Full Record

42732

Four career fire fighters injured while providing interior exposure protection at a row house fire - District of Columbia

• On October 29, 2007, four male career fire fighters ranging in ages from 23 to 38 years were injured while providing interior exposure protection at a residential row house fire. The victims had advanced a 1 ½-inch handline up to the second floor of the exposure building where they encountered heavy smoke and fire in a room in the back of the structure. Fire fighting and search activities commenced and shortly thereafter and without warning, the fire progressed up the stairwell from the first floor and up the exterior back wall temporarily trapping the victims. All four victims retreated down the stairwell and out of the building where they were met by other fire fighters who provided assistance. Each of the victims suffered burn injuries. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) ensure adequate size-up, including in exposure buildings, to reduce the risk of fire fighters being trapped; (2) ensure that fire fighters are trained on the hazards of operating on the floor above the fire without a charged hoseline, and to follow associated standard operating guidelines (SOGs); (3) ensure ventilation is coordinated with the interior attack; (4) provide fire fighters with station/work uniforms (e.g., pants and shirts) that are compliant with NFPA 1975 and ensure the use and proper care of these garments; (5) ensure that fire fighters are trained on initiating Mayday radio transmissions immediately when they are in distress, and/or become lost or trapped. Although the following does not appear to have been a contributing factor in the injuries resulting from this incident, NIOSH recommends that as a good safety practice, fire departments should (6)ensure all fire fighting personal protective equipment ensembles meet NFPA 1971 and are cleaned and maintained according to NFPA 1851.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41976

Career fire fighter dies in residential row house structure fire - Maryland

• On October 10, 2006, a 40-year-old male career Fire Fighter (the victim) was fatally injured during a residential structure fire. At 0222 hours, dispatch reported a residential two-story row house structure fire with possible parties trapped. Battalion Chief #1 was the first on scene and assumed Incident Command (IC). Squad 11 (SQ11) arrived followed by Engine 41 (E41) as heavy black smoke poured out of the front of the residence. A civilian jumped from an A-side second story window and another confused civilian was walking around on the sidewalk; both were attended to by fire fighters. Two E41 fire fighters (the victim and ff#1) led a Squad-11 fire fighter (ff#2) into the residence with a 1 ¾ attack line. They entered a narrow hallway and passed through a door to the foot of the stairs that lead to the second floor. The E41 Lieutenant entered the structure and requested the building be vented due to the heat. At 0228 hours, Battalion Chief #2 (Rear IC) arrived on scene and reported to the C-side of the structure per the request of the IC. The victim advanced to the top of the stairs when conditions became extremely hot. Shortly after hearing that the fire's origin may be in the basement causing the crew to back out, the victim feeling the intense heat ran by ff#1 and into ff#2 (from SQ11) knocking them both to the floor with the front door closing behind them and pinching the hose line. FF#2 struggled to get his arm out the crack of the door while ff#1 was trying to get the victim off of ff#2. Officers and fire fighters were outside trying to pull the fire fighters out and were able to get ff#1 and ff#2 out through a partial opening of the door. The victim could not get out until the door was removed. FF#1 and ff#2 were pulled out at 0232 hours and the victim was removed at 0235 hours. Immediately, paramedics on scene attended to the two fire fighters and the victim. The victim was given cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and transported to the hospital. FF#1 and ff#2 were transported to the hospital and treated for severe burns. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) ensure that thermal imaging cameras (TIC) are used during initial size-up; (2) ensure that ventilation is coordinated with the interior attack; (3) ensure that tools such as door wedges are utilized to prevent water flow and escape problems; (4) ensure that a Rapid Intervention Crew (RIC) is on scene prior to an attack crew entering a hazardous environment; and (5) ensure that department policies and procedures are followed.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41903

Career fire fighter dies in wind driven residential structure fire - Virginia (Rev. ed.)

• On April 16, 2007, a 24-year-old male career fire fighter (the victim) was fatally injured while trapped in the master bedroom during a wind-driven residential structure fire. At 0603 hours, dispatch reported a single family house fire. At 0609 hours, the victim's ladder truck was second to arrive on scene. Fire was visible at the back exterior corner of the residence. Noticing cars in the driveway, no one outside, and no lights visible in the house, the lieutenant from the first arriving engine called in a second alarm. A charged 2 ½" hoseline was stretched to the front door by the first arriving engine crew. The engine crew stayed at the door with the attack line while the cause of poor water pressure in the hoseline was determined. The victim and his lieutenant, wearing their SCBA, entered the residence through the unlocked front door. With light smoke showing, they walked up the stairs to check the bedrooms. The victim and lieutenant cleared the top of the stairs and went straight into the master bedroom. With smoke beginning to show at ceiling level, the victim did a right-hand search while the lieutenant with thermal imaging camera (TIC) in-hand checked the bed. Suddenly the room turned black then orange with flames. The lieutenant yelled to the victim to get out. While verbal communication among the crew was maintained, the lieutenant found the doorway and moved toward the stairs. He ended up falling down the stairs to a curve located midway in the staircase. The lieutenant tried to direct the victim to the stairs verbally and with a flashlight. As the wind gusted up to 48 miles per hour, the wind-driven fire and smoke engulfed the residence. The incident commander (IC) ordered an evacuation and the lieutenant was brought outside by the engine and rescue company crews. The ladder truck lieutenant received burns on his ears and right index finger. At 0614 hours, the rescue company officer issued a Mayday followed by the victim's Mayday. With protection from hose lines, several attempts were made by the engine and rescue company crews to reach the second floor. On the third attempt the stair landing was reached but the ceiling started collapsing and flames intensified. At 0621 hours, due to the intensity of the fire throughout the structure, all fire fighters were evacuated, operations turned defensive, but the incident continued in rescue mode. At 0657 hours, the victim was found in the master bedroom partially on a couch underneath the front windows. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) ensure that standard operating procedures (SOPs) for size-up and advancing a hoseline address the hazards of high winds and gusts; (2) ensure that primary search and rescue crews either advance with a hoseline or follow an engine crew with a hoseline; (3) ensure that staffing levels are sufficient to accomplish critical tasks; (4) ensure that fire fighters are sufficiently trained in survival skills; (5) ensure that Mayday protocols are reviewed, modified and followed; (6) ensure that water supply is established and hoses laid out prior to crews entering the fire structure; (7) ensure that fire fighters are trained for extreme conditions such as high winds and rapid fire progression associated with lightweight construction. Additionally, municipalities should: (8) ensure that dispatch collects and communicates information on occupancy and extreme environmental conditions. Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments: (9) ensure that radios are operable in the fireground environment.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41444

Career fire fighter dies when trapped by collapsed canopy during a two alarm attached garage fire - Pennsylvania

