

## ASRS Database Report Set

# Controller Reports

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Report Set Description.....A sampling of reports from Air Traffic Controllers.

Update Number.....9.0

Date of Update .....April 29, 2008

Number of Records in Report Set.....50

Number of New Records in Report Set .....44

Type of Records in Report Set.....For each update, new records received at ASRS will displace a like number of the oldest records in the Report Set, with the objective of providing the fifty most recent relevant ASRS Database records. Records within this Report Set have been screened to assure their relevance to the topic.

TH: 262-7

**MEMORANDUM FOR: Recipients of Aviation Safety Reporting System Data**

**SUBJECT: Data Derived from ASRS Reports**

The attached material is furnished pursuant to a request for data from the NASA Aviation Safety Reporting System (ASRS). Recipients of this material are reminded of the following points, which must be considered when evaluating these data.

ASRS reports are submitted voluntarily. The existence in the ASRS database of reports concerning a specific topic cannot, therefore, be used to infer the prevalence of that problem within the National Airspace System.

Reports submitted to ASRS may be amplified by further contact with the individual who submitted them, but the information provided by the reporter is not investigated further. Such information represents the reporting of a specific individual who is describing their experience and perception of a safety related event.

After preliminary processing, all ASRS reports are de-identified. Following de-identification, there is no way to identify the individual who submitted a report. All ASRS report processing systems are designed to protect identifying information submitted by reports, such as, names, company affiliations, and specific times of incident occurrence. There is, therefore, no way to verify information submitted in an ASRS report after it has been de- identified.

The National Aeronautics and Space Administration and its ASRS contractor, Booz Allen Hamilton, specifically disclaim any responsibility for any interpretation which may be made by others of any material or data furnished by NASA in response to queries of the ASRS database and related materials.



Linda J. Connell, Director  
Aviation Safety Reporting System

## CAVEAT REGARDING STATISTICAL USE OF ASRS INFORMATION

Certain caveats apply to the use of ASRS statistical data. All ASRS reports are voluntarily submitted, and thus cannot be considered a measured random sample of the full population of like events. For example, we receive several thousand altitude deviation reports each year. This number may comprise over half of all the altitude deviations that occur, or it may be just a small fraction of total occurrences.

Moreover, not all pilots, controllers, air carriers, or other participants in the aviation system, are equally aware of the ASRS or equally willing to report to us. Thus, the data reflect **reporting biases**. These biases, which are not fully known or measurable, may influence ASRS statistics. A safety problem such as near midair collisions (NMACs) may appear to be more highly concentrated in area “A” than area “B” simply because the airmen who operate in area “A” are more supportive of the ASRS program and more inclined to report to us should an NMAC occur.

One thing that can be known from ASRS statistics is that they represent the **lower measure** of the true number of such events that are occurring. For example, if ASRS receives 881 reports of track deviations in 1999 (this number is purely hypothetical), then it can be known with some certainty that at least 881 such events have occurred in 1999. Because of these statistical limitations, we believe that the **real power** of ASRS lies in the **report narratives**. Here pilots, controllers, and others, tell us about aviation safety incidents and situations in detail. They explain what happened, and more importantly, **why** it happened. The values of these narrative reports lie in their qualitative nature. Using report narratives effectively requires an extra measure of study, but the knowledge derived is well worth the added effort.

# **Report Synopses**

**ACN: 777597** (1 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZDC RADAR CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN FSS COORD ERRORS RESULTED IN TWO ACFT RECEIVING SIMULTANEOUS IFR RELEASES FROM RWI.

**ACN: 776007** (2 of 50)

**Synopsis**

MEM DEPARTURE CONTROLLER REPORTS TWO INSTANCES OF FLT CREW CHECKING IN ON THE WRONG FREQUENCY ON THE MEM 7 SID.

**ACN: 774929** (3 of 50)

**Synopsis**

HTS CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING THE LACK OF UPDATED CHARTING INFO REF NEW ANTENNA (MID 2006) INCREASING SEVERAL ALT MINIMUMS.

**ACN: 771039** (4 of 50)

**Synopsis**

SJU TRACON CTLR QUESTIONED ATIS LACK OF INFO REGARDING CONTINUED PRIMARY RADAR OUTAGE INFO.

**ACN: 770829** (5 of 50)

**Synopsis**

A CRJ200 CROSSING TUL RWY 18L/36R AT TXWY F WAS NOT TOLD OF NOR DID THE ARPT CHART SHOW THE TXWY REMOVAL E OF THE RWY. ACFT NEARLY TAXIED ONTO GRASS.

**ACN: 769251** (6 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZOB CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING CONTINUED FREQ STATIC ON 126.52, CITING A RESULTING DISRUPTION OF ATC SERVICE.

**ACN: 767190** (7 of 50)

**Synopsis**

A CONTROLLER REPORTS THAT PILOTS DEPARTING ON THE MEM 7 DEP FREQUENTLY CONTACT TRACON ON AN INCORRECT FREQ.

**ACN: 766005** (8 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZID CTLR EXPERIENCED OPDEV WHEN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE INCORRECT ROUTING RESULTING IN ADJACENT AIRSPACE ENTRY WITHOUT COORD.

**ACN: 765969** (9 of 50)

**Synopsis**

JFK CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING CONTINUED FAILURE OF ETVS TED COM EQUIP.

**ACN: 765694** (10 of 50)

**Synopsis**

SAV CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING OPS AND AVAILABLE INFO ON TBR ARPT, DESCRIBING A RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVING SAME.

**ACN: 765381** (11 of 50)

**Synopsis**

EWR OJT INSTRUCTOR DESCRIBED NEAR OPDEV INVOLVING GAR DURING POSITION RELIEF BRIEFING, CITING LACK OF RADIO COM PORTS AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 765348** (12 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZDC CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING CONTINUING RADIO PROBLEMS AT SBV22 SECTOR.

**ACN: 764190** (13 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZHU CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING ONGOING FREQ FAILURE ON 128.15.

**ACN: 764091** (14 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZNY CTLR DESCRIBED CONFLICT AT FL320 WITH OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC, ALLEGING URET DISTRS CONTRIBUTED TO INCIDENT.

**ACN: 763972** (15 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZOA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL320 WHEN ALT REPORTS WERE IN DISAGREEMENT AND TWO IN-TRAIL ACFT CONFLICTED.

**ACN: 760890** (16 of 50)

**Synopsis**

RDU CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING SOME PLT CONFUSION CONCERNING ALT ASSIGNMENT VERSUS SID DEPICTIONS.

**ACN: 759655** (17 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZBW CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING NEW RNAV SID OFF MHT, INDICATING THE NEW PROC IS CAUSING CONFUSION WITH BOTH CTLRS AND PLTS.

**ACN: 759363** (18 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZBW ARTCC CONTROLLER REPORTS AN INTERMITTENT FREQUENCY IN ACK SECTOR.

**ACN: 758814** (19 of 50)

**Synopsis**

PRC TWR CTLR FAILED TO COMMUNICATE WITH TFC ON BASE, RESULTING IN DIRECTED TURN AWAY FROM THE TFC PATTERN, TIPH PROCS CITED AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 758794** (20 of 50)

**Synopsis**

A ZOB CONTROLLER REPORTS PILOTS FAILING TO SELECT A DTW MAARS ONE TRANSITION CAUSING A TRACK DEV. THIS OMISSION MAY BE COMMON TO OTHER SID DEVIATIONS NATIONWIDE.

**ACN: 758671** (21 of 50)

**Synopsis**

YNG CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE LACK OF PRIOR PROC/CHARTING INFO/BRIEFINGS ON NEW RNAV PROC INTO UCP.

**ACN: 758606** (22 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZBW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL210 WHEN DISTRACTED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS INCLUDING WX, TFC VOLUME AND A SLOW DESCENT.

**ACN: 758565** (23 of 50)

**Synopsis**

MCO CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 2200 FT WHEN FAILING TO ENSURE ALT SEPARATION DURING VECTORS TO ILS FINAL.

**ACN: 758563** (24 of 50)

**Synopsis**

MEM APCH CTLR DESCRIBED CONFLICT WHILE WORKING FINAL MONITOR POS WHEN ACFT MISSED LOC INTERCEPT AND CONFLICTED WITH PARALLEL TFC.

**ACN: 758102** (25 of 50)

**Synopsis**

MEM CTLR DESCRIBED GAR INCIDENT UTILIZING CRDA PROCS ALLEGING LACK OF TRAINING AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 758099** (26 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZMA CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING CHARTING ERROR AND FREQ LIMITATIONS INVOLVING ACFT ARRIVING FROM HAVANA AIRSPACE.

**ACN: 758057** (27 of 50)

**Synopsis**

PHL CTLR ALLEGED SUPVR DISTRACTIONS WHEN INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE TO SAPR1 OPS.

**ACN: 758056** (28 of 50)

**Synopsis**

P31 CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE AURAL ALARM ON THE MSAW SYSTEM, ALLEGING PRIOR PROBLEMS.

**ACN: 757664** (29 of 50)

**Synopsis**

LAS GND CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN INTRAFAC COORD WAS CONFUSED CAUSING A POTENTIAL GND CONFLICT.

**ACN: 757651** (30 of 50)

**Synopsis**

IAD LCL CTLR RPTS ACFT ARE MAKING VISUAL APCHS TO THE NEW PARALLEL NORTH/SOUTH RWY UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO THE WEST OF THE EXISTING RWYS INSTEAD OF RWY 19R.



**ACN: 757598** (31 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZLA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL280 WHEN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE DECREASING SEPARATION, CORRECTIVE ACTION TOO LATE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

**ACN: 757211** (32 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZJX CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL270, REPORTER CITING HEAVY TFC VOLUME AND FAILURE OF SUPVR/TMU INITIATIVES AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 757203** (33 of 50)

**Synopsis**

SAF CTLR DESCRIBED NMAC WHEN IFR TFC FAILED TO ENTER PATTERN AS EXPECTED AND CONFLICTED WITH VFR TFC ON PRACTICE VOR APCH.

**ACN: 757175** (34 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZBW CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION DURING BUSY/COMPLEX TFC PERIOD, CITING LACK OF SUPVR/TMU OVERSIGHT AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 757162** (35 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZFW CONTROLLER REPORTS SIMILAR SOUNDING AND SIMILAR SPELLING OF TWO INTERSECTIONS IN ZFW AIRSPACE. OWWLS AND OWLLS.

**ACN: 757115** (36 of 50)

**Synopsis**

A80 CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING PRM LIMITATIONS, IE, NOT ABLE TO DISPLAY PRIMARY RADAR TARGETS, SECONDARY ONLY.

**ACN: 756972** (37 of 50)

**Synopsis**

D10 CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 4000 WHEN ISSUING A VFR ALT TO AN IFR ACFT, MISREADING THE DATA BLOCK, CITING FATIGUE AS CAUSAL FACTOR.

**ACN: 756614** (38 of 50)

**Synopsis**

EWR CTLR DESCRIBED ANNUAL TFR EVENT THAT IS INITIATED WITH LITTLE GUIDANCE RESULTING IN VARIED EXPECTATIONS AS TO ATC'S ROLE.

**ACN: 756605** (39 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZBW CTLR DESCRIBED FSS FAILURE TO RELAY IFR CANCELLATION WHICH COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SEVERAL UNNECESSARY DEP DELAYS.

**ACN: 756154** (40 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZJX CTLR DESCRIBED BUSY/COMPLEX TFC PERIOD WHEN SUPVR DECISION TO RELEASE DEP THROUGH WX HOLE RESULTED IN TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER.

**ACN: 756038** (41 of 50)

**Synopsis**

N90 CTLR DESCRIBED A FIVE MIN RADAR AND RADIO FAILURE WHILE WORKING ARR'S TO JFK.

**ACN: 755925** (42 of 50)

**Synopsis**

A80 CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING A TWR SUPVR'S DECISION TO DEP THREE RWYS, RESULTING IN DELAYED TURNS AND OPERATIONAL CONFUSION.

**ACN: 755826** (43 of 50)

**Synopsis**

CLT CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN NO TFC WAS OBSERVED ON THE DEP RWY BUT ASDE-X ALARMED ON FALSE TARGET WITH THREE DEP ACFT.

**ACN: 755788** (44 of 50)

**Synopsis**

FAI CTLR DESCRIBED MULTIPLE INSTANCES WHEN ACFT LNDG ON THE SKI STRIP ONE RWY ACTUALLY LAND SHORT IN THE SAFETY AREA.

**ACN: 755711** (45 of 50)

**Synopsis**

L30 CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR OPDEV WHEN CURRENT APCH CHARTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE CTL POSITION.

**ACN: 755544** (46 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZMA CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING ACR'S FAILURE TO CONTACT ENROUTE FACILITIES AS REQUIRED AFTER WX DEV RTE WAS FILED BY COMPANY.

**ACN: 755357** (47 of 50)

**Synopsis**

ZAU CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERORR AT FL220 WHEN FAILING TO SEE CONFLICTING TFC, CITING TFC VOLUME AND AIRSPACE/SECTOR CHANGES AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 755346** (48 of 50)

**Synopsis**

SAV TWR CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING SEVERAL ASR-8 RADAR FAILURES, SUGGESTING REPLACEMENT ASR-11 RADAR BE INSTALLED.

**ACN: 755333** (49 of 50)

**Synopsis**

LAS TWR CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING POSSIBLE INTENTIONAL WRONG TWR FREQ ASSIGNMENTS BY L30 CTLRS, ALLEGING SAFETY CONCERNS.

**ACN: 753353** (50 of 50)

**Synopsis**

A PIT LCL CTLR RPTS ACFT TURN EARLY ON THE PIT 8 DEP AFTER BEING GIVEN A HDG TO FLY BECAUSE OF CONFUSING CHART FORMATTING.

# **Report Narratives**

**ACN: 777597**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200802  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : RWI.Airport  
State Reference : NC  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Weather Elements : Rain  
Light : Night

## **Aircraft : 1**

Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

## **Aircraft : 2**

Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model Name : Learjet 60

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 19  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 19  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 18  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 17  
ASRS Report : 777597

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

## **Narrative**

FSS AT RDU CALLED FOR A CLRNC ON A C172, OFF OF RWI. I WAS BY MYSELF AT THE SECTOR AND BUSY, SO I SAID I WOULD CALL THEM BACK. FIVE MINUTES LATER, I CALLED THEM BACK. THE PHONE RANG ABOUT 7 TIMES BEFORE THEY

PICKED UP. I TOLD THE FSS PERSON THAT I HAVE A CLRNC FOR ACFT #1. SHE SAID, 'I DON'T KNOW WHAT YOU'RE TALKING ABOUT.' I SAID, 'YOU CALLED FOR A CLRNC AND I WAS BUSY. I'M READY TO ISSUE THE CLRNC NOW.' SHE SAID, 'OKAY, GO AHEAD.' I GAVE THE CLRNC BUT 5 MINUTES LATER, SHE CALLED BACK AND SAID SHE COULDN'T LOCATE THE PLT OR THE FSS PERSON WHO ORIGINALLY TOOK HIS CALL. I VOIDED THE CLRNC AND ADVISED HER TO CALL BACK WHEN READY. ABOUT 5 MINUTES LATER, FSS CALLS FOR A CLRNC ON ACFT #2, A LEARJET. I GAVE THE CLRNC WITH A VOID TIME. THE FSS PERSON (DIFFERENT ONE) SAYS, 'WHAT ABOUT ACFT #1? IS HE ALREADY AIRBORNE?' I SAID THAT THAT CLRNC HAD BEEN VOIDED. HE SAID, 'NO, HE GOT IT AND SHOULD BE ROLLING.' I SAID, 'THAT'S FUNNY BECAUSE I CANCELLED THE CLRNC WHEN YOU GUYS COULDN'T LOCATE HIM.' LONG STORY SHORT: ORIGINAL DEP REQUEST CAME FROM RDU FSS. WHEN I CALLED BACK AND IT RANG 7 TIMES, THE CALL GOT FORWARDED TO LEESBURG, VA, FSS. HOWEVER, WHEN I INITIALLY GAVE THE CLRNC TO LEESBURG, THE GUY FROM RDU PICKED UP THE LINE AND THOUGHT I WAS TALKING TO HIM. THE TWO FSS CANNOT HEAR EACH OTHER ON THE LINE. IT HAD SOUNDED GARBLED ON MY END. HAD THAT ACFT #2 (LEARJET) DEPARTED, HE WOULD HAVE TAKEN OFF RIGHT BEHIND THE C172. IT WAS IFR AND AT NIGHT, THIS WAS AN ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN! FSS NEEDS TO STOP CALL-FORWARDING THEIR CALLS TO THE OTHER FSS'S. THEY ALSO NEED TO CLEARLY IDENTIFY WHO THEY ARE (RALEIGH FSS, LEESBURG FSS, ETC). THIS SCENARIO HAPPENED AGAIN LAST WEEK TO ANOTHER CTLR. THIS IS VERY MUCH A CRITICAL SAFETY ISSUE! CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER INDICATED THAT THE RING LANDLINE IN QUESTION DOES NOT ALLOW MULTIPLE USERS TO HEAR ONE ANOTHER, A FACTOR THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THIS INCIDENT. THE CONTROLLER ALSO INDICATED THAT VERY LIMITED BRIEFINGS WERE PROVIDED TO THE WORKFORCE REGARDING LANDLINE FUNCTIONALITIES WHEN CONTRACTOR TOOK OVER THE FSS FUNCTION.

