed to have in their possession their authorized weapons while off duty. I think it's vital the FPS, like other federal law enforcement officers with the same training, be authorized to carry their firearms while off duty and be available to respond to problems. I suspect you would agree with this, that having trained officers with the authority to carry weapons while off duty would increase our security. Would you work with me to see that we can rectify this anomaly?
Secretary Chertoff: I will certainly work with you to see what the issue is and make sure we come to an appropriate resolution.
Representative Cannon: Thank you, sir. I appreciate that and yield back.
Representative Davis: Thank you, Mr. Clay.
Representative William Lacy Clay (D-MO): Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary for being here. Recently, Department of Homeland Security inspector general issued yet another report on the poor performance of airport screeners and found, once again, that undercover agents were often able to smuggle weapons past TSA's airport screeners at multiple airports across the country, including those used by the September 11 hijackers. Why are airport screeners continuing to demonstrate poor performance? And, bluntly put, are our airports and airplanes still vulnerable?
Secretary Chertoff: Let me begin by saying our airports and airplanes are safe. And the reason they are safe is because we use a layered strategy of protection. Meaning, unlike before 9-11, our strategy now involves several different layers of defense. We have the inspection when people come through the checkpoint at the airport. We have hardened cockpit doors, which repel anybody who tries to get in the cockpit and take control of the plane. We have federal air marshals; we have federal flight deck officers who are armed. So, we have a lot more layers of protection in place now, which I think do make the system safe and sound. That's not to say we don't always try to improve it. In the area of screening, a question arises whether we have essentially hit the limit of what human error -- of what we can do to reduce human error in the absence of deploying more advanced technology.
We actually have more advanced technology. We are now deploying these air puffers which detect trace amounts of explosives at airports. I saw one in Los Angeles last week. There are back scatter machines, which would allows us actually to see organic compounds and explosives concealed on a person.
Some of these issues are financial issues. Some of them, frankly, are making a decision to go forward. Some people don't like some of the technologies. I think we have to make a decision if we're going to keep our airports secure, that we're going to have to deploy these technologies; we're going to have to take appropriate steps to preserve privacy. But that in order to move to the next level of detection, we have to start to make sure of the one thing we have that they terrorists don't have, which is our ingenuity in getting technology out into the real world.
Representative Clay: Mr. Secretary, how does it work as far as the first persons that you see when you go to line are usually with the airlines or a private security company. And then you are transferred to TSA personnel. Has that been seamless? Has it been pretty trouble free?
Secretary Chertoff: TSA has the responsibility for dealing with the screeners. I think, as with any human system, anecdotal reporting indicates that there are sometimes problems. Sometimes people say the system works very well. Sometimes people say there are slips in the seams, and that why we build layers in, because I think human experience tells us that, statistically, out of every thousand people, you're going to get a small number who are going to mess up.
What we want to do, though, as I say, is by building the technology in place, we want to reduce the scope of human error. And I have to say, in fairness to the TSA screeners, because I was out there in Los Angeles and I've been in a number of airports, they actually do a phenomenal job working with the technology and being able to identify dangerous items on baggage and on people -- it's not just machines. It requires trained people, and so we have to treat that work force with respect.
Representative Clay: Let me say that since 9/11, I, too, feel safer boarding an airplane; I feel safer in airports. But hypothetically, would you think that -- and say Mr. bin Laden may be sitting around with some of his compatriots and saying look at those foolish Americans, they have now spent billions on airport security and we will never use another airplane again as far as a weapon.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, first of all, based on some of the successes we've had overseas in the last few years, it's my belief that Mr. bin Laden and his compatriots are spending a lot of time worrying about their own hides -- which, of course, is part of a strategy, is to force them to worry about themselves. I do think you're right. We can't really just fight the same battle over and over again, and we are looking at maritime, land borders, the whole complex of issues we have to be concerned about.
I do have to say, though, that the intelligence continues to support the idea, and has supported the idea over the last few years, that the terrorists still regard the airplanes as a significant target. You know, the economy of this country is so dependent on air transportation that we have to be careful to preserve that system and its integrity and public confidence in the system.
Representative Clay: I appreciate your responses. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Davis: Thank you, Ms. Miller.
Representative Candice Miller (R-MI): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your attendance here today. I'm from Michigan, and I know there's a lot of consternation about the southern border of our state, but I'm very concerned about the northern border of our state. In fact, in my particular district and in the region in southeast Michigan, I had your predecessor in for a -- we took him for a helicopter tour, and I'd like to invite you to do the same thing just to get a perspective of the kinds of dynamics that we have that have a lot of concern for all of us.
The Ambassador Bridge, which is the first-busiest commercial artery on the northern tier, is there along with the tunnel to Windsor. In my district we have the Blue Water Bridge, which is the third-busiest commercial artery and the only one that allows for transit of hazardous material. We have the CN rail tunnel there. We have an interesting dynamic along the liquid border that we share with Canada. We call it chemical valley because there is a huge concentration of petrochemical plants along there. And, of course, being right on the lakes, the Great Lakes, which are fully one-fifth of the fresh water supply of the entire planet. There are a number of interesting dynamics that we have there. As well, we, of course, document as much as we can the kind of illegal immigration that is happening there, whether they are transiting across the infrastructure or just simply coming across by boat. That's happening all the time in all types of weather conditions. And there had been some talk with the Department of Homeland Security about the potential of having regional homeland security headquarters across the nation.
And, in fact, we were very interested in pursuing that in the Midwest region there with your department, and I don't know where all that has gone. I also sit on the House Armed Services Committee. Obviously we were very interested in the BRAC process and part of the criteria for the BRAC process was that the DOD should be working with the DHS about not only national security but homeland security for some of the various bases. One of the bases that's in my district has some of the components under your umbrella. The Coast Guard -- it's an Air National Guard base that has the Coast Guard, the border crossing, some of these different kinds of things. I'm just wondering if you could fill me in on where you are with the concept, if you have plans to move ahead with any of these regional homeland security headquarters.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, I mean, this is a matter, I know, that's been proposed and it's something we're looking at. My concern is that I want to be sure that we, whatever we do, is something that does not add a layer of bureaucracy, but that actually streamlines things and flattens the organization. So, as we move forward, we'll obviously look at all different kinds of configurations for making sure we maximize -- we want to get the outcome of more regional cooperation. What the right way to do that is and how to organize the individual elements of the department to do that is still something, frankly, that's kind of an open question.
Representative Miller: If I could just ask one more question as well. A particular dynamic that occurs on our border, because of a number of reasons we have been cannibalizing nurses from Canada to work in our healthcare system, particularly in southeast Michigan. In fact, if you go into any of our hospitals probably 25 percent of all the nurses are Canadian citizens. And there was some consternation about how they were transiting across with the kind of work permits that were required through your department. And I think, for the most part, most of them are now operating under this NEXUS program, and if you could comment on how is that working and were you aware about the Canadian -- we actually, during 9/11, had to stop surgeries for all practical purposes because we couldn't get our nurses across the border. It is a concern there.
Secretary Chertoff: I can't say I was in particular aware of the nurses. But I am aware of the fact that our economy is very interdependent with the Canadian economy. It's true in services; it's true in manufacturing. A critical challenge for us is to have a right balance between security and efficiency, because if either one of those gets out of balance, we're really going to hurt our economy; we're going to hurt our country.
So, NEXUS is a terrific program. It is a program that basically allows us to check people and make sure they are essentially trusted travelers and then let them move back and forth more quickly. And, frankly, that is the way for it across the board for this country in terms of travel in and out of the country, and in terms of a whole series of things, we need to offer people the opportunity to get into a program where we can do a reasonable background check, get some biographical information, make sure they're not a threat, and then build them a biometric identification card that assures that the person holding the card is the person we've checked. And then let them move through the system rapidly. And that gives us both more security and more efficiency, which is, I think, is a win-win for everybody.
