Documents 19-36
19. Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Politico-Military Affairs (Kitchen) to the Counselor and Chairman of the Policy Planning Council (Rostow)/1/
Washington, March 12, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, Internal Security. Secret. Cleared by Eric E. Oulashin (AF), Ellwood M. Rabenold (ARA), Richard E. Usher (FE), and Donald W. Bunte (NEA).
SUBJECT
BNSP Planning Task II (E)--"U.S. Government Organization for Internal Defense"
Attached is the paper "U.S. Government Organization for Internal Defense" developed in response to the BNSP Planning Task II (E) and in collaboration with other bureaus within the Department of State as well as other agencies with responsibilities in the field of overseas internal defense.
While this document was prepared in consultation with other interested agencies and in it we have payed attention to those internal defense organizational changes that have come about since the early days of the Kennedy Administration, it has not been subjected to formal interdepartmental clearance. I assume that, if formal interdepartmental clearance is desired, you will initiate this. Within the Department, however, the paper has been formally cleared with the appropriate bureaus and consequently officially represents the Department's organization for internal defense policy and related activities.
Unless notified to the contrary, I will assume that G/PM has now satisfied the requirements of BNSP Planning Task II (E).
Attachment
U.S. GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION FOR INTERNAL DEFENSE
(BNSP PLANNING TASK II E)
A. Introductory
The purpose of this paper is to outline the organization of the U.S. Government for the task of detecting and either preventing or defeating subversive insurgency in friendly foreign countries. Its scope embraces both Washington and the field.
B. Background
The document entitled "United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy" (USOIDP) September 1962/2/ sets forth the pattern, factors, and lessons of communist insurgency, and describes the scope and application of U.S. strategy to counter it. This document, promulgated as national policy by NSAM 182 on August 24, 1962/3/ and distributed to all departments, agencies, and field posts in September, 1962, is currently under review by an interdepartmental panel under the chairmanship of the Department of State.
/2/See Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 106.
/3/See ibid., Document 105.
The thesis of the USOIDP document is that subversive insurgency represents primarily a Communist attempt to retard, exploit and/or gain control of the development process in underdeveloped countries, and that this threat requires an effective response by the threatened government covering a wide spectrum of political, economic, military, psychological, and other measures. The U.S. role in countering this subversive threat is regarded as ancillary to the local government's. The way in which the U.S. Government organizes itself to assist in this task in any given situation will normally be a reflection of the degree of U.S. influence and freedom of action the U.S. may enjoy in the country threatened by subversive insurgency.
C. U.S. Internal Defense Role
The U.S. purpose in the field of internal defense is to encourage and assist vulnerable nations to develop balanced capabilities for the internal defense of their societies. The U.S. role is normally supplementary to the local effort and therefore designed:
1. To assist in the immunization of vulnerable societies not yet seriously threatened by Communist subversion or insurgency.
2. To assist countries where subversive insurgency is latent or incipient by removing the causes before the stage of insurgency is reached.
3. To assist in the establishment or strengthening of intelligence and internal security organizations.
4. To defeat subversive insurgency in countries actively threatened by assisting the government under attack with military and non-military means.
5. To build confidence in and loyalty to the host government.
6. To minimize the likelihood of direct U.S. military involvement in internal war by maximizing indigenous capabilities for identifying, preventing, and if necessary, defeating subversive insurgency, and by drawing on, as appropriate, the assistance of third countries and international organizations.
To play its role effectively, the United States must be in a position to mobilize, coordinate, and apply its own and other free world resources to strengthen the local internal defense capability in the following critical areas: (a) military, (b) police, (c) economic development, (d) youth, (e) labor, (f) education, (g) leader groups, (h) political institutions, (i) informational and psychological.
As a corollary, the U.S. Government must strengthen organization, and procedures to enable it to apply these resources in a unified, coordinated, and effective manner.
D. Current Washington Organization
1. Special Group (CI)
In recognition of the growing problem of subversion and insurgency, the Special Group (CI) was established in January 1962 by Presidential directive (NSAM 124)/4/ to provide unity of effort and use of all available resources to identify, prevent, or defeat subversive insurgency and related forms of indirect aggression in friendly countries.
/4/See ibid., Document 68.
The functions of the Special Group (CI) are to insure: proper recognition of the subversive insurgency threat; reflection of such recognition in training, equipment, and doctrine; marshaling of resources to deal with the threat, and development of programs aimed at defeating it. In addition, its purpose is to insure the development of adequate programs aimed at identifying, preventing, or defeating subversive insurgency and indirect aggression in countries and regions specifically assigned to it by the President, and to resolve any interdepartmental problems which might impede their implementation.
In performing the above functions, the members of the Special Group (CI) act on behalf of their respective departments and agencies, and depend for staff support upon their own staffs, and upon such country, regional, or functional interdepartmental committees (normally chaired by a State Department Assistant Secretary) as may be established. Consequently, the Special Group (CI) itself has no permanent organizational structure except for its Subcommittee on Training. This has the responsibility for keeping under review internal defense training conducted by all departments and agencies. Agency training requirements have been established by National Security Action Memorandum 131./5/
/5/See ibid., Document 128, footnote 3.
2. Departmental Organization
It will be noted that the charter of the Special Group (CI) specifically provides that program implementation is the responsibility of the departments and agencies represented on the Group. Each department and agency represented on the Special Group (CI) has organized itself differently for its internal defense mission. By and large, they have relied on their various "roles and missions" as set forth in "United States Overseas Internal Defense Policy". Each department and agency (State, DOD, AID, USIA, and CIA) has therefore designated an element within its organization that is charged with the functional task of giving continued attention to overseas internal defense activities. The elements so designated are:
Department of State: Office of Politico-Military Affairs
Department of Defense: International Security Affairs: Special Assistant (to Assistant Secretary) for Special Operations; Joint Chiefs of Staff: Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA)
AID: AID/PC--Special Assistant for Internal Defense
CIA: Deputy Director for Plans, Special Group Office
USIA: Office of Policy (IOP)
Program and policy responsibility for particular geographic areas rests in the regional organizations of the above departments and agencies. Thus, the day-to-day coordination of the many programs and policy decisions involved in the U.S. internal defense effort is normally effected by the regional officers of the several departments and agencies making contact with each other and meeting as the occasion requires in coordination with the designated elements identified above. In addition, ad hoc groups under the chairmanship of State meet as required to develop and monitor country programs and to review country internal defense plans and progress reports prior to submission to interdepartmental regional policy committees and as required to the Special Group (CI).
a. Department of State
The Department of State, in accordance with its primary responsibility in the field of foreign affairs, provides policy guidance and coordination of overseas internal defense policy. Such guidance and coordination is normally effected through the Chiefs of Mission and principal officers overseas and the Department of State in Washington.
Within State, the focal point for the functional coordination of internal defense policy and activity is the responsibility of the Office of Politico-Military Affairs (G/PM--Internal Defense). Responsibility for internal security assessments, policy, and program implementation coordination for particular countries and areas rests in the regional bureaus in coordination with the appropriate regional politico-military affairs advisors and G/PM--Internal Defense.
b. Department of Defense
Within the Department of Defense, responsibility for the functional coordination of internal defense activities is divided between the civilian staff element (ISA) and military staff element (JCS).
International Security Affairs (ISA)
The civilian element responsible for direction, coordination and guidance for internal defense policy within the Department of Defense is the Assistant Secretary of Defense, ISA. To support the Assistant Secretary in this function, a Special Assistant for Special Operations has been designated whose responsibilities include providing policy guidance to the military assistance program--a vital and major element of US overseas internal defense programs.
Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Special Assistant to the Director, Joint Staff, for Counterinsurgency and Special Activities (SACSA) is charged with assisting the Director, Joint Staff, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in all matters pertaining to insurgency and counterinsurgency. Accordingly, SACSA serves as the focal point for such matters for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. His duties include planning, programming, resource development and allocation, and doctrinal guidance. Additionally, he is responsible for discharging Department of Defense staff responsibilities pertaining to the planning and direction of those special cold war operations and special activities, not principally intelligence in character, in which the Department of Defense participates.
c. Agency for International Development
The Administrator of AID has appointed a Special Assistant for Internal Defense to coordinate the formulation of internal defense programming and programming guidance. The Special Assistant for Internal Defense serves as a focal point within AID on internal defense matters and establishes and maintains those interagency relationships necessary to ensure that AID activities are in consonance with U.S. overseas internal defense policy and integrated with the programs of the other U.S. agencies. It is his further responsibility to provide general direction to program planning and development in this field. Programming responsibility for internal defense activities, as in the case of all AID programs, rests with each regional assistant administrator and, for police assistance programs, with the Director of the Office of Public Safety.
d. United States Information Agency
Coordination and general direction of internal defense policy and activities in USIA is the responsibility of the Office of Policy (IOP). The several geographic area offices are responsible for participation in internal security assessments and Agency program implementation in particular countries.
e. Central Intelligence Agency
Responsibility for the staff coordination of overseas internal defense and counterinsurgency matters rests with the Special Group Officer of CIA's Deputy Director for Plans. He is assisted in this responsibility by a very small staff known as the Counterinsurgency Group. Intelligence support to the Special Group (CI) and its member agencies, both in Washington and to the Country Team abroad, is provided by the Deputy Director for Intelligence. Operational support to U.S. overseas internal defense programs in both the clandestine intelligence and covert action fields is exercised through the office of the Deputy Director for Plans and CIA's Chiefs of Station abroad.
E. Internal Defense Plan Program
Pursuant to the directive of the Special Group (CI), country internal defense plans (IDP) have been required for a wide range of underdeveloped countries, including, but not limited to, those countries under the immediate cognizance of the Group. Such plans are normally developed after detailed internal security assessments are made either on the initiative of the Chief of Mission or Washington. Each IDP is given a comprehensive screening and review by an interdepartmental working group assembled under the chairmanship of the State regional bureau. The results of this critique are incorporated in an explanatory memorandum from the regional Assistant Secretaries of State to the Special Group (CI) recommending approval or modification as required. After approval by the Group the IDP becomes the basis for a program of specific actions.
In general, the IDP is designed to serve the following purposes:
(1) To assure continuing attention by the Country Team to details of the local situation.
(2) To sharpen the Country Team's ability to forecast dangerous trends and suggest remedies.
(3) To provide a framework within which to assess programs suggested by the local government.
(4) To persuade the local government to adopt the most promising course of action.
(5) To facilitate planning and program coordination in Washington.
(6) To provide clearly defined U.S. courses of action and establish resource requirements (including funding) covering a one-year projection which, if approved by the Special Group (CI), is binding on all participating agencies.
F. Conclusions
Except for the creation of the Special Group (CI), the U.S. organization for the internal defense effort has been mounted and executed by and large within the framework of existing governmental organization. It is believed that by adhering to the traditional lines of organization and by its determination not to recreate an OCB-type structure, President Kennedy gave the Foreign Affairs agencies an opportunity to develop a more vigorous response to the problem of Communist subversion and insurgency. To insure this, the Administration created the Special Group (CI) and confined its role primarily to finding the weak spots in our internal defense effort and to spurring governmental action where necessary. On reflection, it appears from this vantage point in time, that the determination of the White House not to recreate an OCB and to thrust the primary responsibility for internal defense policy and programs on the appropriate departments and agencies has proven to be sound.
