U.S. Department of Justice 
Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 

Image of United States Department of Justice sealCommunity Oriented Policing Services logoCRIME ANALYSIS IN AMERICA: 


FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 

Image of an aerial shot of a cityImage of a man and woman looking at a computer
CRIME ANALYSIS IN 
AMERICA: 
FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 

Author 
Timothy C. O'Shea, Ph.D. 
Principal Investigator 

Keith Nicholls, Ph.D. 
Co-Principal Investigator 

With assistance from 
Jonathan Archer, MPA 
Elton Hughes, MPA 
Jana Tatum, MPA 

March 2003 

This project was supported by cooperative agreement 
#99-CK-WX-K002 by the Office of Community Oriented 
Policing Services, U.S. Department of Justice. Points of view or 
opinions contained in this document are those of the authors 
and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies 
of the U.S. Department of Justice. 


Table of Contents 

Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . v
Overview. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Project . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Findings. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Organizational Dynamics. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Human Resources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Operations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Conclusion. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
References. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Acknowledgements 

This project was made possible by a grant from the COPS Office. We 
are grateful for that support. We are particularly grateful for the 
thoughtful suggestions and patient guidance that our project manager, 
Matthew Scheider, provided at every stage of this project. Numerous 
reviewers provided countless suggestions that we believe improved 
the survey instrument, field observations and reports. Although they 
are too numerous to thank by name, we would like to express our 
gratitude to them. We would also like to thank the many police 
departments, state police and sheriff's offices that completed the 
survey. We are especially grateful to those departments that 
generously permitted us access to observe their operations. Finally, 
we would like to thank the person who sits by the computer and 
makes sense out of the vast data that police departments collect. The 
crime analyst is at the center of an important, necessary, difficult and 
exciting effort to re-invent American policing. And from what we 
have seen, they are performing admirably. We are all in your debt. 


Overview 

Organizations must adapt to survive. Like 
all organizations, police departments must 
adjust their administrative arrangements to 
accommodate shifts in social, economic, 
and political conditions. While adjustments 
are usually incremental, sometimes change 
is dramatic. American policing changed 
radically at two points in its history, and 
both instances led to a dramatic and far-
reaching transformation in police 
operations and management (Kelling and 
Moore 1991). The first shift came in the 
early 20th century, when the professional 
model appeared. The second 
can be traced to the mid1980s, when the idea of 
community policing began to 
attract serious attention. One 
important change associated 
with community policing 
that we address here is the 
importance that data and 
analysis have assumed in 
police operations. 

One area of police operations 
that has been particularly 
affected by the shift to community policing 
is information processing and crime 
analysis. Community policing does not 
break from professional policing because it 
demands information. Both models 
obviously rely on the acquisition and 
analysis of information to make informed 
decisions. Community policing can be 
distinguished from professional policing 
because it calls for information from 
domains that had previously been neglected 
and for more complex analysis of that 
information. The philosophical shift that 
accompanies the transition from 
professional to community policing opens 
new domains of information and expands 
many that already exist. Community 
policing emphasizes the analysis of data to 
examine the nature of complex community 
problems and to evaluate the effectiveness 
of crime reduction efforts. 

For all practical purposes, the professional 
police system was closed. Community 
policing takes a contrary position: 
democracy demands that law enforcement 
policy reflect the interests of external 
stakeholders (e.g., elected officials, 
citizens, agencies related to the police 
mission, etc.). Aggregating these interests, 
examining the nature and 
make-up of community 
problems, and translating 
them into police policy 
places greater demands on 
the information processing 
operations of the department. 
Communication is primarily 
one direction under 
professional policing. 
Departmental policy is 
formed at the top of the 
organizational structure and 
filtered downward in the 
form of standard operating procedures. 
Policymaking power is not shared, but 
centralized. Here too, the community 
policing model calls for an open system: all 
members of the organization at all levels 
participate in the policymaking process. 
Community policing operations that follow 
from these philosophical shifts, such as 
customer and officer surveys, new 
performance measures, community 
partnerships, strategic planning, etc., 
require substantially more data from 
substantially more sources that often must 
be analyzed via substantially more complex 
methodologies. 

Community policing 
can be distinguished 
from professional 
policing because it 
calls for information 
from domains that had 
previously been 
neglected and for more 
complex analysis of 
that information. 


 

The primary operational goal of 
professional policing is reactive crime
control. Community policing, in contrast,
places a high value on proactive policing 
focused on problem solving. Officers are 
encouraged to systematically scan police 
data, analyze it to discover 
problems and their causes, 
design responses, and assess 
them. The ultimate goal is to 
go beyond crime control and 
deliver a broad range of 
services that improve the 
community's general quality 
of life. This encourages 
police departments to engage 
in complex problem analysis 
that moves beyond 
traditional crime analysis. 
Problem analysis examines 
the nature of community 
problems and combines 
traditional crime analysis 
with more complex social science research 
methods. This type of analysis aims to do 
more than simply apprehend offenders or 
identify high problem neighborhoods. It 
seeks to examine the causes of problems 
and ideally offers potential solutions to 
them derived from this analysis. Clearly 
this type of activity places serious demands 
on the information processing abilities of 
law enforcement agencies and personnel. 