• On February 4, 2007, a 27-year-old male career fire fighter (the victim) and a 38-year-old male career firefighter were trapped under a canopy which collapsed off of a burning residential garage. The victim was pinned under the canopy debris, and was found not breathing while still wearing his SCBA and SCBA mask. The second fire fighter received injuries requiring time off from work. The victim and the injured fire fighter were responding to a report of an "unknown type" fire. Upon arriving on scene, they advanced a charged 1 3/4-inch pre-connected hose line into the structure through an open garage located at the A-side. The victim was the nozzle man. The fire fighters worked long enough to empty their air cylinders, went outside to replace them, and then returned to the garage. When roof debris started to fall, they decided to retreat from the garage. Once immediately outside the garage, they paused underneath the canopy. As the fire fighters pulled the hoseline from the garage, the canopy, which was connected to the garage roof rafters by long metal bars, fell on both fire fighters, trapping them underneath. The designated rapid intervention team (who had just arrived on-scene) worked for approximately 10 minutes to extricate both fire fighters. The victim and the injured fire fighter were sent to the local hospital by ground ambulance. The victim was pronounced dead at the hospital, and the injured fire fighter was treated for injuries requiring time off from work. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) review and follow existing standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting to ensure that fire fighters follow a "2 in 2 out" policy; (2) ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents; (3) establish a collapse zone when structures become unstable; (4) ensure that the Incident Commander continuously evaluates the risks versus gain when determining whether the fire suppression operation will be offensive or defensive; (5) ensure that the first arriving company officer does not become involved in the fire fighting effort after assuming the role of Incident Commander; (6) ensure that a thermal imaging camera is being used during size-up; and (7) ensure that a separate Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed at each structural fire.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41254

Volunteer fire fighter dies after falling through floor supported by engineered wooden-I beams at residential structure fire - Tennessee

• On January 26, 2007, a 24-year-old male volunteer fire fighter died at a residential structure fire after falling through the floor which was supported by engineered wooden I-beams. The victim's crew had advanced a handline approximately 20 feet into the structure with zero visibility. They requested ventilation and a thermal imaging camera (TIC) in an attempt to locate and extinguish the fire. The victim exited the structure to retrieve the TIC, and when he returned the floor was spongy as conditions worsened which forced the crew to exit. The victim requested the nozzle and proceeded back into the structure within an arm's distance of one of his crew members who provided back up while he stood in the doorway. Without warning, the floor collapsed sending the victim into the basement. Crews attempted to rescue the victim from the fully involved basement, but a subsequent collapse of the main floor concluded any rescue attempts. The victim was recovered later that morning. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) use a thermal imaging camera (TIC) during the initial size-up and search phases of a fire, (2) ensure firefighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire and identify buildings constructed with trusses or engineered wood I-beams. Additionally, Municipalities and local authorities should (3) develop a questionnaire or checklist to obtain building information so that the information is readily available if an accident is reported at the noted address. Additionally, Building code officials and local authorities having jurisdiction should (4) consider modifying the current codes to require that lightweight trusses are protected with a fire barrier on both the top and bottom.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41238

Career engineer dies and fire fighter injured after falling through floor while conducting a primary search at a residential structure fire - Wisconsin

• On August 13, 2006, a 55-year-old male, career, Engineer (the victim) died and another fire fighter was injured after falling through a floor at a residential structure fire. The victim and the fire fighter had arrived in their ambulance and assisted the first-due engine attach a 5-inch supply line at approximately 1227 hours. The engine company was conducting a fast attack on a suspected basement fire, while a ladder company conducted horizontal ventilation. The ambulance crew has advanced to the front of the structure when the Incident Commander requested them to conduct a primary search. The victim and the injured fire fighter proceeded to conduct a left hand search at approximately 1234 hours. They took a couple of steps to the left just inside the front door to conduct a quick sweep. Visibility was near zero with minimal heat conditions. Because of the smoke conditions, they kneeled, sounded the ceramic tile floor, and took one crawling step while on their knees. They heard a large crack just before the floor gave way sending them into the basement. The basement area exploded into a fireball when the floor collapsed. The victim fell into the room of origin while the injured fire fighter fell on the other side of a basement door into a hallway. The injured fire fighter was able to eventually crawl out of a basement window. The victim was recovered the next day. The NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) conduct pre-incident planning and inspections of buildings within their jurisdictions to facilitate development of safe fire ground strategies and tactics; (2) use a thermal imaging camera (TIC) during initial size-up and search phases of a fire, and (3) ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire and identify buildings constructed with trusses. Additionally, building code officials and local authorities having jurisdiction should: (4) consider modifying the current building codes to require that lightweight trusses be protected with a fire barrier on both the top and bottom.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

41239

Volunteer deputy fire chief dies after falling through floor hole in residential structure during fire attack - Indiana

• On June 25, 2006, a 34-year-old male volunteer Deputy Fire Chief (the victim) died after falling though a failed section of floor on the first floor of a residential structure fire while attacking the fire from above. Attempts were made to reach the victim via a 14' roof ladder, but due to debris in the basement, fire/smoke conditions, and the angle of the failed floor, all attempts to reach the victim via the ladder failed. Fire fighters entered the house, traversed the floor, and gained interior access to the basement to retrieve the victim. The victim was immediately found but was unresponsive. The crews had difficulty in moving him up the basement stairs, but after approximately 20 minutes they were able to remove, provide medical treatment, and transport him via ambulance to the hospital where he was pronounced dead. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) ensure that fire fighters and incident commanders are aware that unprotected pre-engineered I-joist floor systems may fail at a faster rate than solid wood joists when exposed to direct fire impingement, and they should plan interior operations accordingly; (2) ensure that the Incident Commander (IC) maintains the role of director of fireground operations and does not become directly involved in fire-fighting operations, (3) ensure that risk vs. gain is evaluated during size-up prior to making entry in fire-involved structures, (4) ensure that team continuity and accountability is maintained, (5) ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene as part of the first alarm and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment, (6) use defensive fire-fighting tactics when adequate staff (including command staff), apparatus and equipment for offensive operations are not available or when offensive operations are not practical; (7) provide SCBA face pieces that are equipped with voice amplifiers for improved communications, (8) establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) regarding thermal imaging camera (TIC) use during interior operations, (9) train fire fighters on actions to take while waiting to be rescued if they become lost or trapped inside a structure, (10) use positive pressure ventilation properly, and (11) ensure a back-up radio dispatch system is in place and available when needed.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

