No. 99-1203
In the Supreme Court of the United States
DENNIS THERIOT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
Counsel of Record
BILL LANN LEE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. GROSS
REBECCA K. TROTH
Attorneys
Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530-0001
(202) 514-2217
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
1. Whether the court of appeals correctly upheld as not clearly erroneous
the district court's finding that incumbency and other nonracial considerations,
rather than race, predominated in the drawing of District 3 of the Parish
Council of Jefferson Parish, Louisiana, and therefore correctly concluded
that District 3 is not subject to strict scrutiny.
2. Whether the court of appeals correctly held that the appropriate benchmark
for determining whether a proposed redistricting in Jefferson Parish would
satisfy the nonretrogression principle of Section 5 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973c, was the most recent redistricting plan that
the Parish had adopted and the Attorney General had precleared under Section
5, including the current black percentage of the voting age population of
the Parish districts in that plan.
3. Whether the configuration of District 3 is narrowly tailored to meet
the compelling state interest of compliance with the Voting Rights Act.
In the Supreme Court of the United States
No. 99-1203
DENNIS THERIOT, ET AL., PETITIONERS
v.
PARISH OF JEFFERSON, ET AL.
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. A1-A29) is reported at 185
F.3d 477. The opinion of the district court (Pet. App. A37-A69) is reported
at 966 F. Supp. 1435.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the court of appeals was entered on August 17, 1999. The
petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on November 15, 1999. The jurisdiction
of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).
STATEMENT
1. The Parish of Jefferson is a political subdivision of the State of Louisiana
and is governed by a Parish President and a seven-member Council. In 1980,
the Parish had a population of 454,592. At that time, blacks in the Parish
made up 13.86% of the total population and 11.78% of the voting age population
(VAP). Pet. App. A2 & n.1.
Before 1987, members of the Council were elected under what was known as
the "4-2-1 plan." Under that plan, the Parish was divided into
four Council districts, each of which elected one member. In addition, a
floterial district, or super-district, comprising Districts 1 and 2, elected
a fifth member, a floterial district comprising Districts 3 and 4 elected
a sixth member, and a seventh member (the Council Chairman) was elected
from the entire Parish at-large. In 1986, several Parish voters brought
suit against the Parish, alleging that the Council districts were malapportioned
in violation of the one-person, one-vote requirement of the Equal Protection
Clause. The plaintiffs prevailed in that suit, and in 1987 the district
court entered a consent decree that redrew the four base councilmanic districts,
but otherwise maintained the 4-2-1 structure of the Council. No district
in the 1987 consent decree plan had a black population exceeding 24%. Pet.
App. A2-A3 & n.1.
2. Two Jefferson Parish civic associations and six black voters brought
suit alleging that the 4-2-1 plan violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, 42 U.S.C. 1973, and the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
to the Constitution. After a bench trial, the district court ruled in 1988
that the Parish's districting plan violated Section 2. See Pet. App. A3-A4.
The district court approved, as a remedy for the Section 2 violation, a
plan proposed by the Parish in March 1990,1 which abandoned the 4-2-1 structure
and instead established one at-large district and six single-member districts,
one of which, District 3, had a black majority population and voting age
population. The Attorney General precleared the March 1990 plan under Section
5 of the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1973c.2 Pet. App. A4-A5; Pet. 2 (stating
that District 3 had 50.12% black VAP as reflected in 1980 census figures).
The Parish appealed the district court's finding of liability under Section
2. The court of appeals affirmed, and remanded the case for implementation
of the new districting plan. Pet. App. A5.
3. On remand, the district court recognized that the March 1990 plan would
have to be adjusted to accommodate population shifts reflected in the newly
released 1990 census figures. According to the 1990 census, the total population
of the Parish had declined by about 1.4%, to 448,306, of which 74% was white
and 17.5% (78,263) was black. Pet. App. A5 n.8. The black percentage of
the total population of the Parish grew by 3.6 percentage points between the 1980 census and the 1990 census. Ibid.
The Department of Justice informed Jefferson Parish that the March 1990
districting plan was the appropriate benchmark for determining whether a
new districting plan would cause retrogression under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. The 1990 census showed that District 3 in the March 1990 plan
had a 52.3% black VAP. Ibid.
