

**PARADIGM LOST?  
TRANSITIONS AND THE SEARCH FOR A NEW WORLD ORDER**

David Jablonsky  
Professor of National Security Affairs  
U.S. Army War College

July 1995

\*\*\*\*\*

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, the Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government. This report is approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

\*\*\*\*\*

Comments pertaining to this report are invited and should be forwarded to: Director, Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013-5050. Comments also may be conveyed by calling the Conference Organizer, Dr. Gary L. Guertner, commercial (717) 245-3108 or DSN 242-3108.

\*\*\*\*\*

This study was originally presented at the U.S. Army War College Fourth Annual Strategy Conference held February 24-25, 1993, with the assistance of the Office of Net Assessment. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish the paper as part of its Conference Series.

\*\*\*\*\*

My thanks to Colonel Bruce B.G. Clarke, Colonel (Ret) Arthur F. Lykke, Jr., Colonel James S. McCallum, and Professor Michael G. Roskin for their comments on this paper. Particular thanks go to Colonel McCallum who also provided solid advice, good references and just the right amount of tea and sympathy. Thanks also to Colonel Ralph L. Allen, Chairman, Department of Military Strategy, Planning, and Operations, and Colonel John J. O'Connell, Jr., Chairman, Department of Command, Leadership, and Management, for the use of their department conference rooms to write this study.

## FOREWORD

After every momentous event, there is usually a transition period, in which participants in the events, whether individuals or nation-states, attempt to chart their way into an unfamiliar future. In the United States in this century, there are three such transitions, each focused on America's role in the international arena. After World War I, the American people specifically rejected the global role for the United States implicit in Woodrow Wilson's strategic vision of collective security. In contrast to this "return to normalcy," after World War II the United States moved inexorably toward international leadership in response to the Soviet threat. The result was an acceptance of George Kennan's strategic vision of containing the Soviet Union on the Eurasian landmass and the subsequent bipolar confrontation of the two superpowers in a twilight war that lasted for over 40 years.

Sometime in the penultimate decade of the 20th century, the United States and its allies won the cold war. Once again in the current transition period, the primary questions revolve around the management of power and America's role in global politics. Once again there are the issues of change and continuity. In terms of change, the cold war set in train a blend of integrative and disintegrative forces and trends that are adding to the complex tensions of the current transition. The integrative force that increasingly linked global economies in the cold war, for instance, also holds out the spectral potential of global depression or, at the very least, nations more susceptible to disintegrative actions, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated. In a similar manner, the advances in communications and transportation that have spread the results of medical and scientific discoveries around the world are countered by the malign transnational results of nuclear technology, the drug trade, terrorism, AIDS and global warming.

All that is a reminder of the value of continuity in a Hobbesian world still nasty, brutish and anarchic. The realist paradigm, in other words, still obtains: nation-states are still the primary international actors; power is still the coin of the realm. In such a milieu, American government elites must convince an electorate, increasingly conscious of the domestic threats to national security, of the need to continue to exercise global leadership in the management of power. The answer, as this study demonstrates, is a strategic vision that incorporates a multilateral, great power approach to international relations.

WILLIAM A. STOFFT  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Commandant

## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

We are never completely contemporaneous with our present. History advances in disguise; it appears on stage wearing the mask of the preceding scene, and we tend to lose the meaning of the play. Each time the curtain rises, continuity has to be re-established. The blame. . . is not history's but lies in our vision, encumbered with memory and images learned in the past. We see the past superimposed on the present, even when the present is a revolution.

Regis Debray<sup>1</sup>

"WAR IS PEACE," the Ministry of Truth proclaims in George Orwell's profoundly pessimistic prediction of the future in 1984.<sup>2</sup> And so it was with the cold war. The irony is that one year after Orwell had expected the Western world to be under the complete control of Stalinism, Mikhail Gorbachev arrived on the world scene, setting in train all the events that would reverse the trends inaugurated at the Finland Station so many decades before.<sup>3</sup>

The sudden end to the cold war was similar to the manner in which World War I ended on the Eastern Front in 1918 with the internal breakdown and unconditional withdrawal of a major belligerent. As in 1918 with imperial Russia, no one expected to see the end of the Soviet empire in Europe, the dissolution of the Soviet state, and the repudiation of communism itself throughout that disintegrating state. "In understanding the collapse of communism and the Soviet state," Ronald Steel has pointed out in this regard, "the strategists in government, at universities, and in the well-financed limbo in between have been virtually irrelevant."<sup>4</sup> To be sure, in the most basic of all cold war texts, George Kennan described in 1947 the possibility of such an occurrence with a literary analogy:

Observing that human institutions often show the greatest outward brilliance at a moment when inner decay is in reality farthest advanced, [Thomas Mann] compared the Buddenbrook family, in the days of its greatest glamour, to one of those stars whose light shines most brightly on this world when in reality it has long since ceased to exist. And who can say with assurance that the strong light still cast by the Kremlin on the dissatisfied peoples of the western world is not the powerful afterglow of a constellation which is in actuality on the wane?<sup>5</sup>

But he did not anticipate a peaceful metamorphosis. "Strange things have happened," Kennan wrote in 1951 when examining the possibility of Soviet toleration of its own collapse, "though not

much stranger."<sup>6</sup>

The general surprise at the sudden and relatively quiet outcome of the long twilight struggle was due, in part, to the Orwellian mix of peace and war. For just as war was to Clausewitz the continuation of policy by other means, so was the cold war warfare by other, for the most part, nonlethal means. Nevertheless, it was still conflict--a struggle that lasted for two generations with massive stakes that included a geopolitical rivalry for control of the Eurasian landmass and ultimately the world, and an ideological one in which philosophy in the deepest sense of mankind's self-definition was very much at issue. The end of the cold war, then, represents a victory at least as decisive and one-sided as the defeat of Napoleonic France in 1815, or of Imperial Germany in 1918, or of the Axis in 1945. In terms of the actual capitulation, that moment may have come at the November 19, 1990 Paris summit when Gorbachev accepted the conditions of the victorious coalition by describing the unification of Germany that had come about completely on Western terms as a "major event"--a description that Zbigniew Brzezinski has termed the functional equivalent to the acts of surrender in the railroad car at Compiègne in November 1918 and on the *USS Missouri* in August 1945.<sup>7</sup>

The defeat of the Soviet Union settled the remaining issues left over from World War II with the exception of a divided Korea and the Russian occupation of the Kurile Islands. After both the major wars of this century, it took some time for the international order to settle into what proved to be a relatively stable period until overturned by the next war (or war equivalent). A similar process is currently underway throughout the world in this third major transition period for the United States in the 20th century. Moreover, the victors of the cold war, like their predecessors in 1918 and 1945, are proclaiming a new world order in which, as President Bush described it, "nations recognize the shared responsibility for freedom and justice. . .where the strong respect the rights of the weak."<sup>8</sup>

The success of this or any other world order will depend on the role of the United States, as it did in the transition periods after 1918 and 1945. That role in the current transition is usually addressed in terms of change ranging from a diminishment of military threats to an increase in global interdependence. And in fact the unabridged Webster Dictionary defines change in terms of "transition"--a "passage" in historical context, "from an earlier to a later form with the blending of *old and new features*. . . ."<sup>9</sup> The added emphasis in the definition, however, also highlights the importance of continuity along with change in any transition period. Stressing this continuity, James Rosenau has pointed out, "serves as a useful reminder that even the most pronounced changes have antecedents, that the past cannot be ignored, and that there is always a danger of mistaking the appearance of upheaval for the dynamics of transformation and, thus, exaggerating the depth and

breadth of change."<sup>10</sup>

How analysts think about change and continuity shapes what they look for; and what they look for affects what they find. It is in this sense that Thomas Kuhn's idea of "paradigm" can play an important role. A paradigm is a group of fundamental assumptions that form for the scholar a picture of the world--a shared framework that provides instruction on how to view the object of inquiry. It is both broad and nebulous, certainly broader than a conceptual framework since concepts derive from paradigms. It also has much less specificity than a theory or a model, both of which are organized propositions that relate the concepts that are found in a paradigm. In this regard, Kuhn emphasized, a paradigm does not provide answers; it is not knowledge itself. Instead, it holds out the promise of answers, pointing the way to knowledge by providing "a criterion for choosing problems that, while the paradigm is taken for granted, can be assumed to have solutions."<sup>11</sup>

When the paradigm is not taken for granted, however, when there is a growing sense that existing institutions no longer are adequate to meet the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created, then there occurs what Kuhn has called a paradigm shift. Major shifts of the Copernican, Newtonian and Einsteinian variety come about because of a profound awareness of anomaly which has lasted so long and penetrated so deeply that "a state of growing crisis" is created.<sup>12</sup> Ptolemaic astronomy, for example, was in a scandalous state long before Copernicus appeared. When that paradigm was first developed during the last two centuries before Christ, it was extremely successful in predicting the changing positions of planets and stars. But predictions under the Ptolemaic system never quite conformed with the best available observations. Solutions to these relatively minor discrepancies were sought over the centuries by Ptolemy's successors. By the early 16th century, an increasing number of astronomers recognized that the old system was not sufficient--a recognition of a growing crisis state that was a prerequisite to the rejection by Copernicus of the Ptolemaic paradigm and his search for a new one.<sup>13</sup>

Major shifts such as this are difficult. So long as the tools provided by a paradigm are capable of solving the problems it defines, those tools will continue to be used. Just as it is in manufacturing, Kuhn pointed out, "retooling is an extravagance to be reserved for the occasion that demanded it. The significance of crises is the indication they provide that an occasion for retooling has arrived."<sup>14</sup> Such an occasion arrived in Europe in the 17th century at the end of the Thirty Years War. A sense of crisis had been growing for centuries concerning the hierarchical, universalist, medieval paradigm of international relations, as emerging dynastic states began to exercise the rudiments of national sovereignty.<sup>15</sup> The destructive chaos of the Thirty Years War provided the culminating catalyst for the shift at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648 to an anarchic, state-centric,

realist paradigm that has dominated approaches to change and continuity in international relations ever since.<sup>16</sup>

A similar sense of crisis with the realist, "Westphalian" paradigm has been evolving in the intervening years, particularly in this century of total wars which has given new urgency to the need for the management of power. Efforts to meet that need have been tied inextricably with the attempts by the United States to define its international role in the wake of both world wars. The current post-cold war transition period, which began some time in the penultimate decade of the 20th century, is no exception. As a result, the United States faces the same question posed with negative results after 1918 and left unanswered after 1945 because of the cold war: Should this transition period be the occasion described by Kuhn for retooling? Is it time, in other words, for a major shift from the realist, state-centric paradigm of international relations?

The purpose of this study is to provide a general answer to this question. The first step is to describe the realist paradigm and trace its evolution through major post-war transition periods in European and world history up through the brief transition after World War II for the United States. The cold war, which influenced that post-1945 transition period, is the key to the assessment. For it is this twilight struggle's domination of the American national consciousness for over four decades that will determine ultimately the U.S. approach to world politics and the realist paradigm in the current transition period.

It is here that Kuhn offers additional conceptual help by pointing out that lesser, multiple paradigms can cause or inhibit shifts from one dominant paradigm to another.<sup>17</sup> As a second step, this study will create two such lesser paradigms for viewing the U.S. experience in the cold war. They are frameworks that George Orwell would appreciate. One is that of a "long peace"; the other that of a "long war." Together, these two perspectives of America's recent past form the basis for analysis concerning the question, in this third major transition period for the nation in the 20th century, of change and continuity in the larger realist paradigm of international affairs.

## CHAPTER 2

### THE ENDURING PARADIGM

We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal, and those interests it is our duty to follow.

Lord Palmerston, 1848<sup>18</sup>

In 1648, Pope Innocent X stated that the Peace of Westphalia was "null, void, invalid, unjust, damnable, reprobate, inane, empty of meaning and effect for all time."<sup>19</sup> It was an understandable reaction to a treaty which not only confirmed the Lutheran schism in central Europe, but significantly reduced the political authority of the Pope and the Holy Roman Emperor. In place of the centralized, hierarchical universalism embodied in those two great symbols of Christian unity, the Westphalian peace provided legitimacy to the concepts of sovereignty and dynastic authority, thus creating a framework for a paradigm that would sustain Europe's political fragmentation. Conversely, the peace withdrew legitimacy from the medieval structure as well as any other mode of centralized control to include all forms of hegemony.

In this way, Westphalia sanctified centrifugal forces in Europe that resulted in both an anarchial international system of sovereign states and the internal consolidation of those units. The approach represented a western political tradition going back to Thucydides' Melian dialogue in which the Athenians contended "that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."<sup>20</sup> The tradition was renourished with the birth of the modern state system in Western Europe in 1648. That state-centric, "realist" paradigm has generally dominated efforts to conceptualize and theorize about world politics and the management of power ever since.

Power is the key to the three fundamental assumptions of the paradigm. To begin with, nation-states are the basic actors that account for behavior in international relations--in Hans Morgenthau's words, "the ultimate point of reference of . . . foreign policy," since they alone are sovereign and can thus marshal the necessary power for interactions in global politics.<sup>21</sup> Second, political life is divided into "domestic" and "international" arenas, each one subject to its own laws. On the domestic side, only the government has sufficient power to regulate the activities of all other societal entities in order to maintain order and stability. In the international arena, there is no such leviathan, and anarchy reigns.

The final assumption rests on the previous two. Because of anarchy in the international system, each state must maintain or increase its power or succumb. "The Realist," Robert Osgood has pointed out in this regard, "because he is skeptical of the



ability of nations to transcend their self-interest, sees the struggle for national power as the distinguishing characteristic of international relations."<sup>22</sup> Or as Cicero asked in an earlier age: "What can be done against force without force?"<sup>23</sup>

The question was not immediately addressed after 1648. The norms of the old hierarchical, centralized paradigm had been destroyed. The conceptual framework of the new paradigm did not appear to require international attempts at management of power. As a result, war was only proscribed in terms of changing the 1648 settlement. And in fact the negotiations at Westphalia were more concerned with the past than with the future, producing a static balance that did not foresee the rise of Louis XIV, the expansion of the European state system into the conflict for colonies, the sudden decline of Sweden, and the rise of Russia and Prussia. These and even more pronounced changes in the ensuing centuries, particularly in terms of the nature of war, would begin a process, reflected in the pattern of post-war settlements over the years, that increasingly focused on the management of power while concomitantly bringing some of the underlying assumptions of the realist paradigm into question.

#### **1713 and 1815.**

The War of the Spanish Succession marked the last bid by Louis XIV for hegemony in the late 17th and early 18th centuries. After that long and exhausting conflict, the Utrecht settlements of 1713-15 were designed primarily to resolve the issue of hegemony by excluding both the French Bourbons and the Austrian Hapsburgs from the Spanish dynasty. This meant, in turn, that some type of decentralized balance of power, instead of some form of centralized hierarchical control, would continue to dominate as the system for managing power. At the same time, however, this exclusion also set a precedence for a nascent centralizing tendency of the powers acting in concert to determine the dynastic issues of each state--a tendency confirmed in the recognition by the Utrecht settlements of Frederick William, Elector of Brandenburg, as King of Prussia. Equally important, this precedence was established further at Utrecht in the so-called "British Plan" to move beyond the unilateral intervention device initiated at Westphalia to one that incorporated the general idea of a community of powers as a means of settlement enforcement.<sup>24</sup>

All that notwithstanding, the Utrecht settlements were essentially mired in the past, solving a problem posed by France and Spain, but failing to address fully the more fundamental problems associated with the paradigm shift that had left a system of independent states driven by dynastic ambitions. The primary reason was a lack of urgency. Warfare simply did not require a more centralized control of power. And in fact, because of the limited nature of conflict between Westphalia and Utrecht, war was generally perceived as a practical instrument of policy.

In the post-Utrecht era of the 18th century, warfare became even more circumscribed, involving carefully modulated maneuvers for incremental gains--all in accordance with the balance and elegance of the Age of Reason, as well as the desire not to damage costly professional forces. This restraint, in marked contrast to the conduct of the Thirty Years War, also extended to the civilians, who were increasingly isolated from campaigns in keeping with Frederick the Great's ideal that they should not even be aware at the time of conflict that a state of war existed. An important consequence of all this was that even if they were not always satisfied with their own position in the state system created in 1648 and reconfirmed in the Utrecht settlements, the aristocrats and dynasts who comprised the major 18th century leadership in Europe were content with the system itself. As a result, the great powers in that era developed very little capacity to act together in terms of managing power, with the exception of the Polish partitions which were perceived, at least by Frederick the Great, as a concerted great power plan to secure the peace of Europe. For these leaders, the international anarchy implicit in the realist paradigm was barely perceptible in the classical balance of power age.<sup>25</sup>

All that changed in the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars with the creation of French national armies, which grew ever larger and more unconstrained in response to the public passions and perceptions of the nation in danger. These larger standing forces could not subsist on French territory and increasingly were assigned abroad as the wars continued, their maintenance borne by the occupied states. As a consequence, means began to dictate ends--the obverse of strategy--with France acting less because of defined interests and more in terms of what was possible. The careful calculation of means and ends that had marked the period after the Utrecht settlements thus gave way to almost continual conflict, much of it often without any apparent objective other than that of enriching France.<sup>26</sup>

By 1814 the allies managed to form a permanent coalition against Napoleon, but only after 22 years of incessant warfare and revolutionary upheaval, recurrent assaults on the principles of dynastic legitimacy, unparalleled casualties and destruction, and enormous economic strains on all states. Even then it took herculean efforts on the part of Clemens von Metternich, the Chancellor of the Austrian Empire, and Robert Castlereagh, the Foreign Minister of Great Britain, before the Treaty of Chaumont was signed in March of that year, stipulating that the alliance was to continue in effect for 20 years and providing mutual guarantees against possible French attempts to undo the forthcoming peace treaty. There was no question that Chaumont was not designed for general enforcement of the peace. Nevertheless, the move back toward centralization of power within the overall realist paradigm was unmistakable, particularly when the allied leaders declared publicly after signing the wartime treaty that "they did not come to the conference as mere envoys of the four

courts, . . . but as men entitled to treat for Peace with France in the name of Europe, which is but a single entity."<sup>27</sup>

This great power role was further elaborated in June 1815 at the First Peace of Paris which called for the Vienna Congress to establish "the relations from whence a system of real and permanent balance of power in Europe is to be derived, [and] shall be regulated at the Congress upon the principles determined. . . by the Allied Powers amongst themselves."<sup>28</sup> Those principles evolved the following November in the Quadruple Alliance which created a league to enforce the peace against France. Once again like Chaumont, however, the great powers did not devise a system to govern Europe or to resolve general conflict. There was no formal mechanism for collective action and enforcement. Such action would emerge only through negotiations based on consensus by all five powers. But the alliance did incorporate Castlereagh's idea of a permanent mechanism for monitoring compliance with the peace settlement, by holding periodic great power meetings "for the consideration of the measures which shall be considered the most salutary for the repose and prosperity of nations and for the maintenance of peace in Europe."<sup>29</sup>

"Repose" was the operative word for the great powers during this transition. There was general agreement among them that the revolutionary social system spawned by the French Revolution had caused war and that conversely war had itself created conditions of social dissolution. As a consequence, they concluded that if war could be prevented, social change could be regulated. To this end, each of the great powers exercised restraint within the system they created and at least occasionally subordinated their national interests to the European context of order and prevention of conflict. "Politics is the science of the vital interests of States, in its widest meaning," Metternich wrote in this regard.

Since, however, an isolated State no longer exists. . .  
.we must always view the Society of States as the  
essential condition of the modern world. The great  
axioms of political science proceed from the knowledge  
of the true political interests of all states; it is  
upon these general interests that rests the guarantee  
of their existence. The establishing of international  
relations on the basis of reciprocity under the  
guarantee of respect for acquired rights. . .  
.constitutes in our time the essence of politics.<sup>30</sup>

This ostensible change in the realist paradigm of international relations was actually based on continuity, since it created a static formula for enforcing the peace in a static world. But because that world could not be restored, the formula for peace enforcement had to change; and this in turn threatened to lead to a shift in the overall realist paradigm that Great Britain and many lesser powers could not accept. Castlereagh held

to the traditional concept of a *casus foederis*, arguing throughout the series of allied congresses after the Vienna settlements that great power action could only be in response to an overriding external danger. The Quadruple Alliance, he argued in 1820, was never intended "as a union for the Government of the World, or for the Superintendence of the Internal Affairs of other states. . . ."

The principle of a state interfering by force in the internal affairs of another. . . is always a question of the greatest possible. . . political delicacy. . . . [To] generalize such a principle and to think of reducing it to a System, or to impose it as an obligation, is a Scheme utterly impractical and objectionable.<sup>31</sup>

For Metterich and the other continental leaders, the cause for intervention was any revolution anywhere--joint action, in other words, before a disturbance could take an externally aggressive form. Their "crucial battle," Henry Kissinger has pointed out, "was the first not the last; their effort was to prevent an overriding danger from materializing."<sup>32</sup> All this culminated in the November 19, 1820 Troppau Protocol which, over Britain's objection, stipulated that any revolution that threatened Europe's tranquility would be dealt with by either individual or collective action. Britain had agreed to the original concept of the concert which had required some modification of the realist paradigm in order to provide some measure of security for individual states. But the Troppau Protocol proposed to accomplish this by violating national sovereignty, the fundamental foundation for domestic security in the state-centric Westphalian paradigm, not so much to preserve the peace, but to save a narrow class-defined system of order.

## 1919.

The Concert of Europe began to erode almost from its inception. To begin with, there was the partial isolation of Great Britain which remained unwilling to endorse a policy of great power intervention in the internal affairs of European nations. In addition, new ideological divisions began to break up the moderate conservatism of 1815. In 1830, revolution transformed France from the reactionary monarchy of Charles X to a liberal state on its way to the bourgeois triumph of Louis Phillipe. In Britain, the catalyst was the 1832 Great Reform Act which brought the middle class centrally into British politics. The result was an increasing dichotomy of liberal Great Britain and France and the more conservative trio of Russia, Prussia and Austria--an alignment reinforced by the developing West-East pattern of the Industrial Revolution. Finally, the 1848 revolutions demonstrated that war did not automatically occur from such upheavals and that in fact, as the next two decades were to prove, military force could stave off revolutions and war

could actually protect unreformed domestic institutions.<sup>33</sup>

In any event, the concert clearly was in operation until the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1854. And even after that conflict and through the smaller wars of 1859, 1866 and 1870, the great powers continued to exercise some of the restraint established at Vienna and embodied in the 19th protocol of the 1831 conference on the Belgian issue which stated that "*chaque nation a ses droits particuliers; mais l'Europe aussi a son droit.*"<sup>34</sup> As the century wore on, however, fewer and fewer observers attributed the relative peace to the European Concert as a device for managing international relations. Instead, the "long peace" was generally perceived as a result of "progress," the growth of civilization embodied in almost continuous advances in industry, commerce and science. Despite the more pessimistic outlook of those who decried the growth of materialism and decline of morality, most people took social, political and aesthetic progress as self-evident concomitants to those advances.<sup>35</sup>

Equally important, these trends had a major effect on general attitudes toward war. There were, to be sure, popular anti-war activists like Baroness Bertha von Suttner. Her 1899 novel, *Die Waffen Nieder*, describing an Austrian woman's revulsion against war after the death of her husband in the 1859 Franco-Austrian War, was printed in 37 editions in over a dozen languages. And there was Norman Angell's bestselling *The Great Illusion* (1910), which argued that war was irrational on economic grounds since the destructiveness of war was incompatible with commerce and would thus bring modern industrial nations to ruin. But there were many who agreed with one critic's characterization of von Suttner as "a gentle perfume of absurdity."<sup>36</sup> Moreover, there were those who either agreed with or would bear out George Bernard Shaw's observations in *Major Barbara*. "Well, the more destructive war becomes," a Latin teacher asks an arms manufacturer in that 1905 play, "the sooner it will be abolished, eh?" "Not at all," the arms maker replies. "The more destructive war becomes, the more fascinating we find it."<sup>37</sup>

In any event, in the years prior to World War I, there was the general expectation that any future great power conflict would be, in Michael Howard's description, "brief--no longer, certainly, than the war of 1870 that was consciously or unconsciously taken by that generation as a model."<sup>38</sup> That expectation was reflected in the evolution of offensive military doctrines on the part of most great powers prior to 1914 as well as in the general perception that protracted conflict would lead to economic collapse--the latter demonstrated in Andrew Carnegie's confident assertion that if war should occur, "we won't give them any money."<sup>39</sup> In addition, as the long period of relative tranquility passed into the 20th century, there was an increased tendency to see peace as decadent, corrupt and materialistic with war--noble, uplifting, and glorious--as the only anodyne. "How I long for the great war!" Hilaire Belloc commented. "It will sweep Europe like a broom."<sup>40</sup> Warfare had

thus come to be considered prior to 1914 almost universally as an acceptable and for many people an inevitable if not a desirable way of settling international differences. "The plain truth," William James observed, "is that people want war."<sup>41</sup>

The result of all this was that in the closing decades of the "long peace," there were few vestiges left of the urgency felt by the statesmen at Vienna to centralize the management of power within the realist paradigm. War, the result of the fundamental international condition of anarchy in that paradigm, generally was no longer perceived as a major systemic problem. As a consequence, the management of power increasingly devolved into a decentralized balance of power system with results far removed from the clocklike regularity that governed the limited conflicts of the 18th century. By 1914, Europe was literally divided into two armed camps with a balance that not only failed to prevent war, but actually formented it. "The alliances were neither strong nor credible enough to face down resolute action by the adversary," one analyst has pointed out; "they were just strong enough to drag reluctant participants into military conflict. Instead of deterring war *ex ante*, they actually brought it on *ex post*."<sup>42</sup>

And when that war came, it was a horrific surprise for all participants, washing away the previous misconceptions in a tide of blood, leaving an indelible mark across an entire generation. The reaction of that generation was captured by the protagonist in *Tender is the Night* when he revisits the Somme battlefield after the war. "This western-front business couldn't be done again," he explains, "not for a long time."

