DOE M 151.1-2 Draft 151.1-2 Emergency Management Program for Transportation Safeguards System Activities <AUTHOR> <AUTHOR_EMAIL> <ORG> SO <SUMMARY> This Manual provides detailed emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response requirements to augment draft DOE O 151.1B, Comprehensive Emergency Management System, for DOE or NNSA operations involving Transportation Safeguards System shipments. <DATE_ISSUE> 06/11/2001 <DATE_CLOSE> <TEXT> Draft DOE M 151.1-2 Approved: XX-XX-01 Review: XX-XX-03 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM ACTIVITIES U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY Office of Security and Emergency Operations EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM ACTIVITIES 1. PURPOSE. This Manual provides detailed emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response requirements to augment draft DOE O 151.1B for Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) operations involving Transportation Safeguards System (TSS) shipments. The information is used to establish and maintain emergency management programs, including personnel and resources, in support of Operational Emergencies involving the TSS. The DOE TSS program is managed and operated by the Office of Transportation Safeguards (DOE/AL). The program has the administrative and courier personnel, special transport and escort vehicles, and a Secure Communications Center (SECOM), required to carry out the total responsibility for the safe secure domestic transportation of all DOE-owned or controlled nuclear explosives and quantities of special nuclear material (SNM), as designated in DOE 5632.1B, Protection Program Operations. 2. APPLICABILITY. a. DOE Elements. The requirements of this Manual apply to TSS activities (as detailed in paragraph 1 above.). b. Contractors. Except for the exclusions below, this Manual must be included as a List B directive under the provisions of 48 Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) 970.5204-78. It must be applied to the universe of contractors awarded DOE or NNSA procurement contracts involving the management and transport of TSS materials in accordance with draft DOE O 151.1B. Contractor requirements must be supplemented, as necessary, by DOE or NNSA field elements to implement the requirements of draft DOE O 151.1B and this Manual. Contractors must continue to comply with the requirements of Orders canceled by this Order until their contracts are modified to delete the reference to the requirements of the canceled Orders and to incorporate the new requirements of draft DOE O 151.1B and this Manual. c. Exclusions. (1) Shipments involving other cargo movements outside the TSS , which fall under the requirements of draft DOE M 151.1-3, are excluded from the requirements of this Manual. (2) Facilities and activities of the NNSA Office of Naval Reactors and the Power Marketing Administrations are excluded from the requirements of this Manual. d. Exemptions. (1) If a DOE or NNSA element or contractor can demonstrate that it is subject to emergency management program requirements under the authority of other Federal regulatory agencies, and those requirements are at least as stringent as the requirements of this Manual, an exemption may be requested. (2) Requests for exemptions from the requirements of this Manual must document the basis for each exemption and must establish and justify alternatives equivalent to, or exceeding, this Manual. A process conducted under the provisions of DOE M 450.3-1, DOE CLOSURE PROCESS FOR NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT SETS OF STANDARDS, [see draft DOE O 151.1B, paragraph 4.a.(3.)(b)] may be used to develop alternative requirements, with the resulting alternatives submitted for approval in accordance with paragraph 2.d.(3) below. (3) Requests for exemptions are approved jointly by the Secretarial Officer and the Director of Emergency Operations, with conflicts resolved by the Deputy Secretary or designated Chief Operating Officer for DOE. Requests for exemptions must be submitted from the field element manager to the appropriate Secretarial Officer(s) and the Director of Emergency Operations. 3. SUMMARY. Draft DOE O 151.1B establishes the overall requirements for the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. The TSS Emergency Management Program is a component of the DOE Comprehensive Emergency Management System. This Manual provides additional specific requirements that must be incorporated into emergency management programs. 4. BASE PROGRAM RELATED REGULATIONS AND PLANS. The Base Program for TSS activities must identify and acknowledge the requirement for compliance with laws/regulations/ordinances and plans developed by other regulatory authorities, including those Federal, Tribal, State, and local emergency planning, preparedness, readiness assurance, and response requirements that apply. Applicable Federal agency regulations and other DOE Orders/regulations to be considered include the following or subsequent publications. a. Public Law 83-703, The Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 United States Code (U.S.C.) 2011, as amended, ensures that the development, use, and control of atomic energy is directed to make the maximum contribution to the general welfare, subject at all times to the paramount objective of making the maximum contribution to the common defense and security. b. Title 49 CFR 173.7(b), Shipments of hazardous materials, exempts from Subchapter G those national security shipments made by or under the direction or supervision of DOE or the Department of Defense (DOD) and which are escorted by personnel