Accordingly, it is concluded that the official Washington community has effectively responded to the organizational requirements set forth under the basic National Security Policy Planning Tasks II (E). The present organization for internal defense provides the U.S. Government a far better ability to cope with the growing problem of subversive insurgency today as compared to the general situation prevailing in Washington in early 1961. Although the success or failure of a particular course of action can not be a valid test of whether the organization supporting it is adequate, the ability to develop, plan and initiate programs responding to newly developing problem situations is testimony to effective organization.
20. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to President Johnson/1/
Washington, March 14, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, General, Vol. I, Box 32. Top Secret.
After a review of the currently approved Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have recommended approval of redrafted instructions which are in simplified format and which have been updated to make them editorially compatible with the terminology employed in current plans. A copy of these updated instructions was delivered to you during your meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff on March 4, 1964./2/
/2/See Documents 16 and 17.
[1 paragraph (9 lines of source text) not declassified]
You will recall that the instructions currently in use were approved by President Eisenhower on December 3, 1959,/3/ and were continued in effect by President Kennedy.
/3/See Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, p. 353. A copy of the mostly-declassified Eisenhower administration's "Instructions for the Expenditures of Nuclear Weapons in Accordance With the Presidential Authorization Dated May 22, 1957," which contains revisions dated January 28, 1959, November 2, 1959, and May 12, 1960, is available on the Internet, National Security Archive (www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv), Electronic Briefing Book No. 45, "Eisenhower and Predelegation," Document 3.
Your approval of the updated instructions is requested together with your authorization to place these instructions in effect.
Robert S. McNamara
21. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-219-64
Washington, March 16, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 200, Defense Programs and Operations, JSOP--FY 1969-1971, Feb. 14, 1964, Box 41. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1969-1971 (JSOP-69), Part VI--Force Tabs and Analysis (U)
1. On 14 February 1964, the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, forwarded Parts I through V of the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1969-1971 (JSOP-69) (CM-1181-64). Attached is Part VI, Force Tabulations./2/
/2/Not attached. Regarding this paper, see Document 12 and footnote 1 thereto.
2. Section A of Part VI contains force objectives and associated ration-ale in the format of the Five-Year Force Structure and Financial Program, as requested in your memorandum of 21 December 1963 (subject: "Program and Budget Reviews Calendar Year 1964 Schedule")./3/ Recommendations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning reserve personnel are provided in Table 13; therefore, Table 12, Army Reserve Components Program, was not addressed. Section B contains force objectives, deployments, expansion, and selected reserve tables in the normal JSOP format. Section C consists of situational analyses which were designed to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their determination of the objective force levels recommended in Sections A and B. Although logistic implications were considered in the situational analyses (see paragraph 5, Section C, Volume II of Part VI), specific logistic guidance will be recommended to you in the Logistic Annex to JSOP-69 on 1 April 1964. The Joint Chiefs of Staff will provide their views on personnel in conjunction with their comments on your tentative decisions on all programs by 15 June 1964, as required by your schedule for Calendar Year 1964. The individual views of the Chief of Staff, US Army, the Chief of Naval Operations, the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, and the Commandant of the Marine Corps are briefly and clearly summarized in the Tables of Section A and footnotes thereto. The rationale associated with these Tables provides additional explanation of these views.
/3/A copy is in the Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, 110.01 FY 66 1964.
3. The objective force levels herein are considered essential for national security in support of the US military strategy delineated in Parts I through V, JSOP-69. In considering objective force requirements, the Joint Chiefs of Staff were agreed in many areas as to the degree to which FY 1966 programmed forces meet our basic military objectives. In other areas, however, there exist major unresolved questions and divergencies regarding forces and weapon systems which are reflected in differences in individual and collective force recommendations. As concerns our general war posture, there is the problem of the optimum balance of offensive and defensive means. In connection with our limited war posture, issues exist concerning: force levels; mix of land, sea, and air capabilities; weaponry to be used; rates of modernization; and the use of tactical nuclear weapons and the degree of reliance to be placed on them.
a. Strategic Retaliatory Forces. There is agreement that the United States should maintain a clear margin of strategic superiority as a deterrent. A major issue is whether or not the Minuteman force should be increased above the programmed level. This issue stems from differing views concerning relative emphasis as between counterforce, damage-limiting operations, and assured destruction of the enemy as a modern industrial society. A related issue concerns planning factors and the application thereof to translate differing target lists into delivery system requirements. A second major issue is whether an advanced manned strategic aircraft should proceed beyond the program definition phase at this time.
b. Continental Air and Missile Defense. The Joint Chiefs of Staff are agreed that programmed force levels do not provide sufficient capability for CONUS defense in the mid-range period against the threat of manned bombers and missiles. They further agree that the defense should be composed of a balance between active and passive defense; a balanced air and missile defense, to include antisubmarine forces; and a proper mix of air defense weapons systems. There are significant differences with respect to the balance and mix and the selection of specific air defense weapons systems. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree to continue with the development of the Nike X system, as a matter of priority. One issue, however, is whether a decision can be taken now for production and operational deployment, as justified by research and development progress, or whether final selection of a system for defense against ICBMs and SLBMs should be deferred pending evaluation of further research and development and completion of the study now underway regarding the integration of all components affecting the defense of CONUS. They agree that research to pursue other approaches for missile defense should also be emphasized and that development of increased capability against SLBMs must continue, both in antisubmarine and antimissile capabilities. A second issue relates to the IMI--whether to proceed with deployment beginning in FY 1968 with related phase-down of Century series aircraft and their transfer to the Air National Guard, or to keep open an option to procure the IMI subject to a review of the above study.
c. General Purpose Forces. The specific major issues pertaining to General Purpose Forces center on the number of Army divisions, the numbers and concept of employment of attack carriers, concept of employment of Marine Corps forces, and Air Force tactical aircraft required to carry out the strategy in the mid-range period. The individual force level recommendations vary from proposals for significant increases above the program level to those for substantial reductions. Underlying these recommendations are the differing views regarding the levels and mix of forces required to provide, with an acceptable level of risk, the capability to meet the estimated requirements of a separate major contingency operation while maintaining the readiness to reinforce NATO. A matter which makes the problem more complex is the difficulty of forecasting accurately whether or not it would be advantageous for the United States to use tactical nuclear weapons and, if so, the relative effectiveness and timing of their use. The current intensive study being given these questions should assist in the continuing evaluation.
d. Airlift and Sealift Forces. The Joint Chiefs of Staff agree that there is a continuing need to improve our airlift and sealift capability in order to permit the rapid deployment of our combat forces. An issue in this regard is whether MSTS troopships should be in active status or are sufficiently responsive when retained in ready reserve. Fundamentally, the basic problem with respect to the levels of these forces is the appropriate balance and mix of sealift and airlift with due consideration being given to selective pre-positioning of supplies and equipment. Continuing studies will assist in better understanding of their relationship.
4. The scenarios used in the situational analyses are illustrative, designed to test alternative degrees and types of response with varying levels of combat and support forces. The conclusions derived are valid to the extent that they provide useful information to the decision-making process. Certain assumptions, which necessarily had to be made, and the concepts and factors used, are critical in the derivation of the forces employed in the postulated situations. Individual comments regarding the limitation and usefulness of the scenarios are included in the footnotes. There are differing views regarding the value of the scenarios for deriving forces. One view holds that the scenarios of Section C, prepared separately from Sections A and B, provided an insufficient and inappropriate basis from which to develop over-all objective force levels. The other view, while recognizing limitations, utilized the situational analyses insofar as practicable as a basis for developing and evaluating the force structures for each program and for quantifying support and logistics requirements.
5. Part VI of this year's JSOP has been prepared with a view to serving as a primary vehicle for providing military advice on force structures, particularly as it applies to the FY 1966 budget. The combatant force objectives contained herein have been derived from consideration of such factors as requirements to support the national objectives and strategy in Parts I-V, the recommendations of the commanders of the unified and specified commands, technical feasibility, levels of military capability established in current programs, and reasonable attainability. However, the Joint Chiefs of Staff desire to emphasize that the force levels recommended beyond the period requiring appropriations in FY 1966 are for planning purposes and require recurring evaluation.
6. The further views of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, will be forwarded by separate memorandum.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
22. Memorandum From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
CM-1272-64
Washington, March 20, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 200, Defense Programs and Operations, JSOP--FY 1969-1971, Feb. 14, 1964, Box 41. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1969-1971 (JSOP-69), Part VI--Force Tabs and Analysis (U)
1. I have forwarded, by JCSM-219-64, Part VI (Force Tabs and Analysis) to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan covering the period 1969-971 (JSOP-69)./2/ As indicated in Tables 4-13 and the footnotes thereto of Volume I, the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not reach agreement with respect to certain major programs, including Minuteman, the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA), Nike X, the Improved Manned Interceptor (IMI), Army divisions, Navy aircraft carriers, and Air Force tactical fighter wings.
/2/See Document 21 and footnote 2 thereto.
2. The divergent views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff stem primarily from the same issues as those reviewed last year in JSOP-68,/3/ i.e., the extent of counterforce targeting in the future, the optimum balance between strategic offensive and defensive systems, uncertainties as to the effect of tactical nuclear operations on the requirements for general purpose forces, and the rate and extent of modernization of all forces. During the past year, these problems were the subject of additional study, and they were given further consideration in the situational analyses, or scenarios, which comprise Volumes II-V of Part VI, JSOP-69.
/3/Not found.
3. The scenarios were designed to assist the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their determination of objective force levels. As indicated in the footnotes throughout the analyses, the Service Chiefs have many reservations concerning the assumptions, factors, concepts of employment and conclusions of these analyses. Nevertheless, in my opinion, they have been a valuable asset in bringing additional light to bear on these major issues which all Services are earnestly endeavoring to resolve.
4. After review of the scenario on strategic retaliatory forces, and other studies on this subject during the last year, I am impressed by the uncertainties regarding the value of a more extensive counterforce effort and hence am not convinced as to the need for additional strategic missiles over and above the present program of 1,200 Minutemen.
5. a. Although there are many reservations concerning the scenario on continental air and missile defense forces, I am convinced that the force levels now programmed will not provide adequate CONUS defense in the mid-range period. In looking forward to that period, we are presently faced with a choice, in my opinion, between (1) primary reliance on strategic offensive forces as a means for effecting deterrence or for limiting damage if deterrence fails (without major improvement of defensive means); and (2) a balance of offensive and improved defensive forces which, while also providing for deterrence, will afford the optimum practicable capability for limiting damage. In view of the greater loss of life and productive capacity shown in war games based upon the first choice, I am convinced that it is the second alternative which we should adopt.
b. In order to resolve this issue with understanding, there is an immediate requirement to determine the optimum balance between offensive and defensive systems. Hopefully, the studies now underway in both your office and the Joint Staff will be of assistance in this determination. In the interim, feeling that some requirement will be validated for such programs as Nike X, Phase II SOSUS, and the IMI, I recommend proceeding with these programs in such a way as not to delay their time of availability, but without attempting to establish force objectives at this time. Finalization of the optimum total numbers of the various strategic offensive and defensive systems will require prior determination of the optimum balance among the systems involved.