Delegate Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-DC): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, for your testimony. I've a couple of questions. One has to do with the personnel system. I note in today's Washington Post that the Pentagon is delaying implementation of its personnel system, very much like what was approved for your department. Your department, of course, has even more employees. This was a radical change, obviously, in the government, profound change. I don't envy you having all you have do, having also to deal with these arcane -- it's the only word for them -- details. We had a witness here at one point who seemed not even to understand the root reason for this rather ponderous system that the government has. (Inaudible) -- the government and due process. You, of course, are not a lawyer.
Due process comes into play here when you're talking pay for performance. Due process doesn't come into play when you're talking AT&T or whoever in the private sector. So it becomes really complicated. One doesn't want to build a system that is full of opportunities for litigation and delay. What is being changed, of course, is everything from pay for performance -- and that's the real zinger. If you're talking about a government system where you have got to show that you are being fair, given the constitutional restrictions on the government. But there's labor disputes -- frankly, from top to bottom, the personnel system is being changed. The Pentagon is delaying major aspects, it looks like, of its plan, and I'd like to know the status of the changes, comparable changes in your department.
Secretary Chertoff: Let me first identify, I think, the philosophical and practical reasons for having this new set of improvements in the personnel system. You know, we brought together a legacy personnel systems that had to be integrated, and rather than integrate them according to the least efficient model, the thought was let's take the opportunity, as long as we have to do some integration, to integrate to the 21st century state-of-the-art with respect to personnel. We need to get high performers into the government. We have jobs that need to be done now that are increasingly more sophisticated. We're competing with the private sector, and, candidly, we cannot do that if we cannot offer some reasonably competitive rates including pay bands and pay for performance, so that people who are good performers have some degree of confidence that they're going to be rewarded.
At the same time, I think the cornerstone of the philosophy is it has to be -- our system has to be fair; it has to be transparent and also has be efficient. And a key piece of that is training. We need to make sure that, as people -- as managers and supervisors get involved in the process of reviewing, as part of the system, they really understand how to do it in a way that's fair, transparent and efficient. And, by the way, we should be reviewing the reviewers. We should be making sure that the very fairness, transparency and efficiency levels that they employ are themselves a function that's being reviewed. So –
Delegate Norton: That would assume standards. This is the government. That sounds like any personnel system. This sounds like what any manager anywhere in the United States would say. When you're talking about 800,000 employees going to pay for performance, for example, those are words. The real challenge for you and your department is how to people make that judgment so that you're not overridden with litigation or grievances or complaints, and that's really my question.
Secretary Chertoff: I think that --
Delegate Norton: (Inaudible) -- the standards and whether or not you believe your department is ready to move forward as apparently the Pentagon with its civilian employees does not.
Secretary Chertoff: I believe we are ready to move forward. I think we're looking to implement the current regulations in August of this year and to start the new performance management system, not the pay piece, but the performance management in October. And the idea is do to this in stages, to lay down specific metrics, the kinds of things that are going to be measured in terms of performance and to train managers to do that, and so that everybody has confidence in the system.
But in that regard, I do have to make a point about a problem that we have. As I look at what has been done in the current stage of the appropriations, we've had a substantial cut of money, a $26 million from (HR)MAX, and $98 million from management, which also was responsible. Frankly, if we want to have the system work well, if we want it to be fair and transparent and efficient, we have to pay for it. We can't short change the training; we can't short change putting in place the process, it's going to be fair and efficient, and that's why I think it's very important to fund the system and -- so that it works.
I guess the last observation I'd make is this: I think delay is the worst of all worlds. I think that -- I lived most of my life in a pay-for- performance system in the private sector, and I think it can work and it will work. I think the uncertainty of the transition is always the hardest piece. And, frankly, the longer we delay the transition, the more we drag it out, the worse we're going to have -- the more apprehension people are going to have and the more anxiety, and that's why I think we are committed to doing this. And we should move in a disciplined but brisk manner in getting this implemented.
Delegate Norton: I couldn't agree more.
Representative Davis: The gentlelady's time's expired.
Delegate Norton: Just to finish, I couldn't agree more. Grievances and complaints that go on for years and years, I don't see how they assist either the agency or the person. I must say, though, Mr. Secretary, that, if a court gets grievances or gets cases, training will not be what the court will look at. The court will look at something you mentioned in passing that is so important, and that is the measures, what they were, and whether the supervisor has indeed met those measures. And I just want to emphasize again -- and the reason I do it is because we had someone before us who acted as if due process did not come into play when the government -- whether you're going to pay for performance or whether you have this old GSA system. I ran a federal agency. You will not find me a fan of that system. That standard is not going to change if people, of course, sue the agency, and let me just finally say that I'm very pleased to hear what you said about technical, about screeners, that we have probably reached the level of what you can expect of human screening. And instead of just beating up on screeners, we now have to face the fact the next level is the technology level. Thank you.
Representative Davis: Thank you, the gentlelady's time has expired. Mr. Turner.
Representative Michael Turner (R-OH): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate you holding this hearing concerning the Department of Homeland Security, and, Mr. Secretary, I want to thank you for all of your efforts in the important and enormous job of keeping our country save. Your dedication to that critical goal is certainly what will be part of our great success in keeping this country safe.
You have already acknowledged that one of the challenges that you face is the area of information sharing and data warehousing. Trying to get the various branches of the federal government and of your department to share information and effectively use it. The January 2005 GAO high-risk series report, identifies appropriate and effective information-sharing mechanisms in homeland security as one of the new areas of high risk. And when they issued this report this year they stated, "as in prior GAO high-risk update report, federal programs and operations are also emphasized when they are at high-risk because of their greater vulnerabilities to fraud, waste, abuse and mismanagement and are in need of transformation." In looking to the processes of transforming that area, which is going to be so critical to our success, I wanted to ask you some questions of your thoughts of the issues of the application of commercial processes for information sharing.
In my district we have NCR, which is one of the preeminent data management and teradata companies in the country. They do the processes for Wal-Mart and Federal Express, which are both known as companies that utilize information and data sharing to make certain that they are successful. In talking to representatives of NCR, they talk about the process that they work with clients in looking into what information is needed and then designing systems both that produce data and that can manage data and effectively transmit data. So many times I think we're fearful when the federal government begins to look at trying to seek the acquisition of systems that, for example, in trying to acquire a hammer that they might try to redesign the hammer instead of just going to look for a hammer. In this instance we know that out in the commercial sector, our companies in the United States that have focused on data management have been highly successful. There are those technical expertise, management expertise, that we could tap into.
Could you talk to us for a moment about your efforts to reach out to the commercial sector so that, as we look to this important issue that GAO has identified as high risk, we could take advantage of some of the resources we already have here.
Secretary Chertoff: As a matter of fact, this morning I met with CEOs from the software industry, the Business Software Alliance, to talk generally about some of their issues. And I said to them, you know, I thought that we need to do a better job of tapping into the ingenuity of the private sector in providing solutions; in other words, not necessarily coming in and saying, "Let's build something from scratch," which I think, as experience shows, has often resulted in an overpriced and underperforming system -- this is not just computers; it's across the board -- but sometimes we should be a little less ambitious, take what already has worked and figure out how to adapt it to our current circumstance. We need to do that in this department. We need to do it by completing the process of integrating our IT acquisition and roll out a coordination, which we are in the process of doing. We then need to make sure that we are looking at what's out there in the real world as examples, as opposed to buying pie-in-the-sky promises.