40908

Career lieutenant dies in residential structure fire - Colorado

• On May 14, 2006, a 61-year-old male career Lieutenant (the victim) was fatally injured at a residential structure fire as a result of smoke inhalation. Dispatch had reported a residential two-story structure fire with possible trapped victims. The victim's engine (E9) was first on the scene followed shortly by a ladder truck, where they encountered heavy smoke pouring out of the back of the residence. The victim and two fire fighters from E9 entered the structure in a fast attack mode while fire fighters from the other apparatus rescued a civilian. The victim and fire fighters donned their self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) once inside the smoky kitchen. Then the victim and fire fighters advanced the attack line through the first floor of the house and up the stairs where they encountered high heat and zero visibility. After further advancing into what the victim and fire fighters thought was a hallway (it was actually a small bedroom), they concluded that they were not in the fire room. They felt heat and believed they had fire in the attic above them, so they backed out to regroup at the top of the stairs. The two fire fighters assumed the victim was nearby. Both fire fighters ended up exiting the structure, within minutes of each other, when their low air alarms went off. Other fire fighters heard a personnel alert safety system (PASS) alarm when they were on a landing just below the top of the stairs. The Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) was activated but the fire fighters who had reported the PASS alarm also took the initiative to find the victim. They located the victim underneath a mattress and pulled him to the doorway near the top of the stairs. The RIT progressed to the top of the stairs and extricated the victim to the yard where cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was performed. The hospitalized victim succumbed to his injuries on May 21, 2006. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) ensure that team continuity is maintained; and (2) ensure that officers and fire fighters follow established standard operating guidelines regarding SCBA donning on the fireground. Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have specifically prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments: (3) ensure that all fire fighters are trained on proper radio discipline and operation to communicate with the Incident Commander (IC); and (4) ensure that the Incident Commander receives pertinent information (i.e., location of stairs, number of occupants in the structure, etc.) from occupants on scene and information is relayed to crews during size-up.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39173

Career fire fighter dies while exiting residential basement fire - New York

• On January 23, 2005, a 37-year-old male career fire fighter (the victim) died while exiting a residential basement fire. At approximately 1337 hours, crews were dispatched to a reported residential structure fire. Crews began to arrive on the scene at approximately 1340 hours and at approximately 1344 hours, the victim, a fire fighter and officer made entry through the front door and proceeded down the basement stairwell to conduct a search for the seat of the fire using a thermal imaging camera (TIC). At approximately 1346 hours, the victim and officer began to exit the basement when they became separated on the lower section of the stairwell. The officer reached the front stoop and realized that the victim had failed to exit the building. He returned to the top of the basement stairs and heard a personal alert safety system (PASS) alarm sounding in the stairwell and immediately transmitted a MAYDAY for the missing fire fighter. The victim was located at approximately 1349 hours, and numerous fire fighters spent the next twenty minutes working to remove the victim from the building. At approximately 1413 hours, the victim was transported to an area hospital where he was later pronounced dead. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) Ensure that the first arriving officer or incident commander (IC) conducts a complete size-up of the incident scene; (2) Ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations provide progress reports to the Incident Commander; (3) Establish standard operating procedures (SOPs) regarding thermal imaging camera (TIC) use during interior operations; (4) Ensure that MAYDAY procedures are followed and refresher training is provided annually or as needed; (5) Ensure that a rapid intervention team (RIT) is on the scene and in position to provide immediate assistance prior to crews entering a hazardous environment; and (6) Educate homeowners on the importance of installing and maintaining smoke detectors on every level of their home and keeping combustible materials away from heat sources. Although there is no evidence that the following recommendation could have specifically prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments should: (7) Ensure that fire fighting teams check each other's personal protective equipment (PPE) for complete donning.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

39172

Career captain electrocuted at the scene of a residential structure fire - California

• On February 13, 2005, a 36-year-old male career Captain (the victim) was electrocuted while working at the scene of a three alarm residential structure fire. The Captain was checking on one of his crew members when he walked under a tree and came in contact with a 12kv power line. The line had burned through early in the fire with one section landing on the ground to the south and the other lodged in a tree near the northwest corner of the fire building. It is believed the victim knew of the downed power line that had fallen to the south. However, it appeared to witnesses that he was unaware of the power line that was hanging in the tree,and possibly did not see the caution tape or hear the warning of a fire fighter who was in the vicinity. He walked directly into the power line and collapsed to the ground. A nearby fire fighter used an axe handle to secure and hold the power line off of the victim while fire fighters pulled him away from the line to a safe area. Advanced life support was administered immediately by emergency medical personnel who were at the scene. The victim was transported to a local hospital where he was pronounced dead. NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) Establish, implement , and enforce standard operating procedures/guidelines (SOPs/SOGs) that address the safety of fire fighters when working near downed power lines; (2) Ensure that fire fighters maintain a safe distance from energized electrical hazards, such as downed power lines, until the conductor is de-energized; (3) Ensure that fire fighters are aware of the hazard when working around energized electrical conductors and provide barriers or alerting techniques, which are effective and distinguishable under the conditions, to prevent fire fighters from entering an identified danger zone; (4) Ensure that fire fighter training includes procedures for recognizing and dealing safely with electrical hazards on the fireground; (5) Ensure that all fireground safety broadcasts are acknowledged and repeated; and (6) Ensure that team continuity is maintained on the fireground during fire suppression operations. Although there is no evidence that the following recommendations could have specifically prevented this fatality, NIOSH investigators recommend that fire departments: (a) Ensure that a personnel accountability system is in place and that it includes provisions for, and training on, personnel accountability reporting (PAR) procedures; and (b) Ensure that a clearly marked and monitored collapse zone is established once a defensive fire fighting strategy has been called and a structure has been identified at risk of collapsing.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38610

Career captain dies after running out of air at a residential structure fire - Michigan

• On January 20, 2005, a 39-year-old male career Captain (the victim) died after he ran out of air, became disoriented, and then collapsed at a residential structure fire. The victim and a fire fighter made entry into the structure with a handline to search for and extinguish the fire. While searching in the basement, the victim removed his regulator for 1 to 2 minutes to see if he could distinguish the location and cause of the fire by smell. While searching on the main floor of the structure, the fire fighter's low air alarm sounded and the victim directed the fire fighter to exit and have another fire fighter working outside take his place. The victim and the second fire fighter went to the second floor without the handline to continue searching for the fire. Within a couple of minutes, the victim's low air alarm started sounding. The victim and the fire fighter became disoriented and could not find their way out of the structure. The victim made repeated calls over his radio for assistance but he was not on the fireground channel. The second fire fighter "buddy breathed" with the victim until the victim became unresponsive. The second fire fighter was low on air and exited. The fire intensified and had to be knocked down before the victim could be recovered. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) Enforce standard operating procedures (SOPs) for structural fire fighting, including the use of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), ventilation, and radio communications. (2) Ensure that the Incident Commander completes a size-up of the incident and continuously evaluates the risk versus benefit when determining whether the operation will be offensive or defensive. (3) Ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to immediately respond to emergency incidents. (4) Use defensive fire fighting tactics when adequate apparatus and equipment for offensive operations are not available. (5) Ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with the fire attack. (6) Ensure that team continuity is maintained during fire suppression operations. (7) Ensure those fire fighters who enter hazardous areas, e.g., burning or suspected unsafe structures, are equipped with two-way communications with Incident Command. (8) Instruct fire fighters on the hazards of exposure to products of combustion such as carbon monoxide (CO) and warn them never to remove their face pieces in areas in which such products are likely to exist. (9) Ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team is in place before conditions become unsafe. (10) Use guidelines/ropes securely attached to permanent objects and/or a bright, narrow-beamed light at all entry portals to a structure to guide fire fighters during emergency egress. (11) Use evacuation signals when command personnel decide that all fire fighters should be evacuated from a burning building or other hazardous area; and (12) Train fire fighters on actions to take while waiting to be rescued if they become lost or trapped inside a structure. Additionally, municipalities should establish dispatch centers that are integrated with fire response functions.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

