Strategic Objective 2.2: Ensure Military Capabilities and Readiness

Overall Comments

Draft GAO Strategic Plan 2004-2009 PrintablePDF Version

Strategic Objective 2.2: Ensure Military Capabilities and ReadinessQuestions and Comments

Performance Goal 2.2.1: Assess DOD’s Ability to Maintain Adequate Readiness Levels While Addressing the Force Structure Changes Needed in the 21st Century

Key Efforts

Evaluate DOD’s progress in developing and implementing its role in homeland security
Assess the military services’ training and readiness to accomplish their missions
Assess DOD’s worldwide antiterrorism/force protection program and implementation to provide adequate security to military forces and assets worldwide
Assess DOD’s chemical and biological defense program’s and related activities’ ability to meet current and future threat-focused requirements
Assess the potential for the military services to adopt more efficient and effective concepts for organizing and deploying forces
Assess service efforts to manage and integrate force transformation plans effectively
Assess the extent to which the development and acquisition of weapons systems meet the needs of the armed forces, particularly for transformational capabilities
Assess the key lessons learned from recent military operations overseas
Provide the Congress with objective analysis of the costs and funding for military operations and follow-on activities

Significance

DOD’s implementation of the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review and its follow-on studies presents many opportunities for GAO to assist the Congress in analyzing the basis for and effect of changes to defense strategies and programs and changes in force structure and deployment plans. The Congress will be especially interested in the DOD strategy for homeland security and how it will affect DOD’s ability to carry out more traditional missions. GAO’s independent assessments will highlight potential risks associated with proposed changes and examine how such changes will affect DOD’s ability to address readiness problems.

New areas of emphasis in the defense strategy--such as homeland security, force transformation, space, and information warfare--will force tough trade-off decisions and a closer examination of how to achieve defense goals most cost effectively. Accordingly, analyses of the cost-effectiveness of defense alternatives and options will be needed. Similarly, the Congress and DOD are likely to focus more attention on how DOD can best blend the diverse elements of its total force (active, reserve, and civilian forces) to achieve economies and increase effectiveness and how it can better contain costs related to overseas operations.

Potential Outcomes

Greater congressional understanding of the basis for key changes in defense programs
DOD actions to speed progress toward an effective homeland security strategy
Improved military readiness to accomplish the national military strategy and elimination of barriers to achieving expected levels of readiness
More rigorous requirements determination processes, less duplication of forces and capabilities, and better data for considering force structure alternatives and overseas presence requirements
DOD actions to address inconsistencies between transformation plans, acquisition and other programs (including affordability), and resources in relation to future warfighting needs
Improvements in strategic airlift capabilities and management and better data on costs and implications of overseas training and operations
More cost-effective integration of military and civilian personnel, contractors, allies, and host nations to meet defense needs.

Performance Goal 2.2.2: Assess Overall Human Capital Management Practices to Ensure a High-Quality Total Force

Key Efforts

Assess DOD’s human capital management of its civilian workforce, including acquisition and contracting workforces
Assess DOD’s human capital management of its reserve components
Assess DOD’s human capital management of its active duty forces

Significance

A key concern for DOD is how it will manage its large investment in human capital today and in the future. DOD is the largest U.S. employer, with about 700,000 civilian federal employees, 1.2 million reservists, and 1.3 million active duty service members. DOD also increasingly relies on a large but undetermined number of contractor personnel. DOD’s large and diverse total force requires a large financial investment--for example, over $100 billion--in compensation for the 1.3 million active duty members. Even with substantial financial investment, DOD faces tremendous challenges in managing and sustaining its total force. Its evolving human capital practices present DOD with an opportunity to break from its tradition-bound policies and procedures for managing its diverse total force of civilian employees, reservists, and active duty members.

By organizing the work in this performance goal around the three categories of personnel, GAO is positioned to address both emerging and long-standing areas of congressional concern for any component of the total force. Such concerns include how DOD would implement recently sought legislation to provide it with much greater flexibility in administering its military and civilian human capital programs; the adequacy of DOD’s acquisition and the contracting workforces, which are critical to developing and providing weapon systems and equipment to the military forces; and the timeliness and adequacy of the personnel security investigation process. They also include various issues associated with mobilizing and demobilizing reservists, emphasis on joint DOD operations, and efforts to expand the integrated use of the three categories of personnel. Because DOD’s total force is so large and its mission is so critical, even small improvements in DOD’s human capital management practices can result in large and important gains in national security, total force quality and performance, and cost savings.