We also have the challenge, of course, of having existing legacy systems which we can't entirely scrap, and we've got to figure ways to bridge between those existing systems with platforms that will operate across them. The desired end state, as you say, is an ability to have, like we're on the verge of having now, single e-mail system, single information system, and one that has adequate screening, adequate security, so we're not worried about penetration from the outside.
Representative Turner: I appreciate your efforts in that regard, because it certainly will enhance our success to the extent that we go to those that are already being successful in these processes. Thank you.
Representative Davis: Ms. Maloney.
Representative Carolyn Maloney (D-NY): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this incredibly important hearing. And welcome, Mr. Chertoff. I represent New York City; lost many friends and neighbors on 9/11. And we certainly wish you well. But this copy that came out recently, June 6th, on U.S. News & World Report entitled "Pigging Out: How Homeland Security Became Washington's Biggest Porkfest," is not encouraging, to say the least. It is extremely discouraging and really frightening, in my opinion.
Unfortunately, this is not the only article on this. We've seen headlines like this too often. This article highlighted TSA spending $500,000 for plants and artwork, and then they were purchasing sub- zero refrigerators at a cost of $3,000 each. And as one who represents what remains to be target number one in America, New York City, I find that very troubling. But even more troubling is not addressing the monies towards really preventing danger to coming to our citizens. And in this, they talk extensively about our nation's cargo screening strategy. And in it they reported, and I quote, that "nuclear specialists say some of the efforts suffer from misplaced priorities and rely on detectors so primitive that they cannot tell the difference between highly-enriched uranium and naturally-occurring radiation in kitty litter," end quote.
And on the same day that this report came out, ABC News reported, and I quote, that "the new drive-through detection machines being installed at a cost of half a billion dollars cannot detect the enriched uranium that many say poses the greatest threat to our nation," and that this expert says that it could leave our country's ports -- and I represent, along with New Jersey, one of the biggest ports in our country -- but it would leave our ports susceptible to terrorists smuggling nuclear weapons or material in one of the thousands of containers that came into the country every day. And in this report, they quoted Dr. Tom Coburn (sic), the director of the National Resource Defense Council, a nuclear program, as saying, and I quote, "Unfortunately, we have about a half a billion dollars' worth of kitty-litter detectors that will not detect enriched uranium reliably."
They further reported that in tests it conducted in 2002-2003, uranium shielded in lead easily passed by detection machines that were in place. And I believe that this is totally an unacceptable situation. The smuggling of nuclear material, a dirty bomb or weapons of mass destruction in a commercial cargo container, still represents probably one of the most important if not the most important or most significant security threat to our nation and to our citizens.
In fact, there was a movie out of England that showed what would happen if a dirty bomb exploded in England, and it was horrifying. And some economists estimate if one happened in our country, there would be well over a million casualties and an impact of well over $300 billion to several trillion dollars. But despite this threat, the fact is that most currently-deployed non-intrusive inspection systems in ports were designed to intercept contraband, stolen vehicles, stowaways, and not designed to detect, which is truly our most important threat, dirty bombs or weapons of mass destruction.
So I would like to go to the root of the problem. The article alleges that the problem is a sole-source contract -- that's what the article alleges -- and that that is the problem. So based on that situation, I really would like to ask you about how you feel about this. And specifically, Mr. Chairman, do you believe in best-value procurement so that DHS can properly balance costs and technical capacity and purchasing key technology? Do you agree that the lowest cost is not necessarily the best value? Do you believe in full and fair and open competition for DHS procurement? Do you believe DHS should procure by sole-source methods when there are possibly multiple U.S. sources available? And do you think the best technology should be used to detect weapons of mass destruction in cargo?
Representative Davis: The gentlelady's time --
Representative Maloney: And my time is up.
Secretary Chertoff: Let me, if I may, just take a moment to answer. I agree that nuclear material being smuggled is a very, very high priority for us. And that's one of the reasons the president's budget has asked for funding of about $227 million for a domestic nuclear detection office, which would bring together a lot of the programs we now have to develop systems and technology to identify and detect and thereby intercept nuclear bombs or nuclear material coming into the country. That's a very high priority.
I have to say this about articles like that, though. It strikes me you can pretty much find a self-styled expert to say something about everything. And I think the article overstates dramatically the problem that we have. Radiation-detector monitors, which we have in ports, in fact, do detect radiation quite well. They're extremely sensitive to radiation. There are certain inherent physical limitations as between different types of radioactive material -- for example, plutonium versus highly-enriched uranium -- which are endemic in the physical substance. In other words, we don't create that problem; God creates the problem, because that's the way the physics of nuclear energy works. So we do actually have a robust detection system.
Secondly, it is misleading to say that the machines can't distinguish between kitty litter and other kinds of isotopes, because the way the system is structured is there is a capacity to send back to a targeting center a profile of the particular characteristics of what is being read on the monitor. And scientists sitting in a targeting center are, in fact, capable of distinguishing between kitty litter and isotopes. So that is, again, a misleading statement in the article.
Finally, with respect to shielding, it is true that shielding can create a problem for radiation detection. What the article doesn't tell you, though, is that part of what we do in a layered protection system is you build in a detector that detects the presence of shielding, so that I may not be able to tell -- there may be sufficient shielding to protect the radioactive material from direct detection, but another detector will point out that there's shielding. And if I see there's shielding in a container, I'm going to open it up. I'm going to look inside.
Representative Maloney: Mr. Chertoff, my question was not whether kitty litter could be detected or not. My question was, was this a sole- source contract? Where's the justification document for that contract?
Representative Davis: Well, unfortunately, Ms. Maloney, your time is up.
Representative Maloney: Could you just answer in writing to my questions, since my time is up?
Representative Davis: You had a four-and-a-half-minute question, and that made it tough for him to get everything. And so I'm going to have to go on to the next. Let me just say to members, everybody's been waiting here, and I just want to try to move this along fairly. Mr. Issa.
Representative Darrell Issa (R-CA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I have a border region, San Diego. And I have a unique situation that I've been working through your predecessor organizations for a very long time, and that is, as you well know, but most people in the United States don't know, we have border checkpoints more than 70 miles inside the United States.
And the Border Patrol, under management after management and different secretaries, has always tried to defend these, even though the General Accounting (Office) study shows that they're hard to defend. It'd be perfect to tell you exactly how hard to defend the effectiveness of these, except that the Border Patrol systematically doesn't deliver accurate information as to where apprehensions are. Every time there's a study, every piece of released information always simply talks about regions and areas, when, in fact, there are exact points that they could say, "We apprehended them here, here and here." Having said that, I want to make it very clear that I support the Border Patrol when they try to do things that make sense. In June of 2004, the Temecula Border Patrol station conducted a series of illegal-immigrant sweeps in inland areas in my district. During that time they were called mobile patrol group made up of 12 Border Patrol agents. They successfully had 450 arrests in 18 days, nearly double, nearly double the monthly average for 2003, not for 12 people but for the whole station, for everybody.
Secretary, those mobile patrols, at the orders of Washington, were stopped. A lot of double-talk about "Well, they weren't officially stopped" -- they were stopped. The Border Patrol wants to conduct those. And I don't really care if it's the Border Patrol, it's ICE, it's the man in the moon, who it is. Your organization is reorganizing exactly like the Polish cavalry before World War II. If you continue to use horses that don't succeed, well, there are tanks that do succeed. Effective enforcement, when demonstrated in southern California, is being thwarted through your department by simply not allowing Border Patrol to organize under whatever set of rules and guidelines you have to, or ICE, in order to go after illegal immigrants who otherwise would not be caught.