38524

One probationary career firefighter dies and four career firefighters are injured at a two-alarm residential structure fire - Texas

• On December 20, 2004, a 24-year-old male career probationary firefighter (the victim) died after he became separated from a fire-attack team at a two-alarm, single-story, residential structure fire. The fire-attack team and a search and rescue team entered the structure through the front entrance. After approximately four minutes, the crews the victim was operating with had to perform an emergency evacuation from the structure due to intensifying, uncontrollable fire conditions. Immediately after the evacuation, a personnel accountability report (PAR) was called, and soon after, the crews realized that the victim was missing. The rapid intervention team (RIT) team attempted to search for the victim, but was unable to make entry due to the fire conditions. The victim was found approximately 15 minutes after the PAR, about 15 feet from the point of entry. The victim was pronounced dead on-scene by the county medical examiner. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: (1) Ensure that a complete size-up is conducted prior to making an offensive attack; (2) Ensure that risk vs. gain is evaluated prior to making entry in fire-involved structures; (3) Develop standard operating procedures (SOP's) for advancing a hose line in high-wind conditions; (4) Ensure that team continuity is maintained; (5) Ensure that a backup hose line is pulled and in place prior to entry into fire-involved structures; (6) Consider using a backup manual personal accountability safety system (PASS) device in combination with self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) equipped with integrated PASS devices; (7) Provide SCBA face pieces that are equipped with voice amplifiers for improved interior communications; (8) Ensure that hose lines are not pulled from the burning structure when it is possible that a missing firefighter is in the structure; (9) Train firefighters on initiating emergency traffic (Mayday-Mayday) and manually activating their PASS alarm when they become lost, disoriented, or trapped; and (10) Instruct firefighters to not overcrowd the area of the interior attack team.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

37828

Fire fighter collapses and dies while assisting with fire suppression efforts at a residential fire - Ohio

• On February 23, 2004, a 55-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (FF) responded to a car fire in the garage of a residential home. Traveling in his personal vehicle, he was the first FF to arrive on-scene. While putting on his turnout gear and waiting for fire department (FD) apparatus to arrive, he watched as the fire spread to involve the entire garage and portions of the house. As other FD personnel and equipment arrived, the FF assisted the driver/operator of the first FD engine on the scene. This involved stretching a 1½-inch attack line and a 5-inch hydrant supply line while controlling water flow to the attack lines. After being on scene for approximately 5 to 10 minutes he was asked to retrieve a pike pole from the Engine. Whild standing on the engine's tail board to reach the pike pole, the FF suddenly fell backward and struck his head on the concrete roadway. Witnesses stated that he did not slip or try to break his fall. They immedicately assessed the FF and found him unresponsive with labored respirations and a weak pulse. While an ambulance was being requested from dispatch, other FD members retrieved the advanced life support (ALS) equipment from on-scene apparatus while another protected his cervical spine. Ambulance personnel arrived approximately 4 minutes after his collapse, and found the FF to be in ventricular fibrillation (a heart rate incompatible with life). Despite defibrillation numerous times at the scene, in the ambulance, and at the emergency department (ED), resuscitation efforts failed to revive the FF. The death certificate and autopsy, both completed by a forensic pathologist (the deputy county coroner), listed "arteriosclerotic and hypertensive heart disease" as the immedicate cause of death with "morbid obesity" as a contributory condition. The physical stress of responding to the residential house fire and assisting with operator duties coupled with his underlying atherosclerotic coronary artery disease contributed to this fire fighter's sudden cardiac death. The first five recommendations are preventive measures recommended by other fire service groups to reduce, among other things, the risk of on-the-job heart attacks and sudden cardiac arrest among fire fighters. The last two recommendations, while only indirectly related to this fatality, raise potential safety issues that may be encountered by this FD. (1) Provide mandatory preplacement medical evaluations to ALL fire fighters to determine their medical ability to perform duties without presenting a significant risk to the safety and health of themselves or others. (2) Provide annual medical evaluations for all members. (3) When appropriate, incorporate exercise stress tests (EST) into the annual medical evaluations for fire fighters with multiple risk factors for coronary artery disease (CAD). (4) Clear fire fighters for duty and for respirator use though a physician knowledgeable about the physical demands of fire fighting, the personal protective equipment used by fire fighters, and the various components NFPA 1582, the National Fire Protection Association's Standard on Comprehensive Occupational Medical Program for Fire Departments. (5) Phase in a mandatory wellness/fitness program for fire fighters to reduce risk factors for cardiovascular disease and improve cardiovascular capacity. (6) Consider annual respirator fit testing. (7) Provide adequate fire fighter staffing to ensure safe operating conditions.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

37415

Fire fighter dies of asphyxiation after falling through the burning roof of his home in Wisconsin

• A 43-year-old male fire fighter (the victim) died while fighting a fire in the chimney and attic of his home. He was self-employed as a carpenter, and a 12-year member of the volunteer fire department in his rural community. The victim was home at the time of the early morning fire, and used his portable radio to call the fire department for assistance. He then used a ladder to climb to the roof of his house, and began to shovel deep rooftop snow onto the fire in an attempt to extinguish the fire near the chimney. The roofing next to the chimney collapsed, and the victim fell into the attic space below. The victim apparently tried to escape from the attic fire by crawling toward the furthermost point from the chimney, where a cubbyhole might have provided an exit. Within about ten minutes of the victim's call for help, the fire department volunteers and vehicles arrived at the scene. The captain saw the hole in the roof, but not the victim so the captain turned fire fighting duties over to one team, and led a second team of five fire fighters to search for the victim. The search team, equipped with turnout gear and self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), searched the first floor of the house without finding the victim. They then used chain saws to cut through the first-floor ceiling into the attic area for about 20 minutes before locating the victim. He was not breathing, and was pronounced dead at the scene. The FACE investigator concluded that, to prevent similar occurrences, fire fighters should: 1) Ensure that at least four fire fighters are on the scene before initiating fire fighting operations on the roof of a structural fire. 2) Ensure that all fire fighters wear and use personal alert safety system (PASS) devices when involved in fire fighting, rescue, or other hazardous duties.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