Police executives are acutely aware of the 
additional information demands that 
community policing creates. Fortunately, 
support has come in several forms. Federal 
authorities have actively supported 
community policing, especially when it 
comes to information processing. For 
example, since the Office of Community 
Oriented Policing Services (COPS) was 
formed in 1994, information technology 
awards to state and local law enforcement
agencies have exceeded one billion dollars 
(Abt Associates, 2000). Computer 
hardware and software technology has also 
improved considerably over the past fifteen 
years. Systems currently are less expensive 
to purchase and operate, their operation 
requires less technical skill,
the data are more accessible, 
and their output is more 
intuitive (e.g., crime maps). 
The combination of money 
and improved technology has 
vastly improved law 
enforcement's information 
processing capacity, but this 
improved technological 
capability does not 
necessarily translate into 
more complex data analysis.

Police crime analysis 
operations consist of three 
essential functions.

(1) Assess the nature, extent, and 
distribution of crime in order to 
efficiently and effectively allocate 
resources and deploy personnel. 
(2) Identify crime-suspect correlations to 
assist investigations. 
(3) Identify the conditions that facilitate 
crime and incivility so that 
policymakers may make informed 
decisions about prevention 
approaches (Reuland, 1997).

Problem analysis 
examines the nature of 
community problems 
and combines 
traditional crime 
analysis with more 
complex social science 
research methods. This 
type of analysis aims 
to do more than simply 
apprehend offenders or 
identify high problem 
neighborhoods. 

Community policing involves a shift in 
what has been the traditional focus of crime 
analysts. It involves increased focus on 
identifying the underlying causes of 
chronic crime problems, developing 
responses that are linked to this analysis 
and assessing the effectiveness of those 
responses. 
 


The Project

This guide is a product of the findings of a 
recent study that examined key aspects of 
crime analysis. In 2000, the University of 
South Alabama's Center for Public Policy 
conducted an extensive study of crime 
analysis operations in American law 
enforcement agencies. The project consisted 
of two national surveys and site visits. 
Researchers first surveyed all American law 
enforcement agencies with 100 or more 
sworn personnel. Nearly 65 
percent of the 859 agencies 
responded to the survey. 
Researchers then surveyed a 
random stratified sample (by 
size and region) of 800 law 
enforcement agencies with 
fewer that 100 sworn 
personnel. 

The second phase of the 
project took a more indepth 
look at crime analysis 
operations across the country 
in the "large" departments. 
Data were drawn from telephone interviews 
with forty crime analysts and from site visits 
to nine crime analysis units. The analysts 
interviewed and the sites visited were 
chosen to best explore what we believed to 
be an objectively determined select group of 
crime analysis operations. 

In 2000, the University 
of South Alabama's 
Center for Public Policy 
conducted an extensive 
study of crime analysis 
operations in American 
law enforcement 
agencies. The project 
consisted of two 
national surveys and 
site visits.

This project initially sought to produce a 
guide that would briefly describe the 
operations of an "ideal" crime analysis unit. 
This was based on the hypothesis that over 
the past 10 to15 years police departments 
had made remarkable strides forward in 
developing this specialized police function 
and in moving it towards more complex 
problem analysis activities. Producing a 
guide that represented a composite of the 
"best of the best" would be a 
useful tool for any 
department that wished to 
improve its crime analysis 
operations. This, however, 
was not to be. A different 
story emerged from the 
findings; while it was not 
what was originally hoped 
for, it was nevertheless 
interesting and useful to 
police administrators.

 

This guide is intended to 
inform police managers of 
the structural issues to address when 
considering a crime analysis function. It is 
also intended to expose the current 
limitations of crime analysis and the policies 
that those findings imply. For a more 
detailed description of the project findings, 
please consult the full project report, which 
can be obtained from COPS Online at 
www.cops.usdoj.gov. 


Findings 

A shift in police operations, in this case 
crime analysis, should have followed from 
the shift in philosophy. Community policing 
calls for a change in the police paradigm. It 
would, if adopted, call for expanded 
information domains and a 
more elaborate and problem-
oriented analysis of those 
data. The sorts of data that 
are collected and the ways in 
which they are analyzed are 
closely related to the 
reigning paradigm. If police 
operations and management 
are designed to identify and 
apprehend offenders, then the 
demand for data analysis will 
conform to that limited 
philosophy. If, on the other 
hand, a broader mission and 
vision is developed, one that 
seeks to better understand the 
complex nature of the 
criminal incident, then the 
form of and demand for data 
analysis will change 
accordingly as will the 
function of crime analysts. 

In nearly every instance, we 
found analysts that were 
being asked to direct their efforts to focus 
narrowly on the apprehension of offenders
or possibly on the identification of high 
crime areas. Crime control, narrowly 
defined as the identification and 
apprehension of offenders, dominated the 
demand for crime analysis. This would 
suggest that police operations 
continue to fundamentally 
reflect the professional 
policing model. Police 
managers insisted that crime 
analysis should concentrate 
on tactical operations (i.e., 
support efforts that can be 
directly linked to "catching 
the bad guy") and not on the 
analysis of underlying 
community problems. No 
one would argue that these 
analytic activities are not 
important. One might have 
reasonably anticipated, 
however, a broader and 
deeper range of crime 
analytic activities and output, 
possibly focused on 
identifying the underlying 
causes of broader community 
problems. 