The young men think they could do it but they couldn't. . . . This took religion and years of plenty and tremendous sureties and the exact relation that existed between the classes. . . . You had to have a whole-souled sentimental equipment going back further than you could remember. You had to remember Christmas, and postcards of the Crown Prince and his fiancée, and little cafes in Valence and beer gardens in Unter den Linden and weddings at the mairie, and going to the Derby, and your grandfather's whiskers. . . . This kind of battle was invented by Lewis Carroll and Jules Verne and whoever wrote *Undine*, and country deacons bowling and marraines in Marseilles and girls seduced in the back lanes of Wurtemberg and Westphalia. Why, this was a love battle--there was a century of middle-class love spent here. This was the last love battle.<sup>43</sup>

The reaction of Woodrow Wilson to the Great War was no less emphatic. He had brought a traditionally isolationist United States into World War I by representing it as a great crusade, as a means to create a better world. And when that conflict ended, he continued the crusade with a vision for a new system of managing power. That vision was a reaction to the balance-of-

power system, "that old and evil order" with its "ugly plan. . .of alliances, of watchful jealousies, of rabid antagonisms," which Wilson perceived as the primary cause of the war. Ultimately, that war had to be fought to "do away with the old order and to establish a new one, . . .the center and characteristic of the old order [being] that unstable thing we used to call the 'balance of power'."<sup>44</sup>

The new system was collective security. In its pure form, what Inis Claude calls ideal collective security, it is a system for managing power that requires the participation of every state in the world under a legally binding and codified commitment on the part of these states to respond to aggression anytime and anywhere it might occur.

The scheme is collective in the fullest sense; it purports to provide security for all states by the action of all states, against all states which might challenge the existing order by the arbitrary unleashing of their power. . . .Ideal collective security. . .offer[s] the certainty, backed by legal obligation, that any aggressor would be confronted with collective sanctions.<sup>45</sup>

The new approach, like that of the concert, still had attributes that could be explained using the assumptions of the realist paradigm.<sup>46</sup> Collective security was, after all, a state-centric system for managing power, focused as it was on using states as principal actors to preserve state sovereignty. And the methods for that preservation certainly did not shrink from the application of force. Under Wilsonian collective security, peace would not be based upon a precarious, unstable equilibrium with its minimal capacity for deterrence, but upon an overwhelming preponderance of power automatically and universally applied by a central organization, the League of Nations, against any aggressor nation. "Mere agreements will not make peace secure," Wilson emphasized.

It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created. . .so much greater than the force of any nation now engaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations, could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.<sup>47</sup>

Despite all this, the full implementation of Wilsonian collective security required a shift from the realist paradigm in order to be accepted and thus fulfill the traditional claim in such a shift of solving the problems that had led the old paradigm to crisis. For while it was true that collective security continued to focus on a world of nation-states, those states in the Wilsonian paradigm had to be democracies founded on the principle of nationality if the new world order was to work.

In this regard, Wilson represented a new early 20th century belief in the linkage of authoritarianism within a nation with aggressive behavior towards other states. Moreover, this was explicitly linked to his perception of the uniqueness of the American political experience. For Wilson, there was a thin line between domestic reform in the shape of the American progressive tradition and foreign policy. And this in turn was linked to what he perceived as a unique historical mission with Americans acting as the "custodians of the spirit of righteousness, of the spirit of even-handed justice, of the spirit of hope which believes in the perfectibility of the law and the perfectibility of human life itself."<sup>48</sup>

Equally fundamental to the paradigm shift were the principles of automaticity and universality involved in the application of power against any transgressing state and guaranteed by universal treaty obligation to enforce peace regardless of whether it was in any individual state's immediate interest or not. Only in the new paradigm could Wilson's linkage of domestic law enforcement to a system for managing power in the international arena be understood. For unless states were required to act collectively on legal principles and not on self-interests in a specific case, and unless neutrality was forbidden in the face of aggression, the new concept would not add anything significant to the traditional collective defense of alliances and balance of power and thus would not require a paradigm shift in order to be accepted. This problem, fundamental to any such shift, was captured by Charles Darwin the previous century in *Origins of Species*. "Although I am fully convinced of the truths of the views given in this volume. . .," he wrote, "I by no means expect to convince experienced naturalists whose minds are stocked with a multitude of facts all viewed, during a long course of years, from a point of view directly opposite to mine."<sup>49</sup>

And so it was in the debates over a new world order in the post-World War I transition period. Viewed through the prism of the realist paradigm, the Wilsonian proposals for that order were a series of contradictions. Nations would renege on the automaticity in the system because the idea of "no more war," which was the animating motive for constructing the system, was in tension with the "no more aggression" imperative necessary for the system to function when challenged. The former reflected abhorrence of war, but the latter called for going to war even if short-term self-interest ruled against it. But even if the system could overcome that basic tension, there was no comfort without a paradigmatic shift. "By the very logic of its assumptions," Hans Morgenthau has pointed out in this regard, "the diplomacy of collective security must aim at transforming all local conflicts into world conflicts. . .since peace is supposed to be indivisible. . . Thus a device intent on making war impossible ends by making war universal."<sup>50</sup>

Negotiations based on different conceptual frameworks



produced increasingly acrimonious proceedings. "I offer my apologies to the memory of Attila and his congeners," Georges Clemenceau concluded in disgust as the Versailles discussions dragged on, "but the art of arranging how men are to live is even more complex than that of massacring them."<sup>51</sup> Opponents in the United States argued that the League, in contravention of the American tradition of avoiding entangling alliances, was in fact such an alliance, whose charter contained "clauses which threatened the very existence of the United States as an independent power."<sup>52</sup> Moreover, it was argued, the system tended to preserve the status quo regardless of merit. To attempt to freeze for all time the distribution of power and territory, Elihu Root pointed out, "would not only be futile; it would be mischievous."<sup>53</sup> Wilson, however, would not consider reservations that he believed might mutilate Article X of the League Covenant, with its commitment "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League."<sup>54</sup>

The result was an impasse that Wilson attempted to circumvent by appealing directly to the American people. The key to the success of a new international order, he repeatedly stressed, was America's role as a leader of nations. As a consequence, he had made this leadership a key condition for U.S. participation in the global system just as he was making American involvement in international politics conditional upon the reformation of the system. If the United States did not accept the responsibility thrust upon it by historical events, he warned, there would occur an even more terrible conflict than World War I. In this regard, as Wilson biographer Arthur Link has pointed out, Wilson represented a higher realism, "higher because more perceptive, more in accord with ultimate reality."<sup>55</sup>

That reality included the recognition that while the United States could not ignore a leadership role in the new international order, that role had to be based on values that would continue to claim American allegiance. But to undertake that role alone, as Wilson well realized, would transform the very nature of American society. The alternative to the League for American security in an increasingly interdependent world, he reminded the public, would be a garrison state requiring the United States "to have the biggest army in the world."

There will have to be universal conscription. There will have to be taxes such as even yet we have not seen. There will have to be a concentration of authority in the Government capable of using this terrible instrument. . . . You will have to have a staff like the German staff, and you will have to center in the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy the right to take instant action for the protection of the nation.<sup>56</sup>

In essence, from Wilson's perspective, very little was being

asked of the American people except a leap of faith that he had already made in terms of the League's efficacy. In return for that faith, he emphasized throughout his whistle-stop tour of the country, America would not only escape a dismal future, but be assured of political and economic global advantage. In any event, U.S. forces would not be required for every case of collective action under the League. "If you want to put out a fire in Utah," the President concluded one speech, "you do not send to Oklahoma for the fire engine."<sup>57</sup>

This was hardly a clarion call to sacrifice. In the end, Wilson did not fail, as frequently maintained, because he demanded too much from the American people. He failed despite asking so little of them while holding out the promise of so much. Ultimately that failure had to do with the difficulties in making a fundamental shift in the realist paradigm during the euphoria of a victorious post-war transition period. In the wake of World War I, there was the demand by industry and agriculture to end wartime controls matched by the widespread popular desire to cut the budget and reduce taxes. The Republican Party won the 1920 election by promising to fulfill those expectations. As a consequence, the new administration accelerated the pace of industrial demobilization and laid the foundation for large budget cuts, particularly those in defense, facilitated for the most part by a massive naval disarmament program. Those cuts led to a peace dividend, which Secretary of the Treasury Andrew Mellon promptly provided to the American people in the form of lower taxes.

This return to what Warren Harding termed "normalcy" proved to be extremely popular. But ultimately it deprived the United States of the means required to deal with many of the key international issues in the post-war era. To begin with, the government lacked the military power to take a role in the enforcement of the peace treaty. Moreover, "normalcy" meant that the United States would not forgive Allied war debts owed to America, which in turn caused difficulties for those nations in terms of reducing German reparations. At the same time, financial retrenchment meant that there would be no major American role in reconstructing the European economy.

The result was that the United States emerged from a transition period that was supposed to have led to a new world order without committing its power either to the achievement of that order or to the effective maintenance of the status quo. That neither objective was considered an urgent matter as America returned to "normalcy" was demonstrated in President Coolidge's 1926 State of the Union Address:

The American people are altogether lacking in an appreciation of the tremendous good fortune that surrounds their international position. We have no traditional enemies. We are not embarrassed over any disputed territory. We have no possessions that are

coveted by others; they have none that are coveted by us. Our borders are unfortified. We fear no one; no one fears us.<sup>58</sup>

## 1945.

The League of Nations failed because the preconditions for that organization's effectiveness to manage power were destroyed in the interwar period. It was absolutely essential, for example, that war prevention be the goal of all the great powers, dominant over any one's sectarian national interests. But Italy in the 1920s and Germany and Japan in the 1930s undermined the dominance of that goal. In addition, just as it had been with the Concert of Europe, there could be no breakdown into ideological conflicts between the great powers in the League if a return to the fully decentralized balance-of-power system was to be avoided. But the economic crises made many of the liberal governments of the 1920s vulnerable to fascism, socialism and communism. Communism, in particular, caused not only an ideological rift between Russia and both Britain and France, but also a belief in the West that an anti-Soviet stance was common grounds for cooperation with National Socialist Germany.

Ultimately, as the European Concert had demonstrated, it was also crucial that no great power return to isolation. The absence of the United States meant that the League was still-born, since only strong international leadership by all great powers could have made effective the threat in the League Covenant concerning the application of preponderant power. The withdrawal of America into isolation and then neutrality did much to dissipate the international consensus for more centralized management of power that had been forged in reaction to the first total war in the modern industrial age. The result was the familiar, dismal litany of diplomatic events in the interwar years which ushered in the second half of what Winston Churchill called this century's Thirty Years War.

Early in World War II, much as President Wilson had done throughout the previous conflict, President Roosevelt turned his attention to the management of power in a post-war period. Originally, Roosevelt had justified U.S. participation in the war in idealistic, reformist terms. The Atlantic Charter, for instance, was written in a context redolent of Wilson's Fourteen Points. Nevertheless, there was an underlying realism to Roosevelt's approach that was firmly anchored in the Westphalian paradigm: his idea of forming a great power condominium to bring order out of international anarchy. The so-called "Four Policemen"--the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and China--would have the responsibility, as the President described it, to "impose order on the rest of the post-war world, bombing anyone who would not go along."<sup>59</sup>

By the time the San Francisco conference convened in 1945 to

establish the United Nations, however, there was also a growing recognition of the need to address the basic problem of great power aggression and antagonism, the major cause of the recently ended cataclysm. The result was the veto power given to the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council--a vital move from the realist perspective. For that decision was made not in the idealistic belief that the great powers would continue to live in peace and that the veto would never be used, but with the expectation that there would be occasions on which it would be used to avoid great power confrontation. That the final result was less than the ideal vision was best expressed by the Mexican delegate, who noted that the conference was "engaged in establishing a world order in which the mice could be stamped out but in which the lions would not be restrained."<sup>60</sup>

For the United States, these adjustments within the realist paradigm were no greater than the powers at Vienna had made in terms of the Concert of Europe. The veto provision ensured that America retained the same freedom of action (or inaction) in matters of collective enforcement on which it had insisted in the past. As a consequence, there was no repetition in the 1945 Senate of the fight that had been waged there in 1919 over the approval of an earlier charter. In joining the United Nations, there was no assumption that the United States had compromised its freedom to determine under which circumstances it would employ American power.<sup>61</sup>

And that power as well as material wealth was enormous in 1945 in absolute and relative terms. The United States possessed two-thirds of the world's gold reserve; and its GNP had increased by more than half since 1939 in a period when all other industrial economies were in ruins. In addition, there was America's global prestige bolstered by armed forces deployed in Asia and Europe as well as by atomic monopoly. All in all, it was truly an extraordinary global situation. "Of the great men at the top," A. J. P. Taylor once noted, "Roosevelt was the only one who knew what he was doing; he made the United States the greatest power in the world at virtually no cost."<sup>62</sup>

Power notwithstanding, the transition period began much like that after World War I with the Republican Party, ascendent in the 1946 Congress, voicing a general public demand for industrial and military demobilization. As a result there was a dramatic cutback in both economic controls and the military establishment, which in turn led to arguments over how to spend the second peace dividend of the century. These arguments were resolved by congressional approval of a major Republican tax cut that capped domestic spending and forced even deeper cuts in an already modest defense budget. Almost unheeded was the concern of the Council of Economic Advisors that "a drastic reduction in public outlays plus the rapid demobilization of our armed forces, would lead to heavy unemployment and business dislocation for a substantial period of time."<sup>63</sup>

The domestic background only highlighted the extraordinary decision by the United States in the post-1945 transition period to set aside the long and hallowed tradition defined by Washington in his farewell address and accept the responsibilities rejected after 1918. That decision, in fact, came about almost external to American politics and economics, as the government responded to the increasing Soviet threat by filling the power vacuums created by World War II with economic and military commitments.<sup>64</sup> The result was what Stanley Hoffmann has called "America's quasi-Immaculate Conception as a world leader."<sup>65</sup> Most great powers had "risen through the ranks" by means of long apprenticeships of international involvement and conflict. America, on the other hand, turned to world involvement in the second transition period with all the notions, habits and practices developed during a national existence focused on separation from that world. Unlike Great Britain or the Soviet Union, the United States became a global superpower almost without training and preparation.

All this had important consequences. There was, for instance, the natural inexperience of the tiny group of American foreign policy and governmental elites. The world, contrary to American belief, was not a *tabula rasa*; it was the United States in terms of world involvement that was almost a *tabula rasa*. Moreover, within these elites, there was a general feeling that there must be no repetition of the interwar years' behavior. As a result, there was an exhilarating sense of purpose that pervaded the writings and actions of the so-called "Wise Men" and the growing American "establishment"--a focus on global activism to make up for the passivity of the past. And what better way to compensate for the previous lack of understanding concerning a great nation's need for power than for that establishment to turn to the realist paradigm with a will. Having deserted the world in 1919 and having failed it in the 1930s, these elites were ready to combine a world role with adequate power and the will to use it.<sup>66</sup>

That power, the American establishment quickly came to realize, must be focused on the Soviet Union--a fact recognized by George Kennan and incorporated in his strategic vision through the realist prism for the management of power. Beginning with his famous "long telegram" to the State Department from his Moscow post in 1946 and continuing in the next year with speeches and articles, Kennan outlined a vision squarely focused on the Soviet threat. That threat was not going to go away, he emphasized, because Soviet legitimacy was based on the fiction of an external American menace. As a consequence, the United States must give up idealistic visions such as making the world safe for democracy. Instead, American efforts should be focused on creating a balance-of-power world in order to contain Soviet expansionism until such time as citizens throughout the USSR insisted on major domestic reforms, thus moderating Soviet foreign policy. "The United States has in its power," he elaborated in 1947,

to increase enormously the strains under which Soviet policy must operate, to force upon the Kremlin a far greater degree of moderation and circumspection than it has had to observe in recent years, and in this way to promote tendencies which must eventually find their outlet in either the breakup or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power.<sup>67</sup>

Despite the clarity of this approach within the realist paradigm, the suddenness of U.S. involvement in world affairs, as the domestic fight over the peace dividend indicated, would also require the sense of mission that was firmly rooted in the national ethos with linkage from Jefferson through Wilson to a purveyor of the "American Century" like Henry Luce. "Because America alone among the nations of the earth was founded on ideas which transcend class and caste and racial and occupational differences," Luce wrote in 1942, "America alone can provide the pattern for the future."<sup>68</sup> After 1945, reformist impulse dominated the imperative to preserve the United States from European "contamination," precisely because the latter had prevailed in the first transition and the decades after with such poor results. As a consequence, American enthusiasm in the second transition was incorporated into a vision for the world with origins not in intellectual dogma, as was the case with Marxist-Leninism, but in an idealized conception of the American national experience--a combination of political and moral beliefs.<sup>69</sup>

With this moralism and glorified history came an enormous self-confidence that allowed Americans to see in the sudden acquisition of great power both a reward for the virtues of their national beliefs and purpose and a tool for spreading those virtues. This perception marked a major difference between the two transition periods. During the first period, the United States became a key player because of involvement in a conflict viewed as resulting from the sordid and squalid intrigues of cabinet diplomacy. The second transition, on the other hand, simply became with very little letup a continuation of the American response to one ideological Leviathan, represented by the Fascist repudiation of the Enlightenment, with the response to another, also in the totalitarian mold, the Communist heresy. The result was adoption by the Truman administration of Kennan's sweeping realist vision of world order combined with an equally sweeping vision of a world free from aggression, in which free people could determine their own destinies with the help of the United States. "I believe," President Truman declared in the March 1947 doctrine named for him, "that it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation. . . .I believe that we must assist free people to work out their own destinies in their own way."<sup>70</sup>

This apparent open-ended commitment of ends would not be matched by military means until the Korean conflict, long after the cold war had begun. But the adoption of Kennan's strategic vision concerning the Soviet threat was the turning point.

Because that threat became apparent so rapidly to governmental elites and the American people, there really was very little time for transition before the United States embarked on the cold war. The goal of containment enshrined rhetorically in the Truman Doctrine was reaffirmed by November 1948 in NSC 20/4 as the overall national security objective, concluding that "Soviet domination of the potential power of Eurasia, whether achieved by armed aggression or by political and subversive means, would be strategically and politically unacceptable to the United States."<sup>71</sup> Most important, because that threat was to endure for over 40 years with varying degrees of intensity, global management of power was frozen in a bipolar configuration of that most fundamental concept of management systems in the realist paradigm: balance of power.

## CHAPTER 3

### THE SUBORDINATE PARADIGMS

Men and women a century from now will very likely find the Cold War as obscure and incomprehensible as we today find the Thirty Years War. . . .

Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.<sup>72</sup>

The very word "war" has become misleading. It would probably be more accurate to say that by becoming continuous, war has ceased to exist.

George Orwell, 1984

In 1947, like 1917 or 1940-41, the United States made a decision to go to war because it was not in America's interest to have Europe come under the domination of a single hostile power. No one could anticipate how long that conflict would last; but most agreed with the author of containment that an early denouement in the nuclear era was neither likely nor desirable. "I would rather wait thirty years for a defeat of the Kremlin brought about by the tortuous and exasperatingly slow devices of diplomacy," Kennan wrote in 1949, "than to see us submit to the test of arms a difference so little susceptible to any clear and happy settlement by those means."<sup>73</sup> The result was a long drawn-out twilight conflict in which a succession of U.S. cold war administrations experimented with ways and means to achieve the overall national security objective-- experimentation that rendered the containment process less efficient than it might have been. Nevertheless, that process was ultimately successful. "The post-Cold War world resembles what the 'wise men' hoped the world after 1945 would be," John Lewis Gaddis concluded in this regard. "Containment was a long detour, but it did not, in the end, prevent arrival at the intended destination."<sup>74</sup>

In looking back over the years consumed by that detour, analysts have tended generally to view the cold war in two different ways. McGeorge Bundy, not surprisingly, saw it as a wartime era of danger and survival.<sup>75</sup> And Arthur Schlesinger has called it "this curious episode in modern history, . . . a long, costly, dark, dreary, and dangerous affair," in which an old fashioned geopolitical rivalry grew "into a holy war so intense and obsessive as to threaten the very existence of human life on the planet."<sup>76</sup> On the other hand, there is another group that views the cold war as a time of protracted stability. "The period since 1945," one such proponent concluded, "arguably represents the longest period of great-power peace since the birth of the modern world system. . . ."<sup>77</sup>

Long war or long peace? "Change a name," Crane Brinton observed in his seminal work on revolutions, "and you change the thing."<sup>78</sup> The notion of peace, of course, can describe an



enormous range of relationships from complete accord to outright hostility just short of war. For instance, peace was used to describe American relations with both Canada and the Soviet Union, although the two relationships had very little in common. War, on the other hand, can describe hostilities that fall short of actual fighting or that have escalated into all-out total conflict. America and the Soviet Union have never been formally at war, even during the Russian Civil War when the United States intervened with troops in western Russia and Siberia. Nevertheless, each side after 1947 used force, normally through subversion or surrogates, to challenge the other's interests.<sup>79</sup>

Considerations of the cold war as either a "long peace" or a "long war" form two different subordinate paradigms from which to examine and draw lessons for the future effectiveness of the overall realist framework in the post-cold war era. The major question in using these two paradigms concerns the levels of analysis. Certainly, as David Singer noted as early as 1961, this is a key problem in the study of international relations.<sup>80</sup> Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 *Theory of International Politics* focused on the level of the structure of the international system in a study much admired for its parsimonious approach in a field in which analytic variables abound.<sup>81</sup> Some critics complained that this focus on only one level of analysis failed to account for change.<sup>82</sup> Others pointed out that the state and the individual were important levels of analysis that should not be disregarded and that in fact over time could modify systemic structures.<sup>83</sup> In an earlier work, in fact, Waltz examined the causes of war under three analytical headings or images: "within man, within the structure of the separate states, within the state system."<sup>84</sup> These levels of analysis, he pointed out, were fundamentally interrelated.

