




## Defense Issues/NATO Response to Terrorism May 2008

INFORMATION RESOURCE CENTER  
OFFICE OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, U.S. EMBASSY - DUBLIN  
TEL. (01) 668 8777 (EXT. 2106) - E-MAIL: IRCDUBIN@STATE.GOV

### Country Reports on Terrorism 2007



U.S. law requires the Secretary of State to provide Congress, by April 30 of each year, a full and complete report on terrorism with regard to those countries and groups meeting criteria set forth in the legislation.

Besides meeting Congressional requirements, the 2007 edition of the Country Reports on Terrorism aims to inform, to stimulate constructive debate, and to enhance our collective understanding of the international terrorist threat. The Country Reports should serve as a reference tool to inform policymakers, the American public, and our international partners about our efforts, progress and challenges in the war on terror.

Hundreds of people demonstrate in the streets of Istanbul, Turkey on June 23, 2007 to protest against the bombings that hit the country. AFP Photo.



Afghan men stand and ready to offer prayers at the funeral of legislator Mustafa Kazimi in Kabul, Afghanistan on Nov. 8, 2007. AFP Photo



British forensic police officers remove gas canisters from the burnt wreckage of a vehicle used to ram a passenger terminal at Glasgow Airport in Scotland on July 1, 2007. AFP Photo.

<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/>

## **Release of the Country Reports on Terrorism 2007**

**Dell L. Dailey, Coordinator of the Office for Counterterrorism**

**Russ Travers, Deputy Director of the National Counterterrorism Center; Gonzo Gallegos, Director, Office of Press Relations**

Washington, DC

April 30, 2008

AMBASSADOR DAILEY: Good morning. Thank you for attending this briefing. Besides meeting Congressional requirements, the 2007 edition of the Country Reports on Terrorism aims to inform, to stimulate constructive debate, and to enhance our collective understanding of the international terrorist threat. The Country Reports should serve as a reference tool to inform policymakers, the American public, and our international partners about our efforts, progress and challenges in the war on terror.

The 2007 Report begins with a strategic overview to illustrate trends. We note some positives. First, working with allies and partners across the world, we created a less permissive operating environment for terrorists, kept leaders on the move or in hiding, and degraded their ability to plan and mount attacks. Dozens of countries have passed new legislation or strengthened preexisting laws that provide law enforcement and judicial authorities with new tools to bring terrorists to justice.

(...)

2007 was marked with the affiliation of regional insurgent groups with al-Qaida. We note, in particular, the growing threat in North Africa posed by al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb, AQIM, which was known as a Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, GSPC, prior to its September '06 merger with al-Qaida. April '07, AQIM launched suicide attacks for the first time and vowed to use them as a primary tactic against their enemies. The near-simultaneous December 11 bombings of the Algerian Constitutional Council and the UN headquarters in Algiers underline a substantial shift in strategy. The attack on UN headquarters underline that AQIM now considers foreign interests to be attractive targets.

(...)

Let me summarize, first of all, that we will not prevail against terrorism without embracing a holistic approach such as that employed by the Regional Strategic Initiative. Over time, our global and regional cooperative efforts will reduce terrorists' capacity to harm us and our partners, while local security and development assistance will build up partners' capacity. If we are to be successful, we must work together with our growing networks of partners towards our common goal in a strategic and coordinated manner to overwhelmingly defeat this terrorist compelling challenge.

MR. TRAVERS: Thanks, Dell. Good morning. One of the responsibilities of the National Counterterrorism Center is to compile and maintain a database of terrorist incidents. We then draw from that database and support the Country Reports. *See page :*

**<http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2008/104233.htm>**

<b>GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS .....</b>	<b>9</b>
UNITED STATES, RUSSIA SIGN CIVIL NUCLEAR PACT; AGREEMENT PERMITS CIVILIAN TRADE IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS. By Merle D. Kellerhals Jr. Staff Writer. U.S. Department of State. May 6, 2008 .....	9
NEW FACES, OLD PROBLEMS, FAMILIAR SOLUTIONS? State's Kurt Volker's Remarks on U.S., European Challenges (Volker outlines challenges with energy, Middle East, global ideology) Kurt D. Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. U.S. Department of State, May 2, 2008	
2007 REPORT ON TERRORISM. National Counterterrorism Center. 30 April 2008.....	10
TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND UNITY OF EFFORT TO COMBAT GANGS, CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Remarks before the Ministers of Justice or Attorney Generals of the Americas (REMJA) Washington, DC. April 29, 2008 .....	10
US-VISIT AIR-SEA BIOMETRIC EXIT, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING. Department of Homeland Security. April 28, 2008 .....	11
THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR NATO. Daniel Fried, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. Testimony Before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe. Washington, DC. April 23, 2008.....	11
VOLKER'S SPEECH AT HERITAGE FOUNDATION ON NATO'S FUTURE: DISCUSSES NATO'S CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Kurt Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Remarks at the Heritage Foundation. Washington, DC. April 7, 2008.....	11
SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY. Department of Homeland Security. April 2008.....	12
STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUES LIST OF FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS: FACT SHEET LISTS CURRENT DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. United States Department of State. 2008-04-10 .....	12
UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Web posted April 7, 2008. 08AD613 .....	12
MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ. Report to Congress. In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008. DOD, March 2008.....	13
<b>CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.).....</b>	<b>13</b>
IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ESTIMATES. Congressional Research Service, RS22537, Library of Congress. Hannah Fischer. Web posted April 15, 2008. 08AD624 .....	13
UNITED STATES MILITARY CASUALTY STATISTICS: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. Congressional Research Service, RS22452, Library of Congress. Hannah Fischer. Web posted April 15, 2008. 08AD633 .....	14

---

TIBET: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND U.S. POLICY. Congressional Research Service, RL34445, Library of Congress. Kerry Dumbaugh. April 10, 2008. 08AD620 .....	14
DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW. Congressional Research Service, RL31798, Library of Congress. April 3, 2008. 08AD647 .....	14
<b>THE WHITE HOUSE .....</b>	<b>15</b>
SYRIA DID NOT DISCLOSE BUILDING NUCLEAR REACTOR (White House says it was destroyed in 2007 in an Israeli air strike) By Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., Staff Writer. April 25, 2008 .....	15
• Statement by the Press Secretary. The White House .....	15
<b>THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS .....</b>	<b>15</b>
<b>AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE.....</b>	<b>15</b>
BLAME PORT AUTHORITY. By Ted Frank. AEI Article, Published in the <i>New York Sun</i> . May 1, 2008.....	15
BE PREPARED. By Norman J. Ornstein. AEI Online. ON THE ISSUES. April 29, 2008 .....	16
DEFENSE ISSUES FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION. By Thomas Donnelly, Tim Sullivan. NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK. AEI Online, April 29, 2008.....	16
HOW WE'LL KNOW WHEN WE'VE WON. By Frederick W. Kagan. AEI Article published in <i>The Weekly Standard</i> , May 5, 2008 .....	17
THE AXIS OF EVIL: AN IDIOT'S GUIDE. By David Frum. AEI Article published in the <i>National Post</i> (Canada). April 26, 2008.....	17
<b>ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION .....</b>	<b>17</b>
REPAIRING U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS AFTER BUSH AND PUTIN WELCOME AND MODERATOR. By Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association; Ambassador James E. Goodby, Hoover Institution; Ambassador Avis T. Bohlen, Georgetown University; George N. Lewis, Cornell University. Friday, April 11, 2008.....	17
<b>THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES (ACUS) .....</b>	<b>18</b>
MURDOCH CRITICIZES EUROPE FOR INACTION AND CALLS FOR GLOBAL NATO. ACUS. Washington DC. April 21, 2008.....	18
<b>BROOKINGS INSTITUTION.....</b>	<b>18</b>
AFGHANISTAN: ADDRESSING U.S. MILITARY STAYING POWER. Thomas Lynch, Federal .....	18
HOW TO BE ALL THAT YOU CAN BE: A LOOK AT THE PENTAGON'S FIVE STEP PLAN FOR MAKING IRON MAN REAL. Peter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative. The Brookings Institution, May 02, 2008 .....	19
LISTING OUR TERROR PROBLEMS. Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. Published in <i>The National Interest Online</i> , May 02, 2008.....	19
THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS. Brookings experts testifying before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs April 24, 2008.....	19
• Martin S. Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy.....	19
• Peter W. Rodman .....	20

<b>CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE .....</b>	<b>20</b>
AFGHANISTAN: A NEW START? Kal Eide, UN Special Representative Addresses Priorities. CEIP. Monday, April 28, 2008.....	20
REARMING THE WORLD. By Josh Kurlantzick. CEIP. Article published in the <i>Boston Globe</i> , April 27, 2008	20
<b>CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY .....</b>	<b>20</b>
SUSTAINABLE SECURITY: DEVELOPING A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE LONG HAUL. Center for a New American Security. Jim Thomas. April 2008. 08AD652 .....	20
U.S.-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS: REKINDLING AN ALLIANCE FLAME. Vikram J. Singh; Nirav Patel. CNAS Policy Briefs. April 2008 .....	21
<b>CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS).....</b>	<b>21</b>
THE COHEN-NUNN DIALOGUES: PRESERVE, PROTECT AND DEFEND: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S HOMELAND SECURITY. CSIS Event Transcript. New York University, April 28, 2008 .....	21
TRENDS IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING, 2001-2006. Wan-Jung Chao, Gregory Sanders, Guy Ben-Ari. CSIS. April 24, 2008 .....	22
A POISONED CHALICE? THE CRISIS IN NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING. Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy. April 23, 2008.....	22
IRAQ AND THE CROCKER-PETRAEUS TESTIMONY: THE RISKS THAT ONLY TIME AND A SUSTAINED US PRESENCE CAN DEAL WITH. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman. Web posted April 14, 2008. 08AD622 .....	23
THE ONGOING LESSONS OF THE AFGHAN AND IRAQ WARS. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anthony Cordesman. April 7, 2008. 08AD609 .....	23
<b>COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY .....</b>	<b>23</b>
THE POWER OF TRUTH: QUESTIONS FOR AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI. Jarret Brachman, Brian Fishman, Joseph Felter. Combating Terrorism Center. United States Military Academy West Point, NY, 21 April 2008.	23
<b>GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES.....</b>	<b>24</b>
THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE PAPERS. The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Chatham House. Robin Shepherd, Ed. April 3, 2008. 08AD621 .....	24
RETHINKING NATO PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. Ronald D. Asmus, GMF. Published in the <i>NATO Review</i> , April 2008 .....	24
THE CRISIS OF THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN ORDER: WHAT TO DO ABOUT RUSSIA'S NEWFOUND TASTE FOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST. Ivan Krastev, Chair, Centre for Liberal Strategies. GMF. March 2008 .....	25
TRANSATLANTIC POWER FAILURES: AMERICA AND EUROPE, SEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: HARD POWER HUMBLLED, SOFT POWER EXPOSED, AND A LOSER, MORE PRAGMATIC RELATIONSHIP. Constanze Stelzenmüller. GMF. March 2008 .....	25