6. a. With respect to the limited war operations considered in the scenarios, a point of particular interest is that upon the outbreak of major hostilities in Europe, we could not continue operations in Southeast Asia beyond a possible holding action employing about four divisions. If, on the other hand, a decision were made to continue the limited war operations with a force of eight divisions as planned in the Southeast Asia scenario, any buildup in Europe, over and above the five divisions now there, would be limited initially to no more than seven divisions for a total of twelve divisions in Western Europe, and this could only be done by transfer of the two divisions from Korea. Further expansion of the US ground force contribution in Europe would have to await the availability of the six Army ready reserve divisions which could not be made combat ready, deployed and committed to battle until sometime during the period M+120-M+180.
b. A second point of importance brought out in the examination of the scenarios is that an apparent imbalance exists between Army combat forces and the associated combat support and logistic support units. These Army support units appear to be the limiting factor in the ability of the United States to respond on the postulated scale and timing to major contingencies.
7. The limited war scenarios also indicate possible deficiencies in logistic support in the form of personnel, supplies and equipment for the operations considered. These deficiencies are being analyzed in greater detail and recommendations regarding additional logistic guidance will be covered in the Logistic Annex to JSOP-69.
8. I concur with the force levels in JSOP-69 which are supported unanimously by the Service Chiefs. With regard to those major programs about which there are divergent opinions, my personal views and recommendations are as follows:
a. Program I--Strategic Retaliatory Forces
(1) AMSA. I recommend that the decision with respect to R&D funding in FY 1966 be deferred pending review of the program definition phase.
(2) Minuteman. I do not foresee any requirement for increased funding in FY 1966 or increasing Minuteman force levels beyond those programmed for FY 1969, but recognize the requirement for orderly system modernization.
b. Program II--Continental Air and Missile Defense Forces
(1) IMI. In my opinion, the numbers and types of air defense environment systems and weapons systems are dependent on the determination of a basic concept for air defense in the mid-range period. I recommend that the decision on a procurement program for the IMI be deferred, but that the necessary funds for a first increment of approximately eighteen aircraft in 1968 be included in the FY 1966 budget pending review of the integrated studies of all components of continental air and missile defense now underway.
(2) Nike X. After review of numerous studies during the past year, I am convinced that the deployment of an effective anti-ballistic missile system is an urgent necessity. I recommend, pending completion and review of the integrated continental air and missile defense studies which should develop over-all deployment requirements, that the FY 1966 budget provide for the maximum practicable effort toward completion of development and, if justified by research and development progress in FY 1965, the initiation of production of long lead time items in order to permit initial deployment of approximately 200 missiles (the defense of one area) in FY 1970.
c. Program III--General Purpose Forces
(1) Army Divisions. Although an increase over the presently programmed sixteen divisions might be desirable, in my opinion the provision of adequate support in terms of logistic units and supplies for sixteen divisions is more important than the maintenance of more divisions with inadequate support. I recommend the continuation of a force level of sixteen appropriately supported divisions and seven brigades throughout the mid-range period.
(2) Navy Carriers. I continue to support the recommendation in your 18 December 1963 memorandum to the President to maintain the present force level of fifteen CVAs through FY 1969, to reduce the force to fourteen in FY 1970, and to thirteen in FY 1972./4/ The total number of carriers should remain at twenty-four with the CVSs increasing from nine to ten in FY 1970 and to eleven in FY 1972.
/4/Reference is to a draft memorandum from Secretary McNamara to President Johnson, entitled "Attack Carrier (CVA) Forces," December 18, 1963, included in "Department of Defense Draft Memoranda for the President: Recommended FY 1965-1969 Defense Programs," a December 19 compendium of 14 such draft memoranda. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 218, JCS Files, JMF 7000 (3 Jan 64) Sec 1A)
(3) Air Force Tactical Fighter Wings. I recommend continuing the present FY 1968 program of twenty-four wings (1,740 total tactical aircraft) throughout the period FY 1968-l973. I consider this number to be in balance with the requirements for the support of sixteen Army divisions and the accomplishment of related air tasks.
9. As reported by JCSM-146-64,/5/ the Joint Chiefs of Staff had divergent views concerning the amount of detail which should have been included in the force tabs of JSOP-69. In order to insure the submission by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the maximum useful advice concerning military forces in future JSOPs, I recommend that, prior to approval of the study being conducted by your staff on restructuring the tables of the Five Year Force Structure and Financial Program, it be forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff for comment.
/5/Not found.
10. Subject to the comments in paragraph 8 above, I recommend approval of the major elements of the force composition indicated in the tables of Volume I, Part VI to the Joint Strategic Objectives Plan for FY 1969-1971 (JSOP-69). For those elements not covered in the preceding discussion, I will provide my views in the review of PCPs when they are submitted.
Maxwell D. Taylor
23. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to All Posts/1/
CA-9837
Washington, March 26, 1964, 2:50 p.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1 US. Secret. Drafted by Duncan A. D. Mackay (G/PM) on March 25, cleared by Captain Calvert (Navy), Reynolds (USAF/GC), William Lang (DOD/ISA), Captain Bennett (OSD/AE), O'Donnell (AEC), David H. Popper (EUR/RPM), M. Gordon Knox (EUR/BNA), Ellwood M. Rabenold (ARA), Robert B. Wood (FE), Eric E. Oulashin (AF), James P. Grant (NEA), Jeffrey C. Kitchen (G/PM), Jerry C. Trippe (L), Richard N. Gardner (IO), Jeanne Davis (S/S), and Charles Johnson (White House); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Also sent to the political advisers at major military commands: CINCEUR, CINCLANT, CINCPAC, CINCSAC, CINCSO, CINCSOUTH, CINCSTRIKE, COMATS, HICOM RYUKYUS, and SHAPE. In a March 25 memorandum to U. Alexis Johnson, Jeffrey Kitchen explained that once the airgram was sent, the Navy would send it "to the four CINC's involved, drawing their attention to it, and requesting their assessment of the countries in which this problem could become sufficiently serious to have our Ambassadors take it up with the Governments concerned." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, General, Vol. I, Box 32)
SUBJECT
US Policy of Neither Confirming or Denying Presence of Nuclear Weapons on Board US Naval Ships or Aircraft Visiting Foreign Territory
Joint State-Defense Message.
Policy
It is firm US policy neither to confirm nor deny presence nuclear weapons on board any US warship or aircraft seeking entry foreign ports or airports. This policy, based on overriding operational and security considerations, has since 1958 been reaffirmed on several occasions, and remains basic US policy today.
Recent Ceylonese Requirement for Assurances on Nuclear Weapons
Recent action of Ceylonese Govt in issuing Circular Note of January 24, 1964, to diplomatic missions in Colombo,/2/ denying entry to its ports or airports to any foreign ship or aircraft without prior assurance that it is not carrying nuclear weapons and is not "equipped for nuclear warfare", has again highlighted need for reaffirmation this policy and complete understanding of it. Stated reason for Ceylonese action is "to oppose further spread of nuclear weapons and to support creation of atom free zones."
/2/Not found.
Dangers Inherent in Ceylonese Requirement
Danger is that such requirement may offer superficial appeal to certain governments who may adopt it without examining its implications. We are concerned over possibility that other governments, either as deliberate harassment effort, effort display "neutrality" or perhaps as misguided effort support establishment nuclear free areas, may be considering similar or related actions.
Such action, which the Communists are quick to encourage and take advantage of, would seek to have us divulge the deployment of our nuclear deterrent, divide air and naval forces into black and white (nuclear and non-nuclear) components and seek to embarrass some of our Allies who do not wish to draw attention of their publics to presence of nuclear weapons in their territories.
Possibility It May Become Adopted By Other Countries
Ceylonese requirement of assurances on nuclear weapons has already been strongly endorsed by TASS News Agency, and ChiCom PriMin Chou En Lai joined with Ceylonese Prime Minister in final communiqu February 29/3/ at end of visit to Ceylon in exhorting other states take similar action.
/3/Not found.
There is distinct possibility that Ceylonese requirement may be placed on agenda for Second Non-Aligned Conference in Cairo next September by planning group for conference meeting in Colombo March 23. If expected support for requirement grows, Ceylonese may also later introduce resolution in UNGA calling for adoption by member states in interest halting "spread of nuclear weapons." However, the Dept has no evidence yet that the Ceylonese have this in mind.
Last summer Mexican President Lopez Mateos, in announcing Joint Declaration of five LA states on proposed formation of nuclear free zone, stated that it was Mexican policy to deny national territory for transportation of nuclear weapons (although declaration itself silent on transport of nuclear weapons). GOM, however, is not known to have formalized this policy.
Basis for US Policy
Our policy is based on overriding operational and security considerations. We consider armament of naval ship or aircraft to be an integral part of it and not being "transported" into national territory in sense which Mexico has in mind, or increasing "spread of nuclear weapons" in Ceylonese sense. We cannot accept any requirement that we identify or deny nuclear armament of naval ship or aircraft, for to do so would breach important information regarding extent of our deterrent, and seriously hamper the mobility of the US Forces by dividing them into nuclear and non-nuclear elements. We consider that any conventional ship or aircraft can be fitted with nuclear weapons and given nuclear delivery capability; and, furthermore, that any ship or aircraft can be "equipped for nuclear warfare" if only to defend itself. We are not prepared give blanket assurance to any government, in order gain approval for port entry of naval ships or landings of military aircraft, that no nuclear weapons are carried or would be carried in the future. We consider that such self-imposed limitation on types of aircraft or ships for which we might wish request port entry or landing right neither realistic or in best interests of US.
If any such assurance or requirement is made a precondition of port entry, we would plan to hold the visit in abeyance, leaving original request outstanding until host government in prepared approve visit without reference to any such requirement.
In connection with any denuclearized zone which may be established, we would consider it important to reserve our right of transit for all naval ships or aircraft without having to identify those armed with nuclear weapons or having nuclear delivery capability.
Consultation with Allies on Problem
We have initiated preliminary informal exchange of views in Dept at staff level with Embassy representatives of UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand on Ceylonese requirement. We are exploring whether it may be possible find some common approach to problem.
We have advised UK informally that we do not believe that their initial approach to problem is either realistic or helpful. British tactic thus far has been to have informal assurances given by Mountbatten to PriMin Bandaranaike that no British ship (he inadvertently omitted aircraft) carrying nuclear weapons would ever visit Ceylon. Although GOC has permitted one British military transport land without giving such assurances, GOC has categorically informed UK none will be permitted land in future in absence such assurance in each case. The British HiCom has informed GOC that Mountbatten's overall assurances were intended to apply to aircraft as well, and are awaiting clarification from GOC whether UK military aircraft will be able land in future based on Mountbatten's assurances to PriMin Bandaranaike.
Canadians have destroyer visiting Ceylon at end of March during planning meetings in Ceylon for Second Non-Aligned Conference. Since approval for Canadian ship visit given prior issuance Ceylonese requirement on nuclear weapons, Canadians have not had to give assurances and do not intend to do so. Neither Australia or New Zealand have any immediate requirement for visits to Ceylon by naval ships or military aircraft. While both governments fear that refusal furnish Ceylonese with information on nuclear weapons they request will damage their position with non-aligned states, they have indicated interest informally in finding some agreed formula which would be helpful to us.
Dept believes it would be unwise at present to initiate any discussions on this subject which would tend to give Ceylonese requirement undue importance. We do not intend to acknowledge circular note informing us of requirement or to seek "clarification" of it as France apparently has done with respect to the meaning of the phrase "equipped for nuclear warfare". We believe, however, it would be profitable for us to acquaint friendly governments selectively with our position in order to give them basis on which they can decide not adopt Ceylonese requirement. Dept will issue specific instructions in this regard to certain posts once we have received action called for below.