I want to secondly make it very clear that it is not about just catching illegals, because if you want to catch illegals, you can go to any farm in my district, any hotel in my district -- you can go anywhere you want -- but, in fact, about successfully collecting the worst offenders. And to that extent, although it's not directly your jurisdiction, I want to make you further aware and get your comments on this, the fact that the U.S. attorney in San Diego has refused to prosecute coyotes, no matter how many times they're arrested, unless they use violence or specifically endanger a life or are carrying drugs.
And if you think that's appropriate or not would be my first question. Should we be having a zero tolerance with the coyotes even if we cannot effectively arrest the more than 11 million illegal immigrants in this country?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, of course, it is true that U.S. attorneys are not in my purview. I used to be a U.S. attorney, but that was many years ago and I was in a different part of the country.
Obviously we need to focus on deterring people who are trafficking, starting, of course -- our highest priority are the organizations. If we can take down the organizations, we get the maximum bang for the buck. The more deterrence we can bring to bear, the better off we are. I recognize that U.S. attorneys have constraints. Among other things, you have court constraints. There are only so many judges, so many courtrooms. When you charge people, you have to try them. So that's a numerical limit.
As far as the particular tactic you're talking about, I frankly don't know whether it was stopped or why it was stopped. What I can tell you is that --
Representative Issa: But are you familiar with the mobile patrols and their success? I mean, it was nationally covered in a fairly broad way.
Secretary Chertoff: I mean, I think I was probably a judge when it was being covered, and I was focused on doing judicial things.
Representative Issa: Okay.
Secretary Chertoff: But I do think that we have recently unified our command and control over Border Patrol across the board, the idea being that we don't want to have ad-hoc decisions made about how border tactics are operating. We want to have a comprehensive picture, recognizing that there are different tactics that work on different parts of the border because of the topography. So we're committed to the best practices.
If there's anything there that works -- well, that's legal -- we're going to do it. And, you know, I'm more than happy to go back and say, "Look, let's see, you know, if this worked and it's not continuing, what else do we need to do? Should we reinaugurate it?" I mean, there's no pride of authorship here. We want to do the best to maximize the effect we have with the resources that we can bring to bear.
Representative Issa: I appreciate that. And if, after you've looked at the success of the mobile patrols out of the Temecula checkpoint, you'd get back to my office with either your comments in the negative, if you don't think it worked, or if there were serious problems, or how, on a centralized basis, perhaps we could begin using these kinds of techniques to target those who are either the most dangerous or the least desirable among the 11 million illegals that operate here in the United States today. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Davis: Thank you very much. Mr. Ruppersberger.
Representative Dutch Ruppersberger (D-MD): Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Well, first I want to say you have one of the toughest jobs in Washington. But don't feel alone, because we all need to come together to work with you in our different agencies. I mean, to take 22 different agencies, its tough enough getting two agencies together. So -- and I think really what starts on anything that we do is management, and management at the top.
Now, I have a letter that was written on October -- it's a bipartisan letter -- written October 15th, 2001, and it was to the president. And it's a letter that I'm going to give you a copy of. Basically what the letter says and asks, it asks what are our vulnerabilities as it relates to terrorism and national security, what are the threats, what are our priorities, and how do we link that to funding? And that's basically risk management. Now, what I'm interested is to find out where you are today or where you think you are today as it relates to the threats, the budget priorities and the funding. Now, I have other questions, and I know we've got five minutes, and I'm going to submit to you and ask that you respond to that and maybe to the contents of this letter.
But I think it's important -- I mean, we can talk about immigration; we can talk about money going to the locals. There are a lot of things. But we're not going to be able to accomplish it. So let's start from a management perspective, from a risk management, all the threats, what we're looking for as it relates to funding.
Secretary Chertoff: We are 110 percent on board with the proposition that we have to be risk-based in funding. And that means we look at three characteristics. We look, first of all, at consequence. We look at vulnerability and we look at threat. We have a national preparedness plan which identifies against that template of those three characteristics, the kinds of capabilities and tasks that individual localities or states ought to be able to carry out in order to be prepared to meet the risks as we've outlined them.
And we are capable of working with computer modeling, resources that we have, for example, at the national science laboratories, at being pretty specific in determining using, again, consequence, vulnerability and threat, what our highest-priority targets are. What are the things we ought to be worrying about the most so we can address those things first? That is the template that we use in terms of driving everything that we do. And one of the things we're undertaking in the second- stage review is we are trying to build a way of looking at all the threats, vulnerabilities and consequences and having accountability as part of the three-dimensional matrix for making sure that we have in place everything we need to address the highest-priority targets in terms of those characteristics.
There's something Congress can do to help. We have to continue to move to a funding system that is risk-based. The more ability we have to apply our funding based upon risks that are identified through this discipline process, the closer we are in giving the American public what they're entitled to expect, which is the maximum value for their hard-earned dollars.
Representative Ruppersberger: Okay. Based on what you just said and the matrix that you have, what would you say are your top five threats, from a priority point of view?
Secretary Chertoff: Well --
Representative Ruppersberger: I mean, management, again, is about prioritizing.
Secretary Chertoff: It's a little hard to take a matrix and compress it into five. I would say that among the things that are high priority are, obviously, things which could yield a catastrophic response, a threat which would yield a huge loss in human life or a loss that has huge economic impact. So we do think about, for example, nuclear, biological, chemical. Those are things which would be very --
Representative Ruppersberger: All right. With each one you're going to talk about, how much funding are you putting into these areas?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, again, you know, it's a little more granular than that, because we have to -- you know, we have, for example, in the nuclear area, the president has requested $227 million for a domestic nuclear detection office. Obviously there are other programs. The Department of Energy is doing stuff. The Department of Defense --
Representative Ruppersberger: By the way, I see my yellow light is coming on. I want to get one more question out and then we'll see where we can go. Two years ago, Congressman Waxman and I asked GAO to do a risk management of the Department of Homeland Security, especially as it related to maritime security. And, by the way, I think GAO has some of the top risk-management people, and I would hope that you would use them in your second-stage review and get the information as we do from them, because I think it's a great resource.
But getting back to the questions I asked about your priorities -- I'm not going to have enough time to finish it -- it's important, I think, that we pick those priorities, and I'd like to know where they are and also where your priority of funding, because it's all about funding in the end.
I've got the letter I'm going to give you and I have other questions that I would like you, if you could, to get back. On time. (Laughter.)
Representative Davis: Almost. Okay, thank you. Mr. Platts.
Representative Todd Russell Platts (R-PA): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Secretary, I appreciate your being here, and certainly thank you for your many years of public service, and especially now as head of the Department of Homeland Security.
I wanted to touch on two specific issues that relate to the passage of the Department of Homeland Security Financial Accountability Act last October. I sponsored that legislation and this committee moved it, and the House and Senate passed it and the president signed it into law. We worked very closely with your department, prior to your being there, in drafting, amending, and kind of getting a consensus. Two parts of that that have not yet either been fulfilled or the department is showing now, after the fact, an unwillingness to comply. First is the issue of your CFO.
The law says that within six months of its passage that the president would nominate for Senate confirmation a new CFO or designate a CFO and that the current CFO could continue serving until confirmation occurred. That six months passed about 45 days or so ago. My understanding is you've not yet even begun interviewing potential nominees and I'd be interested in why the delay?
And the law says what it does. It was written in cooperation with the department and the administration. And what's the timeframe that is in place today to get this law complied with?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, we have a very able CFO on board now and of course we know we need to find somebody who is going to ultimately be nominated for a Senate-confirmed position. As you know, there's been a substantial turnover in the department. When I came in with the deputy, we had a large number of vacancies in the top management of the department. We have been working very hard to fill those. Some of those are getting filled.