<b>HERITAGE FOUNDATION .....</b>	<b>25</b>
MAGNEQUENCH: CFIUS AND CHINA'S THIRST FOR U.S. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. By John J. Tkacik, Jr. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1913. May 2, 2008 .....	25
THE U.S. SHOULD REJECT THE U.N. "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT" DOCTRINE. By Steven Groves. Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #2130. May 1, 2008.....	26
PETRAEUS HEARING SHOULD FOCUS ON THREE FRONTS, ONE LONG WAR. By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Lisa Curtis. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1908. April 30, 2008.....	26
THE WEST SHOULD UNITE IN SUPPORT OF GEORGIA. By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1907 April 30, 2008.....	26
PLAYING "WHACK-A-MOLE" WITH NORTH KOREA. By Bruce Klingner. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1905. April 29, 2008.....	27
CONGRESS SHOULD FUND DEVELOPMENT OF AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. By Baker Spring. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1904. April 28, 2008.....	27
REAGAN'S STRATEGIC VISION FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. By the Honorable Richard B. Cheney. Heritage Foundation. Heritage Lecture #1078. April 18, 2008.....	28
<b>INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG) .....</b>	<b>28</b>
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE I: THE NEW SUNNI LANDSCAPE. Middle East Report N°74 30 April 2008..	28
IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE II: THE NEED FOR A NEW POLITICAL STRATEGY. Middle East Report N°75 30 April 2008.....	29
COLOMBIA: MAKING MILITARY PROGRESS PAY OFF. Latin America Briefing N°17. 29 April 2008...	29
RESTORING DEMOCRACY IN BANGLADESH. Asia Report N°151.28 April 2008 .....	29
WILL THE REAL SERBIA PLEASE STAND UP? Europe Briefing N°49. I CG. 23 April 2008 .....	30
<b>INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS (IPFM).....</b>	<b>30</b>
A FISSILE MATERIAL (CUTOFF) TREATY AND ITS VERIFICATION: PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS. IPFM Briefing. 2 May 2008. United Nations Office at Geneva, Palais des Nations, at the 2008 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) .....	30
<b>NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH.....</b>	<b>31</b>
THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN HEARTS AND MINDS: VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SECOND INTIFIDA. National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Jaeger et al. April 2008. ....	31
<b>NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU) .....</b>	<b>31</b>
THE ROLE OF MEDICAL DIPLOMACY IN STABILIZING AFGHANISTAN. By Donald F. Thompson. <i>Defense Horizons</i> Number 63. NDU. May 2008.....	31

---

<b>PEW</b> .....	<b>32</b>
ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE. Andrew Kohut, President, Pew Research Center and Richard Wike, Associate Director, Pew Global Attitudes Project. Published in the <i>National Interest Online</i> . May 5, 2008.....	32
MOST AMERICANS UNFAMILIAR WITH PETRAEUS, RICE REMAINS POPULAR. Pew Research Center. Report. Released: April 4, 2008 .....	32
<b>RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY</b> .....	<b>33</b>
THE AL-QAEDA MEDIA NEXUS: THE VIRTUAL NETWORK BEHIND THE GLOBAL MESSAGE. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: RFE/RL Special Report. Daniel Kimmage. Web posted April 14, 2008. 08AD61733	
<b>RAND</b> .....	<b>33</b>
RETHINKING COUNTERINSURGENCY. RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 5. By: John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy. May 2008.....	33
METHODOLOGY FOR IMPROVING THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS. By: Sherrill Lingel, Carl Rhodes, et.al. Technical Report. RAND May 2, 2008 .....	34
THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR-ARMED REGIONAL ADVERSARIES. By: David Ochmanek, Lowell H. Schwartz. RAND 2008.....	34
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ARMY RECRUITING. By: James N. Dertouzos, Steven Garber. Monograph. RAND 2008 .....	35
COMPARING ALTERNATIVE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES; CAN ASSUMPTION-BASED PLANNING HELP ELEVATE THE DEBATE? By: Robert J. Lempert, Horacio R. Trujillo, David Aaron, et.al. RAND 2008.....	35
<b>STANLEY FOUNDATION</b> .....	<b>35</b>
A SECURITY AND PEACE MECHANISM FOR NORTHEAST ASIA: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation. April 2008.....	35
IMPLEMENTATION: A NEW APPROACH TO MULTINATIONAL COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN. Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation April 2008 .....	36
<b>STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE</b> .....	<b>36</b>
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. Edited by Dr. Carolyn Pumphrey. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. May 2008 .....	36
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE WAR OF IDEAS. By Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 2008.....	37
PROSPECTS FROM KOREAN UNIFICATION. By Colonel, Australian Army David Coghlan. (Carlisle) Papers. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 28, 2008.....	37
BALUCH NATIONALISM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY RESOURCES: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF SEPARATISM IN PAKISTAN. By Dr. Robert J. Wirsing. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 2008 .....	38
THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. TURKISH RELATIONS IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT. Edited by Dr. Frances G. Burwell. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 2008 .....	38

<b>UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL .....</b>	<b>39</b>
FACT SHEET: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM-- UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (Highlights Security Council’s imposed sanctions against Iran). U.S.Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Washington, DC. April 4, 2008 .....	39
<b>UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE .....</b>	<b>39</b>
MANAGING CRISIS AND SUSTAINING PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. United States Institute of Peace. Xinbo Wu. April 2008. 08AD658 .....	39
RESURRECTING THE WALL OF FEAR: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SYRIA. By Robert Grace. USIPeace Briefing, April 2008.....	40
<b>THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY .....</b>	<b>40</b>
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BASIS FOR EU SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. By Emanuele Ottolenghi. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. PolicyWatch #1368. April 30, 2008 .....	40
SLIPPERY POLLS: USES AND ABUSES OF OPINION SURVEYS FROM ARAB STATES. David Pollock. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. Policy Focus #82. April 2008 .....	40
<b>ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS.....</b>	<b>41</b>
US POLICY TOWARDS NORTH AFRICA: THREE OVERARCHING THEMES. Hemmer, Christopher. <i>Middle East Policy Journal</i> vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 55-66 AA08122 .....	41
DEAR MR. PRESIDENT. Hitchens, Christopher. <i>World Affairs</i> vol. 170, no. 3, Winter 2008, pp. 9-14 AA08123 .....	41
BEYOND DARFUR: SUDAN’S SLIDE TOWARD CIVIL WAR. Natsios, Andrew S. <i>Foreign Affairs</i> vol. 87, no. 3, May/June 2008, 77-93 AA08125 .....	41
DISARMAMENT REDUX. Scoblic, J. Peter. <i>Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists</i> vol. 64, no. 1, March/April 2008, pp. 35-39 AA08101 .....	42



## GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS

### **UNITED STATES, RUSSIA SIGN CIVIL NUCLEAR PACT; AGREEMENT PERMITS CIVILIAN TRADE IN NUCLEAR MATERIALS. By Merle D. Kellerhals Jr. Staff Writer. U.S. Department of State. May 6, 2008**



Washington -- Once nuclear rivals but today partners, the United States and Russia have signed an agreement to allow the development of nuclear energy for civilian purposes, expand trade and strengthen efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation.

President Bush, right, accompanied by then-Russian President Vladimir Putin (© AP Images)

President Bush approved the agreement May 5, and it was signed by U.S. Ambassador William Burns and Rosatom Director Sergey Kiriyenko May 6 in Moscow. Rosatom is Russia's state nuclear corporation.

Bush and then-Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to the deal in 2006 at the St. Petersburg Group of Eight Summit.

"The United States and Russia were once nuclear rivals, we are today nuclear partners," Burns said, according to a Reuters news report. "What this agreement allows us to do is to implement some very creative ideas that both Russia and the United States have put forward to deal with the growing challenge of proliferation of nuclear weapons."

The president will submit the agreement to Congress for approval, which has 90 days to act. If Congress does not act within 90 days, then the agreement will go into effect. The Russian parliament also must approve the measure.

<http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/May/20080506141240dmslahrellek0.7348139.html>

### **NEW FACES, OLD PROBLEMS, FAMILIAR SOLUTIONS? State's Kurt Volker's Remarks on U.S., European Challenges (Volker outlines challenges with energy, Middle East, global ideology) Kurt D. Volker, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs. U.S. Department of State, May 2, 2008**

(...) we need a strong and dynamic NATO today no less than in the past. We need it for hard, practical reasons, and because it is also a key part of the glue of our transatlantic community. This is why President Sarkozy's announcement that France will fully normalize its role within NATO and co-host next year's NATO Summit is so significant.


We also need a strong European Union, and a close U.S.-EU partnership. There should be no question: the United States fully supports a strong EU. This is still a relationship in its infancy, however, and the sense of being a single "U.S.-EU community" is not a phrase that usually rolls off

the tongue. It is somehow different when Europeans decide only among themselves on policies, and then exchange views with the U.S., versus when we sit together and make joint decisions together. That is what we do at NATO, and what we need to do better in our U.S.-EU efforts.

And we need to reinvest also in the OSCE. That is the one place where all of Europe and Eurasia meets in one place, and where the values of freedom are squarely on the table thanks to the Helsinki Final Act. It is increasingly difficult to reach consensus in the OSCE, as some states have moved away from democratic societies. But we should meet this challenge with greater creativity and resolve, not less.

<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/May/20080506144704xjsnommis0.8024408.html>

### **2007 REPORT ON TERRORISM. National Counterterrorism Center. 30 April 2008**



Consistent with its statutory mission to serve as the U.S. Government's knowledge bank on international terrorism, the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) is providing this report and statistical information to assist academics, policy makers and the public in understanding the data. The statistical information included in this report is drawn from the data NCTC maintains on the [www.nctc.gov](http://www.nctc.gov) website.

The statistical material compiled in this report, is drawn from the number of attacks of "terrorism" that occurred in 2007, which is the closest figure that is practicable for NCTC to supply in satisfaction of the above-referenced statistical requirements.

<http://www.terrorisminfo.mipt.org/pdf/NCTC-2007-Report-on-Terrorism.pdf>

### **TRANSNATIONAL CRIME AND UNITY OF EFFORT TO COMBAT GANGS, CRIMINALS AND TERRORISTS. David T. Johnson, Assistant Secretary for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State. Remarks before the Ministers of Justice or Attorney Generals of the Americas (REMJA) Washington, DC. April 29, 2008**

“Fighting transnational crime and corruption is an ongoing and deliberate process. We cannot afford to lose the ground we have worked so hard to gain. The future of democracy in the Western Hemisphere and our own national security interests are deeply and inextricably intertwined. Working together, we can create a better future through our united efforts against organized crime building societies where our citizens can live in more secure communities and be governed with the highest level of integrity and respect for the rule of law.”

<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/May/20080501181144eaifas0.5682947.html>

**US-VISIT AIR-SEA BIOMETRIC EXIT, NOTICE OF PROPOSED RULEMAKING.  
Department of Homeland Security. April 28, 2008**

The Department of Homeland Security has issued a notice of proposed rulemaking to establish an exit program at all airports and seaports of departure in the United States.

Under this rule, the Department proposes to require non-U.S. citizens subject to US-VISIT biometric requirements upon entering the United States to also provide biometric identifiers-digital fingerprints-prior to departing the United States from airports or seaports of departure.

The Proposed Rule requires commercial air carriers and vessel owners and operators to collect and transmit this biometric exit information to Homeland Security, in conjunction with passenger manifest information already being collected and submitted by the carriers. The proposed rule would not apply to small carriers and vessel owners and operators, or to general aviation.

<http://edocket.access.gpo.gov/2008/E8-8956.htm>

**THE BUCHAREST SUMMIT AND THE WAY FORWARD FOR NATO. Daniel Fried,  
Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs. Testimony Before the House  
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe. Washington, DC. April 23, 2008**

NATO is not just a military alliance; it is an alliance of values that provided the foundation for freedom's victory in the Cold War. While its core mission remains the same – the defense of its members – NATO is achieving this in new ways. It is evolving into a 21st century role, enlarging the area in Europe where freedom is secure, defending this transatlantic community against new threats and challenges that are often global in scope, and building partnerships around the globe with like-minded countries who want to work together with NATO to face these challenges. The Bucharest Summit further advanced NATO's transformation in each of these areas.