The partial quality of each image sets up a tension that drives one toward inclusion of the others. With the first image the direction of change. . .is from men to societies and states. The second image catches up both elements. Men make states and states make men; but this is still a limited view. . .for states are shaped by the international environment as are men by both the national and international environments.<sup>85</sup>

This relationship is shown by the arrows in Figure 1.

The figure also illustrates the approach to what is essentially a first cut at examining the impact of the cold war on the United States at these three levels from the perspective of that twilight conflict, first as a "long peace" and then as a "long war." At the first level of "man," the general focus is on the American public, particularly in terms of attitudes toward national security formed during the cold war. At the "state" level, the focus is on the evolution of the structure of the U.S. Government--an evolution affected directly by the cold war and indirectly by the effects of that war in terms of the first




Figure 1. The Subordinate Paradigms.

image, the American public. Finally, there is the "international system" and the implications of that system's transformation during the cold war for the United States and its citizens.

**Man.**

*War and the Use of Force.* For the average American citizen who lived through the cold war, the term "long peace" might seem to stretch the phrase to its semantic limit. Certainly, from the "long war" perspective, the cold war was, in fact, an often violent conflict that endured because of the evolution of two critically and associated rules of international behavior: no use of nuclear weapons anywhere and anytime and no direct U.S.-Soviet

military conflict. The maintenance of these two rules throughout the long twilight war was certainly no mean achievement, although hardly what Kant envisioned in describing perpetual peace.

Those rules, however, were not self-apparent when examined through the prism of the cold war as a "long war." It was all very well for a Bernard Brodie to conclude that regardless of culture or overall military strength, the possession of nuclear weapons rendered impossible the Clausewitzian concept of war as an extension of policy. But unlike earlier military technological breakthroughs, the full consequences of using the atomic bomb became apparent at Hiroshima just when the American people became aware of the new weapon's existence. The invention of the machine gun, for instance, inspired no concomitant vision of the horrific slaughter of the Somme; nor did that of poison gas reflect an appreciation of the effect produced by the first dusty, lethal cloud at Ypres.<sup>86</sup>

The result after 1945 was a general perception of a pervasive threat that was reflected not only in public support of governmental programs such as those dealing with bomb shelters, but in a more lasting form through the popular culture. Movies in the Eisenhower years of massive retaliation, for instance, often were concerned with atomic mutants such as giant ants in "Them" or "The Fifty Foot Woman." And audiences were able to muster at least nervous laughter several years after the Cuban missile crisis in response to Stanley Kubrick's savage film, "Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb," which concludes with the destruction of the world by atomic explosions backed by a sound track of Vera Lynn singing her World War II hit: "We'll meet again, don't know where, don't know when. . . ."<sup>87</sup> That this public perception continued to play an important role in the long war was illustrated by the phenomenal success of the ABC movie, "The Day After," in the 1970s.

Viewed from the paradigm of the "long peace," however, this bipolar culture took on a more optimistic outlook.<sup>88</sup> The basic assumption of containment, after all, was that it is sometimes better to learn to live with adversaries than to attempt to destroy them. Added to this was a perception of how irrationally close the bipolar peace had come to being broken during the crises over Quemoy and Matsu and, more seriously, over the Soviet missiles in Cuba. The result was public support in the last decades of the cold war for arms control negotiations and the establishment of crisis management tools such as the "hot line" between the two superpowers.<sup>89</sup>

There was, as a consequence of all this, a reinforcing effect between the two paradigms in terms of the American public's attitude toward war. Certainly, there was no return to the earlier intellectual approach that equated war with progress. Only Harry Lime, the villainous third man in the film of that title, could be allowed the speech he delivers on the great wheel at the Prater in Vienna, when he advises his friend not to be so

disapproving of his illegal activities:

After all, it's not that awful--you know what the fellow said . . . In Italy for thirty years under the Borgias they had warfare, terror, murder, bloodshed--they produced Michaelangelo, Leonardo da Vinci and the Renaissance. In Switzerland they had brotherly love, five hundred years of democracy and peace, and what did that produce . . .? The cuckoo clock.<sup>90</sup>

Equally important, the paradigms reinforced a general perception concerning what John Mueller has described as the "obsolescence" of great power war. Mueller argued, however, that the near-term effects of the nuclear technology had been confused with a long-term trend toward ending great power conflict, caused in part by the public reaction to two world wars. Nevertheless, when viewed from either paradigm, it is hard to deny that, at the very least, nuclear weapons have reinforced at all three levels of analysis a tendency on the part of the great powers not to fight each other. "These new technologies of war," Carl Kaysen pointed out, "have amplified the message of this century's war experiences by many decibels, and set it firmly in the minds of the wide public as well as those of political and military leaders."<sup>91</sup> How firmly that message has been received was illustrated in 1987 when the entertainer, Michael Feinstein, was performing a series of songs by Irving Berlin in the Oak Room of the Algonquin Hotel in New York City. As he rendered the 1911 hit "Alexander's Ragtime Band," Feinstein stopped on the line that explains the way the band plays a bugle call is "so natural that you want to go to war," struck by the anachronistic sentiment. "It's an old song," he remarked.<sup>92</sup>

There was another important reinforcement between the two paradigms that affected the American public's perception of power and force. In order to maintain a long war in peacetime, there had to be an extended perception of national mobilization. Other great powers in history had mobilized their military and economic resources, while leaving foreign policy generally to the diplomats and soldiers. But only in totalitarian societies have popular energies been mobilized for protracted external actions. The United States took an original approach to the problem. The result, on the one hand, was a kind of mental mobilization that went well beyond the limits of the military and foreign policy experts. On the other hand, much of civilian life was largely untouched by the great struggle abroad.<sup>93</sup>

The exceptions were the limited wars on the periphery in Korea and Vietnam, both of which resulted from the peace in war redundancy of the two paradigms focused on the overall bipolar confrontation at the center. Vietnam taught the American public the limits of military power by demonstrating not so much the cost of committing aggression, as the cost of resisting it. At the same time, the economic rise of Germany and Japan in sharp contrast to the ruinous "guns and butter" efforts of the United

States added to the sophistication of the average American concerning the concept of power. Most important, the Vietnam conflict demonstrated to the public, ironically in America's longest hot war, that struggles on the periphery, just because they could take place without disturbing the "long peace," were not necessary to prosecute the "long war." Credibility, in other words, was no longer sufficient as an interest in itself when the cost in blood and material was so apparent. "To leave Vietnam to its fate," President Johnson vainly pointed out, "would shake the confidence. . . in the value of the American commitment, the value of America's word. The result would be increased unrest and instability, and even wider war."<sup>94</sup>

*National Security and the Global Role.* From a "long war" perspective, the Soviet threat was the basis for a 40-year strategic consensus by the American people, providing the United States, in Ronald Steel's description, "with a global vocation."<sup>95</sup> On the geopolitical side, there was a growing public perception, as Hans Morgenthau pointed out, of a "worldwide balance of which the United States and the Soviet Union are the main weights, placed on opposite scales. . . ." Within that framework, other regions had "become functions of the new worldwide balance, mere 'theaters' where the power context between the two great protagonists is fought out."<sup>96</sup> Ideologically by 1950, the American people were becoming accustomed to the framework of a "long war" waged in a Manichean struggle against a pervasive global and evil empire and reflected officially that year in NSC-68:

What is new, what makes the continuing crisis, is the polarization of power which now inescapably confronts [a] slave society with the free. . . .The assault. . . is world wide, and in the context of the present polarization of power a defeat. . . anywhere is a defeat everywhere. . . .<sup>97</sup>

This overall strategic consensus meant that for the first time in their nation's history, Americans perceived an enduring national security role outside U.S. borders. In the context of the "long war," the public and governmental elites began to think of a security system as one that functioned from day to day. Reliable peace in that paradigm was nonexistent, which in turn led to a clarity of alignments and planning against identified threats. The result was a system for an insecure world that included the emergence of NATO and other multilateral regional alliances, growing defense budgets, large "peacetime" military forces, and episodic combat in the Third World.

Equally important, the "long war" accustomed the public to global leadership while at the same time imparting the virtues of patience and cooperation. The fact that the nuclear weapon had only a deterrent role that was lacking any positive productivity meant that Americans grew used to a protracted struggle without a clearly defined end. Concomittantly, there evolved a much greater

general appreciation of the intractability of many issues. Certainly, the establishment of "rules of the game" between the two powers, despite the ideological chasm separating them, was an important manifestation of this development. Equally significant, the American tendency to "solutionism" gave way generally in the public mind over the decades of the "long war" to a realization of the need, in an expression often used by Francois Mitterrand, to "give time to time."<sup>98</sup>

But time in the context of the "long war" also meant money to the American taxpayer. And massive amounts expended in pursuit of absolute security, as George Kennan and President Eisenhower were the first to realize, could actually prevent the achievement of that goal in terms of economic damage to American society. In this regard, the "long war" demonstrated that the American people were not willing to support "risk minimizing" strategies in national security affairs, because such strategies tended to drive up costs even while they attempted to provide insurance against a wide spectrum of potential threats. From this perspective, nuclear weapons were particularly important since they provided at key points in the cold war (1945-50, 1953-61, and less overtly, 1969-80) a means to minimize costs by paying with some increase of risk. Without those weapons, the defense establishment and the underlying foundations of the Military Industrial Complex might have been much larger than they were during the "long war." As a result, there might have been public revulsion to such massive costs, producing isolationism and abrogation of global responsibilities reminiscent of the 1920s.<sup>99</sup>

The aspect of cost in terms of national security was reinforced for the American public by the Vietnam experience in the context of the "long peace" paradigm, since it represented such a protracted and increasingly forceful break for the United States within that framework. The "guns and butter" economy produced in that "limited" war, for instance, set in train many of the social and economic problems that would cause the American people to broaden their definition of national security affairs in the following decades to include domestic as well as foreign policy. Moreover, as the bipolar struggle began to fade into the shade of detente and into an increasingly dominant "long peace" framework in the wake of Vietnam, the sense of purpose and direction that had permeated the mobilization of minds and energies in a national consensus began to dissipate. The result was an adverse synergism combining the decline of both a common doctrine and a common enemy, which produced in turn a massive void for a nation used to perceiving global politics as crusades to save humanity from an overwhelming bully. The consequent strategic uncertainties demonstrated in the revamped containment policies of the Carter and Reagan years spilled over into America's third great transition of this century.<sup>100</sup>

Those uncertainties were reinforced by a growing "declinist" view directly tied to the "long war" paradigm and represented in the national debates generated by the 1987 publication of Paul

Kennedy's *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*.<sup>101</sup> From the standpoint of the public with its general sense of American exceptionalism, nothing appeared quite so disturbing as the declinist assertions that the United States might soon share the "fall" common to every hegemon of the past. Nor was the blow softened by a growing realization, reflected in the debates, that the successful development of American political institutions and economic systems in the major axis powers of World War II might well play a major role in that decline. The result was ironical from the perspective of either paradigm, with the idea of a more modest future being generally rejected by the public at the same time that a disposition not to pay for America's position in the world was increasing in the Reagan years.<sup>102</sup>

By that time, in any event, the American public was ready to jettison the "long war." This was due, in part, to the fatigue factor associated with that particular framework. Moreover, there was the hope of improved relations with the Soviet Union as Gorbachev's initiatives began to take effect, coupled with the growing awareness of American domestic problems, also generally perceived as an outcome of the "long war." Opinion polls indicated that from 1985 on, the nation increasingly was convinced of the need to turn from that "war" and focus on domestic issues, which were perceived more and more as the major threat to U.S. national security. This readiness of the public to turn inward occurred long before the national mood began to sour, frustrated by the unresponsiveness of the political system.<sup>103</sup>

The lessons and habits from the extended global role in the "long war" are also reflected in the same opinion polls, which demonstrate that the public desire to focus on urgent domestic concerns is predicated on a firm commitment to internationalism: a general conviction on the part of the majority of Americans in the current transition that, in terms of national security, the United States "must take an active part in world affairs."<sup>104</sup> The result is a thoughtful and stable commitment to internationalism that, as one prominent pollster has pointed out, "is one of a handful of issues about which citizens have carefully considered the consequences of their views and have come to accept responsibility for them--the defining characteristic of mature public judgment."<sup>105</sup>

Nevertheless, the sense of limitations acquired from the perspectives of both paradigms will color the public's perception of that commitment. In the Third World, early American hopes for speedy economic development based on the U.S. national experience have been replaced by resigned pragmatism tinged with disappointment. In addition, there are the lessons concerning the limitations of military power, no matter how massive, that resulted from violent interruptions of the "long peace" ranging from Vietnam to Lebanon. Moreover, the mixed results from attempts to devise sweeping human rights doctrines and nonproliferation policies are reminders that what finds favor in American eyes is not always so obvious to other nations. Finally,

as both the coalitions of the "long war" and the growing economic linkages of the "long peace" demonstrated to the American people, U.S. global leadership must be provided in a multilateral context.<sup>106</sup>

In terms of national security, this multilateral focus is most understandable in the "long war" context. In this regard, enthusiasm for some form of collective security has emerged in the current transition just as it did in 1918 and 1945, because the end of an epochal conflict gives peace the air of normalcy. But after two generations of the "long war," the American public still remains psychologically disposed to think of a security system operating on a daily basis, focused on a specific threat. At the same time, the apparent victory of liberalism provides a renewed appeal to the idea of collective security, a concept in its idealized form that is oriented on general, nonspecific, abstract threats to security. The answer may lie with the United Nations, about which the public is still ambivalent, particularly if it considers the relatively minor role of that organization in the post-1945 era when viewed from either paradigm. Nevertheless, as opinion polls indicate, there is a latent willingness to support a growing role for the United Nations:

If Americans do not want the United States to do the job unilaterally--yet feel some responsibility for indeed getting it done-- the United Nations is the most credible candidate for the task. Americans are willing to be sold on this proposition, to have their questions and resistances addressed, and their enthusiasm sparked. This will not happen spontaneously. It will require active leadership. The potential nonetheless exists, if America's leaders wish to take advantage of it.<sup>107</sup>

All this means that governmental elites will have to work harder in the current transition period to build a strategic consensus among the American people concerning the increasingly more complex concept of national security. The task is made easier because of both paradigms. Patience, perseverance and endurance in the face of protracted conflict without prospects of clear victory is assuredly a lesson of the "long war." On the other hand, the "long peace" demonstrated that absence of conflict does not necessarily mean tranquility, certainty, or predictability. The cold war showed at times that it can also mean chaos, uncertainty and unpredictability. As a result, there is a growing awareness on the part of the American people that the United States faces a situation in the post-cold war transition period similar to that which, in Edward Luttwak's description, confronted the Roman Empire in its later stages:

The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat would ensure permanent security. Regardless of the amplitude of Roman victories, the frontiers of the empire would



always remain under attack, since they were barriers in the path of secular migration flows from north to south and from east to west. Hence Roman strategy could not usefully aim at total victory at any cost, for the threat was not temporary but endless. The only rational goal was the maintenance of a minimally adequate level of security at the lowest feasible cost.<sup>108</sup>

*Change and Continuity.* From the "long war" perspective, there was an enduring ideological high for the American people, who generally came to regard the Soviet Union during much of the cold war as a conspiracy disguised as a state. President Wilson had helped create this aspect of U.S. foreign policy by presenting the American entry into World War I as a great crusade that would make the world "safe for democracy," with its tacit assumption that Germany was the enemy because it was undemocratic and thus autocratic. And when he incorporated that assumption in the demand contained in the Fourteen Points for the overthrow of the Hohenzollern Monarchy, he created an enduring association for the American people between the form and the behavior of governments. That linkage resurfaced after 1945, resulting in an official U.S. position throughout much of the cold war that adherence to Marxist-Leninism produced governments that were not only internally repressive, but through their presumed subordination to Moscow, a threat to the global balance of power as well.<sup>109</sup>

Most important for continued American public support of the "long war," the linkage was also made specifically with the proselytizing of U.S. values and methods. As the Truman Doctrine demonstrated, the geopolitical reality was never stronger than when it coincided at the ideological level with the defense of freedom and the diffusion of such American virtues as freedom of speech, belief and enterprise. Without such underlying idealism, the post-1945 transition might have occurred more slowly or not at all. For if the American people were to embark on a "long war" with no clearly defined end, it was essential for government leaders to appeal to a tradition as long as the Republic's existence in which, as Thomas Jefferson had described it, the United States was to be "a standing monument and example for the aim and imitation of other countries."<sup>110</sup> It was this "city on the hill" tradition that accounted for the American reaction even from the "long war" perspective to such revelations as the power politics of the Yalta Conference, the espionage of the U-2 incident, or the covert action of the Bay of Pigs.

It is this tradition in the current transition that accounted for the attempts by the Bush administration to maintain the cold war equation between particularist security and universalist freedom as the basis for consensus in the Persian Gulf conflict. The result was that the vital U.S. interest of unimpeded access to Persian Gulf oil was subsumed in a resurrection of the "Munich lesson" that aggression anywhere if

not stopped would endanger world order and thus American security. This was an approach much more satisfying to the American people, but bound to lead to confusion, as the U.S. reaction to aggression in Bosnia has demonstrated. Moreover, this idealism is still tied to the sense of American exceptionalism that was reinforced by the course and outcome of the long war. The problem, as Stanley Hoffmann has pointed out, is that this tendency is not suited for America's third transition period:

It is dangerous. . .to believe in a kind of moral uniqueness or superiority (whose other side, when things turn out badly, is a tendency to blame one-self for all the world's ills, which is just as absurd as the belief that one is predestined and morally fit to cure them), in a special role either as the world's policeman or as the propagator of human rights, especially when the deference of others is shrinking, when the contrast between such ambitions and domestic achievements is glaring and when the direction of 'Manifest Destiny' is anything but manifest.<sup>111</sup>

The current transition also reflects other aspects concerning the American public revealed by the two paradigms. From a "long war" perspective, the growth of the national security state made that public increasingly aware of defense costs. This was accentuated when viewed through the "long peace" framework by the expansion of other governmental programs, which only raised public perceptions that those programs were generally diminished by defense needs. The result has been public expectations of a peace dividend not unlike those in the previous two transition periods.

At the same time, both paradigms reveal, however speculatively, an adverse confluence of trends. From a "long war" perspective, there are the buildup of tensions over the decades and the concomitant "live for the moment" approach that dovetail with the materialism viewed through the "long peace" paradigm. These offer disturbing comparisons with the self-indulgent decades at the end of the extended peace terminated by World War I. From both perspectives, there is the popular culture dominated by selfishness and short-sightedness and the tendency to put personal wishes and demands ahead of societal obligations. A concomitant to this is what John Lewis Gaddis calls "a curious unevenness in the willingness to bear pain."<sup>112</sup> In this regard, the United States has been generous, even profligate with its military forces, but almost irresponsibly selfish in terms of issues affecting lifestyle and pocket book.

Once again, both paradigms are instructive, since this last tendency goes back at least to President Johnson's peace in war refusal to ask for sacrifices in the American home front during the Vietnam war even as he built up the "guns and butter" economy to service both that conflict and the "Great Society." Moreover, as the "long war" declined in the 1980s and with it the public

consensus, President Reagan attempted to restore his domestic basis by convincing the American people that the United States might aspire to great ends without enduring hardships in conjuring up the means. In the end, as Robert Tucker has pointed out, the Reagan years "transformed what had been a disposition not to pay for the American position in the world into something close to a fixed resolve not to do so."<sup>113</sup>

In the wake of the cold war, the American people generally perceive the U.S. Government as a bloated and incompetent gridlocked manifestation of both the "long war" and the "long peace." "Nowadays," George Will has pointed out, "government looks to most Americans like an overbearing and overreaching underachiever that is suspect regarding both its competence and motives."<sup>114</sup> Paradoxically, this collapse of the prestige of government comes just as the American people, increasingly sophisticated in their approach to both the domestic and international aspects of national security, desire more leadership. That leadership, however, will have to develop in this third transition period within a vastly constrained environment, reminiscent more of the first rather than the second transition, if it is to be effective in calling forth sufficient effort and sacrifice by the American people.

#### **State.**

*The National Security State.* Ernest May has described what happens when form and function grow apart in capitals of nation-states as a result of historical change:

In Westminster, the houses of Parliament and Buckingham Palace--both structures of the Victorian era--and the Georgian and Regency offices along Whitehall are buildings for a seat of empire, not for the capital of a middle-ranking member of the European Community. The drab, modest government office blocks of Tokyo and Bonn seem equally ill-suited, given that they serve the second and third ranking powers of the economic world. None of these capitals vies with Vienna, where the magnificent Hofburg is the seat of government for a republic smaller than Indiana. . . .<sup>115</sup>

The "long war" caused a militarization of the U.S. Government that to some extent has produced a similar mismatch between form and function in the current transition period. Only in the context of the "long war" is it possible to understand why power, money, prestige and public influence were conferred on old and new agencies oriented on the Soviet threat and the people who ran them. The result is a vast national security apparatus. In terms of the Executive Branch, that apparatus stretches from the Old Executive Office Building next to the White House, to the plain new State Department Building on 21st Street, across the Potomac to the Pentagon where over 25,000 workers man the tip of

the defense iceberg, to the Central Intelligence Agency further out in Virginia. On Capitol Hill, the members of Congress and their staffs work on myriad committees that oversee the military, intelligence and diplomatic establishments dealing with national security. Finally, outside the government, there is another set of interested participants ranging from arms manufacturers, politicians, and professors, to publicists, pontificators and demagogues, who also invested careers and fortunes in the "long war."<sup>116</sup>

The evolution of a post-World War II government with national security concerns dominant and a military establishment transcendent was not preordained. In fact, the major focus in the global arena after 1945 was primarily on economics as the United States began its familiar postwar pattern of demobilization. So rapid was the pace that one month after the end of the war, the Joint Strategic Survey Committee reported that "a year or more would be required to reconstitute our military position at a fraction of its recent power."<sup>117</sup> As a result of that pattern, there was increasingly acrimonious competition among the services. The 1947 National Security Act settled little in this regard, particularly when President Truman began to cut military spending back to an avowed goal of the 1938 level. Even the Key West meeting the following year that hammered out service functions failed to stop interservice bickering and rivalry. Despite those agreements, for instance, the Navy lunged immediately for a part of the strategic bombing role, setting off the so-called 1949 "Revolt of the Admirals," which soon spilled over in unseemly fashion into Congress and thus to the American people.<sup>118</sup>

By that time, the focus of the government had shifted to the military, primarily because of a series of crises, famous in the litany of early cold war events. Moreover, the best allied intelligence available indicated a large Soviet buildup that included by 1950, 175 divisions, several hundred new bombers capable of striking any part of the Mediterranean or the British isles, large and improving tactical air forces, and over 300 submarines capable of extended underwater operations in the Atlantic. Added to this were the two seminal events of 1949: the explosion of a Soviet nuclear device and the victory of the People's Republic of China in the Chinese Civil War. The result in the spring of 1950 was NSC-68 which called for a substantial increase in military forces--all unlikely to have been achieved if not for the Korean War, which seemed to bear out the principal assumptions of the document. Because of that conflict, congressional leaders in a groundswell of bipartisan support joined President Truman in massively increasing the permanent American military establishment in order to prepare the country for an indefinite "period of acute danger."<sup>119</sup>

The transformation of the American government occurred rapidly thereafter. In FY 50, the military budget accounted for less than one-third of government expenditures and less than 5

percent of GNP--much of that due to residual World War II obligations. By FY 53, the military represented more than 60 percent of the government outlays and more than 12 percent of GNP. In the years ahead, despite a downward trend in military spending when compared to a more rapidly rising GNP, the military establishment that emerged from the Korean War remained the dominant consumer of governmental discretionary funds. At the same time, defense and defense-related agencies employed for much of the "long war" between 60 and 70 percent of all Federal personnel.<sup>120</sup>

1950 was also a dividing line for diplomacy. For even from a "long peace" perspective, the State Department after that year also shifted its focus more and more to military security. As a consequence, American Secretaries of State spent an increasing amount of time in the ensuing decades on issues concerning levels of and arrangements for forward deployed U.S. military forces; amounts of military aid authorized for client states; and, in the last half of the cold war, arrangements for nuclear arms control.<sup>121</sup>

There were similar developments at the White House in terms of increasing structure and organizational precedence oriented on political-military issues, primarily through the development of the National Security Council (NSC). In the early Truman years, that organization was merely one part of the Executive Office of the President, only sparingly used by the Chief Executive. After 1950, the NSC became the government's principal steering mechanism, with real decisionmaking invariably involving the assistants to the president for national security affairs. That post increased exponentially in importance during the Kennedy administration, reaching new peaks in the Nixon and Carter years when the national security advisers often brushed aside the secretaries of state. By the end of the "long war," the business hours of the presidents were occupied primarily with the problems vetted and brought to them by means of the NSC system. And in fact, as Ernest May has pointed out, by that time "the main business of the United States government had become the development, maintenance, positioning, exploitation, and regulation of military forces."<sup>122</sup>

*The Change in Government.* Walter Lippmann early on foresaw the growth of collectivism brought on by the economic problems of the Great Depression which were forcing governments to replace the market place as arbiter of international and national economic relations. Those pressures, he concluded during the Depression, "will enormously increase the scope of government and greatly intensify the dependence of the individual upon government."<sup>123</sup> In this, he was partially correct. It is true, of course, that welfare and social security payments as well as guaranteed price supports for farmers emerged in the 1930s in response to the Great Depression. But because those programs only benefited minorities at the expense of the public majority, they could not command universal support or reach as large a scale as

defense expenditures would in response to the "long war."<sup>124</sup>

It was in the context of the "long war" paradigm that military outlays came to provide a major impetus for the increased role of the American government in redistributing economic resources among the citizenry. It was also in that context that those outlays came to be perceived as serving the common good. As a consequence, there was never concerted opposition to the special interests concerned with contracts for new military weapons and equipment that emerged and grew over the decades. Military expenditures thus increased steadily in response to the needs of the "long war," with governmental purchases of arms from a "long peace" perspective becoming, in William McNeil's phrase, "a stabilizing flywheel for the American economy."<sup>125</sup> The result was a peacetime economy generally immune to business cycles, because the demand and production of weaponry and equipment came over the life of the cold war to be governed by political not financial considerations.

