EDWIN MEESE III, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, AND JOSEPH E. CLARKSON, APPELLANTS V. BARRY KEENE No. 85-1180 In the Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1985 On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Jurisdictional Statement TABLE OF CONTENTS Opinions below Jurisdiction Statutory provisions involved Questions presented Statement The questions are substantial Conclusion Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G OPINIONS BELOW The opinions of the district court (App., infra, 1a-31a, 36a-42a) are reported at 619 F.Supp. 1111. The earlier opinion of the district court issuing a preliminary injunction (App., infra, 44a-65a) is reported at 569 F.Supp. 1513. JURISDICTION The judgment of the district court (App., infra, 32a-34a) was entered on September 13, 1985. A notice of appeal to this Court (App., infra, 35a) was filed on October 11, 1985. On October 29, 1985, the district court granted appellants' timely motion to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), and the judgment was accordingly modified (App., infra, 40a). A notice of appeal to this Court from the amended judgment of October 29 (App., infra, 43a) was filed on November 12, 1985. On November 17, 1985, Justice Rehnquist extended the time within which to docket the appeal to and including January 9, 1986. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1252. /1/ STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED The relevant provisions of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq., are set forth at App., infra, 66a-70a. QUESTIONS PRESENTED 1. Whether the use of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents Registration Act, 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq., which is expressly defined in the Act in a neutral and valid way, violates the First Amendment because in common usage the word "propaganda" might be understood to have a pejorative meaning. 2. Whether appellee, who is not a foreign agent under the Act and is not subject to the requirements or sanctions of the Act, has standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory term "political propaganda" on the ground that the use of that term is alleged to have chilled his exercise of First Amendment rights. STATEMENT 1. This case arises under the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), 22 U.S.C. 611 et seq. As Congress has explained, it is the policy and purpose of this Act * * * to protect the national defense, internal security, and foreign relations of the United States by requiring public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities and other activities for or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign political parties, and other foreign principals so that the Government and the people of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities. 22 U.S.C. 611 note. FARA establishes a comprehensive scheme of registration, reporting, and disclosure for "agents" of "foreign principals." The Act defines "foreign principal" to include "a government of a foreign country." 22 U.S.C. 611(b)(1). In addition, it defines "agent of a foreign principal" to mean in relevant part "any person who acts as an agent, representative, employee, or servant * * * of a foreign principal" and "who directly or through any other person * * * engages within the United States in political activities for or in the interests of such foreign principal * * *." 22 U.S.C. 611(c). An agent of a foreign principal as defined in the Act is required to file a registration statement with the Attorney General. The registration statement shall include, among other things, the agent's name and nationality; a comprehensive statement of the nature of the agent's business; the name of every foreign principal for whom the agent is acting; the terms of the agreement between the agent and the foreign principal; the activities engaged in by the agent, including a detailed statement of any political activities; and the compensation or reimbursement received by the agent and the expenditures made by the agent. 22 U.S.C. 612. In addition to filing a registration statement, an agent of a foreign principal is required to submit to the Attorney General a copy of any "political propaganda for or in the interests of such foreign principal" that the agent transmits in the United States mails or by any means of interstate or foreign commerce. 22 U.S.C. 614(a). /2/ The Act defines the term "political propaganda" to include any communication that is reasonably adapted to * * * in any * * * way influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country * * * or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States * * *. 22 U.S.C. 611(j). The agent must mark any such materials with an identification statement that sets forth the relation between the agent and the materials, explains that the agent is registered with the Department of Justice under the Act and discloses the name of the agent and the foreign principal, advises that the agent's registration statement and the disseminated materials are available for inspection at the Department of Justice, and contains a disclaimer that registration of the agent does not indicate approval by the United States of the contents of the materials. 22 U.S.C. 614(b); see also 22 U.S.C. 614(c). The standard form of the identification statement for films does not use the statutory term "political propaganda" and reads as follows: This material is prepared, edited, issued or circulated by (name and address of registrant) which is registered with the Department of Justice, Washington, D.C. under the Foreign Agents Registration Act as an agent of (name and address of foreign principal). Dissemination reports on this film are filed with the Department of Justice where the required registration statement is available for public inspection. Registration does not indicate approval of the contents of this material by the United States Government. PX I to Original Compalint (Mar. 24, 1983). The labeling requirement is applicable only to agents of foreign principals under the Act and does not apply to subsequent disseminators or recipients of the materials, such as appellee. In fact, such people are free to remove the identification statement that the foreign agent was required to affix to the materials (App., infra, 49a, 54a-55a n.2). 2. The National Film Board of Canada (Ottawa) produces films in Canada. It is an agency of the government of Canada and thus a "foreign principal" under the Act. The National Film Board of Canada (New York office) (NFBC-NY) is the agent of the National Film Board of Canada (Ottawa) in the United States and since 1947 has registered with the Attorney General pursuant to FARA (App., infra, 5a). In complying with the labeling provisions of FARA, the NFBC-NY does not routinely include the required identification statement in its materials but instead submits the films to the Department of Justice for a determination of the ones that are covered by the Act (App., infra, 48a). In 1982, the NFBC-NY submitted to the Department a list of 62 films and videotapes that it had distributed during that year. The Department reviewed five of the films and concluded that three of them included "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Act. Two of the films, Acid from Heaven and Acid Rain: Requiem or Recovery, address the subject of acid rain; the third film, If You Love This Planet, concerns nuclear war. App., infra, 45a, 48a. 3. a. In March 1983, appellee, an attorney and California state legislator, commenced the instant action in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California to challenge the constitutionality