<http://www.state.gov/p/eur/rls/rm/103935.htm>

**VOLKER'S SPEECH AT HERITAGE FOUNDATION ON NATO'S FUTURE: DISCUSSES  
NATO'S CHALLENGES AND THE FUTURE OF TRANSATLANTIC ALLIANCE. Kurt  
Volker, Acting Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs, U.S. Department of  
State. Remarks at the Heritage Foundation. Washington, DC. April 7, 2008**

“When we talk about NATO and the future, NATO's mission to me still remains very much the same mission that NATO has always had, which is the collective defense of its members. That's what it's there for. What's changed is the environment in which NATO needs to go about doing this. We don't face the Soviet threat that Nile described in the heart of Europe in the same way that we did back in the '80s or before; but we do face threats like terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, failed states, rogue states, and NATO has to deal with these new kinds of challenges. And in order to assure the security and defense of its members today, it needs to be acting in very different ways.”

<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080410160317eafas0.1235926.html>

**SMALL VESSEL SECURITY STRATEGY. Department of Homeland Security. April 2008**



The U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) announced a new Small Vessel Security Strategy (SVSS) designed to close security gaps and reduce risks associated with the potential exploitation of small maritime vessels. The SVSS identifies specific goals for which security efforts can achieve the greatest impact without excessive imposition upon the freedom of operation common to the nation’s waterways.

“We saw quite vividly with the U.S.S. Cole attack that violent extremists will not hesitate to use any means, large or small, in their efforts to inflict blows to our maritime assets,” said Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff.

“This strategy ensures all small vessel stakeholders across our ports and coastal waterways can play a role in unified threat mitigation efforts and replaces today’s seemingly honor-based neighborhood watch program with an efficient and successful means to combat terrorism along our waterways.”


<http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/small-vessel-security-strategy.pdf> (PDF, 57 pages - 1.29 MB )

**STATE DEPARTMENT ISSUES LIST OF FOREIGN TERRORIST GROUPS: FACT SHEET LISTS CURRENT DESIGNATED FOREIGN TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. United States Department of State. 2008-04-10**

Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) are foreign organizations that are designated by the Secretary of State in accordance with section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), as amended. FTO designations play a critical role in our fight against terrorism and are an effective means of curtailing support for terrorist activities and pressuring groups to get out of the terrorism business.

<http://www.america.gov/st/texttrans-english/2008/April/20080410111249xjsnommis0.111355.html>

**UNITED STATES INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY INFORMATION SHARING STRATEGY. Office of the Director of National Intelligence. Web posted April 7, 2008. 08AD613**




Each intelligence agency has its own networks and data repositories that make it very difficult to piece together facts and suppositions that, in the aggregate, could provide warning of the intentions of our adversaries. The inability or unwillingness to share information was recognized as an Intelligence Community weakness by both the 9/11 Commission and the Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Commission. The President and the Congress have mandated that the Intelligence Community create a more integrated enterprise where information is routinely shared. Since these mandates were issued, progress has been made in information sharing through the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), the Information

Sharing Environment (ISE), and related partnership efforts. Recognizing the very real and profound necessity to improve information sharing, the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) has

made accelerating and improving Intelligence Community information sharing one of his top priorities.

[http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC\\_Information\\_Sharing\\_Strategy.pdf](http://www.dni.gov/reports/IC_Information_Sharing_Strategy.pdf) [pdf format, 24 pages]

**MEASURING STABILITY AND SECURITY IN IRAQ. Report to Congress. In accordance with the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2008. DOD, March 2008**



This report to Congress, Measuring Stability and Security in Iraq, is submitted pursuant to Section 9010 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act 2007, Public Law 109-289 as amended by Section 1308 of Public Law 110-28 and Section 1224 of Public Law 110-181. The report includes specific performance indicators and measures of progress toward political, economic, and security stability in Iraq, as directed in that legislation. This is the eleventh in a series of quarterly reports on this subject. The most recent report was submitted in December 2007. The report complements other reports and information about Iraq provided to Congress and is not intended as a single source of all information about the combined efforts or the future strategy of the United States, its Coalition partners or Iraq.

<http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/pdfs/Master%20%20Mar08%20-%20final%20signed.pdf>

CONGRESSIONAL DOCUMENTS (HEARINGS, REPORTS, ETC.)

**IRAQI CIVILIAN CASUALTIES ESTIMATES. Congressional Research Service, RS22537, Library of Congress. Hannah Fischer. Web posted April 15, 2008. 08AD624**




This report gathers together various governmental and nongovernmental estimates of Iraqi civilian dead and wounded. No Iraqi or U.S. government office regularly releases publically available statistics on Iraqi civilian casualties. Statistics are sometimes available through alternative sources, such as nonprofit organizations, or through statements made by officials to the press. NOTE: Because these estimates are based on varying time periods and have been created using differing methodologies, posts should exercise caution when using them and should consider them as guideposts rather than as statements of fact.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS22537.pdf> [pdf format, 5 pages]



**UNITED STATES MILITARY CASUALTY STATISTICS: OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM AND OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM. Congressional Research Service, RS22452, Library of Congress. Hannah Fischer. Web posted April 15, 2008. 08AD633**



This report presents difficult-to-find statistics regarding U.S. military casualties in Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan). Some of these statistics are publicly available on the DOD website, while others have been obtained through contact with experts at DOD. Daily updates of total U.S. military casualties in OIF and OEF can be found at <http://www.defenselink.mil/news/casualty.pdf>.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RS22452.pdf>

**TIBET: PROBLEMS, PROSPECTS, AND U.S. POLICY. Congressional Research Service, RL34445, Library of Congress. Kerry Dumbaugh. April 10, 2008. 08AD620**

A series of initially peaceful demonstrations in Lhasa and other Tibetan cities, whose purpose was to mark the 49th anniversary of an unsuccessful Tibetan uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, eventually turned into riots. The Chinese government responded by sealing off Tibet and moving in large-scale security forces. Beijing has defended its actions as appropriate and necessary to restore civil order and prevent further violence but the actions have resulted in calls for boycotts of the Beijing Olympics opening ceremony on August 8, 2008. This report examines the issues and what they mean for future American policy in the region.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL34445.pdf> [pdf format, 28 pages]



**DATA MINING AND HOMELAND SECURITY: AN OVERVIEW. Congressional Research Service, RL31798, Library of Congress. April 3, 2008. 08AD647**



Data mining has been often used as a means for detecting fraud, assessing risk, and product retailing, which involves the use of data analysis tools to discover previously unknown, valid patterns and relationships in large data sets. For homeland security, it can be a potential means to identify terrorist activities, such as money transfers and communications, and to identify and track individual terrorists themselves, such as through travel and immigration records. However, since there are limitations on its scope and use, successful data mining requires skilled technical and analytical specialists who can structure the analysis and interpret the output to expand its potential.

<http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homsec/RL31798.pdf> [pdf format, 41 pages].

## THE WHITE HOUSE

### **SYRIA DID NOT DISCLOSE BUILDING NUCLEAR REACTOR (White House says it was destroyed in 2007 in an Israeli air strike) By Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., Staff Writer. April 25, 2008**

Washington -- Syria did not tell the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) it was building a nuclear reactor in a remote area of eastern Syria with help from North Korean nuclear scientists and engineers, and after it was destroyed in September 2007, made every effort to bury the evidence, White House press secretary Dana Perino says.

"This cover-up only served to reinforce our confidence that this reactor was not intended for peaceful purposes," Perino said in a prepared statement April 24. "We are briefing the IAEA on this intelligence."

IAEA Director General Mohamed ElBaradei confirmed in Vienna April 25 that his office has been given the U.S. intelligence and that the reactor was not yet operational and no nuclear material had been introduced into it.

"The agency will treat this information with the seriousness it deserves and will investigate the veracity of the information," ElBaradei said. "Syria has an obligation under its safeguards agreement with the IAEA to report the planning and construction of any nuclear facility to the agency."

<http://www.america.gov/st/peacesec-english/2008/April/20080425142432dmslahrellek0.9860041.html>

- **Statement by the Press Secretary. The White House**  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2008/04/20080424-14.html>

## THINK TANK PUBLICATIONS

### AMERICAN ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE

#### **BLAME PORT AUTHORITY. By Ted Frank. AEI Article, Published in the *New York Sun*. May 1, 2008**

On February 26, 1993, Islamic terrorists exploded a 1,500-pound bomb in the garage of the World Trade Center, killing six and injuring more than a thousand. This was, a jury decided in 2006, 68% the responsibility of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a bit more than twice the responsibility of the men who actually engaged in the bombing.

The Port Authority, potentially liable for billions because of the decision, including 100% of the "pain and suffering" claims, appealed, noting that the result was "bizarre." This week, a five-judge

panel of the Appellate Division of State Supreme Court in Manhattan unanimously upheld the jury verdict.

(...) We have gotten to the point where five judges can shrug their shoulders at this jury verdict and rationalize it with citation to precedent and say that the Port Authority had public parking, and was therefore asking for it.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27914/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27914/pub_detail.asp)


**BE PREPARED. By Norman J. Ornstein. AEI Online. ON THE ISSUES. April 29, 2008**



AEI's election watcher Norman J. Ornstein follows the fortunes of the presidential and congressional candidates, commenting daily on campaign strategies and policies. But he also writes and speaks regularly about an issue that many members of Congress have chosen to ignore: the possibility of disruption of our election process through a terrorist attack or a natural disaster. Ornstein believes the United States is wholly unprepared for any such scenario, and he has urged Congress to focus its attention on the potential problems. Muddling through has worked thus far, he notes in this article, but it is "flat-out irresponsible" to continue to pay so little attention to the issue.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27899/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27899/pub_detail.asp)

**DEFENSE ISSUES FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION. By Thomas Donnelly, Tim Sullivan. NATIONAL SECURITY OUTLOOK. AEI Online, April 29, 2008**



The events of the past eight years have clarified the military challenges and tasks facing the United States. While many of the new "facts" do not reflect good news--the attacks of 9/11, the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan, the rapid development of Chinese military power, and the spread of nuclear weapons and know-how--all have provided a firmer basis for planning. We can now, after fifteen years of post-Cold War uncertainty, begin to answer better the classic question of defense programming and budgeting: how much is enough?

There remains a critical problem in policymakers' approach to defense planning: confusion about the definition of "defense spending" and what makes up the defense budget. There is a crucial distinction between the baseline defense budget--the costs of raising, training, equipping, and otherwise readying U.S. military forces--and wartime costs--the additional expenses that come with employing the forces, including the costs of resetting them to original readiness levels. Indeed, the constant debates about the unanticipated and escalating (though still relatively low, as discussed below) costs of operations in Iraq and elsewhere have obscured and delayed a much-needed evaluation of the requirements for and costs of the force needed now and for the future. This Outlook will make an initial assessment of the primary security challenges facing the United States, the force requirements necessary to address those challenges, and the programmatic and budgetary implications of the U.S. military's efforts to prepare for future threats.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27895/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27895/pub_detail.asp)



**HOW WE'LL KNOW WHEN WE'VE WON. By Frederick W. Kagan. AEI Article published in *The Weekly Standard*, May 5, 2008**

Virtually everyone who wants to win this war agrees: Success will have been achieved when Iraq is a stable, representative state that controls its own territory, is oriented toward the West, and is an ally in the struggle against militant Islamism, whether Sunni or Shia. This has been said over and over. Why won't war critics hear it? Is it because they reject the notion that such success is achievable and therefore see the definition as dishonest or delusional? Is it because George Bush has used versions of it and thus discredited it in the eyes of those who hate him? Or is it because it does not offer easily verifiable benchmarks to tell us whether or not we are succeeding? There could be other reasons--perhaps critics fear that even thinking about success or failure in Iraq will weaken their demand for an immediate "end to the war." Whatever the explanation for this tiresome deafness, here is one more attempt to flesh out what success in Iraq means and how we can evaluate progress toward it.

[http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27890/pub\\_detail.asp](http://www.aei.org/publications/filter.all,pubID.27890/pub_detail.asp)

**THE AXIS OF EVIL: AN IDIOT'S GUIDE. By David Frum. AEI Article published in the *National Post* (Canada). April 26, 2008**

Mystery solved. On Sept. 6 of last year, Israeli warplanes struck a facility in the deserts of eastern Syria. The Israelis refused to explain what they had hit or why. The Syrians immediately bulldozed the site to block all further investigation. The U.S. government acknowledged the attack but declined otherwise to comment. And the world was left to speculate.