It was in this sense that the arms race with the Soviet Union allowed in diluted form and with very little break the continuation of the deliberate management of the American economy that had worked so well in World War II when arms production finally eliminated the Great Depression. The exigencies of that conflict required such drastic and unpopular political intervention in the market place as rationing. In the "long war," however, it was enough to exert softer political management focused on arms expenditure and the deliberate manipulation of tax and interest rates to sustain a protracted era of prosperity. During that era, when viewed from a "long peace" perspective, it was also the generally rising standard of living that diminished complaints about growing welfare expenditures and farm subsidies, thus contributing to the smooth functioning of the American economy. In the end, both paradigms are essential to understand the primary stimulus for the remarkable political management of the U.S. economy throughout the cold war and how without that combination of peace in war, a different basis for American prosperity would certainly have evolved, as it did for Germany and Japan.

The paradigms play a similar role in examining the evolution of governmental politics and the political culture. From the "long war" perspective, for instance, the overall strategic consensus concerning containment made possible a degree of presidential hegemony, previously only achieved in external or civil war. The rise of the imperial presidency backed by the Supreme Court would last as long as Congress was willing to fall patriotically in line with the Chief Executive's strategic priorities and his budgetary requests. Above all, there were the actions designed to provide more freedom of maneuver, ranging from the use of executive agreements to the crafting of resolutions beginning in the Eisenhower administration that co-opted Congress into approving unspecified presidential moves in advance--a development that reached its logical denouement in the

wake of the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution.

From the standpoint of both paradigms, the second and most prolonged American encounter with the complex concept of limited war explains the decline of this executive dominance. To begin with, limited war theorists had generally seen such conflicts as antiseptic encounters, primarily political in nature and thus manageable as part of the "long peace." The logical concomitants to such an approach were the lack of relevance of military considerations and the unimportance of domestic politics, both of which were prescriptions for ultimate disaster in Vietnam. The former led to the use of military actions primarily in the political sense of "signalling" which in turn had the more pernicious effect of gradualism. The fallacy of the latter belief was exposed by the combination of that gradualism with the communication revolution which brought the increasing human cost of the war to the American people on a daily basis. Ultimately, limited war in Vietnam failed because the chief executives of the United States could not convince their citizens that such a savage break in the "long peace" could serve the overall objectives of the "long war."<sup>126</sup>

As a result, Congress began to reassert its authority in foreign affairs, particularly in the matter of war powers, understandably the most contentious issue when viewed through the combined prism of the two paradigms. In the wake of the cold war, the balancing mechanisms built into the Constitution have returned, functioning as they were originally intended. On the other hand, the strategic consensus that provided the presidency with so much power during the "long war" has disappeared. And although that consensus was directed externally, the increased linkage of foreign policy with domestic policy in terms of national security affairs has generated a perception of general executive-legislative gridlock by a public grown accustomed to over four decades of the imperial presidency.

*Change and Continuity.* From the "long war" perspective, the militarization of the American government made eminent sense as a creative response to unprecedented challenges. Given the pervasive Soviet military threat and the rapid evolution of nuclear and other military technologies against the enduring backdrop of widespread global insecurities, the consequences for the world would have been much different if the United States had not structured itself to deal primarily with military issues. Certainly in terms of international stability, an American government organized to emphasize domestic or international economic affairs could hardly have acted, for example, as a credible foundation to build a collective defense structure like NATO. Nevertheless, the "long war" has left the United States with a government that will be increasingly ill-suited for the new era. The NSC, for instance, is hardly the mechanism for formulating policy options dealing with the environment, trade, population, hunger, or disease. And both the defense and intelligence establishments ultimately will have to make changes

and reorganizations as the post-cold war world emerges.

No one expects Washington to return to the Cincinnati capital of the 1930s in which the State, War, and Navy departments were all housed in what is now the Old Executive Office Building. At the same time, however, there is the clear necessity to design new institutions for the new era. In the previous transition period, the task was easier since the United States had so little international affairs machinery and experience, and thus could build from a fresh base that allowed its newly emerging policy elites to be "present at the creation." There is, to say the least, no comparable void in Washington during the current transition. Moreover, the emphasis on national security during the "long war" has left the departments that manage domestic affairs as largely moribund, somewhat upgraded spinoffs of New Deal agencies. Infusing new life into the Departments of Agriculture, Commerce, Labor, and the Interior will also be a major task in the new era as will transforming the Department of Energy from its status as a barely remodeled Atomic Energy Commission.<sup>127</sup>

The economic choices will be no easier for the United States in the current transition period, particularly if the post-1945 era is viewed through the "long war" paradigm. From that perspective, the cold war is a reminder that America has hardly ever demonstrated in this century a capacity to resolve key economic problems in peacetime. Defense spending in both World Wars as well as throughout most of the cold war stabilized the economy at crucial moments. In fact, except for the exuberant thrust of the "roaring twenties," a period that contained the seeds of the Great Depression, the American economy has not prospered for an extended length of time in the 20th century except in periods of war.<sup>128</sup>

A major problem in all this emerges from the combination of the two paradigms. Belligerent states usually aim to return to peace through victory or compromise and as a consequence make plans both for reconverting their economies and for shaping the post-war order. But the "long peace" accustomed two generations of statesmen to a reversal of Clausewitz's dictum, with politics becoming a method of conducting war by other means. As a result, the United States was not prepared for "victory."<sup>129</sup>

From the "long war" perspective, that lack of preparedness was reflected in the actions of the Reagan administration to postpone the full economic impact of the decline in military spending as a percent of GNP that accompanied the winding down of the cold war. To begin with, the government simply increased military spending, while devaluing the dollar in an attempt to stimulate exports. Finally, the administration used tax cuts and extreme deficits to stimulate the economy. The economic problems that ultimately ensued and have spilled over into the current transition are not ones generally faced by the American government during the full flush of military Keynesianism in the



"long war." The result is a political system that appears fundamentally stalemated in its approach to economic issues.<sup>130</sup>

The basic problem in the current transition period is one of choices concerning the reallocation of resources without causing large-scale disruption and unemployment. Political consensus will be extremely difficult, particularly for expenditures that benefit some segments of society more than others. And yet there is no going back, no real choice that can undo the government intervention in the exchange of goods and services that has affected the daily life of the American people in a unique peace-in-war environment for over two generations. It is up to the government, then, to create some new balance among all the special interests and social groupings in American society. That, in turn, will call for a political process much like the one that redefined the role of the Federal government in the last transition period. At that time, the domestic impact of foreign aid and rearmament was submerged in the debate over what the United States was required to do overseas to contain communism. Government elites in the current transition will have to focus on domestic policy while tempering without relinquishing American global involvement brought on by a 40-year "war," the very duration of which was legitimized through the prism of the "long peace."<sup>131</sup>

An important aspect of that global involvement has to do with change and continuity in the American military. In terms of the "long war" perspective, the most striking result of events after 1945 was the emergence of a huge standing military force which ultimately provided the United States a balanced global reach unlike that of any great power in history. The current joint air, land, sea effectiveness of American forces, for instance, stands in sharp contrast to the situation at the zenith of the Royal Navy's rule of the sea under the *Pax Britannica*, when Bismarck noted that if the British army should land on the coast of Prussia, he would have the local police arrest it. The vastness of the force required for preserving the "long peace" while prosecuting the "long war" on a global scale was captured by Zbigniew Brzezinski at the height of the cold war when he noted that there were:

more than a million American troops stationed on some 400 major and almost 300 minor United States military bases scattered all over the globe. [There were] more than forty-two nations tied to the United States by security pacts, American military missions training the officers and troops of many other national armies, and the approximately two hundred thousand United States civilian government employees in foreign posts all makes for striking analogies to the great classical imperial systems.<sup>132</sup>

All that has changed with the end of the cold war. Downsizing is a fact of life for the U.S. military in this

transition period as it was from the wartime perspective after the other two great conflicts of this century. The principal reason, like that at the conclusion of any war, is that the overarching threat has virtually disappeared. But in vanquishing that threat, the American public and governmental elites have come to realize that changes had occurred in the military element of power as well. As a conflict extended within the "long peace," the cold war prolonged the traditional view of national security as a predominantly military matter, even as a changing world both at home and abroad demanded a more sophisticated, eclectic approach.

Part of the change had to do with the erosion of the 500-year old linkage between military and economic strength, the "self-reinforcing cycle," in William McNeil's words, as a symbiotic means of producing predominance in world politics.<sup>133</sup> By the 1980s, there was a general perception that there was a price to pay for emphasizing military security over solvency, that the 40-year quest for military advantages from the wartime perspective had done nothing to protect the United States from economic decline and social disequilibrium within the extended peace paradigm, and in fact in many cases had exacerbated those problems. That perception was reinforced by the massive economically-induced implosion of the Soviet Union that ended the cold war. Added to that was the recognition that the "long war" for both superpowers had truly been a "long peace" for Germany and Japan, precisely because, like the tiny nation in the film, "The Mouse that Roared," their defeat in war had allowed them to separate economic growth from military capability.<sup>134</sup>

The major problem remaining for the U.S. military in the current transition period is to incorporate these changes in such a way as to make rational the traditional post-war American pattern of demobilization. From the perspectives of both paradigms, the Department of Defense (DOD) is vastly more prepared to do this than in 1947. Thanks to reforms ranging from National Security Act amendments to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, DOD has evolved into a sophisticated, coherent entity in terms of both directing war and coordinating with the myriad government agencies concerned with national security. Nevertheless, there are some formidable challenges.

In the first place, as Senator Nunn has pointed out, the transition should not produce merely a smaller copy of the cold war force, replete with miniaturized versions of the inefficiencies and redundancies that emerged over the decades since the service roles and missions were created in the Key West conference of 1948. It will require a delicate balance. On the one hand, there is the need to reduce the duplication and redundancy of forces and weapons in order to have an affordable military capable of performing strategic and operational missions. On the other hand, as a matter of operational surety, some redundancy has a genuine place in the national military strategy if flexibility and combat survivability are not to be

severely reduced. What does not have a place if congressional and public support for the downsizing military is to be maintained are the protectionism and interservice territoriality that marked the last transition. In the CNN age, a public in search of peace dividends will simply not tolerate a "Revolt of the Admirals."<sup>135</sup>

The most important task, however, and one that also affects the roles and missions issue, is to slow down the process of military downsizing--to "give time to time" in order to arrive at a proper mix of military change and continuity within the U.S. national security strategy. That strategy will not evolve quickly in the current transition period. Nor should it. The world has grown too complex to allow a cut and paste approach to the new era.

As the strategy at the national level develops, the key mission for the U.S. military is to ensure that a disconnect does not develop between it and the national military strategy. In the first transition period, the inwardly focused national strategy that emerged had disastrous results for the United States as well as the international community. But it did have the virtue of a logical linkage with its subordinate and equally disastrous military strategy. In the second transition period, on the other hand, national leaders made sweeping commitments matched by an equally sweeping diminishment of American military power. Task Force Smith is instructive in this regard not so much as a symbol of unpreparedness, but as an illustration of what can happen when a gap is allowed to develop between national security strategy and one of its subordinate strategies. It is true, of course, that the concept of national security is more complex in the current transition. Nevertheless, the experiences of the last half of this century viewed from both subordinate paradigms suggest that the world is not yet ready for an overall shift in the realist paradigm and that consequently national military power will continue to play a vital role in that concept.

From the vantage point of that realist paradigm looking out over a world still nasty and brutish in the post-cold war era, there is comfort in the continuity provided by a two generational war-in-peace mentality. But that continuity is only possible in the current transition if changes in the concept of national security are acknowledged--if, in other words, U.S. domestic, social and economic needs are not sacrificed to the exigencies of the permanent Hobbsian struggle as they were to some extent in the hybrid war that recently ended. For the military this means becoming more efficient and less costly, more relevant to domestic issues, and more willing to focus on multilateral military approaches. Most significant, it means finding new ways to address radically new threats to national security--an effort given bureaucratic impetus by Secretary Aspin's recent restructuring of DOD in which offices were created to address new security problems ranging from nuclear security and counterproliferation to economic and environmental security. In all such efforts, major adjustments will be necessary, not just

in the Department of Defense, but in the entire government and with the consent of the American people. It is a process, as Ronald Steel has pointed out, that is never easy in the best of times.

For the American economy, distorted by a half-century of reliance on military spending, for American political elites, who had come to believe that they were "born to lead," and for an American public, deprived of an enemy to justify its sacrifices, the experience will be a wrenching and possibly threatening one.<sup>136</sup>

### **The International System.**

*The Bipolar Legacy.* During the cold war, the industrial and postindustrial nations somehow managed a dedicated extended preparation for war almost without precedence in history, while at the same time keeping the grimmest of the apocalyptic horsemen at bay. The reason was the evolution of a bipolar distribution of great power after 1945 between the United States and the Soviet Union. At the height of the cold war, that system was viewed primarily through the "long war" paradigm as a destabilizing influence on international relations. "A bipolar world loses the perspective for nuance," Henry Kissinger noted in this regard;

a gain for one side appears as an absolute loss for the other. Every issue seems to involve a question of survival. The smaller countries are torn between a desire for protection and a wish to escape big-power dominance. Each of the superpowers is beset by the desire to maintain its preeminence among its allies, to increase its influence among the uncommitted,<sup>137</sup> and to enhance its security vis-a-vis its opponent.

Over the last decades of the "long peace," however, bipolarity, whether considered as either balance of power or hegemonic stability within the overall realist paradigm, took on a new luster. To begin with, the reduction of key actors to two superpowers simplified communication, thus avoiding the problems experienced by the five Great Powers of Europe in the summer of 1914. Moreover, as the "long peace" came to demonstrate, bipolarity could tolerate defections from coalitions. In this regard, the Sino-Soviet dispute and the subsequent U.S. rapprochement with the People's Republic of China stood in sharp contrast to the two Moroccan crises prior to World War I, both precipitated by attempts to maintain control over coalitions.<sup>138</sup>

The "long peace" paradigm is also instructive concerning the formation of international systems. The cold war demonstrated that peace does not necessarily emerge from a transition period dominated by formal negotiating processes that produce an agreed upon international structure as occurred in 1919. In fact, the

Versailles system barely lasted half as long as that which emerged from a transition after 1945 that produced no peace conference and only a minimum of formal structure and organization to perpetuate the system. Nevertheless, the bipolar system endured primarily because, as Kenneth Waltz has pointed out concerning the superpowers, "two states, isolationist by tradition, untutored in the ways of international politics, and famed for impulsive behavior, soon showed themselves--not always and everywhere, but always in crucial cases--to be wary, alert, cautious, flexible and forebearing."<sup>139</sup>

Those attributes were demonstrated early in the long war-in-peace. Despite the goal of universalism explicit in both the 1941 Atlantic Charter and the 1942 United Nations Declaration, both superpowers after World War II used alliances to create demarcation lines around areas considered of vital interest along the western and northeastern Eurasian strategic fronts. It was, in short, nothing more than the Westphalian principle *cuius regio, eius religio* (whose the region, his the religion) applied to the territories liberated from Axis control, as at least one national leader realized. "Whoever occupies a territory," Stalin declared, "imposes on it his own social system. . .as far as his army can reach."<sup>140</sup>

Those so-called "alliances of position," such as NATO and the Warsaw Pact, were simple, unambiguous, recognizable, and conspicuous dividing lines that were useful in establishing rules of the game for prosecuting war in peacetime. Less useful were the "alliances of movement," the geographic extension of those systems, beginning with the "pactomania" on both sides in the Eisenhower and Khrushchev years, as each nation attempted to outflank the other. The perceived zero-sum bandwagoning effect that motivated the American thrust was summarized by President Kennedy: "If the United States were to falter, the whole world would inevitably move toward the Communist bloc."<sup>141</sup> Nevertheless, despite periodic nods to the ideological concept of roll back, each nation continued to cooperate for the most part concerning primary spheres of influence.<sup>142</sup>

Much of that cooperation had to do with nuclear weapons. Without those weapons, bipolarity would still have emerged in the second transition period because of the collapse of the multipolar system brought on by the "Thirty Years War" of 1914-45. But it is unlikely that cooperative efforts of any duration would have been possible without what Joseph Nye has called "nuclear learning," the vital common ingredient of the two subordinate paradigms. From both perspectives, it was the consideration of the consequences of nuclear weapons and doctrines that led to attempts to provide some structure and coherence to interstate relations that involved the risk of war. The result was the acceptance of formal and informal norms as a basis of guidelines for behavior and rules of engagement. In terms of nuclear weapons, these included the development of Permissive Action Links (PAL) on nuclear weapons, second strike

nuclear capabilities, intrusive verification systems, and tacitly tolerated satellite reconnaissance. All this eventually allowed the establishment of stable security regimes which encouraged both powers to put long-term mutual considerations above shorter term self-interests.<sup>143</sup>

Despite the redundancy of the two paradigms, the conventional wisdom in the early years of the cold war was that arms control served only utopian or propaganda purposes or both. When SALT negotiations began in the late 1960s, the intellectual dispute centered on those who saw arms control as a disaster for the United States and those who considered the process as the last best hope for mankind. By the end of the cold war, the principle of arms control had come to be accepted not only as an integral part of the East-West relationship, but as a useful adjunct to the realist management of power in the international system. At the same time, this evolution also encouraged the isolation of dangerous and destabilizing areas of military competition by means of agreements between the superpowers, ranging from the Antarctic and Outer Space treaties to those focused on the Seabed and Biological Weapons.<sup>144</sup>

The evolution of arms control and other rules of the game between the superpowers flowed into detente and strengthened the "long peace" perspective in the closing decades of the cold war. One result was a "loosening" of bipolarity in which centrifugal forces began to play on the western treaty regime. At the beginning of the cold war, that regime stressed the inviolability of obligations in accordance with the norm *pacta sunt servanda* (treaties are binding). By the last decade of that conflict, there was increased support for the legal doctrine of *rebus sic stantibus*, which terminated agreements if the circumstances at the time of the signing no longer obtained. This change in the international system was demonstrated in the 1980s with the U.S. severance of its formal promise to protect Taiwan and its "strategic divorce" with New Zealand over the issue of docking American ships carrying nuclear weapons.<sup>145</sup>

Such changes, however, were effected on a two-way street. For over 40 years, U.S. political influence with its allies had been increasingly bound up with the specific Soviet threat in the context of the "long war." It was that threat that caused the Europeans and the Japanese to place their security in American hands and thus defer both economically and politically to American leadership, whether in the form of trade concessions, financing of the U.S. treasury deficits or purchases of U.S. military equipment. With the ascending of the "long peace" paradigm, those defense dependencies began to fade and with them the threat-induced deference. At the same time, the rise of West Germany and Japan only emphasized the lack of congruence between the primary military and economic rivalries. The peaceful end of the "long war" further demonstrated the growing importance of economic power and increasingly brought into question the utility of force as the *ultima ratio* of state relations, at least among

the major developed nations.<sup>146</sup>

No such "de-belated" status occurred in the so-called Third World, a categorization of nation-states that even owed its origins to the bipolar nature of the international system. In that world, the absence of superpower war was not synonymous with global peace; nor was the absence of system transformation through war translated into global stability. Instead, recurrent violence in an unstable "peripheral" system occurred alongside a stable "central" system, with an estimated 127 wars and over 21 million war-related deaths taking place in the developing world during the cold war.<sup>147</sup>

From the "long war" perspective, the bipolar struggle distracted from the post-World War II decolonization of the planet, often leading to abrupt actions by the great powers that caused the absence of viable, indigenous state structures. Most important, the "long war" caused both sides to perceive that there were important interests engaged almost everywhere in the world. One result was global militarization, in which the Third World served as an important outlet for the massive amounts of increasingly more sophisticated arms produced in the developed world. Moreover, despite superpower cooperation on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the exigencies of the "long war" caused both sides to ignore the problem in states considered strategically important. As a consequence, with the exception of South Africa, which was isolated because of its racial--not its nuclear--policies, nuclear proliferation occurred during the long war with "surprisingly few diplomatic costs."<sup>148</sup>

*Interdependence.* Both paradigms help explain why the United States used its economic dominance in the second transition period for international economic reconstruction and why that dominance eventually eroded. In one sense, the post-1945 policy was created in an economic context that foresaw prosperity and peace as a result of the reconstructed economies of Western Europe and Japan within an overall interdependent framework of free trade and monetary stability. The resultant prosperity, American planners believed, would not only constrain the divisive forces of nationalism that had been so destructive in the first half of the 20th century, but also set the geopolitical stage for containing the Soviet Union while providing the global economic growth necessary for Third World development. The consequences of that economic vision were the Bretton Woods system, the Marshall Plan, and the dependency of the Third World on the industrial nations for capital and markets.<sup>149</sup>

This growing interdependence was given added impetus by dramatic advances in communication, transportation and technology that emerged from the symbiosis of war-in-peace. One result, as John Herz pointed out with the advent of ICBMs in the Eisenhower years, was that the "hard shell" of national boundaries had been rendered "permeable."<sup>150</sup> Added to this, was the fact that force and military power increasingly came to appear less useful during

the "long peace" as tools to deal with complex economic problems and social crisis. As a consequence, the traditional bond between such power and the organizing legitimacy that had emerged from Westphalia began to weaken. That legitimacy was based on the state's ability to shield the citizen from the capricious violence in the international community. In return, the inhabitants of states took on citizenship which normally included, at the very least, the payment of taxes and participation, if required, in the common defense of the state. But if the state could no longer be depended upon to provide a defensive shield for its citizenry; or if the state had in effect become a contributor to the problems of a society, then the ancient agreement forged at Westphalia was destroyed: "the roof," as Herz noted, would be "blown off" the historic shelter provided by the nation-state since the end of the Thirty Years War.<sup>151</sup>

To this refocus on the viability of the nation-state was added the changing nature of conflict brought on by the peaceful, bipolar great power stalemate of the "long war." Modern war, as it emerged in that stalemate, was no longer the sole preserve of the state in the sense that it had established norms, rules, and etiquettes, as well as standardized strategies. In that context, during the cold war, declarations were rarely exchanged, the identity of warring parties could not always be established, and many military actions did not conform to the traditional concept of two or more national armies fighting each other. The result, as Brian Jenkins predicted, was that the use of force for political purposes has come to range from intifadas, terrorism and insurgent conflicts, through peacekeeping and peacemaking operations to "conventional" set warfare between the organized armed forces of nation-states:

With continuous, sporadic armed conflict, blurred in time and space, waged on several levels by a large array of national and subnational forces, warfare in the last quarter of the twentieth century may well come to resemble warfare in the Italian Renaissance or warfare in the early seventeenth century before the emergence of national armies and more organized modern warfare.<sup>152</sup>

These trends culminated in the mid-1970s with the rise of "interdependence" studies, which criticized the state-centric "realist" tendency to reduce all international relations to a struggle for power in the face of emerging multicentric transnationalism, particularly in the area of economics. Global interdependence, those studies concluded, was altering the nature of traditional geopolitical rivalries. Integration and cooperation were becoming at least as important as balance of power, since global networks were evolving apart from traditional military and ideological alliances. The new trend was toward mutual security in an interdependent world based on an international system that was functioning less and less on a "self-help" basis. The traditional security game, in short, could



be conducted as much with the logic of Adam Smith as Thucydides. Nevertheless, even the earliest proponents of the new school were not prepared for a major shift in the realist paradigm.

