<< COB0000001 >>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL et al	)
		)No. 1:96CV01285
	Plaintiffs,	) (Judge Lamberth)
	v.	)
)
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of	)
the Interior et al.,	)
	Defendants.	)
		)
INTERIOR DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
MAY 31. 2002 ORDER TO PAY THE COURT MONITOR THE SUM OF $54.307.34
The Secretary of the Interior and the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs ("Interior
Defendants") respectfully move this Court for reconsideration of its May 31, 2002 Order,
directing the Department of the Interior to pay the Court Monitor the sum of $54,307.34, as
compensation for his professional fees and expenses from May I through May 31. Counsel for
Interior Defendants have conferred with counsel for Plaintiffs about this motion, and counsel for
Plaintiffs stated that Plaintiffs oppose this motion.
	In support of this motion, Interior Defendants demonstrate in the accompanying
memorandum that reconsideration of the May 31, 2002 Order is warranted on the following
grounds: (1) Interior Defendants were not provided an opportunity to review the compensation
request prior to the issuance of the Order and, therefore, were deprived of an opportunity to
comment or object to such request; (2) the compensation request is not reasonable or proper
because it fails to provide sufficiently detailed information about the work done; and (3) the
compensation request is not reasonable or proper because numerous charges are for activities and
expenses not within the scope of the Court Monitor's appointment order or for activities
<< COB0000002 >>
undertaken which are not properly within this Court's jurisdiction.
	Therefore, the Interior Defendants respectf'ully request that this Court reconsider its May
31, 2002 Order to allow the defendants an opportunity to comment or object to the Court
Monitor's invoice and, further, to direct the Court Monitor to revise his invoice to include
sufficiently detailed information about his work and to remove all charges for activities beyond
the Court Monitor's appointment order or the jurisdiction of this Court.
Dated: June 14, 2002	Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. McCALLUM, JR.
	Assistant Attorney General
	STUART E. SCHH~'FER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
	J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN
	Director
~
SANDRA P. SPOONE
Deputy Director
D.C. Bar No. 261495
JOHN T. STEMPLEWICZ
Senior Trial Counsel
Commercial Litigation Branch
Civil Division
P.O. Box 875
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875
(202) 514-7194
<< COB0000003 >>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
)
ELOIJISE PEPION COBELL et al	)
		)No. 1:96CV01285
	Plaintiffs,	) (Judge Lamberth)
	V.	)
		)
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of	)
the Interior et al	)
	Defendants.	)
		)
INTERIOR DEFENDANTS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF THE
MAY 31. 2002 ORDER TO PAY THE COURT MONITOR THE SUM OF $54.307.34
	On May 31, 2002, this Court issued an Order directing the Department of the Interior to
pay the Court Monitor the sum of $54,307.34 as compensation for his professional fees and
expenses from May 1 through May 31. The Order noted that the Court had reviewed the Court
Monitor's compensation request and found it to be reasonable. The Secretary of the Interior and
the Assistant Secretary - Indian Affairs ("Interior Defendants") respectfully request that this
Court reconsider its Order for the following reasons: (1) the Interior Defendants were not
provided an opportunity to review the compensation request prior to the issuance of the Order
and, therefore, were deprived of an opportunity to comment or object; (2) the compensation
request is not reasonable or proper because it fails to provide sufficiently detailed information
about the work done and instead provides vague descriptions which do not explain the subject
matter addressed; and (3) the compensation request is not reasonable or proper because numerous
charges are for activities and expenses not within the scope of the Court Monitor's appointment
order or for activities undertaken which are not properly within this Court's jurisdiction.
For these reasons, the Interior Defendants respectfully move for the reconsideration of the
<< COB0000004 >>
May 31, 2002 Order to allow them an opportunity to comment on or object to the Court
Monitor's invoice and, further, to direct the Court Monitor to revise his invoice to include
sufficiently detailed information about his work and to delete all items on the invoice which
reflect activities beyond his appointment order or the jurisdiction of this Court.
ARGUMENT
I.	The Interior Defendants Are Entitled To An Opportunity To Comment On
Or Object To The Fees end Expenses of the Court Monitor Prior To The
Issuance Of An Order To Pay.