On Thursday, the Bush administration at last confirmed what had long been rumored: The Syrian facility was indeed a nuclear plant. The plant followed the same design as the Yongbyon plant in North Korea, and North Korean engineers and workers had helped to build it. North Korea and Syria had initiated discussions on the plant in 1997. Construction had commenced in 2005. When the Israelis struck, the plant was only weeks from completion.

[http://www.aei.org/axis\\_of\\_evil\\_idiots\\_guide\\_david\\_frum.htm](http://www.aei.org/axis_of_evil_idiots_guide_david_frum.htm)

## ARMS CONTROL ASSOCIATION

**REPAIRING U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC RELATIONS AFTER BUSH AND PUTIN WELCOME AND MODERATOR. By Daryl G. Kimball, Arms Control Association; Ambassador James E. Goodby, Hoover Institution; Ambassador Avis T. Bohlen, Georgetown University; George N. Lewis, Cornell University. Friday, April 11, 2008**

“(...)we are going to outline the steps that we believe the next pair of U.S. and Russian presidents can and should take to put the U.S.-Russian strategic relationship on a more stable footing, specifically through further verifiable reductions in the two countries’ excessive arsenals and by crafting a more comprehensive and cooperative approach on missile defense and missile nonproliferation.”

[http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20080407\\_US\\_Russia\\_Transcript.asp](http://www.armscontrol.org/events/20080407_US_Russia_Transcript.asp)

## THE ATLANTIC COUNCIL OF THE UNITED STATES (ACUS)

### **MURDOCH CRITICIZES EUROPE FOR INACTION AND CALLS FOR GLOBAL NATO. ACUS. Washington DC. April 21, 2008**

News Corporation Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch questioned Europe's political will to defend itself and called upon NATO to expand beyond current candidates to global members such as Australia, Japan and Israel.

"We must face up to a painful truth," Murdoch said on Monday night, April 21st, in a speech upon receiving the 2008 Distinguished Business Award from the Atlantic Council of the United States. "Europe no longer has either the political will or social culture to support military engagements in defense of itself and its allies."

Speaking to Washington's most important annual gathering of Atlanticists, he said though strong on paper "this makes NATO weak in practice." He called for reform from outside, transforming the alliance with new members chosen according to shared principles "rather than the accident of geography."

[http://www.acus.org/about-news-Awards\\_2008MurdochSpeech.asp](http://www.acus.org/about-news-Awards_2008MurdochSpeech.asp)

## BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

### **AFGHANISTAN: ADDRESSING U.S. MILITARY STAYING POWER. Thomas Lynch, Federal Executive Fellow, Foreign Policy, 21st Century Defense Initiative. Brookings Institution. The American Interest, May/June 2008**

In mid-January, Defense Secretary Robert Gates approved an order to send an additional 3,000 U.S. marines into Afghanistan in anticipation of the now annual Taliban spring offensive. It was the right thing to do, but such a temporary force increase falls far short of what is needed. U.S. military policy is still stumbling toward failure in Afghanistan—a failure that will likely have dire consequences beyond South Asia.

Let's be clear: The mission in Afghanistan is not in jeopardy mainly because NATO members refuse to provide sufficient troops or appropriate engagement protocols for the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF). Neither is the mission in jeopardy because of any deficiency inherent in U.S. or Coalition counterinsurgency doctrine. The problem goes deeper, into the underlying political context of Coalition military operations. The real issue is the transitory and uncertain U.S. military posture in Afghanistan (and, by implication, across South Asia), which undermines the necessary link between relevant military security operations and positive political consequences.

<http://www.the-american-interest.com/ai2/article-bd.cfm?Id=422&MIId=19>

**HOW TO BE ALL THAT YOU CAN BE: A LOOK AT THE PENTAGON'S FIVE STEP PLAN FOR MAKING IRON MAN REAL. Peter W. Singer, Director, 21st Century Defense Initiative. The Brookings Institution, May 02, 2008**

Iron Man is the Marvel comicbook series in which Tony Stark, a playboy industrialist, dons a technologic suit of powered armor. The suit gives him superhuman strength, virtual invulnerability, the ability to fly, and packs an array of weapons. In the comic books, Iron Man uses his suit to battle the communists, a Chinese warlord, Godzilla, and the Incredible Hulk. In the new movie starring Robert Downey Jr. and Gwyneth Paltrow, Iron Man takes on our 21st century versions of arch-villainy: terrorists and an evil CEO.

But Iron Man is no mere fiction. Overcoming our human body's weakness via technology is a vision into which the Pentagon is today investing literally billions of dollars. As former Air Force Chief of Staff General John Jumper describes, "We must give the individual soldier the same capabilities of stealth and standoff that fighter planes have. We must look at the soldier as the system." And such dreams of creating technology enhanced supersoldiers are not too far off. What follows is a look at the process of turning Iron Man from science fiction into military reality.

[http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/0502\\_iron\\_man\\_singer.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2008/0502_iron_man_singer.aspx)

**LISTING OUR TERROR PROBLEMS. Daniel L. Byman, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy, Saban Center for Middle East Policy, The Brookings Institution. Published in *The National Interest Online*, May 02, 2008**

Pakistan's newly elected leaders are negotiating a truce with radical tribal groups in the country that have long been in bed with the Taliban and various jihadist groups. The leaders' proposals, in essence, allow the groups a respite from the government's on-again, off-again counterterrorist campaign in exchange for the radicals halting attacks throughout Pakistan. Unspoken but very much part of the deal is that the factions will be able to organize, sponsor, and conduct cross-border attacks on Afghan government troops and their U.S. and Western allies. Under the deal, the best that the United States can hope for is that the situation in Afghanistan only becomes worse, as opposed to disastrous. An even greater risk is that the radicals simply use the respite to grow stronger, resume attacks that eventually destabilize Pakistan as well as Afghanistan, and plot more dramatic terrorist attacks on the United States and its allies outside the region.

[http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0502\\_terrorism\\_byman.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0502_terrorism_byman.aspx)

**THE FUTURE OF U.S.-SYRIAN RELATIONS. Brookings experts testifying before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs April 24, 2008**

- **Martin S. Indyk, Director, Saban Center for Middle East Policy**

Testifying before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Martin Indyk argued the current policy of isolating Syria has had mixed results. He believes that the next U.S. president should consider a different approach that could foster a more productive relationship allowing mutual goals to be realized in the troubled region

[http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0424\\_syria\\_indyk.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0424_syria_indyk.aspx)

- **Peter W. Rodman**

Testifying before the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Peter Rodman argued "the conditions do not exist for an improvement of relations with Syria as long as Syrian policies remain hostile to important interest of ours in the Middle East." He concluded that Syria must change course in relation to Iraq, Lebanon, and Arab-Israeli peace before the U.S. reaches out to the country.

[http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0424\\_syria\\_rodman.aspx](http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0424_syria_rodman.aspx)

## CARNEGIE ENDOWMENT FOR INTERNATIONAL PEACE

### **AFGHANISTAN: A NEW START? Kai Eide, UN Special Representative Addresses Priorities. CEIP. Monday, April 28, 2008**

Progress in Afghanistan requires more focused coordination by the international community and increased civilian/military cooperation to meet political goals, said Ambassador Kai Eide, the new UN Special Representative in Afghanistan and head of the UN Assistance Mission in Afghanistan, at Carnegie on April 28, 2008. Eide discussed how other nations can work together to address the ongoing threats to stability in Afghanistan, such as mitigating the food price crisis, promoting more effective aid, and supporting national reconciliation efforts.

Transcript: [http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0428\\_transcript\\_kaieide.pdf](http://carnegieendowment.org/files/0428_transcript_kaieide.pdf)

### **REARMING THE WORLD. By Josh Kurlantzick. CEIP. Article published in the *Boston Globe*, April 27, 2008**

With much less fanfare than the early days of the Cold War, the world is entering a new arms race, and with it, a dangerous new web of military relationships. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, which tracks international armed forces spending, between 1997 and 2006 global military expenditures jumped by nearly 40 percent. Driven mainly by anxiety over oil and natural resources, countries are building their arsenals of conventional weapons at a rate not seen in decades, beefing up their armies and navies, and forging potential new alliances that could divide up the world in unpredictable ways.

<http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=print&id=20080>

## CENTER FOR A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY

### **SUSTAINABLE SECURITY: DEVELOPING A SECURITY STRATEGY FOR THE LONG HAUL. Center for a New American Security. Jim Thomas. April 2008. 08AD652**

Thomas looks at the countries in the developing world and their lack of ability to govern and police themselves to secure their regions and how the lack of global security threatens U.S. interest. In order to maintain America's values, interests, and commitments, the security deficit needs to be effectively addressed with a new approach that is more indirect and prevention focused.



[Note: Contains copyrighted material]

[http://www.cnas.org/attachments/contentmanagers/1924/Thomas\\_SustainableSecurity\\_April08.pdf](http://www.cnas.org/attachments/contentmanagers/1924/Thomas_SustainableSecurity_April08.pdf)  
[pdf format, 24 pages].

**U.S.-SOUTH KOREA RELATIONS: REKINDLING AN ALLIANCE FLAME. Vikram J. Singh; Nirav Patel. CNAS Policy Briefs. April 2008**



The honeymoon between Washington and Seoul will not last long without more harmony on the most important issue for the relationship: North Korean denuclearization.

At the Camp David press conference with new South Korean President Lee Myung-bak, President Bush accentuated the positive and ignored the negative by choosing not to mention North Korea in his opening remarks. It was the first sign of trouble in the new courtship between Washington and Seoul that began with Lee's inauguration in March. Lee's pro-U.S. stance and conservative approach to North Korea promised to bring the partners closer than they have been in a decade. His visit to Washington, D.C. in April should have set the course for alliance bliss. Lee was the first South Korean leader invited to Camp David. He was presented with a promise of visa waivers for South Koreans visiting America. The warm tone of his visit had been set in advance by landmark agreements to ease South Korean restrictions on importing American beef--a limit which threatened to derail congressional ratification of the Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS) negotiated last June.

Unfortunately, the summit did not live up to the expectations of its observers or participants.  
<http://www.cnas.org/attachments/contentmanagers/2090/US%20ROK%20Relations%20April%202008.pdf>

**CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES (CSIS)**

**THE COHEN-NUNN DIALOGUES: PRESERVE, PROTECT AND DEFEND: THE CHALLENGES TO AMERICA'S HOMELAND SECURITY. CSIS Event Transcript. New York University, April 28, 2008**

CSIS held a discussion at NYU as part of the Cohen-Nunn Dialogues. The dialogues are a series of public roundtable discussions designed to focus Americans on the seminal issues that the United States must face. This dialogue "Preserve, Protect And Defend: The Challenges to America's Homeland Security" included the Honorable Michael Bloomberg, Mayor, New York City; Stephen Flynn, author of America The Vulnerable; and Jessica Stern, author of Terror in the Name of God.  
[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080428\\_cohennunn\\_transcript.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/events/080428_cohennunn_transcript.pdf)



**TRENDS IN EUROPEAN DEFENSE SPENDING, 2001-2006. Wan-Jung Chao, Gregory Sanders, Guy Ben-Ari. CSIS. April 24, 2008**




Since 2001, Europe finds itself increasingly involved in international military operations. NATO responded to the attacks of 9/11 by invoking, for the first time in its history, Article 5 of the Washington Treaty—the alliance's collective defense clause—and European military assets were deployed to the United States, the Mediterranean Sea, and Afghanistan. Deployable rapid response forces were created by NATO (the NATO Response Force) and by the European Union (the Battle Groups).(...) And at home and overseas, European militaries are stepping up efforts to prepare for and respond to natural disasters and humanitarian crises.