of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents Registration Act. Appellee alleged that he desired to exhibit the three Canadian films but was "deterred from exhibiting the films by a statutory characterization of the films as 'political propaganda'" and that "if he were to exhibit the films while they bore such characterization, his personal, political, and professional reputation would suffer and his ability to obtain re-election and to practice his profession would be impaired" (App., infra, 45a). Plaintiff sought a preliminary and permanent injunction against application of the Act to the three films. The district court denied the government's motion to dismiss and granted appellee's motion for a preliminary injunction (App., infra, 44a-65a). Although the court found that appellee had no standing to challenge the labeling requirement imposed on the agent (id. at 54a-55a) it held that he did have standing to chalenge the validity of the use of the term "political propaganda" in the Act. The court concluded that appellee's "status as a would-be exhibitor * * * differentiates him from citizens generally," that appellee "is likely and reasonably to be understood as using the film to communicate (his) own ideas," and that "a statute which inhibits the exhibitor's ability to exhibit also impinges on the exhibitor's ability to communicate" (id. at 51a-52a). The court also found that appellee's complaint "adequately alleges an injury that is both real and immediate: exhibition of the films which the statute characterizes as 'political propaganda' will brand (appellee), as an exhibitor, as a purveyor of propaganda, which will have an adverse impact on (appellee's) professional and personal reputation" (id. at 52a). Finally, the court determined that the alleged injury could fairly be traced to the government's actions and could be remedied by judicial relief: "(appellee) has made the requisite showing by alleging that the Act characterizes the films that (he) wants to exhibit as 'political propaganda,' that such a characterization necessarily denigrates the contents of the films and vilifies (appellee) as a purveyor of propaganda, and that as a result of such vilification clients and constituents will peremptorily reject the ideas that (appellee) hopes to communicate" (id. at 53a). With respect to the merits of appellee's claim, the district court determined that "the present action raises a substantial question warranting litigation" (App., infra, 57a). In particular, the court rejected the government's argument that the phrase "political propaganda" as defined in the Act does not denigrate the materials covered by the statute. It found that "'(p)olitical propaganda' is ordinarily and commonly understood to mean material that contains half-truths, distortions, and omissions," and that "(t)o characterize a particular expression of political ideas as 'propaganda' is to denigrate those ideas" (id. at 59a). Furthermore, relying on the legislative history of the original 1938 Act, the court also came "to the tentative conclusion that Congress did, in fact, intend to denigrate the affected materials by the use of the term 'political propaganda'" (id. at 60a). The court therefore concluded that "Congress could easily have imposed an identification requirement without denigrating the affected materials" (id. at 58a) and that "Congress was acting artlessly when it defined the term 'political propaganda'" (id. at 62a); in the court's view, "Congress must ultimately respect the limits of the English language * * *. This Court therefore harbors some doubt about the power of Congress to select a term which has a widely understood negative connotation and to designate it as a term of art theoretically having no negative connotation" (id. at 62a-63a). Based on these conclusions, the district court entered a preliminary injunction preventing the defendants "from imposing any of the requirements of the Foreign Agents Registration Act on the (three films in question) pending the disposition of this action" (App., infra, 65a). Although recognizing that appellee had no standing to challenge the labeling requirement applicable to the NFBC-NY, the court concluded that "it is impossible to give (appellee) any effective relief pendente lite without exempting the films which (appellee) wants to exhibit from the requirements of the Act. The labelling requirement only has application to those materials termed in the statute 'political propaganda.' It is the term 'political propaganda,' however, about which (appellee) complains * * *. (S)o long as defendants are enjoined from employing that definition, they must be enjoined from requiring labelling and reports in accordance with (the Act)" (id. at 64a). b. Thereafter, the district court granted summary judgment to appellee on his request for a permanent injunction (App., infra, 1a-31a). The court first adhered to its prior ruling that appellee had standing to contest the validity of the statutory language because he alleged that "he is deterred from * * * (exhibiting the three Canadian films) by the government's characterization of the materials as 'political propaganda'" (id. at 6a; see also id. at 13a-14a). The court reasoned that appellee was complaining "not * * * of a 'chilling effect' on the exercise of his First Amendment rights" but instead "of a species of censorship" (id. at 10a) /3/ and that "it is patently absurd to suggest that one whose expression has been censored by the government lacks standing to complain of that censorship" (ibid.). Moreover, the court found it "immaterial" that appellee, because he was not the agent of a foreign principal under FARA, was not subject to the registration, labeling, or reporting requirements of the Act (id. at 12a); rather, the court concluded that "(t)he statute puts (appellee) to the Hobson's choice of foregoing the use of the three Canadian films for the exposition of his own views or suffering an injury to his reputation" (id. at 15a), and that this establishes "the indirect way in which the statute abridges his freedom of speech" (ibid.). Finally, the court recognized that in upholding appellee's standing it had "part(ed) company" (id. at 13a) with the contrary decision in Block v. Smith, 583 F.Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal pending, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. argued Feb. 12, 1985). Turning to the merits, the district court explained that appellee "is not challenging the power of Congress to require that materials produced by or under the aegis of a foreign government be labeled as to source" (App., infra, 16a). In fact, the court recognized that "(a) revelation of source as a means of impeaching the persuasive force of any piece of advocacy is wholly legitimate, and, indeed, consistent with the loftiest conceptions of the First Amendment" (id. at 25a). Hence, as the court found, it "can hardly be gainsaid" that the disclosure purpose of the Act "serves rather than disserves the First Amendment" (id. at 27a) Rather than challenging the substantive validity of FARA, appellee "asserts that the use of the phrase 'political propaganda' to describe the materials subject to the Act so denigrates the materials that they are made unavailable to (appellee) as a medium for the expression of his own views and that the freedom of speech guaranteed to (appellee) by the First Amendment is, therefore, abridged" (App., infra, 2a; see also id. at 27a). Thus, "the question presented is whether Congress may, consistent with the Constitution, apply a denigrating phrase to those materials (covered by FARA) thereby rendering the materials unavailable to American citizens who wish to use the materials as media for personal expression" (id. at 