We must. . .be cautious about the prospect that rising interdependence is creating a brave new world of cooperation to replace the bad old world of international conflict. As every parent of small children knows, baking a larger pie does not stop disputes over the size of the slices.<sup>153</sup>

The realist response to the concept of interdependence was to acknowledge the socioeconomic transformations that had occurred during the cold war, while denying any significant impact of those changes on the state-centric paradigm focused on the maximization of power in an anarchic world. Kenneth Waltz, for instance, pointed out that transnational processes and non-state actors acquired significance only in the context of a state-controlled international environment. Those states, he argued, "may choose to interfere little in the affairs of non-state actors for long periods of time"; nevertheless, they "set the terms of the intercourse. . . .When the crunch comes, states remake the rules by which other actors operate." As a consequence of the continuing structural predominance of states, the realist paradigm remained firm: no new theories were needed. "A theory that denies the central role of states," Waltz concluded, "will be needed only if non-state actors develop to the point of rivaling or surpassing the great powers, not just a few minor ones. They show no sign of doing that."<sup>154</sup>

In effect, this so-called "neorealist" approach was an update of the realist paradigm without an alteration of its basic premises: a synthesis of that paradigm's assumptions and the modern realities of the post-industrial era. One variant of that approach was the examination of states and transnational entities together in the context of "international regimes," where they could deal with each other through non-hierarchical processes based on agreed sets of principles and procedures that operated in particular issue areas. Despite the added focus on new actors and transnational processes, however, regime theory remained essentially within the realist paradigm, grafting institutions and procedures onto the state-centric system. That system, as Waltz also pointed out, was flexible enough to allow in a passive sense "informal rules to develop," a flexibility that also permitted states to intervene "to change rules that no longer suit them."<sup>155</sup>

The neorealist approach does not suffice for those theorists who emphasize the rise of a transnational, multicentric system of international relations within the security provided by the bipolar war-in-peace framework of the cold war. At the same time, they are unable to postulate a complete shift from the realist paradigm. James Rosenau, for instance, sees the new multicentric world as neither superordinate nor subordinate to the historic

state-centric world. The result is a framework of coexistence that posits sovereignty-bound and sovereignty-free actors as inhabitants of separate worlds, but interacting in such a way as to ensure their continued existence. That interaction, however, is sustained by circumstances in which the state is increasingly inadequate and yet, as Rosenau admits, also indispensable.

All of these doubts notwithstanding, it is difficult to ignore the present capacity of states to control the instruments of coercive force and the publics needed to support their use. The range of issues on which these instruments can be used effectively has narrowed considerably in recent decades, but not yet to the point where it is reasonable to presume that states and their world are dissolving into the multicentric environment. Instead, states must be regarded as still capable of maintaining the norms and practices of their own international system. . . .<sup>156</sup>

*Change and Continuity.* The demise of the bipolar international system is the most obvious change in the post-cold war era. One of the poles in that system simply ceased to operate and then ceased to exist. A major reason for the end of the Soviet Union was that there could be no rational military victory as that bipolar relationship evolved in the long war. The result was that military competition between the two superpowers was prolonged for over 40 years in the "long peace." For the USSR, the extended preparation for conflict delayed modernization while wasting resources--all to a point that finally brought down not only the 70-year-old Soviet regime, but the 300-year-old Russian Empire as well.<sup>157</sup>

There are other important legacies of the bipolar war-in-peace system. The dramatic cold war scientific and technological advances set in train a curious blend of integrative and disintegrative forces and trends that are adding to the complex tensions of the current transition period. The integrative force that increasingly linked global economies in the "long peace," for instance, also holds out the spectral potential of global depression or, at the very least, nations more susceptible to disintegrative actions, as the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait demonstrated. In a similar manner, the advances in communications and transportation that have spread the results of medical and scientific discoveries around the world are countered by the malign transnational results of nuclear technology, the drug trade, terrorism, AIDS and global warming.<sup>158</sup>

At the same time, those advances also led to the unprecedented flow of ideas--truly a development that confirmed Friedrich Schiller's ideal in his poem, "*Die Gedanken Sind Frei.*" Those ideas, combined with the integrative forces of democratic politics and market economies, ultimately brought about the disintegrative sweep of revolutions throughout Central and Eastern Europe in the fall of 1989.<sup>159</sup> The two-edged sword of this

transnational force continues to dominate the current transition period. From this viewpoint, Marshall McLuhan's image of a communications-induced "global village" does not take into account the power of information to reinforce nationalism and move nations away from a global political identity. Instead of one global village, as Joseph Nye has pointed out, "there are villages around the globe more aware of each other."<sup>160</sup>

From the "long war" perspective, the bipolar contest between two ideologies hid this basic strength and durability of nationalism. Nowhere is this more apparent than in Europe where that contest had moderated centuries-old animosities, such as those between France and Germany and between Greece and Turkey. At the same time, the Soviets had suppressed similar differences in the East, whether between Czechs and Poles or Hungarians and Romanians. In the current transition period, there are daily reminders of that "new religion" in the Irish question, the Basque problem in Spain, or the disputes between the Walloons and Flemings in Belgium. And in the former Yugoslavia, nationalism has reemerged in an area that Bismarck once said was not worth the bones of a Pomeranian grenadier, but which nonetheless brought on the maelstrom of the Great War. That area is just one of many examples of how unqualified support for the integrative force of national self-determination in the wake of the long ideological war can contribute to enormous global disorder and disintegration, particularly in a world populated by at least 170 states, less than 10 percent of which are ethnically homogeneous.<sup>161</sup>

All this serves as a reminder that challenges to the state-centric paradigm are not new in international affairs. As one historian has pointed out, the 19th century Great Powers were far more integrated than their more recent counterparts--creating in that age of borderless commerce and travel, "the belle epoque of interdependence."<sup>162</sup> Observing that state of affairs, as we have seen, Norman Angell argued prior to World War I in *The Great Illusion* that the level of economic interdependence in Europe was so high that war was not a cost effective proposition. And after World War II, there were those who argued that specific functions could be taken over by varied entities that would ultimately supersede individual states.<sup>163</sup>

Nonetheless, the nation-state continues to endure. The North American Free Trade Agreement, for instance, is a current example of the continued precariousness of interdependence at its basic economic level as well as the residual strength of nationalism. Moreover, as the debates and referenda over the Maastricht Agreement demonstrated, even a Europe poised to establish a regional common market is not about to make the state system obsolete. "The development of regional integration," Joseph Nye has acknowledged, "outstripped the development of regional communities."<sup>164</sup>

In any event, neither the change nor the continuity embodied

in the concept of interdependence appears likely to increase the stability of the international system in the current transition period. In terms of change, the new forces of integration will continue to generate those of disintegration. As for continuity, even translating the basic economic underpinnings of interdependence into the geopolitics of the state system presents fundamental problems. The classic liberal argument, for instance, is that the more contact between states and their populations, the less danger of conflict. But, in fact, as the example of Norman Angell illustrates, historically those nations with the most contact have most frequently gone to war with each other. Moreover, the "long peace" is a reminder that it was fear of a hot war, not the desire for profit, that brought about superpower cooperation.<sup>165</sup>

A concomitant to all that is a need for continuity with the traditional concepts of military power and war in the current transition, even as the stock of other elements of national power rises in an increasingly complex world. Nowhere was this more dramatically illustrated than in the Gulf War. "The notion that economic power inevitably translates into geopolitical influence is a materialist illusion," Charles Krauthammer noted in this regard. "Economic power is a necessary condition for great power status. But it certainly is not sufficient, as has been made clear by the recent behavior of Germany and Japan, which have generally hidden under the table since the first shots rang out in Kuwait."<sup>166</sup>

And while it is true that the "long peace" reinforced a tendency by the developed industrialized nations to discredit war between themselves, there was no such tendency in the Third World, increasingly militarized as the "long war" took on global dimensions. In fact, there was a general perception that war and violence could improve situations, primarily because many of the developing nations achieved statehood through armed struggle during the years of the cold war. And although there may have been some lessons for Third World nations concerning the futility of such prolonged struggles as the Cambodian upheaval or the Iran-Iraq war, the majority of those countries developed no apocalyptic visions of war similar to those which developed in the West in response to both World Wars and the cold war. How different this outlook on war could be was illustrated by the Ayatollah Khomeini in 1984:

War is a blessing for the world and for all nations. It is God who incites men to fight and to kill. . . . A prophet is all-powerful. Through war he purifies the earth. The mullahs with corrupt hearts who say that all this is contrary to the teachings of the Koran are unworthy of Islam.<sup>167</sup>

Weapons proliferation in the Third World will continue to augment these tendencies in the current transition period, because the legacy of the "long war" lives on in both the East

and the West in the form of bureaucratic, industrial and research infrastructures oriented on the design, procurement and production of military weapons and equipment. It is, in short, extremely difficult to turn off the military-industrial spigot, particularly when the health of national economies after 40 years of chronic preparation for war is tied up, at least in part, with foreign military sales. Added to this is the problem of nuclear proliferation. From the "long peace" perspective, the lesson from the cold war might seem to be that the possession of large numbers of nuclear weapons creates a sense of responsibility on the part of nations, thus diminishing the temptation to take risks, regardless of differences in history, culture or circumstances. That is, of course, hardly a comforting lesson based on recent experiences with such rogue states as Libya and Iraq. The basic fact remains in the current transition that the proliferation of nuclear and conventional weapons, particularly to regional hegemony, will continue to exacerbate the uneven growth of power among states, identified long before the end of the cold war as the principal problem in international relations.<sup>168</sup>

As a consequence of all this, there is still a strong sense of continuity with the overall realist paradigm. Change in the form of growing interdependence is, of course, a fact of life. But world politics is still dominated by the state-centric system, which in fact requires more realism and power in the current transition period in order to balance the integrative and disintegrative forces spawned by that interdependence. For interdependence promotes insecurity and competition without providing the means for mitigating that insecurity and for placing bounds on that competition. Moreover, even if interdependence is beneficial to all players, those benefits may vary to the extent that the perception of those marked disparities may become a new source of conflict. It is, in short, a phenomenon that creates the need for greater order without providing assurance that the need will be met.<sup>169</sup>

The hegemonic stability imposed on the forces and trends unleashed by interdependence disappeared with the cold war. But there is much to be learned from the cooperative efforts that emerged from a long militarized peace combined with a long peaceful militarization. The creation and evolution of NATO, for instance, has many lessons for solving the problems posed by the coexistence of integrated supranational military forces with national military units. Equally important, in this regard, are the projects for managing power from the second transition period, abandoned as the cold war began. Among them was Roosevelt's grand design of the victorious powers acting in concert as part of his "World Policemen" scheme, with its associated plan to create an Anglo-American-Soviet "air corps" for global patrols.<sup>170</sup>

Such great power combinations are traditionally viewed as negative imperialism and hegemonic dominance, a tendency

reinforced by the long bipolar configuration of the international system during the cold war. Over the years, as an example, the Yalta and Potsdam accords have received bad press in both the West and the East. But it should not be forgotten that those agreements also reflected the willingness of the great powers to take responsibility for maintaining the international order, a responsibility best expressed in the Charter of the United Nations. It is this great power responsibility that furthers the linkage between those regime theorists and neorealists who see international institutions as a means to regularize cooperation and provide support for multilateral policies in an anarchic and uncertain world. In the end, since states cannot be forced to choose international over national interests, a sense of global responsibility among the most powerful international actors must provide the consensual leadership for international regimes within the realist paradigm.<sup>171</sup>

This is not enough for the critics of that paradigm. "When the Emperor's clothes are tattered," one concluded, "many a tailor will be found working on new robes."<sup>172</sup> But while those garments may be in better condition, if change is allowed to obscure the very real continuities from the past in this current transition period, the new robes will also be ill-fitting. The rate and direction of global change should not be exaggerated. "[T]o be prematurely right in international affairs," Owen Harries has pointed out, "to anticipate a trend too early and to act on it, can be as fatal as being dead wrong."<sup>173</sup>

## CHAPTER 4

### BROTHER CAN YOU PARADIGM?

Tesman: "But, good heavens, we know nothing of the future."

Lovborg: "No, but there is a thing or two to be said about it all the same."

Henrik Ibsen, *Hedda Gabler*

Today its critics have branded realism obsolete, a relic of the days of courts and princes, an approach out-of-sync with a world of borderless economies, peace-loving democracies, and global crises like the greenhouse effect.

Fareed Zakaria<sup>174</sup>

The cold war reflected two countertraditions in U.S. history. On the one hand was the idea of exceptionalism, that America stood for something new, destined to lead the old world from a discredited international system to a new order. This was embodied in Jeffersonian diplomacy, focused on grand objectives, which because of the force of the American "City on the Hill" example, would not require the use of force for achievement. That tradition was carried on and expanded by Woodrow Wilson, the articulator of American ideals, aspirations and, particularly, the nation's reason of state, the expansion of freedom. On the other hand was the Hamiltonian tradition used to great effect by Henry Cabot Lodge in the debates over the new world order during the first transition period. That approach eschewed grand ambitions, retaining a belief in military force and preparedness while pursuing a foreign policy tied to limited national interests.<sup>175</sup>

Both traditions were indispensable to the strategic consensus that animated U.S. national security policy throughout the cold war. Simply put, that consensus came about because the threat could be expressed in terms of both realist concerns with American security and idealist concerns with the defense of order and free institutions. Thus, there was the concept of containment squarely in the Hamilton-Lodge tradition with its emphasis on the avoidance of war by preparedness, moderation of diplomatic ambition, and, above all, balance of power by means of an enduring alliance system. At the same time, the Jefferson-Wilsonian influence was evident as early as the Truman Doctrine with its image of free people working at their own destinies in their own way. That image combined the distinctly Wilsonian equation of a peaceful, orderly world with a truly democratic one that could only be achieved through U.S. leadership.

The Vietnam experience did considerable damage to the

strategic consensus. Nevertheless, the link between establishing order and freedom and ensuring U.S. security did not break. And in fact the promotion of freedom and order became the basis for restoring domestic consensus in foreign policy in both the Carter (human rights) and Reagan (the Democratic Revolution) administrations. Nor was the linkage absent in the Gulf War, in which President Bush embarked on a new world order that appeared to be a functional equivalent of global containment for the new transition period. On the one hand was the realist perception of world order as the product of a stable distribution of power among the major states. On the other was the Wilsonian tradition of the indivisibility of peace, reflected in the President's declaration at the beginning of the Gulf War that "every act of aggression unpunished. . . strengthens the forces of chaos and lawlessness that, ultimately, threaten us all."<sup>176</sup>

At the conclusion of that war, President Bush informed the nation that the "specter of Vietnam has been buried forever in the desert sands of the Arabian peninsula."<sup>177</sup> But in some very important ways, the Bush administration had returned the United States in the Gulf to a role that Americans ultimately had rejected a generation earlier in Vietnam. At that time, President Johnson had also defended the commitment to world order as being inseparable from U.S. security, with the American intervention repeatedly justified in terms of freedom and self-determination. In that context, the Johnson administration contended, a refusal to play policeman would place world order in jeopardy and with it American security. "We can be safe," Dean Rusk commented, "only to the extent that our total environment is safe."<sup>178</sup>

In a similar manner, the Gulf War seemed to bear out the argument that international stability required a continuity of role by the world's most powerful and trusted nation. But a major part of containment for the United States had been the role of custodian of freedom against a specific adversary. Now, in the new transition period, it appeared America was to become the principal custodian of stability against any state threatening the international order. The shift presented difficulties. To maintain a fragile peace that remained unstable required something more like a policeman than a leader of a coalition working against an identifiable, hostile adversary. But a nation that throughout its history, and particularly in the long war-in-peace, had grown accustomed to perceiving itself as the exemplar and defender of freedom, was bound to find the role of policeman much less appealing.<sup>179</sup>

As a consequence, the equation of world order with American security has become far less compelling in the current transition. Added to this are the difficulties in keeping the ideals of order and freedom together in a changing world where disintegrative forces unleashed by the end of the cold war appear to be, at least temporarily, in the ascendancy over those of integration. "If I had to choose between justice and disorder on the one hand," Goethe once noted, "and injustice and order on the



other, I would always choose the latter."<sup>180</sup> This is a bit strong, but not so easily dismissed when considering whether Yugoslavia is better off today than under Tito, or whether Somalia improved its lot in the wake of the overthrow of its most recent dictator. "America's moral fervor, always close to the surface," one pollster recently concluded, "will be rechanneled from anticommunism to a new era of American patriotism centered on improving the quality of America's goods and services--an uninspiring vision, perhaps, for Cold Warriors but not for the hard-pressed American public."<sup>181</sup>

Such a conclusion may be premature. After all, the forces and trends set in train during and after the cold war have not yet played out in the current transition. But certainly for great powers in the past after long wars, there was a tendency for excesses of domestic introversion to follow the excesses of international conflict. The concomitant to that pattern was normally the rebirth of a balance-of-power system as nationalistic issues gained priority over the cooperative necessities of reducing power conflicts. The result for the United States in such a milieu could be a retreat into parochialism and insularity just when increasing interdependence renders such a state destabilizing; and just when American leadership and resources are required for an anarchic world, made more so by the disintegrative forces of interdependence.

An alternative to all that in the current transition is a return to the "higher realism" of Woodrow Wilson. That realism required the United States to accept a leadership role in world affairs based on values that would claim the enduring allegiance of the American public. At the same time, Wilson warned that a policeman's solitary lot was not a happy one; and that by attempting such a role alone, the United States could become a militarized garrison state and thereby destroy the values and ideals that formed the distinctive nature of American society. Much of that came to pass at times during the cold war. But the impact of the "long war" and "long peace" as shown in all three levels of analysis has also set the stage for a third attempt in this century at the management of power under a systemic framework of collective security.

### **The Management of Power.**

In the current transition period, the concept of collective security has emerged almost by default, rather than on its own merit. Unilateralism for the United States appears increasingly ineffective or illegitimate because of the forces and trends still swirling in the domestic and international arenas as a result of the cold war. And alliances without an adversary seem anachronistic and empty, lacking, as Richard Betts has pointed out, that "animating originality that revolutionary political changes seem to mandate."<sup>182</sup> The result has been an invocation of collective security as the way to manage power in the post-cold

war era that at times appears more as a celebration of peace than as a way to enforce it. This tendency to see peace as the premise of a security system rather than its product was captured at the height of the cold war by Arnold Wolfers:

Promotion of the idea of collective security has created a psychological situation in which the United States cannot turn its back on the concept, not because of what collective security can accomplish. . .but because of what millions of people. . .believe it may accomplish in time. Collective security has come to be the chief symbol of hope that. . .a community of nations will develop in which there will be no more war.<sup>183</sup>

Despite all this, the Wilsonian ideal type of collective security is no more possible in the current transition than it was in 1919 or 1945. The prerequisite shift in the overall paradigm of international relations has simply not occurred, leaving realism, in E. H. Carr's description, as "the impact of thinking upon wishing."<sup>184</sup> That realism was evident during the second transition in the founding of the United Nations, which assumed a multipolar distribution of power with the five great powers, protected by their vetos, enforcing collective security. But cold war bipolarity hobbled that more realistic version of Wilson's institutional approach. As a consequence, the superpower veto became a staple of the U.N. in the coming decades; and the organization was reduced to more modest peacekeeping roles, in which the multilateral forces could be brushed aside at any time the belligerents wished to resume conflict, as they were, for example, in the June 1967 Arab-Israeli War.<sup>185</sup>

Only when the Soviets temporarily boycotted the U.N. Security Council in June 1950 was there the multilateral response to major aggression envisioned in the U.N. charter. And even then, while it was symbolically important for other nations to join in collective action, only American military participation was vital to the outcome of the Korean War. In a similar manner, collective security emerged in the Gulf War, because the United States asserted itself as a hegemon in place of the bipolar balance of power to draw in the U.N. Ostensibly, interests such as access to oil were not the reasons for the American response. Nor was democracy at stake since the ruling family oligarchy reclaimed Kuwait at the end of the conflict. The primary explanation by the Bush administration was opposition to aggression as a matter of principle. It was that universality with its implied automaticity that brought the concept of ideal collective security into the post-cold war equation--an unrealistic development that has only confused the major issue of power management, as responses to the situation in the former Yugoslavia demonstrate.<sup>186</sup>

Ironically, the Gulf War actually demonstrated that global circumstances now resemble those which the founders of the U.N.

envisaged in 1945. At that time, the great power directorate of the Security Council was created based on the principle that power must be commensurate with responsibility. As a consequence, what emerged in the United Nations during the second transition period was a system that could only work against smaller powers--hardly a significant guarantee, the critics at the time emphasized, for maintaining international peace and stability. In the post-cold war world, what was once perceived as a grave defect has emerged almost as a virtue, particularly in the wake of the Gulf War. For the major threats in this new era appear to be posed only by smaller powers that have not yet reconciled their aspirations and level of development with the norms of conventional statecraft. As a result, the U.N. may emerge in the current transition as the best means to express the community of great powers that Wilson had attempted to find in the League.<sup>187</sup>

In any event, the concept of a great power condominium is the logical way for the United States to achieve Wilson's "higher realism" in the current transition period. Ironically, the model for the concept is the 1815 Concert of Europe, scorned a century later by Wilson when he promulgated pure collective security as the best way to manage power. But in a world still dominated by the realist paradigm, that ideal type at one end of the collective security continuum is simply not feasible. A concert, on the other hand, is situated on the opposite end of that continuum and:

represents the most attenuated form of collective security. Though predicated on the notion of all against one, membership in a concert is restricted to the great powers of the day. A small group of major powers agrees to work together to resist aggression; they meet on a regular basis to monitor events and, if necessary, to orchestrate collective initiatives. A concert's geographic scope is flexible. Members can choose to focus on a specific region or regions, or to combat aggression on a global basis. Finally, a concert entails no binding or codified commitments to collective action. Rather, decisions are taken through informal negotiations, through the emergence of a consensus.<sup>188</sup>

To be successful, any such concert that emerges in the current transition period will depend, as it did in 1815, on involvement by all great powers. This would include, at the very least, the addition of Germany and Japan to the five great powers serving as the permanent representatives of the Security Council. Such involvement, however, is not preordained in the post-cold war era. In the former Soviet Union, for example, economic reform may prove so onerous as to preclude a stable and active foreign policy for a self-absorbed Russia, which like Japan after World War II, may need a period without international responsibilities in order to reestablish a growing economy. And even the United States will have to deal with the effects of the "long war." Like

the 1920s, there will certainly be strong incentives to put domestic priorities ahead of everything else--a tendency as Richard Rosecrance has observed, toward "a disastrous reconcentration on the American umbilicus."<sup>189</sup>

Ideological solidarity and renunciation of force are other obvious preconditions for a successful concert of powers, as they were at Vienna. The long peace-in-war made force by the great powers against each other virtually unthinkable. Inducements evolved during the cold war for those states to resolve peacefully, or even tolerate, accumulated grievances that prior to 1945 might have led to major conflict. The appeal, of course, was more to fear than logic. Nevertheless, behavior patterns born of fear can, over time, come to seem very logical. As a consequence, the cold war has already created, in the day-to-day interaction of the great powers, the habits and mechanisms for managing power in an anarchic world.<sup>190</sup>

This does not translate, however, into consistent great power cooperation in pursuit of the collective or public good. That is why the concert system can function within the realist paradigm. It is in this sense that the Concert of Europe is most instructive: the ideas of the common good did not always triumph over competition; war was always a possibility; the maintenance of peace was often at the expense of the weaker powers and of justice; and the great powers often defended their interests narrowly. The Concert, in fact, was always relatively fragile; but it was that very fragility that was a source of strength. Because the statesmen of the 19th century believed that the Concert could not survive major shocks, they were circumspect in their behavior, fearing that if they were not, the Concert could collapse, leaving the management of power to normal balance-of-power politics.<sup>191</sup>

The major criticism of any concert today would be the same as in the 19th century: the elitist nature of the system. But the basic fact of life in international relations is that some cooperation among the great powers is a prerequisite for world order within the state system. Great powers simply will not disappear. The issues of peace or war, security or insecurity in the world political system are largely determined more by these powers than by others. It is also a fact of life viewed from the realist perspective that when great powers work together to further global interests, they also may be promoting special interests of their own, whether it is preserving the political status quo or guarding their ascendancy within their own spheres of influence. And it may even be that without such special interests,<sup>192</sup> collaboration either would not occur or would not progress.