## **Synopsis**

ZDC RADAR CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN FSS COORD ERRORS RESULTED IN TWO ACFT RECEIVING SIMULTANEOUS IFR RELEASES FROM RWI.

**ACN: 776007**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200702  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MEM.Airport  
State Reference : TN  
Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper : 0  
Altitude.MSL.Bound Upper : 5000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MEM.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : A319  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : MEM 7

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MEM.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : MEM 7

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Departure  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 6  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 12.8  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 5.6  
ASRS Report : 776007

## **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

ACFT X DEPARTED RWY 36L AT MEM AND CALLED ME ON THE DEP EAST FREQ AT XA54 LOCAL TIME. ACFT X ROUTE OF FLT MEANT THAT THE PLT SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED DEP WEST, ACCORDING TO THE MEM 7 DEP PROCS. I INSTRUCTED ACFT X TO CONTACT DEP WEST, AND THE ACFT DID SO WITHOUT INCIDENT. THESE TYPES OF MISTAKES WITH THE FREQ ASSIGNMENTS ON THE MEM 7 DEP TAKE PLACE NUMEROUS TIMES EACH DAY. FOR EXAMPLE, 6.5 HOURS LATER AT XG20 LOCAL TIME, ACFT Y DEPARTED RWY 36C AND CONTACTED DEP WEST WHEN, ACCORDING TO THEIR ROUTING, THE PLT SHOULD HAVE CONTACTED DEP EAST. AGAIN, THE ACFT WAS SWITCHED TO THE CORRECT FREQ WITHOUT INCIDENT, BUT IF THIS IS NOT ADDRESSED, THIS CONFUSING DEP PROC WILL CAUSE A TRAGEDY. I SUGGEST THAT A) THAT THE CURRENT CHART FOR THE MEM 7 DEP BE SIMPLIFIED BY REMOVING CLUTTER AND MAKING SURE THAT KEY INSTRUCTIONS ARE LOCATED ON THE CHART IN RELATION TO THEIR CONTEXT OR B) FREQS BE ASSIGNED ACCORDING TO DEP RWY (FOR EXAMPLE: DEPARTING RWYS 18R/36L OR 27, THE DEP FREQ IS 124.65, DEPARTING RWYS 18L/36R, 18C/36C, OR 9, THE DEP FREQ IS 124.15 -- ANY CHANGES TO THESE GUIDELINES WILL BE MADE PRIOR TO THE DEP BY MEM TWR).

## **Synopsis**

MEM DEPARTURE CONTROLLER REPORTS TWO INSTANCES OF FLT CREW CHECKING IN ON THE WRONG FREQUENCY ON THE MEM 7 SID.



**ACN: 774929**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200802

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : HTS.TRACON

State Reference : WV

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Approach

Qualification.Controller : Radar

Experience.Controller.Radar : 20

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 27

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2 : 6

ASRS Report : 774929

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

### **Narrative**

DURING JUNE/JULY 2006 A NEW RADIO TRANSMISSION TOWER WAS CONSTRUCTED NEAR SOUTH SHORE, KY. WHEN THE NOTICE OF PROPOSED CONSTRUCTION CIRCULATED, IT WAS NOTED THAT DUE TO THE HEIGHT IT WOULD AFFECT MINIMUM ENROUTE, MINIMUM VECTORING, AND INITIAL APCH MISSED APCH ALTITUDES. DUE TO OVERSIGHTS IN THE PAPERWORK PROCESS, OUR FACILITY (HUNTINGTON ATCT, WV) WAS NOT NOTIFIED OF THE NOTICE OF CONSTRUCTION AND ONLY BECAME AWARE OF THE TOWER BY PLT COMPLAINTS - COMPLAINTS RECEIVED DURING DECEMBER 2006. OUR FACILITY HAS REVISED THE MINIMUM VECTOR ALTITUDE IN THAT SECTOR, BUT ALMOST 15 MONTHS LATER THE CHANGES TO LOW ALTITUDE AND INSTRUMENT APCH PROC CHARTS REMAIN AS FDC NOTAMS. I BELIEVE THIS IS A SAFETY HAZARD AND DISSERVICE TO THE AVIATION COMMUNITY. IT IS CLEAR THE CHANGES ARE PERMANENT, SO WHY NOT REVISE THE INSTRUMENT APCH PROC AND LOW ALTITUDE CHARTS TO PUT THE INFORMATION IN FRONT OF THE PLT? WHEN ASKED ABOUT WHEN THESE CHANGES WILL BE PUBLISHED ON THE CHARTS, I HAVE BEEN TOLD OKLAHOMA CITY HAS TO WAIT UNTIL THE PROCS ARE DUE FOR CHANGE OR REVIEW.

### **Synopsis**

HTS CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING THE LACK OF UPDATED CHARTING INFO  
REF NEW ANTENNA (MID 2006) INCREASING SEVERAL ALT MINIMUMS.

**ACN: 771039**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200701

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SJU.TRACON

State Reference : PR

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Approach

Qualification.Controller : Radar

Experience.Controller.Radar : 7

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 7

ASRS Report : 771039

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Radar Equipment : SJU.TRACON

## **Narrative**

SAN JUAN ASR8 PRIMARY RADAR HAS BEEN OTS FOR WKS. WE ARE USING SECONDARY RADAR. I LISTENED TO THE SAN JUAN ARPT RECORDED ATIS. THEY WERE NOT ADVERTISING THIS OUTAGE, WHICH MAKES ME WONDER IF THEY NEVER DID FROM THE START.

## **Synopsis**

SJU TRACON CTLR QUESTIONED ATIS LACK OF INFO REGARDING CONTINUED PRIMARY RADAR OUTAGE INFO.

**ACN: 770829**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200801

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : TUL.Airport

State Reference : OK

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Night

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : TUL.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Local

Experience.Controller.Radar : 20

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 20

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2 : 10

ASRS Report : 770829

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Became Reoriented

Resolutive Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airport

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Situations**

Chart.Airport : TUL.Airport

## **Narrative**

ACFT REQUESTED TO CROSS ACTIVE RWY (18L) AND TAXI VIA TXWY E ON THE E SIDE OF RWY. THE ACFT WAS GIVEN INSTRUCTION TO CROSS RWY 18L AT TXWY F (AS REQUESTED). THE ACFT CONTINUED TAXI ACROSS THE RWY AT A

DIAGONAL TO THE NE. BELIEVING THAT TXWY F CONTINUED AT A DIAGONAL ON THE E SIDE OF THE RWY THE PLT TAXIED AT A NORMAL SPD. UPON REACHING THE E SIDE OF RWY THE PLT NOTICED THAT TXWY F NO LONGER EXISTED ON THE E SIDE OF RWY 18L (BECAUSE IT WAS REMOVED DURING TXWY CONSTRUCTION IN AUG/SEPT 07). HE MADE A HARD L TURN TO REMAIN ON THE RWY THEN TAXIED APPROX 200-300 FT ON THE RWY TO TXWY C THEN EXITED THE RWY. I ASKED THE PLT IF HIS CHART SHOWED TXWY F CROSSING THE RWY ALL THE WAY ACROSS THE RWY THEN INTERCEPTING TXWY E ON THE E SIDE OF RWY 18L. HE REPLIED, 'YES, OUR MAP SHOWED FOXTROT CROSSING AT A DIAGONAL ALL THE WAY ACROSS.' I TOLD HIM THAT THE E SIDE OF F HAD BEEN REMOVED MONTHS BEFORE AND THAT A NEW CHART SHOULD ALREADY SHOW THAT. I ASKED WHAT DATE HIS CHART SHOWED HE REPLIED, 'DEC 07.' WHEN ASKED ABOUT THIS, THE ARPT OPS PERSONNEL SAID THAT THEY HOPE THAT THE ISSUE SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY APR 08. HAD THIS HAPPENED DURING POOR VISIBILITY OR DURING SLICK RWY/TXWY CONDITIONS, THE ACFT MAY HAVE ENDED UP IN THE GRASS JUST OFF THE ACTIVE RWY. THIS CONDITION WILL CAUSE A POTENTIAL HAZARD FOR POSSIBLY ANOTHER 5 MONTHS.

### **Synopsis**

A CRJ200 CROSSING TUL RWY 18L/36R AT TXWY F WAS NOT TOLD OF NOR DID THE ARPT CHART SHOW THE TXWY REMOVAL E OF THE RWY. ACFT NEARLY TAXIED ONTO GRASS.

**ACN: 769251**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200801  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DTW.Airport  
State Reference : MI

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Handoff Position  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 15  
ASRS Report : 769251

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : ZOB.ARTCC

## **Narrative**

AT VARIOUS INTERVALS DURING THE WORK DAY, FREQ 126.52 WILL GIVE OFF A LOUD BURST OF STATIC LASTING UP TO 35 SECONDS. THIS CAUSES A DISRUPTION OF ATC SERVICES BECAUSE WE CANNOT RECEIVE XMISSIONS DURING THE BURST OF STATIC. I FEEL THIS IS A VERY UNSAFE SITUATION. THE XMITTER AND RECEIVER ARE LOCATED IN ALGONAC, MI, 30 MILES NE OF DETROIT, MI.

## **Synopsis**

ZOB CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING CONTINUED FREQ STATIC ON 126.52, CITING A RESULTING DISRUPTION OF ATC SERVICE.

**ACN: 767190**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MEM.Airport  
State Reference : TN  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1500

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Weather Elements : Rain  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MEM.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : MEM 7

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Departure  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 6.6  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 12.1  
ASRS Report : 767190

## **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

## **Situations**

Chart.SID : MEM

## **Narrative**

ACFT DEPARTED RWY 36L ON A WEST DEPARTURE TAG. THEY CHECKED IN ON THE EAST DEPARTURE FREQUENCY, WHICH I WAS WORKING. I IMMEDIATELY SWITCHED ACFT TO THE WEST DEPARTURE FREQUENCY. THIS HAPPENS ON A

DAILY BASIS, AIRCRAFT DEPARTING AND CHECKING IN ON THE WRONG DEPARTURE FREQUENCY. SOMETIMES IT FEELS LIKE THE PILOTS ARE JUST GUESSING -- I SUPPOSE THEY HAVE A 50/50 CHANCE OF BEING RIGHT. A FEW MONTHS AGO, I WAS CONTACTED BY A RETIRED PILOT FROM NASA ASRS. HE WAS ASKING FOR SOME SUGGESTIONS. WITH THE HELP OF SOME OF MY FELLOW CONTROLLERS WHO ARE ALSO PILOTS, I LEFT A MESSAGE ABOUT WHAT WE THOUGHT SHOULD BE DONE. TWO THINGS, FIRST, ELIMINATE THE CLUTTER ON THE MEM 7 DEPARTURE PAGE BY REMOVING THE MAJORITY OF FIXES. ONLY INCLUDE SEVERAL FIXES ALONG BOTH SIDES OF THE DIVIDING LINE BETWEEN EAST AND WEST DEPARTURE. SECOND, THERE IS ONE IMPORTANT NOTE TO THE MEM 7 DEPARTURE, AND BY ELIMINATING SOME OF THE CLUTTER, THE NOTE SHOULD BE ABLE TO BE RELOCATED CLOSER TO THE AREA THAT IT ACTUALLY APPLIES TO. WE OFTEN HAVE SIMULTANEOUS DEPARTURES AT MEM. THIS FREQUENCY PROBLEM SEEMS LIKE AN EASY FIX, BUT IF NOTHING IS DONE, ONE OF THESE DAYS A CONTROLLER IS GOING TO TURN THE WRONG AIRCRAFT INTO THE ONE HE/SHE THINKS HE/SHE IS TALKING TO. ONE CONTROLLER HAS ALREADY COMMITTED AN OPERATIONAL ERROR WITH THIS MISTAKEN FREQUENCY AS A CAUSAL FACTOR. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: REPORTER STATED THAT THIS PILOT ERROR IS AS COMMON AMONG ACR PILOTS AS IT IS WITH GA PILOTS. THIS REPORTER HAS SUBMITTED SEVERAL SIMILAR REPORTS ABOUT THIS SAME EVENT OCCURRING. HE WITNESSES IT ALMOST DAILY AND BELIEVES THAT MANY TIMES A PILOT WILL PICK A FREQUENCY KNOWING THEY HAVE A 50% CHANCE OF BEING CORRECT. AFTER CONSULTING WITH SEVERAL PILOTS AND CONTROLLERS FAMILIAR WITH THE MEM DEPARTURE, THE REPORTER SUGGESTS REMOVING UNNECESSARY NAVAIDS FROM THE CHARTS IN ORDER TO BETTER EXPOSE THE DEMARCATION LINES AND THE FREQUENCIES. ADDITIONALLY THE 'EXCEPTION' FOR ACFT 7000 FT AND BELOW SHOULD BE PLACED NEARER TO THE PLACE ON THE CHART THAT IT APPLIES TO. THE MOST IMPORTANT CHANGE HOWEVER SHOULD BE REMOVING CLUTTER, THUS ALLOWING INSTRUCTIONS TO STAND OUT. THE REPORTER KNOWS THAT RNAV DEPARTURE PROCEDURES ARE BEING DISCUSSED AND HOPES THAT CHANGES IN FREQUENCY NOTIFICATION WILL TAKE PLACE WITH THAT. AS A FINAL BACKUP THE LOCAL CONTROLLERS COULD BE REQUIRED TO STATE THE ASSIGNED FREQUENCY AT DEPARTURE TIME IN ORDER TO PREVENT CONFUSION OR MISUNDERSTANDING ABOUT WHAT FREQUENCY TO CONTACT TRACON ON AFTER TKOF.

## **Synopsis**

A CONTROLLER REPORTS THAT PILOTS DEPARTING ON THE MEM 7 DEP FREQUENTLY CONTACT TRACON ON AN INCORRECT FREQ.



**ACN: 766005**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Navaid : LOZ.VORTAC  
State Reference : KY

## **Environment**

### **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZID.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Regional Jet 200 ER&LR  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC  
Route In Use.Approach : Traffic Pattern  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : N/S

### **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Military : 4  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 21  
ASRS Report : 766005

## **Events**

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : Entry  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## **Narrative**

ACFT QUESTIONED HIS RTE, ON A PDR HYK LOZ SPA LNDG CAE, I MISREAD THE PDR AND GAVE HIM HIS REQUESTED RTE HYK LOZ HMV SPA LNDG CAE. OPDEV OCCURRED AFTER LOZ TURNED FOR HMV INSTEAD OF SPA, 20 DEG DIFFERENCE.

## **Synopsis**

ZID CTLR EXPERIENCED OPDEV WHEN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE INCORRECT ROUTING RESULTING IN ADJACENT AIRSPACE ENTRY WITHOUT COORD.

**ACN: 765969**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport  
State Reference : NY

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Ground  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 20  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 5  
ASRS Report : 765969

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : JFK.Tower

## **Narrative**

THE ETVS TED COMS EQUIP AT THE GND CTL 2 POS REPEATEDLY FAILS. THIS STARTED SEVERAL MONTHS AGO, FAILING SEVERAL TIMES A WK. EVENTUALLY THE POS FAILED SO FREQUENTLY THAT AIRWAYS FACILITIES TECHNICIANS DID A REPAIR. THAT WAS ABOUT A MONTH AGO. NOW, THE POS FAILS SEVERAL TIMES A DAY, AND CAN BE OUT AS LONG AS SEVERAL HRS UNTIL A TECHNICIAN RESPONDS. GND CTL #2 IS USED DURING BUSY PERIODS OF TFC AT KENNEDY ARPT. IF THIS POS FAILS WHILE STAFFED, COMS WITH VEHICLES, REPOSITIONING ACFT, AND ACFT WAITING TO TAXI IS LOST. THERE IS NO EXCUSE FOR THE FAA TO FAIL TO MAKE A PERMANENT FIX TO THIS VITAL PIECE OF EQUIP. THEY WILL WAIT UNTIL THERE IS NEAR COLLISION, OR WORSE, BEFORE THEY COME UP WITH A SOLUTION.

## **Synopsis**

JFK CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING CONTINUED FAILURE OF ETVS TED COM  
EQUIP.

**ACN: 765694**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : SAV.TRACON  
State Reference : GA

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
ASRS Report : 765694

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Narrative**

WE HAD A VFR GO FROM 73J, WHICH WENT IFR, THEN CAME TO SAV. OCEAN FOGBANK ROLLED IN FROM E. SAV WENT IFR SO TOOK HIM TO TBR, WHICH WAS RPTED VFR, HOWEVER RWY 14/32 CLOSED AND IT WAS NIGHTTIME, HOWEVER RWY 5/23 WAS OPEN. ACFT FLEW OVER TBR AND SAID THE PCL WAS NOT WORKING. TOOK HIM 10 MI W OF TBR TO MHP BECAUSE NO RWY LIGHTS. MEANWHILE HE SAID HE WAS MINIMUM FUEL. I HAVE WORKED HERE FOR A LONG TIME AND FOUND OUT, THROUGH TALKING TO THE SECURITY MAN AT TBR, THERE WAS NO LIGHTING AT ALL ON RWY 5/23. I LEFT THE SUPVR A NOTE TO PLEASE PUT OUT A MEMO STATING RWY 5/23 IS UNLIT AND NEVER HAD RWY LIGHTS. IF I DID NOT KNOW AND HAVE BEEN HERE FOR THIS LONG IT WOULD BE NICE TO KNOW INFO, ESPECIALLY WHEN YOU HAVE AN EMER. I ASKED MY SUPVR IF IT IS IFR, DOES THE APCH WITH NO RWY LIGHTING, BECOME UNSAFE AND PLACE US WITH LIABILITY? I WILL NOT DO THE APCH. THE ACFT WHO WAS MINIMUM FUEL WORST CASE COULD HAVE CRASHED. MY JOB IS TO ASSIST THE PUBLIC WITH CORRECT AND SAFE INFO, AND MGMNT AT SAVANNAH CHOOSES TO IGNORE ANY SAFETY ISSUE.