In light of this upsurge in military preparations and deployments, it is important to track trends in European defense spending. Doing so can help answer many critical questions; for example, have defense budgets in Europe grown or declined, and by how much? How have European defense budgets fared given changes in national economies? How much are European governments spending on defense procurement and research and development (R&D)?

<http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080424-chao-europeandefense.pdf>

**A POISONED CHALICE? THE CRISIS IN NATIONAL SECURITY PLANNING, PROGRAMMING, AND BUDGETING. Anthony H. Cordesman, CSIS Burke Chair in Strategy. April 23, 2008**



The crisis in US national security planning, programming, and budgeting is not the fault of any one Administration, and has often been shaped by the mistakes of the US congress and key military commanders. It has accelerated sharply over the last eight years, however, and will be a major burden for the next President. The real cost of national security spending is likely to be 20-30% higher that is estimated in current baseline budget requests. There is no clear or

coherent plan, program, or budget that reflects the fact the nation is at war and no credible mix of force plans, modernization plans, and procurement plans for the future.

Whether or not it is fair to call this crisis a “poisoned chalice” depends on one’s choice in rhetoric. What is clear is that there are a wide range of critical areas where cost escalation poses a critical problem, where no hard choices have been made, where key programs are not fully defined or cannot be implemented, and where trade-offs will have to be made between major increases in the defense budget and current force plans. The combined cost of war, steadily rising military manpower costs, the underfunding of operations and maintenance, and a procurement crisis in every service will force the next Administration to reshape almost every aspect of current defense plans, programs, and budgets.

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080422\\_fy2009\\_poisoned\\_chalice.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080422_fy2009_poisoned_chalice.pdf)

**IRAQ AND THE CROCKER-PETRAEUS TESTIMONY: THE RISKS THAT ONLY TIME AND A SUSTAINED US PRESENCE CAN DEAL WITH. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anthony H. Cordesman. Web posted April 14, 2008. 08AD622**

If there is any clear message that emerges out of the events of the last few weeks, it is that the risks in Iraq remain high enough so that no one can yet say whether the odds of any kind of US success are better than even. The fact remains, however, that there is still a marginally better case for staying than for leaving. Moreover, no one in the America should forget that US decisions affect the lives of some 28 million Iraqis, or the responsibility the US bears for its failure to prepare for stability operations and nation-building in going to war, its failure to deploy adequate troops to secure the country, its empowerment of Shi'ite exile movements and its support of de-Baathification and the disbandment of the Iraqi military forces.

[Note: contains copyrighted material].

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080407\\_iraq\\_and\\_reasons.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080407_iraq_and_reasons.pdf) [pdf format, 10 pages]

**THE ONGOING LESSONS OF THE AFGHAN AND IRAQ WARS. Center for Strategic and International Studies. Anthony Cordesman. April 7, 2008. 08AD609**



Understanding that there are obvious dangers in trying to draw any common lessons from the fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq and that they are very different countries, it may still be said that they have common lessons. Moreover, many of the most important lessons reinforce both what the US military has learned (relearned?) about stability operations, nation building, and counter insurgency and put in Field Manuals like the one on Operations (FM-3-0), and much of the work of various study groups. This paper outlines the “ongoing lessons” of the campaigns in the two countries.


[Note: Contains copyrighted material]

[http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080407\\_afgh-iraqlessonbrief.pdf](http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/080407_afgh-iraqlessonbrief.pdf) [pdf format, 86 pages]

**COMBATING TERRORISM CENTER AT WEST POINT, U.S. MILITARY ACADEMY**

**THE POWER OF TRUTH: QUESTIONS FOR AYMAN AL-ZAWAHIRI. Jarret Brachman, Brian Fishman, Joseph Felter. Combating Terrorism Center. United States Military Academy West Point, NY, 21 April 2008**

On 16 December 2007, Ayman al-Zawahiri invited journalists and Jihadist enthusiasts to ask him questions via the primary Jihadist web forums. Zawahiri promised to personally answer some of those questions in a subsequent statement. On 2 April 2008, As-Sahab Media released the first part of Zawahiri's response in the form of a one hour, forty-three minute



audio statement, which was accompanied by Arabic and English transcripts.

Zawahiri used the opportunity to publicly address topics that have been dogging him for years. He answered some questions directly, like whether al-Qa'ida's willingness to kill innocent Muslims in the course of their operations is apostasy. He sidestepped other questions, including more politicized ones about al-Qa'ida's increasing difficulties in Iraq and, in particular, al-Qa'ida's official position toward Iran.

As part of the CTC's ongoing effort to make relevant information about al-Qa'ida and its associated movements available to more audiences, we are pleased to include 1,888 of the original questions (in full-text Arabic and translated English) posed to Zawahiri on the two most exclusive Al-Qa'ida internet forums.

[http://ctc.usma.edu/questions/CTC-Power\\_of\\_Truth\\_4-21-2008.pdf](http://ctc.usma.edu/questions/CTC-Power_of_Truth_4-21-2008.pdf)

## GERMAN MARSHALL FUND OF THE UNITED STATES

**THE BUCHAREST CONFERENCE PAPERS. The German Marshall Fund of the United States and Chatham House. Robin Shepherd, Ed. April 3, 2008. 08AD621**



Published ahead of the Bucharest Conference, the Bucharest Papers are written by independent authors on the topics of NATO's mission in Afghanistan; NATO enlargement; NATO's relationship with Russia; and global cyber defense and NATO.

[Note: contains copyrighted material].

[http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/11276\\_bucharest08.pdf](http://www.chathamhouse.org.uk/files/11276_bucharest08.pdf) [pdf format, 56 pages]

**RETHINKING NATO PARTNERSHIPS FOR THE 21ST CENTURY. Ronald D. Asmus, GMF. Published in the *NATO Review*, April 2008**

In the 1990s, NATO's new partnerships were a key component of the Alliance's reinvention for the post-Cold War era. NATO enlargement and intervention in the Balkans were in many ways the biggest new strategic steps the Alliance took.

The development of new partnerships tools nonetheless helped prevent the emergence of new dividing lines in the wake of enlargement, allowed NATO to build relationship with countries that were strategically important but not candidates for membership, and facilitated the putting together of the NATO-led coalition that helped keep peace in the Balkans. Partnerships were therefore a critical part of NATO's success in the 1990s and the grand strategy of projecting stability across the continent.

[http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=400&parent\\_type=P](http://www.gmfus.org/publications/article.cfm?id=400&parent_type=P)



**THE CRISIS OF THE POST-COLD WAR EUROPEAN ORDER: WHAT TO DO ABOUT RUSSIA'S NEWFOUND TASTE FOR CONFRONTATION WITH THE WEST. Ivan Krastev, Chair, Centre for Liberal Strategies. GMF. March 2008**



The author of this paper argues that Russia's newfound taste for confrontation with the West is not an emotional overreaction or theatrical grandstanding - it is a strategic choice. The Kremlin's new foreign policy is not circumstantial in nature. It is the expression of a new foreign policy consensus within the Russian elite and the Russian society at large. The author analyzes what the West can do to allow the coexistence of a post-modern European Union and a post-imperial Russia.

[http://www.gmfus.org//doc/krastev\\_web.pdf](http://www.gmfus.org//doc/krastev_web.pdf)

**TRANSATLANTIC POWER FAILURES: AMERICA AND EUROPE, SEVEN YEARS AFTER 9/11: HARD POWER HUMBLLED, SOFT POWER EXPOSED, AND A LOSER, MORE PRAGMATIC RELATIONSHIP. Constanze Stelzenmüller. GMF. March 2008**

This briefing paper examines the massive failures of that occurred after 9/11 on both sides of the Atlantic. It analyzes the notion of power, and the ideas and policies that stemmed from the attack by asking the following questions: What failed, and why? What remains valid, and worth preserving? And what is the way forward for the transatlantic relationship?

<http://www.gmfus.org//doc/constanzeWEB.pdf>



## HERITAGE FOUNDATION

**MAGNEQUENCH: CFIUS AND CHINA'S THIRST FOR U.S. DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. By John J. Tkacik, Jr. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1913. May 2, 2008**

One of Senator Hillary Clinton's Asia policy advisers quit her presidential campaign several days ago, complaining that the candidate was engaging in "gratuitous China bashing." And, in fact, the Senator has of late been engaged in a jeremiad on China.

To be sure, a good portion of the sourness nurtured in the Democratic Party's base against China is undeserved, and more about big-labor politics than genuine security concerns, yet Senator Clinton has spotlighted at least two grave vulnerabilities in America's defense industrial base: Chinese state-controlled investments in key U.S. defense suppliers and the impact on defense supplies caused by seemingly unrelated environmental litigation that closed down the world's second-largest rare-earths mine and thereby gave China a monopoly on oxide ores that are absolutely essential to all defense electronics.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm1913.cfm>

**THE U.S. SHOULD REJECT THE U.N. "RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT" DOCTRINE.**  
**By Steven Groves. Heritage Foundation. Backgrounder #2130. May 1, 2008**



The "responsibility to protect" (R2P) doctrine out-lines the conditions in which the international community is obligated to intervene in another country, militarily if necessary, to prevent genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other atrocities. Despite its noble goals, the United States should treat the R2P doctrine with extreme caution.

Adopting a doctrine that compels the United States to act to prevent atrocities occurring in other countries would be risky and imprudent. U.S. independence—hard won by the Founders and successive generations of Americans—would be compromised if the United States consented to be

legally bound by the R2P doctrine. The United States needs to preserve its national sovereignty by maintaining a monopoly on the decision to deploy diplomatic pressure, economic sanctions, political coercion, and especially its military forces.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/bg2130.cfm> or:  
[http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/bg\\_2130.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/upload/bg_2130.pdf)

**PETRAEUS HEARING SHOULD FOCUS ON THREE FRONTS, ONE LONG WAR. By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. and Lisa Curtis. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1908. April 30, 2008**

On April 24, President George W. Bush announced his intention to nominate General David H. Petraeus as Commander of U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM). As a Combatant Commander he will be responsible for overseeing all military action in the Middle East and South Asia.

CENTCOM includes the three most violent and decisive fronts in the battle against al-Qaeda's transnational terrorist network. Senate leadership has indicated its plan to hold confirmation hearings on the appointment before Memorial Day. Those hearings should focus on the single most important issue--recognizing that the fights in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan are inextricably linked, in much the same way as the campaigns in France, the Mediterranean, and the Russian Front were integral to defeating Nazi Germany during World War II. The CENTCOM commander will have to pursue an integrated strategy that wins on all three fronts.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/HomelandSecurity/wm1908.cfm>

**THE WEST SHOULD UNITE IN SUPPORT OF GEORGIA. By Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1907 April 30, 2008**

In the last few days, Moscow has beefed up its "peacekeeping force" in the breakaway Abkhazia on the Black Sea, claiming it is protecting Russian citizens, who are the majority population of Abkhazia. Furthermore, Russian troops are amassing on the de-facto Abkhazia-Georgia border. The Caucasus may be on the brink of a war. At the same time, Russia has accused Georgia



of planning to invade Abkhazia, accusations that sound distinctly hollow under the circumstances.

Throughout April, Russia has escalated its political and military pressure on its neighbor Georgia. At the NATO summit in Bucharest, President Vladimir Putin reportedly threatened to recognize the independence of the breakaway autonomous republics of Abkhazia and South Ossetia if Georgia was granted a Membership Action Plan (MAP) for eventual accession to NATO. On April 16, despite France and Germany balking at providing a MAP, and apparently as retribution for the West's recognition of Kosovo's independence, Putin instructed the Russian Foreign Ministry to upgrade the legal and economic ties between Russia and the secessionist governments of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, violating Georgian sovereignty.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/upload/wm\\_1907.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/RussiaandEurasia/upload/wm_1907.pdf)

### **PLAYING "WHACK-A-MOLE" WITH NORTH KOREA. By Bruce Klingner. Heritage Foundation WebMemo #1905. April 29, 2008**

The U.S. intelligence community's revelation that North Korea was helping Syria to build a nuclear reactor "not intended for peaceful purposes" after seven months of Bush Administration stonewalling will be a serious body blow to the Six-Party Talks. The intelligence disclosure, coming so soon after strenuous congressional and interagency objections to a tentative agreement between Washington and Pyongyang to resolve the data declaration impasse, could be a knockout punch to the current U.S. strategy in the talks.