If police operations and 
management are 
designed to identify 
and apprehend 
offenders, then the 
demand for data 
analysis will conform 
to that limited 
philosophy. If, on the 
other hand, a broader 
mission and vision is 
developed, one that 
seeks to better 
understand the 
complex nature of the 
criminal incident, then 
the form of and 
demand for data 
analysis will change 
accordingly as will the 
function of crime 
analysts. 


Organizational Dynamics 

Specialization 

Crime analysis has evolved into a 
specialized unit in American policing. 
Nearly 75 percent of the police departments 
surveyed reported having specialized crime 
analysts. Of those that have a crime analyst 
specialist, nearly 75 percent said that the 
analyst was assigned to a separate unit. 
Some have argued that greater efforts should 
be directed toward pushing data to the end 
users (i.e., beat officers and detectives) in a 
fashion that facilitates analysis at the lowest 
levels; others argue that pulling data to a 
specialized unit and conducting the analysis 
there is more efficient and more effective. 
This is a legitimate issue for police 
executives to consider; it has generally not 
been one that police policymakers have 
addressed. 

Although the trend toward specialization is 
clear, never assume that 
functionally differentiated 
crime analysis is the most 
appropriate option. Some 
departments may choose to 
rely on technology to help 
department members to do 
their own analysis (e.g., 
Chicago Police Department's 
Information Collection for 
Automated Mapping 
(ICAM). Other departments may choose to 
designate a person or unit to conduct the 
analysis. Police administrators will have to 
decide which approach is more in keeping 
with their particular organizational 
philosophy and technological capacity. 

Line and Staff 

The role that a functionally differentiated 
unit should play, either staff or line, is an 
important aspect of organizational dynamics. 
Both executives and members of the unit, 
view crime analysis units as a support and 
advisory function to line members. This is 
not in question. The question is not whether 
crime analysis should be a staff function; the 
question is rather to what end the staff 
function should be directed. The findings 
overwhelmingly suggest that crime analysts 
value tactical analysis (that supports short-
range planning, primarily interested in crime 
control activities) over strategic analysis 
(that supports long-range planning, 
primarily interested in more complex 
organizational issues that involve 
departmental strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities, and threats) or problem 
analysis (that supports the identification and 
response to persistent 
community problems). 
Managers seem to share that 
view, even though most 
crime analysis units are 
under the authority of 
administrative divisions. 

Although the trend 
toward specialization is 
clear, never assume 
that functionally 
differentiated crime 
analysis is the most 
appropriate option. 

The rather single-minded 
focus on tactical analysis is 
troublesome on several 
levels. First, tactical crime analysis has 
developed into a specialization because it 
requires technical skills and training that the 
ordinary sworn member does not have. After 
all, organizational complexity is what drives 
specialization. However, hardware and 
software technology is moving toward more 


user-friendly applications. As time passes, 
the computer literacy of people entering the 
police field is increasing. One would 
expect that these changes should reduce the 
need for tactical analysis (at least as it is 
currently defined) to be performed by 
"experts." As the need for tactical support 
decreases, so does the need for a 
functionally differentiated unit that 
narrowly defines its mission as one of 
support for tactical operations. Second, 
current thinking about 
police administration 
stresses the importance of 
strategic management, 
which demands 
substantially higher levels 
of strategic intelligence 
(e.g., stakeholder 
assessments, forecasting, policy evaluation, 
performance measurement, organizational 
intelligence, citizen surveys, etc.). It should 
not be unreasonable to expect a crime 
analyst to possess the necessary technical 
skills and training (e.g., advanced research 
design and methods, statistics, survey 
research, program evaluation, 
organizational behavior, etc.) to perform 
tasks associated with strategic or problem 
analysis. Granted, it is more than what is 
now expected of crime analysts. 

The need for lowerlevel technician skills 
(e.g., generating point maps, creating crime 
bulletins, etc.) is decreasing because of 
more intuitive software and the increased 
computer literacy of officers. Thus, the 
need for specialization may well evaporate 
over time. It may be necessary to redefine 
the role assigned to crime analysts. 

It may be necessary to 
redefine the role 
assigned to crime 
analysts. 

Centralization 

The question of centralization in the crime 
analysis context arises when a functionally 
differentiated unit is formed with multiple 
members that delivers crime analysis 
support to multiple dispersed units. The 
question becomes whether crime analysis 
operations should have an independent and 
distinct chain of command (centralized), or 
whether its members should be embedded 
in the chain of command 
within the dispersed units that 
they support and into which 
they are physically assigned 
(decentralized). For example, 
should a crime analyst 
assigned to support a precinct 
station fall within the precinct 
station chain of command, and thereby 
under its authority, or should the crime 
analyst fall within a departmentwide crime 
analysis unit chain of command and 
ultimately be responsible to the crime 
analysis operations manager? 