For all these reasons, the middle and smaller powers of the world will keep a vigilant watch on any emerging concert of great powers in the post-cold war era. Such a concert can mitigate much of the suspicions by such measures as refraining from making its

role too explicit or co-opting leading secondary powers for particular purposes. In any event, all political systems, and particularly international regimes, have some dissatisfied elements that will not necessarily undermine the foundation of the system. But unless a concert of great powers addresses the fundamental aspirations and the rising expectations of the developing world, the system will only exacerbate the growing bipolar nature of North-South relations. The "have nots" of that world represent a majority of the population and the states in international society. Moreover, weapons proliferation has the potential to bring future military challenges from those states, at least at the regional level, to a point not too dissimilar to that which occurred in the 1930s when Britain and France, representing the League of Nations, confronted the revisionist states of Germany, Italy and Japan. At that time, the "have not" nations represented one of the two principal concentrations of military power in the world; and the alternative to any type of peaceful change that would have appeased their demands was war.<sup>193</sup>

The alternative to a concert of powers in the state-centric realist paradigm is the decentralized balance-of-power system that resulted in both world wars of this century. Other systems for managing power will require a paradigm shift. One example is to return full circle to the hierarchical medieval paradigm in which war in the sense of organized violence between sovereign states does not exist, because sovereign states do not exist. But, as we have seen, the 17th century shift from that paradigm to the realist framework came about because of crisis in the form of ubiquitous violence and insecurity.

And while concepts such as ideal collective security and world government still deal with nation-states, their implementation requires paradigm shifts made unnecessary by the new assumptions. The ideals of universality and automaticity in pure collective security are based on covenants between all states and a central organization. In a similar manner, world government by contract is a system by which all sovereign states subordinate themselves to that government. The basic case for both concepts is the need to manage power in a Hobbesian world. But if states do exist in a Hobbesian state of nature, the covenants by which they are to emerge from it cannot occur. For if, as Hobbes maintained, "covenants without swords are but words," this will also be true of covenants directed toward the establishment of a collective security organization or a universal government.<sup>194</sup>

To make a paradigm shift in these circumstances will not help. The advocate of world government, for instance, can demonstrate the feasibility and desirability of his scheme only by shifting to a new paradigm, the basic assumption of which is that international relations do not resemble a Hobbesian state of nature. Covenants in that framework are more than words, providing as they do the basis for collaboration between sovereign states. But to make that basic assumption is to weaken

the imperative for bringing the international state of nature under control by means of a shift from the realist paradigm. World government theorists are thus stranded in a world which, viewed through a realist paradigm, makes their propositions as utopian as that envisioned by Alfred Lord Tennyson in "Locksley Hall," 150 years ago:

Till the war-drums throbb'd no longer,  
and the battle flags were furl'd  
In the Parliament of man, the  
Federation of the world.  
There the common sense of most shall  
hold a fretful realm in awe,  
And the kindly earth shall slumber  
lapt in universal law.<sup>195</sup>

The concept of a great power concert has no such utopian image. Instead, it provides a "realistic" way to manage power that will satisfy the American public grown accustomed in the "long war" to the day-to-day operation of a security regime. Most important, the move toward multilateral great power cooperation will allow the United States to continue a leadership role in world affairs without an overwhelming financial burden even as it refocuses on domestic threats to national security and responds to the demands of an increasingly interdependent world. There is a story, in this regard, of a man who was lost in Scotland and asked a farmer for directions to Edinburgh. "Oh sir," the farmer replied, "if I were you, I shouldn't start from here."<sup>196</sup> The idea that the state system does not provide the best starting point to explore the management of power has something of this quality. The fact is that it is within the state system in the current transition period that the "higher realism" of Woodrow Wilson can emerge successfully in a concert of great powers.

### **Strategic Vision.**

"Where there is no vision," the book of Proverbs concludes, "the people perish." Vision, however, is not enough. As history has consistently demonstrated, there is a symbiotic relationship between strategic vision and decisive authority. Without such authority to implement the vision, there remains only the sterile utterances of the prophet. On the other hand, decisive authority without vision, particularly at the highest levels of government, will produce politicians awash in a sea of expediency. But combine the insight of the prophet with the authority of the politician, and the result is the statesman at the national strategic level capable of achieving strategic vision.

It is by means of strategic vision that the statesman shapes and controls projected change instead of simply reacting to the forces and trends that swirl without direction into the future. He accomplishes this by dint of imagination and creativity and by balancing idealism with realism. Opportunism in this regard does

not diminish statesmanship. Anyone desiring to shape events, whether politician or statesman, must be opportunistic to some degree. But the politician merely adjusts his purposes to fit reality, while the visionary statesman attempts to shape reality in terms of his purpose or the change he desires. "When technique becomes exalted over purpose," Henry Kissinger has pointed out in this regard, "men become the victims of their own complexities. They forget that every great achievement in every field was a vision before it became a reality. . . . There are two kinds of realists: those who use facts and those who create them. The West requires nothing so much as men able to create their own reality."<sup>197</sup>

Such leaders in times of upheaval and great change can inspire, challenge, and educate in terms of their image of the future. Education is particularly important, since statesmen have to bridge the gap between their vision and the experiences of their people, between their intuition and national tradition. It is not an easy process. As a result, there are few periods in history in which the confluence of strategic vision and decisive authority has lasted for very long.

Nowhere, as we have seen, is this dilemma better illustrated than in the efforts of Metternich and Castlereagh to form a Concert of Europe after 1814. Metternich is an example of a statesman who limits his vision to the current experiences of his people and thus ultimately dooms his policy to sterility. In his case, it was a vision of the status quo, of the preservation of the multinational Austrian Empire in a time of great rising nationalism. Castlereagh, on the other hand, is an example of a statesman whose vision so far outruns the experience of his people that he fails to achieve the necessary domestic consensus for decisive authority, however wise the vision. That vision concerned the involvement of traditionally insular Great Britain in peacetime Continental politics in order to ensure equilibrium among the Great Powers.<sup>198</sup>

In the 20th century, each of the post-World War transitions for the United States were marked by strategic visions for managing power. Like Castlereagh, Wilson's vision of ideal collective security went far beyond American national experience. The result was an impasse that he attempted to circumvent by appealing directly to the public for the authority to implement his strategic vision. During his whistle-stop tour of the country, an exhausted Wilson suffered a massive stroke and was incapacitated for the remainder of his presidency. In the end, it hardly mattered. The Wilsonian vision required a shift from the realist paradigm which itself was not fully understood by a nation and a people poised for a return to the soft incubus of isolationistic "normalcy."

In the second transition period, George Kennan's strategic vision of containing the Soviet Union was rooted squarely in the realist paradigm. The orientation of that vision on the Soviet

threat was significant. As that threat became more apparent in the opening years of the cold war, the orientation insured the acceptance of that vision, first by governmental elites and then by the American people. Moreover, because that threat was to endure for 45 years with varying degrees of intensity, the entire succession of U.S. Presidents in the cold war from Truman to Reagan enjoyed the historically anomalous coincidence of a coherent strategic vision and overall decisive authority.

The current transition period is not one in which a strategic vision that would balance foreign with domestic policy can easily play a major role. This is one of the ironic legacies of the long war-in-peace. For in the successful pursuit of the overall strategic vision in that twilight conflict, successive administrations set in motion military, social, and economic forces that increased the tension between these contradictory elements of U.S. national security policy. To that misfortune, largely in reaction to this tension, were added the political effects of a resurgent Congress. There is, of course, a natural adversarial process between the congressional and executive branches implicit in the U.S. Constitution. But that process was largely dormant between Pearl Harbor and Tet '68. The massive congressional reentry into foreign affairs since Vietnam has hindered and will continue to hinder the confluence of a balanced vision with authority in the executive branch.

Further complicating the problem is the changing nature of the threat. In recent years, the American people have become increasingly aware of the domestic threats to their national security, whether in the form of illicit drugs, inner city rot, the savings and loan fiasco, or the national debt. At the same time, the successful realization of the strategic vision that animated Western strategy throughout the cold war has also diminished a public perception of international menace. In foreign affairs, the threat now seems more speculative, certainly less urgent, whether it be the fragmentation of Yugoslavia or the prospect of Russia metamorphosing into another Weimar, sullenly nursing its grudge in the wake of its cold war defeat.

Nevertheless, there are potential threats in the international arena that should be addressed along with domestic threats in any new strategic vision if that vision is to achieve the credibility that will eventually result in decisive authority. To begin with, there is the proliferation of mass destruction weapons. "By the year 2000," former Secretary of Defense Cheney has noted, "it is estimated that at least 15 developing nations will have the ability to build ballistic missiles--eight of which either have or are near to acquiring nuclear capabilities. Thirty countries will have chemical weapons and ten will be able to deploy biological weapons as well."<sup>199</sup> Added to this concern is the emergence of nations marked by resentment against the West and the status quo with the capability and the inclination to use these weapons of mass destruction. These are revolutionary powers whose principal issue



is not adjustment within the international system, but the system itself. They not only feel threatened, a regular feature of the realist state system, but they also can never be reassured short of absolute security, a precondition for the absolute insecurity of their opponents.

Equally important in this regard are threats posed by an increasingly interdependent world. There is, for example, the growing recognition that planet Earth is a very fragile ship hurtling through space--that separate events ranging from the destruction of rain forests to depletion of the ozone layer may be the ultimate threats to national security. Or, as another example, there is the growing disparity between the North and the South, the developed and developing countries of the world. The South has watched the North fight three great internecine wars in this century: the two world wars and the cold war. Now, fueled not only by latent industrial revolutions but those of transportation, technology, and communications- information as well, the Southern nations are ready to take their place in the sun. An American strategic vision in the new era must acknowledge these rising expectations, since a vision of a brave new world within the realist paradigm that does not take into account the human condition worldwide is fundamentally at odds with American values. In the long run, such a vision will stand no more chance of garnering decisive authority than will a vision that ignores the human condition on the domestic front.

In all this a new strategic vision must ultimately come to grips with the management of power. Once again, the proper mix of change and continuity will be the key. In terms of continuity, of course, there is the enormous leverage that the United States possesses because of the victory in the cold war. America simply cannot afford to ignore that situation. In the game of cricket, after a successful "at bat," a team with good defensive capabilities can voluntarily relinquish its bat to the opposing side with the expectation of winning the game. International relations will not likely provide such an option for the United States in the current transition period. The game will thus continue without relief against a new succession of opponents, each with bowlers and batmen never encountered before.<sup>200</sup>

But the long war-in-peace has also brought about major changes for the United States in terms of all three levels of analysis. As a result, any vision for managing power that remains fixed on a completely dominant, cold war-like American role in the international arena will eventually lose decisive authority to implement that vision as the current transition continues. Such a vision could also trigger a reaction that either ignores the realist paradigm by retreating into some form of isolationism and protectionism, or causes a premature shift of that framework. The realist paradigm, however, is still viable. The solution is to convince the American people that the threat in the international arena requires a centralization in the management of power within that paradigm, much like that which occurred in

1815. A vision that incorporates a great power concert will allow the United States to address its domestic problems and thus keep American values intact, while continuing to provide leadership in global politics. It is a vision that Castlereagh, Wilson and Kennan would understand.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSION

The commonest error in politics is sticking to the carcasses of dead policies. When a mast falls overboard you do not try to save a rope here and a spar there in memory of their former utility; you cut away the hamper altogether. And it should be the same with a policy. But it is not so. We cling to the shred of an old policy after it has been torn to pieces; and to the shadow of the shred after the rag itself has been thrown away.

Lord Salisbury <sup>201</sup>

In the life of societies and international systems there comes a time when the question arises whether all the possibilities of innovation inherent in a given structure have been exhausted. At this point, symptoms are taken for cause; immediate problems absorb the attention that should be devoted to determining their significance. Events are not shaped by a concept of the future; the present becomes all-intrusive. However impressive such a structure may still appear to outsiders, it has passed its zenith. It will grow ever more rigid and, in time, irrelevant.

Henry Kissinger <sup>202</sup>

We playwrights who have to cram a whole human life or an entire historical era into a two-hour play, can scarcely understand this rapidity [of change] ourselves. And if it gives us trouble, think of the trouble it must give political scientists who have less experience with the realm of the improbable.

Vaclav Havel <sup>203</sup>

A student one time questioned Isaac Deutscher, Trotsky's biographer, concerning Deutscher's assertion that Trotsky was an extremely far-sighted person. Not one of Trotsky's predictions, the student argued, had come to fruition. "Not yet," Deutscher is reported to have replied, "which shows you just how far-sighted he really was."<sup>204</sup> The anecdote demonstrates just how important reference points can be. It also illustrates the type of rationalization used by many international relations theorists as they look for alternatives to the realist paradigm.

In this regard, Thomas Kuhn has described three types of phenomena about which new theory might be developed. The first is already well explained by existing paradigms. There is thus neither motive nor need for new theory construction. At the other extreme are the phenomena of recognized anomalies which cannot be

assimilated by existing paradigms and, as a consequence, require framework shifts in order to be explained. Somewhere between are the phenomena whose nature is indicated by existing paradigms, but whose details require further theory articulation in order to be understood fully.<sup>205</sup>

It is in this middle category that the phenomena resulting from an increasingly complex and interdependent world belong in terms of the realist paradigm. Theories of change abound, of course, to explain those phenomena. But as Kuhn pointed out, a paradigm "is declared invalid only if an alternate candidate is available to take its place."<sup>206</sup> And few theorists are ready to make that claim in terms of the state-centric realist framework. "What is occurring in the world is not a serious demise of states as the central actors in the system," one critic concluded, ". . . but rather their acceptance that they have to work together in controlling a variety of interdependencies."<sup>207</sup>

Any such cooperation will take place within the realist paradigm. For the interdependence that emerged in the international system during the cold war has unleashed a variety of disintegrative as well as integrative forces. The task for American statesmen in this transition period is to convince the people of the United States that the dangers and potentials of these forces are great enough to require continued American involvement and leadership in international affairs. At the same time, that leadership must include a major role in moving the other great powers toward a consensual condominium that can realistically centralize the management of power in a self-help, anarchical world. All this will require a strategic vision that creates a picture of this desired continuity and change, credible enough to achieve authority for implementation.

Oddly enough, statesmen in the current transition period can take heart in this difficult endeavor from the experience of the Viscount Castlereagh who, in the wake of the Vienna Congress, lost the authority to implement his strategic vision. The British statesman is proof nonetheless that men become myths not because of what they know, not even because of what they do, but because of the tasks they set out for themselves. For Castlereagh, that task was to bring insular Great Britain into the peacetime Continental political dialogue in order to preserve a European equilibrium of force. To this end, between 1815 and 1820 the British statesman was instrumental in inaugurating a series of congresses at which all the great powers assembled to discuss ways to maintain the European balance. Toward the end of that period, however, the conservative eastern powers began to use those forums to legitimize interference in newly emerging liberal regimes in Europe. As a consequence, there was a public outcry in England against Castlereagh and his policy so strong that he was driven from office. Shortly thereafter he committed suicide. But his strategic vision lived on. For the Great Powers, including Great Britain, had become accustomed through the congress system to periodic meetings for resolving differences. The eventual

result was the Concert of Europe, which helped produce a century of relative peace among the great powers of Europe.<sup>208</sup>

For American statesmen, a similar success in achieving the implementation of a strategic vision to guide the United States through this third major transition of the 20th century will require that they successfully issue a new call to greatness to the American people. This time, however, there will be no clarion calls for stirring crusades against fascism and communism. Instead, the call must be focused on creating stability in the international order, on averting chaos in an anarchical world. The problem is that while equilibrium is a necessity for that stability, it does not constitute a sufficient purpose for the American people, with their historic sense of mission. Peace must be presented as more than the absence of conflict. Stability must be perceived as a bridge to the realization of human aspirations, not an end in itself.

In the final analysis, American statesmen must create an image of desired change within the realist paradigm that inspires their citizens to efforts at least as great and for goals at least as grand as those that marked the 40-year war-in-peace. It is a picture that the great Ulysses could paint to his comrades, even at the end of 10 years of warfare followed by a decade spent in fruitless efforts to return home to his beloved Ithaca:

Come, my friends,  
'Tis not too late to seek a newer world. . . .  
We are not now that strength which in old days  
Moved earth and heaven; that which we are, we are;  
One equal temper of heroic hearts,  
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will  
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.

## ENDNOTES

1. Kalevi J. Holsti, *Peace and War: Armed Conflicts and International Order 1648-1989*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 335.
2. George Orwell, *1984*, New York: The New American Library of World Literature, 1961, p. 7. In describing this kind of thinking, Orwell coined a word which has become a part of modern vocabulary: "doublethink." "Doublethink means the power of holding two contradictory beliefs in one's mind simultaneously, and accepting both of them. . . .This process has to be conscious, or it would not be carried out with sufficient precision. But it also has to be unconscious, or it would bring with it a feeling of falsity and hence of guilt." *Ibid.*, p. 264.
3. No pun intended. Theodore S. Hamerow, *From the Finland Station: The Graying of Revolution in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Basic Books, 1990. See also John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the End of the Cold War: Implications, Reconsiderations, Provocations* (hereinafter referred to as *Cold War*), New York: Oxford University Press, 1991, p. 64.
4. Ronald Steel, "The End and the Beginning," *The End of the Cold War. Its Meaning and Implications*, ed., Michael J. Hogan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 105. As will be demonstrated, there is a major difference in whether the cold war is examined in terms of being a "long war" or a "long peace." See for example, Robert W. Tucker, "1989 and All That," *Sea Changes: American Foreign Policy in a World Transformed*, ed., Nicholas X. Rizopoulos, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1990, p. 217, who finds no historic parallel of a hegemonic conflict being terminated by the default of one side "in time of peace." Emphasis added. On the perception of the suddenness of the event, see General Powell's September 27, 1991 comments to the Senate Armed Services Committee: "We have seen our implacable enemy of 40 years vaporize before our eyes." R. J. Jeffery Smith, "Initiative Affects Least Useful Weapons," *The Washington Post*, September 28, 1991.
5. "X," George F. Kennan, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 25, No. 2, July 1947, p. 580.
6. Change "without violent breaks in the continuity of power." George F. Kennan, "America and the Russian Future," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 29, April 1951, p. 368. See also Paul Kennedy's similar assessment over a quarter of a century later: "Those who rejoice at the present-day difficulties of the Soviet Union and who look forward to the collapse of that empire might wish to recall that such transformations normally occur at very great cost, and not always in a predictable fashion." *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, New York: Random House, 1987, p. 514. Kennan, of course, was remarkably accurate about the internal

disintegration of the Soviet state. See also John Lewis Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 3, Winter 1992/93, p. 56.

7. Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Cold War and its Aftermath," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 1992, pp. 31-49. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 135. At the Paris summit, President Bush certainly made the end official. "The Cold War is over," he proclaimed. David Reynolds, "Behind Bipolarity in Space and Time," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 215.

8. George Bush, "Toward a New World Order," September 11, 1990 address before a joint session of Congress, *U.S. Department of State Dispatch 1*, No. 3, September 17, 1990, p. 91. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 147, and John M. Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts on World War III," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 39.

9. Emphasis added. *Webster Dictionary*.

10. James N. Rosenau, "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges: Toward a Post-International Politics for the 1990s," *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges. Approaches to World Politics for the 1990s*, eds., Ernst-Otto Czempill and James N. Rosenau, Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989, p. 17.

11. Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, 2nd ed., Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970, p. 37. See also *Ibid.*, pp. 80 and 174-175; Richard W. Mansbach and John A. Vasquez, *In Search of Theory. A New Paradigm for Global Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1981, pp. xiv and 4; Robert K. Merton, *Social Theory and Social Structure*, rev. ed., New York: Free Press, 1965, pp. 12-16; and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Structure and International Transformation: Space, Time and Method," *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, p. 32.

12. Kuhn, pp. 67. The shift itself is, of course, also subjective, with paradigm changes being perceived only by those affected. For outsiders, these changes may seem like the Balkan revolutions in the early 20th century: part of a normal developmental process. For astronomers, as an example, the discovery of X-rays did not affect their paradigm and could be accepted as a mere addition to knowledge. For someone like Roentgen, whose research dealt with radiation, X-rays necessarily destroyed one paradigm as they created another. *Ibid.*, pp. 92-93.

13. *Ibid.*, pp. 68-69. See also Thomas S. Kuhn, *The Copernican Revolution*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1957, pp. 135-143.

14. Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, p. 76.

15. The awareness of a "state of crisis" in the universalist

medieval paradigm was apparent as early as the Council of Constance which met from 1414 to 1418. Adda B. Bozeman, *Politics and Culture in International History*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 504. But see Joseph Strayer, *On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970, p. 57, who concludes that "by 1300, it was evident that the dominant political form in Western Europe was going to be the sovereign state. The Universal Empire had never been anything but a dream; the Universal Church had to admit that defense of the individual state took precedence over the liberties of the Church or the claims of the Christian Commonwealth."