Councilman James Lawson, the incumbent in District 2 in the invalidated
4-2-1 plan, proposed a new plan using the new census figures that protected
his incumbency interests as well as the interests of the majority of the
other incumbents. On May 8, 1991, the Parish Council adopted the plan Lawson
had proposed, altered slightly to reflect the concerns of an extremely vocal
constituent.3 In the Lawson Plan, District 3 has a black VAP of 57.4%. Pet.
App. A6-A7.
Although the parties presented the Lawson Plan to the district court as
a joint stipulation, the district court rejected it on the ground that the
parties had improperly allowed "politics" to influence the redistricting
process. The district court appointed a special master to assist in adjusting
the March 1990 plan to reflect the census figures. The special master drew
a plan based largely on the lines in the March 1990 plan, which contained
a District 3 with a 49% black VAP. The district court ordered implementation
of the special master's plan. Pet. App. A7.
4. The court of appeals reversed the district court's rejection of the Lawson
Plan. The court of appeals ruled that the district court had intruded on
the Council's legislative responsibility in redistricting by ordering implementation
of the special master's plan, and that the special master's plan unacceptably
failed to include a black-majority district necessary to remedy the Parish's
violation of Section 2. The remand order instructed the trial court to issue
an injunction requiring the Parish to submit the Lawson Plan to the Department
of Justice for expedited review under Section 5. The district court did
so, and on August 27, 1991, the Attorney General precleared the Lawson Plan.
Pet. App. A7-A8.4
5. In 1995, petitioners brought this suit in district court, challenging
the Lawson Plan (particularly District 3) as an unconstitutional racial
gerrymander in violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments to the
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act of 1965. The district court allowed
the United States and local officials to intervene to defend the Lawson
Plan. Pet. App. A8-A9.
After a bench trial, the district court entered judgment for respondents.
Pet. App. A36-A68. The court's extensive findings of fact stressed that
incumbency played the predominant role in the Council's decision to adopt
the Lawson Plan. In particular, the district court found that, while race
"was a factor, it is clear that political incumbency drove the pencil
in designing these districts." Id. at A48.5 Other factors at work,
the court found, were the one-person, one-vote rule, considerations of contiguity
and compactness in light of the Parish's particularly dispersed population,
and other traditional districting principles, including uniting communities
of interest. Ibid.; see id. at A53-A57. The district court also found that
splitting districts and even precincts for political reasons was not uncommon
in the Parish (id. at A55), that the increase in the black VAP of District
3 to 52.3% as reflected in the 1990 census justified the use of that figure
for the purpose of measuring retrogression under Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act (id. at A58-A59), and that vestiges of discrimination remain
in Jefferson Parish (id. at A59-A60).
After reiterating the factors that had predominated in determining the shape
of the districts in the Lawson Plan, the district court held that District
3 should not be subjected to strict scrutiny because petitioners had failed
to prove that race predominated in the drawing of that District. Pet. App.
A62. The court further concluded that the shapes of the districts in the
Lawson Plan were not so "bizarre" as to require strict scrutiny
on the ground that the district lines could not be explained on a ground
other than race. Id. at A63. Although the court therefore did not examine
in detail whether District 3 satisfies strict scrutiny, it did state generally
that "this plan has been narrowly tailored to meet a compelling state
interest." Id. at A68.
6. The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. A1-A29. Noting that petitioners
"bear the burden of proving an impermissible racial classification,"
id. at A11, it sustained the district court's finding that racial considerations
did not predominate in the drawing of District 3: "The record reveals
no clear error inasmuch as incumbency protection, maintaining communities
of interest, addressing one-person, one-vote concerns and natural geographic
conditions predominated in drawing District 3." Id. at A12.
The court stressed that much of the discussion surrounding the adoption
of the Lawson Plan turned on political considerations, including the likelihood
that Lawson and another incumbent (Lloyd Giardina) would each campaign for
the same District 2 Council seat. "Although the Lawson Plan resulted
in a race between Lawson and Giardina in District 2, it garnered the most
support because it met the political and incumbency concerns of the majority
of the existing councilpersons." Pet. App. A13.6 The court of appeals
also held that the district court did not clearly err in finding that District
3 unites communities of interest among low-income residents, and in particular,
it sustained the district court's finding that District 3's low-income residents
share "common social and economic needs." Id. at A18.7 It further
sustained the district court's finding of the "paramount" importance
to the Parish of meeting the Constitution's one-person, one-vote requirement
in a V-shaped jurisdiction that is "very irregular" geographically
and topographically. Id. at A19-A20. The court did not find the shape of
District 3 to be "bizarre on its face," but in any event, it determined
that "any irregularity associated with the shape of District 3 is derivative
of politics, joining communities of interest, one-person, one-vote concerns,
and the geography and population distribution in the Parish." Id. at
A20-A21.