## **Synopsis**

SAV CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING OPS AND AVAILABLE INFO ON TBR ARPT, DESCRIBING A RECENT INCIDENT INVOLVING SAME.

**ACN: 765381**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport  
State Reference : NJ

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Night

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around

## **Aircraft : 3**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : TEB.Tower  
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Function.Instruction : Instructor  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 16  
ASRS Report : 765381

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Function.Instruction : Trainee  
Qualification.Controller : Developmental

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure  
Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : EWR.Tower

## **Narrative**

AT EWR ARPT, AN ACFT LNDG RWY 4R WAS INSTRUCTED TO GO AROUND DUE TO TFC ON THE RWY, AT THE SAME TIME A RWY 4L DEP WAS JUST BREAKING GND DOWNFIELD. CTL INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN TO SEPARATE THESE 2 ACFT BY A TRAINEE WHO WAS IN THE PROCESS OF BRIEFING A RELIEVING CTLR. THE INSTRUCTOR (ME) GAVE THE TRAINEE INSTRUCTIONS TO AVOID CONFLICT WITH TEB ILS RWY 6 ARRS, HOWEVER THE TRAINEE GOT CAUGHT UP IN THE HEAT OF THE MOMENT AND ISSUED HIS OWN INSTRUCTIONS, WHICH PUT THE RWY 4L DEP IN DIRECT CONFLICT WITH THE TEB ILS RWY 6 ARR. I WAS ABLE TO CALL THE DHO LINE WITH N90 AND ADVISE APCH CTL AS TO THE PENDING SITUATION AT WHICH TIME THEY TURNED THE TEB ARR AWAY FROM THE EWR DEP. SEVERAL GLARING ISSUES STAND OUT FROM THIS EPISODE, ONE WHICH HAS BEEN ADDRESSED OVER AND OVER AGAIN IN THE PAST. THE EWR MISSED APCH PROC FOR ACFT LNDG RWY 4R CONFLICTS WITH THE DEP PROC FOR ACFT DEPARTING RWY 4L. THIS IN TURN LEAVES A CTLR LITTLE ROOM TO MANEUVER ACFT ON GAR'S OR MISSED APCHS FROM BOTH TEB AND LGA AIRSPACE. ALSO DANGEROUS IS THE FACT THAT THE TRAINEE WHO WAS PROVIDING A POS RELIEF BRIEFING AT THE TIME OF THIS INCIDENT WAS UNABLE TO RESPOND TO HIS TRAINER'S INSTRUCTIONS TO RESOLVE THIS CONFLICT. WHILE I (TRAINER) WAS AWARE OF THE SITUATION AND GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE TRAINEE, I DID NOT HAVE OVERRIDE CAPABILITY AS THE RELIEVING CTLR (WHO WAS UNAWARE OF THE PENDING SITUATION, DUE TO THE FACT HE HAD JUST PLUGGED IN), WAS PLUGGED INTO THE JACK THAT WOULD HAVE GIVEN ME THE CHANCE TO ISSUE THE PROPER CTL INSTRUCTIONS.

## **Synopsis**

EWR OJT INSTRUCTOR DESCRIBED NEAR OPDEV INVOLVING GAR DURING POSITION RELIEF BRIEFING, CITING LACK OF RADIO COM PORTS AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 765348**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DAN.Airport  
State Reference : VA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Marginal  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZDC.ARTCC  
Make Model Name : Caravan Undifferentiated  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 6  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 6  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 4  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 1  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2 : 6  
ASRS Report : 765348

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : ZDC.ARTCC

## **Narrative**

OJT WAS BEING CONDUCTED ON S BOSTON (SBV22) AT THE TIME AND THE ACFT WAS ON FREQ 124.05 AT THE TIME. DUE TO POOR OR NON EXISTENT FREQ

COVERAGE, THE SECTOR WAS ALSO USING A BORROW ULTRA HIGH SECTOR  
FREQ 134.62. ACFT X WAS ON A VECTOR FOR THE ILS RWY 2 AT DANVILLE (DAN)  
MUNICIPAL ARPT. WHEN THE ACFT REACHED 15 MI SE OF DAN THE CTLR TRIED  
TO GIVE THE ACFT A TURN AND ALT CLRNC TO INTERCEPT THE LOC. THE ACFT  
NEVER RESPONDED TO ANY INSTRUCTION, AS WELL AS ATTEMPTS TO HAVE THE  
ACFT 'IDENT' IF IT HEARD THE CTLR WITH NO RESPONSE. THE CTLR WAS ALSO  
EXPERIENCING NUMEROUS PROBS WITH BOTH FREQS FROM OTHER ACFT.  
ANOTHER ACFT WAS USED TO RELAY TO ACFT X TO VECTOR TO THE ILS AND  
PLACE THE ACFT ON 134.62. THIS FREQ WAS STILL VERY POOR FOR MOST ACFT,  
AND IT TOOK SEVERAL XMISSIONS TO ISSUE CLRNCs. THESE FREQS HAVE BEEN  
WRITTEN UP NUMEROUS TIMES. TO DATE THERE HAS BEEN NOTHING TO  
RESOLVE THE ISSUES WITH THESE FREQS AND IF THEY ARE NOT RESOLVED AS  
THEY HAVE WORSENERED, THIS COULD RESULT IN A FATAL SITUATION.

### **Synopsis**

ZDC CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING CONTINUING RADIO PROBLEMS AT  
SBV22 SECTOR.



**ACN: 764190**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : CRP.Airport  
State Reference : TX

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZHU.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 3  
ASRS Report : 764190

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : ZHU.ARTCC

## **Narrative**

ACR X ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT MY SECTOR (SECTOR 58) SEVERAL TIMES BEFORE RETURNING TO PREVIOUS CTLR'S FREQUENCY. THAT CTLR THEN ALERTED ME TO THE SITUATION. I THEN MONITORED MY VSCS EQUIPMENT TO KNOW WHEN AN INCOMING TRANSMISSION WAS OCCURRING BY OBSERVING THE FREQUENCY RECEIVE INDICATOR LIGHTS 'TWINKLE.' THIS FREQUENCY -- 128.15 - - HAS HAD THIS PROBLEM AS AN ONGOING ISSUE FOR SEVERAL MONTHS NOW. I THEN MADE CONTACT WITH THE PILOT.

## **Synopsis**

ZHU CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING ONGOING FREQ FAILURE ON 128.15.

**ACN: 764091**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200712  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport  
State Reference : NY  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 32000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed  
Light : Night

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZNY.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : EMB ERJ 145 ER&LR  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 22  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 22  
ASRS Report : 764091

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 1000

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## **Narrative**

BUSY AND DISTR BY URET. ACR X SWBOUND AT FL320. ACR Y AT FL330 NEBOUND AND OPPOSITE DIRECTION TO ACR X. DSCNT WITH XING RESTR GIVEN TO ACR Y. APPROX 2 MINS LATER, I NOTICED THE FL240 AS AN ASSIGNED ALT IN ACR Y'S DATA BLOCK. I WAS SURPRISED THAT I HAD GIVEN THIS ASSIGNMENT AND LACKING A FLT STRIP FOR VERIFICATION, INSTRUCTED ACR Y TO MAINTAIN FL330 WHEN THE 2 WERE LESS THAN 10 MI APART. WAS ONLY THE GRACE OF GOD THAT ACR Y DID NOT LEAVE FL330. I WAS SHAKEN BY THIS AND ATTRIBUTE MOST OF MY INATTENTION TO THE VERY DISTRACTING DEMANDS OF THE URET.

### **Synopsis**

ZNY CTLR DESCRIBED CONFLICT AT FL320 WITH OPPOSITE DIRECTION TFC, ALLEGING URET DISTRS CONTRIBUTED TO INCIDENT.

**ACN: 763972**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200711

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SFO.Airport

State Reference : CA

Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 32000

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOA.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B747-400

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Route In Use.Enroute : Pacific

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOA.ARTCC

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : B747-400

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Route In Use.Enroute : Pacific

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Non Radar

Qualification.Controller : Radar

Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 25

Experience.Controller.Radar : 25

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 25

ASRS Report : 763972

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation

Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING OCEANIC POS OC3 AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT BTWN ACR X AND ACR Y. UPON ACR Y PROGRESSING DONER, THE PROGRESS RPT SHOWED FL320. THE DATA BLOCK/FLT PLAN SHOWED FL340. THROUGH COMMERCIAL RADIO, I REQUESTED ACR Y VERIFY ALT. ACR Y AGAIN RPTED AT FL320. I ENTERED FL320 AS THE NEW ALT FOR ACR Y AND OCEAN 21 (ATOP) DISPLAYED AN ALERT BTWN ACR X AND ACR Y, BOTH AT FL320 (6 MINS IN TRAIL). I THEN ASKED ACR Y IF ABLE FL330. ACFT STATED AFFIRMATIVE AND I IMMEDIATELY CLBED ACFT TO FL330.

### **Synopsis**

ZOA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL320 WHEN ALT REPORTS WERE IN DISAGREEMENT AND TWO IN-TRAIL ACFT CONFLICTED.

**ACN: 760890**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200711

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : RDU.Airport

State Reference : NC

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Clearance Delivery

Qualification.Controller : Non Radar

Experience.Controller.Radar : 25

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 21

ASRS Report : 760890

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Situations**

Chart.SID : All SIDS

## **Narrative**

AT RDU WE ISSUE THE DEP SID AND AN ALT OF 7000 FT TO DEPARTING JETS FROM CLRNC DELIVERY. THIS MORNING I HAD 3 PLTS -- 2 FROM ACR'S AND 1 FROM AN AIR TAXI -- QUESTION THE PROC (THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME). THE FIRST WAS AN ACR PLT THAT SAID THAT THE DEP PROC SAID TO CLB TO 1900 FT AND WANTED TO VERIFY THAT I HAD SAID 7000 FT IN THE CLRNC. I EXPLAINED THAT THE PART HE WAS READING WAS A NON RADAR PROC. I STATED THAT HE SHOULD EXPECT THE LCL CTLR TO ISSUE A HDG AND HE SHOULD CLB TO 7000 FT AS I HAD INSTRUCTED IN HIS CLRNC. ANOTHER ACR PLT CHIMED IN, 1 MIN LATER, AND SAID THAT THE PROC SAID CLB RWY HDG -- NOT AN ASSIGNED HDG. I EXPLAINED AGAIN THAT IT WAS A NON RADAR PROC. NEXT AN AIR TAXI PLT SAID HE HAD BEEN LISTENING AND THAT THE PROC WAS VERY CONFUSING, IT SAID CLB ON A 232 DEG HDG TO 1900 FT, THAT IT DID NOT SAY IT WAS A NON RADAR PROC. I EXPLAINED THAT HE WAS EXPECTED TO FOLLOW THE HDG FROM THE LCL CTLR AND CLB TO 7000 FT AS INSTRUCTED BY CLRNC DELIVERY. HE SAID HE WOULD FILE FROM HIS END AND ASKED US TO CHK INTO IT FROM OUR END. HERE IS THE ISSUE. WE AT RDU HAVE HAD NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS ABOUT THE SID'S AT RDU. IT IS A SAFETY ISSUE. IF A JET WERE TO DEPART RWY 23L OR

23R AND TURN TO A 210 DEG HDG, WHICH IS OUR PROC, AND THE PLT LEVELED AT 1900 FT, HE WOULD IMPACT AN OBSTRUCTION 10 MI S OF THE ARPT. IF THE JET DEPARTS RWY 23L AND THE PLT DOES NOT TAKE A TURN TILL HE LEAVES 1900 FT THEN HE HAS DEVIATED FROM TFC DEPARTING RWY 23R. I HAVE FORWARDED THIS ISSUE TO OUR MGMNT STAFF. IN THE PAST WE HAVE NOT HAD ANY RELIEF RESOLVING THIS ISSUE FROM THE REGIONAL OR NATIONAL LEVEL.

### **Synopsis**

RDU CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING SOME PLT CONFUSION CONCERNING ALT ASSIGNMENT VERSUS SID DEPICTIONS.



**ACN: 759655**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC  
State Reference : NH  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 170

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Regional Jet CL65, Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : MANCHESTER

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC  
Navigation In Use.Other : GPS  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : COTEE

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 29  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 10  
ASRS Report : 759655

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Procedure Or Policy : ZBW.ARTCC

## **Narrative**

NEW DEP SID OUT OF MHT. PROC HAS BUILT IN CLB PARAMETERS (COTEE1) BUT PROC HAS GENERATED NOTHING BUT CONFUSION WITH PLTS AND CTLRS. PROC IS UNSAFE BECAUSE ADVANCED NAV ACFT ARE CLRED VIA 1 PROC THAT HAS SHORTER DISTANCE -- IF ACFT IN FRONT (EG, CRJ1) IS NOT ADVANCED RNAV BUT ACFT IN BACK IS (EG, B733) THEN THE SECOND ACFT TURNS INSIDE OF #1 ACFT AND POTENTIAL LOSS OF SEPARATION. SID IS VERY VERY CONFUSING TO BOTH CTLRS AND PLTS (AS PLT COMPLAINED TO ME ON FREQ THIS AM 'WHOEVER DESIGNED THIS DOESN'T KNOW ANYTHING ABOUT FLYING AN AIRPLANE'). VERY VERY CONFUSING PROC AND AT BRIEFINGS TO AREA CTLRS MORE QUESTIONS WERE ASKED THAN WERE ANSWERED. PROC SHOULD BE CANCELED -- NO BENEFIT TO USERS OR CTLRS.

## **Synopsis**

ZBW CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING NEW RNAV SID OFF MHT, INDICATING THE NEW PROC IS CAUSING CONFUSION WITH BOTH CTLRS AND PLTS.

**ACN: 759363**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC  
State Reference : MA

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 29  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 10  
ASRS Report : 759363

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : ZBW.ARTCC

## **Narrative**

FREQUENCY 133.45 USED BY ACK SECTOR HAS BEEN INTERMITTENT FOR MONTHS. DESPITE NUMEROUS COMPLAINTS THE FREQUENCY HAS NOT BEEN FIXED. THE AGENCY SLAPS DOWN ANOTHER FREQUENCY TRACKING SHEET TO 'DOCUMENT' THE PROBLEMS BUT NOTHING IS GETTING DONE! SEVERAL WEEKS AGO THE FREQUENCY WAS SO BAD THAT I HAD TO TERMINATE RADAR ON AIRCRAFT ABEAM CAPE COD AND TELL THEM TO CONTACT MONCTON CENTER AT 67WEST (BOUNDARY). FREQUENCY IS INTERMITTENT AND DANGEROUS -- I REFUSED TO USE IT LAST WEEK AND A SECOND SITE EWB WAS USED BUT ABSENT A LOSS OF SEPARATION NOTHING IS GETTING FIXED.

## **Synopsis**

ZBW ARTCC CONTROLLER REPORTS AN INTERMITTENT FREQUENCY IN ACK SECTOR.