16. C. V. Wedgwood estimated in 1938 that Germany's population declined from 21 million to less than 13.5 million. C. V. Wedgwood, *The Thirty Years War*, London: Jonathan Cape, 1938, p. 516. S. H. Steinberg, *The Thirty Years War and the Conflict for European Hegemony 1600-1660*, New York: Norton, 1966, Chapter 3, points out that losses in the conflict were exaggerated. See also Geoffrey Parker, *The Thirty Years War*, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1984, p. 211, who estimated a decline in population from 20 million to approximately 16 or 17 million. See also John Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday. The Obsolescence of Major War*, New York: Basic Books, 1989, p. 8.

17. Kuhn, *Structure of Scientific Revolution*, p. 150.

18. Jasper Ridley, *Lord Palmerston*, London: Constable, 1970, p. 334.

19. Holsti, p. 25.

20. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*, trans. Rex Warner, Harmondsworth, Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, Ltd., 1987, p. 402.

21. Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace*, 4th ed., New York: Knopf, 1967, p. 10. See also Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 5.

22. Robert E. Osgood, *Ideas and Self-Interest in America's Foreign Relations*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1953, p. 9. See also Mansbach and Vasquez, p. 5.

23. Kenneth W. Waltz, *Man, the State and War: A Theoretical Analysis*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, p. 159.

24. Charles Doran, *The Politics of Assimilation: Hegemony and Its Aftermath*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1971, pp. 119-122 and Holstei, pp. 72-76.

25. John U. Nef, *War and Human Progress*, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972, p. 165; Geoffrey Treasure, *The Making of Modern Europe 1648-1780*, London: Methuen, 1986, p. 207;



Holstei, pp. 102-103; and Michael Howard, *War in European Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986, p. 72.

26. Holstei, p. 105; Geoffrey Best, *War and Society in Revolutionary Europe*, Suffolk: The Chaucer Press, 1982, pp. 92-93; Howard, p. 82; and Kyung-won Kim, *Revolution and International Systems*, New York: New York University Press, pp. 91-92 and 94-95.

27. G. A. Chevallez, *The Congress of Vienna and Europe*, Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1964, p. 123. See also Henry Kissinger, *A World Restored*, Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1977, Chapter VIII.

28. Charles K. Webster, *The Congress of Vienna*, London: Bell, 1934, p. 45.

29. Holsti, p. 129. For the informality and flexibility in the understanding between the great powers, see the October 1818 British Memorandum submitted to the Conference at Aix-la-Chapelle which concluded: "There is no doubt that a breach of the covenant [of the territorial system of Europe] by any one State is an injury which all the other States may, if they shall think fit, either separately or collectively resent, but the treaties do not impose, by express stipulation, the doing so as matter of positive obligation." René Albrecht-Carrié, *The Concert of Europe*, New York: Walker, 1968, p. 37.

30. Harold Nicolson, *The Congress of Vienna*, London: Constable, 1946, p. 39. See also Richard Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 1992, pp. 72-73.

31. Harold W. Temperley and Lillian M. Penson, eds., *Foundations of British Foreign Policy: Documents Old and New*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1938, pp. 47 and 61. It was the method, not the objective to which Castlereagh was objecting. The immediate objective of the various Vienna settlements, he wrote in December 1815, was "to inspire the States of Europe. . .with a sense of the dangers they have surmounted by their union,. . .to make them feel that the existing Concert is their only perfect security against the revolutionary embers more or less existing in every state of Europe. . . ." Hans G. Schenk, *The Aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars*, London: Kegan Paul, 1947, p. 117.

32. Kissinger, p. 228.

33. Rosecrance, pp. 72-73. The Concert existed in name until 1914. Most studies agree that the Concert was in operation at least up until the beginning of the Crimean War. See for example, Paul Schroeder, "The 19th Century International System: Changes in the Structure," *World Politics*, Vol. 39, No. 1, October 1986, pp. 1-26; Richard Elrod, "The Concert of Europe: A Fresh Look at an International System," *World Politics*, Vol. 28, No. 2, January

1976, pp. 159-174; and Robert Jervis, "Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 36, No. 2, Spring 1982, pp. 173-194.

34. Holsti, p. 166. There were 25 meetings of great power representatives between 1830 and 1884 under the periodic summit provision in Article VI of the Quadruple Alliance. Two of those were congresses (Paris 1856, Berlin 1878) attended by heads of states and foreign ministers. F. H. Hinsley, "The Concert of Europe," *Diplomacy in Modern European History*, ed., Lawrence W. Martin, New York: Macmillan, 1966, p. 53. But see W. N. Medecott, *Bismarck, Gladstone, and the Concert of Europe*, London: Athlone Press, 1956, p. 18, who believes there were many factors that constrained the great powers: "As long as Europe remembered the horrors of the Napoleonic Wars it remained for the most part at peace, and therefore in concert; but it was peace that maintained the Concert, and not the Concert that maintained peace."

35. Holsti, pp. 140-142, lists 31 armed conflicts from 1815 to 1914 that had an impact on the independent European security system--one war every 3.3 years, up from one every 2.8 years for 1714-1814. After 1871, discounting the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05, there were no great power conflicts until World War I.

36. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 30 and 37. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 168, and J. D. B. Miller, *Norman Angell and the Futility of War: Peace and the Public Mind*, New York: St. Martin's, 1986. After the war, Angell reiterated these points, emphasizing that he had never claimed that war would not occur, just that it was irrational. James Lee Ray, "Threats to Protracted Peace: World Politics According to Murphy," *The Long Postwar Peace: Contending Explanations and Projections*, ed., Charles W. Kegley, Jr., New York: Harper Collins, 1990, p. 320. Nevertheless, Angell also demonstrated considerable optimism about the impact of war's economic futility on the incidence of conflict when he asserted that "not only is man fighting less, but he is using all forms of physical compulsion less. . .because accumulated evidence is pushing him more and more to the conclusion that he can accomplish more easily that which he strives for by other means." Norman Angell, *The Great Illusion: A Study of the Relationship of Military Power in Nations to Their Economic and Social Advantage*, London: William Heinemann, 1910, pp. 268-269.

37. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 220.

38. Michael Howard, *The Causes of War and Other Essays*, 2nd ed., Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1983, p. 9.

39. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 50. See also Steven E. Miller, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Stephen Van Evera, eds., *Military Strategy and the Origins of the First World War*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991.

40. Roland N. Stromberg, *Redemption by War: The Intellectuals and 1914*, Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1982, p. 11; Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 43; and Neff, Chapter 19.

41. Original emphasis. William James, *Memories and Studies*, New York: Longmans, Green, 1911, p. 304. See also Howard, *Causes of War*, p. 9; Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 38 and 46; and James Joll, *The Origins of the First World War*, New York: Longman, 1984, p. 203, who points out that "the protagonists in 1914 often felt that they were the victims of objective forces which they could not control."

42. Rosecrance, pp. 67-68.

43. F. Scott Fitzgerald, *Tender is the Night*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1934, p. 57.

44. All quotations are from Ray S. Baker and William E. Dodd, eds., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson, War and Peace*, New York: Harper, 1927, Vol. I, p. 342, and Vol. II, pp. 234-35. In his later attempts to sell his vision to the American people, Wilson pointed out that collective security "is the only conceivable system that you can substitute for the old order of things which brought the calamity of this war upon us and would assuredly bring the calamity of another war upon us." *Ibid.*, Vol. II, p. 51.

45. Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations*, New York: Random House, 1962, pp. 110 and 168. See also Charles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, "Concerts, Collective Security, and the Future of Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 16, No. 1, Summer 1991, p. 119; Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration*, Chapter Twelve, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1962; Marina Finkelstein and Lawrence Finkelstein, eds., *Collective Security*, San Francisco: Chandler, 1966; Inis Claude, Jr., *Swords Into Plowshares*, New York: Random House, 1956, Chapter 12; and Frederick H. Hartmann, *The Conservation of Enemies*, Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1982, Chapter 13.

46. Because a concert operates on the notion of all against one and relies on collective action to resist aggression, it falls into the collective security family. Robert Jervis refers to a concert as a "nascent collective security system." Robert Jervis, "From Balance to Concert: A Study of International Security Cooperation," *World Politics*, Vol. 38, No. 1, October 1985, pp. 58-59, 78. Paradoxically, Wilson attributed many of the problems of the 19th century diplomatic experience to the men who had created the European concert. The new order, he insisted, must have "no odor of the Vienna settlement." Arthur Walworth, *America's Movement, 1918: American Diplomacy at the End of World War I*, New York: Norton, 1977, p. 95.

47. James Brown Scott, ed., *President Wilson's Foreign Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1918, p. 248. See also Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp. 96-97.

48. Arthur S. Link, *The Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson and Other Essays*, Nashville: Vanderbilt University Press, 1971, p. 78. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 40; Robert Dallek, *The American Style of Foreign Policy*, New York: Knopf, 1983, pp. 62-91; and Baker and Dodd, Vol. III, pp. 147-148, for Wilson's identification even prior to World War I of American ideals and aspirations with people throughout the world.

49. Kuhn, *Structure*, p. 151. See also Richard K. Betts, "Systems for Peace or Causes of War? Collective Security, Arms Control, and the New Europe," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1, Summer 1992, pp. 9 and 16-17.

50. Morgenthau, p. 412. See also Betts, p. 17.

51. Holstei, p. 175.

52. Claude, *Power and International Relations*, p. 140. Wilson's opponents were known as the "irreconcilables," the "bitterenders," and the "battalion of death." Alexander DeConde, *A History of American Foreign Policy*, 2nd ed., New York: Scribner, 1971, p. 479, and Selig Adler, *The Isolationist Impulse: It's Twentieth Century Reaction*, New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1957, pp. 102-105. See also Michael J. Hogan, "Foreign Policy, Partisan Politics, and the End of the Cold War," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 231.

53. Arthur S. Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1957, p. 136. See also Betts, p. 17. Root considered Article X of the Covenant "a vague universal obligation." Robert W. Tucker, "Brave New World Orders," *The New Republic*, February 24, 1992, p. 32.

54. Herbert Hoover, *The Ordeal of Woodrow Wilson*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1958, p. 184. Lloyd George of Great Britain summarized the problem with Article X in terms of the realist paradigm when he argued that:

the probable effect of including in the constitution of the League of Nations obligations to go to war in certain conditions will be to make it impossible for any nation to join the League, for no nation will commit itself in such a vital manner except by the free decision of its own Government and of its own Parliament, and no Government and no Parliament can come to such a decision except after an examination of the facts at the time when the decision has to be made. The attempt to impose obligations of this kind. . .will either end in their being nugatory or in the destruction of the league itself. The thing that really

matters is that the nations should remain in continuous consultation under a system which enables them to come to prompt decisions on world problems as they arise from day to day.

George Egerton, *Great Britain and the Creation of the League of Nations*, Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press, 1978, p. 122.

55. Link, *Higher Realism of Woodrow Wilson*, p. 130. Tucker, "Brave New World Orders," pp. 26-27.

56. Baker and Dodd, Vol. II, p. 392. Before America's entry into the war, interventionists had warned that a German victory might force the United States to build up its armaments which might, in turn, as Wilson's advisor, Colonel House warned, "change the course of our civilization and make the United States a military nation." Arthur S. Link, et al, eds., *The Papers of Woodrow Wilson*, Vol. III, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1966, p. 37. For a study of Wilson as a realistic idealist, see August Heckscher, *Woodrow Wilson*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1991.

57. Baker and Dodd, Vol. II, p. 351. See also Hoover, pp. 256-257 and Baker and Dodd, Vol. I, pp. 555 and 611-613.

58. Robert W. Tucker and David C. Hendrickson, *The Imperial Temptation. The New World Order and America's Purpose*, New York: Council of Foreign Relations Press, 1992, p. 181. See also *Ibid.*, p. 60; Tucker, "Brave New Worlds," p. 30; and Hogan, p. 235.

59. John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Post-War American National Security Policy*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1982, p. 10, and *Cold War*, p. 40. See also Dallek, pp. 321 and 533-534. For the general views of the Roosevelt administration on cooperation with the Soviet Union and the establishment of the United Nations, see Daniel Yergin, *Shattered Peace: The Origins of the Cold War and the National Security State*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1977, pp. 47-48; and John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1972, pp. 28-31.

60. *Documents of the United Nations Conference in International Organization*, New York: United Nations, 1945, XI, p. 474. The majority at the conference recognized that the veto provision "meant that if a major power became the aggressor the Council had no power to prevent war. In such case the inherent right of self-defense applied, and the nations of the world must decide whether or not they would go to war." *Ibid.*, p. 514; Claude, pp. 158, 165.

61. Tucker and Hendrickson, pp. 61-62.

62. Warren E. Kimball, ed., *Churchill and Roosevelt: The Complete Correspondence*, Vol. III, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984, p. v. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 7, and Stanley Hoffmann, "America's Heritage," *Adelphi Paper* No. 256, London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1990/1991, p. 3.

63. Richard M. Freeland, *The Truman Doctrine and the Origins of McCarthyism: Foreign Policy, Domestic Politics, and Internal Security, 1946-1948*, New York: Knopf, 1985, p. 49. See also Hogan, p. 236, and Richard J. Barnet, "A Balance Sheet: Lippmann, Kennan and the Cold War," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 122.

64. For this post-revisionist view, see Gaddis, *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947*, and Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration and the Cold War*, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992.

65. Hoffmann, p. 5. Some historians perceive the American shift toward internationalism as beginning in the 1930s due to changes not only in the international system, but also in the structure of politics and the economy in the United States. See, for example, Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987.

66. Hoffmann, pp. 5-6, and Walter Isaacson and Evan Thomas, *The Wise Men*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1986.

67. "X," Kennan, p. 582.

68. Dallek, pp. 141-142.

69. This idealization, of course, had a long history in popular culture. See for example, Neal Gabler, *An Empire of Their Own: How the Jews Invented Hollywood*, New York: Anchor/Doubleday, 1989, which demonstrates how central European Jewish immigrants like Louis B. Mayer and Samuel Goldwyn produced an idealized picture of the United States in their films that influenced generations of American moviegoers. The great film director, John Ford, summed this approach up in his movie, "The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance." When one protagonist, played by Jimmy Stewart, returns to a small western town years after the shooting captured in the film's title in order to set the facts straight, he meets resistance from the town's newspaper editor. "This is the West, sir," the editor points out. "When the legend becomes fact, print the legend." Andrew Sinclair, *John Ford. A Biography*, New York: Frederick Ungar, 1984, p. 197.

70. Harry Truman, March 12, 1947, Message to Congress, *A Decade of American Foreign Policy. Basic Documents 1941-49*, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1950, p. 1256. See also Hoffmann, pp.

6-7. Most historians view the post-World War II transition period as very brief, with 1947 in most cases marking the beginning of the cold war. Moreover, there is renewed appreciation that that conflict was not simply a consistent whole extending over four decades. There is increased use, in this regard, of the term "the first cold war" in discussing the period from 1947 to Stalin's death in 1953. See, for example, Fred Halliday, *The Making of the Second Cold War*, 2nd ed., London: Verso, 1986, and Reynolds, p. 245.

71. Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, p. 57.

72. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Some Lessons from the Cold War," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 59.

73. Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 30. For another key player's inability to anticipate how long containment would take to work, see Paul H. Nitze, *From Hiroshima to Glasnost: At the Center of Decision*, New York: Grove Werdenfeld, 1989, p. 52.

74. John Lewis Gaddis, "How Wise Were the Wise Men?", *The Atlantic*, February 19, 1992, p. 102. See also Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 352-357.

75. McGeorge Bundy, *Danger and Survival: Choices About the Bomb in the First Fifty Years*, New York: Random House, 1988.

76. Schlesinger, p. 54. See also Mueller, "Quiet Cataclysm: Some Afterthoughts on World War III."

77. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Introduction," *The Long Postwar Peace*, p. xi. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 215-245.

78. Crane Brinton, *The Anatomy of Revolution*, New York: Prentice-Hall, 1952, p. 189. See, for example, Kuhn's description in *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions*, p. 118, of the revolution in chemistry in which Lavoisier saw oxygen where Priestley had previously seen only dephlogisticated air and where others had seen nothing at all.

79. Joseph Kruzal, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Stability of the Postwar Era," *The Long Postwar Peace*, p. 250.

80. David J. Singer, "The Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations," *The International System*, eds. Klaus Knorr and Sidney Verba, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1961, pp. 77-92.

81. Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, Reading, MA: Addison-Welsey, 1979, pp. 93-99.

82. See, for example, John Gerard Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity," pp. 142-152, and Robert O. Keohane, "Theory of World Politics: Structural Realism and

Beyond," pp. 169-173--both in *Neorealism and its Critics*, ed. Robert O. Keohane, New York: Columbia University Press, 1986. But also see Robert G. Gilpin, "The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism," *Ibid*, pp. 301-321.

83. Gaddis, "International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War," pp. 31 and 34. See also Kenneth A. Oye, ed., *Cooperation Under Anarchy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," *International Organization*, Vol. 41, No. 3, Summer 1987, pp. 371-402; Alexander L. George, Philip J. Farley, and Alexander Dallum, eds., *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation: Achievements, Failures, Lessons*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1988; and Stephen Krasner, ed., *International Regimes*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983. Waltz never claimed that structure accounted for everything that happens in international relations. "To explain outcomes one must look at the capabilities, the actions and the interactions of states, as well as the structure of their systems. . . . Causes at the national and the international level make the world more or less peaceful and stable." Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 174-175. See also Kenneth N. Waltz, "Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics," *Neorealism and its Critics*, pp. 327-329 and 342-343.

84. Waltz, *Man, the State and War*, p. 12.

85. Original emphasis. *Ibid.*, p. 230.

86. Kruezel, p. 250, and Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 109. Bernard Brodie, Michael D. Intriligator, Roman Koepowicz, eds., *National Security and International Stability*, Cambridge, MA: Oelgeschlager, Gunn & Hain, 1983, p. 12.

87. Gene D. Phillips, *Stanley Kubrick, A Film Odyssey*, New York: Popular Library, 1975, p. 125.

88. This bipolar focus was also reflected in the historiography of U.S. foreign relations, as demonstrated in the "orthodox," "revisionist," or "postrevisionist" schools of diplomatic history. John Lewis Gaddis pointed out in 1983 that 20 percent of U.S. doctoral dissertations in diplomatic history for the previous four years had dealt with some aspect of the early 1945-50 cold war era. "The Emerging Post-Revisionist Synthesis on the Origins of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History*, Vol. 7, Summer 1983, p. 171. See also Reynolds, p. 250.

89. Colin S. Gray, *The Geopolitics of Superpower*, Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1988, p. 70. See also George, *et al*, *U.S.-Soviet Security Cooperation*.

90. Graham Greene and Carol Reed, *The Third Man*, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968, p. 114. Orson Wells added these lines for his role of Harry Lime. The conversation is with Lime's old



friend, Holly Martins, played by Joseph Cotton.

91. Carl Kaysen, "Is War Obsolete? A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. XIV, Spring 1990, p. 61. See also, Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, pp. 220-221; Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 105-118; Bundy, pp. 463-516; and Michael Mendelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

92. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 52.

93. Hoffmann, p. 8.

94. Lyndon B. Johnson, "Address at John Hopkins University: Peace Without Conquest," April 7, 1965, *Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Lyndon B. Johnson, 1965*, Vol. I, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1966, p. 395.

95. Steel, p. 107.

96. Morgenthau, p. 149.

97. "NSC-68, A Report to the National Security Council," April 14, 1950, *Naval War College Review*, Vol. XXVII, No. 6, May/June 1975, p. 56.

98. Hoffmann, p. 14; see also Betts, p. 13.

99. On the risk minimizing, cost maximizing pattern, see John Lewis Gaddis, "Containment and the Logic of Strategy," *The National Interest*, No. 10, Winter 1987/1988, pp. 27-38. See also Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 352-353, and *Cold War*, pp. 115-116.

100. Hoffmann, pp. 16-17.

101. Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*. See also Mancur Olson, *The Rise and Decline of Nations: Economic Growth, Stagflation, and Social Rigidities*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1982; Aaron L. Friedberg, *The Weary Titan: Great Britain and the Experience of Relative Decline, 1895-1905*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988. For the debate, see Peter Schmeisser, "Taking Stock: Is America in Decline?" *New York Times Magazine*, April 17, 1988, pp. 24-27, 66-68, 96; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Understating U.S. Strength," *Foreign Policy*, No. 72, Fall 1988, pp. 105-129; Samuel P. Huntington, "The U.S.--Decline or Renewal?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 67, No. 4, Winter 1988/89, pp. 76-96; Paul Kennedy, "Can the U.S. Remain Number One?", *New York Review of Books*, March 16, 1989, pp. 36-42; Henry R. Nau, *The Myth of America's Decline: Leading the World Economy into the 1990s*, New York: Oxford University Press, 1990; Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 1990; and Paul Kennedy, "Preparing for the 21st Century: Winners and Losers," *The New York Review of Books*,

Vol. XL, No. 4, February 11, 1993, pp. 32-44.

102. Tucker and Hendrickson, pp. 4-5. On other cyclic views of history, see George Modelski, ed., *Exploring Long Cycles*, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987; Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981; Joshua A. Goldstein, *Long Cycles: Prosperity and War in the Modern Age*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988; and William R. Thompson, *On Global War: Historical-Structural Approaches to World System Analysis*, Columbia, SC: University of South Carolina Press, 1988. The cold war from this cyclic view "was a brief, unsuccessful, and not even particularly interesting challenge by the Soviet Union to the hegemonic position the United States established for itself in world politics after 1945." Gaddis, "International Relations Theory," p. 49.

103. David Yankelovich, "Foreign Policy After the Election," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 4, Fall 1992, p. 5.

104. 71 percent Gallup Poll, September 1991, *Ibid.*, p. 6.

105. *Ibid.*, p. 7. The American public in terms of its commitment to internationalism "has made the long voyage from casual opinion to thoughtful consideration." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

106. *Ibid.*, and Hoffmann, p. 14.

107. Yankelovich, p. 10; see also Betts, p. 13.

108. Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire*, Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 1976, p. 137.

109. Christer Jonsson, "The Ideology of Foreign Policy," *Foreign Policy: USA/USSR*, eds., Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Pat McGowan, Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1982, p. 103; Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 11-13; and David Allan Mayers, *Cracking the Monolith: U.S. Policy Against the Sino-Soviet Alliance, 1949-1955*, Baton Rouge: Louisiana State Press, 1986. "There probably never was any real possibility," Ernest May noted, "that the post-1945 relationship could be anything but hostility verging on conflict." "The Cold War," *The Making of America's Soviet Policy*, ed., Joseph S. Nye, Jr., New Haven: Yale University Press, 1984, p. 204.

110. Merrill Peterson, ed., *Thomas Jefferson: Writings*, New York: Library of America, 1984, p. 1084.

111. Hoffmann, p. 21. See also Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "What New Order?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 83; David C. Hendrickson, "The Renovation of American Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 71, No. 2, Spring 1992, p. 55. "As in 1917, as in 1941," Louis J. Halle pointed out in terms of the cold war, "it was still not possible to tell the American people what the real issue was. . . ." *The Cold War as History*, 2nd ed.,

New York: Harper & Row, 1991, p. 121.

112. Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 207. See also William H. McNeil, "Winds of Change," *Sea Changes*, p. 176. Alexander Hamilton once warned that a national propensity to run ceaselessly into debt in peacetime could lead to "great and convulsive revolutions of empire." Hendrickson, p. 58.

113. Robert W. Tucker, "Reagan's Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs, America and the World 1988/89*, Vol. 68, No. 1, p. 27. See also, James Chace, *Solvency: The Price of Survival*, New York: Random House, 1981, p. 15. As early as 1978, one observer noted that the "kind of broad consensus. . . obtained during the post-war era and which became a shibboleth of American foreign policy may no longer be possible to resurrect short of war. American interests are too diverse and American power much less predominant. . . and the President will have to look for support for his foreign policies much as he might seek to do for his domestic programs." James Chace, "Is a Foreign Policy Consensus Possible?," *Ibid.*, Vol. 57, No. 1, Fall 1978, pp. 15-16.