specifically designated by or under the authority of those agencies. c. DOE O 232.1A, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF OPERATIONAL INFORMATION, dated 7-21-97, ensures that the Office of the Secretary, and both DOE and DOE-contractor line management, are kept fully informed on a timely basis of events that could adversely affect national security, or the safeguards and security interests of DOE, the health and safety of the public or the workers, the environment, the intended purpose of DOE facilities, and the credibility of the Department, including transportation occurrences. d. DOE M 232.1-1A, OCCURRENCE REPORTING AND PROCESSING OF OPERATIONS INFORMATION, dated 7-21-97, Group 6, Transportation, provides detailed categorization requirements for transportation occurrences. e. DOE O 452.1A, NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE AND WEAPON SURETY PROGRAM, dated January 17, 1997, establishes requirements and responsibilities for DOE's Nuclear Explosive and Weapon Surety (NEWS) Program. f. DOE O 452.2A, SAFETY OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVE OPERATIONS, dated January 17, 1997, establishes the applicability, requirements, and safety of the DOE nuclear associated activities and facilities, and for protection, health, and safety of workers and public and the environment. g. DOE O 452.4, SECURITY AND CONTROL OF NUCLEAR EXPLOSIVES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS, dated May 5, 1997, establishes DOE requirements and responsibilities to prevent the deliberate unauthorized use of U.S. nuclear explosives and U.S. nuclear weapons. h. DOE O 461.1, PACKAGING AND TRANSFER OR TRANSPORTATION OF MATERIALS OF NATIONAL SECURITY INTEREST, dated 9-29-00, establishes requirements and responsibilities for the Transportation Safeguards System (TSS) packaging and transportation and onsite transfer of nuclear explosives, nuclear components, Naval nuclear fuel elements, Category I and Category II SNM, special assemblies, and other materials of national security interest. i. DOE O 470.1, SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY PROGRAM, dated 9-28-95, ensures protection against unauthorized access; theft, diversion, loss of custody, or destruction of nuclear weapons, or weapons components; espionage; loss or theft of classified matter or Government property; and other hostile acts that may cause adverse impacts on national security or on the health and safety of DOE and contractor employees, the public, or the environment. j. DOE O 473.2, PROTECTIVE FORCE PROGRAM, dated 6-30-00, establishes policy, requirements, responsibilities, and authorities, for the management and operation of the DOE Protective Force Program. k. DOE 5632.1C, PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS, dated 7-15-94, establishes policy, responsibilities, and authorities for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests (e.g., special nuclear material, vital equipment, classified matter, property, facilities, and unclassified irradiated reactor fuel in transit). l. DOE Manual 5632.1C-1, MANUAL FOR PROTECTION AND CONTROL OF SAFEGUARDS AND SECURITY INTERESTS, dated 7-15-94, with Change 1 dated 4-10-96, provides supplementary requirements for the protection and control of safeguards and security interests. m. AL 5610.14, change 1 dated December 15, 1994. This is a Supplemental Directive (SD) to DOE Order 5610.14, TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM (TSS) PROGRAM OPERATIONS, dated 5-12-93. This SD implements and supplements the Department of Energy (DOE) Albuquerque Operations Office (AL) requirements and responsibilities with respect to the TSS, and sets forth additional AL policies and procedures to be followed for utilization of the TSS. This SD does not change any requirements contained in the DOE Order, but contains administrative or contractual guidance. Additional requirements and responsibilities are identified in AL 1120, "Organization, Authorities, and Functions," and other related DOE and AL directives. 5. CONTACT. For assistance regarding this directive, contact the Director of Emergency Operations at 202-586-9892. BY ORDER OF THE SECRETARY OF ENERGY: CONTENTS 1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 2. HAZARDS ASSESSMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 3. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 4. TRAINING AND DRILLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .4 5. EXERCISES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 6. READINESS ASSURANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 7. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 8. OFFSITE RESPONSE INTERFACES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 9. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . .9 10. EMERGENCY CATEGORIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION . . . . . . . 10 11. NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS. . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 12. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 13. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND REENTRY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 14. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 15. EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12 16. TERMINATION AND RECOVERY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PROGRAM FOR TRANSPORTATION SAFEGUARDS SYSTEM ACTIVITIES 1. CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS. a. General. Emergencies involving Department of Energy (DOE) or National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) Transportation Safeguards System (TSS) differ from emergencies involving DOE or NNSA fixed facilities and emergencies involving transportation of hazardous materials and other cargo movements in several ways. (1) The TSS is used for select shipments between DOE or NNSA nuclear complex facilities, and between DOE, NNSA, and Department of Defense facilities within the contiguous United States. (2) Onsite: Movements of hazardous materials (radioactive, chemical, biological, etc.) must comply with the site transportation requirements. Emergency response for transportation accidents/incidents that occur on a DOE or NNSA site is the responsibility of the DOE or NNSA site organization and its contractors. For accidents/incidents involving TSS shipments on other Federal sites, personnel in charge of the shipment must initiate incident command, then establish a unified command with site responders as they arrive on scene. Convoy personnel in charge of the shipment must maintain custody and security of the cargo until relieved by authorized DOE authority. (3) Offsite: If a TSS classified shipment is involved in an accident/incident and a National Security Area (NSA) is declared, convoy personnel must have initial responsibility for incident command within the NSA until they are relieved by a DOE-appointed Senior Energy Official (SEO). The area around the NSA must have a local incident command system that must work jointly with the DOE incident commander. If a NSA is not required, convoy personnel must initiate incident command; but as local responders arrive at the scene, establish a unified command with the local responders. Convoy personnel must maintain custody and security of the cargo during all offsite incidents. The convoy commander must be the DOE Federal On Scene Commander (FOSC) and SEO to direct and coordinate with the response jurisdiction incident command and the DOE response assets. The convoy commander must retain the DOE FOSC and SEO responsibilities until properly relieved. (4) During response to an offsite transportation emergency, DOE must provide assistance in accordance with Federal statutes and regulations, mutual aid agreements, or other memorandums of agreement to support Tribal, State, and local authorities. (5) Transportation emergencies that occur offsite are categorized as Operational Emergencies for the purpose of internal DOE or NNSA notification. b. Responsibilities under DOE Directives. TSS activities and associated contractors are responsible forC (1) coordinating DOE=s emergency response activities associated with movement of weapons-related items and SNM; (2) ensuring emergency preparedness is incorporated into OTS plans and procedures; and (3) ensuring coordination of OTS emergency preparedness with host site and offsite emergency response organizations (EROs). 2. HAZARDS ASSESSMENTS. a. TSS Convoy Operations. (1) Emergency Planning Hazards Assessments (EPHAs) must be developed and maintained for TSS transportation shipments in accordance with draft DOE O 151.1B, Attachment 3. (a) TSS and associated contractor-operated fixed sites typically operate as tenants on host facilities. TSS must provide to the Federal sites data that includes hazards information and EPHAs pertaining to TSS shipments. The sites must incorporate this hazards information into their emergency management plan (e.g., EPHAs, protective actions, emergency classification levels). (b) EPHAs must be performed for transportation shipments. EPHAs must be updated whenever changes in transportation shipments or methods take place, but reviewed at least annually. (2) EPHAs must include review of Protective Action Recommendations (PARs), currently in use (i.e., green, yellow, red card system) to validate the recommended protective actions for response personnel. (3) EPHA information must be used, in conjunction with security considerations, in determining the NSA in the event of an offsite transportation emergency involving a TSS shipment. An NSA may be declared by the convoy commander to maintain custody and security of the cargo, as well as public health and safety. In this event, the EPHA information must be used to establish the NSA. b. Air Operations. EPHAs must be developed and maintained for TSS air transportation shipments in accordance with draft DOE O 151.1B, Attachment 3. c. Maintenance. Existing EPHAs must be reviewed and updated every year, or prior to a significant change in hazardous material inventory or function/operations. If such changes result in an increase in hazards, the EPHA must be updated immediately. If, however, the changes result in a reduction of hazards with no adverse effect on safety or emergency preparedness and response, the modifications may be performed at the next scheduled review and update. 3. PROGRAM ADMINISTRATION. a. A program must be developed to ensure the development and maintenance of the emergency plan and procedures, development of the annual Emergency Readiness Assurance Plan (ERAP), development and conduct of training and exercise programs, coordination of evaluation (assessment) activities, development of related documentation, and coordination of emergency resources. b. The emergency plan must document the emergency management program and describe the provisions for response to an Operational Emergency, based on needs determined by the results of the EPHA. The emergency plan must be reviewed annually and updated as necessary. c. Emergency Plan Implementing Procedures (EPIPs) must describe how emergency plans must be implemented. EPIPs must be reviewed annually and updated as necessary. d. Plans and procedures must clearly state roles, responsibilities, and requirements associated with ERO's individual positions, operations, and interfaces, including categorization/classification and protective actions for events. e. Plans and procedures must coordinate development and integration of the emergency management program with DOE's Integrated Safety Management system. f. All emergency preparedness documents, such as plans, procedures, scenarios, and assessments, must be reviewed for classification by an Authorized Derivative Classifier or Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information (UCNI) reviewing official. 