Ironically, the Bush Administration's zeal in pursuit of an agreement with North Korea could ultimately constrain U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill's future negotiating maneuverability. This is probably a good thing. The negotiations at times have seemed to take on a life of their own, seemingly far ahead of their stated objective. The Bush Administration will now be pressured to insist on a much higher level of North Korean compliance.

There is suspicion that the Bush Administration is aware of other North Korean nuclear activity, including potential proliferation to Iran that would further aggravate the congressional mood toward the Six-Party Talks. The Administration's repeated rebuffs of congressional inquiries on the Syrian enigma have engendered bitter bipartisan anger that could jeopardize legislative support for the talks or other Bush foreign policy initiatives. Trust is certainly lacking with respect to how the Administration might handle evidence of an Iranian connection.

[http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm\\_1905.pdf](http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/upload/wm_1905.pdf)

### **CONGRESS SHOULD FUND DEVELOPMENT OF AIR-TO-AIR MISSILE DEFENSE TECHNOLOGY. By Baker Spring. Heritage Foundation. WebMemo #1904. April 28, 2008**

On December 3, 2007, during a test conducted at New Mexico's White Sands Missile Range, a modified AIM-9X Sidewinder missile intercepted an Orion target ballistic missile in the boost phase of flight. The technology responsible for this successful test result is the Raytheon Company's

Network Centric Airborne Defense Element (NCADE) interceptor program, the centerpiece of which is an inexpensive boost-phase missile defense system. Yet the lasting success of this program requires devoting \$15 million of the Bush Administration's proposed missile defense budget request to the continued development of the NCADE interceptor.

By providing for NCADE in the fiscal year 2009 defense authorization and appropriations bills, Congress would be able to field an inexpensive boost-phase missile defense system within the next few years. Considering the high-cost and lengthy production time of alternative boost-phase missile defense systems, Congress should immediately bolster the security of the United States by fully incorporating NCADE into our nation's missile defense program.

The Bush Administration's ballistic missile defense strategy requires a variety of interceptor systems. When combined, these different systems are capable of knocking down hostile ballistic missiles in the boost, mid-course, and terminal phases of flight.

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/wm1904.cfm>

**REAGAN'S STRATEGIC VISION FOR MISSILE DEFENSE. By the Honorable Richard B. Cheney. Heritage Foundation. Heritage Lecture #1078. April 18, 2008**

It's always a pleasure to come back to Heritage. An invitation from The Heritage Foundation, obviously, is always very special--only more so when it provides an opportunity to talk about Ronald Reagan's visionary Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). I'm sure [Heritage President] Ed Feulner thought, "Well, if we're going to talk about Star Wars, we might as well invite Darth Vader." I'm happy to accept.

I see many friends in the room tonight. I'm reminded of a tribute once given to Ed and the supporters of The Heritage Foundation--comments that are still apt today. We are "unlucky in many things in our time, but among our blessings is the quality of those, so many of them here tonight, who have risen to defend our heritage. It is they whom we gather here to celebrate. Their industry, learning, wit, generosity: their passion for our country and its ideals."

<http://www.heritage.org/Research/NationalSecurity/hl1078.cfm>

## INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP (ICG)

**IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE I: THE NEW SUNNI LANDSCAPE. Middle East Report N°74 ICG. 30 April 2008**

This is the first of two companion reports on Iraq after the Surge, which Crisis Group is publishing simultaneously, with identical Executive Summaries and policy Recommendations. Part I analyses changes in the Sunni landscape. Part II analyses the state of political progress.

Against the odds, the U.S. military surge contributed to a significant reduction in violence. Its achievements should not be understated. But in the absence of the fundamental political changes in Iraq the surge was meant to facilitate, its successes will remain insufficient, fragile and reversible. The ever-more relative lull is an opportunity for the U.S. to focus on two missing ingredients:

pressuring the Iraqi government to take long overdue steps toward political compromise and altering the regional climate so that Iraq's neighbours use their leverage to encourage that compromise and make it stick. As shown in these two companion reports, this entails ceasing to provide the Iraqi government with unconditional military support; reaching out to what remains of the insurgency; using its leverage to encourage free and fair provincial elections and progress toward a broad national dialogue and compact; and engaging in real diplomacy with all Iraq's neighbours, Iran and Syria included.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5415&l=1>

### **IRAQ AFTER THE SURGE II: THE NEED FOR A NEW POLITICAL STRATEGY. Middle East Report N°75 ICG. 30 April 2008**

This is the second of two companion reports on Iraq after the Surge, which Crisis Group is publishing simultaneously, with identical Executive Summaries and policy Recommendations. Part I analyses changes in the Sunni landscape. Part II analyses the state of political progress.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5418&l=1>

### **COLOMBIA: MAKING MILITARY PROGRESS PAY OFF. Latin America Briefing N°17. ICG. 29 April 2008**

Almost six years of intense security operations against the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) by the administration of President Álvaro Uribe are beginning to produce tangible results. Government forces killed several important rebel field commanders in 2007 and two members of the central command in March 2008, including second-in-command Raúl Reyes, and have severely disrupted insurgent communications, prompting a loss of internal cohesion and decreasing illegal revenues. However, this progress has come at the cost of severely deteriorating relations with Ecuador and Venezuela and increased risk of political isolation after the controversial bombing raid on Reyes's camp inside Ecuador. Military gains can pay off only if combined with a political strategy that consistently pursues a swap of imprisoned insurgents for hostages in FARC captivity, reestablishes much needed working relations with neighbours along borders and strongly advances integrated rural development to consolidate security and broaden Colombia's international support.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5410&l=1>

### **RESTORING DEMOCRACY IN BANGLADESH. Asia Report N°151.28 April 2008**

Bangladesh is under military rule again for the third time in as many decades. Although the caretaker government (CTG) insists its plans to stamp out corruption and hold general elections by December 2008 are on track, its achievements have been patchy, and relations with the major political parties are acrimonious. Efforts to sideline the two prime ministers of the post-1990 democratic period have faltered (though both are in jail), and the government has become bogged down in its attempts to clean up corruption and reshape democratic politics. Even if elections are held on schedule, there is no guarantee reforms will be sustainable. If they are delayed, the risk of



confrontation between the parties and the army-backed government will grow. There is an urgent need for all sides to negotiate a peaceful and sustainable return to democracy.

<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5408&l=1>

## **WILL THE REAL SERBIA PLEASE STAND UP? Europe Briefing N°49. I CG. 23 April 2008**


Kosovo's independence declaration on 17 February 2008 sent shock waves through Serbia's politics and society, polarising the former in a manner not seen since the Milosevic era. Rioting led to attacks on nine Western embassies, destruction of foreign property and massive looting. The government fell on 10 March, split over whether to pursue a nationalist or pro-Western path. Belgrade's efforts to create a de facto partitioning of the north of Kosovo threaten the new state's territorial integrity and challenge deployment of European Union (EU) missions there, and Serbian parliamentary and local elections on 11 May are unlikely to change the basic policy towards the new state, even in the unlikely event a pro-Western government comes to power. They may, however, well give Serbia's nationalist parties new leverage.



<http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5402&l=1>

## **INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS (IPFM)**

### **A FISSILE MATERIAL (CUTOFF) TREATY AND ITS VERIFICATION: PROGRESS REPORT FROM THE INTERNATIONAL PANEL ON FISSILE MATERIALS. IPFM Briefing. 2 May 2008. United Nations Office at Geneva, Palais des Nations, at the 2008 NPT Preparatory Committee Meeting, in cooperation with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)**



Speakers:

**Frank von Hippel**, Co-Chair, International Panel on Fissile Materials and Professor of Public and International Affairs, Princeton University  
**Jean du Preez**, James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, and International Panel on Fissile Materials

**M. V. Ramana**, Centre for Interdisciplinary Studies in Environment and Development (CISED), Bangalore, India, and International Panel on Fissile Materials  
**Zia Mian**, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, and International Panel on Fissile Materials (presenting on behalf of A. H. Nayyar)  
**Arend Meerburg**, International Panel on Fissile Materials  
**Alexander Glaser**, Program on Science and Global Security, Princeton University, and International Panel on Fissile Materials Moderated by Patricia Lewis, Director, United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR)

[http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site\\_down/ipfmbriefing080502.pdf](http://www.fissilematerials.org/ipfm/site_down/ipfmbriefing080502.pdf)

---

## NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH.

### **THE STRUGGLE FOR PALESTINIAN HEARTS AND MINDS: VIOLENCE AND PUBLIC OPINION IN THE SECOND INTIFADA. National Bureau of Economic Research. David A. Jaeger et al. April 2008. 08AD664**

David A. Jaeger et al examine how violence in the Second Intifada influences Palestinian public opinion. They find, derived from micro data from a series of opinion polls linked to data on fatalities, that Israeli violence against Palestinians leads them to support more radical factions and more radical attitudes towards the conflict. However, the effect is temporary and vanishes completely within 90 days. There is also some evidence that Palestinian fatalities lead to the polarization of the population and to increased disaffection and a lack of support for any faction.

Although overall Israeli fatalities do not seem to affect Palestinian public opinion, when those fatalities are divided by the different factions claiming responsibility for them, we find some evidence that increased Israeli fatalities are effective in increasing support for the faction that claimed them.

[Note: Contains copyrighted material]

<http://www.nber.org/papers/w13956.pdf> [PDF format, 49 pages].

## NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY (NDU)

### **THE ROLE OF MEDICAL DIPLOMACY IN STABILIZING AFGHANISTAN. By Donald F. Thompson. *Defense Horizons* Number 63. NDU. May 2008.**



Comprehensive stabilization and reconstruction of Afghanistan are not possible given the current fragmentation of responsibilities, narrow lines of authorities, and archaic funding mechanisms.

Afghans are supportive of U.S. and international efforts, and there are occasional signs of progress, but the insurgent threat grows as U.S. military and civilian agencies and the international community struggle to bring stability to this volatile region. Integrated security, stabilization, and reconstruction activities must be implemented quickly and efficiently if failure is to be averted. Much more than a course correction is needed to

provide tangible benefits to the population, develop effective leadership capacity in the government, and invest wisely in reconstruction that leads to sustainable economic growth. A proactive, comprehensive reconstruction and stabilization plan for Afghanistan is crucial to counter the regional terrorist insurgency, much as the Marshall Plan was necessary to combat the communist threat from the Soviet Union.<sup>1</sup> This paper examines the health sector as a microcosm of the larger problems facing the United States and its allies in efforts to stabilize Afghanistan.

[http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense\\_horizons/DH63.pdf](http://www.ndu.edu/ctnsp/defense_horizons/DH63.pdf)

PEW

**ALL THE WORLD'S A STAGE. Andrew Kohut, President, Pew Research Center and Richard Wike, Associate Director, Pew Global Attitudes Project. Published in the *National Interest Online*. May 5, 2008**

Simply put, America's image in much of the Muslim world remains abysmal. Iraq, the war on terrorism, American support for Israel and other key features of U.S. foreign policy continue to generate animosity in the Middle East, Asia and elsewhere. In many nations considered central to the war on terror, the general public deeply distrusts the United States. Even in countries like Kuwait that have long been considered relatively pro-American, the U.S. image has declined.