Frequently when the unit is decentralized, a 
central crime analysis authority remains; 
thus, the principle of unity of command is 
violated. Many of the departments that we 
visited and interviewed by phone followed 
this practice, arguing that a centralized line 
of authority was needed, but it was 
impossible to ignore the local command 
structure. To do so, they insisted, would 
damage the relationship between crime 
analysis and target. Often, according to 
respondents, this hybrid decentralization 
arrangement leads to situations in which 
the crime analysis unit mission is 
subordinated to a variety of questionable, 
and at times trivial, needs of the target 
superior. 


The findings suggest that a crime analysis 
unit, when it is multimember and when it 
supports multiple targets, should be 
structured with a single, 
distinct unit chain of
command.

Coordination

The benefits of the division 
of labor have been discussed 
above. There are, at the same 
time, costs associated with 
the division of labor. 
Functionally differentiated 
units tend to develop 
independent, unit-level missions that may 
or may not conform to the overall mission 
of the organization. Management must seek 
to coordinate inter-unit operations to insure 
that all units remain focused on the 
organization's strategic 
mission. In its staff capacity, 
the crime analysis unit 
should serve as a structural 
means to facilitate inter-unit 
coordination. Crime analysts, 
as the department's 
information specialists, 
should be the primary center 
for identifying tactical and 
strategic problems, and 
ultimately for stimulating the 
discussions that lead to 
alternative responses.



 The findings suggest  
that a crime analysis 
unit, when it is  
multimember and when  
it supports multiple  
targets, should be  
structured with a  
single, distinct unit  
chain of command. 

To do so, however, the unit must develop 
sound, formal links with other units. We 
found that this was not the case. Links with 
other units are informal; interactions 
between units are primarily ad hoc. 
Although it appears that nearly three-
quarters of large police departments have 
chosen to specialize the crime analysis 
function, the operations of the function 
seem to be, at best, loosely 
integrated into the fabric of 
the organization. One is
struck by the perception of 
many crime analysts that they
must "sell" the unit to others
in the department. Unit
members appear insecure,
reluctant to assert themselves,
and generally unwilling to
take their place in the 
organization. 

Managers should consider designing 
formal, structural arrangements to link the 
crime analysis unit with logically 
connected operations and units (e.g., crime 
prevention, POP, planning, COMSTAT, 
etc.). 

Managers should 
consider designing
formal, structural  
arrangements to link  
the crime analysis unit  
with logically  
connected operations  
and units (e.g., crime  
prevention,  
POP, planning,  
COMSTAT, etc.).  

Performance Measures 

Measuring individual, unit,
and organizational
performance is critical to the
management function. We 
found little evidence of
formal performance
measurement in the crime
analysis units that we visited
and spoke with in phone
interviews. This deficiency 
appears to be linked to the 
overall ad hoc nature of the relationship 
between crime analysis and the targets to 
whom they provide support. This 
relationship could best be described as 
tentative. Crime analysts, as noted above, 
feel the need to "sell" their product to other 


members of the department. Analysts have 
no clear sense about which products are 
considered useful to the 
target. They produce, deliver, 
and through anecdotal 
evidence draw conclusions 
about the value of their 
work. Neither the analysts, 
nor the analysts' managers 
are clear about how and how 
well targets use their 
product. Individual-level 
quantitative and qualitative 
measures cannot be 
established until managers 
know what products the 
crime analysis unit should be producing.

This must come through a systematic 
assessment of crime analysis output. Most 
units that we visited and 
spoke with by phone 
interview were aware of this 
deficiency and have made 
efforts to remedy it, but with 
only minor success. 

Managers should design 
formal mechanisms to 
discover the relative value 
that endusers place in their 
products and thus begin the 
process to develop useful 
performance measures. 

Managers should 
design formal 
mechanisms to 
discover the relative 
value that endusers 
place in their products 
and thus begin the 
process to develop 
useful performance 
measures. 


Human Resources 

Job Description 

Researchers routinely found formal job 
descriptions, most often drafted for use in 
job announcements, in the departments they 
visited and interviewed via telephone. They 
also discovered job descriptions in 
departmental general orders. The entry-level 
position generally called for a person with 
an undergraduate degree in 
one of the social sciences, 
familiarity with basic office 
software, and good verbal 
and written communication 
skills. Basic entry-level 
requirements for job 
announcement purposes seem 
to be reasonably well 
described, but frequently 
ignored the research skills 
often necessary for more complex analysis 
of underlying crime problems. 

When it comes to articulating the routine, 
daily activities of a crime analyst, the 
findings were less encouraging. We found 
that only one of the departments that we 
visited or spoke with had a formal job 
manual for the crime analyst position. 
Several were in the process of drafting one. 
Nearly every analyst that we spoke with 
believed that a manual was necessary, but 
they also pointed out that drafting one was a 
complex and difficult task that required a 
collaborative effort between analysts and 
managers. The general absence of a formal 
manual further illustrates the ad hoc nature 
of crime analysis in American law 
enforcement and is a further indication that 
the function has not been given the careful, 
deliberate consideration that it should. Thus, 
managers who oversee a specialized crime 
analysis function should construct a formal 
crime analysis position manual. 