I think you know the process of searching tends to be a cumbersome process not least of all because, first of all, these are challenging jobs. And sometimes the people you want for them don't necessarily want to give up their lucrative careers to take them. And sometimes it's because it's a cumbersome background check process. So we are aware of the requirement. We're committed to meeting it. We're dealing with marked constraints and kind of practical constraints, but we are actively involved in the process of filling -- trying to fill the position.
Representative Platts: I hope that the process will pick up because it's something that regularly in my subcommittee when we talk about the various agencies, that we've laws on the books and agencies just fail to comply with the law and there's never any consequences. That certainly doesn't work back home when citizens don't comply with the law and the law was agreed to by the administration.
And the fact that we're now a month-and-a-half past the six-month deadline, so we're seven-and-a-half months past when the department knew this was a requirement. And it's not simply to go through the process. It's because Congress has said that we believe that in these departments it's important to have the best possible officials in place and that Senate confirmation process is part of ensuring that. I certainly don't have anything bad to say about Andy Maner, your current CFO, but the law is as it stands and needs to be compiled with. Related to that same piece of legislation deals with internal controls. And financial management, one of the president's five core -- president's management agenda, one of the core areas was financial management and through the legislation we've sought to help strength your department's financial management process. You inherited I think more than 15 material weaknesses in the various agencies. Getting to that foundation is assessing your internal controls. The law as passed said in the current fiscal year '05, you have to make an assertion regarding your internal controls. And, in '06 have an audit of your internal controls. In this year's budget that came up to Congress from the administration, there was language proposing to delay the assertion one year and to delay the internal control audit two more years. So a total of three years from the time that a law was passed.
I'd like to know why you don't want to go forward with that and what is the department's position today in complying with the law as it stands?
Secretary Chertoff: Let me tell you where we are. In March of this year, the CFO established an internal control committee which was responsible to implement the provisions of P.L. 108-330. Last month, in May, we developed an implementation guide for the internal control provision working with OMB in an interagency committee. We also began executing a planning phase of implementation to determine what documentation we would need and the kind of testing that would need to be performed. And over the summer we plan to complete the GAO internal control management and evaluation tool as the assessment process to support the statement of assurance in FY05. We've also in the fiscal year 2006 budget, which is pending, requested a little over $5.2 million and five full-time equivalents to support remediation efforts to transform the legacy internal controls structure, so we integrated control framework.
So we are moving forward on this briskly. It is a challenge. As you point out, we have a lot of legacy agencies. So we have not only the challenge of meeting a new standard but also bringing together and binding all the existing legacies. And I think we have a brisk program to move forward and complete what we need to do.
Representative Platts: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. If you could follow up maybe in writing to the committee, a timeline you propose for confirmation of the CFO and specifically your intent to comply with the law passed last year regarding the assertion for '05 and the internal control audit for '06. That would very much be appreciated.
Secretary Chertoff: Okay.
Representative Platts: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Davis: Thank you very much, Mr. Platts. Mr. Porter.
Representative Jon Porter (R-NV): Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, appreciate you being here and your depth of knowledge in such a short time of being in that role. If you look at the economies of every state in the nation, they each have their strength from ranching, farming, industrial, chemical, depends on the state. I represent the community of Nevada, Las Vegas area, one of the major tourist destinations in the world where close to 40 million tourists a year visit a state of about 2 million people. Of course after September 11, we experienced some very, very serious downturn in our economy. But more importantly we realized at the point more than ever, the importance of coordination between the federal government and the state governments.
In that, Nevada's number one economy is tourism. I think many times overlooked that in every state in the union, travel and tour is one, two, and three in every state as far as their economic base but also in employment. I believe so much in the fact that we needed to have representation in the Department of Homeland Security, we worked, in the bill that passed last year, of course, the reform act, to create a role for your special assistant, Alfonso Martinez-Fonts who is now working closely with the tourism-travel industry.
So first, let me say thank you for the efforts of your assistant. But also to reiterate the importance, as you're developing your new plans I know you're creating a department, possibly a token-white policy office that the tourism and travel industry, whether it be Anaheim, Disneyland, Orlando, Chicago, New York, where ever in this country, New Orleans, we handle a lot of people. And a great mass of people and we worked closely with TSA and other agency -- other parts of your department.
We want to reiterate the importance of that communication so we can play a major role in helping you because security certainly is paramount. Community in Nevada, our hotels, our resort industry is state of the art. The latest security, latest technology and we appreciate the effort so far but want to reiterate in the future that that's important. So more of a comment than a question. And if I could follow up now with a more specific question. As you know also, Nevada has been chosen as a site for high-level nuclear waste to be buried at the Yucca Mountain. I appreciate comments today about the current uranium detection methods are problematic. As we're looking at homeland security and the possible transportation of 77,000 tons of nuclear waste through most every state in the union, I'd appreciate if you'd one, comment of course on the tourism aspect but also on plans to secure our communities as this waste travels by every -- by schools and churches and malls and parks, that we have the proper security in place.
Secretary Chertoff: Let me try to address both of those issues. We're sensitive about the fact that tourism and travel is a significant component of the economy not just for the hotels, the airlines, shipping. I mean across the board it has a major ripple effect. And one of the things we are trying to do as we move forward for example with security and airports and infrastructure security, is to build a system that is actually -- facilitates ease of movement and travel in tourism while building in security.
Now, I need both of these because we know if there are security problems, that people are not going to want to travel. But we also know that if it's inconvenient and inefficient, people are not going to want to travel. So we try to maximize both. And in line with that, I met, when I was in New York about a month or so ago with representatives of the travel and tourism industry. When I was overseas a couple of weeks ago, I met with overseas travel and tourism representatives to make this point. To say that we want to build systems for security that work with the needs of our travel and tourism sectors of the economy and not at cross purposes.
As far as nuclear goes, we work hand in hand with the NRC and the other agencies that have the substantive expertise in terms of transporting and storing nuclear waste to make sure that they have the benefit of our insights with respect to security type issues. They often own the expertise and have been doing a lot of work frankly over a number of years even before 9/11 in modeling the types of threats there are to nuclear material and how you can best protect against them. And that's an area where we are going to continue to be actively involved again, working with the NRC and the other responsible agencies who have direct supervision over nuclear material to make sure we are assuring safety for communities.
Representative Porter: And I appreciate, two diverse questions and apply them in a period, but back to the tourism. I think it's important and imperative to note that our goal, like yours, is the security and safety of these individuals. We work closely with TSA and we've evolved into, I think, a premier facility at our airport, McCarran Airport, in handling these 30-some million that travel through our airport and we would like to offer our assistance in other areas because of our expertise. But it's certainly economic but more importantly that we can help balance the security with that and I appreciate your comments. Thank you.
Representative Davis: Thank you. Mr. Mica followed by Mr. Duncan.
Representative John Mica (R-FL): Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize. I've had to run in and out for another hearing across the hall. Actually two hearings today. Nice to see you, Mr. Secretary, and thank you for participating today and giving us sort of an update of where we are and where we want to go. One of the concerns that we have, and I've heard expressed on the floor, is the checking of cargo. And say that only some six percent of cargo is examined either coming in or commercial aircraft, et cetera. And right now, you have a system that's based on really going out and doing spot checks and using sort of intensive and costly personnel. Have you given any consideration to setting standards, looking at a system that relies more on you setting sort of the rules? And again, a process that should be followed in checking of companies as opposed to sort of a massive -- we'd probably bankrupt the system or completely slow down the economy or bring it to a halt if we did 100 percent cargo check. Are you looking at an optional approach?