	On April 16, 2001, this Court issued an Order appointing Joseph S. Kieffer, m to serve as
Court Monitor, with the consent of the Plaintiffs and the Interior Defendants and in accordance
with the Court's inherent powers, subject to certain conditions. See Order, April 16, 2001
("Initial Appointment Order"). These conditions dictated that the Court Monitor serve for a
period of at least one year, "monitor and review all of the Interior [Diefendants' trust reform
activities and file written reports of his findings with the Court," and "be compensated at a rate of
not less than $250.00/hour for his services and [] be reimbursed for all expenses incurred in
connection with his appointment "with the Interior Defendants bearing such costs. Id. at ¶¶ 1, 2,
6.	This Court extended the Court Monitor's term of service for an additional year on April 15,
2002. See Order April 15, 2002 ("Subsequent Appointment Order").'
111n so doing, the Court incorporated only two of the three conditions to the Interior Defendants'
consent to the reappointment, one of which was that "the Court Monitor's reports shall be given
no greater deference than those set out in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53." See Order,
4/15/02. Nonetheless, the subsequent appointment order did not reappoint the Court Monitor
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, but instead reappointed him "in accordance with
the Court's inherent powers." See Subsequent Appointment Order at 2; compare Subsequent
Appointment Order at 1-2 ("By Order dated April 16, 2001 ... in accordance with the Court's
inherent powers, the Court appointed Joseph S. Kieffer, Ill to serve as Court Monitor"
"ORDERED that, pursuant to the Court's Order of April 16, 2001, Mr. Kieffer's term of service
2
<< COB0000005 >>
	Although not appointed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, the Court
Monitor, much like a special master, has the duties and obligations of a judicial officer. See
Lister v. Commissioners Court, 566 F.2d 490 (Sth Cir. 1 978).2 The United States Supreme Court
has described the role of a master and the compensation for such a position as follows:
The value of a capable master's services cannot be determined with mathematical
accuracy, and estimates will vary, of course, according to the standard adopted.
He occupies a position of honor, responsibility, and trust; the court looks to him to
execute its decrees thoroughly, accurately, impartially, and in full response to the
confidence extended; he should be adequately remunerated for actual work done,
time employed, and the responsibility assumed. His compensation should be
liberal, but not exorbitant. The rights of those who ultimately pay must be
carefully ~rot~t~....
Newton v. Consol. Gas Co., 259 U.S. 101, 105 (1922) (emphasis added); see also Reed v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 607 F.2d 737, 748 (6~" Cir. 1979) ("Courts must never lose sight of the
fact that the fees in a case of this kind [school desegregation case] are paid from public funds.").
	To protect the rights of those who must bear the burden of remunerating a court appointed
judicial officer, the party so directed is entitled to object to his or her fees, costs and expenses.
as Court Monitor is extended for one year") with Order, Feb. 24, 1999 ("Pursuant to Rule 53 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the court HEREBY APPOINTS Alan L. Balaran to serve as
special master"). Moreover, since the subsequent order rejected one of the three conditions of
the Interior Defendants' consent to the reappointment, the reappointment was made without
Defendants' consent. Compare Interior Defs.' Response to Court Order Dated April 3, 2002
Regarding Court Monitor, filed April 11, 2002 at 1-2 (consenting to the Court Monitor's
reappointment so long as "his reports are limited to reporting on steps taken by the Department to
rectify the breaches of trust declared by the Court or steps taken that 'would necessarily delay
rather than accelerate the ultimate provision of an adequate accounting."') ~iIii Subsequent
Appointment Order at 2 ("Defendants' position seeking to limit the scope of the Court Monitor's
review to specific breaches is rejected.").
~' Some courts have held that the term "court monitor" is simply another name for a special
master and that court monitors are governed by the standards for special masters set forth in Fed.
R. Civ. P. 53. See Juan F. v. Weicker. 37 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1994).
3.
<< COB0000006 >>
Casey v. Lewis, 43 F.3d 1261, 1272 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that "it would be unfair to order
Defendants to pay the fees without an opportunity to object" and remanding the order of
reference to the district court to incorporate Defendants' request for an opportunity to object to
the fees of the Special Master), ~rt granted 514 U.S. 1126 (1995), rev'd on other grounds, 518
U.S. 343 (1996).