37412

Two fire fighters die and one seriously injured when an upstairs floor collapses on them during a residential fire in California

• A 29-year old fire fighter (decedent 1), and a 21-year old fire fighter (decedent 2) died and a 42-year old fire captain was injured when a second story floor fell on them while fighting a residential fire. The home's resident was also fatally injured. The municipal fire department received a call at 4:11:35 a.m. from a neighbor of the residence on fire reporting a structure fire. Subsequent calls reported a women trapped in her home. Two engines, one truck, a battalion chief, a chief's operator and a safety engine were dispatched to the scene. Entrance was made through the single-story structure in the front in order to access the involved two-story addition at the rear. The fire fighters attacked the flames with 1¾ inch and 1½ inch hoses in order to attempt the rescue of the trapped resident. While they were fighting the fire, the second story floor collapsed without any warning. The floor, which was twenty-seven feet by 21-feet 8-inches, collapsed as a whole. The CA/FACE investigator concluded that, in order to prevent future occurrences, fire departments should: -Address the need for a coordinated attack strategy. -Reassess attack strategy when the possibility of rescue has passed and fire damage is significant. -Develop a training program that specifically addresses the structural integrity of a fire-damaged structure. -Assure that fire department communications protocol is adequate, that it is known to all personnel, and that it is followed. -Ensure that fire command always maintains close accountability for all personnel at the fire scene.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

37408

Residential basement fire claims the life of career lieutenant - Pennsylvania

• On January 9, 2004, a 45-year-old male career lieutenant (the victim) sustained serious injuries after he partially fell through the first floor while fighting a residential basement fire. The victim was among the first on the scene, and he reported light smoke coming from a two-story, middle row town home. The victim entered the structure without his self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) to investigate, and reported to the Incident Commander (IC) that it was a basement fire. The victim exited the structure to assist his crew in advancing a 13/4-inch hoseline into the structure through the front door of the first floor. The victim's crew protected the first floor and looked for fire extension as another crew attacked the fire through a rear entrance into the basement. The victim exited the structure a second time, presumably for air, and spoke to another member who was conducting ventilation. The victim went back into the structure and was trapped on his third attempt to exit when he partially fell through the floor. Rescue crews found and removed the victim within minutes and he was transported to an area hospital where he died from his injuries seven days later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: -Require, and all officers should enforce the requirement, that all fire fighters wear their SCBA's whenever there is a chance they might be exposed to a toxic or oxygen-deficient atmosphere, including during the initial assessment. -Ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire. -Ensure that team continuity is maintained with two or more fire fighters per team.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

36993

Fire fighter suffers heart attack at the scene of a structure fire and dies two months later - Indiana

• On December 15, 2002, at approximately 1750 hours, a 61-year-old male career Fire Fighter was at the scene of a fire in a single-family residence when he suffered a heart attack, medically known as a myocardial infarction. While awaiting coronary artery bypass graft (CABG) surgery, he suffered a second heart attack. Despite CABG surgery, his cardiac condition required extensive rehabilitation, and he was transferred to a long term care facility. Due to his deteriorating condition and poor prognosis, a do-not-resuscitate order was writen. Twenty-three days later he suffered a cardiac arrest. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was not begun and he was pronounced dead on February 1, 2003. The death certificate listed "acute myocardial infarction" due to "atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease" as the immediate cause of death and "chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (COPD)" as a contributing factor. No autopsy was performed. The following recommendations address some general health and safety issues. This list includes some preventive measures that have been recommended by other agencies to reduce the risk of on-the-job heart attacks and sudden cardiac arrest among fire fighters. These selected recommendations have not been evaluated by NIOSH, but represent published research, or consensus votes of technical committees of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) or fire service labor/management groups: consider requiring exercise stress tests (EST) for fire fighters with two or more risk factors for coronary artery disease (CAD); ensure that fire fighters are cleared for duty by a physician knowledgeable about the physical demands of fire fighting and the various components of NFPA 1582; ensure fire fighters are physically capable of performing the essential job tasks of structural fire fighting; phase in a mandatory wellness/fitness program for fire fighters to reduce risk factors for cardiovascular disease and improve cardiovascular capacity; perorm an autopsy on all on-duty fire fighter fatalities. Although unrelated to this fatality, the Fire Department should consider this additional recommendation based on safety and economic considerations: provide mandatory annual medical evaluation to ALL fire fighters consistent with NFPA 1582 to determine their medical ability to perform duties without presenting a significant risk to the safety and health of themselves or others; discontinue the routine use of annual chest x-rays unless specifically indicated; discontinue the routine use of annual electrocardiograms (EKG) unless medically indicated

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

20460

Volunteer lieutenant dies following structure collapse at residential house fire - Pennsylvania

• On November 1, 2002, a 36-year-old male volunteer Lieutenant (the victim) died after being crushed by an exterior wall that collapsed during a three-alarm residential structure fire. The victim was operating a handline near the southwest corner of the fire building where there was an overhanging porch. As the fire progressed, the porch collapsed onto the victim, trapping him under the debris. Efforts were being made by nearby fire fighters to free him when the entire exterior wall of the structure collapsed outward and he was crushed. The victim was removed from the debris within ten minutes, but attempts to revive him were unsuccessful and he was pronounced dead at the scene. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should: * ensure that Incident Command (IC) continually evaluates the risk versus gain when deciding an offensive or defensive fire attack; * ensure that a collapse zone is established, clearly marked, and monitored at structure fires where buildings have been identified at risk of collapsing; * establish and implement written standard operating procedures (SOPs) regarding emergency operations on the fireground; * develop and coordinate pre-incident planning protocols throughout mutual aid departments; * implement joint training on response protocols throughout mutual aid departments; * ensure that an Incident Safety Officer, independent from the Incident Commander, is appointed and on-scene early in the fireground operation.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