Managers who oversee 
a specialized crime 
analysis function 
should construct a 
formal crime analysis 
position manual. 
Selection 

Selecting a civilian crime analyst is 
substantially different from selecting a 
sworn crime analyst. When it 
comes to civilians, most of 
the departments that we 
visited or spoke with began 
the process by posting a job 
announcement, often via the 
city or department website. 
Some departments hired 
civilians from within the city 
personnel system. In those 
that hired from outside the 
city system, the pattern generally consisted 
of some combination of basic written exam, 
oral board interview, and background 
investigation. 

When selecting civilians, the most common 
complaint was the long processing time. 
With sworn members, the selection issues 
are different. One could reasonably assume 
that when a civilian applies for a non-sworn 
position he/she has an interest in the work. 
This may not be the case when the selection 
pool consists of sworn members. Because 
the position is specialized, it requires skills 
and training that may not be commonly 
found among the sworn population. If the 
position falls within the boundaries of a 
collective bargaining agreement, the 
selection process may be driven by 
standards that are unrelated to the job 


description (e.g., seniority). The appeal of 
the assignment may be unrelated to the 
work (e.g., steady watch, straight days, 
weekends off, etc.). This was the case in 
several of the departments that we spoke 
with in phone interviews. Members of the 
unit who did not have the desirable 
qualifications were selected because they
bid successfully. Unit productivity suffered 
dramatically in these departments. 

Another selection issue,
especially important for 
agencies forming a crime 
analysis unit, concerns 
selection of the unit leader.  
The departments that we 
visited and spoke with in 
phone interviews, all of 
which scored high in all 
domains of crime analysis,
agreed that the unit's success 
was directly related to the 
energy of the unit's leader, 
particularly a newly formed 
unit's first leader. These 
findings support the idea that 
the success of a crime 
analysis unit is linked to a 
leader, or "policy 
entrepreneur." A common
characteristic found among 
the better units that we 
visited was a dynamic leader who was a 
powerful influence on the unit's success.

Thus, the selection process for civilian 
crime analysts should be as brief as 
possible to avoid losing qualified people to 
other jobs. Sworn crime analysts should be 
exempt from collective bargaining 
requirements for position assignments. 
Departments should carefully consider unit 
leadership, especially when a new unit is 
being formed. A "policy entrepreneur" 


is 
vital to a new unit's success. 

Career Path 

Like the selection process, crime analyst 
career path issues revolve around the 
member's organizational status (i.e., 
civilian or sworn). A sworn member's 
assignment to the crime 
 analysis unit, in a technical 
sense,has no effect on 
his/her career path. Vertical
movement for a sworn officer
is predominantly a function
of how well the officer
performs on a promotional
exam. Previous assignments
have little, if anything, to do
with promotion decisions.


The selection process  
for civilian crime  
analysts should be as  
brief as possible to  
avoid losing qualified  
people to other jobs.  
Sworn crime analysts  
should be exempt from  
collective bargaining  
requirements for 
position assignments. 
Departments should
carefully consider unit 
leadership, especially 
when a new unit is 
being formed. A "policy 
entrepreneur" is vital to 
a new unit's success. 

Civilian status adversely 
impacts career opportunities 
in a law enforcement agency. 
Ordinarily, for civilian crime 
analysts, there is little 
opportunity for vertical 
movement and in almost all 
cases none for lateral 
movement. There are 
exceptions: In several 
California departments the 
crime analyst may bid for other openings in 
municipal departments that have similarly 
defined positions (e.g., data processing). In 
one department, the crime analyst has been 
eligible for advancement to higher-ranking 
civilian administrative positions within the 
police department. 


Limited career mobility for civilians, 
according to some analysts that we spoke 
with, has resulted in high turnover. This is 
somewhat ironic: according 
to proponents of 
civilianization, turnover is 
reduced when sworn 
members are replaced by 
civilians. The tenure for 
sworn members in a crime 
analysis unit, the argument 
goes, is shortened through 
frequent transfers and 
promotions. We found that the absence of 
lateral and vertical opportunity for civilians 
may also result in high turnover. 

Managers will thus have to weigh the 
benefits of civilian crime analysts against 
the costs of high turnover due to a narrow 
career path. To avoid turnover, 
policymakers should consider 
opening opportunities for 
civilian members, both 
laterally and vertically. 

Training 

When it comes to crime 
analysis, training does not 
appear to be a high-priority 
issue. This is partially 
explained by the mission, 
either explicitly or implicitly articulated by 
managers and analysts. Police managers 
tend to emphasize tactical analysis. Most 
analysts that we spoke with resented 
engaging in activities that cannot be linked 
directly to the identification and 
apprehension of offenders. To this end, 
managers and analysts have placed great 
value in data manipulation (data bases and 
spreadsheet) and various presentation tools 
(e.g., word processing, graphics, digital 
imaging, etc.). In many instances, training 
has been unnecessary because the people 
who have been drawn to the analyst 
position have acquired the 
valued skills on their own.

To avoid turnover, 
policymakers should 
consider opening 
opportunities for 
civilian members, both 
laterally and vertically. 

In-service training 
curriculum should be 
developed to train 
crime analysts to 
exploit the data in a 
more sophisticated and 
problem-oriented 
fashion. 