	In the matter at hand, the Interior Defendants were deprived of the opportunity to
comment on or object to the Court Monitor's invoice prior to the Court's issuance of the May31,
2002 Order to pay $54,307.34. Consequently, the Court should relieve the Interior Defendants
from the May 31, 2002 Order to allow them the opportunity to comment on or object to the Court
Monitor's invoice.
II.	The Compensation Request Is Not Reasonable Or Proper Because It Fails To
Provide Sufficiently Detailed Information About The Work Done.
	The Court Monitor's compensation request fails to provide sufficiently detailed
information about the work he has done and, therefore, is improper and unreasonable. In
commenting upon the Supreme Court's grant of fees and expenses to a Special Master, Justice
Blackmun noted that:
fees and expenses charged by a Special Master, when allowed by this Court,
represent our assurance to the parties that the charges are reasonable and proper.
A party's consent to the allowance of fees and expenses does not absolve this
Court of its duty to make that determination.
Kansas v. Colorado, 498 U.S. 933, 934 (1990) (Justice Blackmun commenting on the Court's
order granting motion of Special Master for interim fees and expenses, but reserving his formal
dissent). Simil'arly, in Texas v. New Mexico, 475 U.S. 1004 (1986), Chief Justice Burger, joined
by Justice Blaekmun and Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the Court's grant of interim fees and
4
<< COB0000007 >>
expenses to a Special Master on the ground that the information provided in support of the fee
request was lacking, stating:
I am unwilling to act without being provided with at least as much information as
private clients routinely receive from their privately retained counsel.... I would
defer action on the application for interim fees until adequate information is
provided. Without such data, this Court cannot protect the legitimate public
interests implicated.
Texas, 475 U.S. at iOO5~ (finding that the Special Master omitted any information concerning the
experience levels of the four attorneys working with him and information regarding the specific
hourly rates of the Special Master and each of the four attorneys).
	Analogously, with respect to attorney fee applications, this Circuit requires that such
applications contain sufficiently detailed information about the hours logged and the work done,
as "it is insufficient to provide the District Court with very broad summaries." National Ass'n of
Concerned Veterans v. Secretary of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Although
the fee application need not present the "exact number of minutes spent nor the precise activity to
which each hour was devoted nor the specific attainments of each attorney," "the application
must be sufficiently detailed to permit the District Court to make an independent detennination
whether or not the hours claimed are justified." i~ (advising that "[tihe better practice is to
prepare detailed summaries based on contemporaneous time records") (quoting in part Co~eland
~'Ch Justice Burger, quoting from his dissent in Louisiana v. Mississipvi, 466 U.S. 921
(1984), reiterated that "[a] Special Master of this Court is a surrogate of the Court and in that
sense the service performed is an important public duty of high order in much the same way as is
serving in the Judiciary. I do not suggest that Special Masters should serve without
compensation, as for example, Senior Federal Judges have done for a number of years in such
cases, but I believe the public service aspect of the appointment is a factor that is not to be wholly
ignored in determining the reasonableness of fees charged in a case like this." Texas. 475 U.S. at
1005 (dissent).
5
<< COB0000008 >>
v. Marshall, 641 F.2d 880, 891 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
	In this matter, the Court Monitor's invoice fails to satisfy this standard because it
provides only vague descriptions of his activities that prohibit any appraisal of the reasonableness
of the requested fees. For example, throughout the invoice, the Court Monitor itemizes fees in
very broad and vague terms, including: "Review documents," "Review pleadings," "Telcons with
third parties and DOI officials," "Re view trial transcripts," "Administration," "Legal Research,"
"Review correspondence," "Prepare for and interview DOI official," "Telcons with third parties,"
"Review pleadings and correspondence," "Revise letter in response to DOJ letter," "Prepare for
and participate in telcon," "Telcon with DOI officials," "Prepare notes," "Prepare for and attend
third party meeting," "Prepare for and attend meeting with DOI official," "Review DOJ letter
response and related documents and pleadings," "Outline letter response," "Prepare letter
response to DOJ," "Research," and "Document review." See Letter and Invoice from Joseph S.
Kieffer to Hon. Royce C. Lamberth, dated May 31, 2002, attached to Order, May 31, 2002
("Kieffer Invoice") at 1-8. These ambiguous descriptions lack any notation of the subject matter
under the Court Monitor's consideration or the general areas or aspects of trust reform under his
review.