Action Required
Without initiating any discussions on this subject, addressees are requested report soonest (1) any indications that any other governments or local port officials may be considering possible adoption of Ceylonese requirement of assurances of nuclear weapons and (2) any official or press comment on Ceylonese action, particularly degree of support for it.
For USUN--Dept would appreciate report of any indication of intention Ceylonese or other delegation raise this in UN context.
For USRO--Your recommendation is requested on utility of US raising this question for discussion in POLAD meeting with view to obtaining common NATO front.
Rusk
24. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, March 26, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Nuclear Weapons, General, Vol. I, Box 32. Top Secret.
I accept the recommendation made by you and the Joint Chiefs of Staff in your memorandum of March 14th/2/ and hereby authorize you to put into effect the updated "Instructions for Expenditure of Nuclear Weapons in Emergency Conditions" which were brought to me by the Joint Chiefs on March 4, 1964./3/ It is my understanding that the redrafted instructions are basically the same as those approved by President Eisenhower and continued in effect by President Kennedy.
/2/Document 20.
/3/See Documents 16 and 17.
I would like to receive copies of all implementing directives which the Joint Chiefs issue on the basis of these instructions.
I have asked Mr. McGeorge Bundy to discuss with you and Secretary Rusk whether a substantive review of the instructions is needed to ensure that they reflect our coordinated views./4/
/4/In a March 31 note to Secretary Rusk, attached to another copy of his memorandum of March 26, McGeorge Bundy wrote: "The action referred to in paragraph 3 of this memorandum will await the completion of the Joint Staff studies which Secretary McNamara mentioned at a recent luncheon meeting with the President." (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 US)
Lyndon B. Johnson/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that indicates President Johnson signed the original.
25. Memorandum From the Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, A-471.61 (25 Jan 64). Top Secret; Restricted Data.
JCSM-260-64
Washington, March 27, 1964.
SUBJECT
Development of Very High-Yield Nuclear Weapons (U)
1. By memorandum, dated 4 March 1964,/2/ subject as above, the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense (Atomic Energy) expressed your desire for the views and comments, as appropriate, of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on a draft of a proposed memorandum for the President on the above subject. The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that while the proposed memorandum would no longer support the recommendation made in JCSM-117-63, dated 11 February 1963,/3/ that the development of a very high-yield laydown bomb [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to be compatible with the B-52 aircraft be initiated immediately, it does not preclude reconsideration of this subject at a later date.
/2/Not found.
/3/Not found, but this JCS paper led to a Department of Defense initiative in early 1963 to persuade the Atomic Energy Commission to sign a joint DOD-AEC letter to President Kennedy proposing the development of a multi-megaton nuclear weapon. AEC Chairman Glenn Seaborg had reservations about the proposal, however, and prevailed in having the issue referred first to the White House for thorough study. For background, see Journal of Glenn T. Seaborg, Chairman, U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1961-1971 (Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory, University of California, 1989), vol. 5, pp. 258, 410, 436, 501, 525.
2. In view of the Limited Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, the Joint Chiefs of Staff consider the following factors to be pertinent to this decision at this time:
a. The development, without atmospheric testing, of the proposed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] laydown bomb for B-52 delivery would not advance appreciably the nuclear state-of-the-art in the yield-to-weight ratios.
b. It is too early to know, in detail, what can be accomplished through the redirection of weapons development effort necessitated by the restriction against testing in the prohibited environments. Significant advancement in the development of very high-yield nuclear weapons may be attainable without atmospheric testing.
c. The effort to be expanded in very high-yield weapons development could be directed toward advancing the state-of-the-art so that knowledge and new weapon designs are available to permit rapid advancements should the decision be made to resume testing in the prohibited environments.
d. Future large boosters potentially available could provide a capability for delivery of very high-yield warheads. The facilities for missiles such as Atlas F and Titan II conceivably could be modified to accept such large boosters.
3. The Joint Chiefs of Staff conclude that:
a. A [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] weapon should not become for the indefinite future the largest yield weapon available for military application.
b. Although the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] laydown bomb for the B-52 would have met the recommendations set forth in JCSM-117-63 referred to in paragraph 1, above, the effort and expenditure of resources for its development would be better oriented toward the advancement of the state-of-the-art directed toward the attainment of very high-yield weapons with advanced technology, i.e., [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] and higher yield of aircraft laydown delivery and/or missile delivery.
c. Because of the uncertainties in high-yield weapons effects and in requirements for nuclear weapons during the 1970s, research, experimentation, and testing in the area of very high yields should be conducted by the Atomic Energy Commission to the maximum extent possible within the constraints of the Limited Test Ban Treaty.
d. Development should not be undertaken at this time of a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] high-yield warhead for present missile systems.
4. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that the draft of the proposed memorandum for the President, as changed by the line-in, line-out rewrite in the Appendix hereto,/4/ be submitted as the response to National Security Action Memorandum No. 245./5/
/4/Not printed.
/5/The study Seaborg requested (see footnote 3 above) was authorized in NSAM No. 245, "High Yield Nuclear Weapons," May 21, 1963. (Johnson Library, National Security File, National Security Action Memoranda, Box 2)
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Maxwell D. Taylor
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
26. Circular Airgram From the Department of State to Certain Posts/1/
CA-9940
Washington, March 30, 1964, 10:50 a.m.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-1966, DEF 15 US. Secret. Drafted by Richard G. Colbert (S/P) and George L. Warren (G/PM) on January 31; cleared by Henry D. Owen (S/P), Howard Meyers (G/PM), Arthur E. Pardee, Jr. (SCI), John J. Conroy and Charles R. Stout (EUR), Richard W. Barrett (O), Thomas P. Dillon (P), James R. Johnstone (FBO), Dillon (USIA), Heath (FAA), William P. Bundy (DOD/ISA), Thomas D. Morris (DOD/I&L), Arnold W. Frutkin and Packard (NASA), Joint Staff (JCS), Captain Muzzey (Coast Guard), David Rowe (S/S); and approved by U. Alexis Johnson. Sent to Ankara, Athens, Bonn, Brussels, London, Madrid, Paris, Rome, The Hague, and USCINCEUR.
SUBJECT
Survey of U.S. Overseas Bases
Joint State/Defense Message. The basic National Security Policy Planning Task Program calls for a re-examination of U.S. base and installation requirements,/2/ both military and non-military, over the next five years on a world-wide basis with a view to:
/2/This review, coordinated by the Policy Planning Council, covered 34 subjects. Documentation on the assignments, status, and terms of reference of these tasks is ibid., S/S-NSC Files: Lot 70 D 265, Basic National Security Policy.
1. Restricting number and kind to those most urgently needed.
2. Determining alternate ways of meeting future requirements through exploitation new technology (such as space-borne communications, use of U.S. or U.K-owned islands, establishment floating bases, etc.)
3. Exploring various ways essential requirements can be met through cooperative arrangements, sharing of facilities, standby agreements, etc.
DOD has been given responsibility for directing re-examination and has established steering committee in Washington under Asst. Sec. Def. for Installations and Logistics./3/ Committee, composed of representatives from State, Joint Staff JCS and DOD (ISA), has developed guidelines and procedures for conduct of examination provided for under part 1, which are outlined in latter part of this message. Committee has also established liaison with other U.S. agencies having facilities abroad for purposes of securing accurate reflection of the interests of and appropriate participation by all such agencies. Parts 2 and 3 of task outlined above will be prosecuted separately, under guidance provided by steering committee.
/3/Thomas D. Morris.
As the initial step to carry out part 1 above, a small interagency survey group will proceed to Europe on or about May 6./4/ This group and subsequent groups will conduct an on the ground country by country survey of existing facilities. Local participation in the survey group will be requested as appropriate from local commands and agencies. As shown in following guidelines, primary objective will be recommendations for collocation and consolidation of U.S. facilities where feasible with full consideration local and area political and economic factors.
/4/Documentation on the European visit of this survey group, as well as later visits by other groups to other regions, is in the National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 15 US, and S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, Bases.
Italy has been selected as the first country for examination. A timetable for other country surveys will be announced as experience factors are developed.
The survey group, under the general guidance of the Ambassador in each country, will work closely with appropriate military commanders, representatives of U.S. non-defense agencies with facilities in the country under study--i.e., NASA, USIA, FAA, Coast Guard and the diplomatic mission. A physical inspection of selected facilities is anticipated.
To facilitate work of survey group, certain basic data is to be prepared by overseas military commands and by non-military agencies in advance of group's arrival. Data prepared by non-defense agency activities in any country should be solicited and held by the Embassy concerned for the use of the survey group. All military data should be collected as directed by USCINCEUR and held by the senior U.S. commander in the country under survey. Details on the data required and the installations to be reviewed will follow immediately by separate instruction. All data should be completed so as to be available prior to the beginning of the work of the survey group in Rome, Italy on May 11.
To further assure that elements involved in supporting the work of the survey are fully informed of the objectives of this effort, a briefing by the chairman of the steering committee will be held at Camp Des Loges on April 20. USCINCEUR will designate required representation from subordinate commands and a separate message will outline the desired Embassy and non-defense agency representation. Additional briefings will be held in convenient locations as the survey group moves from country to country.
GUIDELINES
I. Objectives
A. To develop an inventory and description of current utilization for all U.S. bases and installations overseas including nature of real property interest, number, kind and cost of personnel, basic and collateral mission of activities, or other prime characteristics determining need for the property.
B. To exploit opportunities for collocating several of the U.S. military Services at the same base or installation (i.e., Army/Air Force or Army/Air Force/Navy, etc.).
C. To determine feasibility and economic desirability of collocation of non-military activities on military installations or military activities on non-military installations.
D. To determine which of the U.S. real property holdings overseas can be released, which can be reduced in size, and which are urgently needed to support current operations or are to be retained in standby.
E. To develop and recommend policy guidelines which contribute to the most efficient and economic utilization of U.S. Government overseas facilities.
F. To examine the local as well as area political and economic implications of any recommended adjustment in the present U.S. base structure in each country surveyed.
II. Policy Assumptions
A. Only those U.S. bases and installations overseas shall be retained that are most urgently needed to support U.S. Government or operations under joint agreements with other countries and all other property holdings shall be released or reduced in size to conform to need.
B. Collocations of activities both military and non-military shall be recommended where dollar savings can be realized and where such relocation does not significantly interfere with the performance of the assigned task or mission or other basic policy considerations.
C. In those cases where U.S. bases or installations are maintained in a standby status or operations are greatly reduced, the facilities shall be utilized on an interim basis where practical to house or otherwise support U.S. activities, both military and non-military. Where economically practical, relocations shall be planned to such installations although the duration may be indefinite.
D. Maximum joint use of facilities will be made with NATO, SEATO and similar alliances with proportionate sharing of construction and operational costs.
E. Maximum utilization shall be made of large multi-purpose bases and installations to obtain effective withdrawal of U.S. activities from urban centers.
F. Relocation of U.S. activities shall be recommended where present location interferes with local expansion or municipal growth.
III. Specific Guidance
A. Headquarters and Administrative Facilities
1. Inspection of headquarters and administrative facilities shall be undertaken with particular interest in vacating leased space involving significant rental payments by the U.S. Government.