When training is offered, 
according to the analysts 
that we interviewed, the 
courses provided are 
elementary and as a rule are 
geared toward the entry-
level person. Relatively little 
energy or inclination has been directed 
toward higher-level data analysis. 

This type of training is especially necessary 
if the analysis function is going to become 
more sophisticated, considering that the 
entry-level requirement for analysts 
requires only the most basic understanding 
of statistical or social science 
research methods. Police 
have improved greatly their 
capacity to store, access, and 
disseminate data. However, 
the fact remains: according 
to our findings, crime 
analysts continue to "count" 
crime far more effectively 
than they "analyze" it. The 
training implications are 
obvious. In-service training 
curriculum should be developed to train 
crime analysts to exploit the data in a more 
sophisticated and problem-oriented fashion. 

Compensation 

Compensation issues are similar to career 
path issues. When the crime analyst is a 
sworn member, we found that compensation 
was not an issue. Compensation for sworn 
members is solely a function of vertical 


movement. A move to the crime analysis 
unit for a sworn member is always either a 
lateral transfer or a new assignment upon 
promotion. It has no bearing 
on compensation. We found
that crime analysts, when
they are sworn members, 
receive no additional pay 
based on the position. 

When it comes to civilian 
members, compensation is an 
administrative issue and is 
closely tied to career path. 
The limits in vertical 
movement obviously limit 
compensation increases for 
civilians. In addition, 
however, we found that when
compared to sworn members, 
civilians with similar 
responsibilities and who 
perform similar tasks (when compared both 
within and between departments) are paid 
substantially less. This is a condition that 
does not go unnoticed by civilian members. 
It would appear that an unintended 
consequence of cost savings associated 
with civilianization is high turnover. 

Managers will have to weigh 
the benefits of civilian crime 
analysts against the costs of 
high turnover due to 
compensation disparities. If 
the benefits are sufficiently 
high, then policymakers 
should consider pay 
schedules that correspond to 
sworn positions with similar 
responsibilities and tasks. 
When the crime analyst is 
sworn, and if turnover due to 
voluntary requests for 
transfer are a problem, 
departments may consider
pay increases tied to the 
position. This may provide 
an incentive for a good 
officer to remain in the position. 
 
It would appear that 
an unintended 
consequence of cost 
savings associated 
with civilianization is 
high turnover. 
Managers will have to 
weigh the benefits of 
civilian crime analysts 
against the costs of 
high turnover due to 
compensation 
disparities 
 

Operations

Hardware and Software Technology 

Law enforcement agencies have improved 
their hardware and software inventories 
considerably over the past 
twenty years due to a variety 
of factors (more sophisticated 
personnel, advances in 
technology, affordability of 
hardware and software, etc.). 
Nearly every law 
enforcement agency, both big 
and small, has automated 
systems that are capable of 
storing and processing large 
data sets. Judging from the 
surveys (mail and phone) and 
our interviews with crime analysis personnel 
across the country, we found that city and 
county government, as well as federal 
agencies, are providing law enforcement 
managers with the necessary financial 
resources to equip their departments with 
basic automated systems. 

These encouraging findings aside, we did 
discover that when it comes to hardware and 
software, system planning is weak. Many of 
the departments that we visited and the 
analysts that we spoke with, complained of 
poorly planned systems that 
have been developed 
piecemeal over time. This is 
not a problem confined to 
law enforcement; information 
system planning is a problem 
faced by a wide range of 
public and private sector 
organizations. The overall 
weaknesses in strategic 
planning by law enforcement 
agencies aggravate the planning problems 
associated with information systems 
development. Rational, comprehensive 
strategic planning has not been a part of the 
police administrative culture. When this is 
found in any organization, public or private, 
weaknesses in adapting to 
changing technology are 
likely to follow. 

Law enforcement agencies 
should construct a 
comprehensive, time-
bounded rational information 
systems plan. If the 
department is engaging in 
strategic planning, then the 
information systems plan 
should be specifically 
assigned to an action plan team. If the 
department does not engage in formal 
strategic planning, then a distinct 
information systems plan should be 
developed, including an articulated mission, 
goals, objectives, and tasks. A team should 
be formed to construct the plan and oversee 
its implementation. 

The overall 
weaknesses in 
strategic planning by 
law enforcement 
agencies aggravate the 
planning problems 
associated with 
information systems 
development. 

Law enforcement 
agencies should 
construct a 
comprehensive, time-
bounded rational 
information systems 
plan. 

Output: Tactical 

As we have noted several times throughout 
this report, analysts and managers place a 
high value on tactical 
analysis. There appears to be 
a view, commonly held by 
crime analysis personnel, that 
their first priority is to 
provide support for field 
officers, whose primary 
responsibility is to identify 
and apprehend offenders. 
This belief is consistent with 
an emphasis on crime 
control, indicative of the professional model 
of policing. 


Those who have been responsible for 
charting the course for crime analysis have 
directed the deployment of resources to a 
narrowly defined "crime control" model. 
Owning and using advanced 
hardware and software has
been held up by crime 
analysts as evidence of a 
more sophisticated, 
professional, specialized 
function. One cannot argue 
with the fact that data are 
managed substantially more 
efficiently and effectively 
than, say, twenty years ago. 
If the ultimate aim is to be 
able to collect more data, 
access it more easily, and 
count it better, then we have 
arrived. 