Potential Outcomes

A more strategic approach to overall DOD human capital planning and overall management of the civilian workforce
Acquisition and contractor workforces aligned with changing roles and responsibilities
An enhanced overall strategic approach to DOD human capital management of reserve forces
An improved, strategic approach to DOD human capital management of active duty forces

Performance Goal 2.2.3: Assess the Ability of Weapon System Acquisition Programs and Processes to Achieve Desired Outcomes

Key Efforts

Provide annual status and risk updates on a wide range of weapon systems, observing trends in acquisition performance and opportunities for budgetary actions
Target reviews of individual weapon systems to assess their ability to achieve outcomes early enough so that DOD can take action well ahead of major decisions
Assess barriers that prevent DOD from advancing technology while at the same time developing new weapons more quickly and predictably

Significance

DOD invests well over $100 billion each year in a wide array of weapon systems to equip the U.S. armed forces. These systems range from upgrades to tanks and fighter aircraft to sophisticated satellites and networks of systems, such as those used for national missile defense. It is not unusual for a single program to cost over $40 billion. These investments represent the largest discretionary portion of the U.S. budget.

DOD’s acquisition process has produced the best weapons in the world. At the same time, the process routinely yields weapons that exceed cost and schedule estimates by significant amounts. The opportunity costs of such increases are significant; a mere 3 percent cost growth per year means that $3 billion of scarce discretionary funds are not available for new investments. Given the complexity of modern weapons, some problems can be expected. Many, however, can be predicted and avoided. It is not unusual for a new program to rely on fledgling technologies for high performance, only to report late in development that insufficient time and money had been estimated to develop the technologies and incorporate them into an overall design.

As unplanned cost increases occur, activities such as testing are deferred, giving rise to the late discovery of problems. Ultimately, it takes more money to buy fewer of a new weapon, thereby limiting anticipated capabilities. DOD recognizes this pattern and has signaled its intention to improve acquisitions. Recently, DOD has begun to recognize the potential of using best practices adopted from world-class enterprises to field systems within predicted estimates and to reduce the time and cost of doing so.

Potential Outcomes

More relevant knowledge base for congressional decision making
Increased use of best practices to achieve desired outcomes
Better transition of new technologies to weapon programs and reduced acquisition cycle times and costs

Performance Goal 2.2.4: Identify Ways to Improve the Economy, Efficiency, and Effectiveness of DOD’s Support Infrastructure and Business Systems and Processes

Key Efforts

Identify ways to improve the economy, efficiency, and effectiveness of existing logistics functions
Assess transformation of DOD’s logistics systems to meet future needs and reduce the overall logistics footprint
Assess DOD’s efforts to realign defense organizations and improve its business processes
Assess DOD’s efforts to realign and/or reduce excess defense facilities in the United States and overseas and improve the management and maintenance of its facilities
Assess DOD’s and the military services’ efforts to develop weapon systems with smaller logistics impact and lower operating and support costs

Significance

Although the United States significantly reduced its defense force structure and military spending in the decade following the end of the Cold War, similar reductions did not occur in the defense support infrastructure, which has historically consumed about 60 percent of DOD’s budget. (This represents mission-support funding for various program elements, such as central logistics and installation support.) Operating efficiencies and reductions have resulted from efforts such as base realignment and closure, consolidations, organizational and business process reengineering, privatization, and competitive sourcing. However, DOD is faced with the need to address substantial inefficiencies in support operations; aging equipment and facilities; and continuing problems in the areas of spare parts, maintenance, and repair. DOD officials recognize that they must achieve greater efficiencies to manage their support operations more effectively, contain costs, and provide increased funding for weapon system modernization and other priority needs. Such pressures are likely to continue despite recent growth in the defense budget, and pressures for significant additional increases are likely in future years.