On the bright side, America seems to be winning the battle of ideas on some important fronts. First and foremost, support for terrorism has declined dramatically over the last few years in many Muslim countries. Fewer Muslims now consider suicide bombing justifiable, and confidence in Osama bin Laden has waned. Moreover, the 2007 Pew Global Attitudes survey revealed the extent to which there is broad support for democracy, capitalism and globalization throughout all regions of the world, including Muslim nations. Support for American ideas, however, does not necessarily translate into warm feelings for America. Instead, Muslims believe the United States fails to live up to its rhetoric on democracy, and they tend to blame the United States for the aspects of globalization they do not like.

<http://www.nationalinterest.org/Article.aspx?id=17502>

**MOST AMERICANS UNFAMILIAR WITH PETRAEUS, RICE REMAINS POPULAR. Pew Research Center. Report. Released: April 4, 2008**

Gen. David Petraeus has played a pivotal role in crafting the U.S. military strategy in Iraq, but he is an unfamiliar figure to most Americans. On the eve of Petraeus' congressional testimony on the situation in Iraq, a solid majority (55%) says they do not know enough about the top U.S. commander in Iraq to offer an opinion of him.

The latest national survey by the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press, conducted March 24-29 among 1,001 adults, finds that 27% view Petraeus favorably while 18% say they have an unfavorable view of him.



Views of Petraeus are divided along party lines, with more than twice as many Republicans as Democrats offering a positive rating of the general (45% vs. 19%). A quarter of independents rate Petraeus positively. However, large percentages in all partisan groups, including nearly half of Republicans (47%), are not familiar enough with Petraeus to offer their opinion of him.


<http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/410.pdf>



## RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY


### **THE AL-QAEDA MEDIA NEXUS: THE VIRTUAL NETWORK BEHIND THE GLOBAL MESSAGE. Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty: RFE/RL Special Report. Daniel Kimmage. Web posted April 14, 2008. 08AD617**

This brief study surveys a representative sample of Arabic language jihadist\* media from July 2007 and attempts to answer two questions: What does the structure of jihadist media tell us about the relationship between Al-Qaeda central and the movements that affiliate themselves with it? And what can the priorities of jihadist media tell us about the operational priorities of Al-Qaeda and affiliated movements?  
[http://docs.rferl.org/en-US/AQ\\_Media\\_Nexus.pdf](http://docs.rferl.org/en-US/AQ_Media_Nexus.pdf) [pdf format, 28 pages]




## RAND

### **RETHINKING COUNTERINSURGENCY. RAND Counterinsurgency Study -- Volume 5. By: John Mackinlay, Alison Al-Baddawy. May 2008**



During the period of decolonization in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom faced more insurgent activity than any other Western power. British government officials and military forces proved proficient at defeating or controlling these rebellions. However, these uprisings were much less complex than the modern jihadist insurgency. Past insurgent movements were primarily monolithic or national in form, had very specific local goals, and derived most of their power from the local population. These limitations made past rebellions vulnerable to strong military responses. In contrast, the modern jihadist insurgency is characterized by its complex and global nature. Unlike past insurgent forms that aspired to shape national politics, the jihadist movement espouses larger thematic goals, like overthrowing the global order. The modern jihadist insurgency is also more global in terms of its popular support and operational territory. It makes far better use of communications technology and propaganda to reach the minds and hearts of global audiences. The contemporary international security environment has therefore become a frustrating place for Western powers. Despite great technological and military advances, British and U.S. counterinsurgency (COIN) operations have been slow to respond and adapt to the rise of the global jihadist insurgency. Operational failures in Iraq and Afghanistan have highlighted the need for the West to rethink and retool its current COIN strategy. After analyzing past British COIN experiences and comparing them to the evolving nature of the modern jihadist insurgency, the authors suggest a new framework for future COIN operations.  
[http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG595.5.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG595.5.pdf)

**METHODOLOGY FOR IMPROVING THE PLANNING, EXECUTION, AND ASSESSMENT OF INTELLIGENCE, SURVEILLANCE, AND RECONNAISSANCE OPERATIONS. By: Sherrill Lingel, Carl Rhodes, et.al. Technical Report. RAND May 2, 2008**




Lingel et al. present alternative methods to approach U.S. Air Force intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) tasking and assessment processes and outline a methodology for assessing the benefits and costs of different ISR employment strategies. The U.S. Air Force greatly increased the number of operational surveillance and reconnaissance sensors and its ability to process data from these sensors in support of operations across a wide range of conflicts. However, along with the increased number of sensors comes an increase in the complexity of the tasking of these assets needed to prosecute either planned for or emergent battlefield targets. This problem has been compounded by an increased use of mobile systems by adversaries.

As part of the authors' research, they developed new assessment techniques and operational strategies to improve the command and control process for assigning ISR assets in dynamic environments. The authors also suggest tools to assist commanders of ISR assets in their decisions regarding allocating and retasking ISR assets. The report focuses on traditional target sets against adversaries whose behavior is well understood.

[http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical\\_reports/2008/RAND\\_TR459.pdf](http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR459.pdf)

**THE CHALLENGE OF NUCLEAR-ARMED REGIONAL ADVERSARIES. By: David Ochmanek, Lowell H. Schwartz. RAND 2008**




North Korea's test of a nuclear weapon in 2006 shows that such weapons are within reach of determined regional powers. Thus, defense planners in the United States and elsewhere must begin now to confront the new security challenges posed by nuclear-armed regional adversaries. While U.S. conventional and nuclear forces will continue to have deterrent effects on the leaders of regional adversaries such as North Korea and Iran, the dynamics of the deterrent balance vis-à-vis these actors may be quite different from that to which the United States became accustomed during the Cold War. The weakness of these states at the conventional level, coupled with the high stakes they will have at risk in a conflict with the United States, could lead them to seriously consider brandishing or using nuclear weapons in a conflict. This, in turn, could compel U.S. leaders to temper their military and political objectives in such conflicts.

To improve the United States' military and political leverage in these situations, a great deal more needs to be done to develop and field capabilities, such as multilayered theater missile defenses and improved surveillance and target-tracking capabilities, that can prevent the enemy's use of nuclear weapons.

[http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG671.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG671.pdf)

**PERFORMANCE EVALUATION AND ARMY RECRUITING. By: James N. Dertouzos, Steven Garber. Monograph. RAND 2008**



Designing and implementing performance metrics that support Army goals requires analysis of how different metrics would affect recruiter behavior and, in turn, recruiters' contributions toward achieving the Army's goals. The authors evaluate traditional performance metrics, such as number of contracts signed per month per recruiter, and find that they do not adequately measure recruiter effort, skill, and productivity. They then develop a "preferred performance metric" that takes into account the difficulty of recruiting different types of youth in various markets. Using a performance metric that better reflects Army values and more accurately assesses recruiter effort and skill would have significant benefits. However, because the recruiter reward system is deeply engrained, the authors propose modest, gradual changes to the system — for example, improving mission allocation algorithms to reflect variations in market quality and differences in market segments and lengthening the performance evaluation window to at least six months to reduce emphasis on monthly station-level mission accomplishment.

[http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND\\_MG562.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG562.pdf)

**COMPARING ALTERNATIVE U.S. COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES; CAN ASSUMPTION-BASED PLANNING HELP ELEVATE THE DEBATE? By: Robert J. Lempert, Horacio R. Trujillo, David Aaron, et.al. RAND 2008**

The United States faces the challenge of countering the terrorism threat. Frequently, both expert decisionmakers and lay citizens have trouble assessing alternative strategies to address such issues because of the emotions they engender and of the deep uncertainty involved. RAND has a long history of developing and employing methods for addressing such questions and distilling complex policy problems into their essential trade-offs. One such approach, assumption-based planning (ABP), focuses on identifying and addressing the key assumptions and thus the key vulnerabilities underlying an organization's plans. ABP not only offers a qualitative approach widely useful in its own right but has also provided the foundation for a family of new quantitative methods that aim to improve strategic decisionmaking under the conditions of deep uncertainty that are characteristic of the terrorism threat. Can ABP help contentious groups more systematically debate alternative U.S. counterterrorism strategies? This briefing reports on two sets of workshops that attempted to do just that.

[http://rand.org/pubs/documented\\_briefings/2008/RAND\\_DB548.pdf](http://rand.org/pubs/documented_briefings/2008/RAND_DB548.pdf)

## STANLEY FOUNDATION

**A SECURITY AND PEACE MECHANISM FOR NORTHEAST ASIA: THE ECONOMIC DIMENSION. Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation. April 2008**

This brief explores the economic dimension of multilateral security cooperation in Northeast Asia, including a discussion of the purported security benefits of economic engagement with North

Korea. The brief raises some cautionary questions about the scope for multilateral economic cooperation in Northeast Asia before outlining how economic cooperation can complement longer-run security and economic objectives on the peninsula, including economic reform in North Korea.

A primary, though not exclusive, objective of a Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NAPSM) should be the integration of North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Such an opening is a prerequisite to the country's economic renewal and resolution of its chronic humanitarian problems. Deepened economic interdependence would also embed North Korea in relations that could reduce the likelihood of disruptive behavior. Yet in addition to a resolution of the nuclear question, the attainment of these objectives depends crucially on the nature of the economic ties that develop.



For engagement to be fruitful and politically sustainable, it must emphasize reform in North Korea and the private sector's involvement in the country's economic revival. The multilateral project should not be simply a vehicle for channeling aid to North Korea; such a mechanism could even have perverse effects on the reform process.

[http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/Haggard\\_NolanPAB308.pdf](http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/Haggard_NolanPAB308.pdf)

**IMPLEMENTATION: A NEW APPROACH TO MULTINATIONAL COORDINATION IN AFGHANISTAN. Ambassador Ronald E. Neumann. Policy Analysis Brief. Stanley Foundation April 2008**



Afghanistan is faltering as the Taliban continues an insurgency and the government of President Hamid Karzai struggles to deliver services. Around the world there are calls for new efforts at policy coordination among the donor countries who are aiding Afghanistan. However, former US Ambassador to Afghanistan Ronald Neumann writes that there should be less emphasis on policy coordination and more on implementation in the delivery of services to the Afghan people. In this brief he shows how greater emphasis on implementing existing strategy will produce better results. Further, he extracts lessons from the Afghanistan experience that could apply elsewhere.