31546

Fire fighter collapses and dies at the scene of residential fire - Florida

• On February 7, 2001, a 65-year-old male Fire Fighter responded to a fire in a double-wide mobile home. On the scene, after setting up a change area for self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA), operating the pump panel, and replacing a SCBA on the apparatus, he collapsed. Despite cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and advanced life support (ALS) administered by crew members, ambulance paramedics, and personnel at the local hospital's emergency department (ED), the victim died. The death certificate, completed by the Medical Examiner's Office, listed "hypertensive and arteriosclerotic heart disease" as the immediate cause of death. Pertinent autopsy results included an enlarged heart (concentric left ventricular hypertrophy), coronary atherosclerosis, four vessel bypass, pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema. Other agencies have proposed a three-pronged strategy for reducing the risk of on-duty heart attacks and cardiac arrests among fire fighters. This strategy consists of: 1) minimizing physical stress on fire fighters; 2) screening to identify and subsequently rehabilitate high risk individuals; and 3) encouraging increased physical capacity. Issues relevant to this Fire Department include: -Provide mandatory preplacement medical evaluations to ALL fire fighters to determine their medical ability to perform duties without presenting a significant risk to the safety and health of themselves or others. -Provide mandatory annual medical evaluations to ALL fire fighters to determine their medical ability to perform duties without presenting a significant risk to the safety and health of themselves or others. -Incorporate exercise stress tests into the Fire Department's medical evaluation program for ALL fire fighters. -Provide automated external defibrillators (AEDs) as part of the basic life support equipment for fire apparatus. -Phase in a mandatory wellness/fitness program for fire fighters to reduce risk factors for cardiovascular disease and improve cardiovascular capacity. -Perform an annual physical performance (physical ability) evaluation.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

36144

Fire fighter suffers fatal heart attack at fire at his residence - Florida

• On September 26, 2001, a 32-year-old male fire fighter reported a fire at his own house and initially assisted the responding fire fighters by pulling and holding hose. Half an hour later, he had chest pain and sought help from emergency medical service personnel at the scene. After being evaluated, treated with oxygen (which relieved the pain), and observed, the pain returned and he had a seizure, developed a cardiac arrhythmia (abnormal heart beat), and stopped breathing. Despite cardiopulmonary resuscitation and advanced life support, which began immediately and continued on the way to the hospital and in the emergency department, the fire fighter died. Based on autopsy findings, the death certificate listed "acute thrombosis of coronary artery" due to "arteriosclerotic cardiovascular disease" as the cause of death. The following recommendations address some general health and safety issues identified during this investigation. This list includes some preventive measures that have been recommended by other agencies to reduce the risk of on-the-job heart attacks and sudden cardiac arrest among fire fighters. These selected recommendations have not been evaluated by NIOSH but represent published research or consensus votes of technical committees of the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) or fire service labor/management groups: - Institute preplacement and periodic medical evaluations. These should incorporate exercise stress testing, depending on the fire fighter's age and coronary artery disease risk factors. - Fire fighters should be cleared for duty and for respirator use by a physician knowledgeable about the physical demands of fire fighting, the personal protective equipment used by fire fighters, and the various components of NFPA 1582, the National Fire Protection Association's Standard on Medical Requirements for Fire Fighters and Information for Fire Department Physicians. - Phase in a mandatory wellness/fitness program for fire fighters to reduce risk factors for cardiovascular disease and improve cardiovascular capacity.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

36131

Structural collapse at residential fire claims lives of two volunteer fire chiefs and one career fire fighter - NJ

• On July 4, 2002, a 30-year-old male volunteer fire chief, a 40-year-old male volunteer deputy fire chief, and a 30-year-old male career fire fighter died when a residential structure collapsed, trapping them, along with four fire fighters and an officer who survived. At 0136 hours, a combination fire department and a mutual-aid volunteer fire department were dispatched to a structure fire. Local law enforcement radioed Central Dispatch reporting a fully involved structure with three children trapped on the second floor. The first officer on the scene assumed incident command and reported to Cental Dispatch that the incident site was a three-story structure with fire showing and that people could be seen at the windows. Note: The female resident (survivor) was the person seen in the window. The three children that were reported as being trapped did not survive and were later found in the debris. Additional units were requested, including a mutual-aid ladder company from a career department. Crews were on the scene searching for occupants and fighting the fire for approximately 27 minutes when the building collapsed. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar incidents, fire departments should 1) ensure that the department's structural fire fighting standard operating guidelines (SOGs) are followed and refresher training is provided; 2) ensure that the incident commander (IC) formulates and establishes a strategic plan for offensive and defensive operations; 3) ensure that the incident commander (IC) continuously evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident; 4) ensure that a separate incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed; 5) ensure that fire fighters conducting interior operations (e.g., search and rescue, initial attack, etc.) provide progress reports to the IC; 6) ensure that accountability for all personnel at the fire scene is maintained; 7) ensure that a Rapid Intervention Team (RIT) is established and in position; 8) ensure that the officer in charge of an incident recognizes factors (e.g., structural defects, large body of fire in an old structure, etc.) when analyzing potential building collapse; 9) ensure, when feasible, that fire fighters should respond together, in one emergency vehicle, as a crew. Additionally, municipalities should consider establishing and maintaining regional mutual-aid radio channels to coordinate and communicate activities involving units from multiple jurisdictions.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

35665

One career fire fighter dies and a captain is hospitalized after floor collapses in residential fire - North Carolina

• On March 4, 2002 a 22-year-old male career fire fighter (the victim) was injured and subsequently died and a 25-year-old male captain was injured when the floor collapsed while they were fighting a residential fire. The captain was transported by ambulance to an area hospital where he was admitted overnight for first- and second-degree burns. The victim was conscious and was transported by medical helicopter to a state medical center where he died 2 days later. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risks of similar occurrences, fire departments should ensure that each incident commander conducts a size-up of the incident before initiating fire-fighting efforts, after command is transferred, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident; ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the dangers of searching above a fire; ensure that an incident safety officer, independent from the incident commander, is appointed; ensure that ventilation is closely coordinated with fire attack; ensure that a rapid intervention tTeam is established and in position immediately upon arrival; ensure that adequate numbers of staff are available to operate safely and effectively.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

35332

Residential fire claims the lives of two volunteer fire fighters and seriously injures an assistant chief--Missouri

• On March 18, 2001, two volunteer fire fighters, Victim #1 (36-year-old male Lieutenant) and Victim #2 (39-year-old male fire fighter) died and an Assistant Chief was injured during an interior fire attack at a local residence. The Assistant Chief and the two victims agreed to exit the structure when the Assistant Chief's and Victim #2's low-air alarms sounded. The Assistant Chief continued to fight the fire as the two victims attempted to follow the hoseline outside. As the crew was exiting, a partial collapse of the second floor disoriented and trapped the two victims inside the structure. The Assistant Chief was knocked down in the living room approximately three feet from the exit and was pulled out by crew members. Mutual-aid departments were dispatched to the scene and located and removed the two victims at approximately 0146 hours. All three fire fighters were transported to the local hospital where the victims were pronounced dead. The Assistant Chief was treated for his injuries then flown to an area burn unit.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