Potential Outcomes

Costs avoided and opportunities identified to reprogram funding for other priority needs while strengthening efficiency and effectiveness of existing support systems
Improved logistics support that will enhance the readiness and sustainability of U.S. military forces
Reduced facilities infrastructure, improved facilities maintenance and planning for facility needs and recapitalization costs, and improved overall cost-effectiveness of facilities management

Performance Goal 2.2.5: Assess the National Nuclear Security Administration’s Efforts to Maintain a Safe and Reliable Nuclear Weapons Stockpile

Key Efforts

Assess the National Nuclear Security Administration’s (NNSA) efforts to establish effective personnel, procurement, and planning systems to address the workforce and infrastructure challenges it faces
Assess NNSA’s research and development and production programs to support a safe and reliable stockpile
Assess the extent to which DOE and NNSA have developed an effective and efficient security program to protect nuclear weapons material and information

Significance

In response to repeated management and security problems, the Congress passed legislation in October 1999 that established NNSA. NNSA, a semiautonomous agency within DOE, is responsible for nuclear weapons production, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the production of naval reactors. Since its establishment in March 2000, NNSA has begun to develop approaches for addressing issues associated with planning, organization, procurement, personnel, and security. Although NNSA finally issued its reorganization plan in December 2002, much remains to be done to implement this plan effectively and concern continues to be expressed in the Congress about the slow pace of NNSA’s reorganization and how effective its new structure will be.

New management approaches are vital if NNSA is to effectively address the programmatic challenges before it. Because it is assumed that the United States will continue its policy of no testing, NNSA must develop first-of-a-kind experimental facilities and advanced supercomputing technology to ensure that the nation’s nuclear weapons stockpile is safe and reliable without underground testing. It must ensure that there is a modern and efficient production infrastructure to maintain and refurbish the stockpile as it ages. It must find effective human capital strategies to respond to an aging contractor and federal workforce. It must continue to improve its project management and contract administration to ensure effective results from the almost $8 billion per year appropriated for this effort. Finally, it must improve security operations at all its facilities to ensure that classified information, nuclear materials, and weapons are adequately protected.

Potential Outcomes

A better understanding of the stockpile stewardship program to help the Congress ensure that the annual investment of more than $5.5 billion is spent efficiently and supports specific program outcomes
Improved DOE process for the safe production and storage of nuclear materials and components at the nuclear weapons complex
Improved NNSA and DOE programs for ensuring the security of classified information, nuclear materials, and weapons
Better information to help decision makers gauge the ability of NNSA’s stockpile stewardship program to ensure the safety and reliability of existing nuclear weapons

Performance Goal 2.2.6: Assess Whether DOD and the Military Services Have Developed Integrated Systems, Procedures, and Doctrines to Support Joint and Coalition Forces on the Battlefield Safely and Effectively

Key Efforts

Evaluate how DOD and the military services are establishing joint requirements and developing equipment and weapon systems to achieve joint capabilities
Evaluate DOD’s and the Services’ efforts to develop and field integrated command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance (C4ISR), and space and weapons systems and the extent to which these systems will lead to information superiority and greater battlefield awareness
Assess DOD’s efforts to experiment with future joint warfighting concepts and capabilities and support the results with investment decisions
Assess DOD’s plans and activities related to conducting joint and integrated operations with its international partners abroad
Assess the effectiveness and timeliness of DOD’s development of overarching architectures that are needed to guide the acquisition and design of a “system of systems”

Significance

As recent experience has shown in military operations in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq, success greatly depends on the ability of military forces to work effectively in a joint environment. The ability to conduct joint and combined operations is key to maintaining a superior force in an era in which the nature and extent of national security missions have become broader and more varied and the battlefield less segmented. Not only must the military integrate its own forces, it must also have the capabilities to operate with those of its allies and coalition partners. Implementing Joint Vision 2020 and its principal concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full dimensional protection require that the U.S. military develop the doctrine, organization, training, systems, and leadership to function as a truly integrated joint force. Through integration, the military can become faster, more lethal, and more precise.