2. Maximum utilization of administrative space in major U.S. bases and installations shall be a principal objective to be accomplished through consolidation of like activities or by collocation.
3. Particular care shall be taken to identify the space in facilities vacated as a result of the recently directed reduction in Armed Forces Headquarters operations.
B. Depots
1. Inspections of depot facilities shall include a review of inactive depots to determine their adaptability for other uses.
2. Alternate uses for standby facilities shall be developed for interim utilization.
3. Excess depots shall be noted and recommended for release and disposition.
C. Family Housing
1. Family housing shall be reviewed to determine degree of utilization (present and estimated future), condition, and cost of operation.
2. Leased housing shall receive particular attention with consideration given to rental savings possible from use of U.S.-owned facilities.
3. Family housing available on active and inactive bases and installations shall be noted for possible utilization by relocated activities.
D. Communications
1. Communication facilities shall be reviewed with consideration given to economic and/or technical advantages of relocation, consolidation, substitute facilities, etc.
2. Retention of major properties due entirely to the retention of communication facilities shall be the subject of specific review. Possible relocation to hard core installations shall be explored.
E. Air Bases
Air facilities retained for current or future requirements shall be utilized to the maximum extent possible and alternate uses developed for vacant facilities which may be utilized to satisfy requirements for all U.S. Government activities overseas.
F. Public Affairs Guidance
1. The survey groups from Washington will be limited in numbers and will maintain an inconspicuous presence. There will not be discussions with the host Government at this time. No announcement will be made by Washington or in the field on the mission of the survey groups.
2. In the event questions arise in the individual countries, the survey group should be described as a routine inspection and evaluation of the effectiveness of the U.S. utilization of facilities stating that similar inspections have been held in the past and more can be expected in the future.
G. Diplomatic and Consular Facilities
Insofar as diplomatic and consular facilities are concerned, the steering committee, in advance of the departure from CONUS of the survey group, will coordinate with the FBO to determine if current space utilization of such facilities in the country under survey permits incorporation of miscellaneous needs of other U.S. agencies. Conversely, any additional diplomatic or consular space requirements which might be located in facilities currently administered by other agencies will be made known. This data plus any other supplementary information provided by the Country Team will be made available to the survey group for consideration.
Rusk
27. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Read) to the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, April 15, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Intelligence File, Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board, Vol. 1 [1 of 2], Box 5. Secret.
SUBJECT
Audio Surveillance and Countermeasures Problems Within the United States Intelligence Community
REFERENCE
(a) March 20 memo from Mr. Bundy to the Secretary of Defense, Secretary of State, and the Attorney General/2/
/2/Dated March 20, 1963; not found.
(b) March 12 memo on subject to Mr. Bundy by the Acting DCI/3/
/3/Document 18.
(c) August 14, 1963 report of the NSC Special Committee on Audio Surveillance Countermeasures/4/
/4/Not found.
In reply to your memorandum of March 20, 1963, appropriate officers of the Department of State have reviewed the referenced Acting DCI memorandum and the annual NSC Special Committee report.
1. The Department would first like to comment on the DCI memorandum of March 12 which in part deals with audio countermeasure activities. The Department's primary role in the field of audio countermeasures is based on the authority and responsibility of the Department as the major foreign affairs agency of the United States Government. We are strongly opposed to any change of leadership in the audio countermeasure community and we object to relinquishing our role as Chairman of the NSC Special Committee or of any resultant new committee that may evolve. The Department of State has been the leader in the U.S. audio countermeasures community since the late 1940's and continues to hold this position today. The Department's position of leadership in the audio countermeasures field has been established by the fact that the Office of Security of the Department of State is responsible for the over-all security of approximately 300 U.S. diplomatic and consular establishments. The Department of State cannot delegate the authority to guide and coordinate audio countermeasures activities to any other agency in view of the Department's responsibility for the security of the greatest bulk of penetration target areas.
The Department's position is further supported by having in effect the largest number of trained engineers and technicians in the field supported by a major research and development effort under the guidance of experienced engineers. The present Department of State research and development efforts have been in effect since 1961 and these efforts have been successfully translated into operational countermeasure equipments and techniques. A few specific examples of Department of State accomplishments in this area are the acoustic conference room, the panoramic receiver, the signal recognizer system and standardization of a secure telephone system. Further evidence of the Department's leadership in the audio countermeasures field is witnessed by the fact that Department of State security engineers have been responsible for over 95 per cent of all U.S. Government "finds", including six additional microphones and one transmitter discovery since the NSC Special Committee report of August, 1963.
For the same reason [2 lines of source text not declassified] the Department of State feels that it must also chair any audio countermeasures body in view of the Department's primary role in this field.
Regarding Sections 7(c) and 7(d) of the DCI report, we wish to make the following comments:
(1) Technical Inspections
The question of coordination of "sweeps" or technical inspections as stated in the DCI memorandum does not exist. Clear-cut areas of responsibility for the security of our overseas military and diplomatic missions have been long established. The Office of Security of the Department of State is clearly responsible for the over-all security of all U.S. diplomatic representation and has provided security services to all tenant agencies operating within U.S. diplomatic missions abroad. Security within U.S. military installations is clearly a military responsibility and conflict between military and the Department of State interests does not exist. [4 lines of source text not declassified]
The Department of State feels that the coordination of countermeasures equipment requirements are best resolved directly in the committee responsible for the coordination of research and development efforts as provided for in the present NSC Special Committee. A division of the operational elements from the research and development elements of any countermeasures body can serve only to delay translation of these requirements into tangible results. This condition characterizes the confusion and lack of progress of the NSC Special Committee during the initial period of its formation.
It is the Department's opinion, therefore, that the proposal for a new technical subcommittee to coordinate inspection schedules and stimulate requirements has little foundation.
(2) Counter-audio Research and Development
The Department of State is in favor of coordinating countermeasure development, equipment and procedure requirements and believes the present NSC Special Committee on Technical Surveillance Countermeasures has made significant progress in this regard within the last three years. The impetus gained by this Committee in translating these requirements into realistic development objects is, in the opinion of the Department of State, a direct result of (a) the growing awareness of all member agencies of the need for close cooperation in establishing policy and program guidelines, and (b) technically competent and experienced leadership of the Special Committee by the Department of State.
The Department of State recognizes the need for expansion of basic and applied research within the countermeasures field and for greater coordination of this research among the member agencies. The inability of the present NSC Special Committee to achieve greater progress can be attributed to (1) its lack of member representation of a sufficiently high level of individual authority and technical competence and (2) the unavailability of information concerning current U.S. advances in positive audio surveillance equipment and techniques. The offer by the Acting DCI of cooperation in regard to this latter impeding factor is warmly accepted.
The Department of State can see no need for the proposed transfer of the present Special Committee from the NSC to the USIB. Analysis of the Special Committee's structure has not revealed any deficiencies in this body that can be attributed to its relationship with the NSC. However, if such a transfer is determined as being in the best interests of the United States, the Department of State feels that any audio countermeasures body established under the USIB should occupy full committee status. The importance of the efforts of any body concerned with the problem of audio surveillance countermeasures, in view of known existing threats, is of far too major a magnitude to be relegated to subcommittee status.
2. We concur with the recommendations contained in the NSC Special Committee report of August 14, 1963. These recommendations have in fact been enacted during the past three years by the Department of State.
The Department of State feels that the Special Committee's report is both timely and comprehensive in view of present day threats against the security of the U.S. Government. However, the Department considers the list of recommendations generated by the Special Committee lacking in one major respect. Specifically, there is needed a recognition of and an appropriate recommendation for action on the present lack of cooperation and exchange of information between the positive Intelligence and the Counter Surveillance Communities.
The alarm expressed by the Scientific Guidance Panel in Section II-4 of the Guidance Panel's interim report dated August 19, 1963/5/ was, in the opinion of the Department of State, not well founded. The Scientific Guidance Panel has not reviewed the Department of State's present countermeasure program with the exception of having received a comprehensive briefing in February, 1964 by the Department of State on the present status of our efforts in resolving the Moscow Signal problem.
/5/Attached to Document 9.
Summary
In reply to those recommendations in Sections 7(c) and 7(d) of the DCI memorandum, we submit the following recommendations:
(1) That the present Special Committee be retained under the NSC, or if deemed necessary be established as an independent committee under the USIB.
(2) That membership of a new audio countermeasure coordinating body be limited to technically-qualified representatives from the Department of Justice, the CIA, the Department of State and the DIA.
(3) That the present Technical Subcommittee of the NSC Special Committee be retained as a working technical group with representatives from all U.S. Government agencies having formal technical countermeasure programs in effect.
(4) That the Department of State retain chairmanship of any inter-agency audio countermeasures body.
John A. McKesson/6/
/6/Printed from a copy that indicates McKesson signed for Read.
28. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Johnson/1/
Washington, undated.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Memos to the President, McGeorge Bundy, Vol. 3. Top Secret; Restricted Data.
SUBJECT
High Yield Nuclear Weapons
A year ago President Kennedy requested the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission to re-examine the need for the development of very high yield nuclear weapons--particularly a weapon in the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] category. He also requested a review of the question of developing a high yield warhead to be delivered by presently programmed missile systems./2/
/2/Regarding this review, see footnotes 3 and 5, Document 25.
AEC and DOD have now recommended that we should not proceed with the development of a high yield weapon [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for delivery by a B-52 bomber. The B-52 can now carry two [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bombs, which bombs are already in the stockpile and are compatible with dual carriage in the B-52. There is [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] difference in the effectiveness between [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bombs and one [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] bomb, and the expense of developing the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] option is not warranted. They have also recommended that we should not develop a high yield warhead for present missiles. The additional expense is not justified by the increase in the capability of these missiles.
The memorandum/3/ also recommends that we should continue to conduct a vigorous program of research, experimentation, and underground testing directed toward the advancement of the state-of-the-art to the extent possible under the Limited Test Ban Treaty for the development of very high yield weapons of advanced design in the order of [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] or higher. The AEC is already pursuing this research objective without further authorization. The report also recommends that we improve our capability to test such large weapons in the atmosphere if the Treaty is broken. I believe this recommendation is justified and is consistent with the "safeguards" assurances we have given to the Congress and the terms of the partial test ban treaty.
/3/Reference apparently is to an April 10 memorandum from Deputy Secretary of Defense Vance to President Johnson, which spelled out in some detail the reasons for opposing at that time development of high-yield nuclear weapons. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, A-471.61 (25 Jan 64)) This memorandum incorporated almost all the proposed revisions suggested by the JCS in its Appendix to Document 25.
If you approve, I will send the attached memorandum to Mr. Vance./4/
/4/Not attached, but printed as Document 29.
McGeorge Bundy/5/
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
29. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to the Deputy Secretary of Defense (Vance)/1/
Washington, April 23, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, A-471.61 (25 Jan 64). Top Secret; Restricted Data. Stamped notations indicate that Vance and Howard saw the memorandum. It is also reproduced in sanitized form in Seaborg, Journal, vol. 26, p. 245.
SUBJECT
High Yield Nuclear Weapons
The President has noted the memorandum/2/ reporting the results of the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission re-examination of the need for very high yield nuclear weapons, and concurs in the recommendation of the Department of Defense, in which the Atomic Energy Commission has concurred, that programs should not be initiated at this time for the development of a high yield warhead for our present missiles or high yield bomb for the B-52.
