NO, HE HAS DENIED THESE ALLEGATIONS FLAT-OUT, AND HE'S PLACED
           IN DISPUTE UNDER OATH CONTRADICTING STATEMENTS. SO NOW WE'VE
           GOT A MESS IN THIS COUNTRY, AND IT'S A DIRECT RESULT OF THE
           ACTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES. HE'S GOTTEN
           HIMSELF IN A SITUATION IN WHICH HIS STATEMENT DIRECTLY
           CONTRADICTS OF OTHER PEOPLE'S STATEMENTS UNDER OATH. AND THAT
           IS A MATTER THAT'S NOT GOING AWAY LIGHTLY. AND I WILL SAY WHAT

           IS OFFENSIVE TO ME AND IS A CONCERN TO ME, HE HAS EMBROILED THE
           OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENCY IN THIS MATTER. HE HAS USED THE POWER,
           THE STAFF, THE PEOPLE OF HIS OFFICE TO DEFEND HIMSELF AND TO
           ENTWINE THEMSELVES INTO THIS AFFAIR. HE HAS, THEREFORE, IN THE
           COURSE OF THIS ACTIVITY, IN MY OPINION, AS THIS ONE SENATOR --
           AND I HAD NO INTENTION TO SPEAK THIS MORNING ON THIS SUBJECT
           BUT IT HAS BEEN TROUBLING ME FOR A LONG TIME. I THINK HE HAS

           DISHONORED THE PRESIDENCY IN THAT REGARD. AND HE'S NOT HANDLED
           IT PROPERLY. I WISH IT WERE NOT SO. IT IS NOT GOOD FOR THIS
           COUNTRY. IT IS NOT A RIGHT THING FOR US TO HAVE TO BEING ABOUT
           THROUGH TODAY. BUT THERE'S NO ONE WHO HAS ANY RESPONSIBILITY
           FOR IT BUT THE PRESIDENT. AND IF HE THINKS HE CAN GO AROUND AND
           CLAIM THAT THE PERSON WHO'S BEEN COMMISSIONED BY OBJECTIVE
           COURT, FEDERAL COURT, TO INVESTIGATE HIS ACTIVITIES, IT'S HIS
           FAULT INSTEAD OF HIS OWN. THAT'S WHAT HE'S SUGGESTING, AND THAT

           IS NOT AN ACCURATE THING. SO I AM VERY TROUBLED BY THIS MATTER.
           I THINK WHAT WE NEED TO DO IS SIMPLY TO ALLOW THE SPECIAL
           PROSECUTOR TO DO A JOB. HE MAY WELL FIND THERE'S EVIDENCE OF
           WRONGDOING. HE MAY FIND THERE'S NO EVIDENCE OF WRONGDOING. HE
           MAY FIND THERE MIGHT BE SOME EVIDENCE OF WRONGDOING BUT THERE'S
           INSUFFICIENT PROOF TO BRING CHARGES. SO I DON'T KNOW WHAT'S
           GOING TO HAPPEN. I HOPE WE GET IT OVER WITH. I HOPE THE
           PRESIDENT WILL COOPERATE WITH IT. BUT I THINK WE NEED TO BE
           RESPECTFUL OF THE LEGAL PROCESS IN THIS COUNTRY AND NOT ATTEMPT

           TO UNDERMINE IT. BECAUSE WE DON'T UNDERMINE A PART OF IT
           WITHOUT UNDERMINING ALL OF IT. AND EVERY DAY THERE'S A
           PROSECUTOR IN AMERICA, YOUNG PEOPLE ARE BEING TRIED FOR DRUG
           OFFENSES OR OTHER OFFENSES, AND THEY HAVE TO ACCEPT THE
           WORKINGS OF THAT SYSTEM. POLICE ACCEPT THE WORKINGS OF THAT
           SYSTEM. MOTHERS AND FATHERS ACCEPT THE WORKINGS OF THAT SYSTEM
           WHEN THEIR CHILDREN ARE CHARGED WITH CRIMES AND IT'S A PAINFUL,
           HORRIBLE, DIFFICULT TIME FOR ALL OF THAT. BUT WE HAVE TO
           RESPECT THE RULE OF LAW. AND I AM VERY, VERY TROUBLED THAT

           THOSE WOULD, IN MY OPINION, MAKE COMMENTS AND SUGGESTIONS TO
           TRY TO SHORTSTOP AN INVESTIGATION AND IN EFFECT UNDERMINE LAW
           BY POLITICAL POWER AND POLITICAL INFLUENCE. IT SHOULD NOT
           HAPPEN. I THINK IT'S A MATTER WE NEED TO TALK MORE ABOUT IN
           THIS BODY. MR. PRESIDENT, I THANK YOU FOR YOUR LEADERSHIP, AND
           I YIELD THE FLOOR.
           