	More importantly, an assessment of the reasonableness of the Court Monitor's charges for
these activities cannot be made from vague descriptions, such as: review documents, review
pleadings, review trial transcripts, administration, review correspondence, prepare for and
participate in telcon, and prepare notes. Id. The invoice fails to identiI~' the topics, subject
matters, or aspects of trust reform being monitored by the Court Monitor and the participants in
such discussions and meetings. For example, numerous charges on the invoice are for "Telcons
6
<< COB0000009 >>
with third parties." See Kieffer Invoice (entries dated May 3, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 23, 28,
29, 30). This description is not only inadequate to permit a determination of the reasonableness
of the fees, but suggests that such charges are not within the scope of the Court Monitor's
appointment order because contact with "third parties" cannot be construed as "monitor[ing] and
review[ing]... [Djefendants' trust reform activities." See Section Hi, j~frg; Subsequent
Appointment Order at 2.
	Furthermore, the Court Monitor's invoice stands in stark contrast to the May 1, 2002
invoice submitted by the Special Master, Alan L. Balaran. See Order, filed May 3, 2002 at 1
(ordering the defendants to pay the Law Office of Alan Balaran the sum of $55,770.25 no later
than May 31, 2002); April 2002 Report of the Special Master (Attachment 6 - May 1, 2002,
Invoice #2 for $55,770.25). Throughout the invoice, the subject matters and issues under the
Special Master's review are consistently described, including the topics discussed in meetings,
correspondence, and phone calls and subject matters being reviewed through documents reviews
and interviews. ~ April 2002 Report of the Special Master, Attachment 6 ("Draft letter to
Spooner regarding NPS information and conference w/ experts regarding same," "Review expert
report (and technical assessment) regarding TFAS; draft letter to Spooner," "Draft letter to Court
regarding Denver IvfMS retest," "Review documents regarding Lee's Summit move, document
retention and life cycle; document research and correspondence regarding same," "Begin
interviews to ascertain information regarding impact of proposed movement of records; review
documentation regarding same," "Interview officials regarding protocols necessary for proper
records review, storage, research; review 16 BIAM and other protocols regarding same; begin
drafting report and recommendation regarding findings," "Review trial and contempt testimony
7
<< COB0000010 >>
regarding origins of centralization program; review HLIiP Subproject status; review Homan's
strategic plan regarding centralization initiative; review chronology of events regarding
retirement of boxes.. .," "Review letter from A. Kessler w/ attached letter from L. Jensen
(counselor to the Solicitor) requesting an extension of time," "Conference with IBM and USi
regarding outstanding site investigations").
	The information and explanations in the Court Monitor's invoice fall far short of the
detailed descriptions required to provide an assurance that the fees charged are reasonable and
properly within the scope of his appointment order. Given the Court Monitor's demonstrated
tendency, described below, to exceed the limits of his order of appointment and this Court's
jurisdiction — thereby violating limits imposed by the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers and the Administrative Procedure Act — it is crucial that the Interior Defendants be
afforded meaningful review of the activities for which the Court Monitor seeks to charge them.
III.	The Compensation Request Is Not Reasonable Or Proper Because The Court
Monitor Includes Charges For Activities Which Are Beyond His
Appointment Order And The Jurisdiction Of This Court.
	To the extent that it is possible to determine the activities of the Court Monitor from his
invoice, it appears that he includes charges for activities beyond the scope of his appointment
order and the jurisdiction of the Court. A party should not be required to pay for activities which
are not within the order of reference of a special master or court monitor. See. e.g.. Reed v.
Cleveland Bd. of Educ. 607 F.2d 737, 748 (6th Cir. 1979) (concluding that defendants should not
be required to pay for 322.5 hours spent by a court's consultant because these hours were spent
8
<< COB0000011 >>
on activities which were not included in the statement of his appointment)4.
