Bibliographic Citation
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Title | Defense and stability |
Creator/Author | Reinhardt, G.C. |
Publication Date | 1986 Jun 27 |
OSTI Identifier | OSTI ID: 7156764; DE87005728 |
Report Number(s) | UCRL-53743 |
DOE Contract Number | W-7405-ENG-48 |
Resource Type | Technical Report |
Resource Relation | Portions of this document are illegible in microfiche products. Original copy available until stock is exhausted |
Research Org | Lawrence Livermore National Lab., CA (USA) |
Subject | 350100 -- Arms Control-- Policy, Negotiations, & Legislation-- (1987-) ;290600 -- Energy Planning & Policy-- Nuclear Energy; BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE-- GAME THEORY;WARFARE-- GAME THEORY; NATIONAL DEFENSE;NUCLEAR WEAPONS;STABILITY;USA;USSR |
Related Subject | ASIA;EASTERN EUROPE;EUROPE;MATHEMATICS;NATIONAL DEFENSE;NORTH AMERICA;STATISTICS;WEAPONS |
Description/Abstract | This study is a further extension of our investigations into prevenient stability; here, we look at the effects of strategic defensive systems.^We use the Exchange code to examine the changes in crisis stability and deterrence brought about by various levels of strategic defense for both US and USSR cities.^Our results show that crisis instability rises slightly as either side alone increases its defense effectiveness, with maximum instability occurring at values of defense effectiveness approximating 80%.^After that point, crisis stability increases until the situation can be regarded as more stable than it was initially.^Our results also show that when both superpowers increase their defense effectiveness simultaneously, crisis instability reaches a maximum at the same time mutual deterrence begins to decrease.^These findings cast doubt on the wisdom of sharing strategic defense technology. |
Country of Publication | United States |
Language | English |
Format | Pages: 15 |
Availability | NTIS, PC A02/MF A01; 1. |
System Entry Date | 2001 May 13 |
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