           MR. SESSIONS: MR. PRESIDENT, I SUGGEST THE ABSENCE OF A QUORUM.
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE CLERK WILL CALL THE ROLL.
           
           

           MR. DASCHLE: MR. PRESIDENT?
           
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: THE MINORITY LEADER IS RECOGNIZED.
           

           MR. DASCHLE: MR. PRESIDENT, I ASK UNANIMOUS CONSENT THE QUORUM
           CALL BE DISPENSED WITH.
           

           THE PRESIDING OFFICER: WITHOUT OBJECTION, SO ORDERED.
           

           MR. DASCHLE: MR. PRESIDENT, OVER THE COURSE OF THE LAST SEVERAL
           MONTHS I'VE COME TO THE SENATE FLOOR THREE TIMES NOW TO DISCUSS
           THIS NATION'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY AND FORCES IN THE POST-COLD WAR
           ERA. IN EACH OF THESE STATEMENTS, I MADE THE CENTRAL POINT THAT
           I PERCEIVE A GROWING MISMATCH BETWEEN OUR STRATEGY AND FORCES
           AND THE REAL-WORLD CONSIDERATIONS THEY WERE DESIGNED TO
           ADDRESS. I ALSO USED THE OPPORTUNITIES TO INDICATE SEVERAL
           PRACTICAL STEPS I THOUGHT WE COULD TAKE IMMEDIATELY TO CORRECT
           THIS GROWING IMBALANCE. I COME TO THE FLOOR TODAY NOT TO AMEND

           MY PREVIOUS OBSERVATIONS BUT TO PROVIDE NEW, MORE COMPELLING
           EVIDENCE TO BUTTRESS MY EARLIER CONCLUSIONS. LET ME REITERATE
           THE CONTEXT OF THIS DEBATE. FIRST, DESPITE THE END OF THE COLD
           WAR NEARLY SEVEN YEARS AGO, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA STILL
           FIELD ROUGHLY 14,000 STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS, EACH WITH A
           DESTRUCTIVE POWER TENS OR HUNDREDS OF TIMES GREATER THAN THE
           NUCLEAR DEVICES THAT BROUGHT WORLD WAR II TO A CLOSE. THE

           CLOSEST RIVAL, FRIEND OR FOE HAS LESS THAN 500 STRATEGIC
           WEAPONS. SECOND, BOTH THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA CONTINUE TO
           KEEP ROUGHLY 5,000 OF THEIR STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ON A HIGH
           LEVEL OF ALERT, READY TO BE LAUNCHED IN A MOMENT'S NOTICE.
           THIRD, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA CONTINUE TO ADHERE TO AN
           OVERALL STRATEGIC CONCEPT KNOWN AS MUTUALLY ASSURED
           DESTRUCTION, OR M.A.D. IN ADDITION, EACH SIDE FOLLOWS
           OPERATIONAL CONCEPTS THAT PERMIT THE FIRST USE OF NUCLEAR
           WEAPONS AND ALLOW FOR THE LAUNCH OF WEAPONS AFTER RECEIVING

           WARNING OF ATTACK BUT BEFORE THE INCOMING WEAPONS DETONATE.
           THIS SET OF FACTS IS DISCONCERTING, TO SAY THE LEAST. IT HAS
           LED THE NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES IN AN EXCELLENT REPORT
           ENTITLED, "THE FUTURE OF U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY" TO
           CONCLUDE THAT THE BASIC STRUCTURE OF PLANS FOR USING NUCLEAR
           WEAPONS APPEARS LARGELY UNCHANGED FROM THE SITUATION DURING THE
           COLD WAR. WITH BOTH SIDES APPARENTLY CONTINUING TO EMPHASIZE
           EARLY AND LARGE COUNTERFORCE STRIKES. AS A RESULT, THE DANGERS