4. TRAINING AND DRILLS. A coordinated and comprehensive program of training and drills must be an integral part of the emergency management program to ensure that training for program-specific emergency response capabilities is developed, offered, delivered, validated through testing or drills, maintained, and documented. Drills provide supervised, "hands-on" training and/or validation of classroom training for members of the ERO. a. An emergency management training program plan must be developed to provide a systematic view of program goals, organizational responsibilities, resources, and planned activities. The plan must include training goals and qualification requirements, outline of training activities, list of resources and facilities, and a description of the Emergency Management Training Organization, target audience, schedule of training activities, and training program administration. b. Minimum emergency management program standards, capabilities, training, proficiency, and performance requirements must be defined, and remedial training and demonstration of competence must be required, following poor performance in events, drills, or exercises. c. The training program for personnel [i.e., primary and alternate(s)] comprising the ERO must provide forC (1) initial training and annual refresher training for all ERO personnel; (2) refresher training when hazards or the emergency plan/implementing procedures change; and (3) demonstrations of proficiency. d. Drills must ensure that ERO members are familiar with procedures, interfaces, facilities, job aids and resources, equipment for response, protection and communication, and computer applications through practical, "hands-on" activities. e. Training for ERO personnel must emphasize the need for practical judgements involving event categorization/classification, protective actions, and the urgency of notifications of Operational Emergencies. f. Emergency Action Level (EAL) training must be periodically scheduled and conducted to improve the proficiency of ERO personnel in the timely and conservative classification of Operational Emergencies, including decision-making with incomplete or uncertain information for events and conditions not covered explicitly by the EALs. g. The training of all decision-makers authorized to categorize and classify Operational Emergencies promptly and accurately must be validated each quarter, employing hypothetical scenarios and available facility/site aids, such as EAL sets. h. Emergency-related information and training on TSS shipment-specific conditions and hazards must be made available to offsite emergency response personnel and organizations during an emergency. i. Remedial training and demonstration of competence must be required, following poor performance in events or exercises. j. Training and drill records must be maintained to document and monitor participation, proficiency, and competence. 5. EXERCISES. All elements of an emergency management program must be validated over a 5-year period through an approved formal exercise program. The exercise program must demonstrate responses to simulated, realistic emergency events/conditions in a manner that, as nearly as possible, replicates an integrated emergency response to an actual event. Planning and preparing for exercises must be conducted through an effective and structured approach that includes documentation of specific objectives, scope, time lines, injects, controller instructions, and evaluation criteria for realistic scenarios. Each exercise must be effectively and reliably conducted, controlled, evaluated, documented and critiqued. Lessons learned must be documented and result in corrective actions and improvements. a. The offsite transportation emergency response capability of the TSS must be exercised once every year and include evaluation and critique. b. An annual exercise must be designed to test and demonstrate TSS's integrated emergency response capability. The basis for the exercise must be rotated among courier sections. c. Select offsite response organizations must be invited to participate in emergency response exercises at least once every 3 years. This effort must be part of a coordinated readiness assurance program to evaluate interfaces. d. As part of an operational readiness review, TSS must successfully complete a full- participation exercise before starting a new hazardous operation, or before restarting an operation that was shut down for safety concerns. e. Exercise packages for exercises involving external participation must be forwarded to the Director of Emergency Operations for review not later than 45 days prior to the exercise. f. Asset exercise participation must be invited at least once every 3 years. Assets in the exercise must include, at a minimum, one or more of the following: Accident Response Group (ARG), Nuclear Emergency Support Team (NEST), Federal Radiological Monitoring and Assessment Center (FRMAC), Aerial Measuring System (AMS), National Atmospheric Release Advisory Capability (NARAC), Radiation Emergency Assistance Center/Training Site (REAC/TS), and Radiological Assistance Program (RAP). g. Critiques and Corrective Actions. (1) A critique process, which includes gathering and documenting observations of the participants, must be established. (2) The organization responsible for evaluating an exercise must determine if the exercise, or elements of the exercise, satisfactorily accomplished the exercise objectives. If the objectives were not satisfactorily accomplished, a failing grade must be assigned to the exercise, or elements of the exercise, and the objectives must be retested within 90 days. (3) Corrective action items identified as a result of the critique process must be incorporated into the emergency management program. Corrective action plans must be developed and submitted for approval, in accordance with DOE O 414.1A, QUALITY ASSURANCE. 