If, however, the aim is to 
"analyze" the data through 
using more sophisticated 
methodologies, that is, 
making the best use of 
the analytic tools 
available to solve 
community problems, 
then we clearly have 
not arrived

If the ultimate aim is to 
be able to collect more 
data, access it more 
easily, and count it 
better, then we have 
arrived.

If, however, the aim is to 
"analyze" the data through  
using more sophisticated
methodologies, that is,
making the best use of the analytic tools 
available to solve community problems, 
then we clearly have not arrived. In the 
end, the substance of tactical output that 
crime analysis units currently produce is 
remarkably similar to what was produced 
twenty years ago. Most of what we found 
on briefing room bulletin boards were 
various notices directed toward patrol and  
investigative units about individual 
offenders (wanted, known to be working, 
recently released, etc). The turnaround time 
for release of these notices is faster than 
twenty years ago because of desktop 
publishing software and digital 
photography, but the substance is 
essentially the same. We also found pin 
maps in various places, also distributed 
primarily to line officers. These also are
more easily produced and noticeably more 
current than twenty years ago because of 
the advances in geographical information 
systems, but they too are essentially the 
same. And lastly, we saw an 
occasional pattern or series
notice, sometimes discovered 
by the crime analysis unit 
and sometimes discovered by 
a field unit, normally 
investigations. 

There was sporadic evidence 
of more sophisticated 
analysis (e.g., geographic 
profiling, point-pattern 
analysis, standard deviation-
based early warning systems, 
etc.). Applied researchers are 
working on advanced 
methodologies (particularly
crime mapping applications)
directed toward tactical
analysis. However, the 
evidence demonstrated that 
these advanced methods were more often 
the exception than the rule. As we have 
noted above, counting crime dominates 
current tactical analysis. Analysts are 
expected to either know or have the 
capacity to learn basic PC skills sufficient 
to operate the machine, manage data sets 
(data file construction and manipulation, 
querying, report construction, etc.), 
generate digital maps (and work with data 
in that context), and publish notices and 
alerts. Higher-level research design and 
methodologies, including intermediate-
level statistics, are not demanded, nor are 
they currently performed by crime analysts. 
In short, crime analysis is, by all 
appearances, underutilizing the vastly 
improved data sets that are now available. 
 


Law enforcement policymakers should 
demand higher-level pre-service and in-
service training for crime analysts that will
equip them with higher-order 
analytic skills. Law 
enforcement policymakers 
should enter into partnerships 
with academic institutions, 
especially applied 
researchers, to develop 
approaches and methods to 
utilize law enforcement data 
sets for problem analysis 
purposes. 

Law enforcement 
policymakers should 
demand higher-level 
pre-service and in-
service training for 
crime analysts that will 
equip them with 
higher-order analytic 
skills. Law 
enforcement 
policymakers should 
enter into partnerships 
with academic 
institutions, especially 
applied researchers, to 
develop approaches 
and methods to utilize 
law enforcement data 
sets for problem 
analysis purposes. 

Managers who have 
adopted formal long-
range planning should 
consider creating 
formal links with their 
crime analysis unit and 
develop practices that 
will stimulate strategic 
analysis. 

Output: Strategic 

Law Enforcement Assistance 
Administration (LEAA) 
funding in the 1970s 
provided the first 
concentrated effort to support 
the creation of formal crime 
analysis units. Crime analysis 
was viewed as a necessary 
adjunct to the fulfillment of 
LEAA's primary goal (i.e., to 
encourage and facilitate 
formal, comprehensive, 
rational planning in the 
criminal justice system). The 
need for rational planning 
has not changed. If anything, 
the current model of policing 
stresses the value of formal 
strategic planning more than 
ever. Strategic planning 
requires the support of specialized 
personnel that are skilled in research design 
and methods. 


Site visits and phone interviews indicated 
that strategic analysis of the sort that 
supports strategic planning is rarely 
conducted. Several of the sites that we 
visited did dedicate crime analysts to 
strategic analysis tasks, but this was 
normally limited to annual reporting and 
staffing allocation. We rarely found crime 
analysis personnel formally 
linked to the department's 
long-range planning process. 
The data do not permit us to 
speculate about the reasons 
for this apparent 
underutilization of the crime 
analysis unit; however, 
several possibilities occur as 
explanations. First, the 
emphasis on tactical crime 
analysis is consistent with the 
professional policing model, 
the mission of which is 
driven by crime control and 
offender apprehension. 
Second, long-range, strategic 
planning has not been part of 
the organizational fabric of 
policing. Although the 
current model of policing 
encourages police managers 
to embrace strategic 
planning, it has simply not 
taken hold as yet. Therefore, 
since the demand for 
strategic analysis is low, we 
would expect to find it 
subordinated to tactical crime 
analysis, which we did. 

This suggests that managers 
who have adopted formal 
long-range planning should 
consider creating formal links with their 
crime analysis unit and develop practices 
that will stimulate strategic analysis. For 
example, the crime analysis unit may take 
responsibility for conducting an analysis of 
stakeholder beliefs and opinions that would 
help to shape departmental goals and 
objectives. 