           OF INITIATION OF NUCLEAR WAR BY AIR OR BY ACCIDENT REMAIN
           UNACCEPTABLY HIGH. THE SAME SET OF CIRCUMSTANCES MOVED GENERAL
           LEE BUTLER, WHO JUST FOUR YEARS AGO AS A FORMER COMMANDER OF
           THE STRATEGIC COMMAND, WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SETTING U.S. POLICY
           FOR DETERRING A NUCLEAR WAR, AND IF DETERRENCE FAILED, FIGHTING
           SUCH A WAR, TO OBSERVE THAT OUR PRESENT POLICIES, PLANS AND
           POSTURES GOVERNING NUCLEAR WEAPONS MAKE US PRISONERS STILL TO
           AN AGE OF INTOLERABLE DANGER. MR. PRESIDENT, I AGREE WITH THE

           NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND GENERAL BUTLER. OUR STRATEGIC
           NUCLEAR FORCES ARE TOO LARGE FOR THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD. AND
           OUR OPERATIONAL PROCEDURES CARRY AN UNACCEPTABLE LEVEL OF RISK.
           WHAT ARE THE PRACTICAL RAMIFICATIONS OF THIS ASSESSMENT?
           I HAVE CONCLUDED THAT THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SEEK AN
           AGREEMENT TO DRAMATICALLY CUT THESE FORCES AND CHANGE THE WAY
           THEY ARE OPERATED. MUTUALLY AGREED UPON AND SIGNIFICANT
           REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBER OF STRATEGIC NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE IN

           THE BEST INTEREST OF THE UNITED STATES. MUTUALLY AGREED UPON
           CHANGES IN HOW WE OPERATE OUR FORCES AND SYSTEMS WILL INCREASE
           TRUST AND REDUCE PRESSURE TO LAUNCH NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT A
           MOMENT'S NOTICE. AS I NOTED EARLIER, I'VE HELD THESE VIEWS FOR
           SOME TIME AND HAVE SEEN NOTHING TO CONVINCE ME OTHERWISE. TO
           THE CONTRARY, RECENT EVENTS HAVE ONLY SERVED TO STRENGTHEN MY
           CONVICTIONS. IN PARTICULAR, I'M REARING TO AN EXCELLENT
           TWO-PART SERIES FROM LAST WEEK'S "WASHINGTON POST" ENTITLED,

           "SHATTERED SHIELD." IN A STUDY RELEASED LAST FRIDAY BY THE
           CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE. THE MAIN CONCLUSION REACHED IN
           "THE WASHINGTON POST" SERIES IS THAT RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR FORCES
           AND ITS EARLY WARNING IN COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS SUFFER
           FROM A LACK OF RESOURCES THAT JEOPARDIZE THEIR VERY EXISTENCE.
           ACCORDING TO THESE ARTICLES, KNOWLEDGEABLE EXPERTS IN THE
           UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA HAVE CONCLUDED THAT REGARDLESS OF
           WHETHER THE U.S. OR RUSSIA MOVE AHEAD ON BILATERAL ARMS CONTROL
           TREATIES, A DECADE FROM NOW RUSSIA'S FORCES WILL BE LESS THAN

           ONE-THENGT THE SIZE THEY WERE AT THE PEAK OF SOVIET POWER. THE
           STRATEGIC ARSENAL IS EXPECTED TO DECLINE FROM A COLD WAR HIGH
           OF NEARLY 11,000 WEAPONS IN 1990 TO ROUGHLY 1,000 BY 2007, LESS
           THAN TEN YEARS FROM NOW. AS EVIDENCE, EXPERTS POINT TO A
           GROWING NUMBER OF RUSSIA'S NUCLEAR POWERED SUBMARINES PILED UP
           IN PORT UNFIT FOR PATROL, FOR TRA STEE JIBBING BOMBERS
           INCAPABLE OF COMBAT AND A STEADY DETERIORATION OF LAND-BASED
           MISSILE FORCE. THEY KNOW RUSSIA IS DEDICATING FEW RESOURCES TO

           ADDRESS THIS DECLINE BY DEVELOPING NEW STRATEGIC SYSTEMS. IN
           SHORT, RUSSIA'S STRATEGIC TRIAD COULD CEASE TO EXIST WITHIN TEN
           YEARS. IF FORECASTS ABOUT THIS DECLINE ARE CORRECT AND AS I --
           AND MOST EXPERTS BELIEVE THIS TURN OF EVENTS PRESENTS AN
           OPPORTUNITY FOR U.S. AND RUSSIA POLICY-MAKERS TO IMMEDIATELY
           PUSH FOR MUCH DEEPER JOINT REDUCTIONS IN CURRENTLY CONTEMPLATED
           UNDER START II OR EVEN THE START III FRAMEWORK, IF THE RUSSIANS
           ARE HEADED DOWNWARD, NOW IS THE TIME TO LOCK THEM IN ON

           SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVELS. IF WE FAIL TO REACH AN AGREEMENT
           WITH THE RUSSIANS AND LOWER LEVELS, FUTURE RUSSIAN GOVERNMENTS
           WILL BE FREE TO ACT UNENCUMBERED BY STRICT AND VERIFIABLE
           LIMITS. FEWER RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS WILL REDUCE THE THREAT
           THIS NATIONS FACES FROM INTENTIONAL, ACCIDENTAL OR UNAUTHORIZED
           LAUNCH. FEWER U.S. WEAPONS WILL STILL ALLOW US TO EFFECTIVELY
           DETER ANY ADVERSARY AND MAKE SENSE IN THE POST-COLD WAR
           ENVIRONMENT. IN ADDITION, THIS POST SERIES HIGHLIGHTED A
           TROUBLING DEVELOPMENT. RUSSIA'S SYSTEMS DESIGNED TO GIVE IT

           WARNING OF ANTIQUE AND COMMAND AND CONTROL OF ITS NUCLEAR
           FORCES ARE FACING THE SAME PRECIPITOUS DECLINE AS S NUCLEAR
           FORCES FOR THE
           
           SAME REASON: LACK OF RESOURCES. RUSSIA HAS LOST ACCESS TO MANY
           RADAR SITES LOCATED ON THE TERRITORY OF KNEWLY INDEPENDENT
           STATES WHILE ITS SYSTEM OF SATELLITES FOR DETECTING MISSILE
           LAUNCHES IS SLOWLY BEING DEPLETED. ACCORDING TO ONE FORMER
           RUSSIAN DEFENSE OFFICER, RUSSIA IS PARTIALLY BLIND, AND THE
           SITUATION IS NO BETTER WITH RESPECT TO ITS COMMAND-AND-CONTROL

           STRUCTURE. ABOUT A YEAR AGO THEN-DEFENSE MINIMUM STORE IGOR
           REDANIOV OBSERVED NO ONE TODAY CAN GUARANTEE THE RELIABILITY OF
           OUR CONTROL SYSTEMS. RUSSIA MIGHT SOON REACH THE RESHOLD BEYOND
           WHICH ITS ROCKETS AND NUCLEAR SYSTEMS SIMPLY CANNOT BE
           CONTROLLED. THESE DEVELOPMENTS SHOULD NOT CAUSE ANYONE IN THIS
           COUNTRY TO REJOICE. RUSSIAN PROBLEMS WITH THEIR EARLY WARNING
           AND COMMAND CONTROL SYSTEMS CAN VERY QUICKLY BECOME OUR
           PROBLEM. RUSSIAN INABILITY TO CORRECTLY ASSESS WHETHER A
           MISSILE HAS BEEN LAUNCHED OR TO PROPERLY CONTROL ALL OF ITS

           NUCLEAR WEAPONS PUTS OUR NATIONAL SECURITY AT RISK. ALL OF THIS
           IS KPAUNDED BY THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES CONTINUE TO --
           COMPOUNDED BY THE FACT THAT BOTH SIDES CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN
           EXCESSIVELY LARGE NUMBERS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AT EXCESSIVELY
           HIGH LEVELS OF ALERT. IT IS IN OUR INTEREST TO REDUCE RUSSIA'S
           DEPENDENCE ON THESE AGING SYSTEMS. THIS CAN BE DONE BEST BY
           CHANGING THE WAY THE U.S. AND RUSSIAN FORCES OPERATE. EACH
           COUNTRY SHOULD LOWER THE NUMBER OF WEAPONS ON HAIR-TRIGGER
           ALERT, AND THE UNITED STATES SHOULD CONSIDER SHARING EARLY
           WARNING INTELLIGENCE WITH RUSSIANS. A FINAL PIECE OF EVIDENCE

           TO BACK UP MY CONCLUSIONS SURFACED LATE LAST WEEK. THE C.B.O.
           IN A STUDY CARRIED OUT AT MY REQUEST, CONCLUDED THE PENTAGON
           SPENDS NEARLY $20 BILLION TO $30 BILLION ANNUALLY TO MAINTAIN
           AND OPERATE OUR CURRENT LEVEL OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ROUGHLY 7,000
           DEPLOYED STRATEGIC WEAPONS AND BETWEEN 500 AND 1,000 TACTICAL
           WEAPONS. MOREOVER, IF MY COLLEAGUES ON THE OTHER SIDE OF THE
           AISLE CONTINUE TO REJECT THE ADVICE OF MANY OUTSTANDING EXPERTS
           AND PREVENT US FROM EVEN REDUCING TO THE SENATE RAFIED START II