Because the court of appeals determined that race did not predominate in
the drawing of District 3, it concluded that strict scrutiny was not appropriate,
and it did not address whether the Lawson Plan would survive strict scrutiny.
Pet. App. A32. The court did, however, consider and reject petitioners'
argument that the Lawson Plan could not be justified to avoid retrogression
under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act because (petitioners argued) only
the last plan under which elections actually have been held provides the
proper benchmark for determining retrogression. Pet. App. A24-A25. Rather,
the court held, the appropriate benchmark for determining retrogression
is the last plan that was legally in force or effect, not the last plan
under which elections were actually held. A contrary rule, the court observed,
would often "sentence minorities complaining of vote-dilution to a
fate similar to Sisyphus," since a plaintiff that proved a Section
2 violation could not then use a plan entered as a remedy for that violation
as the appropriate benchmark for Section 5 purposes (unless elections had
actually been held under the remedial plan). See id. at A25-A26. In effect,
the court observed, petitioners "would have us turn the [plaintiffs]
away and have them prove a Section 2 violation all over again. We decline
to impose such a requirement." Id. at A26.
ARGUMENT
The court of appeals correctly sustained the district court's finding that
race did not predominate in the drawing of the lines of District 3 of the
Jefferson Parish Council. That determination reflects a factbound application
of this Court's now settled principles setting forth the requirements for
establishing a racial gerrymander in violation of the Equal Protection Clause.
The court of appeals also correctly concluded that conditions under the
March 1990 plan at the time redistricting to reflect the 1990 census was
proposed (including the black voting age population of the Parish Council's
districts as reflected in the 1990 census figures) provided the appropriate
benchmark for determining whether a redistricting plan to account for 1990
census would cause retrogression in violation of Section 5 of the Voting
Rights Act. That conclusion does not conflict with any decision of this
Court or any court of appeals. Further, since the court of appeals concluded
that race did not predominate in the drawing of District 3 in the Lawson
Plan, it did not reach the question whether District 3 satisfies strict
scrutiny. Accordingly, this case does not present an appropriate vehicle
for review of any broad questions concerning whether and when compliance
with the Voting Rights Act justifies a districting plan dictated primarily
by racial considerations.
1. Petitioners contend that District 3, a black-majority district in Jefferson
Parish, is an unconstitutional racial gerrymander. To establish a racial
gerrymander, petitioners must first prove that race was the "predominant
factor" motivating the jurisdiction's redistricting decision; that
is, that the jurisdiction "subordinated traditional race-neutral districting
principles, including but not limited to compactness, contiguity, respect
for political subdivisions or communities defined by actual shared interests,
to racial considerations." Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995);
see also Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 905 (1996) ("The constitutional
wrong occurs when race becomes the dominant and controlling consideration.")
(internal quotation marks omitted). Because this "threshold standard"
is a "demanding one," see Miller, 515 U.S. at 928 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring), strict scrutiny is not triggered by evidence that race was
only one of several factors animating the drawing of a district's boundaries.
See Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 958-959 (1996) (opinion of O'Connor, J.,
joined by Rehnquist, C.J., and Kennedy, J.) ("Strict scrutiny does
not apply merely because redistricting is performed with consciousness of
race. * * * Nor does it apply to all cases of intentional creation of majority-minority
districts."); see also id. at 993 (separate opinion of O'Connor, J.,
concurring) ("Only if traditional criteria are neglected and that neglect
is predominantly due to the misuse of race does strict scrutiny apply.");
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 546 (1999).
The courts below faithfully followed this Court's decisions and examined
the factors considered by the Parish in drawing and adopting the Lawson
Plan (including the lines of District 3). Based on that examination, the
lower courts correctly concluded that incumbency, not race, was the predominant
factor in the fashioning of District 3. With regard to the influence of
incumbency concerns, the courts below found that Councilmember James Lawson
was the driving force behind the plan that the Parish ultimately adopted
and the court of appeals ordered into effect in August 1991. Pet. App. A6-A8.