**ACN: 758814**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PRC.Airport  
State Reference : AZ  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 500

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PRC.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Qualification.Controller : Non Radar  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 10  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 10  
ASRS Report : 758814

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Other : Personal  
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING THE LCL 1 POS ON RWY 21L WITH THE LCL 2 POS OPEN DURING MODERATE TFC. I HAD ALREADY GIVEN A CESSNA ON L DOWNWIND A LNDG

CLRNC AND HAD SEVERAL OTHER ACFT IN THE PATTERN WHEN AN ACFT CALLED FOR DEP. A SEMINOLE JUST CROSSED THE LNDG THRESHOLD AND I KNEW I COULD GET THE DEP OUT IF I UTILIZED TIPH. THE LNDG CESSNA HAD ALREADY TURNED BASE AND I INSTRUCTED HIM TO CANCEL LNDG CLRNC, CONTINUE L BASE, TFC HOLDING IN POS. I INSTRUCTED THE DEP, TFC L BASE, RWY 21 POS AND HOLD AND AS SOON AS THE PREVIOUS ARR EXITED THE RWY I GAVE THE CESSNA THAT WAS IN POS TKOF CLRNC. I LOOKED OUT TO SEE THE CESSNA ON BASE APPARENTLY OVERSHOOT FINAL AND ADVISED HIM AS SUCH. HE RESPONDED THAT I INSTRUCTED HIM TO CONTINUE ON BASE. THE LCL 2 CTRLR HAD MANY ACFT IN THE PATTERN FOR RWY 21R AND I QUICKLY HAD THE CESSNA TURN AWAY FROM THE ARPT AND ENTER A R DOWNWIND FOR RWY 21L. I COORD WITH THE LCL 2 CTRLR AND RE-SEQUENCED THE CESSNA INTO THE ARRS FOR RWY 21L. AFTER THE CESSNA SAFELY LANDED, I BRIEFLY TOLD THE PLT THAT MY INSTRUCTIONS WERE NOT CLR, THAT I WAS SORRY, AND I WILL CHANGE MY PHRASEOLOGY FOR THAT SIT. THE PLT RESPONDED THAT HE WAS CONCERNED ABOUT FLYING INTO THE R DOWNWIND TFC BUT WAS JUST FOLLOWING OUR INSTRUCTIONS. I ADVISED HIM THAT HE SHOULD ALWAYS ASK FOR CLARIFICATION IF THERE IS EVER ANYTHING THAT IS UNCLR OR THAT HE HAS A CONCERN ABOUT. I BELIEVE THAT IF WE WERE STILL UTILIZING THE OLD TIPH RULES THAT THIS INCIDENT NEVER WOULD HAVE HAPPENED. THE RIDICULOUS REQUIREMENT THAT WE CAN ONLY PUT AN ACFT INTO POS WITH NO OTHER ACFT CLRED, ESPECIALLY AT A VFR ARPT, DOES NOTHING TO ENSURE THAT THERE WILL NOT BE A FLYOVER. EXTRA EYES IN THE CAB TO MONITOR THE TFC AND WATCH FOR MISTAKES IS THE BEST ANSWER FOR PREVENTING INCURSIONS OR ACCIDENTS. THE NEW TIPH RULES ACTUALLY RELAX THE REQUIREMENT TO HAVE EXTRA STAFFING IN THE CAB WHEN USING TIPH. WE CAN NOW USE TIPH WHEN THERE IS NOBODY BEHIND US TO ASSIST. THE NEW RULES HAVE LED TO MANY GAR'S BECAUSE THE CTRLRS FORGET TO CLR THE ACFT ON FINAL TO LAND AFTER UTILIZING TIPH TO GET A DEP OUT. THESE NEW TIPH PROCS ARE YET ANOTHER EXAMPLE OF POOR PROCS DEVELOPED WITHOUT INPUT FROM THE CTRLRS.

## **Synopsis**

PRC TWR CTRLR FAILED TO COMMUNICATE WITH TFC ON BASE, RESULTING IN DIRECTED TURN AWAY FROM THE TFC PATTERN, TIPH PROCS CITED AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 758794**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DTW.Airport  
State Reference : MI

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZOB.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Commercial Fixed Wing  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Navigation In Use.Other : FMS or FMC  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Intermediate Altitude  
Route In Use.Departure.SID : MAARS ONE

## **Component : 1**

Aircraft Component : FMS/FMC

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Supervisor  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 22  
ASRS Report : 758794

## **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Company Policies  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory  
Consequence.FAA : Assigned Or Threatened Penalties

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

DURING THE PAST 15 DAYS, CLEVELAND CENTER HAS FILED 3 PILOT DEVIATIONS FOR IDENTICAL INCIDENTS. THE INCIDENTS ALL INVOLVED AIR CARRIER AIRCRAFT ROUTED OUT OF DTW VIA THE MAARS1 SID AND THE ACO TRANSITION. ON THIS ROUTE THE AIRCRAFT SHOULD FLY THE DXO 106 RADIAL OVER MAARS INTERSECTION TO THE SPHRE INTERSECTION BEFORE TURNING TOWARD ACO. WHAT IS HAPPENING IS THAT THESE AIRCRAFT ARE GETTING TO MAARS AND

MAKING AN IMMEDIATE RIGHT TURN TOWARD ACO. THE FAA HAS TRIED TO RAISE AWARENESS OF EVERYONE INVOLVED. HERE IS AN ANALYSIS THAT WAS PREPARED AT CLEVELAND CENTER AFTER THE FIRST TWO INCIDENTS: CLEVELAND ARTCC FILED TWO PILOT DEVIATIONS REGARDING IDENTICAL, BUT SEPARATE INCIDENTS. PROBLEM SCENARIO: AIRCRAFT FLYING FROM DETROIT METRO TO POINTS SOUTHEAST, FILE VIA THE MAARS ONE DEPARTURE, AKRON TRANSITION. THE COMPUTER CODE FOR THIS ROUTE IS: DTW.MAARS1.ACO. THE PROBLEM OCCURS WHEN AIRCRAFT GET TO MAARS INTERSECTION. INSTEAD OF CONTINUING ON THE TRANSITION, SOME THEN MAKE A RIGHT TURN AND PROCEED DIRECT TO ACO. (NOTE: THIS MAY OCCUR AFTER A ROUTE REVISION HAS BEEN ENTERED IN THE FMS PRIOR TO THE AIRCRAFT REACHING MAARS.) THIS IS A SERIOUS COMPROMISE TO AIR SAFETY. AN ACR CAPT ONBOARD WHEN THEIR DEVIATION OCCURRED ADVISED THAT HE WAS CERTAIN THAT THE FMS WAS PROPERLY CONFIGURED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE BECAUSE HE, THE PILOT, AND ANOTHER CHECK AIRMAN IN THE JUMP SEAT HAD DISCUSSED IT. WHEN THE CLEVELAND CENTER CONTROLLER ASKED THEM IF THEY WERE TURNING DIRECT TO ACO, THE CAPTAIN WAS VERY SURPRISED TO SEE THAT THE ACO TRANSITION ROUTING IN THE FMS HAD CHANGED TO MAARS DIRECT ACO. THE CAPTAIN WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PROBLEM HE HAD ENCOUNTERED. UPON RETURNING TO DTW, HE CONTACTED A MAINTENANCE TECHNICIAN TO DISCUSS THE PROBLEM. THEY RAN TEST SCENARIOS IN THE AIRCRAFT BY ENTERING THE MAARS DEPARTURE ROUTE INTO THE DATABASE FIVE SEPARATE TIMES. WHILE WORKING DIFFERING SCENARIOS, IE, A CLEARANCE DIRECT MAARS ON COURSE, THE SYSTEM DROPPED THE ACO TRANSITION ROUTING AND REPLACED IT WITH MAARS DIRECT ACO. THIS HAPPENED ON THREE OF THE FIVE TEST SCENARIOS THEY RAN. THE CAPTAIN IS ELEVATING THIS SITUATION WITHIN HIS COMPANY. HE IS ALSO WILLING TO ASSIST IN CORRECTING THE PROBLEM BY SHARING HIS FINDINGS WITH ANY INTERESTED PARTIES. CONCLUSION: CLEVELAND CENTER DOES NOT KNOW THE EXACT CAUSE OF THE PROBLEM. HOWEVER, IT DOES SEEM TO BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE FMS DATABASE. CONCERTED EFFORT NEEDS TO BE APPLIED TO PINPOINT AND RESOLVE THIS PROBLEM. UNTIL THAT TIME EVERY EFFORT MUST BE MADE TO MAXIMIZE THE AWARENESS OF CONTROL PERSONNEL AND FLIGHT CREWS. IN DECEMBER THE MAARS1 SID WILL BE REVISED IN SUCH A WAY THAT WILL CORRECT THIS PROBLEM. UNTIL THAT TIME, EVERYONE MUST BE ALERT TO THE POTENTIAL PROBLEM. I BELIEVE A SAFETY ALERT BULLETIN SHOULD BE ISSUED. CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: THE REPORTER STATED THAT THIS ANOMALY HAS NOW OCCURRED 7 TIMES INVOLVING VARIOUS ACFT AND DIFFERENT ACR'S: B757, RJ, AND A319. A COMMERCIAL DATABASE PRODUCER AND AN FMS COMPONENT MFG WERE CONTACTED IN ORDER TO INVESTIGATE THE EVENTS BUT COULD NOT DUPLICATE THE BEHAVIOR IN A SIMULATOR. HOWEVER, THE REPORTER HAS SPOKEN WITH PILOTS INVOLVED IN THE DEVIATIONS AND HAS DETERMINED THAT ACCORDING TO THE PILOTS IN EVERY CASE THE ACFT FMS WAS PROGRAMMED CORRECTLY. HOWEVER AT SOME POINT ALONG THE ROUTING A TURN WAS MADE TOWARD ACO. THIS CREATES A POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH ACFT ARRIVALS INTO ANOTHER BUSY AREA ARPT. THE REPORTER KNOWS THAT A PLANNED REVISION WILL CORRECT THIS ISSUE, BUT UNTIL THEN HE FEELS AS MANY PILOTS AS POSSIBLE SHOULD BE NOTIFIED IN ORDER TO HELP PREVENT AN AIRBORNE CONFLICT. THE REPORTER NOTED THAT THE MAARS ONE IS COMPOSED OF THE MAIN SID, MAARS1.MAARS AND TWO TRANSITIONS: MAARS1.ACO AND MAARS1.HIMEZ. THERE IS A POSSIBILITY THAT PILOTS ARE NOT SELECTING THE MAARS1. ACO TRANSITION BUT INSTEAD LEAVING

MAARS1.MARS WITHOUT ANY TRANSITION. SINCE ACO IS THE NEXT FIX, THE ACFT WOULD TURN AT MAARS INTXN, THE END OF MAARS1.MARS SID CODING.

### **Synopsis**

A ZOB CONTROLLER REPORTS PILOTS FAILING TO SELECT A DTW MAARS ONE TRANSITION CAUSING A TRACK DEV. THIS OMISSION MAY BE COMMON TO OTHER SID DEVIATIONS NATIONWIDE.



**ACN: 758671**

## Time / Day

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : YNG.TRACON  
State Reference : OH

## Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Night

## Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 15.8  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 4.2  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 4.2  
ASRS Report : 758671

## Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## Assessments

Problem Areas : FAA

## Situations

## Narrative

I WAS INFORMED BY A FELLOW CTLR THAT THE RNAV 5 APCH INTO UCP, ONE OF OUR SATELLITES WAS CHANGING SUBSTANTIALLY ON THE CHART DATE. UPON REVIEW, THE APCH COURSE HDG WAS CHANGING, FIX NAMES WERE CHANGING, AND 1 FIX'S POS WAS MOVING .1 MI. NO ONE AT THE FACILITY WAS INFORMED, NOR HAD MAPS INDICATING THE NEW APCH COURSE AND FIXES BEEN ORDERED. THE NEW IAF IS NOW IN A NEIGHBORING FACILITY'S AIRSPACE (PIT). THEY WERE NOT INFORMED OF THE CHANGE EITHER. ALSO, AN AIRWAY WAS RE-ADDED (V576) BTWN YNG AND CXR FOR THE SAME CHARTING DATE. CTLRS HAD NOT BEEN BRIEFED ON THESE CHANGES. WHEN LCL MGMNT ATTEMPTED TO FIND OUT WHY THE FACILITY HAD NOT BEEN INFORMED OF THE COMING CHANGES, THE RESPONSE FROM OKC WAS THAT 'CTLR'S ARE REQUIRED TO REVIEW APCH PLATES PRIOR TO CLRING ACFT FOR AN APCH' AND THERE WAS NO REQUIREMENT TO LET US KNOW ANY OF IT IN ADVANCE. UNFORTUNATELY, IT LEAVES CTLRS IN A POS OF ATTEMPTING TO CLR ACFT FOR APCHS THAT ARE NOT DEPICTED ON THEIR

MAPS AND NOT GETTING BRIEFED ON THE CHANGES UNTIL AFTER THE FACT. I BELIEVE THAT THE AGENCY'S CUTTING BACK ON PERSONNEL AND RESOURCES CONTRIBUTES TO THE FACT THAT FIELD FACILITIES AREN'T GETTING TIMELY INFO. THERE IS A BREAKDOWN IN COMS NATIONWIDE THAT IS ADVERSELY AFFECTING ALL LEVELS OF SVC. UNTIL THE LAST FEW YRS, I HAD NEVER 'NOT' BEEN INFORMED OF CHANGES IN MY AIRSPACE UNTIL AFTER THEY HAD ALREADY OCCURRED AS IS OCCURRING FREQUENTLY NOW.

### **Synopsis**

YNG CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING THE LACK OF PRIOR PROC/CHARTING INFO/BRIEFINGS ON NEW RNAV PROC INTO UCP.

**ACN: 758606**

### **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZBW.ARTCC  
State Reference : NH  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 21000

### **Environment**

Weather Elements : Thunderstorm  
Light : Daylight

### **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : A319  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

### **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B757-200  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

### **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Military : 4  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 24  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 14  
ASRS Report : 758606

### **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Oversight : PIC

### **Person : 3**

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Oversight : PIC

## Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Consequence.FAA : Investigated  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 27000  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 900

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : Weather

## Narrative

ACFT Y DEVIATING THROUGH A BREAK IN A LINE OF TSTMS AT FL210. ACFT X EBOUND AT FL210 ON A SEPARATE ARR RTE. AS I WAS ABOUT TO DSND ACFT Y (B757) A FLY FLEW INTO MY EYE. I GOT DISTR. BY THE TIME I DSNDDED HIM AND HE STARTED DOWN, HE GOT WITHIN 5 MI OF ACFT X (A319). WX, DISTRS, SLOW DSCNT BY ACFT Y (DELAYED DSCNT 40 SECONDS UNTIL TOLD TO EXPEDITE), ALL CONTRIBUTED TO THIS ERROR. ALSO, A LACK OF STRATEGIC PLANNING BY TFC MGMNT PUT 2 ACFT ON PARALLEL RTES AT SAME ALT TOWARDS TSTMS. ALSO, RECEIVING SECTOR HOLDING STACK WAS FULL AND HE ADVISED HIS SUPVR WHO SAT ON THE INFO. THE RESULT -- A NO-NOTICE HOLD PUT ON MY SECTOR, WHICH GREATLY ADDED TO THE SECTOR COMPLEXITY.

## Synopsis

ZBW CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL210 WHEN DISTRACTED BY A NUMBER OF FACTORS INCLUDING WX, TFC VOLUME AND A SLOW DESCENT.

**ACN: 758565**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : MCO.TRACON  
State Reference : FL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2200

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Marginal  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MCO.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Small Aircraft, Low Wing, 1 Eng, Fixed Gear  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MCO.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Skyhawk 172/Cutlass 172  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 24  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 19  
ASRS Report : 758565

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Other : Personal  
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot  
Function.Oversight : PIC

## **Person : 3**

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Consequence.FAA : Investigated  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 8000  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 200

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## **Narrative**

VECTERING IFR ACFT FOR APCHS TO XING ILS'S DID NOT HAVE VERT SEPARATION WHEN ACFT PATHS WERE TO CROSS. A COMBINATION OF CIRCUMSTANCES INCLUDING: WORKING 9TH DAY OUT OF LAST 10 WHILE TRAINING MOST OF THE TIME. TFR IN EFFECT FORCING IFR AND VFR TFC INTO AN ALREADY BUSY SECTOR. LOSS OF WAIVER ALLOWING SIMULTANEOUS INST APCHS AT MCO AND ORL (WE NEEDED TO FORCE IFR ACFT LOW TO GET THE VISUAL APCH AVOIDING THE NEED TO SEQUENCE WITH MCO TFC. XING ILS APCHS AT ISM AND ORL WHEN BOTH ARRS ARE BEING FORCED DOWN FOR PROCS AND SECTORIZATION.

## **Synopsis**

MCO CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 2200 FT WHEN FAILING TO ENSURE ALT SEPARATION DURING VECTORS TO ILS FINAL.

**ACN: 758563**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : MEM.TRACON  
State Reference : TN  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 3000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MEM.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : SF 340B  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : MEM.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : SF 340B  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 22  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 17  
ASRS Report : 758563

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Oversight : PIC

## **Person : 3**

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Oversight : PIC

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 6000  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING FINAL MONITOR W AT MEM, I DID THE FREQ OVER RIDE CHK. I NOTIFIED LCL THAT FINAL MONITORING WAS IN PROGRESS AND DETERMINED HOW FAR OUT TFC WAS VISIBLE. LCL SAID 2 - 2 1/2 MI. LCL ASKED ABOUT CALLING THE APCH FIXES BECAUSE THE DME ON THE RWY 36L LOC WAS OTS. FINAL MONITOR E COMMENTED THAT THE WX SEQUENCE ON THE IDS SCREEN WAS NOT CURRENT. HE/SHE MOVED DOWN TO THE NEXT POS (ABOUT 3 FT) TO CHK THE CURRENT WX AND I MONITORED THE ATIS, TO DETERMINE THE CURRENT WX AND TO VERIFY THAT THE DME OTS WAS BROADCAST CORRECTLY. ACFT X WAS ESTABLISHED ON THE RWY 36L LOC XING THE STEP-DOWN FIX AT 4000 FT WHILE ACFT Y WAS ON THE BASE FOR THE E PARALLEL ABOUT 2 MI BEHIND ACFT X AT 3000 FT. ALL IS WELL. I MOVE ON WITH MY SCAN. A FEW SECONDS LATER, FME POINTS TO ACFT X AND TELLS ME TO STOP THEM AT 4000 FT. I LOOK AT ACFT X AND HE IS DSNDING OUT OF 3700 FT STILL ON THE LOC AND ACFT Y IS ABOUT 2 MI BEHIND ON A NE HDG. ACFT Y APPARENTLY WENT THROUGH THE LOC AND WAS CORRECTING. I TOLD FME THAT THEY HAD DIVERGING COURSES. PROCS REQUIRE THAT ACFT ARE ESTABLISHED ON THE FINAL AND ON TWR FREQ OUTSIDE OF THE W STEP-DOWN FIX, W RWY AT 4000 FT, E RWY AT 3000 FT. ACFT Y WENT THROUGH THE LOC AND JOINED 2 MI INSIDE THE E STEP-DOWN FIX. THE E STEP-DOWN FIX IS APPROX 1 MI INSIDE THE W STEP-DOWN FIX. I DON'T SEE HOW I COULD HAVE PREVENTED THIS ERROR AND I CERTAINLY DID NOTHING TO CAUSE IT.