/2/See footnote 5, Document 28.
The President has also noted and concurred in the recommendation that the AEC be authorized to carry out certain ground and airborne operations to prepare itself to develop a three-month readiness posture to make tests in the atmosphere of high yield devices if such tests become necessary and are authorized. He has expressed his desire that such tests be conducted in so far as possible without any publicity.
McGeorge Bundy
30. National Security Action Memorandum No. 299/1/
Washington, May 12, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, S/PC Files: Lot 70 D 199, National Security Action Memos (NSAM). Confidential.
TO
The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT
Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad
The President has rescinded NSC 6019/1 (Evacuation and Protection of U.S. Citizens in Danger Areas Abroad) dated January 2, 1961/2/ and has directed that the Secretaries of State and Defense be responsible for carrying out this program.
/2/Regarding NSC 6019/1, see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960, vol. III, p. 532.
McGeorge Bundy
31. Memorandum From Secretary of Defense McNamara to the Secretary of the Navy (Nitze), the Secretary of the Air Force (Zuckert), and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor)/1/
Washington, May 16, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 200, Defense Programs and Operations, 1966 Budget Guidance, May-June 1964, Box 41. Top Secret. Three pages of tables are not printed.
SUBJECT
Force Guidance for Submission of PCP's on Strategic Retaliatory Forces (U)
REFERENCE
ASD(C) Memorandum of February 20, 1964/2/
/2/Not found.
I have completed my review of the Strategic Retaliatory Forces recommended in JSOP-69./3/ This memorandum summarizes my tentative guidance for the preparation of Program Change Proposals for these forces. In those cases in which my tentative guidance corresponds with previously approved forces, my guidance is shown in the Previously Approved and Tentative Force Guidance (PA&TFG) line; in other cases, my guidance is shown in the Tentative Force Guidance (TFG) line. In those cases in which Previously Approved and Tentative Force Guidance differ, the Services will submit PCP's to implement the latter.
/3/Document 12.
As I indicated in my Draft Memorandum for the President on Recommended FY 1965-FY 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces, December 6, 1963,/4/ I believe that our Strategic Retaliatory Force requirements should be based on two objectives:
/4/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1961-1963, vol. VIII, Document 151.
1. "Assured Destruction." An essential test of the adequacy of our posture is the assured capability to destroy the Soviet [1-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] after absorbing a well planned and executed Soviet surprise attack. The purpose of such a capability is to give us a high degree of confidence that, even under conditions extremely favorable to the Soviets, we can deter a calculated deliberate nuclear attack.
2. "Damage Limiting." Beyond the force required to meet the test of "Assured Destruction" additional forces may be justified for counter-force targeting if they could reduce the damage to the U.S. in the event of a Soviet attack by an amount sufficient to justify their added costs.
I do not believe that there can be any reasonable doubt about the adequacy of our forces to achieve the first objective. As I showed in last December's Memorandum to the President, referred to above, the approved 1969 Strategic Retaliatory Forces including 1000 Minutemen could be expected to be able to destroy about [1 line of source text not declassified] in a second strike after a surprise attack. Even under extremely favorable assumptions from the Soviet viewpoint, which now seem even more unlikely than they did last December, these forces could destroy about [1 line of source text not declassified]. Therefore, I believe that the adequacy of our forces, with 1000 Minutemen rather than 1200 for "Assured Destruction" has been established beyond a reasonable doubt.
As for additional Strategic Retaliatory Forces for the "Damage Limiting" objective, it is clear that they must be considered in relation to our other programs intended for the same purpose, e.g., Continental Air and Missile Defenses and Civil Defense. Moreover, to the extent that we buy additional Strategic Retaliatory Forces for "Damage Limiting", they should be justified as part of a balanced program, that is, a program that maximizes the number of lives saved for the amount of money spent. There are several studies under way now in the Department that are examining this matter, including:
1. A Study of Alternative General Nuclear War Postures to be completed by the CJCS Special Studies Group no later than 1 September (SecDef memorandum to CJCS of 9 January 1964)./5/
/5/See footnote 7, Document 61.
2. A study plan on Strategic Offensive and Defensive Forces integrating study efforts of the Military Departments and other contributing agencies (DepSecDef multi-addressee memorandum March 12, 1964)./6/
/6/Not printed. (Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, 381 Strategic Retaliatory Forces (9 Jan 64) Jan-Jun 64)
As these studies are completed, I will consider recommendations from the Service Secretaries and the Joint Chiefs of Staff if they believe that revisions of any tentative force guidance are indicated. After I have had an opportunity to review such recommendations and studies themselves, I shall issue revised guidance if necessary.
Minuteman
I question whether it would be a wise use of our resources to include the funds for 100 additional Minutemen in the FY 1966 budget for deployment by end FY 1968, for the following reasons.
1. We are not ready to decide on the deployment of Nike-X and the character and scale of our damage limiting program at this time. There are a number of strategic and technical uncertainties yet to be resolved. Moreover, the timing and Congressional support for the necessary full fallout shelter program is still uncertain.
2. Moreover, even if we were to go ahead with a full fallout shelter program and deployment of Nike-X beginning in FY 1966, it has not been established that additional Minuteman ICBM's would form a part of a balanced damage limiting program.
3. Furthermore, even if it were established that additional Minutemen were a part of a balanced program that included full fallout protection and a Nike-X deployment, these missiles must be time-phased to match the availability of other damage limiting forces.
4. Finally, because of the Minuteman II retrofit program, we will be continuing production of Minuteman missiles. Therefore, if a larger force is required at a later date, we retain the option to buy it with no loss in lead time or production re-start costs.
Therefore, I request that the Air Force submit a PCP which levels off the Minuteman force at 1000 missiles. I recognize that the previously approved retrofit schedule was designed on the basis of a 1200 rather than a 1000 missile force objective and that therefore, in all probability, it should be modified. I would like the Air Force to reconsider the deployment of Minuteman II in light of this change and to recommend one that is consistent with achieving the ultimate force objective economically.
The previously approved decisions on spare missiles, missile motor shelf life, extended survivability of Wings I and II are unaffected. In addition, missile-away indicator, radio-launch overlay, improved launch enable system, time-on-target and squadron status reporting subsystems approved for RDT&E, production, and retrofit into Wings I-V will be implemented. Initiation of the retrofit of the Minuteman II system could become necessary in the 1972-1973 period because of the shelf life of the system. Studies should continue determining the best follow-on system.
Last year the Air Force proposed the siting of a squadron in a location which would allow peacetime launches under conditions as near as possible to operational reality. A possible location was the Hunter Liggett reservation north of Vandenberg AF Base. The basis for the proposal was to provide actual operational tests of missile, launcher, control systems, human factors, and technical data. It also would provide a control sample from which to determine bias in test launches and control system, and anomalies introduced by and during shipment of missiles from operational sites to Vandenberg missile range. If the Air Force still recommends such a plan, I request that its Minuteman PCP include this siting as an alternative to the basic plan that would not include isolated siting, together with a cost comparison and an evaluation of its cost and effectiveness in relation to such alternatives as an additional flight at Vandenberg AF Base.
B-52
The Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend no change in the B-52 force structure through FY 1970. The phase-down of this force beyond FY 1970 was contingent upon the phase-in of an Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft proposed by the Air Force.
The issue of the force level is related to the structural integrity of the B-52. Last year the Air Force proposed a comprehensive modification program to correct all known faults of the B-52. At that time, I approved the program for all B-52s except the "B" series. Recently my staff with the cooperation of the Air Force and other agencies has completed a review of the structural problems. It now appears that additional modifications will have to be undertaken to assure the integrity of this force into the '70's.
I have requested that the Secretary of the Air Force provide me with alternative bomber force levels, their effectiveness over the planning period, and the associated costs and schedules for the modification program necessary to sustain these alternatives. These studies will provide a basis for a decision at a later date.
B-58
The Joint Chiefs of Staff show in their proposed force a faster attrition in the B-58 force beginning in FY 1967. Unless there are compelling reasons to show that the quantities of command support aircraft available cannot support the recommended quantities, no change should be made. If a change is required, I request that the Air Force submit an appropriate PCP.
Materiel Acquisition Guidance for Programmed Strategic Bombers
The approved bomber force will carry with them those equipments necessary for redeployment in the event of hostilities. Therefore, prepositioning of stocks of spares, supplies or equipments is not required at other than existing approved squadron deployed locations. Procurement of chaff, tanks and pylons, engines, etc., are required only to support peacetime training and one wartime sortie per bomber.
Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA)
With respect to a follow-on aircraft, the Chiefs of Staff, less the Chief of Staff, Air Force, recommend that we defer a decision on development and procurement programs for AMSA pending review of the program definition phase. The Chief of Staff, Air Force, recommends for planning purposes a force level of 200 aircraft with operational availability of 105 aircraft by end FY 1973.
I support the view of the majority that the decision on the development and procurement be deferred. In addition to any PCP which the Air Force might wish to submit in support of a new strategic bomber development program, separate comprehensive R&D proposals concerning exploratory engine development (not limited to AMSA) and advanced avionics development should be submitted. However, I believe that a decision on deployment would be premature at this time.
Atlas D, E and Titan I
I understand that the Air Force has given serious consideration to the early phase-out of Atlas D and E, and Titan I. I agree that such a plan merits careful attention and request that the Air Force submit a PCP which phases out these missiles by end FY 1965 and Atlas F by end FY 1968.
The Atlas D is configured in a soft, three missile complex and has a slow reaction time. The first missile cannot be launched until fifteen minutes after an execution order; the second missile not before eight minutes later; and the third missile after still eight minutes later. The Atlas E, configured one missile per site, is hardened only to 25 psi and has a reaction time of fifteen minutes. The Titan I is configured three missiles per complex. Theoretically, it is hardened to between 150-200 psi, but the great complexity of the system makes its actual survival potential very uncertain and most probably lower. Moreover, the reaction time of Titan I is also slow--the first missile fifteen minutes after an execution order; the second missile eleven minutes later; and the third missile eleven minutes later, a full 37 minutes later, a full 37 minutes after the order to fire is given. The survival probability of these missiles has been estimated by the JCS to be very low. Since large quantities of Minuteman missiles will be in the inventory, it seems appropriate to phase out these complex and unsatisfactory first generation systems in order to realize cost savings that can be applied to more effective systems. Studies should be initiated which examine the possibility of using the fully hardened silos for other missile systems.
Atlas F procurement beyond FY 1964 is no longer required since Atlas E missiles can be converted into Atlas F missiles with very little modification. In addition, Atlas E assets could also be used for other space booster requirements. Atlas F and Titan II follow-on operational reliability tests are reduced to six firings each per year, as opposed to 12 firings previously approved, bringing the proportion of missiles expended into line with the Minuteman and Polaris test programs.
ICBM Reliability Program
Last year the Services proposed a reliability improvement program consistent with the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. We have allocated large numbers of missiles for the operational test firings. To assure continued reliability of our missile systems during their operational deployment lifetime, follow-on operational tests are also programmed. The following quantities of ICBMs are tentatively approved.
|
Missiles Reqd for Follow-on Reliability Test |
End Fiscal Year | ||||
|
1966 |
1967 |
1968 |
1969 |
1970 | |
|
Atlas F |
6 |
6 |
3 |
0 |
0 |
|
Titan II/a/ |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
6 |
|
Minuteman I |
20 |
55 |
45 |
35 |
25 |
|
Minuteman II/a/ |
20 |
35 |
45 |
55 | |
/a/Requiring continued procurement.