Because Lawson wanted his areas of political strength in District 2, areas
were added and deleted for political reasons, and racial matters were secondary
in the minds of those drawing the plan. Id. at A13-A14. Indeed, with regard
to the specific geographical areas on which petitioners focus, the district
court found either that there was no racial motivation present in placing
those areas in District 3, or that political motivations predominated. Id.
at A49-A54. The court of appeals agreed, concluding that "the issue
of race was plainly subordinate to the majority of the councilpersons' preoccupation
with protecting incumbency and maintaining other political advantages."
Id. at A13-A14. The district court also exhaustively addressed the other
factors that motivated the drawing of the plan, and after reviewing that
evidence in detail, the court of appeals confirmed that "[t]he record
presents bountiful evidence supporting the district court's finding that
political incumbency, communities of interest, one-person, one-vote, and
geography dwarf issues pertaining to race." Id. at A21. Petitioners
provide no basis for this Court to disturb those factual conclusions in
which two lower courts have concurred. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,
482 U.S. 656, 662 (1987).
Petitioners note that the Parish was aware of the need to comply with the
Voting Rights Act in redistricting. It has never been disputed that the
Parish considered as a factor in the 1991 redistricting process the need
to create a majority-black district in order to comply with that statute.
The Parish could not have acted otherwise in light of the adjudicated Section
2 violation. But evidence that the Parish undertook to comply with the Voting
Rights Act is not proof that race predominated in the drawing of the specific
lines of the majority-black district. Here, the courts below considered
the evidence of the Parish's awareness of the need to devise a remedy for
the Section 2 violation and to comply with Section 5 and concluded that
neither those concerns nor other racial considerations predominated over
traditional districting concerns, and indeed, that those considerations
were accommodated within traditional districting principles. Thus, the court
of appeals concluded that "[i]ssues of race were relevant, inasmuch
as the Parish Council was directed to remedy a Section 2 violation, yet
did not predominate." Pet. App. A22.
The courts below also agreed there was no evidence that District 3 reflected
any policy of "maximization" of minority voting strength without
regard to traditional redistricting principles. Cf. Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. at 926. The district
court found (Pet. App. A24) that petitioners "had not demonstrated
that the [Department of Justice] coerced the Parish into designing a district
that maximizes District 3's black population," and the court of appeals
agreed: "Stated simply, there was no proverbial big brother manipulating
the process of drawing the districts." Id. at A17 n.18. Because the
plan the Parish drew generally respected traditional redistricting principles,
and because (as the courts found) the relatively minor deviations from compactness
in District 3 are explained by politics, not race, the fact that the Parish
was also aware of the need to comply with the Voting Rights Act does not
trigger strict scrutiny or suggest a constitutional violation.
2. Petitioners contend (Pet. 10-11) that the adoption of District 3 cannot
be justified on the ground of avoiding retrogression of minority voting
strength in violation of Section 5 because, they contend, the appropriate
benchmark under Section 5 is minority voting strength in the last plan under
which elections were actually held, not the last valid plan that was in
force and effect. In this case, the last Council elections before the adoption
of the Lawson Plan were held under the 4-2-1 plan, in which no district
had more than a 24% black VAP. That plan, as we have explained (pp. 2-3,
supra), was found to violate Section 2. The Parish subsequently adopted,
and the Attorney General precleared, a March 1990 plan that created one
black-majority district, but no elections were held under that plan because
the census and the requirement of redistricting intervened.
Petitioners' argument is not properly presented in this case. At bottom,
petitioner's contention amounts to an argument that District 3 of the Lawson
Plan does not satisfy strict scrutiny because, even if it was adopted to
avoid retrogression, it is not narrowly tailored to accomplish that end
since (they maintain) Section 5 precluded retrogression only from the 24%
black VAP under the 4-2-1 plan, not the 52.3% black VAP in the March 1990
plan (as reflected in the 1990 census figures). But the question whether
the Lawson Plan satisfies strict scrutiny would arise only if racial considerations
had predominated in the adoption of that Plan. As we have explained, racial
considerations did not so predominate, and so there is no occasion to reach
the question whether the Lawson Plan is narrowly tailored to avoid a Section
5 violation. That question could arise only if the Lawson Plan required
strict scrutiny.