Secretary Chertoff: I think the answer is, first of all we're acutely aware of the fact we screen, I mean we inspect a percentage based upon what we screen. But if we were to physically inspect everything, I think you're quite right, we would -- the system would grind to a halt. So we have to take into account a number of things. We have to consider the risks. There's a difference. We deal with cargo that travels on passenger planes versus cargo that travels on cargo planes. There may be some differences in the way we want to handle that.
And as a general principal, I think we are always open to the question of are there ways we can build a process that is -- requires -- does not require federal ownership of the process but where the federal government sets standards and checks the checkers. But puts the responsibility on the people who are other players in the process, private players to actually make sure that they are keeping standards.
Now, the devil is in the details and there may be different requirements in different settings. That by the way is a model we use in a lot of different areas in government. We use it in a securities area. I know when I was in the area of being a prosecutor, we had increasingly found the use of private sector ombudsman or inspectors general as a way to have compliance in business that did not require the federal government itself to own the compliance, but we could create a model in which someone else would have that responsibility with our supervision and checking. So that's probably a long-winded answer to the question that we are open to systems that minimize costs, maximize efficiency and give us the best possible protection.
Representative Mica: Well, same type of approach or similar approach in having you set standards say for passenger screening. I believe you've already certified some companies and we have five private screening companies that have worked very well under federal supervision. Micromanaging all of that from Washington in sort of a Soviet-style system has proven very difficult.
You haven't been in office that long, but you'll be getting requests from members here, the lines are backed up at my airport, what are you going to do? In Orlando, and I'm chairman of aviation, we had a request for additional screeners. It took some six months to do an evaluation, then by the time the folks got on board, well they changed the number slightly. The situation had changed because of the fluctuation of schedules and requirements and season and conventions, all kinds of things. Is it possible for us to look at decentralizing the system? We have the opt-out which I authored in the bill. And the major problem, too, we have with opt-out right now, in many airports we do it across the country if the liability question was satisfactorily resolved for them. Where are we on that?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, as I say, we do have some pilot programs, I think five, we've had five opt-outs. We're always interested in seeing how that approach compares with the current approach. As I said earlier, I continue to think -- well, we have identified, but to coin existing technologies that would do a better job in terms of puffers and back scatter. If we can finance that and get it out there, that's going to make a big difference. As far as the safety act goes, that's a very significant tool if we can get the private sector involved in carrying its share of the burden of security. And I'm pleased to say that we have in the, I guess, three and a-half months I've been on the job we've approved more than twice as many applications than had been approved during the preceding two years. But I don't regard that as a mission accomplished. I regard that as merely a kind of a direction we have to point the way.
Philosophically, my understanding in the intent to Congress with the safety act was not to put DHS in the position of picking the best or the winner or having a competition. But picking technologies that were good, that added value and then getting them reasonable protection under the safety act. And I think if we have an appropriate philosophy, we're going to see a much more efficient use of that process.
Representative Mica: So the high-tech proposal that we've offered, just in conclusion, we'd solicit your support because high-tech is the answer. Not only expediting check baggage screening, but also passengers and giving us better detection at much lower cost as GAO had pointed out. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Davis: Thank you. Mr. Duncan.
Representative John Duncan, Jr. (R-TN): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, a couple of years ago when the Congress passed the farm bill and it had the word security in it, the Wall Street Journal had an editorial which said that anytime a bill had the word security in it, we should give it four times the scrutiny. Because their point was, is that every department and agency was trying to come up with security measures so they could get higher funding. And I remember when Governor Gilmore, who chaired the president's commission on terrorism and what to do about it. In his final report to the president, in his letter he said, we must resist the urge to try to seek total security because it's not achievable and it will drain resources away from things that are attainable.
And so, it seems to me that what the most difficult question here is how do you achieve the balance necessary because we all want to keep the country as safe as possible. And yet we're thousands of times more likely to be killed in a car wreck on the highways or even more likely to be struck by lightning or win a lottery than being killed by a terrorist. So how do you achieve that balance? What is the common sense approach that's necessary to do what we need to do, but not go ridiculously overboard in that process? I've heard on the news and read that there are hundreds of companies now and thousands of ideas that have been submitted to your department. And everybody has the latest product, the latest idea. This seems to me to be a very difficult process, but I just wanted to get your thoughts in response to what I've just said.
Secretary Chertoff: My response is I agree 100 percent with what you just said. We should be a secure nation, but not a security nation. Meaning our life should not just be about security. Our life should be about our prosperity and our freedom and our security is what is indispensable to preserve our way of life. I think the first thing we do is we have an honest -- we were honest with the American people. We say exactly what you've said and what I've said. We are not going to protect everybody against every bad thing every place at every moment. Before 9/11, apart from terrorism, there have been bad things that have happened. There've been trail derailments. There've been fires. There've been things of that sort. We have to take reasonable precautions and that's where risk management comes in.
We have to identify those things that are truly catastrophic and we really have to work hard on those. And then there are things that are going to happen that are going to be bad, but frankly, we're going to look to our state and local partners and private citizens to take reasonable precautions. As you say, everyday we make judgments. We take some risks because we want to be able to get in the car or go to work or go to the movies. So, part of it is we've got to make sure we have a very clear statement to the American people which I think by the way they'll have no trouble understanding because I think they do it in their own life. We need to build risk management into our programs and we need to then walk the walk, meaning we need to make decisions that do not overprotect.
And what I'm happy to say is I think in some of the things, we've been able to do since we -- since I got here, which I know about, we've started to make some decisions that I think are common sense decisions that balance risks. For example, there was an issue about should we remove placards from hazardous material -- placards, warning placards from railcars because there's some risk that that might identify a target for a terrorists. And we balanced the risk. We said look, it's more important to have first responders know what's in the car if there's an accident than it is to worry that some terrorist is going to read it. So we said, okay, we're going to keep the placards up.
Our general aviation at Reagan. Again, you know, we balanced risks against benefits and we've in principal, come up with an idea. We're going to open it up in a limited control fashion. So we are now starting to make decisions in this department that produce results that balance properly. And I think the more we do that the better off we're going be.
Representative Duncan: Well, very good answer. Let me go to another direction very quickly. I've read several articles that we're most vulnerable now on cybersecurity. We've talked, especially young people but we're teaching almost everybody to worship the computer today. And I know they can do miraculous things.
But are you also discussing or looking into encouraging companies and agencies to keep old-fashioned backup paper systems? Or what steps are you taking to really work on this cyber security threat, which I read is extremely dangerous?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, as I said, I met this morning with the Business Software Alliance, which are CEOs of a number of prominent companies, to talk about cyber security. We have identified that as something we need to beef up in our department. Part of it is having defenses against various kinds of cyber attacks. Part of it is physical security. You know, there are technologies now where you have dual authorizations. It's not only a password, but it's a thumbprint. And that kind of -- promoting that kind of security and building those kinds of standards in what we do internally as well as what our private sector does is an important step in protecting our computer assets.
Representative Duncan: All right, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Representative Danny Davis (D-IL): Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for being here. I'm going to try to move quickly through my questions. In the new personnel system that's being implemented, the House took some actions on an amendment a couple of weeks ago that basically hurt the funding for that. Do you want to comment on that? It's at a critical stage in its development, and zeroing out those funds, did that hurt?
Secretary Chertoff: Mr. Chairman, it's essential we have the funding to move the program forward. The worst-possible world would be to have a system that we cannot properly operate because we haven't trained people. If nothing else, fairness to the people in the system requires that we fund it in a way that allows us to get it moving.