6. READINESS ASSURANCE. The Readiness Assurance Program must provide a DOE-wide framework and associated mechanisms for ensuring that emergency plans, implementing procedures, and resources are adequate and sufficiently maintained, exercised, and evaluated (to include assessment and appraisal), and that appropriate and timely improvements are made in response to needs identified through coordinated and comprehensive emergency planning, resource allocation, training and drills, exercises, and evaluations. a. Emergency Readiness Assurance Plans. An ERAP must be prepared and submitted, as described in draft DOE O 151.1B. b. Self-Assessment. Readiness assurance evaluations (i.e., program self-assessments) must be conducted annually to identify potential weaknesses, to develop lessons learned from training, drills, exercises, and actual responses, and to develop and implement specific corrective actions in a timely manner. c. Tracking System. A system to track and verify correction of findings from program and exercise evaluations, or from actual responses must be developed, established, and maintained. (1) The evaluated activity must acknowledge evaluation findings within 90 days of receiving the findings by submitting a corresponding plan for correction. (2) The evaluating organization must validate the closure of all open or unresolved evaluation findings, unless the evaluating organization is the Office of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance (OA). In that case, line management that oversees the performance of the evaluated activity must verify the closure of all open or unresolved OA findings. d. Metrics. A system of performance measures and/or metrics to capture and track objective data regarding the status of emergency management programs, and their performance in key functional areas, must be developed, established, and maintained. The specific measures/metrics to be included and the frequency of data reports must be developed and published by the Director of Emergency Operations, in coordination with operations/field office managers and the Lead Program Secretarial Officer (LPSO), Cognizant Secretarial Officer (CSO), and Program Secretarial Officer (PSO). e. System Checks. A program of System Checks will determine if components in the emergency response program are functional. System Checks will be limited to those components of the emergency response system that are critical elements (i.e., maintaining an Emergency Operations Center point of contact, maintaining a recall roster, generating a predictive plot or plume model, maintaining an emergency notification procedure, establishing a Video Teleconference/Emergency Communications Network line, providing a copy of a situation report, providing current meteorological data). The System Check program will be developed, established, and maintained by the Director of Emergency Operations; facility/site involvement will be limited to responding when the check is conducted. f. No-Notice Exercises. A program of no-notice exercises will determine if one or more selected objectives in an emergency response program perform according to applicable plans, procedures, and/or other established requirements. The No-Notice Exercises Program will be developed, established, and maintained by the Director of Emergency Operations; facility/site involvement will be limited to providing trusted agents and responding when the exercise is conducted. Criteria for this program will be developed and published by the Director of Emergency Operations, in coordination with operations/field office managers and the LPSO, CSO, and PSO. g. Program Evaluations. (1) Operations/Field Office. Each DOE or NNSA operations/field office must evaluate the emergency management program at each facility under its supervision. Each facility must be evaluated at least once every year. The operations/field office must notify the CSO of its evaluation schedule. (2) Headquarters. (a) LPSOs must schedule and perform periodic readiness assurance evaluations of emergency management activities at least once every 3 years. (b) OA conducts appraisals in accordance with DOE O 470.2A, SECURITY AND EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT INDEPENDENT OVERSIGHT AND PERFORMANCE ASSURANCE PROGRAM. (c) Schedules for all Headquarters evaluations and follow-on activities must be coordinated with the Director of Emergency Operations to minimize impacts and maximize benefits. No more than one Headquarters evaluation, not including follow-on activities, should be scheduled per TSS-operation, or contractor-operated facility, per year. 7. EMERGENCY RESPONSE ORGANIZATION. This organization must be established and maintained by personnel with overall responsibility for the initial and ongoing response to and mitigation of an emergency. The ERO must have each of the following