16a). The district court acknowledged that "political propaganda" is "a term of art to describe every sort of communicative or expressive medium intended or reasonably adapted to influence persons within the United States with respect to * * * foreign or domestic policies" (App., infra, 2a; see also id. at 16a, 17a, 18a, 20a, 21a, 30a). The court also recognized that the Act contains a "neutral statutory definition" of the term (id. at 20a) that "carries no negative connotation" (ibid.). And the court further found that "there are dictionary meanings of the word 'propaganda' that do not suggest a negative connotation" (ibid.). /4/ Nevertheless, the district court held that "Congress is without the constitutional power to use the phrase 'political propaganda' to describe the materials subject to the statute's labeling requirement, because those materials are 'core' First Amendment materials and because the use of such a term abridges (appellee's) freedom of speech" (App., infra, 22a). Relying on dictionary definitions of "propaganda" and the affidavits of academics and journalists, the court found, "as a matter of fact, that the phrase 'political propaganda,' and particularly the word 'propaganda,' is a 'semantically slanted word'" and that "the term 'propaganda' as used in ordinary speech is a word of reproach" (id. at 19a (citation omitted)). On that basis, the court determined that "whoever disseminates materials officially found to be 'political propaganda' runs the risk of being held in a negative light by members of the general public" (id. at 26a). Concluding that the First Amendment proscribes "a statute whose purpose is entirely proper, but which inadvertently burdens speech by the terms in which it is couched" (id. at 24a), the court held that "the use by Congress of an inflammatory phrase to designate (or denigrate) clearly protected First Amendment materials abridges (appellee's) speech" (id. at 21a). In addition, the district court concluded that "the suppression of speech was part of the intent of Congress in adopting the challenged portion of the Foreign Agents Registration Act" (App. infra, 24a). The court conceded that from the enactment of FARA in 1938 "(t)he purpose of (the statute) has always been, at least in part, to give notice to the recipients of materials * * * (from a) foreign government of the source of such materials" (id. at 3a), that the original Act "as primarily intended as a 'sunshine' statute" (id. at 24a (emphasis in original)), and that, in connection with subsequent amendments, "Congress deemed it appropriate to modify the xenophobic tenor of the original Act and to emphasize the 'sunshine' aspect of the law" (id. at 4a). Nonetheless, the court decided that "Congress enacted the portion of FARA at issue in order to suppress or restrict that which it found abhorrect. Despite its employment of a wholly legitimate means to that end, Congress used the appellation, 'political propaganda,' which it understood and intended as a term of opprobrium, and by which it intended to discourage or suppress speech" (id. at 25a). Finally, the district court ruled that the abridgement of speech that it had found could not be justified on the ground that the statute was narrowly drafted to further a compelling governmental interest. Looking to the need for the specific statutory language in question, the court found that there was "no justification compelling or otherwise for the use of the phrase 'political propaganda'" (App., infra, 28a). For these reasons, the district court held that Congress's use of the phrase "political propaganda" was unconstitutional. Emphasizing its view that such usage did not reflect "the best solution to a knotty problem of draftsmanship" (App., infra, 29a), the court reasoned that "(h)owever difficult it may be to draft a statute, it is surely not beyond reason to demand that those whose business is communication communicate with their audience in terms of their audience's linguistic conventions" (ibid.). Accordingly, the court permanently enjoined enforcement of "any portion of the Foreign Agents Registration Act which incorporates the term 'political propaganda' as a term of art. 22 U.S.C. Sections 611(j) and 614(a) (b) and (c)" (App., infra, 31a). The court also stated that these provisions were severable from the remainder of FARA and that its decision did not adjudicate the validity of any other part of the Act (id. at 30a). c. The government timely moved to alter the district court's judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Although the government did not seek reconsideration of the court's basic holding of unconstitutionality, it did request substantive modification of the terms of the injunction entered by the court. The court granted this motion and limited its order to enjoining enforcement of the provisions of 22 U.S.C. 611(j) and 614(a)-(c) with respect to the three films at issue in this case (App., infra, 36a-42a). THE QUESTIONS ARE SUBSTANTIAL The district court's decision in this case, holding unconstitutional the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents Registration Act, represents an erroneous and unprecedented exercise of the power of judicial review. Although not questioning the substantive validity of the Act, and indeed finding that the Act affirmatively promotes First Amendment values, the district court concluded that the statute is linguistically invalid because of the terminology Congress used. And in reaching its conclusion the district court disregarded the express provision in the Act that defines "political propaganda" in a neutral and constitutionally unobjectionable way comporting with accepted dictionary meanings of the term. The district court thus struck down the statute not because of what it does but because of what it says and, more particularly, because of the way the statute says it and the possibility that its language might be misunderstood to have a meaning exactly contrary to the statutory definition provided by Congress. Moreover, the district court's ruling comes in a case in which the plaintiff lacked standing to sue. By permitting such actions to be brought, the decision below opens up the federal courts to litigants who have no cognizable interest at stake and seek to use the judicial process to air political grievances or publicize policy disputes. Accordingly, this Court's review under 28 U.S.C. 1252 is plainly warranted. Because the error in the district court's decision is manifest, we suggest that the Court should summarily reverse the judgment below. 1. a. The power of judicial review "to judge the constitutionality of an Act of Congress * * * (is) 'the gravest and most delicate duty that * * * (a court) is called upon to perform.'" Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64 (1981), quoting Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927) (Holmes, J.). See also Regan v. Time, Inc., No. 82-729 (July 3, 1984), slip op. 10; United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 20-21 (1960); Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). In undertaking such review, "(t)he question for (the courts), of course, is not whether Congress could have done a better job, but whether the job it did violates (the Constitution)." Regan v. Time, Inc., slip op. 12-13 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). And in answering that question, courts must be mindful of "the strong presumption in favor of the validity of congressional action" (Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188, 200 (1982)) and give "'great weight to the decisions of Congress'" (Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. at 64 (citation omitted)). In invalidating the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents Registration Act, the court below adopted an erroneous method of analysis and departed from the proper role of the federal judiciary. In effect, the district court undertook to review and edit Congress's choice of statutory language. However, just as courts "naturally do() not review congressional enactments as a panel of grammarians" (Flora v. United States, 362 U.S. 145, 150 (1960), so too Article III judges are not professors whose job it is to grade Congress on its legislative drafting skills or mastery of English usage. See also Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676, 684 (1972); Costanzo v. Tillinghast, 287 U.S. 341, 344 (1932); Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). The district court's "red pencil" approach to constitutional adjudication is fundamentally misconceived. The Foreign Agents Registration Act expressly defines the term "political propaganda" to mean any * * * communication * * * which is reasonably adapted to * * * influence a recipient or any section of the public within the United States with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country * * * or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States * * *. 22 U.S.C. 611(j). Thus, "political propaganda" is used as a broad, generic designation of the materials covered by the Act. /5/ The district court conceded that the phrase "political propaganda" in FARA is a "term of art" (App., infra, 2a, 16a, 17a, 18a, 20a, 21a, 30a) and that the "statutory definition" of the term is "neutral" (id. at 20a) and "carries no negative connotation" (ibid.). In addition, the court acknowledged that this statutory definition accords with "dictionary meanings of the word 'propaganda' that do not suggest a negative connotation" (ibid.) /6/ In these circumstances, the district court erred in striking down Congress's use of the term "political propaganda." /7/ As this Court has recognized, it is "both within the right and the wisdom of Congress not to trust to the colloquial or the dictionary meaning of * * * (a word), but to write its own." 62 Cases of Jam v. United States, 340 U.S. 593, 596 (1951). Where, as in this case, an Act of Congress contains its own definition, the "statutory definition() of terms * * * prevail(s) over colloquial meanings." Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Lenroot, 323 U.S. 490, 502 (1945). "Statutory definitions control the meaning of statutory words, of course" (Lawson v. Suwannee Fruit & S.S. Co., 336 U.S. 198, 201 (1949)), and serve to exclude other meanings of those terms (Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 392 & n.10 (1979)). See also Summit Valley Industries, Inc. v. Local 112, United Brotherhood of Carpenters, 456 U.S. 717, 722 (1982); NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., 341 U.S. 322, 324-325 (1951); United States v. Lombardo, 241 U.S. 73, 76 (1916). The district court refused to accept the reasonable statutory definition of "political propaganda," but instead looked to "the conventions of ordinary usage" (App., infra, 20a) and concluded that "the term 'propaganda' as used in ordinary speech * * * is a word of reproach" (id. at 19a). However, "definition by the average man or even by the ordinary dictionary with its studied enumeration of subtle shades of meaning is not a substitute for the definition set before us by the lawmakers with instructions to apply it to the exclusion of all others." Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S. 87, 96 (1935). Where Congress "has attempted to secure precision and certainty by * * * supplying its own glossary," courts are not "free in despite of it to choose a meaning for (themselves)" (id. at 95, 96). The district court's approach would "pervert the process of interpretation" by "'mak(ing) a fortress out of the dictionary.'" Farmers Reserve & Irrigation Co. v. McComb, 337 U.S. 775, 764 (1949) (citation omitted). In addition, the Constitution does not, as the district court believed, require Congress to devise "the best solution to a knotty problem to draftsmanship" or "demand that those whose business is communication communicate with their audience in terms of their audience's linguistic conventions" (App., infra, 29a). Nothing in the Constitution commands that Congress draft statutes in language that, to the satisfaction of federal judges, is not capable of being misunderstood. On the contrary, such a rule is precluded by both the imprecision inherent in the English language and a proper regard for the constitutional separation of powers and the realities of the legislative process. As this Court explained in United States Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 577-579 (1973): There might be quibbles about the meaning of * * * (the statutory phrase); but there are limitations in the English language with respect to being both specific and manageably brief, and it seems to us that although the prohibitions may not satisfy those intent on finding fault at any cost, they are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to the public interest. See also Tidewater Oil Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 151, 157 (1972). Thus, "almost any word or phrase may be rendered vague and ambiguous by dissection with a semantic scalpel," but "(t)his kind of semantic inquiry" "amounts to little more than verbal calisthenics" and "should not occupy the time of federal courts." Cole v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 238, 240 (1970) (Harlan J., concurring in the result). Even where constitutionally protected activities are involved, it is not the role of the judiciary to second-guess Congress's decisions on issues that are inherently matters of judgment and discretion. In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 82-84 (1976), for instance, this Court sustained the $10 and $100 thresholds for the recordkeeping and reporting requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act (2 U.S.C. 431 et seq.). Although recognizing that the threshold levels "are indeed low" and "may well discourage participation by some citizens in the political process" (424 U.S. at 83), the Court nonetheless rejected the constitutional challenge to those provisions (ibid.): (W)e cannot require Congress to establish that it has chosen the highest reasonable threshold. The line is necessarily a judgmental decision, best left in the context of this complex legislation to congressional discretion. A similar analysis should apply to Congress's use of one word or phrase rather than another in drafting a statute; legislative choices of language are generally not susceptible to constitutional review by the courts. And here, as elsewhere, it must be remembered that a judge's view of what is wise or desirable is not the same as what the Constitution requires. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 33 (1981). Questions of policy and judgment in selecting from among available alternatives are the province of Congress, not the federal judiciary. See, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 542-543 n.25 (1979); Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578, 591 (1973). It is the responsibility of the legislature rather than the courts to consider claims that laws are assertedly improvident or inartful, and "judicial intervention is generally unwarranted no matter how unwisely we may think a political branch has acted." Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 97 (1979). The district court's decision is also irreconcilable with other settled principles governing judicial review of the constitutionality of federal statutes. This can be seen in several ways. For example, if the Foreign Agents Registration Act had not used the shorthand term "political propaganda" but instead had repeated the lengthy (and neutral) statutory definition in every instance, the validity of the statute would, under the district court's opinion, be beyond question. Thus, the proper judicial response to the district court's concern about the use of the word "propaganda" should have been to define the term in a neutral and constitutionally acceptable manner; such a ruling would be analogous to a clarifying or narrowing construction to correct a statute that is vague or overbroad on its face. See, e.g., Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972); United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954). But in this case, of course, no such ruling is necessary, since FARA itself already provides a constitutionally valid definition of the phrase. The challenged Act is no more unconstitutional than if Congress, rather than using the term of art "political propaganda" at all, had inserted the complete and unassailable definition of that term throughout the statute. Likewise, suppose Congress had used the statutory term "political propaganda" but had supplied no definition of the phrase. If the statute were challenged on the ground that it had (or might possibly be understood to have) a pejorative meaning that violated the First Amendment, a federal court would "have a duty" (United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973)) to follow the "cardinal principle" (Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)) of construing the statute, if fairly possible, to avoid the constitutional defect. See also, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 n.24 (1982). As the Court has explained this doctrine, there is "a strong presumption that the law-making body intended to act within, and not in excess of, its constitutional authority" (Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 546 (1914)), and courts "cannot * * * lightly impute to Congress an intent to invade * * * (constitutional) freedoms" (Eastern R.R. Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 138 (1961)). Thus, "(t)he judicial function is 'not to destroy the Act if we can, but to construe it, if consistent with the will of Congress, so as to comport with constitutional limitations.'" Selective Service System v. Minnesota Pub. Service Research Group, No. 83-276 (July 5, 1984), slip op. 8 (citation omitted). Accordingly, a court confronted with the undefined term "political propaganda" would seek to interpret the statute in a neutral way that both accorded with Congress's intent and would be constitutionally permissible. But surely the Foreign Agents Registration Act is open to no greater challenge because Congress itself offered such a definition on the face of the statute. The district court hence erred in not reading the Act, consistently with Congress's explicit definition, to use the term "political propaganda" in a neutral rather than pejorative fashion. /8/ Finally, even if "political propaganda" were considered to be a pejorative term notwithstanding the statutory definition and the foregoing principles of judicial review, such usage would not render the Act unconstitutional. First, any disparagement that may be involved in the government's characterization of advocacy as "propaganda" does not infringe the advocate's freedom of speech. If an Executive official publicly described the Canadian films as "propaganda," or if a congressional committee conducted an investigation and issued a report calling the films "propaganda," it could hardly be thought that the First Amendment rights of prospective exhibitors of the films would be violated. See National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1969). Such a categorization, even if intended to denigrate the films by conveying the idea that they are false and distorted, would not amount to an unconstitutional restraint or abridgement of an exhibitor's opportunity to use the films in expressing his own point of view. /9/ The Foreign Agents Registration Act, to the extent it embodies a pejorative meaning of the term "political propaganda" at all, stands on no different constitutional footing. Moreover, given the operation of the Foreign Agents Registration Act, any use of the term "political propaganda" in a pejorative sense does not violate the First Amendment. As explained above (see page 4, supra), the identification statement that the registered foreign agent must put on disseminated materials is entirely neutral and does not even use the statutory term "political propaganda." /10/ Similarly, in connection with a registered foreign agent's submission of covered materials, the Department of Justice makes no public statement that the materials are "political propaganda." Thus, in the administration of the Act, the phrase "political propaganda" is not publicly used but rather appears only in internal Department of Justice documents and communications with the agent. And, of course, the use of the term "political propaganda" on the face of the Act is explicitly accompanied by the neutral definition in the statute itself. Accordingly, the sole basis for any asserted First Amendment violation here is that the media or other third parties might publicly utilize the phrase "political propaganda" without adequately conveying the statutorily prescribed definition of this term of art. But the possibility that some people might thereby misunderstand the meaning intended by Congress, and that as a result prospective exhibitors would "run() the risk of being held in a negative light" (App., infra, 26a), is too attenuated and remote to support a First Amendment claim. As this Court stated in upholding the constitutionality of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act (2 U.S.C. 261 et seq.), any such "restraint is at most an indirect one resulting from self-censorship." United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612, 626 (1954). b. In invalidating the statutory language, the district court relied not only on the assumed "chilling" effect of the term "political propaganda" but also on the conclusion that Congress "understood and intended (the phrase) as a term of opprobrium" and "intended (it) to discourage or suppress speech" (App., infra, 25a). However, we doubt that such congressional intention would suffice to render the Act unconstitutional. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-385 (1968). If, as discussed above, the statute passed by Congress does not impermissibly "chill" expression, it is hard to see why a court should strike down the legislation simply because Congress hoped that there would be a "chilling" effect. But in any event, there is no basis for the district court's conclusion that Congress intended "political propaganda" as a term of disparagement designed to deter free expression. The Foreign Agents Registration Act was adopted in 1938. At that time, the Act did not use the phrase "political propaganda" or provide for the labeling of such materials; rather, its primary requirement was the registration of agents of foreign principals. The Act was based on a recommendation of the McCormack Committee that "Congress should enact a statute requiring all publicity, propaganda, or public-relations agents or other agents or agencies, who represent in this country any foreign government or a foreign political party or foreign industrial or commercial organization, to register." H.R. Rep. 153, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 23 (1935). Finding that such agents were seeking "to influence the external and internal policies of this country" (H.R. Rep. 1381, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1937)), Congress