In addition, the previously proposed test program for sea-launched ballistic missiles will continue.
Robert S. McNamara/7/
/7/Printed from a copy that indicates McNamara signed the original.
32. Intelligence Note From the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Hughes) to Acting Secretary of State Ball/1/
Washington, June 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Charles E. Johnson Files, Reconnaissance Satellites. Secret.
SUBJECT
Khrushchev on Reconnaissance Satellites
Twice in two weeks Khrushchev has raised the subject of satellite reconnaissance in conversations with Americans--Drew Pearson and Senator Benton. The Soviet Premier probably has two things in mind. First and most immediate, to maximize pressure on the US to cease overflights of Cuba; second, over time to gain acceptance for the idea that satellite reconnaissance obviates the need for extensive disarmament controls.
Cuban Overflights. In both the Pearson and Benton conversations Khrushchev raised the subject of satellite reconnaissance in the context of threatening to shoot down a U-2. As Khrushchev described them, the flights were not only increasingly dangerous but unnecessary, a point similar to Castro's May Day argument that the U-2 flights were unnecessary because the US had reconnaissance satellites.
Argument Against Disarmament Controls. Although the current emphasis is on Cuba, the idea that satellites obviate the need for disarmament controls appears to have been in Khrushchev's mind longer. On July 8, 1963 Khrushchev raised the subject in a conversation with Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak, arguing that satellites made aerial inspection unnecessary for a European arms control system. Since then the argument has been taken up by lower-ranking Soviet officials, for example by Viktor Karpov of the Soviet Embassy here.
Legitimacy of Satellite Reconnaissance. Like Khrushchev's May 1960 suggestion in Paris that he would not have objected to US use of a satellite instead of a U-2, Khrushchev's statements to Spaak, Pearson, and Benton all suggest that Moscow is seeking to legitimize satellite reconnaissance.
The degree of Soviet acceptance to date of satellite reconnaissance should not be overstressed, however. For example, in the UN Outer Space Committee the Soviets have been willing to forego discussion of the subject but they have not made explicit statements accepting the practice. Moreover, the Soviet media have not published Khrushchev's remarks, Adzhubei's boast in Helsinki last September about Soviet pictures of New York and Castro's May Day statement. Moscow is also apparently reluctant to suggest to the home audience that the Soviet Union is vulnerable to American surveillance.
Next Moves. Khrushchev's semi-public references to reconnaissance satellites could reflect his intention to pursue more formal discussions in this field. He could formally put to the US the proposition on Cuba he has put informally to Pearson and Benton. More broadly, he could seek to inject new momentum into old disarmament debates by formally proposing use of satellites instead of traditional forms of inspection.
For the moment, however, we would expect Khrushchev to continue his semi-public remarks to foreigners: they avoid formally accepting US satellite programs as legitimate while showing Khrushchev as seeking a way out of a crisis over Cuba. At the same time they permit him to make threats about the Cuban overflights without putting them formally on the record. He may be calculating that he can with his present tactics maneuver the US into a position where it must choose between three relatively awkward alternative responses: (1) it could remain silent and appear adamant in face of his "reasonable" suggestion; (2) it could agree with his arguments and stop the U-2s; or (3) it could counter his simple proposition with a complex technical, and possibly revealing, argument about the limitations of satellite photography.
If Khrushchev finds that his tactics backfire--i.e. that the US welcomes his acceptance of the legitimacy of satellite photography but continues flying the U-2s--it would become more likely that he would make a formal, high-level approach to us to get us to substitute satellites for U-2s.
33. Letter From the Director of the White House Office of Emergency Planning (McDermott) to Secretary of State Rusk/1/
Washington, June 17, 1964.
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 1-2 US. No classification marking. An attached June 26 note from Marion A. Baldwin (S/S-S) to William E. Knepper (S) requested approval of an attached draft letter from G. Griffith Johnson to McDermott, as a reply to McDermott's letter to the Secretary. A "yes" is handwritten in the margin of Baldwin's note.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
I recently submitted to The President a report about the progress that has been made on the Supply-Requirements Study for Nuclear War and Reconstruction that is currently being carried out by the Office of Emergency Planning in cooperation with a number of Federal agencies, including the Department of State./2/ On June 4, 1964, the Honorable Walter Jenkins, Special Assistant to the President, wrote me that "The President has asked to be kept advised periodically of your progress," and added that "Because of the obvious need for nuclear war objectives to provide guidance for stockpile policy, the participating Federal agencies should give high priority to this work." A copy of Mr. Jenkins' memorandum is enclosed./3/
/2/The progress report has not been found. Regarding what apparently is the final report, see footnote 4, Document 44.
/3/Attached but not printed.
The Department of State, under guidance issued by the Office of Emergency Planning, is contributing to this study through the development of estimates covering the supply of and requirements for various major resources following a nuclear attack on the United States. The study was explained at a special meeting of the Interdepartmental Emergency Planning Committee on October 1, 1963./4/ Since that date, all departments and agencies having either resource or claimant responsibilities for specific materials, products, or services during emergency periods have been conducting detailed evaluations in their assigned areas.
/4/Not further identified.
The results of the study will be invaluable in our planning for the postattack recovery of the nation, and will provide the basis for setting nuclear war stockpile objectives. Our present stockpile objectives are based on supply-requirements studies reflecting the needs of a conventional war. We are currently being urged, both by members of the Congress and representatives of industry, to develop stockpile objectives which will meet the needs of nuclear war and reconstruction.
I would appreciate your informing the individuals in your agency that are engaged in this study of its importance and of the necessity for ensuring that no unjustifiable delays prevent its completion as soon as possible. In this connection, I would also appreciate having you bring a copy of Mr. Jenkins' memorandum to their attention.
Sincerely,
Ed
34. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
No. 1391/64
Washington, June 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security File, Subject File, Space, Outer, Vol. II, 5/1- , Box 37. Secret. Prepared jointly in the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Intelligence.
SUBJECT
The Soviet Reconnaissance Satellite Program
A Soviet military reconnaissance satellite program appears to be well under way with possibly as many as 12 flights since 1962. The program uses recoverable vehicles launched from Tyuratam under the mantle of the Cosmos series. The camera system, providing an estimated resolution between 10 and 30 feet, probably is carried in the 10,400-pound Vostok vehicle. The program is expensive, possibly costing as much as 500 to 700 million dollars so far, and places added demands on resources available for Soviet space programs. A requirement for precise targeting information on US targets, not obtainable through other collection means, seems to be the primary reason for the program. Also, Soviet collection of other military intelligence on the US could be usefully supplemented by satellite photography. Khrushchev's open acknowledgments of the program have been aimed at stopping U-2 flights over Cuba, but also imply a desire for a tacit understanding on reconnaissance satellites. The existence of the Soviet program tends to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet attempt to attack a US satellite.
1. We have concluded that the Soviet military reconnaissance satellite program may have involved as many as 12 flights since 1962. The evidence is convincing that these were military reconnaissance satellites, although they may have had additional missions. Their launch times and orbits were ideally suited for reconnaissance coverage of the US during daylight hours, the payload was recovered, they were earth oriented and stabilized within the requirements of a sophisticated camera system, and telemetry from them reflected payload activity like that of a reconnaissance photographic payload.
2. A study of the 16 Cosmos satellites successfully launched from Tyuratam between 26 April 1962 and 10 June 1964 leads us to believe that four of them were military reconnaissance satellites, eight others probably were, and four probably were not.
3. We cannot make a firm judgment on the quality of the Soviet reconnaissance photography with the limited data now available. On the basis of what we know about Soviet optical competence and film technology and the operational characteristics of these satellites, we estimate that the camera system could provide resolution between 10 and 30 feet. Telemetry from some of the Cosmos satellites suggests that they employed three framing cameras plus an indexing camera.
4. Moscow has held that the purpose of the Cosmos series, which began in March 1962, was to collect scientific data. It became clear, however, that different types of vehicles were being launched from two different rangeheads, Kapustin Yar and Tyuratam, and the characteristics of the 14 satellites successfully orbited from Kapustin Yar rule out a reconnaissance mission.
5. The 16 successful Cosmos operations from Tyuratam which we have examined are believed to have used the basic 10,400-pound Vostok vehicle, with the possible exception of Cosmos 22 and 30. All were recovered in the Soviet Union three to ten days after launching. The most recent in the series, Cosmos 32, had an inclination of 51 degrees to the equator, while all previous Tyuratam Cosmos satellites had inclinations of 65 degrees. This change suggests that the Soviets are improving their reconnaissance program because the inclination of Cosmos 32 permitted greater coverage of the US each day.
6. The series launched from Tyuratam may have had other missions in addition to photographic reconnaissance. The presence of a small radiation package aboard most vehicles is one example of such a secondary mission. Four meteorological satellites in the series transmitted cloud pictures from orbit but this photography was not of military reconnaissance quality. Two of these could also have provided geodetic mapping data. Other research work probably is involved, such as development of lunar and planetary mapping.
7. We have identified most of the Tyuratam satellites as military reconnaissance vehicles on the basis of detailed examination of all their known characteristics. Among the indicators of a reconnaissance mission, we note the following:
a. Orbital elements: With the exception of Cosmos 4 and 9, the apogees, perigees, and orbital periods of these satellites were ideally suited for reconnaissance and were not completely compatible with any other mission. (see Table 1 and Figure 1)/2/
/2/Neither the table nor any of the figures is printed.
b. Launch times: All Tyuratam Cosmos vehicles have been launched during a time which assured daylight conditions on the ground on all south to north passes over the Northern Hemisphere. (see Figures 2 and 3)
c. Payload recovery and mission lifetime: Each vehicle stays up at least until it begins to retrace the same ground area, and the payloads are recovered.
d. Weather factors: Preliminary analysis suggests that launch dates have coincided with generally clear weather over the United States.
e. Orientation and stabilization: The vehicles are earth oriented and stabilized about three axes with the rate of vehicle motion--.01 to .02 degrees per second--held within the requirements of a sophisticated camera system.
f. Ground command activity: The ground command system, which is capable of handling at least 240 different commands, is the kind which would be needed to support present and future reconnaissance satellite requirements. The Cosmos satellites so far are known to have employed at least twenty different commands involving three different ground stations in the USSR.
g. Telemetry data recorded during payload activity: Every one of these satellites stored data during certain times of interest when the vehicle was not over the Soviet Union, and subsequently played it back when over Soviet ground stations. We have determined after analyzing this activity that stabilization corrections were made during the early recording period, and that after the vehicle was stabilized, operation of payload mechanisms began. At no time during the payload operation was any attitude correction applied. The way in which the four mechanisms observed on Cosmos 20 functioned was consistent with the operation of a small indexing camera and three higher resolution cameras. (see Figure 3)
h. Soviet statements: Khrushchev himself has alluded to Soviet satellite reconnaissance on several occasions. In 1963, he told Belgian Foreign Minister Spaak that the Soviets were engaged in photographing the United States and that he could produce the photographs to prove it. Former Senator Benton also quoted Khrushchev as saying, during their recent meeting in Moscow, that Soviet space cameras have filmed US military installations./3/
/3/See Document 32.