Representative Davis: I talked to Mr. Menendez whose amendment took the money. I don't think he was even aware that this was the money to implement that system. And I hope we can work to make sure in the conference that that money is restored. Two weeks ago we did a press conference. Your people were just excellent. We had former TSA Assistant Secretary Stone announce the pending release of the interim final rule reopening Reagan National Airport to general aviation.
Do you know what the status of that rule is?
Secretary Chertoff: I believe we're working on the technical aspects of the rule, and I hope to have it out within a few weeks.
Representative Davis: Thank you very much. The USVISIT program is absolutely critical at this point. It's -- what kind of plans does the department have to generate stakeholder ownership as well as a buy-in at the Department of State and the Department of Justice in order to have a really truly integrated border management system? Just also, what are the next major increments of the US-VISIT program that DHS will deliver and how is it going from your perspective?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, it's been very successful so far. And, by the way, when I was in Europe I had unsolicited praise from three separate government officials in European countries about how Europeans like the system because it moves them much more efficiently. And we are working to put -- we've got pilot programs with US- VISIT at several ports of exit, so we can get the exit piece of it. And we are now more efficient about being able to tap into both our own database and the FBI's database from a single point of contact at each of the ports of entry where we have deployed US-VISIT. We're going to continue the program going forward, and we're going to use it as a platform to actually have a more robust effort to have knowledge of who is coming in and who is leaving our border.
Representative Davis: Thank you. Switching to cyber security, do you see a need to have a senior person in the White House or OMB to coordinate cyber security policy across the government agencies? Or do you think DHS should be maybe working with the critical infrastructure that's owned by the private sector in coordinating policy. I think you know what I'm asking.
Secretary Chertoff: Yes, we are looking to upgrade our capability in terms of doing our cyber security piece. And a large part of what we do is, we network, not surprisingly, with the private sector, because they actually own most of the assets, and they have a good deal of ingenuity. So we are looking to, as part of our second-stage review, find a way to further build on those relationships to give us kind of a comprehensive approach to dealing with cyber security.
Representative Davis: Thank you. Let me just finally ask, there's been a considerable debate up here over container security, and how much is actually inspected. Can you just give us your views in terms of how safe the containers are coming into this country, what other strategies might be pursued, how open you are to some new ideas in those areas?
Secretary Chertoff: I'll answer both parts of that. We use a layered approach now. We screen 100 percent. We inspect those containers that, under our screening system, are high risk. And then we are continuing to move to commence the inspection process at the port of departure as opposed to the port of entry. We are deploying radiation detection monitors. I announced last week that by the end of the year the port of Los Angeles, which I think is the largest in the U.S. for containers, would be fully deployed with radiation portal monitors by the end of the year. The next stage, which I think you asked about, is equally important. We --
Representative Davis: Let me just try to take a different -- let me look at an idea, for example, the SEC would require traded companies to have their financial affairs in order, but they don't actually check the books themselves. They have third-party auditors, certified auditors, with their reputations on the line, accomplish that. Is there anyway that the CBT should look at shifting that type of system where you could have -- be prepared by -- (inaudible) -- third- party auditors rather than having you do that? Is that a concept you think would --
Secretary Chertoff: Absolutely. I mean, I think a concept we look at it is, the idea again of using, as I said, the private inspectors general. And modern supply chain management. I mean, companies now have the ability to track their stuff at a very specific level.
We are starting to talk about how we can tap into that expertise, so we don't have to own everything ourselves. We want to set the baseline. We want to be confident and assured. We don't want to necessarily operate it all as a government operation.
Representative Davis: Thank you very much. Mr. Souder.
Representative Souder: Mr. Secretary, if anything anybody has watched, it's the breathtaking scope of the job that you have. And I wanted to raise an unusual opportunity here as you're redoing the department to raise a couple of additional questions, and I know we'll continue to work through these both in homeland security and other areas.
First, let me thank you for your efforts in Coast Guard, because that is one of the classic examples of multitasking. If the boats go out of Alaska, the fishing industry, and all of Alaska, Northwest United States, could be destroyed; if we don't have search and rescue in the Great Lakes people are going to drown and off Florida and elsewhere. In the Caribbean we depend on the Coast Guard for drug interdiction as well as terrorist interdiction. And the bottom line is, we don't have more boats. These boats can't be in harbor, in the Caribbean, in Alaska, on the Great Lakes. And I appreciate your support for more boats, and we're going to need more. But I appreciate your earlier comments.
And also -- I know yesterday the drug task force meeting with speakers -- drug task force, which I believe was canceled -- I hope you can do that. Many members have expressed to me, because you are the largest combined drug agency that there is, because of the border patrol legacy, Customs, air and marine, Shadow Wolves, Coast Guard, all those things are in your department. And 30,000 people die from narcotics. Terrorism is a perceived, and there's certainly a great potential threat, but every year narcoterrorists are doing this, and the money is very interrelated. Also I interacted with your staff on the Capitol airspace security question. I spent quite a bit of time with Chairman Rogers last night. And he's working with that. And I just believe there needs to be better coordination. We weren't even out of the cloak room, and that building would have been blown up.
We are dependent here in the Capitol building on earlier warning, earlier detection, and certainty of security, because there is no way they can move us out of these buildings, no matter how hard they try, and they were yelling at all of us, but we can't get out.
And it's clear there are still arguments going on between the different agencies, and it isn't just a matter of the White House. Congress and the Supreme Court are equal branches, and there has to be some kind of coordinated security. Also Congressman Reyes raised on "Fox & Friends" this morning another unusual thing related to borders, and that is, Mexicans are immediately deported at El Paso if you don't have another crime. At El Paso, they used to have 17 times you were detained, but as long as you don't have another crime now they just send you back to Mexico.
But we've got about 10 percent of the people who aren't Mexicans. When I was on the border last, there were Brazilians, Middle Easterners being picked up, and we don't have detention facilities to put them in.
They are then on a deportation hearing up to their own recognizance. That is, we have enough of a problem with people coming in with Mexican IDs and going back to Mexico. But clearly we're going to have to have some kind of way to address these others who are not coming back for their deportation hearing. And while they may not have a criminal record, they certainly are a potential -- it is a huge vulnerability. And I wonder if that, and one other question if you could address, do you support additional detention centers for non- Mexicans so we don't just let them go -- release them into the United States. And then the last thing is that, given the incident on the Canadian border last week with the murderer who killed the two Canadian citizens, we have a problem at these small border crossings, that, short term it's not our greatest problem, but the millennium bomber came across in a small crossing at Port Angeles. It was dependent on the local agent from your department actually intuitively saying this person seems suspicious. And we don't have adequate blood detection equipment. We don't have adequate other types of things to put at all these small borders. But I wonder if this has done any reevaluation. This guy had a bloody chain saw in his back seat and other guns. Is there some kind of additional type of check that this has made you reevaluate, like a bloody chain saw rule or something.
Secretary Chertoff: Those are a lot of questions. I think they break into two parts. Let me try to answer them both. We are very mindful of the issue of people other than Mexicans across the southern border. One approach which we have expanded is expedited removal, which allows us to remove them more quickly. There is now additional funding in the budget for more beds, clearly the ability to detain -- we detain those who have criminal records, the ability to expand it and detain others potentially, particularly those who are flight risks, is important. We also are looking at alternative ways of ensuring that we can -- if we release people them we can get them back, which is bracelets or monitoring, supervision. So those are approaches that we are working on now to see if we can have a better ability to make sure people don't just get released into the population and never return.