positions as part of their response organization. a. A duty officer must be assigned 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. b. The Operation Command Center (OCC) must be staffed 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week to support TSS shipments. c. A duty officer and OCC personnel must be available to categorize and classify an event, as appropriate, 24 hours a day, and 7 days a week. This authority must be unambiguous and clearly communicated throughout the organization. d. OTS TSS facilities and transportation on host sites must follow host site emergency management plans and integrate with the site ERO, unless there is a conflict with TSS operating procedures, at which time TSS operating procedures must have precedence. Host DOE or NNSA sites must categorize and classify, as appropriate, all TSS transportation incidents that physically take place on the host site. Convoy personnel must assist the host site with subject matter expertise when an incident involves a TSS transportation shipment on that site. e. Each individual assigned to the ERO must receive training and achieve a passing score on a test of their assigned ERO position(s) annually. f. The convoy commander must establish effective control at the accident/incident scene and integrate local agencies and organizations that provide response support. (1) The convoy commander must be the incident commander in charge at the accident/incident scene and must establish a command and control organization compatible with the National Fire Protection Association 1561 Incident Command System. Upon arrival of local responders, incident command must be handed off or must become unified based upon the mission. However, convoy personnel must maintain control of the cargo in accordance with operating procedures. (2) Convoy personnel must be predesignated as liaison personnel with responsibility for the following: (a) Initiating communications and ensuring effective ongoing communications with offsite agencies during an event, and (b) Coordinating with the ERO concerning logistics, effective communications, consistency of units of measure, etc., for the deployment of radiological assets. 8. OFFSITE RESPONSE INTERFACES. a. DOE and NNSA must coordinate with Tribal, State, and local agencies and organizations responsible for offsite law enforcement assistance and emergency response and protecting the health and safety of the public. Liaison personnel associated with the TSS must ensure regular liaison with State contacts appointed by governors of States. Contacts with each State governor's office must be verified annually. Personnel must be assigned to share information with offsite representatives and discuss common solutions to challenges in planning for and responding to TSS emergencies. b. Processes must be in place to implement external communications with Tribal, State, and local agencies and organizations concerning shipment hazards, alert and notification methods, potential emergency consequences and protective actions, emergency plans, and provisions for coordination on release of emergency information to the public. 9. EMERGENCY FACILITIES AND EQUIPMENT. a. Facilities and equipment adequate to support emergency response must be available for use and maintained as follows: (1) Provisions must be established for use of an alternate location if the primary command center is unavailable. (2) Provisions must be established to ensure that equipment and documentation, such as time designation and units of radiation, are compatible with equipment and documentation associated with DOE and NNSA assets. b. Emergency equipment and supplies must be made available and maintained. 10. EMERGENCY CATEGORIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION. a. Onsite. Emergencies involving TSS transportation shipments that occur on DOE or NNSA sites must be categorized and, as appropriate, classified within 15 minutes of recognition. The site is responsible for classification in accordance with the site emergency plan. Convoy personnel must provide the site with hazard information concerning the shipment, as long as the information does not involve the release of classified information. However, if further information is required, classified information may be released to properly cleared individuals per special operating procedures. This information must be used by the site to assist with its categorization, classification, and coordination of response activities. b. Off-Site. Emergencies involving TSS shipments offsite must be categorized as Operational Emergencies in accordance with draft DOE O 151.1B. Trained personnel must have clear authority to categorize an event as an Operational Emergency within 15 minutes of recognition. Protective Action Recommendations (PARs) must be provided directly to local responders as soon as possible after the event scene is secure. Provisions must be in place for the timely notification of PARs to designated State contacts. c. When shipments are overcome by hostile events, the emergency must be categorized as soon as possible. National security shipments must be defended as a first priority and this defense must take precedence over all other actions. 