           LEVEL OF 3,500 WEAPONS, C.B.O. ESTIMATES THIS SHORTSIGHTED
           SHORTSIGHTEDNESS WILL COST THE PENTAGON NEARLY $1 BILLION A
           YEAR IN CONSTANT 1998 DOLLARS. IF THE PENTAGON IS FORCED TO
           STAY AT THESE EXCESSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS LEVELS, THE DEFENSE
           DEPARTMENT MUST DUMP $1 BILLION A YEAR ON UNNEEDED SYSTEMS,
           THEREBY, DEPRIVING MUCH MORE WORTHY D.O.D. PROGRAMS OF
           MUCH-NEEDED RESOURCES. IF THE PENTAGON WERE ALLOWED TO FOLLOW A
           MORE RATIONAL COURSE, THIS FUNDING COULD BE USED TO ENHANCE THE
           HOUSING OF OUR MILITARY PERSONNEL, IMPROVE THEIR QUALITY OF

           LIFE, INCREASE THEIR READINESS TO ARM THEM WITH THE MOST
           SOPHISTICATED CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY AVAILABLE. IF WE WERE
           FORCED TO STAY ON OUR CURRENT TRACK, WE WILL DO NONE OF THESE.
           INCIDENTALLY, C.B.O. NOTED THAT IF WE WERE TO REDUCE DOWN TO
           THE LEVEL THE RUSSIANS ARE EXPECTED TO REACH SHORTLY, ROUGHERLY
           1,000 STRATEGIC WEAPONS, THE SAVINGS COULD REACH AS HIGH AS
           $2.5 BILLION ANNUALLY. IN SUMMARY, MR. PRESIDENT, I STAND BY
           THE CONCLUSIONS THAT I'VE STATED ON MY PREVIOUS STATEMENTS ON
           THIS SUBJECT. OUR CURRENT STRATEGIC NUCLEAR POLICY AND FORCE

           POSTURE IS OUTMODED AND IN NEED OF MAJOR IMMEDIATE
           REASSESSMENT. THE ONLY CHANGE IN THE INTERVENING PERIOD SINCE
           MY FIRST ADDRESS IS THE EMERGENCE OF NEW INFORMATION THAT HAS
           STRENGTHENED MY CASE AND HEIGHTENED THE SENSE OF URGENCY ON
           THIS ISSUE. "THE WASHINGTON POST" SERIES POINTS OUT WE HAVE AN
           OPPORTUNITY AND A RESPONSIBILITY TO ACT QUICKLY TO CHANGE BOTH
           OUR POLICY AND OUR FORCES. THE DECLINE IN RUSSIAN NUCLEAR
           FORCES PROVIDES AN IDEAL OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO MAKE SIGNIFICANT
           PROGRESS IN THE ARMS REDUCTION FRONT. THE DETERIORATION OF

           RUSSIA'S EARLY WARNING AND COMMAND-AND-CONTROL SYSTEMS COMPELS
           US TO SEEK WAYS TO REDUCE THE UNNECESSARY LEVEL OF RISK BROUGHT
           ABOUT BY HOW WE OPERATE OUR FORCES. FINALLY, C.B.O. STUDY
           DEMONSTRATES THERE IS A FINANCIAL LOSS FROM INACTION AS WELL.
           OUR CURRENT DEFENSE POSTURE FORSZS THE PENTAGON TO DIVERT
           BILLIONS OF DOLLARS OF SCARCE RESOURCES FOR MORE NEEDED AND
           IMPORTANT DEFENSE PROGRAMS. NOW IS THE TIME TO STEP INTO THE
           FUTURE. WE MUST DRAMATICALLY REDUCE THE LEVELS OF NUCLEAR
           WEAPONS AND THE ASSOCIATED RISK LEVELS. IF WE ACT IN THIS

           MANNER, WE WILL GREATLY REDUCE THE RISKS OF NUCLEAR WAR,
           ENHANCE OUR CONVENTIONAL FORCE
{END: 1998/03/27 TIME: 10-30 , Fri.  105TH SENATE, SECOND SESSION}