114. George Will, "Change Not Overly Momentous," *The Carlisle Sentinel*, January 21, 1993.

115. Ernest R. May, "The U.S. Government, A Legacy of the Cold War," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 217.

116. *Ibid.*, and Schlesinger, p. 56.

117. Samuel P. Huntington, *The Common Defense, Strategic Programs in National Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1961, p. 36. See also May, p. 219.

118. Paul Y. Hammond, *Super Carriers and B-36 Bombers*, Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1963, and Phillip S. Merlinger, "The Admirals' Revolt of 1949: Lessons for Today," *Parameters*, Vol. XIX, No. 3, September 1989, pp. 81-96.

119. NSC 114/1, August 8, 1951, U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States 1951 (FRUS)*, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977, Vol. I, pp. 127-157. See also Huntington, *Common Defense*, pp. 47-61, and May, p. 221.

120. May, pp. 225-226, and Dennis S. Ippolito, *Uncertain Legacies: Federal Budget Policy from Roosevelt Through Reagan*, Charlottesville: University Press of Virginia, 1990, Chapters 4 and 5.

121. In 1949, only 7 percent of the more than ten thousand pages of *Foreign Relations of the United States* was located in sections with titles containing the words "security" or "military." In 1951 for the thirteen thousand pages of the *FRUS*, the figure was 28 percent. May, pp. 226-227.

122. *Ibid.*, p. 227. For the evolution of the NSC, see Karl F. Inderfurth and Loch K. Johnson, eds., *Decisions of the Highest Order. Perspectives on the National Security Council*, Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole, 1988.

123. Walter Lippmann, "Ten Years: Retrospect and Prospect," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 11, October 1932, pp. 51-53.

124. The cold war in effect relegitimized capitalism politically after the blows rendered by the years of the Great Depression and World War II to its basic ideological and institutional foundations. Lloyd C. Gardner, "Old Wine in New Bottles: How the Cold War Became the Long Peace," *The Long Postwar Peace*, p. 129. See also McNeil, p. 180.

125. *Ibid.*

126. Stephen P. Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," *International Security*, Vol. 7, No. 1, Fall 1982, pp. 83-113. See also Hoffmann, p. 10.

127. May, pp. 218 and 228. "Institutions for service to empire continue onward with a clanking automaticity, in spite of the dramatic changes in the world or strong constituencies calling for an end to empire. Made to fight old wars, the systems call for the new ones." Bruce Cumings, "The Wicked Witch of the West is Dead. Long Live the Wicked Witch of the East," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 90.

128. Gar Alperovitz and Kai Bird, "The Fading of the Cold War--and the Demystification of Twentieth-Century Issues," *The End of the Cold War*, pp. 209-210.

129. Stanley Hoffmann, "A New World and Its Troubles," *Sea Changes*, p. 275, and Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 135.

130. Barnett, p. 124, and Alperovitz and Bird, p. 210.

131. McNeil, pp. 181-182.

132. Zbigniew Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages: America's Role in the Technotronic Era*, New York: Viking, 1970, p. 34. See also Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 14.

133. "Europe, in short, launched itself on a self-reinforcing cycle in which its military organization sustained, and was sustained by, economic and political expansion. . . ." William H. McNeil, *The Pursuit of Power*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1982, p. 143. See also Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, p. xvi, original emphasis: "The history of the rise and later fall of the leading countries in the Great Power system since the advance of western Europe in the sixteenth century. . . shows a very significant correlation over the longer term between productive and revenue-raising capacities on the one

hand and military strength on the other."

134. Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 157-158, and Kennedy, *Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, pp. xx-xxi. See also Walter Lippmann's definition of solvency: "If its expenditures are safely within its assured means, a family is solvent when it is poor, or is well-to-do, or is rich. The same principle holds true of nations." *U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the Republic*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1943, p. 10.

135. Sam Nunn, "Roles and Missions in the Department of Defense," *Congressional Record*, Vol. 138, No. 98, July 2, 1992, pp. S9959-S9565. See also Business Executives for National Security, "After the Cold War, How Much Defense Is Enough? Shaping Military Roles and Missions to Secure the Newly Won Peace," *Issue Brief*, No. 4, October 1992, and Barton Gellman, "Services Moving to Protect Turf," *The Washington Post*, January 28, 1993.

136. Steel, p. 112. See also R. Jeffrey Smith, "Defense Policy Posts Restructured," *The Washington Post*, January 28, 1993.

137. Henry Kissinger, *American Foreign Policy. Three Essays*, New York: Norton, 1969, pp. 56-57. For definitions of bipolarity, see Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 132-138 and 163-182, and Kenneth Waltz, "The Stability of a Bipolar World," *Daedalus*, Vol. 93, No. 3, Summer 1964, pp. 881-909. Other definitions included: "(1) a condition in which states are polarized into two hostile coalitions; (2) a condition in which there are only two states capable of a strategy of global deterrence; (3) a system of only two states. . . ." R. Harrison Wagner, "What was bipolarity?", *International Organization*, Vol. 47, No. 1, Winter 1993, p. 89. Wagner believes that bipolarity in these definitions as well as in that of Waltz, "is either undefined, irrelevant to post-World War II international politics, or implies behavior that is inconsistent with the behavior it is supposed to explain." *Ibid.*

138. J. David Singer, "Peace in the Global System: Displacement, Interregnum, or Transformation," *The Long Postwar Peace*, p. 84. On balance of power vs. hegemonic stability theories, see Jack S. Levy, "Long Cycles, Hegemonic Transitions, and the Long Peace," *Ibid.*, p. 148: "Whereas balance-of-power theory hypothesizes that the threat of hegemony is a sufficient condition for a counter-coalition of other great powers and therefore for a general war, hegemonic theory hypothesizes that hegemony is a sufficient and perhaps necessary condition for the absence of a major war." On bipolar stability, see Oye, *Cooperation Under Anarchy*; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 132-138, 163-176, and 192; Stephen Van Evra, "Primed for Peace. Europe After The Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. 15, No. 3, Winter 1990-91, pp. 33-40; and Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 46.

139. Waltz, *Theory of International Relations*, p. 173. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 151-152, and Steel, p. 110, who points out that despite costs, the cold war provided something for all major parties as it developed into "an eminently workable international system. It was predictable, economically manageable, politically useful, and militarily unthreatening." On the early use if not the first use of the term "superpowers," see Reynolds, p. 248, and William T. R. Fox, *The Superpowers: The United States, Britain and the Soviet Union--Their Responsibility for Peace*, New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1944. Fox's criteria still applies to the United States which demonstrated in the Gulf War "great power plus great mobility of power." *Ibid.*, p. 21.

140. Milovan Djilas, *Conversations With Stalin*, trans. Michael B. Petrovich, New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1961, p. 114.

141. Seyom Brown, *The Faces of Power*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, p. 217. On the two categories of alliances, see Charles W. Kegley, Jr. and Gregory A. Raymond, "Alliances and the Preservation of the Postwar Peace: Weighing the Contribution," *The Long Postwar Peace*, p. 277-278.

142. During the tenure of such a quintessential hardliner as John Foster Dulles, for example, the East German and Hungarian revolts occurred without American action. The two notable exceptions were Korea and Cuba; but mixed signals certainly played a major role in both cases: the former because of the 1949 drawdown of American troops and the famous Dean Acheson speech to the National Press Club the following year; the latter because of U.S. inaction in the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion.

143. "Nuclear weapons did not cause the condition of bipolarity; other states by acquiring them cannot change the condition." Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 180. Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security Regimes," pp. 371-402. See also Alexander L. George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," *U.S.-Soviet Cooperation*, pp. 655-678; Robert Jervis, *The Meaning of the Nuclear Revolution*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1989; and Michael Mandelbaum, *The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics Before and After Hiroshima*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

144. Joseph Kruzal, "Arms Control, Disarmament, and the Stability of the Postwar Era," *The Long Postwar Peace*, pp. 266-267, and George, Farley and Dallum, *passim*.

145. On loose bipolarity, see Alexei Filitov, "Victory in the Postwar Era: Despite the Cold War or Because of It?," *End of the Cold War*, p. 82. Kegley and Raymond, p. 285.

146. Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 6; Steel, p. 111; and Cumings, p. 87. On the linkage of U.S. domestic attitudes,

institutions and perceptions to the recreation of Germany and Japan, see Dallek, pp. 146-150. John Mueller has noted of Japan: "Without benefit of missile or bazooka it has obtained status, influence, respect and admiration; and it inspires emulation, envy and genuflection. If that's not power, who needs it?", *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 223.

147. Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures 1989*, Washington: World Priorities, 1989. See also Charles W. Kegley, Jr., "Explaining Great-Power Peace: The Sources of Prolonged Postwar Stability," *The Long Postwar Peace*, p. 8; Michael Brecher and Jonathan Wilkenfeld, "International Crisis and Global Instability: The Myth of the 'Long Peace'," *Ibid*; and Eliot Cohen, "Distant Battles: Modern War in the Third World," *International Security*, Vol. 10, No. 5, Spring 1986, p. 186.

148. Leonard S. Spector, *The Undeclared Bomb*, Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988, p. 4. See also Reynolds, p. 248.

149. James A. Nathan and James K. Olwer, *United States Foreign Policy and World Order*, Boston: Little, Brown, 1986, p. 453. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 196-197, and *Strategies of Containment*, pp. 28-29 and 59-61.

150. John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics*, Vol. IX, 1957, pp. 473. Herz elaborated on this in *International Politics in the Atomic Age*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1959, and then reconsidered a decade later. "For the time being, or so it appears, it is not internationalism, 'universalism,' or any other supranational model that constitutes the alternative to the territorial, or nation-state, system, but genuine, raw chaos." John H. Herz, "The Territorial State Revisited: Reflections on the the Future of the Nation-State," *International Politics and Foreign Policy. A Reader in Research and Theory*, ed., James N. Rosenau, New York: Free Press, 1969, p. 88.

151. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," pp. 473-474.

152. Brian Jenkins, *New Modes of Conflict*, Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 1983, p. 17. See also Holsti, p. 272.

153. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye, Jr., *Power and Interdependence*, 2nd ed., New York: Harper Collins, 1989, p. 10. For the specific comparison of the ideal type of complex interdependence with the realist paradigm, see *Ibid.*, Chapter 2. See also Gaddis, "International Relations Theory," p. 41.

154. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 94-95. The problem, Waltz emphasized, "is not to say how to manage the world, including its great powers, but to say how the possibility that great powers will constructively manage international

affairs varies as systems change." *Ibid.*, p. 210. See also *Ibid.*, chapters 7-9; Rosenau, *Turbulence in World Politics*, pp. 244-245; James E. Thomson and Stephen D. Krasner, "Global Transactions and the Consolidation of Sovereignty," *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, pp. 195-197; and Fareed Zakaria, "Is Realism Finished?" *The National Interest*, No. 30, Winter 1992/93, p. 28.

155. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 94. See also James N. Rosenau, *Turbulence and Change in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990, p. 15; Krasner, *International Regimes*, p. 2; and Robert O. Keohane, "Realism, Neorealism, and the Study of World Politics," *Neorealism and Its Critics*, p. 15. For an attempt to create a theory of institutions with liberal implications based on premises that are consistent with those of political realism, see Robert O. Keohane, *After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984.

156. Rosenau, *Turbulence and Change in World Politics*, p. 247. See also James N. Rosenau, "Interdependence and the Simultaneity Puzzle: Notes on the Outbreak of Peace," *The Long Postwar Peace*, pp. 309-313. In 1989, Rosenau termed the multicentric system as "complementary" rather than an "emergent new world order." Transitions, he conceded, must have continuity as well as change. "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges," p. 12; and Werner Link, "Reflections on Paradigmatic Complementarity in the Study of International Relations," *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, pp. 99-116.

157. Brzezinski, "Cold War and Its Aftermath," p. 47, and Hoffmann, "A New World and Its Trouble," p. 276.

158. See Gaddis, *Cold War*, Chapter 11, for the concept of what he refers to as the forces of "Integration" and "Fragmentation," and Rosenau, "Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges," p. 8, who develops a similar concept which he refers to as "Centralizing" and "Decentralizing" tendencies.

159. Hamerow, pp. 210-225 and 300-309; Zbigniew Brzezinski, *The Grand Failure: The Birth and Death of Communism in the Twentieth Century*, New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1989, pp. 254-255; and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*, New York: Basic Books, 1990, p. 188.

160. Nye, "What New Order?," p. 85. See also Brzezinski, *Between Two Ages*, p. 19, who believes that the more helpful image is von Laue's one of the "global city"--"a nervous, agitated, tense and fragmented web of interdependent relations. . . better characterized by interaction than by intimacy."

161. *Ibid.*, p. 91, and Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 199.

162. Asa Briggs quoted in Zakaria, p. 28.



163. *Ibid.* See also Thomson and Krasner, p. 195.

164. Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," *World Politics*, Vol. XL, January 1988, p. 239. But also see Nye, "What New World Order?", p. 88.

165. Richard Rosecrance, *The Rise of the Trading State: Commerce and Conquest in the Modern World*, New York: Basic Books, 1986, pp. 78-79 and 212-213. As Robert Jervis has pointed out, there is almost a circular logic in the liberal argument, with interdependence developing in part because of expectations of peace, while the economic benefits of close economic interdependence make peace more likely. "A Useable Past for the Future," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 260; Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, pp. 138-139; Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 183; Gaddis, "Theories of International Relations," p. 42; and George, "Factors Influencing Security Cooperation," pp. 655-678.

166. Charles Krauthammer, "The Unipolar Moment," *Foreign Affairs: America and the World 1990/91*, Vol. 70, No. 1, Winter 1990/91, p. 24.

167. Mueller, *Retreat from Doomsday*, p. 257. See also Holsti, pp. 283 and 328. For the tendency to romanticize revolutionary violence, see Frances Fitzgerald, *Fire in the Lake: The Vietnamese and the Americans in Vietnam*, New York: Vintage, 1972, pp. 589-590, in which she looks forward to the day when "the narrow flame of revolution" will "cleanse the lake of Vietnamese society from the corruption and disorder of the American War."

168. Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics*, p. 230, and A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics*, 2nd ed., New York: Knopf, 1968, Chapter 14. As early as 1981, Kenneth Waltz advocated the proliferation of nuclear capabilities to smaller powers as a key way to help them coexist in a self-help world. "The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better," *Adelphi Paper* No. 171, London: International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981. In 1990, he continued to advocate the gradual proliferation of nuclear weapons as a way to reinforce stability. "Nuclear Myths and Political Realities," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LXXXIV, September 1990, pp. 733-734. That same year, John Mearsheimer asserted that Europe could be stabilized with a "limited and carefully managed proliferation of nuclear weapons." "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe After the Cold War," *International Security*, Vol. XV, Summer 1990, p. 54. For the idea of making Germany a nuclear power, see Richard Uleman, "Enlarging the Zone of Peace," *Foreign Policy*, Fall 1990. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 111, and Robert C. Johansen, "Do Preparations for War Increase or Decrease International Security?", *The Long Postwar Peace*, pp. 236-238.

169. Tucker, "1989 and All That," p. 228; Thomson and

Krasner, p. 216; and Keohane and Nye, p. 249, who emphasized that they made no assumption that interdependence would lead to increased cooperation or have benign consequences. Interdependence, they pointed out, did not make power obsolete.

170. On the persistence of hegemony even after the demise of the original conditions that gave rise to it, see Keohane, *After Hegemony*, pp. 182-216. But see Susan Strange, "The Name of the Game," *Sea Changes*, pp. 253-255 and 258, who believes that American hegemony is not in decline, that there is, instead, a shift in the basis of American power, but not a loss of that power. See also Filitov, pp. 84-85.

171. Regimes are defined as "sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors' expectations converge in a given area of international relations." Krasner, p. 2. See also Filitov, p. 86; Zakaria, pp. 28-29; and Kupchan, p. 131, who concludes: "When inter-state cooperation has already begun to emerge because of shifts in elite beliefs, and the Realist assumptions of a competitive self-help world are thus relaxed, a fertile ground exists for institutions to play a much more prominent role in shaping state behavior." But see Tucker, "1989 and All That," p. 229, who points out: "While a hegemonic power, if determined to do so, can impose a solution on the conflicts arising from interdependence, partners can only disagree."

172. Katzenstein, p. 292.

173. Owen Harries, "Fourteen Points for Realists," *The National Interest*, No. 30, Winter 1992/93, p. 109. See also Thomson and Krasner, pp. 196-197, and Susan Strange, "Toward a Theory of Transnational Empire," *Global Changes and Theoretical Challenges*, pp. 161-176.

174. Zakaria, p. 21.

175. Hendrickson, p. 55, and Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 190.

176. Tucker, "Brave New World Orders," p. 26. See also Tucker and Hendrickson, pp. 185-187, and Nye, "What New Order?", pp. 83-84.

177. A radio address. Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 152. To a smaller group, the President remarked: "By God, we've kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all." *Ibid.*

178. *Ibid.*, p. 55. In Vietnam and in the Gulf War, credibility also came to be perceived as an interest in itself in terms of overall stability. After the Gulf War, for instance, President Bush declared:

I think because of what's happened we won't have to use U.S. forces around the world. I think when we say

something that is objectively correct--like don't take over a neighbor or you're going to bear some responsibility-- people are going to listen. Because I think out of all this will be a new-found--let's put it this way: a reestablished credibility for the United States of America.

@ENDNOTENOINDT = "Excerpts from Bush's News Conference on Postwar Moves," *The New York Times*, March 2, 1991.

179. Tucker and Hendrickson, pp. 25-27. See also Gaddis, *Cold War*, p. 208, for realist impatience with the ideological strains placed on geopolitics.

180. Zakaria, p. 31.

181. Yankelovich, p. 12.

182. Betts, p. 15.

183. Wolfers, p. 197. See also Betts, p. 23. "The achievement of orthodox status is very often fatal to the integrity of a concept. When it becomes popular and respectable. . .men are strongly tempted to proclaim their belief in it whether or not they genuinely understand its meaning or fully accept its implications." Claude, *Swords Into Plowshares*, p. 246.

184. E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An Introduction to the Study of International Relations*, New York: St. Martin's Press, 1939, p. 10.

185. Other examples include the Greek Cypriot coup and Turkish invasion in 1974 as well as the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon. Betts, p. 25, and *The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace-Keeping*, New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, October 1985.

186. Betts, p. 26; Tucker and Hendrickson, pp. 51-52; and Nye, "What New Order?", p. 90.

187. In the League of Nations, the great powers of the Council operated under the unanimity provision of the Covenant which did not apply to Council members who were party to the dispute. The veto power of the U.N. Security Council permanent members, on the other hand, prevented the U.N. from addressing great power disputes. Claude, *Power and International Relations*, pp. 159-165. See also, Hoffmann, *America's Heritage*, p. 21; Tucker and Hendrickson, p. 63; Kupchan, p. 122; and Holstei, p. 248.

188. Kupchan, p. 1120. "The story of international politics is written in terms of the great powers of an era." Waltz, *Theory of International Politics*, p. 72. See also Betts, p. 27, who believes that the result of the 19th century concert was a

security that was selectively collective and thus condominium. But see Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics*, New York: Columbia University Press, 1977, pp. 225-226, who believes "concert" is a better term than "condominium."

189. Rosecrance, "A New Concert of Powers," p. 76. Rosecrance envisions a five-power concert with the European Community subsuming Great Britain, France and Germany. *Ibid.*, p. 65.

190. Gaddis, *Cold War*, pp. 211-212.

191. Jervis, "A Useable Past for the Future," pp. 263-264.

192. Zakaria, pp. 29-30, and Bull, p. 299.

193. Holsti, p. 138; Bull, pp. 300-301; and Nye, "What New Order?", p. 93.

194. Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan*, ed., Michael Oakeshott, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1952, p. 109. World government by conquest, of course, is very much in the realist tradition. During the last 500 years, the modern state system has come close to being transformed by conquest into a universal empire owing allegiance to a single supreme government. Bull, pp. 262-263. See also, Grenville Clark and Louis Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 2nd ed., Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960; Robert Hutchins, et al., *Preliminary Draft of a World Constitution*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1947; and Wesley Wooley, *Alternatives to Anarchy: American Supranationalism Since World War II*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.

195. Tennyson's visionary future as expressed in this poem was a favorite of Winston Churchill, who liked to recite the more bloodthirsty predictions of future warfare, and of President Truman, who wrote these lines on a scrap of paper he carried with him for over 50 years. Martin Gilbert, *Winston Churchill*, Vol. VI: *Finest Hour, 1939-1941*, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1983, p. 1038; and John Hersey, *Life Sketches*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989, pp. 245-246. See also, Bull, pp. 262-263. Much of the modern impetus for world government stemmed from the cataclysms of the two World Wars. "Only the creation of a world government," Albert Einstein wrote in this regard, "can prevent the impending self-destruction of mankind." Albert Einstein, *Einstein on Peace*, eds., Otto Nathan and Heinz Norden, New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960, p. 482. And Bertrand Russell reflected the fundamental problem of moving back and forth between two paradigms when he wrote: "It is entirely clear that there is only one way in which great wars can be permanently prevented and that is the establishment of an international government with a monopoly of serious armed force." Morton Grodzins and Eugene Rabinowitch, eds., *The Atomic Age: Scientists in National and World Affairs*, New York: Basic Books, 1963, p. 124.

196. Bull, p. 295.

197. Henry Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership: A Reappraisal of the Atlantic Alliance*, New York: McGraw-Hill, 1965, p. 251. See also Henry Kissinger, "The White Revolutionary: Reflections on Bismarck," *Daedalus*, Vol. 97, Summer 1968, pp. 909-910. "It can never be the task of leadership to solicit a consensus, but to create the conditions which will make a consensus possible. A leader, if he performs his true function, must resign himself to being alone part of the time, at least while he charts the road." Henry Kissinger, "American Policy and Preventive War," *Yale Review*, Vol. 44, April 1955, p. 336.

198. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, p. 329.

199. Secretary Cheney's statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee in connection with the FY 1992-93 Budget for the Department of Defense, Washington, February 21, 1991.

200. Graham Allison, "National Security Strategy for the 1990s," *America's Global Interests, A New Agenda*, ed., Edward K. Hamilton, New York: W. W. Norton, 1989, p. 211.

201. Lady Gwendolen Cecil, *Life of Robert Marquis of Salisbury*, London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited, 1921, Vol. 2, p. 145.

202. Kissinger, *The Troubled Partnership*, p. 249.

203. President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia, Address to U.S. Congress, February 1990.

204. Bruce R. Kuniholm, "The End of the Cold War in the Near East: What It Means for Historians and Policy Planners," *The End of the Cold War*, p. 167.

205. Kuhn, p. 97.

206. *Ibid.*, p. 77. See also *Ibid.*, p. 145.

207. Mark W. Zacher, "The Decaying Pillars of the Westphalian Temple: Implications for International Order and Governance," *Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics*, eds., James N. Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992, p. 67.

208. Kissinger, *A World Restored*, pp. 322-323.

#### ABOUT THE AUTHOR

DAVID JABLONSKY is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the U.S. Army War College. He holds a B.A. in European History from Dartmouth College; an M.A. in International Relations from Boston University; and an M.A. and Ph.D. in European History from the University of Kansas. Dr. Jablonsky has held the Elihu Root Chair of Strategy and is the author of numerous monographs and articles as well as *The Nazi Party in Dissolution: Hitler and the Verbotzeit 1923-1925* (1989) and *Churchill, the Great Game, and Total War* (1991).

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William A. Stofft  
Commandant

\*\*\*\*\*

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE

Director  
Colonel John W. Mountcastle

Conference Organizer  
Dr. Gary L. Guertner

Author  
Dr. David Jablonsky

Editor  
Mrs. Marianne P. Cowling

Secretaries  
Mrs. Rosemary E. Moore  
Ms. Rita A. Rummel

\*\*\*\*\*

Cover Artist  
Lawrence C. Miller

Composition  
Mrs. Mary Jane Semple