	In this matter, the initial appointment order of the Court Monitor directs that "Mr. Kieffer
shall be compensated at a rate of not less than $250.00/hour for his services and shall be
reimbursed for all expenses in connection with his appointment." ~ Initial Appointment Order
at ¶ 6. This provision regarding the Court Monitor's compensation was not modified by the
Court's subsequent appointment order. See Subsequent Appointment Order. The scope of the
Court Monitor's appointment is to "monitor and review all of the Interior defendants' trust
reform activities and file written reports of his findings with the Court. These reports shall
include a summary of the defendants' trust refonn progress and any other matter Mr. Kieffer
deems pertinent to trust reform." Id. at 2; see also Initial Appointment Order at ¶2.
	The Court Monitor's invoice improperly includes fees and charges for activities which are
not within the scope of his appointment order or within the jurisdictional limits of this Court. As
set forth in Interior Defendants' previous pleadings, the Court Monitor's Seventh Report should
be rejected in its entirety by this Court as it was an impermissible intrusion upon the internal
affairs of the Department of the Interior. See Interior Defendants' Response To The Seventh
Report Of The Court Monitor, filed May 16, 2002. Specifically, the Seventh Report violates the
constitutional separation of powers doctrine and contravenes the bounds of the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706. Id. In the report, the Court Monitor goes beyond the scope
~' In Reed, the court found that the authority to appoint "expert advisors or consultants to the
special master and the court" derived from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53 or from the
inherent power of the court. Id. at 746.
9
<< COB0000012 >>
of his appointment order, which directs him to "monitor and review.., trust reform activities,"5
by advancing as established fact his own view of the competency of Interior personnel and the
appropriate assignment of management responsibilities, including an expanded role for the
Special Trustee. The report also infringes overtly upon the authority of the Secretary of the
Interior, as it critiques her supervision and evaluation of the Special Trustee. Such internal
personnel matters within an Executive Branch agency are not within the province of the judiciary
or a court appointed judicial officer, nor are such sensitive internal deliberations and decisions
matters for public comment or judicial review. Therefore, fees included in the Court Monitor's
invoice for preparation, revision, or filing of the Seventh Report should be removed, as the
activities associated with such fees are not properly within the scope of his appointment or within
this Coui-t's jurisdiction. See Kieffer Invoice (entries dated May 1: "Review and revise report"-
$500, "Draft report"- $500; entries dated May 2: "Finalize Seventh Report"- $375, "Prepare
Seventh Report for submission and distribution"- $300, "File and distribute Seventh Report"-
$150).
	The Court Monitor should also be directed to delete all charges related to the issuance of
formal discovery by means of document requests and conducting depositions, as such activities
are also not within the appointment order. As mentioned above, the Court Monitor was
appointed to "monitor and review" trust reform and was directed to issue written reports of his
findings with the Court. See Subsequent Appointment Order at 2; Initial Appointment Order at
~' Although the Court Monitor's appointment order directs that his "reports shall include a
summary of the defendants' trust reform progress and any other matter Mr. Kieffer deems
pertinent to trust reform," this broad mandate cannot overcome the constitutional doctrine of
separation of powers and the bounds of this Court's jurisdiction under the Administrative
Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706.
10
<< COB0000013 >>
¶2~ No authority was provided in his appointment orders to conduct formal discovery. The
initial appointment order provided that "Mr. Kieffer is permitted to make and receive ex parte
communications with all entities necessary or proper to effectuate his duties" and that "Interior
shall also provide Mr. Kieffer with access to any Interior offices or employees to gather
information necessary or proper to fulfill his duties [and] Mr. Kieffer shall bring to the attention
of the Court any problems with access to information or persons that cannot be resolved
informally." See Initial Appointment Order at ¶¶ 3, 4.~ Thus, the mechanism devised by the
Court to facilitate the gathering of information by the Court Monitor on the progress of trust
reform was an informal process of ex parte communications and access to Interior offices and
employees.
	This mechanism was not altered by the Court's subsequent appointment order. Although
the subsequent order prescribed that the Court Monitor's findings of fact based upon witness
statements "be developed from on-the-record testimony given under oath with an opportunity for
cross-examination by the parties "see Subsequent Appointment Order at 2-3, this simply allows
the Court Monitor to confirm in recorded, sworn interviews particular statements that individuals
have made elsewhere if he wishes to rely upon such statements in his reports. Because formal
discovery is not within the scope of the Court Monitor's appointment order, the fees associated
with such activities should be eliminated from his invoice. See Kieffer Invoice (entry dated May
~' The Secretary directed all Interior employees to provide the Court Monitor with "access to
records and documents of the Department, its bureaus and offices, as well as to any officer and
employee of the Department and to any of its offices, bureaus or contractors that he deems
necessary for the accomplishment of his duties to review and monitor the trust reform efforts of
the Department." See Memorandum from Secretary Norton to All Employees of the Department
of the Interior, dated April 24, 2001 at 1-2 (Exhibit A).