35328

First-floor collapse during residential basement fire claims the life of two fire fighters (career and volunteer) and injures a career fire fighter captain - New York

• On March 7, 2002, a 28-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (Victim #1) and a 41-year-old male career fire fighter (Victim #2) died after becoming trapped in the basement. Victim #1 manned the nozzle while Victim #2 provided backup on the handline as they entered the house. After entering the structure, the floor collapsed, trapping both victims in the basement. A career fire fighter captain joining the fire fighters near the time of the collapse was injured trying to rescue one of the fire fighters. Crew members responded immediately and attempted to rescue the victims; however, the heat and flames overcame both victims and eliminated any rescue efforts from the garage entrance. NIOSH investigators concluded that, to minimize the risk of similar occurrences, fire departments should ensure that the Incident Commander is clearly identified as the only individual responsible for the overall coordination and direction of all activities at an incident; ensure that the Incident Commander conveys strategic decisions to all suppression crews on the fireground and continually reevaluates the fire condition; ensure that Incident Command conducts an initial size-up of the incident before initiating fire fighting efforts and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident; ensure that fire fighters from the ventilation crew and the attack crew coordinate their efforts; ensure that fire fighters report conditions and hazards encountered to their team leader or Incident Commander; and ensure fire fighters are trained to recognize the danger of operating above a fire.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

34844

Volunteer fire fighter killed and career chief injured during residential house fire - Tennessee

• On March 1, 2002, a 21-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (the victim) died after becoming separated, disoriented, and lost as he, the chief, and other fire fighters were trying to escape from the interior of a fully involved house fire. Two fire fighters eventually pulled the victim out of the house into the front yard, but he was unresponsive and not breathing. The victim received cardiopulmonary resuscitation and was transported to the local hospital, where he was pronounced dead on arrival.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

33084

Volunteer fire fighter dies fighting a structure fire at a local residence - Texas

• On January 27, 2000, a 74-year-old male volunteer fire fighter (victim) died while fighting a structure fire. At approximately 1316 hours, Central Dispatch notified the volunteer department of smoke in a residence. The assistant chief was the first to arrive on the scene and confirmed to Central Dispatch that they had a working fire venting out of the roof. He assumed duties as the incident commander (IC) until the arrival of the chief, who took command. The assistant chief confirmed to the chief that they had fire and heavy smoke, he reported that no one was inside the house. The first engine to arrive on the scene was Engine 608 with a captain (the victim), two fire fighters (fire fighters #1 and #2), and a chauffeur/engine operator. Engine 608 was positioned on the east side of the structure, and the victim and two fire fighters pulled a 200-foot, 1 3/4-inch cross lay from the engine and advanced toward the structure to perform an aggressive interior suppression attack. As the victim applied water to the fire, the two fire fighters went to the door to pull more hose line so that the victim could advance the line deeper into the structure. As the fire fighters were feeding the victim additional line, they felt the hose line drop. The two fire fighters reported to the chief, who then ordered the assistant chief to form a rapid intervention team (RIT) to perform a search and rescue operation. The RIT made four entries into the structure before successfully removing the victim.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

33036

Career fire fighter dies and three are injured in a residential garage fire - Utah

• On March 31, 2000, a 36-year-old male fire fighter (the victim) died, and three other fire fighters were injured while fighting a residential garage fire. The fire fighters had responded to a call that had come in from Central Dispatch at 2200 hours. As Engine 1 approached the scene from the south, at 2207 hours, the captain assumed incident command (IC) and conducted a quick size-up of the south, east, and north sides of the structure as Engine 1's driver drove past and parked the apparatus just north of the scene. The IC reported to Central Dispatch smoke and flames showing at the garage window on the south side of the structure and smoke coming from around the edges of the closed garage door. The IC proceeded to the garage door where he kicked in one corner of the door while the two fire fighters from Engine I (victim and fire fighter #1) stood at the door with 200 feet of charged 1 3/4-inch hose line. They quickly knocked down most of the fire in the garage. Believing that the fire was knocked down, the IC instructed the victim and fire fighter #1 to enter the structure, go upstairs, search for any civilians who may be inside, and open some windows for ventilation. The victim and fire fighter #1 proceeded with their 1 3/4-inch hose line through the front door. The smoke just inside the front door was thick and black and was banked from the ceiling to just above floor level. The lieutenant from Engine 2 (lieutenant and two fire fighters), who had just arrived on the scene, was directed by the IC to follow the 1 3/4-inch line into the structure and provide assistance to the two fire fighters (victim and fire fighter #1) who had just entered the structure. The lieutenant followed the hose line until he reached the two fire fighters upstairs at the end of the hall, in front of the master bedroom door. The Lieutenant noticed a glow at the end of the hall near the stairway and that the heat had dramatically increased. He then turned and sprayed water down the hall, hoping to knock down the heat. Unsuccessful at knocking down the heat, the lieutenant, fire fighter #1, and the victim moved farther down the hall to try and escape the heat. The lieutenant then decided that they had to exit by following the hose line back to the front door. Fire fighter #1 came out the front door followed by the lieutenant, who believed that the victim was following him, but the victim never came out. A rapid intervention team (RIT) consisting of two fire fighters from Ambulance 1 was assembled and was able to enter through bedroom #2's window. At approximately 2239 hours, the RIT located the victim in the master bedroom and dragged him back through bedroom #2 and out the window to the fire fighters waiting on the garage roof and in the driveway. The victim was transported by ambulance to a nearby hospital where he was pronounced dead at 2317 hours.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

33028

Lieutenant dies at a fire in a one-and-one half story dwelling - West Virginia

• On April 26, 2000, a 43-year-old male lieutenant suffered a cardiac arrest at the scene of a fire in a 1½-story single family dwelling. After a loose connection on his self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) caused the lieutenant to lose air, he exited the structure to change air cylinders. While his air cylinder was being changed, he collapsed. Dispite cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) and advanced life support (ALS) performed on the scene by crew members and paramedics, and by hospital personnel at the emergency department (ED), the victim died 8 days later. The death certificate, completed by the Assistant Medical Examiner, listed "atherosclerotic coronary disease" as the immediate cause of death. An inspection report, also completed by the Assistant Medical Examiner, listed "myocardial infarct (based on circumstances, EKG changes, and serologic testing)" as the cause of death and "mild chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and hepatitis per history" as contributing factors.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

32834

Residential house fire claims the life of one career fire fighter - Florida

• On November 25, 2000, a career male fire fighter (the victim) died in a residential house fire. At 0135 hours, the victim responded to the call and became a part of the interior search crew. The crew stretched their line to the rear of the structure before being forced to exit due to fire conditions. During their exit, the victim became disoriented and did not exit. The victim was located and pronounced dead at the scene at 0250 hours.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