Conclusion 

Ask a police officer who entered the 
profession twenty or thirty years ago to list 
the most important changes in policing 
during his or her tenure. You would 
certainly find some mention of the 
remarkable advances in the tools now 
available to process data and transform it 
into useful information. More crime data are 
collected. The data that are collected cover a 
broader range of characteristics of the 
criminal incident. Most of the data that we 
collect are stored in digital format, thus 
providing the ability to more easily access 
and manipulate the data. The tools to 
analyze the data are more sophisticated and 
getting more user-friendly by the day. 
Display of the findings of the analysis is 
more intuitive and is more easily understood 
by a wider audience. Given these 
remarkable changes, one might expect that 
the analytic product is likewise more 
advanced and has led to correspondingly 
more sophisticated police tactical and 
strategic decision outcomes and solutions to 
chronic crime problems. 

We believe, unfortunately, that this is not the 
case. No one would argue that we do not 
collect, store, and count more effectively 
and efficiently than we ever have. It is quite 
another matter, however, when the criteria 
for high-quality crime analysis is "analysis." 
The technology is there; we just do not seem 
to be maximizing the potential that those 
tools hold. The data are answering the 
questions that we pose: How much crime do 
we have? Where is that crime? Is that crime 
clustering? Is that crime moving? Are there 
clusters of crime that we can attribute to an 
individual or group of individuals? These 
are all relevant questions and certainly fall 
within the police mandate. What we must 
ask is, are these the only questions that we 
should be asking? The answer, we would 
argue, is no. The more important question, 
that is yet to be answered, is, What are the 
questions that we should be asking? 
Community policing directs us to questions 
focusing on community level problems. 
What are the problems in the community? 
What are the causes of those problems? 
What types of responses are more effective 
in providing solutions to those problems? 
Undeniably these questions are much more 
difficult to answer. However, it is possible to 
develop more complex understandings of 
community problems and to develop 
solutions to them, often involving 
collaborative partnerships with other 
government agencies and community 
members. Crime analysts could be one of 
the driving forces behind developing this 
deeper understanding of problems and 
possible solutions to them. 

Some of the weaknesses of the crime 
analysis function may be addressed by 
simple structural fixes. We have tried in this 
guide to point out some of the more 
obvious. Resolving the management and 
operational issues that were discussed above 
should help. However, crime analysis, in our 
view, will not realize its true potential until 
such time as the core issues are resolved. 
The proponents of community policing have 
been hammering away at the need to change 
the cultural underpinnings of policing. This 
study suggests how the culture can and has 
retarded the potential of one very important 
police operation. 

We continue to define the police problem in 
excruciatingly narrow terms, which results 
in excruciatingly narrow crime analysis 
products. Analysts produce reports that 
support the essentially reactive nature of the 
police "crime control" model. The police 
problem is not typically defined in a manner 


that seeks to understand the patterns and 
relationships in the collected data that 
would explain the criminal or disorder 
problem in a fashion that would suggest 
proactive police responses. The dominant 
crime analytic activity is 
counting crime and 
providing offender 
information to field 
operations personnel. While 
departments claim to have 
adopted "community 
policing," police managers 
continue to tenaciously 
(some might argue
stubbornly) define police 
field operations in terms of 
crime control not problem-
oriented, solution-focused terms. 

Advances 
in information processing, 
and hopefully advances in 
data analysis methods, 
will provide the police 
with unprecedented 
opportunities to broaden 
their mission. 

How might we go about resolving this 
problem? It would seem unreasonable, and 
unlikely, to simply insist that the police 
change their culture to accommodate the 
broader mandate suggested by the 
community policing types. Until such time 
as the police can be shown how their data 
can be better utilized to support operations 
associated with the broader mandate, one 
can only expect the police to prefer the 
status quo. The proverbial ball, it would 
seem, is in the court of those who have for 
years criticized police strategies and tactics. 
For the past fifteen years academics have 
been given unprecedented access to police 
data. Partnerships have flourished between 
police and academics. Yet, when it comes 
to practical applications of data analysis to 
inform problem analysis, academics have 
not been up to the challenge. It is one thing 
to say that the police should focus their 
attention on understanding the factors 
behind patterns and relationships in the 
police data to better explain the 
complexities of the criminal and disorder 
incident. It is quite another thing to show 
how. 

One should not conclude, however, that the 
entire burden for developing a more 
sophisticated crime analysis 
function should rest on the 
shoulders of academics. We 
would hope that contemporary 
police managers can bring 
themselves to think outside 
the box. Advances in 
information processing, and 
hopefully advances in data 
analysis methods, will provide 
the police with unprecedented
opportunities to broaden their 
mission and mandate in a 
manner that may well impact the nature 
and extent of crime, not merely react to its 
occurrence. This will require police 
policymakers to critically assess their 
current operations and management 
paradigm. They will have to permit 
themselves to be open to new ideas, 
methods, and practices and provide 
employees within the department with the 
necessary skills, resources and time to 
conduct such problem analytic tasks. It will 
not be enough for the academics, or anyone 
for that matter, to provide the tools and 
techniques; police managers will have to 
understand and appreciate the value of 
these new tools and techniques and demand 
the products that they imply. 



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