11
<< COB0000014 >>
3: "Outline deposition schedule and deponents"- $250; entry dated May 4: "Review court orders
and prepare deposition protocol and letter to DOJ regarding document and deposition requests" -
$375; entry dated May 5: "Review and revise deposition protocol letter"- $125; entry dated May
6: "Prepare for document requests and Depositions"- $625; entry dated May 7: "Prepare for
depositions"- $625; entry dated May 8: "Review documents and prepare first document
production request"- $1125; entry dated May 9: "Prepare for deposition and first document
request"- $1000; entry dated May 14: "Prepare for depositions"- $375; entries dated May 15:
"Prepare notice of depositions"- $250, "Prepare for depositions"- $250; entry dated May21:
"Prepare for depositions" - $625; entry dated May 22: "Review documents and prepare document
request"- $750).
	Moreover, as the Court Monitor was appointed solely to report to the Court on Interior's
efforts to accomplish trust reform, it is beyond his mandate to conduct legal research, and fees for
such research should be removed from the Court Monitor's invoice. See Kieffer Invoice (entry
dated May 7: "Legal Research"- $250; entry dated May 8: "Legal Research"- $250; entry dated
May 29: "Research"- $375). As noted in Section II, supra, charges for "Telcons with third
parties" are similarly inappropriate.
	Finally, the Court Monitor's fees and expenses for attendance and presentation at the
InterTribal Monitoring Association ("ITMA") meeting are inappropriate. ITMA is a national
non-profit tribal consortium of 53 federally-recognized tribes which conducts national tribal
meetings to discuss tribal efforts regarding trust fund issues. Attendance at such meetings is not
within the purview of the Court Monitor's appointment order to "monitor and review all of the
Interior defendants' trust reform activities" -- nor is the preparation or provision of speeches for
12
<< COB0000015 >>
such meetings.
	Likewise, it is improper to charge the Interior Dcfendants for the Court Monitor's
speeches at Tribal Task Force on Trust Management Reform meetings. The Tribal Task Force
was formed to facilitate Interior's consultation with Tribes regarding the creation of a new
organization to manage trust systems, operations and programs within the Department, and it
consists of two tribal representatives from each of the twelve BIA regions and nine Department
individuals. See Ninth Quarterly Report, Office of Indian Trust Transition, at 43-44. Several
meetings were held by the Tribal Task Force to facilitate recommendations regarding various
organizational proposals for the Secretary. Id. Speaking at such meetings is not within Mr.
Kieffer's monitoring role. Accordingly, all charges associated with attendance at the ITMA
meeting and speeches made at the Tribal Task Force meeting should be redacted from the Court
Monitor's invoice. See Kieffer Invoice (entry dated May 14: "Prepare for presentations and to
attend Tribal Task Force and ITMA meetings"- $437.50; entry dated May 16: "Prepare
presentations to [[MA and Tribal Task Force"- $500; entries dated May 17: "Meeting with
Tribal representatives re: ITMA and Tribal Task Force meetings"- $500, "Prepare for ITMA
presentation"- $250; entries dated May 18: "Prepare for and attend ITMA meeting"- $2250,
"Review ITMA documents"- $375; entry dated May21: "Prepare talking paper"- $375; entry
dated May 28: "Review Tribal Task Force and ITMA documents"- $750; entry dated May 29:
"Prepare talking paper"- $375)7~
~' Certain Lees in the Court Monitor's invoice pertain to both the Tribal Task Force and the ITMA
meetings. See Kieffer Invoice (entry dated May 14: "Prepare for presentations and to attend
Tnbal Task Force and [[MA meetings"- $437.50; entry dated May 17: "Meeting with Tribal
representatives re: ITMA and Tribal Task Force meetings"- $500; entry dated May 28: "Review
Tribal Task Force and iTMA documents"- $750). These charges must be segregated to delete
13
<< COB0000016 >>
CONCLUSION
	For the aforementioned reasons, the defendants respectfully request that this Court
reconsider its May 31, 2002 Order to allow the defendants an opportunity to comment on or
object to the Court Monitor's invoice and, further, to direct the Court Monitor to revise his
invoice to include sufficiently detailed information about his work and delete all charges for
activities beyond the Court Monitor's appointment order or the jurisdiction of this Court.