32825

Residential structure fire claims the life of one career fire fighter - Alabama

• On April 20, 2000, a career fire department responded to a residential structural fire at a local residence. The victim was part of an interior attack crew who was killed when he fell through the upstairs floor while trying to locate the fire. The fire originated in the basement wiring directly under the section of the floor that collapsed.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

32448

Structure fire claims the lives of three career fire fighters and three children - Iowa

• On December 22, 1999, fire fighters from a career fire department responded to a structural fire at a local residence. The fire was started when a stove turned on shortly after 0800 hours, ignited the materials setting on the stove top. A 49-year-old shift commander (Victim #1), a 39-year-old engine operator (Victim #2) assigned to drive Aerial Truck 2, and a 29-year-old engine operator (Victim #3) assigned to drive Engine 3 lost their lives while performing search-and-rescue operations for three children who were trapped inside the burning structure. These fire fighters were part of a five-person crew who were on duty at the time of the alarm.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

32446

A volunteer assistant chief was seriously injured and two volunteer fire fighters were injured while fighting a townhouse fire - Delaware

• On October 29, 2000, a 26-year-old male volunteer assistant chief (the victim) was seriously injured while attempting to make an emergency evacuation from a townhouse fire. The victim was transported transported to the regional level I trauma center for immediate medical treatment. He was then life-flighted to the regional burn center where he was placed on a ventilator and hospitalized for 19 days. Two other fire fighters (fire fighters #1 and #2) were injured. Fire fighter #1 received second-degree burns to his wrists while conducting fire suppression efforts and was transported to the regional hospital for treatment. Fire fighter #2 received first-degree and second-degree burns to the wrist and ears while exiting the building.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

25776

Lieutenant dies while directing interior ventilation and primary search operations at a fire in a three-story dwelling - Pennsylvania

• On January 27, 1998, a 47-year-old male Lieutenant responded to a fire in a three-story dwelling. While laddering the building and directing interior ventilation and primary search operations, the victim had an unwitnessed collapse. He was found by a firefighter returning for further instructions. After approximately 55 to 60 minutes of CPR and advanced life support (ALS) on scene and at the hospital, a normal heart rhythm was regained. Neurologic consultation was requested and test indicated that the victim's unwitnessed collapse resulted in anoxic encephalopathy (brain death), so he was taken off life support and died on February 3, 1998. The death certificate and the autopsy, completed by the City Medical Examiner, listed "acute myocardial infarction" due to "atherosclerotic cardiovascular disease" as the immediate cause of death and "smoke and soot inhalation" as significant conditions. Other agencies have proposed a three-pronged strategy for reducing the risk of on-duty heart attacks and cardiac arrests among fire fighters. This strategy consists of (1) minimizing physical stress on fire fighters; (2) screening to identify and subsequently rehabilitate high risk individuals; and (3) encouraging increased individual physical capacity. The following issues are relevant to this fire department: 1. Fire fighters should have annual medical evaluations to determine their medical ability to perform duties without presenting a significant risk to the safety and health of themselves or others. 2. Reduce risk factors for cardiovascular disease and improve cardiovascular capacity by phasing in a mandatory wellness/fitness program for fire fighters. 3. All personnel entering a potentially hazardous atmosphere should wear an SCBA.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

30769

Single-family dwelling fire claims the life of a volunteer fire fighter, Indiana, January 9, 1999

• On January 9, 1999, a male volunteer fire fighter died of smoke inhalation while performing an interior attack on a fire at a single-family dwelling. A city police officer, who was first on scene, entered the structure to try to extinguish the blaze with a portable fire extinguisher, and assisted the exit of family members from the structure. A volunteer engine company, composed of a driver/operator and a fire fighter (the victim), were the first arriving company to the fire. When the engine company arrived, the driver/operator reported heavy smoke and fire showing from the northwest corner of the house. The Chief arrived within minutes of the first engine. The Chief then assisted the driver/operator in connecting the supply line to a fire hydrant approximately 150 feet away. At the same time the victim and the police officer dragged the 1 3/4 inch hose from the engine to the front porch of the structure. The victim, wearing full turnout gear, donned SCBA and entered the structure to extinguish the fire. The Chief, returning from hooking up to the hydrant, noticed that the victim was not present and went around the exterior of the house to locate him. The Chief pulled on the hoseline inside the front door to get the victim's attention. He felt no resistance, so then called "Man down." At the same time the Assistant Chief and three other fire fighters arrived in their privately owned vehicles. The Chief ordered a rescue attempt and the Assistant Chief, one fire fighter and the driver/operator donned SCBAs and entered the structure to search for the victim. They could enter only 2 feet due to heavy smoke and extreme heat. Minutes after the Assistant Chief entered the building, the water pressure dropped. The crews SCBA low-air alarms began to sound. The porch and part of the roof collapsed. The Chief ordered an exterior attack with three charged lines. Approximately 2 hours after arrival, the fire was knocked down, and attempts to locate the victim continued. He was found approximately 10 feet inside the structure. NIOSH investigators concluded that to minimize similar incidents fire departments should: 1) establish and implement an incident management system with written SOPs for all fire fighters and ensure that all fire fighters are trained on the system, 2) ensure that command conducts an initial size-up of incidents before initiating fire fighting efforts, and continually evaluates the risk versus gain during operations at an incident, 3) ensure at least four fire fighters are on the scene before initiating interior fire fighting operations at a working structure fire, 4) ensure that fire fighters who enter hazardous areas be equipped with two-way communications with incident command, 5) ensure automatic aid is established when known water pressure problems exist.

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

30069

Floor collapse in a single family dwelling fire claims the life of one fire fighter and injures another, Kentucky

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

30066

Fire fighter dies as a result of a cardiac arrest during an apartment fire, Louisiana

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]

30065

Fire fighter dies of a heart attack while responding to a residential oil heater fire, Delaware

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30063

Fire chief dies as a result of a heart attack while fighting a fire in a two-story dwelling, New York, December 1, 1997

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30062

Single family dwelling fire claims the lives of two volunteer fire fighters, Ohio, February 5, 1998

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30061

One fire fighter dies of smoke inhalation, one overcome by smoke while fighting an attic fire, New York, July 4, 1997

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30083

Two fire fighters die of smoke and soot inhalation in residential fire, Pennsylvania, October 27, 1997

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30054

Vacant dwelling fire injures two fire fighters, Virginia, July 11, 1998

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30052

Volunteer fire fighter dies of a heart attack after conducting firefighting activities at a single family log cabin dwelling, Virginia, December 7, 1997

• c.1: DOCUMENT ROOM - ROOM 209 [Status: IN]