In any event, petitioners' argument is without merit. Section 5 plainly
bases nonretrogression on the most recent plan validly in force and effect,
not on the earlier plan under which elections were most recently held. Otherwise,
as the court of appeals observed (Pet. App. A25-A26), in many cases Section
2 litigation would be a pointless exercise. Here, for example, black voters
in Jefferson Parish established in litigation that Jefferson Parish's 4-2-1
plan (with no majority-black district) violated Section 2, and that finding
of liability was affirmed by the court of appeals. The parties then agreed
upon, and the district court eventually adopted, a remedial (March 1990)
plan in which one majority-black district was created. By the time that
plan was finally adopted, however, the census had intervened, and so the
Parish had to adopt a new plan to reflect population shifts. If petitioners'
view of Section 5 were adopted, however, then Jefferson Parish could not
have been justified even in adopting the very same remedial (March 1990)
plan, because the proper benchmark for retrogression would have been the
previous 4-2-1 plan, with a maximum 24% black VAP in any district. Thus,
to obtain a majority-black district after the 1990 census, the plaintiffs
would have been required to establish a Section 2 violation over again (and
perhaps again and again, if the vagaries of timing were such that elections
were not held under a remedial plan before a new census). The Voting Rights
Act does not relegate minority voters "to a fate similar to Sisyphus."
Id. at A25-A26.
The Attorney General's Section 5 Guidelines explain that the retrogression
standard generally requires a comparison of the proposed voting change to
a "benchmark," which is "the last legally enforceable practice
or procedure used by the jurisdiction," to determine whether there
is any reduction in minority electoral opportunity. 28 C.F.R. 51.54(b)(1).
Retrogression is determined by using the racial composition of the population
in districts as reflected in the most recent census (or more accurate and
recent figures) as a starting point. See City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 186 (1980) (the "effect of the 13 annexations must be
examined from the perspective of the most current available population data");
28 C.F.R. 51.54(b)(2). The use of the most recent census (or other highly
reliable) figures is necessary because they are most likely to present an
accurate depiction of minority voting strength at the time the Section 5
preclearance submission is made. If there have been population shifts in
districts since the previous census, old census figures may present a misleading
picture of minority voting strength. See Ketchum v. Byrne, 740 F.2d 1398,
1402, 1414 (7th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1135 (1985); Burton v.
Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1347 (D.S.C. 1992), vacated on other grounds,
508 U.S. 968 (1993).8
Petitioners have sought to rely on Young v. Fordice, 520 U.S. 273 (1997),
and Abrams v. Johnson, 521 U.S. 74 (1997), but those decisions confirm that
the proper benchmark for retrogression is the current level of black voting
strength in the last valid plan that was in effect in the jurisdiction.
In Abrams, the Court rejected the contention that the proper benchmark for
retrogression in that case was minority voting strength in a plan that was
an unconstitutional racial gerrymander when it was drawn (as distinguished
from a plan that became malapportioned over time because of population shifts),
and held that the proper benchmark was the last plan that was constitutional
when drawn and was legally in effect in the district before the unconstitutional
plan was drawn. Id. at 97. That decision, however, establishes only that
the plan that provides the benchmark must have been constitutional when
it was drawn, not that elections must have been held under the plan. In
Fordice, the Court rejected the claim that a provisional voter registration
plan that was never actually adopted by the State was "in force or
effect" for purposes of determining the benchmark. 520 U.S. at 282.
In this case, it is not disputed that the March 1990 plan was valid and
in effect when the 1990 census figures were released, and petitioners never
challenged the constitutionality of that plan. The March 1990 plan was the
plan the Council adopted, the district court approved, and the Attorney
General precleared. It was the plan that would have been used had a Council
election been held at that time to fill a vacancy or for any other reason.
Cf. Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 394-395 (1971). The court of appeals
therefore correctly concluded that the March 1990 plan, including the 52.3%
black VAP of existing District 3 under 1990 census data, provided the proper
benchmark for Section 5 review of any plan that would be adopted after the
1990 census.9
3. Petitioners argue more generally (Pet. 26-30) that the Lawson Plan does
not satisfy strict scrutiny because that Plan was not necessary to avoid
a violation of the Voting Rights Act. As we have explained (pp. 13-14, supra),
that contention is not properly presented here, because both lower courts
determined that race did not predominate in the drawing of District 3. In
addition, the court of appeals did not address whether the Lawson Plan satisfies
strict scrutiny, and so this Court should not decide that issue in the first
instance. Cf. Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 658 (1993).