To make effective decisions, joint commanders must have a complete, accurate, and timely picture of the battlefield and must be confident that C4ISR systems can exchange information quickly and accurately. In addition, appropriate concepts and doctrine must be in place, and forces must be structured and trained to facilitate joint operations. In the past, DOD and the services have lacked coordinated or common procedures and interoperable systems to carry out joint military operations. This is largely because the services have traditionally developed separate approaches to warfighting and have built the forces and capabilities needed to execute their own individual approaches. Consequences of this have been the acquisition of costly overlapping and duplicative systems on the one hand and gaps in capabilities on the other. Current and anticipated future missions will require more coordinated joint and combined operations that optimize and leverage all services’ capabilities. In addition, greater emphasis by DOD on the “system of systems” approach to developing and acquiring new capabilities requires greater up-front acquisition and design planning that will allow these systems to function together. This may require the development of standards or other means to ensure this interoperability. Examples of systems of systems include the Future Combat System, Missile Defense, and the Global Information Grid.

Potential Outcomes

More cost-effective, integrated acquisition of weapons systems and materiel
Improved interoperability of systems and exchange of information necessary for effective command, control, and communications
Improved management of battlefield information and communications
Improved coordination of service and joint warfighting experimentation efforts and funding support for the results
More effective joint exercises and training
Enhanced ability of U.S. forces to operate with allies

Performance Goal 2.2.7: Analyze and Support DOD’s Efforts to Improve Planning, Programming, Budgeting, Execution, and Program Performance

Key Efforts

Track DOD’s obligations of its annual appropriations and examine how various elements of the defense budget are being spent, including special supplemental appropriations
Analyze the extent to which key aspects of the DOD budget submission are reasonable and justified
Assess the DOD future years’ plans for their long-term reasonableness and affordability
Evaluate how DOD assesses the collective investment needed for weapons systems modernization and how it prioritizes this investment across systems
Assess DOD’s efforts and identify alternative approaches to improve planning, programming, budgeting, and program performance in support of its overall defense strategy
Assess the effectiveness of DOD’s efforts to improve its overall operations and to address major performance and accountability challenges and areas identified as high risk

Significance

By law, DOD is required to undertake a comprehensive review of its defense programs every 4 years. This Quadrennial Defense Review is expected to provide a blueprint for changes to plans, programs, budgets, goals, and objectives and has been dually designated as DOD’s strategic plan for purposes of meeting the requirements of the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Thus, the Quadrennial Defense Review provides a view of future management directions and serves as a strategic framework for assessing results.

DOD operations currently involve over $1 trillion in assets, a budget authority of approximately $330 billion in 2002, and about 3 million military and civilian employees. Planning and budgeting for DOD represent one of the largest management challenges within the federal government. While DOD has the most effective warfighting organization in the world, the same level of excellence is not evident in many of its planning, budgeting, and performance tracking processes that are critical achieving DOD’s mission reasonably economically, efficiently, and effectively. The Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS) is DOD’s key strategic planning tool for allocating these resources across its overall mission. The planning component of the 2-year process rests on the annual National Security Strategy, the Quadrennial Defense Review, and several other annual planning tools such as the Joint Strategy Review and the Defense Planning Guidance. Programming flows from this process, and reflects an analysis of the services’ program objectives. Budgeting is then done through negotiation between the military services and DOD’s Comptroller.

GAO’s work has identified a number of DOD operations and programs as “high risk” because of their vulnerability to waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement. Many of DOD’s management and budgeting processes are not linked in a coherent, results-oriented manner. As a result, DOD cannot ensure that its budgets and its annual and future years’ plans are reasonable or affordable or that they will achieve the results necessary to ensure national security. DOD’s planning process has been criticized because it fails to articulate a clear vision and does not consider resource constraints at a broad enough level. In addition, it does not provide decision makers with alternative options. Finally, it does not provide good output measures, which help to determine the true cost of providing capability to the warfighter. Recently, the Deputy Secretary of Defense issued new policy memorandums and a management initiative decision to revamp the PPBS process to address some of these issues.

Potential Outcomes

Increased accountability of the Office of the Secretary of Defense for planning and allocating resources and of the military services and defense agencies for executing their budgets to achieve their objectives
Improved accountability through providing of information to defense-related appropriations and authorization committees for their deliberations on DOD’s budgets
Improved budget and program planning to realistically address changing national security needs with limited resources
Improved performance of DOD programs through a greater focus on results and high-risk areas