11. NOTIFICATIONS AND COMMUNICATIONS. a. Procedures must be established for prompt initial notification of affected personnel, emergency response personnel, and response organizations, including DOE or NNSA elements and Tribal, State, and local organizations. b. Procedures must be established for continuing effective communication among response organizations throughout an emergency. c. DOE or NNSA field and Headquarters operations centers (OCs) and Tribal, State, and local organizations must be notified within 15 minutes, and all other organizations within 30 minutes of the categorization of an Operational Emergency. When shipments are overcome by hostile events, notifications and PARs must follow as soon as possible. PARs must be provided directly to local responders as soon as possible after the incident scene is secure. Provisions must be in place for TSS-designated personnel to ensure timely provision of PARs to designated State contacts. 12. CONSEQUENCE ASSESSMENT. Estimates of onsite and offsite consequences must be computed and assessed in a timely manner throughout the emergency. Consequence assessments must be integrated with categorization and protective action decisions, incorporating applicable indicators and measurements and coordination with offsite agencies. Follow-up support must be provided by DOE and NNSA radiological response assets. 13. PROTECTIVE ACTIONS AND REENTRY. a. Protective action requirements applicable to DOE or NNSA personnel and the public must include the following: (1) Protective actions for DOE or NNSA personnel, contractor personnel, and the public must be predetermined and directly associated with categorization criteria and EALs. The EPHA must provide the basis for protective actions and PARs. (2) Protective Action Guides and/or Emergency Response Planning Guidelines, prepared in conformance with DOE or NNSA-approved guidance applicable to the actual or potential release of hazardous materials to the environment, must be used in protective action decision-making. (3) Timely PARs for the public must be provided to appropriate Tribal, State, and/or local authorities. Provisions must be in place to provide this information to local responders at the emergency scene, as well as to assigned State contacts. b. For TSS operations involving hostile actions, initial emergency notifications must be made to DOE Headquarters OC Watch Office by "Flash" notification. If a shipment is overcome by hostile events, on-scene event categorization, notifications, and PARs must follow as soon as possible. National security shipments must be defended as a first priority and this defense must take precedence over all other actions. PARs must be provided directly to local responders as soon as possible after the incident scene is secure. Provisions must be in place for personnel assigned to the TSS to ensure timely provision of PARs to designated State contacts. c. Re-entry planning must include contingency planning to ensure the safety of re-entry personnel, such as planning for the rescue of re-entry teams. All individuals involved in re-entry must receive a hazards/safety briefing prior to emergency response activities. 14. EMERGENCY MEDICAL SUPPORT. Medical support must be in accordance with TSS and site requirements. 15. EMERGENCY PUBLIC INFORMATION. a. Public information must be provided through the DOE/AL Public Affairs Office in coordination with the Headquarters Office of Public Affairs and any affected host site. b. Provisions must be in place to provide accurate, candid, and timely information, consistent with requirements of the Freedom of Information Act and the Privacy Act. Information must be provided to ensure the health and safety of TSS personnel, responders, and the public during all emergencies, so as to establish facts, avoid rumors and speculation, and be responsive to public concern and information needs. c. A Joint Information Center (JIC) must be established to provide a single source of information regarding emergencies involving TSS shipments. The JIC must be established, directed, and coordinated by a senior DOE or NNSA public affairs manager or alternate. JIC staffing must include trained spokespersons with technical expertise related to the emergency. d. The emergency public information program must be integrated with the TSS emergency management program plans and procedures. The program must include provisions to inform applicable personnel, responders, and the public concerning shipment hazards, emergency points of contact, protective actions, and emergency response activities on a routine basis. e. A press statement must be released within 1 hour of the declaration of an operational emergency. However, this may be delayed for security reasons and/or malevolent acts. In this case, a press statement will be released as soon as the scene is secure or it is determined that a press release is needed for public safety. f. The Headquarters Director of the Office of Public Affairs and the Director of Emergency Operations must be informed of all DOE or NNSA emergency public information actions. These notifications must be made as soon as practicable, but are not required prior to issuing the initial news release. All statements must be coordinated with Headquarters thereafter. g. In situations involving classified information, sufficient unclassified information must be provided to explain the emergency response and protective actions required for the health and safety of workers and the public. 16. TERMINATION AND RECOVERY. a. Termination and recovery of TSS related events at a site are the responsibility of the affected site, with support from TSS. b. Termination and recovery of other events are the responsibility of the FOSC, with the assistance of senior officials responding to the event. c. The ERO and the accident investigation team, operating under the provisions of DOE O 225.1A, ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION, must coordinate or integrate their activities to facilitate an orderly transition of responsibilities for the emergency scene.