In any event, petitioners err in arguing that the court of appeals' August
1991 decision ordering the Parish to create a majority-minority district
to remedy the adjudicated Section 2 violation did not establish a compelling
interest in creating a majority-minority district when the Parish's district
lines were adjusted to reflect the 1990 census. Although the Court has not
explicitly decided the question, a majority of the Court has stated that
compliance with Section 2 is a compelling state interest, see Vera, 517
U.S. at 990 (separate opinion of O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 1033
(Stevens, J, dissenting); id. at 1065 (Souter, J., dissenting). Petitioners
do not argue to the contrary here. See Pet. 26-30.
Rather, petitioners contend (Pet. 28) that compliance with Section 2 could
not have been a compelling interest in this case because there was no evidence
in this case that there "presently existed impediments to the Parish's
minority citizens' ability to fully participate in the electoral process."
In other words, petitioners argue that, when the Parish drew its majority-minority
district in the Lawson Plan, the Parish was required at that time to establish
that the absence of such a district would contravene Section 2. But petitioners
fail to acknowledge that the court of appeals had already determined, only
a year earlier, that the Parish's previous 4-2-1 election scheme violated
Section 2, and had ordered the Parish to implement a plan with a majority-minority
district as a remedy for that violation. Thus, petitioners appear to contend
that the Parish and the courts below were required to reconsider those Section
2 findings after the 1990 census results became available and reconfirm
that the preconditions for finding a Section 2 violation under Thornburg
v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986), were met under new census data. Petitioners
cite no authority (and there is none) for the proposition that a court must
revisit a finding of a Section 2 violation whenever more recent census figures
become available. The court of appeals properly rejected petitioners' invitation
to revisit the merits of the protracted Section 2 litigation absent affirmative
proof that population densities and concentrations had changed such that
the Gingles preconditions could no longer be met. Pet. App. A26.
Petitioners also suggest (Pet. 9) that the Attorney General, in exercising
her preclearance authority under Section 5, required the Parish to draw
a district that is unconstitutional in order to avoid retrogression. That
argument is flawed for several reasons. First, both the district court and
the court of appeals specifically found (in addition to their findings that
racial considerations did not predominate in the drawing of District 3)
that the shape of the District 3 under the Lawson Plan was not "bizarre"
(especially given the highly dispersed population of the Parish) and did
not contravene Shaw v. Reno. See Pet. App. A20, A63. Therefore, this case
presents no occasion for the Court to consider what limits the Equal Protection
Clause, including the principles of Shaw v. Reno, may place on the nonretrogression
principle of Section 5.
Second, the Attorney General considers constitutional principles against
racial gerrymandering in applying the nonretrogression principle of Section
5 in the administrative preclearance process. The Attorney General's Section
5 guidelines make clear that the Attorney General considers a variety of
factors in determining whether preclearance should be granted, including
the protections of the Equal Protection Clause:
In making a determination the Attorney General will consider whether the
change is free of * * * retrogressive effect in light of, and with particular
attention being given to, the requirements of the 14th, 15th, and 24th amendments
to the Constitution, 42 U.S.C. 1971(a) and (b) * * * and other constitutional
and statutory provisions designed to safeguard the right to vote from denial
or abridgment on account of race, color, or membership in a language minority
group.
28 C.F.R. 51.55. The benchmark provides a guide, not an absolute limit below
which minority voting strength may not fall. For example, Section 5 does
not require jurisdictions to draw plans that violate the one-person, one-vote
principle of the Equal Protection Clause, or are otherwise unconstitutional.
Similarly, Section 5 does not require a jurisdiction to engage in unconstitutional
racial gerrymandering to achieve preclearance, and the Attorney General
administers Section 5 in light of that understanding.
CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted.
SETH P. WAXMAN
Solicitor General
BILL LANN LEE
Acting Assistant Attorney General
MARK L. GROSS
REBECCA K. TROTH
Attorneys
APRIL 2000
1 In reciting the history of this case, the court of appeals initially referred
to this plan incorrectly as the February 1990 plan, Pet. App. A4-A5, but
later correctly referred to it as the March 1990 plan (id. at A25 n.24).
See id. at A45-A46 (district court's findings of fact).
2 Because Louisiana and all of its political subdivisions are jurisdictions
covered under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, Jefferson Parish may not
enact or seek to administer any new voting procedure unless it first obtains
"preclearance" of the new procedure from either the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia or the Attorney General. A voting
change may not be precleared if it will cause, or has the purpose to cause,
a "retrogression" in minority voting strength, that is, if the
change will adversely affect, or is designed to affect adversely, the ability
of minority voters to participate in the political process. See Reno v.
Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 120 S. Ct. 866, 868-869 (2000). That retrogression
standard generally requires a comparison of the proposed voting change to
a "benchmark," which is "the last legally enforceable practice
or procedure used by the jurisdiction." 28 C.F.R. 51.54(b)(1).
3 See Pet. App. A53 (district court refers to that constituent as raising
"political Cain" because she wanted to be in District 1); id.
at A58 (that "uproar" caused the Council to divide precinct between
two districts).
4 Elections were held in the fall of 1991 using the Lawson Plan, and for
the first time in the history of Jefferson Parish, voters elected a black
Council member. Pet. App. A8 & n.1.
5 With respect to incumbency, the district court observed that the Council
had understood that the first elections after the 1990 census would almost
certainly pit incumbents against each other, as the Parish had abandoned
the floterial districts in the old 4-2-1 plan. Recognizing that necessity,
Lawson set out to ensure that his own district, District 2, included his
strongest political constituencies, while likely supporters of his anticipated
opponent for District 2, Lloyd Giardina, were placed in the neighboring
District 3. For that reason, several areas were placed in District 3 even
though those areas, if placed in District 2, would have made District 2
more compact. Some of those divisions, moreover, could not be explained
on racial grounds, for several areas with larger black populations were
placed in District 2 rather than the majority-black District 3. See Pet.
App. A49-A51.
6 The court rejected petitioners' contention that the Department of Justice
had pressured the Parish "to adopt a plan with maximum benefits to
minority voters." Pet. App. A17 n.18; id. at A25 n.24. The court concluded
that, notwithstanding petitioners' efforts to "exaggerate and misconstrue
the nature of the communications between the DOJ and the Parish Council,"
id. at A25, "there was no proverbial big brother manipulating the process
of drawing the districts," id. at A17 n.18. Rather, "DOJ properly
advised the Parish of a benchmark under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act."
Ibid.
7 In reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals cited the evidence in
the record of the "plethora" of civic and community organizations
whose members live in District 3 and have been active in addressing the
issues of housing, education, and poverty in the community. Pet. App. A18
n.20. It also rejected petitioners' argument that that evidence of communities
of interest was not properly considered by the district court because that
evidence had been developed after the district lines were drawn. The court
noted that, when the Lawson Plan was drawn in 1991, members of the Parish
Council were already "well aware" of the socioeconomic conditions
of Parish residents and were familiar with the evidence of those conditions
compiled during the earlier Section 2 litigation. Id. at A19.
8 To the extent that petitioners fault the practice of measuring minority
voting strength using current census figures, it should be noted that petitioners'
assumption (Pet. 4-5) that reliance on current figures will result in racial
gerrymandering is unfounded factually as well as legally. There is no bias
in that practice, as current census figures may show either increases or
decreases in minority VAP from the previous census. If the 1990 census had
shown that the minority VAP of District 3 had decreased over the previous
decade, those 1990 census figures would still have provided the appropriate
measure for determining retrogression.
9 Petitioners note (Pet. 8) that, although District 3 in the March 1990
plan, with a black VAP of 50.12% as reflected in the 1980 census figures,
satisfied the compactness requirement of a single-member majority-minority
district established as a remedy for a Section 2 violation, no court has
expressly decided whether a majority-minority district with a greater percentage
of black voters than 50.12% also satisfies the compactness requirement under
Section 2. Nevertheless, it remains true that the 52.3% black VAP in District
3 provided the appropriate figure for avoiding a violation of the nonretrogression
principle of Section 5, which has a separate application from that of Section
2. This Court has frequently emphasized that Section 2 and Section 5 "combat
different evils and * * * impose very different duties upon the States."
Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. Bd., 520 U.S. 471, 477 (1997). Section 2 "was
designed as a means of eradicating voting practices that minimize or cancel
out the voting strength and political effectiveness of minority groups."
Id. at 479 (internal quotation marks omitted). Section 5, however, was designed
"to insure that the gains thus far achieved in minority political participation
shall not be destroyed," Beer v. United States, 425 U.S. 130, 141 (1976)
(brackets omitted), and thus "freez[es] election procedures in the
covered areas unless the changes can be shown to be" nonretrogressive,
id. at 140 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).