## **Synopsis**

MEM APCH CTLR DESCRIBED CONFLICT WHILE WORKING FINAL MONITOR POS WHEN ACFT MISSED LOC INTERCEPT AND CONFLICTED WITH PARALLEL TFC.



**ACN: 758102**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MEM.Airport  
State Reference : TN

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MEM.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Citation III, VI, VII  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Flight Phase.Landing : Go Around  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : MEM.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : SF 340B  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 6.5  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 12  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 5.6  
ASRS Report : 758102

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Aircraft  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING LC2 AND LC3 FOR RWYS 18C/L AND RWY 27 DURING THE LAST HALF OF AN INBOUND PUSH. THE WIND WAS 150 DEGS AT 10 KTS FOR ALL OF MY SHIFT. WE WERE LNDG RWYS 18L/R AND RWY 27 USING CONVERGING RWY DISPLAY AID (CRDA). ACFT X WAS ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 18L AND ACR Y WAS ON APCH TO RWY 27. THE RWY 27 FINAL CTLR WAS USING A CRDA TARGET TO SPACE ACR Y WITH ACFT X. INSIDE THE MARKER, ACFT X SLOWED TO 120 KIAS. ACR Y INDICATED SPD WAS 160 KTS. I ASKED ACR Y TO REDUCE TO FINAL APCH SPD, BUT ACR Y WAS ALREADY AT FINAL APCH SPD. I ASKED ACR Y TO MAKE A L OR R S-TURN FOR SPACING, BUT ACR Y REPLIED UNABLE. I IMMEDIATELY SENT ACFT X AROUND. CONSIDERING THAT THE AGENCY PROVIDED EACH CTLR AT MEM ATCT WITH ONLY 3 PRACTICE PROBS OF TRAINING (2 PROBS DEVOID OF WIND AND THE THIRD FACTORING IN WIND UNREALISTICALLY) FOR CRDA PROCS ON THE RWY 27 FINAL POS AND ONLY A 1 1/2 HR BRIEFING FOR THE TWR PROCS, IT IS NOT SURPRISING THAT THE NUMBER OF GAR'S FOR ACFT INVOLVED IN A SIMULTANEOUS RWY 18L/C AND RWY 27 OP HAVE GONE UP. IT ALSO DOESN'T MAKE SENSE THAT THE AGENCY INSISTS ON USING RWY 27 IN AN S CONFIG WHEN THE WIND IS NOT ALIGNED FOR IT. THE AGENCY CREATES A VERY DANGEROUS OP CONSIDERING WHAT LITTLE CAPACITY IS GAINED.

## **Synopsis**

MEM CTLR DESCRIBED GAR INCIDENT UTILIZING CRDA PROCS ALLEGING LACK OF TRAINING AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 758099**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZMA.ARTCC  
State Reference : FL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 36000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZMA.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : A320  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level  
Route In Use.Enroute : Atlantic

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Function.Instruction : Instructor  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
ASRS Report : 758099

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Company : Air Carrier  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Oversight : PIC

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Communication Equipment : ZMA.ARTCC  
Chart.WAC : H-8

## **Narrative**

ACR X CHECKED ONTO WRONG FREQUENCY, CHART IS INCORRECT FOR MIAMI CENTER OVER URSUS BORDO & TANIA SHOWS 135.22 (SHOULD BE 126.22). HAVANA GAVE AIRCRAFT CORRECT FREQUENCY BUT AS REQUIRED AIRCRAFT CANNOT CHECK ON 10 MINUTES PRIOR TO BOUNDARY AND CALL MIAMI CENTER ON 134.8 OR 127.22 SECTORS 59 & 60. AIRCRAFT ARE BLOCKING SECTOR 59 OR 60'S FREQUENCY TRYING TO COMPLY WITH EARLY CHECK IN, NEW FREQUENCY 126.32 IS TOO WEAK TO HEAR AIRCRAFT SOUTH OF MIAMI CENTER AND HAVANA CENTER'S COMMON FIR BOUNDARY. RELOCATE RADIOS TO BIMINI OR ADD A DIRECTIONAL ANTENNA TO INCREASE COVERAGE AREA.

## **Synopsis**

ZMA CTLR EXPRESSED CONCERN REGARDING CHARTING ERROR AND FREQ LIMITATIONS INVOLVING ACFT ARRIVING FROM HAVANA AIRSPACE.

**ACN: 758057**

## Time / Day

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## Place

Locale Reference.Airport : PHL.Airport  
State Reference : PA

## Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Night

## Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 18.9  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 12.6  
ASRS Report : 758057

## Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## Narrative

WHILE WORKING THE FINAL VECTOR 1 (FV1) POS (VECTOR TO RWY 27R), THE SUPVR BEGAN TO DISTRACT ME WHILE I WAS BUSY VECTORING TO THE FINAL APCH COURSE. HE STATED 'WE ARE GOING TO A SAPR1' (SIMULTANEOUS APCHS TO PARALLEL RWYS 27R/27L). I ADVISED HIM I WAS TOO BUSY FOR THE TRANSITION, AND WOULD NEED A MIN TO REVIEW THE PROC. THE SUPVR CONTINUED TO TALK AND DISTRACT ME WHILE I WAS BUSY CTLING THE VECTORING ACFT. I NEEDED TO REPEAT CLRNCs IN ORDER TO TRY TO HEAR AND VERIFY READBACKS. HE BEGAN TO POINT TO ACFT ON MY SCOPE, AND STATED THAT THIS WOULD BE THE ACFT FOR RWY 27L. I ONCE AGAIN STATED THAT I WAS TOO BUSY AND SIMPLY WAS NOT READY FOR THE TRANSITION. THE SUPVR BEGAN INSTRUCTING OTHER CTRLRS TO TAKE ACFT TO RWY 27L WHICH IS VECTORED BY ANOTHER CTRLR AT THE FINAL VECTOR 2 (FV2) POS, AND ANNOUNCED TO OTHERS 'WE ARE ON A SAPR1 CONFIGN.' IN ORDER FOR THIS POS (FV2) TO VECTOR TO RWY 27L, A BRIEFING OF TFC AND AN EXCHANGE OF AIRSPACE MUST BE ACCOMPLISHED. THIS BRIEFING WAS NOT DONE. THE SUPVR CONTINUED TO DISTRACT ME TO THE POINT WHERE I HAD TO PUT MY FINGER IN MY EAR TO BLOCK HIM OUT. THE FV2 CTRLR ADVISED ME THAT THE ACFT FOR RWY

27L HAD MY RWY 27R TFC IN SIGHT. I STILL HAD NOT HAD A CHANCE TO REVIEW THE PROC OR AIRSPACE. AFTER I WAS RELIEVED FROM POS, I TALKED TO THE SUPVR AND THE OPS MGR. I STATED I WAS NOT HAPPY WITH WHAT OCCURRED AND WAS CONCERNED OF A POSSIBLE LOSS OF SEPARATION. THE OP MGR SAID HE WAS WATCHING THE ENTIRE TIME AND NO LOSS OF ANY SEPARATION HAD OCCURRED. THE INFO ABOUT THE SAPR1 APCH WAS NEVER BROADCAST ON THE ATIS (AUTOMATED TERMINAL INFO SYS), A REQUIREMENT THAT IS NEEDED BY THE PLTS IN ADVANCE SO THAT THEY MAY SET UP AND PREPARE FOR THE APCH TO BE EXPECTED.

### **Synopsis**

PHL CTLR ALLEGED SUPVR DISTRACTIONS WHEN INSTRUCTED TO CHANGE TO SAPR1 OPS.

**ACN: 758056**

## Time / Day

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## Place

Locale Reference.Airport : NSE.Airport  
State Reference : FL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1700

## Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : P31.TRACON  
Operator.Other : Military  
Make Model Name : Mentor (T-34)  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 3  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 13  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 3  
ASRS Report : 758056

## Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : MSAW  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## Assessments

Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

## Narrative

I WAS WORKING THE NSE ARR SECTOR (K/AR) AT P31 WHEN I NOTICED 'LA' FLASHING IN THE DATA BLOCK OF A MIL T34. I CALLED NSE TWR AND ADVISED THEM OF THE LOW ALT ALERT. I THEN CALLED THE SUPVR AND INFORMED HIM THAT NO AURAL ALARM HAD SOUNDED. THE DATA TAG FLASHED 'LA' FROM ABOUT A 4 MI FINAL UNTIL TOUCHDOWN, BUT NEVER SOUNDED TO ALERT ME (CONFIRMED BY THE CTRLR WORKING BESIDE ME). WHEN I ASKED OUR

AUTOMATION SPECIALIST ABOUT THIS, SHE SAID THE COMPUTER SHOWED THAT THE AURAL ALARM SOUNDED ON ABOUT A 4 MI FINAL. AT P31, WE HAVE HAD THIS PROB FOR A LONG TIME. A FEW WKS AGO ACR X TRIED TO LAND AT NUN INSTEAD OF PNS ACCIDENTALLY. THE CTLR DIDN'T CATCH THE MISTAKE IMMEDIATELY BECAUSE THE AURAL ALARM DID NOT SOUND. IN THE ACR X SITUATION, 3 CTLRS AND THE SUPVR CONFIRMED THAT THE AURAL ALARM DIDN'T SOUND, BUT THE AUTOMATION SPECIALIST SAID THAT THE COMPUTER SHOWED THAT THE AURAL ALARM HAD SOUNDED. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL OTHER CTLRS THAT HAVE RPTED PROBS WITH THE AURAL ALARM NOT SOUNDING TO THEIR SUPVRS, BUT THE EQUIP HAS NOT BEEN FIXED YET AND THE INCIDENTS ARE NOT BEING RPTED ON OUR 'DAILY FACILITY LOG.' THIS MAKES THE PROB DIFFICULT TO TRACK BECAUSE THE INCIDENTS ARE WRITTEN ON STRIPS AND PASSED TO THE SUPVR WHO HOPEFULLY GETS THE INFO TO THE AUTOMATION SPECIALIST.

### **Synopsis**

P31 CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING THE FAILURE OF THE AURAL ALARM ON THE MSAW SYSTEM, ALLEGING PRIOR PROBLEMS.



**ACN: 757664**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model Name : HS 125 Series  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Ground : Taxi

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Ground  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 20  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 2  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 4  
ASRS Report : 757664

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Ground Less Severe  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## **Narrative**

I WAS ON POS AT GND CTL W (GCW), A TRAINEE/DEVELOPMENTAL WAS RECEIVING A PROFICIENCY SKILL CHK ON LCL CTL TWO (LC2). AN HS25 WAS HOLDING SHORT OF RWY 19L AT TXWY S. A B737 WAS ON RWY 19L, A BE36 WAS ON FINAL APCH TO RWY 19R. I COORDINATED TO CROSS RWY 19L (E TO W) AFTER THE B737 DEP AND TO CROSS RWY 19R AFTER THE BONANZA ARR. UPON OBSERVING THE B737 ROLL PAST TXWY S, I INSTRUCTED THE BIZ JET TO CROSS RWY 19L AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 19R (FOR THE BE36 ARR). THE SUPVR PERFORMING THE SKILL CHK HEARD MY INSTRUCTIONS TO THE BIZ JET, AND PROCEEDED TO TELL ME TO HOLD THE JET SHORT (OF RWY 19L). I ATTEMPTED TO STOP THE BIZ ACFT HOWEVER, THE XMISSION WAS TOO LATE. THE BIZ JET HAD PROCEEDED ACROSS THE RWY HOLD LINES. I LATER DISCOVERED THAT ANOTHER B737 WAS 'CLRED FOR TKOF' ON RWY 19L FROM INTXN L. I BELIEVE THE LC2 CTLR THEN PROCEEDED TO CANCEL THE SECOND B737 TKOF CLRNC AND INSTRUCTED THE FIRST B737 TO 'TAXI INTO POS AND HOLD.' THE BIZ JET HAD ALREADY COMPLETED XING RWY 19L PRIOR TO THE SECOND B737 HOLDING ON THE RWY.

### **Synopsis**

LAS GND CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN INTRAFAC COORD WAS CONFUSED CAUSING A POTENTIAL GND CONFLICT.

**ACN: 757651**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Day : Tue  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : IAD.Airport  
State Reference : DC  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 1600

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : IAD.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : MD-80 Series (DC-9-80) Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 24  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 24  
ASRS Report : 757651

## **Events**

Anomaly.Ground Encounters.Other  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Situations**

Airport.Construction : IAD.Airport

## **Narrative**

AN MD80 HAD PREVIOUSLY CHECKED IN ON A VISUAL APCH TO RWY 19R AND RECEIVED A CLRNC TO LAND. LOCAL CTL WEST'S (LCW) ATTENTION WAS THEN

FOCUSED ON ANOTHER RWY WHERE AN ACFT WAS HOLDING IN POSITION FOR A RELEASE. ON A TWO MILE FINAL AT APPROX 1600 FT MSL, THE MD80 REALIZED THAT SOMETHING WAS NOT RIGHT AND INITIATED A GAR WITH LOCAL CTL WEST. LCW SAW THAT THE ACFT WAS LINED UP FOR THE CONSTRUCTION RWY (FUTURE RWY 19R) AND ALSO ISSUED GAR INSTRUCTIONS. THE VISIBILITY ON THE WX SEQUENCE WAS RPTD AS 6 WITH HAZE. THE TOWER FRONT LINE MANAGER RECEIVED A PHONE CALL FROM METROPOLITAN WASHINGTON ARPT AUTHORITY WHOSE CONTRACT CONSTRUCTION WORKERS ON THE NEW RWY WERE ALARMED. THIS HAS OCCURRED AT LEAST 5 TIMES IN THE LAST 5 MONTHS AND, IN FACT, JUST HAPPENED AGAIN TODAY. THE RWY CONSTRUCTION IS PROGRESSING AND THEY HAVE POURED A LOT OF CONCRETE. THIS SCENARIO ONLY SEEMS TO OCCUR WHEN IN A SOUTH OPERATION WITH VISUAL APCHES TO RWY 19R. IT WAS A TOPIC OF DISCUSSION AT THE RWY SAFETY ACTION TEAM (RSAT) MEETING HELD IN SEPTEMBER. WHAT HAS THE ARPT AUTHORITY AND IAD ATC DONE TO MITIGATE THIS: 1) MWAH HAS PLACED BIG ILLUMINATED SIGNS WITH X'S AT EITHER END OF THE CONSTRUCTION RWY. PLTS RPT NOT SEEING THEM WHEN TURNING FOR LINE-UP SEVERAL MILES OUT. 2) THE APCH PLATES HAVE BEEN MODIFIED TO SHOW THE OUTLINE OF THE CONSTRUCTION RWY. WAS THIS CARRIED OVER TO THE ELECTRONIC VERSIONS? 3) ATC HAS PLACE A CAUTION ON THE ATIS TO WARN PLTS ABOUT THE CONSTRUCTION RWY. WE ARE CONSIDERING MOVING IT UP EARLIER IN THE BROADCAST. 4) I HAVE ASKED POTOMAC APCH (PCT) QA MANAGER TO LOOK INTO THE SITUATION TO SEE IF FINAL CTRLS CAN HELP MITIGATE THIS -- PERHAPS BY ISSUING A CLRNC TO INTERCEPT THE RWY 19R LOCALIZER IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE VISUAL APCH CLRNC. HOWEVER, I DON'T THINK THAT THIS GOES FAR ENOUGH. I BELIEVE WE NEED TO GET THE WORD OUT ASAP TO USER GROUPS/AIRLINES/ASSOCIATIONS. SURELY, THIS IS NOT A NEW ISSUE. WHAT HAS BEEN DONE WITH OTHER ARPTS WHO HAVE BUILT NEW PARALLELS? CALLBACK CONVERSATION WITH RPTR REVEALED THE FOLLOWING INFO: RPTR ADVISED THAT FACILITY MANAGEMENT WAS ACTIVELY CONSIDERING REQUIRING CLRNCs TO INCLUDE PHRASES SIMILAR TO THOSE SUGGESTED BY THE RPTR. RPTR IS CAUTIOUSLY OPTIMISTIC THIS WILL PROVE ADEQUATE.

## **Synopsis**

IAD LCL CTLR RPTS ACFT ARE MAKING VISUAL APCHS TO THE NEW PARALLEL NORTH/SOUTH RWY UNDER CONSTRUCTION TO THE WEST OF THE EXISTING RWYS INSTEAD OF RWY 19R.