enacted FARA "to require all persons who are in the United States for political propaganda purposes * * * to register * * * and to supply information" (ibid.). From the outset, Congress made clear that the Act was a disclosure or "sunshine" law: The bill does not in any way impair the right of freedom of speech, or of a free press, or other constitutional rights. * * * * * Such propaganda is not prohibited under the proposed bill. The purpose of this bill is to make available to the American public, the sources that promote and pay for the spreading of such foreign propaganda. Our National Food and Drug Act requires the proper labeling of various articles, and safe-guards the American public in the field of health. This bill seeks only to do the same thing in a different field, that of political propaganda. H.R. Rep. 1381, supra, at 2-3. By shining "the spotlight of pitiless publicity" on foreign agents, Congress sought to ensure that "our people * * * (would) know the sources" of the information they were receiving (id. at 2.). To be sure, as the district court noted (App., infra, 25a), Congress expressed concern about the activities of foreign agents in this country to spread the dogma of Naziism, fascism, and communism. That is hardly surprising, given the perilous times of national and international danger in which the legislation was born. But Congress did not prohibit such activities or construct a statutory scheme designed to suppress them; indeed, contrary to the purpose attributed to it by the district court, Congress could scarcely have thought that proselytizers of those views would have been "chilled" into submission by any purported stigma associated with the word "propaganda." Rather, the approach chosen by Congress was to require the full disclosure of information to the public. As the district court acknowledged (App., infra, 25a), "a revelation of source as a means of impeaching the persuasive force of any piece of advocacy is wholly legitimate, and, indeed, consistent with the loftiest conceptions of the First Amendment." /11/ In 1942, the Act was amended to add the term "political propaganda" and to require that such materials be labeled with an identification statement and a copy submitted to the government. The legislation expressly declared that "the policy and purpose of this Act * * * (are to) requir(e) public disclosure by persons engaging in propaganda activities and other activities for or on behalf of * * * foreign principals so that the Government and the people of the United States may be informed of the identity of such persons and may appraise their statements and actions in the light of their associations and activities." 22 U.S.C. 611 note. This disclosure purpose is further reflected in the broad and neutral statutory definition of "political propaganda," which, as previously discussed, provides that the term "includes any * * * communication or expression * * * reasonably adapted to * * * influence a recipient * * with reference to the political or public interests, policies, or relations of a government of a foreign country * * * or with reference to the foreign policies of the United States." 22 U.S.C. 611(j). The legislative history of the 1942 amendment confirms the disclosure rationale of the statute and the neutral sense in which Congress used the term "political propaganda." For example, the House Report stated that "(i)t cannot be emphasized too strongly that these amendments do not change the fundamental approach of the statute, which is one not of suppression or of censorship, but of publicity and disclosure * * * * *. With all this information (required by the amendment) at their disposal, recipients of such propaganda can properly appraise its worth." H.R. Rep. 1547, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 2, 4 (1941); see also H.R. Rep. 2038, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1942). In addition, the Senate Report explained that the term "political propaganda" is "comprehensively defined" in order to ensure that "all political propaganda disseminated by agents of foreign principals" would be subject to the requirements of the Act; thus, the definition of "political propaganda" was intended to be "a broad one," since Congress considered it "desirable that any material which (a foreign agent) disseminates that may be classed as political propaganda be properly labeled and copies filed." S. Rep. 913, 77th Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1941); see also S. Rep. 1227, 77th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1942). This explicit legislative history refutes the district court's conclusion that it was Congress's purpose to suppress objectionable expression by using the term "political propaganda" in a narrow and pejorative sense. /12/ The Foreign Agents Registration Act was further amended in 1966. After stating that the amendments were "designed to strengthen the basic purposes of the original act," Congress explained the statutory scheme as follows: The act is intended to protect the interests of the United States by requiring complete public disclosure by persons acting for or in the interests of foreign principals where their activities are political in nature or border on the political. Such public disclosures as required by the act will permit the Government and the people of the United States to be informed as to the identities and activities of such persons and so be better able to appraise them and the purposes for which they act. H.R. Rep. 1470, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1966) (emphasis added); S. Rep. 143, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (1955) (emphasis added). Congress also noted that the 1966 amendments were "aimed at better focusing the act on those individuals attempting to influence Government policies through political activities" (ibid.). Thus, once again, Congress recognized that the statute was intended to be a "sunshine" law that covers all types of political activity and is not confined to those that could be pejoratively characterized as "propaganda." In sum, both the Act on its face and its consistent legislative history indicate that FARA is a neutral disclosure statute and that the term "political propaganda" is simply a broad generic designation of the materials covered by the Act. There is no basis to conclude, as the district court did, that the term "political propaganda" was used in a narrow, derogatory sense in order to suppress speech that Congress found objectionable. 2. The preceding discussion also demonstrates that appellee lacked standing to bring this suit. Article III of the Constitution establishes "irreducible minimum" requirements for standing. Valley Forge College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982). These requirements "are not satisfied merely because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has couched that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process" (id. at 471). Instead, "(a) plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable to the defendant's unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief." Allen v. Wright, No. 81-757 (July 3, 1984), slip op. 12-13. Thus, "Art. III requires the party who invokes the court's authority to 'show that he personally has suffered some actual or threatened injury.'" Valley Forge College, 454 U.S. at 472 (citation omitted). This injury "must be * * * 'distinct and palpable'" rather than "'abstract' or 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical.'" Allen v. Wright, slip op. 13 (citation omitted). Moreover, the requisite injury-in-fact must be one caused by "'the challenged action of the defendant, and not injury that results from the independent action of some third party not before the court.'" Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 736 (1981), quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976). And of course the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing his standing. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 501-502, 517-518 (1975). Under this controlling standard, the district court erred in holding that appellee had standing to challenge the constitutionality of the term "political propaganda" in the Foreign Agents Registration Act. It is undisputed that appellee is not an "agent of a foreign principal" under the Act and is not subject to any of the requirements or sanctions prescribed by the Act. It is also undisputed that the identification statement with which the registered agent must label the films does not use the phrase "political propaganda," and in any event appellee is entirely free to remove that label when he exhibits the films (see page 4, supra). Nor does the government itself publicly disclose that appellee is exhibiting films that constitute "political propaganda" within the meaning of the Act (See page 20, supra). Thus, appellee is essentially a stranger to the Act. Appellee's claim that his First Amendment rights have been violated is based on the assertion that some members of the public might learn, through the media or otherwise, that the Canadian films have been determined to be "political propaganda" under the Act; that these people might misunderstand or not be informed of the definition of this term that Congress provided, and instead might ascribe to it a pejorative meaning; that they might, because of this pejorative characterization, form a negative opinion of appellee himself as the exhibitor of the films; that as a result appellee might suffer an injury to his reputation and consequent damage to his economic, political, or social interests; and that the prospect of such harm has deterred appellee from exhibiting the films as part of his First Amendment expression. Such a chain of reasoning is simply too tenuous and remote to allow appellee to invoke the power of the federal courts to decide the constitutionality of an Act of Congress. Furthermore, appellee's real objection goes not to the statute that Congress enacted, but rather to the actions of third parties and the possibility that they might attribute to the term "political propaganda" a meaning contrary to that intended by Congress. /13/ In holding that appellee's allegation of a "chilling effect" sufficed to give him standing, the district court's decision is also inconsistent with Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972). There, this Court recognized that a plaintiff "who alleges that the exercise of his First Amendment rights is being chilled" does not, "without more," have standing (id. at 12). It noted that "in each of the() cases (in which the Court had considered a "chilling effect" argument), the challenged exercise of governmental power was regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature, and the complainant was either presently or prospectively subject to the regulations, proscriptions, or compulsions that he was challenging" (id. at 11). Thus, while the Court's decisions "fully recognize that governmental action may be subject to constitutional challenge even though it has only an indirect effect on the exercise of First Amendment rights," they have in no way eroded the "established principle that to entitle a private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of executive or legislative action he must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining a direct injury as the result of that action" * * *. Allegations of a subjective "chill" are not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat of specific future harm * * *. Id. at 12-14; see also United Public Workers v. Mitchell 330 U.S. 75, 86-91 (1947); United Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. v. Reagan, 738 F.2d 1375, 1378-1380 (D.C. Cir. 1984). /14/ The district court sought to avoid these principles on the theory that appellee "is not * * * complaining of a 'chilling effect' on the exercise of his First Amendment rights; he is complaining of a species of censorship" (App., infra, 10a). Thus, the court concluded that it is "immaterial" that "the statute is not, by its terms, addressed to (appellee) personally" (id. at 12a). However, contrary to the district court's reasoning, no issue of censorship is involved in this case. No speech has been restrained or prohibited by the government, no sanction or penalty has been imposed for engaging in protected activity, no governmental licensing board has been established, and no content-based regulation or unfettered official discretion serves as a bar to free expression. Compare, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 577 (1965); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. at 11; Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503-505 (1952); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 713-714, 716-717 (1931). Rather, this case involves a classic "chilling effect" argument that is controlled by Laird v. Tatum. /15/ CONCLUSION Probable jurisdiction should be noted. Because the decision of the court below is patently erroneous, we suggest that the Court should reverse summarily. Respectfully submitted. CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General RICHARD K. WILLARD Assistant Attorney General CAROLYN B. KUHL Deputy Solicitor General MARK I. LEVY Assistant to the Solicitor General LEONARD SCHAITMAN HAROLD J. KRENT Attorneys JANUARY 1986 /1/ Appellants' Rule 59(e) motion requested that the district court narrow the substantive terms of the injunction that the court had entered based on its constitutional ruling. Because this timely motion, which was granted by the district court on October 29, sought to amend the September 13 judgment in a substantive and material way, we believe that the finality of the judgment was suspended during the pendency of the motion, and therefore that the time for filing a notice of appeal did not begin to run until the court entered an amended judgment on October 29. See FCC v. League of Women Voters, No. 82-912 (July 2, 1984), slip op. 7-9 n.10; Communist Party of Indiana v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 441, 445-446 & n.4 (1974); United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 41-42 & n.1 (1966); see also Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56 (1982); White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employment Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 450-451 (1982). Out of an abundance of caution, however, we have filed notices of appeal from both the original and the amended judgments and have obtained an extension of time in order to permit the docketing of the appeal in a manner that will be timely as measured from the date of either judgment. /2/ The Act also requires the agent to submit to the Attorney General a report setting forth the places, times, and extent of such dissemination. 