Dated: June 14, 2002	Respectfully submitted,
ROBERT D. MeCALLUM, JR.
	Assistant Attorney General
	STUART E. SCHIFFER
Deputy Assistant Attorney General
	J. CHRISTOPHER KOHN
	Director
	D.C.	At..
	SANDRA P. SPOON
Deputy Director
Bar No. 261495
JOHN T. STEMPLEWICZ
Senior Trial Counsel
Commercial Litigation Branch
Civil Division
P.O. Box 875
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875
(202) 514-7194
time spent on activities beyond the scope of Court Monitor's duties. For instance, fees for ITMA
activities are not within the scope of the Court Monitor's appointment order and should be
deleted as well as fees for preparing for presentations at both the ITMA and Tribal Task Force
meetings.
14
<< COB0000017 >>
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
	I declare under penalty of perjury that, on June 14, 2002 I served the Foregoing Interior
Defendants 'Motion for Reconsideration of the May 31, 2002 Order to Pay the Court Monitor
the Sum of $54,307.34, and the attached Interior Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion
for Reconsideration of the May 31, 2002 Order to Pay the Court Monitor the Sum of $54,307.34
by hand upon:
Keith Harper, Esq.	Dennis M Gingold, Esq.
Native American Rights Fund	Mark Kester Brown, Esq.
1712 N Street, NW.	1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976	Ninth Floor
	Washington, D.C. 20004
Alan L. Balaran, Esq.
Special Master
1717 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
12th Floor
Washington, D.C. 20006
Joseph S. Kieffer, m
Court Monitor
420 - 7k" Street, N.W.
Apartment 705
Washington, D.C. 20004
By U.S. Mail upon:
Elliott Levitas, Esq.
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530
<< COB0000018 >>
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
ELOUISE PEPION COBELL et al	)
		)
	Plaintiffs,	)
		)
	v.	)	Case No. 1:96CV0 1285
)	(Judge Lambertli)
GALE A. NORTON, Secretary of the Interior et ~,)
		)
	Defendants.	)
ORDER
	Upon consideration of the Interior Defendants' Motion For Reconsideration of the May 31,
2002 Order to Pay the Court Monitor the Sum of $54,307.34, Plaintiffs' responses thereto, and the
entire record in this case, it is hereby ORDERED that Interior Defendants' motion is GRANTED; and
	IT IS ORDERED that the Order of May 31, 2002 is vacated; and
	IT IS ORDERED that the Court Monitor is directed to revise Invoice #13 (May 1 - May 31,
2002) to provide sufficiently detailed information about the work done and to remove all items and
charges which reference activities beyond the scope of his appointment order and the jurisdiction of
this Court; and
	IT IS ORDERED that the Court Monitor provide the Interior Defendants with a copy of all
future invoices for professional fees and expenses which are submitted to the Court; and
	IT IS ORDERED that the Interior Defendants will have ten (10) days from receipt of the Court
Monitor's invoices to submit any objections or comments to such invoices.
SO ORDERED this _____ day of	, 2002.
ROYCE C. LAMBERTH
United States District Judge
<< COB0000019 >>
cc:
Sandra P. Spooner
John T. Stemplewicz
Cynthia L. Alexander
Commercial Litigation Branch
Civil Division
P.O. Box 875
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, D.C. 20044-0875
Fax (202)514-9163
Dennis M Gingold, Esq.
Mark Brown, Esq.
1275 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Ninth Floor
Washington, D.C. 20004
Fax (202) 318-2372
Keith Harper, Esq.
Native American Rights Fund
1712 N Street, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036-2976
Fax (202) 822-0068
Elliott Levitas, Esq.
1100 Peachtree Street, Suite 2800
Atlanta, GA 30309-4530
Joseph S. Kieffer, m
Court Monitor
420 - 7~" Street, N.W.
Apartment 705
Washington, D.C. 20004