**ACN: 757598**

### **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 28000

### **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

### **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model Name : Citation X  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

### **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZLA.ARTCC  
Make Model Name : Learjet 60  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

### **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 17  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 17  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2 : 5  
ASRS Report : 757598

### **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Company : Corporate  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain  
Function.Oversight : PIC

### **Person : 3**

Affiliation.Company : Corporate  
Function.Flight Crew : Captain

## Events

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Critical  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Consequence.FAA : Investigated  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 15000  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 100

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## Narrative

I WAS WORKING 15 ARRS INTO LAS WITH NO D-SIDE. I WAS TIME BASE METERING INTO LAS, BUT THE TIMES WERE AT 6 MINS, OR MORE SO I TURNED OFF THE CTAS AND WENT TO 10 MI IN-TRAIL. I DSNDED THE LEARJET TO FL240. HE WAS AT FL290. THEN I TURNED TO KSINO FOR MY SEQUENCING AT FL280. I THEN NOTICED THE LEARJET WAS NOT DSNding FAST ENOUGH, SO I CLBED HIM UP TO FL290. I TURNED THE C750 40 DEGS TO THE R AND DSNDED HIM. THE C750 SAID HE WAS RESPONDING TO AN RA AND CLBED INTO THE LEARJET. PRIOR TO ALL THIS MY D-SIDE WAS TAKEN AWAY FROM ME BY THE SUPVR. ALSO TIME BASE METERING WAS IN EFFECT WITH NO TMU FLOW TO ADJACENT CTRS.

## Synopsis

ZLA CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL280 WHEN FAILING TO RECOGNIZE DECREASING SEPARATION, CORRECTIVE ACTION TOO LATE TO BE EFFECTIVE.

**ACN: 757211**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZJX.ARTCC  
State Reference : FL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 27000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 3  
Experience.Controller.Military : 4  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 3  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 14  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 1  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2 : 1  
ASRS Report : 757211

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 0.3  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 0.3  
ASRS Report : 756122

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolutive Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Consequence.FAA : Investigated  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 18000

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Weather

## Narrative

I WAS WORKING D88 (DARBS SECTOR) DURING THIS INCIDENT. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT, THE SECTOR WAS SEVERELY IMPACTED WITH WX AND ASSOCIATED DEVS. THE PRECIP WAS COVERING A MASSIVE AREA OF THE STATE FROM AT LEAST 30 MI SW OF OCF CONTINUING TO THE NE FOR 50 MI OR MORE. W470 AND NOVA AREAS WERE HOT AND WE TRIED BUT, WERE UNABLE TO OBTAIN ANY RELEASE OF THESE AREAS. TPA DEPS WERE DEVIATING W DIRECTLY INTO THE TPA ARR STREAM. AS A RESULT WE HAD INSTITUTED THE DARBS 19, TO HAVE TPA ARRS DELIVERED TO US AT FL190 RATHER THAN THE USUAL FL270, SO THAT THE DEPS COULD TOP THE DSNding ARRS. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT WE WERE TRYING TO SEQUENCE 2 SEPARATE GROUPS OF TPA ARRS THAT WERE STACKED ON TOP OF ONE ANOTHER, 3 ACFT IN EACH STACK. AGAIN THE DARBS 19 WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN EFFECT, HOWEVER AT THIS TIME WE REALIZED THAT WE WERE ALSO RECEIVING TPA ARRS AT FL270 AND FL250, THUS THE STACKS (WHICH SHOULD COME TO US IN-TRAIL). WE MADE THE SUPVR AWARE THAT WE WERE RECEIVING THE TPA'S STACKED AND NOT ON THE DARBS 19 MEANING WE WERE RECEIVING ARRS FROM 2 DIFFERENT SECTORS (HIGH AND LOW) THUS THE STACKS AND NO IN-TRAIL AT ALL AND ASKED FOR SOME HELP. THE SECTOR COMPLEXITY AT THIS TIME WAS VERY HIGH AND WE REALLY COULD HAVE USED SOME TPA SPACING AND IN-TRAIL. AT THIS TIME WE NOTICED X CONFLICT ALERT WITH Y. X WAS A TPA ARR LEVEL AT FL270 THAT SHOULD HAVE BEEN DSNDED PRIOR TO THE R16 (MAYO) BOUNDARY BUT APPARENTLY WASN'T. MAYO (R16) APPARENTLY DID NOT RECEIVE A POINTOUT OR DATA BLOCK ON X. THEY PROCEEDED TO DSNd Y AN MCO ARR TO FL270 IN CLOSE PROX TO X. CONFLICT ALERT ACTIVATED AND THE RADAR PERSON IMMEDIATELY DSNDED X TO AVOID CONFLICT. I BELIEVE MUCH OF THIS SITUATION COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED WITH SOME PLANNING. WE WERE VERY BUSY AND HAD BEEN FOR THIS ENTIRE SESSION. TMU SHOULD HAVE INCREASED THE IN-TRAIL SPACING FOR TPA. THERE SEEMS TO BE AN EFFORT AT OUR FACILITY TO NEVER SLOW TFC DOWN FOR ANY REASON. THE WX WAS SEVERELY IMPACTING BOTH ARRS AND DEPS YET WE WERE RECEIVING NO HELP FROM TMU. THE DARBS 19 WAS SUPPOSED TO BE IN EFFECT YET IT SUDDENLY DISAPPEARED. WHY, WE DON'T KNOW. BUT RECEIVING TPA'S STACKED WAS COMPLETELY UNACCEPTABLE. IT SEEMS ANY TIME A CTLR ASKS FOR SOME IN-TRAIL IT IS MET WITH TREMENDOUS RESISTANCE. ALSO OF NOTE, EARLIER IN THIS SESSION WE WERE SUPPOSED TO BE RECEIVING MCO ARRS 10 MI IN-TRAIL. WE RECEIVED SEVERAL OF THESE STACKED. AGAIN VERY BUSY. THE RADAR INSTRUCTED ME TO HAVE MAYO SPIN ONE OF THE STACKED ACFT EITHER A R OR L 360 DEGS THEIR CHOICE. THE SUPVR CAME OVER AND SAID WE MUST TAKE THAT HD OF AND THAT MAYO WAS MUCH BUSIER THAN US. OF COURSE THERE WAS NO WAY FOR US TO GET THE IN-TRAIL WITHOUT SPINNING THIS ACFT. IN THE END MAYO SPUN THE ACFT. BUT THIS IS AN EXAMPLE OF THE PRESSURE THEY KEPT PUTTING ON US. THE WATCH WORD SEEMS TO BE 'KEEP PRESSURE ON THE SYS.' THEN SURPRISE WHEN



SOMETHING BREAKS. WE WERE CONSTANTLY BEING DISTR WITH NEW PLANS AND SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH THE SUPVRS DURING THIS ENTIRE SESSION AND WE FELT THAT WE WERE GETTING VERY LITTLE HELP AT ALL. I CANNOT HELP BUT FEEL THAT THIS ATTITUDE OF 'WE'LL HAVE NO DELAYS WHATSOEVER' IS ALMOST CERTAINLY A COMPROMISE ON SAFETY. INCIDENTALLY DUE TO THE HIGH COMPLEXITY AND VOLUME VERY FEW WX CALLS WERE MADE TO ACFT DURING THIS PERIOD.

### **Synopsis**

ZJX CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL270, REPORTER CITING HEAVY TFC VOLUME AND FAILURE OF SUPVR/TMU INITIATIVES AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 757203**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SAF.Airport  
State Reference : NM  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 7800

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SAF.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : SR20  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Navigation In Use.Other.VORTAC  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : SAF.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model Name : Citation X  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Traffic Pattern

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Clearance Delivery  
Function.Controller : Ground  
Function.Controller : Local  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 12  
Experience.Controller.Military : 20  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 16  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 18  
Experience.Controller.Supervisory : 16  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 11  
ASRS Report : 757203

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Other Personnel.Other

Qualification.Pilot : ATP  
Qualification.Pilot : CFI  
Experience.Flight Time.Last 90 Days : 120  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 8500  
Experience.Flight Time.Type : 40  
ASRS Report : 755702

## Events

Anomaly.Conflict : NMAC  
Independent Detector.Aircraft Equipment : TCAS  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Independent Detector.Other.Flight CrewA : 2  
Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Took Evasive Action  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 200

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## Narrative

CIRRUS WAS ON PRACTICE VOR 33 APCH VICINITY PROC TURN. AS ZAB HAD IFR INBOUND, I PASSED TFC ON CIRRUS AND REQUESTED BEACON CODE. GIVEN XXXX. ACFT ACKNOWLEDGED, ZAB PASSED CITATION AND REQUESTED TO PASS OVER ARPT FROM FTI VISUAL APCH TO ENTER L DOWNWIND TO RWY 2 FOR DSCNT PURPOSES, WHICH I APPROVED. I HAD ADVISED CIRRUS TO EXPECT CITATION TFC FROM FTI EARLIER. THEN ADVISED CIRRUS THAT CITATION WOULD OVERFLY ARPT TO W SIDE L DOWNWIND. WHEN CITATION CAME UP ON FREQ HE ADVISED HE WAS ON R DOWNWIND TO RWY 2. I ADVISED AND QUESTIONED THAT AS HE WAS EXPECTED TO OVERFLY ARPT AND THUS NOT BE TFC FOR CIRRUS. I ASKED ALT. BOTH WERE AT 7800/7900 FT. I SUGGESTED CITATION CLB FOR TFC IMMEDIATE VICINITY. CITATION CLBED, CIRRUS DUCKED UNDER TAKING EVASIVE ACTION. I SAW CITATION CLB RAPIDLY OVER CIRRUS. CITATION LATER SAID HE HAD CHANGED MIND ON OVERFLT FOR R DOWNWIND DUE TO TCAS TFC 500 FT BELOW. I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY OTHER TFC AT THAT ALT EXCEPT CIRRUS WHICH WOULD HAVE BEEN ON CITATION'S L SIDE UNTIL HE TURNED INTO HIM. ZAB DID NOT LET US KNOW ABOUT CHANGE NOR DO I BELIEVE THEY PASSED TFC TO THE CITATION ON THE CIRRUS WHICH THEY SHOULD HAVE HAD TARGET ON XXXX CODE. PLT OF CIRRUS ADVISED ME HE INTENDED TO FILE RPT AS WELL. WE ARE LONG OVERDUE FOR RADAR, SLAVED OR STANDALONE. THIS IS THE SECOND CLOSE CALL OF THIS TYPE IN THE PAST 3 WKS. SUPPLEMENTAL INFO FROM ACN 755702: FLT WAS AN INST CHK RIDE. THE APPLICANT COMPLETED THE PROC TURN AND WAS INBOUND ON THE VOR 33 APCH. WHILE 3-4 MI OUT, SAF TWR REQUESTED WE SQUAWK XXXX FOR CTR BECAUSE THERE WAS A CITATION INBOUND. WE COMPLIED. WE THEN HEARD THE CITATION ON THE FREQ AND WE ANNOUNCED 3 MI SE OF THE VOR ON THE APCH. SAF IS A NON RADAR ARPT AND THE TWR CTLR ACKNOWLEDGED AND THANKED US FOR THE RPT. AS WE APCHED THE VOR WE HEARD TWR QUERY THE CITATION ON THEIR ALT. THEY WERE AT 7900 FT. WE WERE AT 7800 FT AND JUST PASSING THE VOR. THERE WAS SOME DISCUSSION AS TO THE CITATION'S INTENTION AS TO HOW THEY WERE GOING TO ENTER TFC FOR RWY 2 AT SAF. TWR THOUGHT THE CITATION HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO CROSS OVER THE FIELD AND ENTER L TFC. THE CITATION THOUGHT THEY WERE SUPPOSED TO ENTER R TFC FOR RWY 2. I

LOOKED TO MY R AND SAW THE CITATION AT 3 O'CLOCK POS AT OUR ALT AND HEADED IN OUR DIRECTION. I ANNOUNCED 'MY CTLS' AND TOOK THE ACFT FROM THE APPLICANT. I TURNED AWAY FROM THE CITATION AND DSNDED IMMEDIATELY. THE CITATION PASSED BEHIND US AND ENTERED R TFC FOR RWY 2. I RETURNED THE ACFT TO THE APPLICANT WHO CONTINUED THE APCH (AND THE CHK RIDE) SUCCESSFULLY. SAF TWR WORKS DILIGENTLY TO VISUALLY SEPARATE TFC AT THIS ARPT. THIS COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF THERE HAD BEEN CLEARER HDOF FROM CTR TO TWR. IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT A CTR TRAINING SIT MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THE LOSS OF SEPARATION.

### **Synopsis**

SAF CTLR DESCRIBED NMAC WHEN IFR TFC FAILED TO ENTER PATTERN AS EXPECTED AND CONFLICTED WITH VFR TFC ON PRACTICE VOR APCH.

**ACN: 757175**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Navaid : BAF.VORTAC  
State Reference : CT  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 34000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B767 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B747 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 7  
ASRS Report : 757175

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING A HIGH ALT SECTOR THAT WAS SATURATED AND VERY COMPLEX. WE WERE MIXING 2 FLOWS OVER BAF VOR AND NEEDED TO CHANGE ALT ON NUMEROUS ACFT. NEITHER MYSELF OR MY D-SIDE CAUGHT THE

POTENTIAL CONFLICT WITH ACR X AND ACR Y, WHO WERE BOTH CONVERGING OVER BAF VOR UNTIL THEY WERE WITHIN 10 MI OF EACH OTHER, I INITIATED A TURN AND DSCNT TO ACR Y (B747) AND WAS ABLE TO MAINTAIN SEPARATION. I ESTIMATE THAT SEPARATION WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST WITHIN A MIN. THE SECTOR WAS SATURATED FOR A FULL 30 MINS PRIOR, NO ASSISTANCE WAS PROVIDED BY THE SUPVR. NO IN-TRAIL WAS PUT IN PLACE TO MANAGE THE FLOW OF TFC. THIS WAS THE SAME SITUATION, THE DAY PRIOR, SAME SECTOR, SAME SUPVR, SAME OVERLOADED SITUATION. I THINK MANAGING TFC FLOWS AND VOLUME ARE NOT THE FOCUS OF SUPVRS. SAFETY HAS TAKEN A BACK SEAT TO MANAGING TIME ON POS.

### **Synopsis**

ZBW CTRLR DESCRIBED NEAR LOSS OF SEPARATION DURING BUSY/COMPLEX TFC PERIOD, CITING LACK OF SUPVR/TMU OVERSIGHT AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 757162**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Day : Sat  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZFW.ARTCC  
State Reference : TX

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 18  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 18  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 17  
ASRS Report : 757162

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Unable

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

## **Narrative**

THE FOLLOWING DUPLICATION WAS MADE CLEAR TO MANAGEMENT AT ZFW UPON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE RNAV DEPARTURES, BUT MY COMPLAINT WAS DISMISSED. WE WERE RECENTLY BRIEFED ON THE SAFETY NOTICE ON KIRST/KRIST, SO I DECIDED TO REPORT THIS POTENTIAL PROBLEM. THERE IS AN INTERSECTION CALLED 'OWWLS' (305000/961580) ON THE RIICE1 STAR. THIS STAR FEEDS INTO IAH (AND RELATED AIRPORTS) FROM THE NORTH-WEST, INCLUDING DEPARTURES FROM AND OVERFLIGHTS FROM OVER THE DFW TERMINAL AREA. THERE IS A WAYPOINT NAMED 'OWLLS' ON THE ARDIA3, DARTZ2, JASPA2, AND NELYN2 RNAV DEPARTURES FROM DFW THAT IS THE TURN POINT TO THE NORTH-EAST OF DFW FOR DEPARTURES TAKING OFF NORTH AND GOING SOUTH OFF THE EAST (OR BUSIER) SIDE OF THE DFW AIRPORT. THIS INCLUDES THE DEPARTURE ASSIGNED TO AIRCRAFT GOING FROM DFW TO IAH, CXO, AND DWH (DARTZ2). THIS WOULD MEAN THAT A SLIGHT SPELLING ERROR ON DEPARTURE PROGRAMMING (OWWLS FOR OWLLS) WOULD RESULT IN A SHARP TURN OF ABOUT 160 DEGREES SHORTLY AFTER TAKEOFF, A TURN DIRECTLY INTO THE DOWNWIND FEED POINT FOR DFW AT AN ALTITUDE NOT CONDUCTIVE TO SAFETY...AND AN ERROR AFTER THAT POINT (OWLLS FOR OWWLS) WOULD CAUSE A 180 DEGREE TURN ON A DEPARTURE INTO THE FACE OF FOLLOWING TRAFFIC. YOU CAN SEE THE POTENTIAL FOR A PROBLEM RIGHT

THERE. ALSO AIRCRAFT FROM NORTH OF THE DFW AREA HEADING TO CVE FOR THE RIICE1 CVE TRANSITION MIGHT BE CLEARED TO OWWLS. IF THIS HAPPENS, AND THEY ENTER OWLLS, THE GENERAL DIRECTION OF FLIGHT WILL APPEAR CORRECT AT FIRST, GIVING NEITHER TO PILOTS NOR ATC ANY INDICATION OF THE ERROR HAVING BEEN MADE.

### **Synopsis**

ZFW CONTROLLER REPORTS SIMILAR SOUNDING AND SIMILAR SPELLING OF TWO INTERSECTIONS IN ZFW AIRSPACE. OWWLS AND OWLLS.