22 U.S.C. 614(a); see also 22 U.S.C. 616(a). /3/ The court elaborated that "(a) 'chilling effect' occurs when an actor is prospectively dissuaded from engaging in First Amendment protected activities by a threat of government sanction. Censorship, by contrast, consists of present governmental interference with or suppression of expression" (App., infra, 10a). /4/ The court also noted that the "the information required by the disclosure statement seems wholly innocuous" (App., infra, 5a). As explained above (see page 4, supra), the identification statement affixed to the films does not use the term "political propaganda." /5/ The district court did not suggest that the term "political propaganda," either on its face or as applied in the administration of the Act, constitutes a content-based standard or discriminates against certain viewpoints or issues. We note that in 1983, when the Canadian films in this case were classified, other films designated as "political propaganda" included Flight of Soviet Jewry: Let My People Go, which was disseminated in the interest of the Consulate General of Israel, and Berlin Means Business and More, distributed in the interest of the Berlin Economic Development Corporation. /6/ All standard dictionaries include a definition of "propaganda" as the systematic or widespread dissemination or promotion of ideas or doctrines. See, e.g., Webster's Third New International Dictionary 1817 (1976 ed.) ("dissemination of ideas, information, or rumor for the purpose of helping or injuring an institution, a cause, or a person"; "doctrines, ideas, arguments, facts, or allegations spread by deliberate effort through any medium of communication in order to further one's cause or to damage an opposing cause"; "a publication or display having the purpose or effect of furthering or hindering a cause"); 8 Oxford English Dictionary 1466 (1978 ed.) ("(a)ny association, systematic scheme, or concerted movement for the propagation of a particular doctrine or practice"); Random House Dictionary of the English Language 1152 (1966 ed.) ("information, rumors, etc., deliberately spread widely to help or harm a person, group, movement, institution, nation, etc."). /7/ We also note that Congress has used the term "propaganda" in a neutral sense in a number of other statutes. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. 4107; 26 U.S.C. 501(c)(3), 2522(b), 4945(d); 36 U.S.C. 1304. Likewise, this Court has recognized the neutral meaning of the word in referring to a variety of activities as "propaganda." See, e.g., Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974); National Association of Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264, 280 n.14 (1974); NLRB v. Drivers Local 639, 362 U.S. 274, 279 (1960). /8/ Similarly, if Congress had defined the term "political propaganda" in a manner that was unconstitutional in part, the doctrine of severability would require that, insofar as it would be consistent with legislative intent, a court strike down only the invalid portion of the statute and uphold the remainder. See Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., No. 84-28 (June 19, 1985); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. at 769 n.24; Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 63. Indeed, Congress included a severability clause in the Act (Ch. 263, Section 12, 56 Stat. 258, 22 U.S.C. 611 note), which is an affirmative indication of "the intention of Congress not only that an express provision found to be unconstitutional should be disregarded without disturbing the remainder of the statute, but also that any implication from the terms of the Act which would render them invalid should not be indulged." Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. at 63. To the extent that the district court concluded that the term "political propaganda" improperly incorporated a pejorative as well as a neutral meaning, it should have confined its holding of unconstitutionality to the invalid portion of the statute and left in place the valid portion -- precisely the result that would be reached by accepting the neutral definition of the term that Congress has provided. /9/ In fact, in the real world of political activity, "it may be just as likely that the added publicity about the films because of this controversy may attract a larger audience for (an exhibitor)." Block v. Smith, 583 F.Supp. 1288, 1295 n.7 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal pending, No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. argued Feb. 12, 1985). See also Canadian Films and the Foreign Agents Registration Act: Oversight Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 40-41 (1983). /10/ Furthermore, appellee, as an exhibitor, is under no obligation to identify the source of the films and in fact is free to remove the registration statement that the foreign agent is required to include (see page 4, supra). /11/ See also, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 64-68; United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. at 625-626; Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1, 97-100 (1961); id. at 138-140 (Black, J., dissenting); Viereck v. United States, 318 U.S. 236, 250-251 (1943) (Black, J., dissenting); Attorney General of the United States v. Irish people, Inc., 684 F.2d 928, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (opinion of Wald, J.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1172 (1983). /12/ In fact, President Roosevelt initially vetoed the 1942 Act because he believed that it could interfer with the joint activities of the United States and its wartime allies in areas of national defense. See S. Rep. 1227, supra, at 1-2; 88 Cong. Rec. 1139 (1942). In response, Congress enacted a limited exemption to the otherwise applicable requirements of the Act for foreign governments whose interests were deemed by the President to be vital to the defense of the United States. See 22 U.S.C. 613(f). Furthermore, contemporaneous judicial interpretation of the Act recognized that it "sought to bring about a disclosure of the authorship and source of that which appeared in publications and other media of dissemination at the instance of * * * foreign governments * * *, whether friendly or unfriendly, whether violent or mild." United States v. Kelly, 51 F.Supp. 362, 363 (D.D.C. 1943). Given that the Act thus applied to "mild" activities on the part of "friendly" governments and would (absent the specific exemption) extend even to wartime activities on behalf of our nation's allies, it can hardly be said that the Act was deliberately intended to disparage and repress speech of which Congress disapproved. /13/ We also note that appellee, despite his allegations of a "chilling effect," in fact exhibited the films even before the district court had entered a permanent injunction (see App., infra, 6a n.2). /14/ As Judge Scalia explained in United Presbyterian Church (738 F.2d at 1378-1379 (emphasis in original)): "(C)hilling effect" * * * is foreclosed as a basis for standing by the Supreme Court's holding in Laird v. Tatum * * *. All of the Supreme Court cases employing the concept of "chilling effect" involve situations in which the plaintiff has unquestionably suffered some concrete harm (past or immediately threatened) apart from the "chill" itself. * * * "Chilling effect" is cited as the reason why the governmental imposition is invalid rather than as the harm which entitles the plaintiff to challenge it. * * * * * (T)he standing question * * * (is) whether the fear (of a "chilling effect") constitutes cognizable harm. On th(is) point, Tatum is clear and categorical: "(a)llegations of a subjective 'chill' are not . . . adequate." /15/ In Block v. Smith, 583 F.Supp. 1288 (D.D.C. 1984), appeal pending No. 84-5318 (D.C. Cir. argued Feb. 12, 1985), suit was brought by plaintiffs who, like appellee, are prospective exhibitors of these three Canadian movies and seek to challenge the constitutionality of the statutory term "political propaganda." The district court dismissed the action for lack of standing. While there may be some differences in the allegations of standing in Block and the present case, each court noted its disagreement with the other's ruling. See 583 F.Supp. at 1296 & n.10; App., infra, 13a. APPENDIX