



# The Effects of Lunar Dust on Advanced EVA Systems: Lessons from Apollo

# James R. Gaier

NASA Glenn Research Center

# **Ronald A. Creel**

SAIC

"Dust is the number <u>one</u> concern in returning to the moon"


- Apollo 16 Astronaut John Young

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**Office** 



- NASA's Vision for Space Exploration
  - Goal advancement of "...U.S. scientific, security, and economic interests through a robust space exploration program."
  - The Vision is based around a spiral development that extends "...human presence across the solar system, starting with a human return to the Moon by the year 2020..."
  - Spiral 2: 4 14 day human missions to lunar surface

# **AEVA** program has been charged

- Develop technology
- Develop flight hardware
- Spacesuits, tools, and vehicular interfaces for the lunar surface exploration
- **AEVA Environmental Protection Program** 
  - Mitigate risks due to **dust**, radiation, toxicological







- Apollo astronauts cited multiple problems caused by lunar dust
- Dust degradation effects can be sorted into categories
  - Vision obscuration
  - False instrument readings
  - Loss of foot traction
  - Dust coating and contamination
  - Seal failures
  - Clogging of mechanisms
  - Abrasion of materials
  - Thermal control problems
  - Inhalation and irritation risks
- Lunar dust properties which cause these effects must be understood, simulated, and mitigated if AEVA systems are to operate effectively





**Dust Free** 



**Dust Covered** 






#### First noted on Apollo 11 LM landing

- Began noticing at altitude of 100 ft
- More severe as altitude decreased
- Apollo 12 even more severe

- Concerned LM foot could land on boulder, small crater
- Landing profile changed, Apollo 14 had fewer problems
  - Had fewer dust problems of all types
  - Intrinsically less dust site?
- Apollo 15, 16 both reported problems on landing
  - Both used higher landing profile
- No mention in Apollo 17 debriefing
  - Also had fewer dust problems reported
- Minor camera problems on Apollo 15
  - Fixed by brushing off lens









- Apollo 12 velocity trackers gave false readings
  - Locked onto moving dust and debris during descent
- Apollo 15 landing radar outputs affected
  - Altitudes less than 30 feet
- Dust on visors adversely affected Lunar Roving Vehicle (LRV) indicators and gage readings
- Apollo 17 reported minimal problems of this sort
  - Less loose dust at landing site(?)
  - Each landing site will be different!








- **Neil Armstrong reported material** on boot sole made ladder slippery
- No other similar reports

- Apollo 12 astronauts report specifically there were no problems
- Astronauts started kicking ladder before ingress
  - Kept some of the dust out of the LM
  - May have shaken enough dust off to prevent slipping
  - Limited number of egress-ingress cycles
- Not thought to be a major concern



**Mission Support LM Model** 







#### Dust quickly and effectively coated surfaces

- Boots, gloves, suits, and hand tools affected
- Dust on Apollo 11 TV cord concealed it and created tripping hazard
- Dropped Apollo 12 contrast chart became unusable
- LRV fender extensions knocked off, resulting in astronauts and equipment being covered with dust

### Coating problems developed into other problems

- Clogging of mechanisms
- Seal failures
- Abrasion

- Thermal control
- Dust created housekeeping problems
  - Much astronaut time devoted to ineffective brushing off and wiping down equipment











- Ability to seal suits for EVA's compromised
- Apollo 12 higher than normal suit pressure decay
  - Pete Conrad's suit was tight before first EVA
  - After first EVA 0.15 psi/min
  - After second EVA 0.25 psi/min
  - Safety limit was 0.30 psi/min
  - Dust could not be completely cleared off of fittings
- All Apollo environmental, gas, and regolith sample seals failed
  - Samples contaminated before reached earth








- Equipment clogged and mechanisms jammed on every mission
  - Equipment conveyor to LM
  - Lock buttons
  - Camera equipment
  - Velcro® fasteners
  - Zippers
  - Wrist locks
  - Hose locks
  - Faceplates
  - Sunshades
  - Vacuum cleaner
- Particularly problem when fender extensions were knocked off LRV
- Several crew remarked could not have sustained more surface activity





**Apollo 17 Fender Fix** 





- Conrad and Bean's suits worn through above boot
  - Micrometeoroid protection layer breached
  - Several layers of Kapton<sup>®</sup> multi-layer thermal insulation breached
- Brushing dust off scratched indicator dial faceplates
  - Made some LRV indicators unreadable on Apollo 16
- Obscured vision
  - Harrison Schmitt's visor sun shade so scratched he could not see in certain directions
- Apollo 17 astronaut cover gloves for core drill were worn
  - Worn through after drilling cores on two (of three) EVA's
- Abrasion caused some of the most serious problems







- LRV batteries exceeded temperature limits
  - Losing fender extensions increased dust exposure for dust covers and radiators
  - Power switching required on Apollo 16


- Communications, TV camera, experiment radiators also adversely affected
  - Surface Electrical Properties (SEP) experiment failed

#### Valuable EVA time spent trying to clean radiators

Limited effectiveness

#### Ground-based tests for dust removal by brushing were inadequate and misleading

- Need high quality thermal/vacuum test facility
- Need "believable" testing of prevention and mitigation methods, correlated with actual system models



Battery No. 2 Temperature



Astronaut Brushing Radiator







- Dust could compromise astronaut health
- Apollo 11 reported dust gave off distinctive, pungent odor
  - Suggests small particle sizes were suspended in spacecraft
  - May have reactive volatiles on the surface of the dust
  - Dust irritated eyes, but was easily removed
  - Dust under fingernails was persistent
- Apollo 12 reported eye and lung irritation on return trip
  - Contaminated the CM after docking with LM
- Apollo 12 crew reported dust got in everywhere
  - Conrad and Bean covered with dust when they removed space suits
- Harrison Schmitt reported hay fever-like symptoms from dust
  - Lasted much of the return trip







- Wide range of experts generated a report that identified:
  - Systems that would be affected by dust
  - How those systems would be affected
  - Risks associated with each system so affected
  - Requirements that need to be developed
  - Knowledge gaps
- Resulting list of potential problem areas in EVA systems
  - Those culled from the Apollo experience
  - Possible electrical problems such as power drains and shorts







- TRL 6 development for Spiral 2 surface suit, other AEVA components by 2009
  - Testing requirements now being developed
  - Realistic testing facilities identified or built up
  - Requirements for appropriate simulants being developed
- How well they hold up in the dusty environment
  - Evaluation of candidate suit materials that would be exposed to the dust New mitigation strategies will be tested at this level
    Effectiveness quantified
  - Component-level testing

Particularly important for joints and connections

- Evaluate new designs and materials identified in the first stage
- Full-up suit and system tests

Identify system problems that are not obvious from the component tests.







- Functional properties of dust are key
  - Optical properties
  - Abrasive properties
  - Adhesion properties
  - Thermal properties
  - Tribological properties
  - Electrical properties
  - Magnetic properties
  - Other properties?
- May use different simulants to test different properties
  - The fewer that can be used, the better
  - Must not compromise fidelity in properties to minimize number of simulants







- Required characteristics of the lunar simulants yet to be defined
- AEVA simulant(s) properties driven by requirements
  - Goal is to reduce risk of AEVA failure due to dust
- **ISRU** simulant properties driven by requirements
  - Goal is to develop resource utilization technology
- Since the goals are different, the simulants might also differ
  - Communication between the AEVA and ISRU teams must be maintained
  - The more commonality of simulants, the better
  - Fortunate coincidence if simulants required by both efforts are the same.