**ACN: 757115**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710

Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : ATL.Airport

State Reference : GA

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Marginal

Light : Dusk

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : A80.TRACON

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Approach

Function.Controller : Radar

Qualification.Controller : Radar

Experience.Controller.Radar : 22

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 18

ASRS Report : 757115

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Narrative**

ATL LNDG E, WITH TRIPLE ILS PRM APCHS IN USE. ALL 3 FINALS WERE BUSY. I WAS WORKING THE PRM MONITOR WHEN THE APCH SUPVR CAME TO US AND POINTED OUT AN ACFT THAT WAS NOT DISPLAYED ON OUR SCOPES, BUT WAS FLYING ERRATICALLY THROUGH ALL 3 FINALS AT A HIGH RATE OF SPD (UP TO 180 KTS) WITH A MODE C THAT INDICATED ANYWHERE FROM BELOW 2000 FT TO ABOVE 23000 FT. THE ACFT CIRCLED AROUND AND FLEW RIGHT AT OTHER ACFT WITHOUT OUR HAVING ANY IDEA OF HIS ACTUAL ALT OR INTENTIONS. AT FIRST THE ACFT APPEARED TO HAVE CRASH LANDED W OF ATL, BUT A FEW MINS LATER, ONE OF THE PLTS RPTED A HIGH WING ACFT CIRCLING A COUPLE HUNDRED FT ABOVE THE TREETOPS. THE ACFT TARGET WAS NEVER DISPLAYED ON ANY OF THE

3 PRM DISPLAYS. THE PRM SCOPES WERE COMPLETELY USELESS IN THIS SITUATION. AS FAR AS I KNOW, NO RECORD WAS KEPT OF THIS INCIDENT. WITHOUT SOUNDING A LITTLE PARANOID, WHAT IF THIS PLT HAD SOME BAD INTENTIONS? AT THE VERY LEAST, THE PLT FLEW THROUGH 3 FINALS FULL OF ACFT WITHOUT ANY REPERCUSSIONS. I DON'T BELIEVE THE FAA IS FULFILLING ITS SAFETY CRITICAL MISSION BY HAVING CTLRS USE A PIECE OF EQUIP THAT DOESN'T DISPLAY PRIMARY TARGETS. WITHOUT THESE TARGETS BEING DISPLAYED, CTLRS CANNOT PROVIDE TFC INFO TO THE PLTS ON UNKNOWN TARGETS FLYING THROUGH THE FINALS.

### **Synopsis**

A80 CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING PRM LIMITATIONS, IE, NOT ABLE TO DISPLAY PRIMARY RADAR TARGETS, SECONDARY ONLY.

**ACN: 756972**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : DFW.Airport  
State Reference : TX  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 4000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D10.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : PA-34-200 Seneca I  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : D10.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Skylane 182/RG Turbo Skylane/RG  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 2  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 15  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 6  
ASRS Report : 756972

## **Person : 2**

Affiliation.Other : Personal  
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

## **Person : 3**

Affiliation.Other : Personal  
Function.Flight Crew : Single Pilot

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Required Legal Separation  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Detected After The Fact  
Consequence.FAA : Investigated  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 3000  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 500

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : FAA

## Narrative

I WAS WORKING MULTIPLE POS AND FREQS COMBINED ON THE SATELLITE ARPTS OF DFW TRACON. IT WAS AFTERNOON, WHICH IS NORMALLY BUSY ON A VFR DAY SUCH AS THIS. WE HAD TFC RESTRS OVER THE TOP OF DFW ARPT, WHICH REROUTED MORE TFC THAN NORMAL THROUGH MY SECTOR. I WAS WORKING 6 DIFFERENT FREQS COMBINED, WHICH ADDS TO THE FREQ CONGESTION AND WORKLOAD. WE DID NOT HAVE THE POS SPLIT OFF LIKE THEY SHOULD HAVE BEEN BECAUSE OF STAFFING. THERE WERE NUMEROUS DELAYS (IFR DEPS) BECAUSE OF WORKLOAD. SUPERVISION WAS ALSO INADEQUATE. THIS WAS MY 3RD WK IN A ROW OF MANDATORY 6 DAY WORK WKS. A COUPLE OF DAYS WERE 10 HR DAYS AND FATIGUE WAS DEFINITELY CAUSAL FACTOR. BOTH ACFT INVOLVED WERE IFR ARRS FROM THE SW. WHEN THE SECOND ACFT X CHKED IN, I MISTOOK THE 'V' IN THE CALL SIGN FOR A 'VFR DESIGNATOR.' THE VFR DESIGNATOR IS A 'V' WHICH SHOWS UP ON THE RADAR TAG, JUST BELOW THE ACFT IDENT. WHEN THE ACFT CHKED IN, I ASSIGNED HIM A VFR ALT 500 FT ABOVE THE OTHER ACFT. THE PLT ACKNOWLEDGED THE VFR ALT, BUT NEVER QUESTIONED IT. IFR SEPARATION WAS LATER LOST BECAUSE OF THE VFR ALT ASSIGNMENT. IT IS MY PERSONAL OPINION THAT IF THE POS HAD BEEN STAFFED ADEQUATELY, THIS ERROR WOULD NOT HAVE HAPPENED. WE HAD 3 ERRORS ON THIS POS WITHIN 2 DAYS. DURING ALL ERRORS THE SECTOR WAS NOT ADEQUATELY STAFFED, IN MY OPINION. I WORK AT ONE OF THE BUSIEST TERMINAL FACILITIES IN THE WORLD. OUR FACILITY IS APCHING A 50% REDUCTION IN THE NUMBER OF VETERAN FPL CTLRS THAT WE HAD JUST 2 YRS AGO. INSTEAD OF CURTAILING TFC AND SVCS TO MEET REDUCED STAFFING LEVELS, CTLRS ARE ROUTINELY FORCED TO WORK COMBINED SECTORS, 6 DAY WORK WKS WITH FEWER BREAKS AND 10 HR DAYS TO HANDLE THE WORKLOAD. MANY CTLRS WERE DENIED SUMMER VACATION WITH THEIR FAMILIES AND MORALE IS AT AN ALL TIME LOW. THE NUMBER OF ERRORS KEEP CLBING (EVEN THOUGH THE FAA RENAMED CERTAIN TYPE OF ERRORS IN AN ATTEMPT TO DISGUISE THE ACTUAL NUMBERS) BECAUSE THE FAA DECIDED TO CUT WAGES, RETIREMENT BENEFITS AND MOVING EXPENSES FOR CTLRS, OUR FACILITY IS UNABLE TO ATTRACT QUALIFIED, EXPERIENCED CTLRS. THE NEW CTLRS WE ARE GETTING HAVE LITTLE OR NO EXPERIENCE. IF THERE WAS NOT ENOUGH STRESS ALREADY FROM WORKING MORE TFC, LONGER HRS WITH LESS BREAKS, LONGER WORK WKS AND LESS VACATION TIME WITH FAMILY, WE ARE BEING FORCED TO TRAIN NEW, INEXPERIENCED CTLRS, THE FAA HAS CREATED A VERY HAZARDOUS AND DANGEROUS ENVIRONMENT. THIS IS A RECIPE FOR DISASTER.

## Synopsis

D10 CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT 4000 WHEN ISSUING A VFR ALT TO AN IFR ACFT, MISREADING THE DATA BLOCK, CITING FATIGUE AS CAUSAL FACTOR.

**ACN: 756614**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : EWR.Airport

State Reference : NY

Altitude.AGL.Bound Lower : 0

Altitude.AGL.Bound Upper : 1500

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower

Make Model Name : Helicopter

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : EWR.Tower

Make Model Name : Helicopter

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Local

Qualification.Controller : Non Radar

Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 16

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 10

ASRS Report : 756614

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Procedure Or Policy : EWR.Tower

## **Narrative**

TFR'S ARE PUT INTO EFFECT WITH LITTLE TO NO GUIDANCE GIVEN TO THE AIR TFC CTLRS RESPONSIBLE FOR THIS AIRSPACE. THERE ARE NO SOP'S AND THE MAJORITY OF INSTRUCTIONS ARE ISSUED ON THE FLY. VOLUME IS EXTREMELY HIGH IN WHAT IS NORMALLY A VERY TIGHT SELF-ANNOUNCED UNICOM CORRIDOR, YET PLTS EXPECT AND SOME CTLRS BELIEVE THEY SHOULD BE PROVIDING RADAR SVCS. THIS IS A DAUNTING AND EXTREMELY DANGEROUS TASK AND IN MY OPINION HAS CREATED A VERY DANGEROUS SITUATION FOR THE PLTS INVOLVED AND A VERY COMPROMISING SITUATION FOR THE AIR TFC CTLRS THAT ARE EXPECTED TO POLICE THE MAYHEM THAT ENSUES. AT NO TIME HAS ANYONE WHO WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR MANNING THIS RADAR POS BEEN CONSULTED AS TO WHAT WOULD LEAD TO A SAFE AND ORDERLY PROC AS IT RELATES TO THIS TFR.

## **Synopsis**

EWR CTLR DESCRIBED ANNUAL TFR EVENT THAT IS INITIATED WITH LITTLE GUIDANCE RESULTING IN VARIED EXPECTATIONS AS TO ATC'S ROLE.

**ACN: 756605**

## Time / Day

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## Place

Locale Reference.Airport : PQI.Airport  
State Reference : ME  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZBW.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Rockwell, Aero Commander single-engine, undifferentiated  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

## Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 29  
Experience.Flight Time.Total : 500  
ASRS Report : 756605

## Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## Assessments

Problem Areas : FAA

## Narrative

ACFT INBOUND TO PQI ON VISUAL APCH. ACFT GIVEN CANCELLATION INSTRUCTIONS AND RADAR SVC TERMINATED. SEVERAL ACFT REQUEST DEP CLRNC. I HAD SUPVR CALL FBO AT PQI TO SEE IF X HAS LANDED. FBO RPTS ACFT ON GND AND GETTING FUEL. I ISSUED DEP CLRNC TO Y (HE DEPARTS) THEN Z (AND HE DEPARTS). SEVERAL MINS LATER X CALLS ME AIRBORNE REQUESTING TO PICK UP HIS IFR CLRNC. I ISSUE CLRNC. THE FLT SVC CALLS ME AND TELLS ME THAT X CANCELED HIS FLT PLAN AT XA24. I ASKED X WHEN HE CANCELED HIS INBOUND FLT PLAN AND HE TOLD ME WITH THE WX BRIEFER BUT THAT THE PLT WAS 'SPEAKING TO SOMEONE IN GA AND HE WASN'T SURE WHO TO CALL.' THANKFULLY, I HAD NOT CHEWED OUT X (YET?) FOR FAILING TO CANCEL



INBOUND AND POSSIBLY DELAYING OTHER OUTBOUND FLTS, BUT THE FAILURE OF FSS PERSONNEL TO PROMPTLY CANCEL FLT PLANS AND/OR PROVIDE TIMELY ATC INFO IS DEPLORABLE. THIS IS CERTAINLY NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT WE'VE HAD THIS PROB IN MY AREA. WE'RE JUST GETTING SO FED UP WITH IT (AND REALIZING THAT IT'S NOT AN ABNORMALITY) THAT I'M FILING THIS TODAY.

### **Synopsis**

ZBW CTLR DESCRIBED FSS FAILURE TO RELAY IFR CANCELLATION WHICH COULD HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO SEVERAL UNNECESSARY DEP DELAYS.

**ACN: 756154**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : ZJX.ARTCC  
State Reference : FL  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 14000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : IMC  
Weather Elements : Thunderstorm  
Light : Night

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZJX.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : A320  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 1.5  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 0.75  
ASRS Report : 756154

## **Events**

Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Turbulence  
Anomaly.Inflight Encounter : Weather  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Environmental Factor  
Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Weather

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING SECTOR 57, WHEN WX HAD THE MICKEY AND WORMS DEP CORRIDOR CLOSED, ACFT WERE BEING LAUNCHED OUT THE BITHO ARR CORRIDOR AND THE ARRS WERE MOVED E TO ACCOMMODATE MY DEPS. THERE WAS EXTREME CELLS OVER THE MICKEY AND WORMS DTA. THEN SOMEONE IN MGMNT DECIDED TO START DEPARTING THE ACFT THROUGH A 3 MI WIDE HOLE

IN THE EXTREME PRECIP, BTWN THE MICKEY AND WORMS DTA, THAT I WAS DISPLAYING ON MY SCOPE. THEREFORE, I STOPPED TAKING HDOFS UNTIL THE PRECIP WAS ON THE TAIL OF THE RADAR RETURN, BECAUSE AT THE TIME I DID NOT HAVE TIME TO CALL THE WX TO THE ACFT THAT WERE DEPARTING. WHEN I ACCEPTED THE HDOF OF THE ACFT, THE HOLE WAS ALMOST COMPLETELY CLOSED, I WAS EXCEPTIONALLY BUSY AND DID NOT HEAR ANY CALL FROM HIM UNTIL HE INFORMED ME HE WAS RECEIVING SEVERE TURB. IT WAS THE FIRST RPT OF ANY CHOP OR TURB RPTED IN THE AREA. I IMMEDIATELY INFORMED ORL APCH, THEN INFORMED MY SUPVR. AFTER THE EVENT I WAS STILL ON POS FOR WHAT SEEMED LIKE 20 MINS BEFORE BEING RELIEVED. I WAS VISIBLY AGITATED AND SHOULD NOT HAVE CONTINUED WORKING TFC. THIS IS CONSISTENTLY A STANDARD OP PROC FROM FLOW CTL TO PUSH THESE ACFT THROUGH SMALL HOLES IN EXTREME PRECIP INSTEAD OF STOPPING DEPS OR ROUTING THEM WELL CLR OUT OTHER SIDES OF THE APCH CTL.

### **Synopsis**

ZJX CTLR DESCRIBED BUSY/COMPLEX TFC PERIOD WHEN SUPVR DECISION TO RELEASE DEP THROUGH WX HOLE RESULTED IN TURBULENCE ENCOUNTER.

**ACN: 756038**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : JFK.Airport  
State Reference : NY  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 2000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : N90.TRACON  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Military : 4  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 28  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 21  
ASRS Report : 756038

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA  
Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING THE ROBER RADAR POS ABOUT XA00 WHEN I LOST MY RADAR AND MY RADIOS AT THE SAME TIME. I HAD 5 ACFT ON VECTORS TO JFK ARPT AT THE TIME THAT I LOST ALL OF MY TOOLS. OTHER POS IN THE JFK APCH AREA ALSO LOST RADAR AND THEIR RADIOS. FOR ABOUT 5 MINS THE AIRPLANES WERE NOT UNDER ATC CTL IN A VERY BUSY AND CONGESTED TERMINAL AREA.

## **Synopsis**

N90 CTLR DESCRIBED A FIVE MIN RADAR AND RADIO FAILURE WHILE WORKING ARR'S TO JFK.

**ACN: 755925**

## Time / Day

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## Place

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : A80.TRACON  
State Reference : GA

## Environment

Flight Conditions : Marginal  
Weather Elements : Thunderstorm

## Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Departure  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 25  
ASRS Report : 755925

## Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## Assessments

Problem Areas : FAA

## Situations

ATC Facility.Procedure Or Policy : ATL.Tower

## Narrative

AT ATL WE HAVE WHAT IS CALLED A 'DEP SPLIT.' THIS SPLIT DETERMINES WHICH DEPS COME OFF WHICH RWY, IE, N AND W DEPS OFF OF RWY 8R AND S AND E DEPS OFF OF RWY 9L. SINCE RWY 10/28 OPENED IN MAY OF 2006, EVEN THOUGH THERE WERE NO PROCS DEVELOPED PRIOR TO ITS OPENING TO USE IT AS A DEP RWY, WE HAVE BEEN RUNNING A 'TRIPLE DEP' SPLIT AT CERTAIN TIMES OF THE DAY. THIS IS GENERALLY A FIASCO, WHICH IN MY OPINION ONLY DELAYS ACFT MORE THAN IT EXPEDITES THEM, BUT THAT IS ANOTHER STORY. ON THIS PARTICULAR DAY, THERE WAS A LARGE AREA OF LEVEL 3 AND HIGHER PRECIP APCHING THE ARPT FROM THE SE. THE SUPVR IN THE TWR ADVISED HIS INTENTION TO BEGIN DEPARTING ALL 3 RWYS (8R, 9L AND 10) IN ABOUT 15 MINS. E AND S DEPS WOULD BE COMING OFF RWY 9L AND W DEPS WOULD BE COMING OFF RWY 10. I, AND OTHER CTRLRS, TOLD THE APCH SUPVRS THAT THIS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO HAPPEN. IF WE STAYED ON 2 RWYS (8R AND 9L) THE E DEPS COULD COME OFF RWY 9L STRAIGHT OUT AND STAY N OF THE WX AND THE S DEPS COULD COME OFF ON A 180 DEG HDG AND STAY W OF THE WX.