<http://www.stanleyfdn.org/publications/pab/NeumannPAB408.pdf>


**STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTE. U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE**

**GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS. Edited by Dr. Carolyn Pumphrey. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. May 2008**


On March 29-31, 2007, the Strategic Studies Institute and the Triangle Institute for Security Studies conducted a colloquium on "Global Climate Change: National Security Implications" held in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. This volume is based on the proceedings of this conference. Chapter 1 addresses the growing historical awareness of the threat and outlines the science of climate-change. Chapters 2 and 3 focus on how climate change might affect human societies and the degree to



which it might cause or exacerbate violence and conflict. Particular attention is paid to the implications for the security of the United States. Chapters 4 and 5 consider a variety of potential solutions, ranging from international diplomacy to the development of efficient technologies. Chapters 6 and 7 focus on the role of the U.S. Armed Forces. What can they do and what should they do to mitigate climate change or prepare to meet the threat? Chapter 8 summarizes and concludes. Contributors to this volume agree that climate change is a threat deserving of serious attention. They stress the need for greater planning and coordination and for further research as well as the utility of engagement—military to military and state to state—on environmental issues. They differ as to whether the Armed Forces should play a leading or supporting role, but agree that they can—and already do—make a valuable contribution.  
<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB862.pdf>




**PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR: INCITING MUSLIMS THROUGH THE WAR OF IDEAS. By Dr. Sherifa D. Zuhur. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 2008**



Never before have Americans paid so much attention to Islam and Muslim ideology. Although efforts have been made to separate mainstream views from extremist principles, Muslims feel that many of their basic beliefs are under attack in the ongoing war of ideas. The author explores why, surveying a broad swath of accusations and efforts to change Muslim and Islamist ideas and institutions.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB843.pdf>

**PROSPECTS FROM KOREAN UNIFICATION. By Colonel, Australian Army David Coghlan. (Carlisle) Papers. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 28, 2008**




Throughout the 1990s, predictions of Korean reunification were rife. Since then, enthusiasm for such predictions have faded, and although the underlying assumption of reunification remains, forecasts of when and how this will occur have been more subdued. Reunification poses two distinct yet interdependent conundrums: reunification itself, which is the immediate challenge; and the strategic landscape that emerges from reunification, which has the potential to fundamentally transform strategic relationships in Northeast Asia. Within this context, this paper examines the prospects from Korean reunification. Initially, it will establish the framework from which such prospects will emerge: the nature of the North Korean regime, the cost of reunification, and likely reunification scenarios. From this framework, a raft of challenges and opportunities present themselves to the stakeholders in the region; and South Korea, China, the United States and, to a lesser extent, Japan and Russia will be examined to determine prospects

from Korean reunification. The paper will suggest that China, at the expense of the United States, has positioned itself to profoundly influence the nature of reunification, the “tilt” of a unified Korea, and with it, the future Northeast Asian strategic environment.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB859.pdf>


**BALUCH NATIONALISM AND THE GEOPOLITICS OF ENERGY RESOURCES: THE CHANGING CONTEXT OF SEPARATISM IN PAKISTAN. By Dr. Robert J. Wirsing. Monograph. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 2008**



The author examines the energy context of the simmering Baluch separatist insurgency that has surfaced in recent years in Pakistan’s sprawling Baluchistan province. In particular, he looks at how Pakistan’s mounting energy insecurity--a product of rapid increase in demand coupled with rising scarcity and the region’s intensified energy rivalry--has both magnified the economic and strategic importance of this province while at the same time complicating Pakistan’s efforts to cope with the province’s resurgent tribal separatism. The author concludes that Pakistan’s government needs to overhaul its counterinsurgent policies to avoid protracted conflict and to enlist the Baluch as partners in energy development, not antagonists of it.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB853.pdf>

**THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. TURKISH RELATIONS IN A TRANSATLANTIC CONTEXT. Edited by Dr. Frances G. Burwell. Strategic Studies Institute. U.S. Army War College. April 2008**



The relationship between Turkey and the United States is complicated because of differing core purposes and somewhat differing memberships, i.e., NATO and the European Union. Current Turkey-U.S. diplomatic and military relations are strained, but both countries recognize how vital it is to address issues of mutual importance. In mid-2007 the Atlantic Council, Strategic Studies Institute, and German Marshall Fund of the United States jointly organized a conference to discuss the current state of U.S.-Turkish-EU ties and to consider how those relations might be repaired and enhanced. This conference report provides an overview of the enduring issues that must be addressed if Turkey-U.S. relations are to move beyond current roadblocks and begin to realize their full potential. Since this conference took place, the political environment in Turkey has changed, and several of the issues, such as the use of Iraq as a staging area by Kurdish insurgents, have continued to evolve. Such dynamics reveal the importance of the ideas surfaced in each of the conference presentations and the need to continue addressing the issues identified.

<http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB861.pdf>

## UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL

### **FACT SHEET: UN SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION ON IRAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM-- UN Security Council Resolution 1803 (Highlights Security Council's imposed sanctions against Iran). U.S.Department of State, Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Washington, DC. April 4, 2008**

On March 3, 2008, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution (UNSCR) 1803, with 14 votes in favor and none against (one country, Indonesia, abstained). This is the fifth time the Security Council has acted on the Iran nuclear issue. It is the fourth time the Council has acted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to impose legally binding sanctions on Iran for the proliferation risks presented by its nuclear program and its failure to suspend its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities.

UNSCR 1803 is consistent with the international community's effort to increase incrementally the pressure on the Government of Iran in a targeted way that avoids broader sanctions that would be harmful to the Iranian people. The resolution's adoption follows on the heels of yet another report by International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General, Mohamed ElBaradei, which noted that the major issue of Iran's "alleged studies" of activities "with a possible military nuclear dimension" has not been resolved, and other issues are still subject to "correct and complete" verification.

UNSCR 1803 (2008) requires Iran to suspend all uranium enrichment, regardless of its location in Iran, as well as research and development associated with centrifuges and uranium enrichment. Although the IAEA has not reported on any ongoing reprocessing activities in Iran, those are also covered by the suspension requirement. In addition, UNSCR 1803 requires Iran to halt its construction of the Arak Heavy Water Research Reactor and activities at the Heavy Water Production Plant at Arak.

<http://www.state.gov/t/isn/rls/fs/102891.htm>

## UNITED STATES INSTITUTE OF PEACE

### **MANAGING CRISIS AND SUSTAINING PEACE BETWEEN CHINA AND THE UNITED STATES. United States Institute of Peace. Xinbo Wu. April 2008. 08AD658**

Since the end of the Cold War, a series of crises have strained relations between the People's Republic of China and the United States, including the Taiwan Strait crisis of 1996, the U.S. bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the midair collision between a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft and a Chinese fighter plane in 2001. By drawing lessons from these past crises and understanding the characteristics of Chinese and U.S. crisis-management styles, specific, tailor-made recommendations about how to avoid and manage various future crises between the two nations can be made. It is important for both sides to enhance their dialogue over crisis management to get a better sense of each other's crisis management mechanism and to accurately interpret each other's crisis behavior.

<http://www.usip.org/pubs/peaceworks/pwks61.pdf> [PDF format, 48 pages].

**RESURRECTING THE WALL OF FEAR: THE HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN SYRIA.  
By Robert Grace. USIPeace Briefing, April 2008**

Over the past several months, Syrian authorities have engaged in a harsh campaign of repression against leading dissidents and human rights activists. The crackdown, overshadowed by developments elsewhere in the region, has received scant media coverage in the U.S. and Europe. To shed light on recent developments in the Syrian political scene, USIP recently convened a public discussion on human rights in Syria, featuring the Institute's Radwan Ziadeh, Mona Yacoubian, and Steven Heydemann, and Joe Stork of Human Rights Watch. This USIPeace Briefing summarizes their presentations and the subsequent discussion.

[http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace\\_briefings/2008/0410\\_syria\\_human\\_rights.html](http://www.usip.org/pubs/usipeace_briefings/2008/0410_syria_human_rights.html)

**THE WASHINGTON INSTITUTE FOR NEAR-EAST POLICY**

**HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE BASIS FOR EU SANCTIONS AGAINST IRAN. By Emanuele Ottolenghi. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. PolicyWatch #1368. April 30, 2008**

When the UN Security Council approved the third round of sanctions against Iran by adopting Resolution 1803 in March 2008, U.S. policymakers anticipated that the European Union would follow past practice and enact additional punitive measures. Almost two months later, however, Europeans are still at loggerheads on how best to implement the resolution, with several countries -- mostly the ones with strong commercial interests in Iran -- still adamant that the EU should not go beyond the text of the resolution. The EU could resolve this internal dispute by refocusing its sanctions debate on Iran's human rights record, an issue on which it is often easier to build consensus in Europe.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/templateC05.php?CID=2821>

**SLIPPERY POLLS: USES AND ABUSES OF OPINION SURVEYS FROM ARAB STATES.  
David Pollock. The Washington Institute for Near-East Policy. Policy Focus #82. April 2008**



For better or worse, yesterday's "Arab street" has merged with today's information superhighway. One can hardly pick up a newspaper, turn on the television, or go online without coming across the latest poll numbers purporting to show what Middle Easterners are "really" thinking. Even senior U.S. officials often give such polls pride of place when dealing with the region. All of this attention raises two basic -- yet largely unanswered -- questions: How reliable are these polls? And are their findings useful, or even meaningful?

In this Policy Focus, former senior State Department advisor David Pollock argues that most Arab public opinion polls fail these tests. Apart from the particularly severe constraints of conducting opinion surveys in Arab states, many regional polls are fraught with methodological, political, and other biases. By comprehensively dissecting survey practices across a broad spectrum of countries and polling organizations, the paper serves as a



guidebook for how -- or how little -- policymakers should use polling data to help them understand Arab states.

<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/download.php?file=PolicyFocus82initial.pdf>

## ARTICLES FROM U.S. JOURNALS

**US POLICY TOWARDS NORTH AFRICA: THREE OVERARCHING THEMES. Hemmer, Christopher. *Middle East Policy Journal* vol. 14, no. 4, Winter 2007, pp. 55-66 AA08122**

Summary: For decades the U.S. has lacked a coherent regional policy for North Africa, a trend that is beginning to change as ties with Libya and Algeria begin to improve. The author, professor at the Air War College, encourages policymakers to build a mature, more nuanced approach to the region, by offering a recent review of country-specific policy successes in the region. Continued support on common concerns such as terrorism will depend on willingness to help countries confront regional challenges and avoiding a tendency toward “with us or against us” diplomacy, supporting opposition within countries in the name of promoting democracy, even if they are not necessarily pro-American. Available online at:

[http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi\\_qa5400/is\\_200712/ai\\_n21301159](http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa5400/is_200712/ai_n21301159). [IS;DIM]

**DEAR MR. PRESIDENT. Hitchens, Christopher. *World Affairs* vol. 170, no. 3, Winter 2008, pp. 9-14 AA08123**

Summary: Perennial gadfly Christopher Hitchens takes aim at the White House, urging a “Nixon-in-China” movement toward improving relations with Iran. Many Iranians have relatives abroad, are connected to the outside world despite government censorship, are frustrated with their government, and are open to improving relations. The author proposes building upon U.S. aid to Iran following the 2003 Bam earthquake to a public offer to help seismically vulnerable Iran secure key infrastructure, something its own regime ignores. The U.S. has eliminated external threats in Iraq and Afghanistan, and now should encourage Iranians to bring about things they already want – better governance and improved relations with the outside world. Available online at:

<http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/Winter-2008/full-dear-mr-president.html>. [IS;DIM]

**BEYOND DARFUR: SUDAN’S SLIDE TOWARD CIVIL WAR. Natsios, Andrew S. *Foreign Affairs* vol. 87, no. 3, May/June 2008, 77-93 AA08125**

Summary: While the crisis in Sudan’s western Darfur remains in the spotlight, the former U.S. Special Envoy to Sudan calls attention to the lingering tensions that threaten to unravel the tenuous North-South peace; the plight of Sudan’s Nubian minority; and the breakdown of yet another peace agreement between eastern Sudan’s Beja and Rashaida communities, all of which conspire to make the free and fair 2008 elections key to the country’s future and security in the broader region. The international community must continue to impress upon Khartoum the importance of addressing these challenges and avoiding another civil war, but even engagement may not be enough.

<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20080501faessay87306/andrew-s-natsios/beyond-darfur.html>

**DISARMAMENT REDUX. Scoblic, J. Peter. *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* vol. 64, no. 1, March/April 2008, pp. 35-39 AA08101**

Summary: Scoblic, executive editor of *The New Republic*, writes that the subject of nuclear disarmament has only recently again become a subject of polite conversation in Washington, due in part to recent *Wall Street Journal* by former Secretaries of State Henry Kissinger and George Shultz, former Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Senator Sam Nunn. With decades of foreign policy experience among them, Scoblic says these “eminences grises” garner respect from both sides of the political aisle. His article effectively tracks the ebb and flow of U.S. political interest in the subject and points to recent legislation introduced by Senator Dianne Feinstein calling for a nuclear policy review by the president and a nuclear posture review by the Defense Department. He quotes a recent University of Maryland survey indicating that 73 percent of Americans support the verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons, while noting that such opinion does not generally translate into mainstream of political action. Introducing a dose of realism, the author says that “the deeper one cuts into nuclear arsenals, the harder it becomes to cut any more.”  
**<http://thebulletin.metapress.com/content/w46653x605746011/fulltext.pdf>**