On the issue of the report on the Canadian citizen, I don't want to get too specific. I will say that, as with the Resam case, you know, our best weapon in many cases is still good old-fashioned, well- trained intuition. Even with the machinery, even with the high tech, you got to read it, and that requires training. And I'm continually impressed by the phenomenal job that our folks do at the border and at the airports, in picking up on the cues that you need to know something.
I think in this particular case, in fairness, there was not a failure to identify that there was an issue. My understanding is that the local border patrol folks questioned the person, seized the weapons, checked relentlessly to see if there was any outstanding warrants or paper or charges.
At the end of the day, though, a U.S. citizen is entitled to return to the country, and we cannot hold people without a legal basis. And I think in that particular case, whatever the ultimate disposition of the case is, there was no legal basis on which to hold this person. So it was not a failure of investigation or a failure to process it. It was kind of an inherent limitation of our system of law.
Representative Souder: Is there an automatic check with the RCMP?
Secretary Chertoff: I don't know if there is an automatic check, but my understanding is they checked with every conceivable -- in every way they could think of to see if there was paper out. I think they caught on to the fact that there was something to ask about. That's my understanding; that's what I've been told.
Representative Souder: Thank you.
Representative Davis: Thank the gentleman. Mr. Secretary, you have a reputation that says that you think strategic, that you're organized, that you're demanding, and I think those are some very important characteristics, and we appreciate the job you're doing, and we appreciate you coming before this committee. Some of your staff, when we put in the legislation on color coded in the authorization bill, almost seemed offended that we would put it in the legislation, because I think you folks are moving away from colors to be a little more helpful. But I just want to understand your attitude about how the alert system should work.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, first of all, I want to be clear because sometimes there is a little bit of a misunderstanding. The Department of Homeland Security does not own the alert system. It's actually an HSPD, a presidential directive. And a number of agencies participate in the process of setting the alert. The system serves two functions --
Representative Davis: Let me just say, and parenthetically, that's why we wanted to have some say in that by why we put it in the authorization bill.
Secretary Chertoff: I think it serves two functions. One is that -- we have geared in the private sector, and in state and local government, a series of measures that one takes when it gets up to orange, including certain funding mechanisms. So obviously we are now -- we now have baked into the system a whole lot of stakeholders who have made their own arrangements based on the idea of elevating the level.
Sometimes as was the case last year, I think in the financial sector in the New York metropolitan area, we are able to give some specificity of the threat. Sometimes the threat, although credible, is not particularly specific, and we have to weigh whether under the circumstances we should advise state and locals and private sectors to take additional protective measures. That's a hard task. There is a public awareness dimension as well, which is also important, but will have certain different dynamics. As with anything else, this is a system which we've had experience with for two or three years. It clearly makes sense to look at it and see if there are improvements that should be made. Congress has indicated we should do that.
We want to make sure at the end of the day we can preserve both elements: we can have a system that works for our stakeholders, operationally, and also a system that is not overly alarming to the public, gives them reasonable insight into what is going on in the world around them, but does not place a burden on them or impede the living of their daily lives.
Representative Davis: Well, let me just share with you that I think our legislation clearly wants you to be geographic when you can be, to be economic sector specific when you can be, and it wants you -- it wants us to tell the public what it means, in other words what actions they might take. And I can tell you a few years ago, just close to the New Year's Eve, we knew that we were looking for radioactive material. We knew we were looking in five cities. And I will tell you, every staff member who had that briefing made sure they took specific action and didn't go in specific places.
And it seemed outrageous to me that the people who knew what the threat was took one action, and the people in general who didn't had no sense of what action they should have taken.
Secretary Chertoff: Well, we do have a -- we do try and we -- obviously will want to continue to try to be as specific as to sector or as to geography, as we can be. The issue of what we can tell people, we are obviously always constrained by sources and methods, and we have to be careful sometimes not to create a panic. I mean often we get information that is very -- you really have a doubt, and you have to balance whether it is sufficiently definite that you want to put out a warning, particularly if it is going to result in people taking dramatic activity. It could have real unintended consequences. I mean the last piece you raise is kind of the moral issue. I mean I and you have more insight into threats than the average person. And we often struggle with the fact that we cannot take steps on our own behalf that we would not warn other people about. That's kind of a personal moral issue we have to deal with.
But we clearly want to convey as much information as we can consistent with not overly alarming people and consistent with the quality of the intelligence and the preservation of sources and methods.
Representative Davis: It's clearly a trade-off. But I tell you, if you know that a site is dangerous, at least parents should -- and it's a public place -- at least parents should have the recognition that if they go there they take a chance. And maybe they want to go but not bring their kids. There are things that I think the public has a right to know, and I hope that the department will move more in that direction than in the other direction.
Let me -- I know you want to leave, let me just quickly ask you about the cargo issue. And the cargo issue is, frankly, we don't check cargo on passenger aircraft. That's the bottom line. And I hope we refrain from saying we check it because we have known carrier. It strikes me that Congress has been reluctant to even put a deadline on this. We did it for baggage. We did it for luggage under the belly of an aircraft. Why shouldn't we be expecting from you that you should tell us, this is what we can do by this period of time, and this is what we can do by this period, and this is what we can do by this?
Secretary Chertoff: One of the things I asked when we set out the second-stage review is specifically this question. I said we need to develop a plan to determine how we're going to handle the issue of cargo on passenger planes and cargo on cargo planes. It has to be a system that works in a way that does not destroy the cargo industry because it makes it impossible to ship things because it takes too long. And it has to assure us reasonable security. Whether the approach is the one taken, suggested by Congress, by Chairman Michel, whether it's another approach, I do agree, this is one of the things we need to have an answer in the really short term, and I expect one of the things that will emerge from a second-stage review will be a plan and a set of recommendations about how to go forward to address this very important issue.
Representative Davis: Okay. I know that you just have one question. The Secretary wanted to leave by 12:00, so if you could make it a quick one.
Representative: Sure. I was a former county executive during 9/11, and one of the bigger issues is the standard of getting money and resources to first responders, to state and local and then holding them accountable for their performance. As you know, there has been some lax accountability, a lot of money that has been wasted. And I just want to throw it out as far as, where are we with respect to the standards as it relates to getting resources, money, to the first responders? And then the issue of what is going for what purpose, and then holding them accountable for performing it?
Secretary Chertoff: We have a set of national preparedness goals, which breaks down basically all the things you need to be prepared to do across the spectrum from prevention through response for first responders. And below each of the categories are some very specific things that every particular region or area needs to have. We don't give design; we give performance. You know we recognize there are differences geographically and in terms of communities. That is the template we are going to be using in terms of distributing grant money. We're going to be saying, these are the things you need to be coming forward and saying, I need money to do this, that or the other thing under this particular goal or standard.
That tool, when it is fully deployed, will be a tool that will allow us to have both intelligent application of resources and real accountability.
Representative: Which includes areas, for instance, like Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, New York, versus maybe Jackson Hole, Wyoming?
Secretary Chertoff: Well, there are two separate issues. One is how we divide among areas. And I think that we're going to do based on a risk-based theory. And as I said, the president's budget, and the administration has urged that we move away from large guaranteed amounts per state down to -- I think the House passed 0.25, because that gives us more money we can allocate. But you know we're not driven by state. We're driven by infrastructure; we're driven by consequence. You know it's not a question of jurisdictional line. It's a question of what our analytical tools show us is the most intelligent way to spend money.
Representative Davis: Mr. Secretary, you've been generous with your time, and we wanted to get you out by 12:00. Thanks for staying a little later, and with that, the record will remain open for 10 days for members' questions, and any other information we need to insert into the record.
Secretary Chertoff: Thank you very much.
Representative Davis: And we'll put Mr. Ruppersberger's letter into the record. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. This hearing is adjourned.
End.
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