IF THERE WERE W DEPS COMING OFF RWY 10, THE S DEPS WOULD ALSO HAVE TO GO STRAIGHT OUT, MEANING THEY WOULD HAVE TO FLY 25 MI OR SO E BEFORE THEY COULD TURN S BECAUSE OF THE LEVEL 3 AND 4 WX SE OF THE ATL ARPT. DESPITE CTLR OBJECTIONS, THIS DEP SPLIT OCCURRED AND RESULTED IN JUST WHAT WE WARNED WOULD HAPPEN. S DEPS WERE HAVING TO FLY 25 OR MORE MI E TO GET AROUND THE WX, THEY WERE NOT ABLE TO CLB BECAUSE THEY WERE HAVING TO CROSS THE ARR AREA TWICE, AND IT QUICKLY TURNED INTO AN UNSAFE MESS. I THEN SUGGESTED THAT IF THEY WERE GOING TO INSIST THAT WE DO THIS OP, GIVE THE S DEPS OFF OF RWY 9L THE FREQ OF THE RWY 10 CTLR, WHICH WOULD ALLOW HIM TO TURN THEM S PRIOR TO THE WX IF HE DIDN'T HAVE TFC. I WAS TOLD 'WE DON'T DO IT THAT WAY.'

### **Synopsis**

A80 CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING A TWR SUPVR'S DECISION TO DEP THREE RWYS, RESULTING IN DELAYED TURNS AND OPERATIONAL CONFUSION.

**ACN: 755826**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200709

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.ATC Facility : CLT.Tower

State Reference : NC

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : CLT.Tower

Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier

Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121

Flight Phase.Climbout : Takeoff

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Local

Qualification.Controller : Non Radar

Experience.Controller.Radar : 23

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 13

ASRS Report : 755826

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Navigational Facility

## **Narrative**

I WAS WORKING LCL CTL E. I OBSERVED A TARGET ON THE ASDE-X DISPLAY THAT I CONFIRMED WAS FALSE AS I LOOKED OUT THE WINDOW. I INFORMED FLM OF THE TARGET. I CLERED A JET FOR TKOF AND AS THE ACFT ROLLED IT SET OFF THE ALARMS ON ASDE-X INDICATING A POTENTIAL COLLISION. THIS SITUATION WAS LOGGED. EXACT SAME OCCURRENCES FOR EACH OF THE NEXT 2 DEPS. FINALLY AFTER I DEMANDED THE EQUIP BE TAKEN OFF LINE OR I BE RELIEVED OF THE POS THE FLM PUT THE ASDE-X IN LIMITED MODE. WHEN THE FALSE TARGET DISAPPEARED, THE ASDE-X WAS PUT BACK IN FULL OP. PROB WAS NEVER DIAGNOSED OR FIXED.

## **Synopsis**



CLT CTLR DESCRIBED INCIDENT WHEN NO TFC WAS OBSERVED ON THE DEP RWY  
BUT ASDE-X ALARMED ON FALSE TARGET WITH THREE DEP ACFT.

**ACN: 755788**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200709  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : FAI.Airport  
State Reference : AK  
Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 0

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : FAI.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : J3 Cub  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : FAI.Tower  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Scout  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Landing : Roll

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Qualification.Controller : Non Radar  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 6  
ASRS Report : 755788

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Airport  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

THE SAFETY AREA S OF THE THRESHOLD OF SKI STRIP ONE IS OF THE SAME MATERIAL (GRAVEL) AND SHAPE AS THE ACTUAL SKI STRIP. AS A RESULT, MANY

PLTS ACTUALLY LAND IN THE SAFETY AREA. ON THIS DAY, I OBSERVED 3 ACFT IN A ROW TOUCH DOWN WELL S OF THE THRESHOLD IN THE SAFETY AREA.

### **Synopsis**

FAI CTLR DESCRIBED MULTIPLE INSTANCES WHEN ACFT LNDG ON THE SKI STRIP ONE RWY ACTUALLY LAND SHORT IN THE SAFETY AREA.

**ACN: 755711**

## Time / Day

Date : 200709  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## Place

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 9000

## Environment

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## Aircraft : 1

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Operator.General Aviation : Personal  
Make Model Name : Piper Single Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Navigation In Use.Other : GPS  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Instrument Non Precision  
Route In Use.Arrival : On Vectors

## Person : 1

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Approach  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Military : 4  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 26  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 17  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position2 : 6  
ASRS Report : 755711

## Events

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## Assessments

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication  
Problem Areas : FAA

## Narrative

PA46 REQUESTED A GPS RWY 19L APCH TO LAS. I PULLED UP THE APCH PLATE ON THE SYS AND CLRED ACFT TO REQUESTED FIX HAMIG. MY APCH PLATE SHOWED

HAMIG ON THE STAAV 111 DEG RADIAL 7 MI FIX, HIS SHOWED OVER NELLIS AFB. I TURNED THE PA46 L IMMEDIATELY HDG 190 DEGS, AND DSNDED ACFT TO 8000 FT AND CALLED NELLIS WITH A POINTOUT. WE DETERMINED I DID NOT HAVE THE CURRENT APCH AT MY DISPOSAL. THIS APPEARS TO BE TURNING INTO A COMMON OCCURRENCE AT LAS, AND IS VERY DISTURBING. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR KEEPING THE INFO IN OUR SYS UP TO DATE? THEY CERTAINLY ARE NOT DOING THEIR JOB! THANK GOODNESS LSV TOOK THE POINTOUT OR I WOULD HAVE HAD AN AIRSPACE VIOLATION! UNACCEPTABLE!

### **Synopsis**

L30 CTLR DESCRIBED NEAR OPDEV WHEN CURRENT APCH CHARTS WERE NOT AVAILABLE AT THE CTL POSITION.

**ACN: 755544**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200710  
Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Navaid : ZIN.NDB  
State Reference : FO  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 36000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : Mixed  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZMA.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : A319  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Non Radar : 19  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 19  
ASRS Report : 755544

## **Events**

Anomaly.Airspace Violation : Entry  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR  
Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Company  
Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Narrative**

ACR X FLYING FROM SAN JUAN, PR (TJSJ) RE-FILED THE FLT PLAN THROUGH SANTO DOMINGO AND PORT AU PRINCE'S AIRSPACE FOR WX AVOIDANCE. PLT NEVER CALLED SANTO DOMINGO ATC NOR PORT AU PRINCE CTRS. THE MAP CLRLY SHOWS THE FIR BOUNDARIES, RADIO CONTACT INSTRUCTIONS AND XFER POS. ACR X CHKS IN WITH ZMA ABOUT 20 MI FROM THE BOUNDARY ON THE CORRECT FREQ SO THERE APPEARS TO BE A MAP IN THEIR FLT BAG. ZMA

SECTORS FOR THE LAST 3 DAYS HAVE HAD NUMEROUS ACFT VIOLATE THEIR AIRSPACE BECAUSE PLTS OR COMPANIES WERE CHANGING FLT PLANS, BUT NOT ADVISING CTRS -- SANTO DOMINGO OR PORT AU PRINCE -- THEN FLYING THROUGH THEIR AIRSPACE AND TRYING TO HAVE ZMA PERFORM THE REQUIRED FLT DATA FUNCTIONS OF RTE CHANGES AND NOTIFICATIONS. MIAMI FSS AT GRAND TURK WAS EXPERIENCING SIGNIFICANT DELAYS IN PROVIDING SVC THE ENTIRE WKEND AND THE ACFT CREWS WERE CALLING ZMA TO ATTEMPT TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES. A NOTAM SHOULD BE DISTRIBUTED ADVISING ALL ACFT FLYING IN THE REGION BTWN HAVANA CTR (MUHA), ZMA, PORT AU PRINCE, SANTO DOMINGO, JAMAICA, AND ARUBA TO CALL THE APPROPRIATE CTR 10 MINS PRIOR TO THE BOUNDARY.

### **Synopsis**

ZMA CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING ACR'S FAILURE TO CONTACT ENROUTE FACILITIES AS REQUIRED AFTER WX DEV RTE WAS FILED BY COMPANY.

**ACN: 755357**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200709  
Local Time Of Day : 1201 To 1800

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : MUT.Airport  
State Reference : IA  
Altitude.MSL.Single Value : 22000

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAU.ARTCC  
Operator.General Aviation : Corporate  
Make Model Name : HS 125 Series  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Descent : Intermediate Altitude

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.ARTCC : ZAU.ARTCC  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : Super King Air 200 HDC  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91  
Flight Phase.Cruise : Level

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Experience.Controller.Limited Radar : 1.5  
Experience.Controller.Radar : 20  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 21  
ASRS Report : 755357

## **Events**

Anomaly.Conflict : Airborne Less Severe  
Anomaly.Other Anomaly : Unstabilized Approach  
Independent Detector.ATC Equipment : Conflict Alert  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Alert  
Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued New Clearance  
Consequence.FAA : Investigated  
Miss Distance.Horizontal : 28200  
Miss Distance.Vertical : 0



## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : FAA

## **Narrative**

ACFT #1 WAS DSNDED TO FL220 FROM FL240 TO ENTER MY AIRSPACE (AT AND BELOW FL230). ACFT #2 AT FL220 ENTERED MY AIRSPACE APPROX 2 MINS LATER. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT THERE WERE APPROX 22 ACFT ON FREQS AND 28 DATA BLOCKS ON SCOPE. BY THE TIME THAT I NOTICED THE PROB AND TOOK ACTION, IT WAS TOO LATE. I WAS WORKING A SECTOR THAT USED TO BE 2 SECTORS, WITH A MANUAL CTLR HELPING. IN THE PAST, THERE WAS AN OPPORTUNITY TO SPLIT THE SECTORS OFF, BUT NOT ANY MORE. AS OF 2 MONTHS AGO, MGMNT AT ZAU DECIDED TO DECOMMISSION THE SECOND SECTOR LEAVING THE CTLRS TO WATCH A LARGER SECTOR NEEDING 3 FREQS FOR COVERAGE. THE DECOMMISSIONING WENT AGAINST ANY AND ALL INPUT FROM THE CTLRS WORKING THE AIRSPACE. MGMNT DOESN'T WORK THE AIRSPACE, THE CTLRS DO, AND THEIR INPUT SHOULD NOT BE DISREGARDED. THE FREQ CONGESTION AND ADDITIONAL AIRSPACE IS A VERY SERIOUS ACCIDENT WAITING TO HAPPEN! ALL OF THIS IS HAPPENING WITH 5 TO 6 LESS CTLRS PER SHIFT THAN 2 YRS AGO.

## **Synopsis**

ZAU CTLR EXPERIENCED OPERROR AT FL220 WHEN FAILING TO SEE CONFLICTING TFC, CITING TFC VOLUME AND AIRSPACE/SECTOR CHANGES AS CONTRIBUTORY.

**ACN: 755346**

### **Time / Day**

Date : 200709

Local Time Of Day : 0601 To 1200

### **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : SAV.Airport

State Reference : GA

### **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Local

ASRS Report : 755346

### **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

### **Assessments**

Problem Areas : FAA

Problem Areas : Maintenance Human Performance

### **Situations**

ATC Facility.Radar Equipment : SAV.Tower

### **Narrative**

AT SAVANNAH ATCT THE PRIMARY RADAR OTS. THE 32 YR OLD ASR-8 HAS FAILED 2 WKS IN A ROW. PLEASE NASA CONTACT THE FAA AND ADVISE THEM WE NEED ASR-11 TO SEPARATE THESE PLANES. THE RADAR IS NOT GETTING ANY BETTER.

### **Synopsis**

SAV TWR CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING SEVERAL ASR-8 RADAR FAILURES, SUGGESTING REPLACEMENT ASR-11 RADAR BE INSTALLED.

**ACN: 755333**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200709  
Local Time Of Day : 1801 To 2400

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : LAS.Airport  
State Reference : NV

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC  
Light : Night

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAX.Tower  
Operator.Common Carrier : Air Carrier  
Make Model Name : B737 Undifferentiated or Other Model  
Operating Under FAR Part : Part 121  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

## **Aircraft : 2**

Controlling Facilities.TRACON : L30.TRACON  
Controlling Facilities.Tower : LAS.Tower  
Make Model Name : Any Unknown or Unlisted Aircraft Manufacturer  
Flight Phase.Descent : Approach  
Route In Use.Approach : Visual

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA  
Function.Controller : Local  
Qualification.Controller : Radar  
Qualification.Technician : Airframe  
Experience.Controller.Military : 10  
Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 6  
ASRS Report : 755333

## **Events**

Anomaly.Other Anomaly.Other  
Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1  
Resolatory Action.None Taken : Anomaly Accepted

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : ATC Human Performance  
Problem Areas : FAA

## **Situations**

ATC Facility.Procedure Or Policy : L30.TRACON

## **Narrative**

WHILE WORKING LCL CTL 1 AND LCL CTL 2 COMBINED AT LAS TWR, I RECEIVED NOTIFICATION FROM LAS VEGAS TRACON L30 THAT THE MEAD AND DAGGOT SECTORS ARE COMBINED. I PASSED THIS INFO ON TO OTHER PERSONNEL IN THE TWR (LAS) AND WAS TOLD THAT IT HAD ALREADY BEEN DONE. I THEN INQUIRED TO THE DAGGOT SECTOR ON WHY THEY RE-COORD THE SECTORS BEING COMBINED. THE REPLY WAS THAT AN ACFT HAD COME OVER ON THE WRONG DEP FREQ. THE NEXT ACFT THAT CHKED IN WITH THE TWR WAS ON THE WRONG FREQ. I THEN COORD WITH THE APPROPRIATE SECTOR TO INFORM THEM OF THE CORRECT FREQ. WITHIN 2 OR 3 MINS ANOTHER ACFT CHKED IN WITH THE TWR ON THE WRONG FREQ. THIS IS NOT THE FIRST TIME THAT THIS HAS HAPPENED IN LAS VEGAS. THE MGMNT AT LAS VEGAS TWR HAS BEEN INFORMED, BUT HAS FAILED TO FOLLOW UP ON THE OTHER INCIDENTS. IT IS MY BELIEF THAT LAS VEGAS TRACON (L30) IS INTENTIONALLY ISSUING THE INCORRECT TWR FREQ. THIS IS A SAFETY ISSUE THAT SHOULD BE INVESTIGATED AND ADDRESSED IMMEDIATELY. UNNECESSARY FREQ CHANGES DURING A CRITICAL PHASE OF FLT ARE DANGEROUS.

## **Synopsis**

LAS TWR CTLR VOICED CONCERN REGARDING POSSIBLE INTENTIONAL WRONG TWR FREQ ASSIGNMENTS BY L30 CTLRS, ALLEGING SAFETY CONCERNS.

**ACN: 753353**

## **Time / Day**

Date : 200709

Day : Thu

## **Place**

Locale Reference.Airport : PIT.Airport

State Reference : PA

Altitude.AGL.Single Value : 1700

## **Environment**

Flight Conditions : VMC

Light : Daylight

## **Aircraft : 1**

Controlling Facilities.Tower : PIT.Tower

Operator.General Aviation : Personal

Make Model Name : Citation II S2/Bravo

Operating Under FAR Part : Part 91

Flight Phase.Climbout : Initial

Route In Use.Departure : On Vectors

Route In Use.Departure.SID : PIT

## **Person : 1**

Affiliation.Government : FAA

Function.Controller : Local

Experience.Controller.Radar : 19

Experience.Controller.Time Certified In Position1 : 9

ASRS Report : 753353

## **Events**

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Clearance

Anomaly.Non Adherence : FAR

Anomaly.Non Adherence : Published Procedure

Anomaly.Other Spatial Deviation

Independent Detector.Other.ControllerA : 1

Resolatory Action.Controller : Issued Advisory

Resolatory Action.Flight Crew : Returned To Intended or Assigned Course

## **Assessments**

Problem Areas : Airspace Structure

Problem Areas : Chart Or Publication

Problem Areas : Flight Crew Human Performance

## **Situations**

Chart.SID : PIT

## **Narrative**

ACFT DEPARTED RWY 28R. RTE OF FLT AND CLRNC WAS: PIT.PIT8.MGW..RIC. LC2 ASSIGNED 'FLY RWY HDG' TO ACFT FOR NOISE. AT 1700 FT MSL THE ACFT WAS SPOTTED BEGINNING A TURN TO THE S. LC2 QUERIED THE PLT AND PLT STATED HE WAS COMPLYING WITH PIT 8. LC2 STATED 'YOU NEED TO TAKE A LOOK AT THAT. FLY HDG XXXX CONTACT DEP.' THE PLT MISREAD THIS PROC. IT IS A COMMON MISTAKE, TOO COMMON. AT THE TIME OF THE INCIDENT TFC WAS NOT A FACTOR. HOWEVER, IF THERE HAD BEEN A KC135 EXECUTING PRACTICE APCHES, SEPARATION WOULD HAVE BEEN LOST. THIS IS AN ONGOING COMMON PROBLEM ESPECIALLY WITH GENERAL AVIATION AND FRACTIONAL ACFT. I THINK IT HAS SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE PRESENTATION OF THE COMMERCIAL CHARTS. TOWER MANAGERS HAVE BEEN WORKING HARD TRYING TO GET THIS PROBLEM SOLVED. THERE DOESN'T SEEM TO BE ANY COOPERATION FROM OTHER LINES OF BUSINESS WITHIN THE FAA. I RECOMMEND WE STOP USING THE PIT 8 UNTIL ANOTHER FORMAT OR VERSION IS COMPLETED AND PUBLISHED.

## **Synopsis**

A PIT LCL CTLR RPTS ACFT TURN EARLY ON THE PIT 8 DEP AFTER BEING GIVEN A HDG TO FLY BECAUSE OF CONFUSING CHART FORMATTING.