8. If we are correct in concluding that most of the Cosmos satellites launched from Tyuratam have a reconnaissance mission, it would seem that Moscow is devoting a substantial share of its space effort to the collection of military intelligence. According to preliminary estimates based on the costs of US scientific satellites, the cost of Tyuratam Cosmos operations to date may have amounted to the equivalent of about 700 million to one billion dollars, roughly 20 percent of total expenditures estimated for all observed Soviet space programs. As a rough proportion of this estimate, the costs of a military reconnaissance program including the 12 satellites launched so far would be on the order of 500 to 700 million dollars.
9. Also important is the additional strain imposed on the human and material resources available for Soviet space programs by the demands of a reconnaissance program.
10. We believe that the USSR has made this large investment primarily for missile targeting purposes. Strategic missile systems require precise information on the geodetic relationship of the target to the launch point, particularly in the case of hardened targets. The precise targeting information needed on the hundreds of targets in the US is only obtainable by satellite photography. The resolution we estimate the Soviets can achieve--10 to 30 feet--would be sufficient to obtain such targeting information when combined with other geodetic mapping data.
11. Despite the USSR's comparatively easy access to much information on military weapons and installations in the US it has requirements for military reconnaissance satellites beyond those for targeting data.
a. Supplementary intelligence on trends in the organization, deployment, and strengths of US strategic missile, long-range bomber, and naval carrier forces could be gained through satellite photography.
b. The USSR also has a requirement for high resolution photography--five feet or better--for technical analysis of classified US installations only accessible to overhead reconnaissance.
c. The Soviets probably have a requirement for a reconnaissance system capable of transmitting photos while in flight. Such a system could provide intelligence on movements of US strategic forces during crisis and wartime situations, and on results of wartime strikes.
12. In view of Soviet activity in the reconnaissance satellite field, Moscow may be more tolerant of similar US programs than it has been in the past. Khrushchev's recent open acknowledgment of both US and Soviet efforts tends to bear this out. Although his immediate objective in these remarks has been to secure a cessation of U-2 flights over Cuba, they suggest a desire on his part for a tacit understanding with the US on reconnaissance satellites.
13. We believe that the Soviets intend to develop an antisatellite capability. We have no evidence of such a development, but they may develop a limited capability at an early date so as to be able to retaliate if the US should interfere with a Soviet satellite. In our view, however, the existence of a Soviet reconnaissance satellite program tends to reduce the likelihood of a Soviet attempt to destroy or neutralize a US satellite.
35. Memorandum From President Johnson to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, June 18, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, OSD Files: FRC 330 69 A 7425, A-400.23 (6 Mar 64). Top Secret; Restricted Data. A stamped notation, dated July 13, indicates that McNamara saw the memorandum.
SUBJECT
FY 1966 Nuclear Weapons Production and Stockpile
I approve the proposed Nuclear Weapons Stockpile for the end of FY 1966 submitted to me by the Department of Defense and Atomic Energy Commission on December 19, 1963 (as subsequently amended by the joint memorandum by the Department of Defense and Bureau of the Budget on May 29, 1964)./2/
/2/Neither found.
Accordingly, I approve a total of [number not declassified] complete nuclear weapons ([number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the stockpile composition for the end of FY 1966. I also approve a total of [number not declassified] complete nuclear weapons ([number not declassified] nuclear warhead elements) as the adjusted stockpile composition for the end of FY 1965. This will mean a planned production by the Atomic Energy Commission of [number not declassified] complete weapons and a planned retirement of [number not declassified] complete weapons during FY 1966.
I authorize you, in coordination with the Atomic Energy Commission, to make such minor changes (±10%) within the production total of [number not declassified] complete weapons for FY 1965 as may be necessary to adjust production schedules to meet AEC material availabilities. I further authorize you to make minor changes (±10%) in any line item or collective total that may be required because of adjusted delivery system assets or changes in strategic, tactical, air defense, or antisubmarine warfare concepts. Any changes indicative of a major shift in defense policy or AEC production capability will be submitted for my approval.
Lyndon B. Johnson
36. Letter From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Taylor) to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
Washington, July 1, 1964.
/1/Source: Washington National Records Center, McNamara Files: FRC 330 71 A 3470, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Folder 17. Secret; Personal & Confidential. "Sec Def has seen" is stamped on the letter.
Dear Mr. Secretary:
With more warning of my departure from the arena of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,/2/ I would probably be leaving with fewer regrets over the unfinished business which I must leave behind. Given the circumstances of my reassignment, I have been unable to complete or even expedite work in many of the important areas where I had hoped to make a contribution during my terminal years of military service. The purpose of this letter is to note and comment upon some (but clearly not all) of the important issues which are still unresolved.
/2/General Taylor was appointed Ambassador to Vietnam on July 1.
a. The effectiveness of the Joint Staff.
In spite of the many able and dedicated officers who serve on the Joint Staff, I leave it with a feeling that it is still marginally effective. It continues to be hampered by an uneven and sometimes excessively heavy workload, by cramped working conditions, and by inadequate recognition of its members by their Service of origin. While some progress has been made in giving greater incisiveness to Joint Staff papers and in preserving the integrity of the Joint Staff input from distortion by Service views, there is still an inherent slowness in the Joint Staff operations which often affects adversely the timeliness of the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and thus dulls their impact. An excessive concern over Service representation among the incumbents of the various key posts is another factor which works against continuity of assignment and flexibility in the use of Joint Staff personnel. Finally, the Services are still not putting their best people on the Joint Staff--not always. These factors in combination work against its effectiveness and require correction. J-1 has this whole field presently under study and will, I hope, come forward soon with constructive suggestions.
b. Proportionate distribution of assignments by Service.
I mentioned the disadvantage of the current practice of distributing important jobs in the Joint Staff rigidly by service. I am opposed to this practice in principle in filling any and all important posts within the Department of Defense. While we should follow the general policy of roughly proportionate Service sharing of participation in the important functions of the Department, we should not accept a strait-jacket policy which prevents choosing the best man for the job regardless of Service. I would favor calling for nominations from all Services to fill all important positions and then endeavor to pick the best qualified man from among the nominees. In the long run, I do not believe this practice would work against an adequate and fair representation of all the Services in the key billets within the Department of Defense.
c. The readiness of contingency plans.
In working on the Cuba and Southeast Asia plans, I have been impressed by the incompleteness of our past contingency planning. With the exception of these two plans which have lately received a great deal of special attention, our other contingency plans are little more than outlines which could not be expanded for implementation other than on a "crash" basis without months of additional staff work both in the field and in the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As I leave the Joint Staff, it is not yet clear whether CINCPAC's 32 series can be supported without considerable mobilization and within an acceptable time frame. Once these CINCPAC plans are put in order, the same kind of treatment should be accorded all of the contingency plans which have a reasonable possibility of implementation.
d. Inadequacy of Army support units.
From this examination of contingency plans, it is becoming quite clear that the force structure of the Army is out of balance. There are insufficient support type units to permit the deployment of the combat forces as they become ready for commitment to action. The implementation of virtually any contingency plan will require some mobilization, if not to meet the needs of the immediate contingency then to replace units deployed from CONUS reserves. There are three alternatives open to us; either (a) to increase the size of the regular Army to permit the formation of the missing support units, or (b) to reduce the combat structure to a proper balance with the existing support structure, or (c) to accept the fact that partial mobilization will be indispensable in any contingency situation.
e. Need for rational logistic guidance.
A further byproduct of the study of contingency plans is a growing recognition of the need for rational logistic guidance to assure the combat readiness of the forces required to execute the approved strategy. We should re-read paragraph 40, Part IV, JSOP-69,/3/ and decide whether or not we really mean the language contained therein. If we do, we should then formulate the logistic guidance which will permit the creation, maintenance, and combat support of the general purpose forces described therein. General Meyer has considerable work in progress directed toward this end. He needs full support to carry it forward to completion.
/3/See Document 12. Part IV is not printed.
f. New SIOP guidance.
[1 paragraph (10-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
g. Army-Air Force relations.
I regret to report that the relations between the Army and Air Force in Washington have not improved--indeed, I believe that they are worse than when I arrived on my present tour of duty. We are paying the price today of unsound and incomplete decisions and uncoordinated doctrine developed over past years. The immediate need is for the approval of a statement differentiating between organic Army aviation and that Air Force aviation provided in support of the Army. I have made a recommendation to you on this subject with which you are familiar. The second requirement is to make clear that sustained land combat is the primary function of the Army to which the Air Force is in a supporting relationship. The Army commanders responsible for conducting sustained land combat must always have available under their operational control that indispensable element of air power necessary for the success of the land battle. If necessary, the attachment of Air Force units should be made without hesitation. If such procedures are not adopted, I would consider an overhaul of the statement of roles and missions to be indispensable.
h. Review of roles and missions.
With regard to the possible requirement for a review of roles and missions, I would point out that the last statement of roles and missions was effected in 1947 and was based largely upon the capabilities of the Services at that time. Since then, there have been many changes in weapons, in warfare, and in the capabilities of the Services so that a review would appear to be timely. When it takes place, specific consideration should be given to the desirability and feasibility of the following adjustments of roles and missions:
(1) Assumption by the Air Force of the provision of all air vehicles for the Army in accordance with CSAFM-408-64 dated 12 May 1964,/4/ provided to you on that date.
/4/Not found.
(2) Assumption by the Army of the close air support responsibilities now assigned to the Air Force.
(3) The assignment of the Army role in continental air defense to the Air Force.
(4) Restatement of the mission of the Marine Corps in consistence with present capabilities and probable employment in contingencies.
(5) Placing of all or part of Marine aircraft aboard Navy carriers.
(6) Elimination of equipment now organic within various units of the Services which is subject to intermittent rather than habitual use and the pooling thereof at another echelon.
To resolve such questions as the foregoing in a temperate atmosphere will be difficult. However, until it is accomplished there will be a continuing struggle among the Services over missions and parts of missions which presently overlap agreed frontiers.
i. Civilian-military relationships in the Pentagon.
During my service as Chairman, I have worked to the best of my ability to attenuate or, if possible, to eliminate the differences--sometimes real, sometimes imaginary--between the civilian and military authorities in the Department of Defense. I hope that our own personal relationship of which I have been very proud has set an example for those around us and has contributed to proper team play. Inevitably, however, there are areas of potential friction where there is an overlap or gray zone of common interest between subordinate elements of DOD. Insofar as the business of the JCS is concerned, it is the Comptroller's office and ISA which by the nature of their duties are most likely to impinge upon the responsibilities of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. While informal discussions have tended in the past to remove most of the abrasive corners, there are still potential difficulties arising from the fatal attraction which some of our civilians find in military planning. To cite a recent example, I suggest a look at DEF 975264 to Vientiane./5/ I feel that it is very important for ISA and the Systems Analysis area of the Comptroller's office to understand that they are not in the business of military planning and are not a rival source of military advice in competition with the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
In closing, let me say what a pleasure it has been to have been associated with you in the last year and nine months. In my former unhappy days as Chief of Staff of the Army, I cried out for a decisive Secretary of Defense to end the unending conflicts. I got one and am now content. If you will only stay with your present job and not allow yourself to be diverted to other tasks, I have no concern over the soundness of the future policies and programs of the Department of Defense.
/5/Not found.
Sincerely yours,
Maxwell D. Taylor
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