UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS BRIEFING:
"UZBEKISTAN: TWO YEARS AFTER ANDIJON"
MAY 18,
2007
COMMISSIONERS:
REP. ALCEE L. HASTINGS, D-FLA.,
CHAIRMAN
REP. LOUISE M. SLAUGHTER, D-N.Y.
REP. MIKE MCINTYRE, D-N.C.
REP. HILDA L. SOLIS, D-CALIF.
REP. G.K. BUTTERFIELD, D-N.C.
REP.
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, R-N.J.
REP. ROBERT B. ADERHOLT, R-ALA.
REP. MIKE
PENCE, R-IND.
REP. JOSEPH R. PITTS, R-PENN.
SEN. BENJAMIN L. CARDIN,
D-MD., CO-CHAIRMAN
SEN. CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, D-CONN.
SEN. RUSSELL D.
FEINGOLD, D-WIS.
SEN. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, D-N.Y.
SEN. JOHN F. KERRY,
D-MASS.
SEN. SAM BROWNBACK, R-KAN.
SEN. GORDON H. SMITH, R-ORE.
SEN.
SAXBY CHAMBLISS, R-GA.
SEN. RICHARD BURR, R-N.C.
FRED L. TURNER
CHIEF
OF STAFF
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
FRED L. TURNER, MODERATOR,
CHIEF OF
STAFF,
COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
ROBERT TEMPLER,
DIRECTOR, ASIA PROGRAM,
INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP
OLGA OLIKER,
SENIOR INTERNATIONAL POLICY ANALYST,
THE RAND CORPORATION
DANIEL
KIMMAGE,
CENTRAL ASIA ANALYST,
RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
The briefing was held at 10:14 a.m.. in Room 1100 Longworth House Office
Building, Washington, D.C., Fred L. Turner, Chief of Staff, Commission on
Security and Cooperation in Europe, moderating.
[*]
TURNER: Can I
suggest to everybody that we move up a little bit? I don't think it makes sense
for us to wait for the room to fill. So why don't we just fill in, even in
front of the dais right here? Yes, fill it up right here that way we don't have
to scream to one another.
Yes, there's room up here. But why don't we go
ahead and get started? And thank you for coming to this briefing this morning
on Uzbekistan. The Helsinki Commission, of which I'm now the staff director,
has held a series of hearings and briefings on Uzbekistan over the years. Our
event today is particularly timely, in my view, as this week was the second
anniversary of Andijon, which, I'm sure, we're all aware of.
The shooting of
hundreds of people in Andijon in May 2005 has had a profound impact on
Uzbekistan. Even prior to that tragedy, Uzbekistan had no legal opposition and
tightly controlled media. Since then, things have gotten only worse.
Andijon may have had an even greater on Uzbek/U.S. relations. Bilateral ties
are in such deep freeze right now that people sometimes forget just how eagerly
President Karimov cultivated Washington during the 1990s and the early years of
this decade.
Yesterday our military base has been closed. Almost all
U.S.-based democracy promoting organizations have been expelled. And Uzbek
media accused the U.S. of seeking to orchestrate a regime change through
so-called color (ph) revolution. Meanwhile, Russia and China are successfully
importing Tashkent on a daily basis.
The new chairman of the Helsinki
Commission, Congressman Alcee Hastings, has been to Uzbekistan several times,
most recently during his tenure as president of the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly.
While he was there, he met with President Karimov in a meeting that lasted
several hours.
And Chairman Hastings had a very candid visit with President
Karimov. They each gave their candid assessment of where the U.S./Uzbek
relationship was and where it might go in the future.
So as I said, I think
we're all aware of the situation today in Uzbekistan. And yet we wonder whether
there is not a way to reach out to Tashkent.
For two years we've talked
past each other in a sense when we have spoken at all. And the question becomes
can (ph) disengagement help improve the human rights situation in Uzbekistan
(ph). Are we in a better place today than we were two years ago (ph)? Are the
people in Tashkent and other (inaudible) in Uzbekistan (inaudible)?
I know
we're all curious to hear from our distinguished panel today, to hear their
views on whether or not we have leveraged this Tashkent, is there a possibility
for reproachment (ph) with the current Uzbek leadership. And perhaps the answer
is no. And then we must deal with the consequences of that decision.
But
maybe there is a way to re-amp (ph) these relations. And if there is, I think
we'd all like to find out how we get there. So I hope our panel today will help
us find some solutions. And I'm delighted that each of them has decided to join
us this morning.
Our first witness is Robert Templer, who, I believe --
well, they're all to my left, and that makes it easy. He's the director of Asia
programs at the International Crisis Group. He heads a team of more than 20
researchers working in eight different offices covering 20 countries in Asia,
formerly a correspondent for Agence France-Presse -- I always can't pronounce
that properly -- and has been a visiting scholar at Berkley.
Mr. Templer
is the author of Shadows and Wind: A View of Modern Vietnam and two forthcoming
works on complex (ph). And he's testified to the commission several times in
the past. And we're delighted he's back with us this morning and look forward
to your comments.
TEMPLER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you very
much for the opportunity to speak to the panel today. Uzbekistan is now on a
short list of countries probably (ph) including Zimbabwe, North Korea, Burma,
Belarus, who have essentially refused to live up to their international
obligations and have chosen isolation over development and growing connections
to the rest of the world.
Realistically I think there's very little the
United States can do to change the behavior of these nations when they're
determined to focus on their own path to development process (ph) and
concentrate the wealth of their countries in the hands of a very small group of
leaders. The leaders of these countries are concerned predominantly with
remaining in power with very little concerns for the broader interests of
national development.
Generalized sanctions on these regimes have very
little impact. Indeed, they've often hurt the very sections (ph) of these
governments by limiting economic opportunities even further. Diplomatic
pressure alone is often shrugged off. Governments there (ph) often don't even
care what the world thinks about them.
Very limited European sanctions
imposed on (inaudible) have only had a marginal impact on the government. They
have sent a signal, and they have caused some irritation in Tashkent. But
they've not achieved the aim that they set out to do, which was to force the
government there to hold an open investigation into what happened in Andijon.
But long as Uzbekistan maintains close relations with Russia, China, India, its
neighbors, it's unlikely that broader sanctions could have any significant
impact.
Islom Karimov has repeatedly shown his disregard for the
international standards that he signed up for when Uzbekistan became
independent. His views has shaped the Uzbekistan that we see today where a
handful of officials control the economy while hundreds of thousands of people
have been forced to leave the country just to survive.
He won't change. And
I don't believe there are any real prospects for reform in Uzbekistan long as
he's in power.
Reforms may not come even when he's gone. It may be a long
time before we see significant progress in Uzbekistan.
We've come to reject
any ideas of Karimov as somehow a good star (ph) who's been misled by bad
officials around him. He's at the epicenter of corruption and violence in
Uzbekistan. There's little likelihood he's going to give up power this year.
Indeed, even if he formally steps down from the presidency, he's likely to
maintain his grip through other means.
Nowadays even his neighbors -- none
of them are really truly Democrats -- are quite embarrassed by the coarseness
(ph) of his rule. I think there are very profound limits on what can be
achieved by U.S. policy. But the U.S. should focus on what can be done as long
as Karimov remains in power and plan ahead for when he's gone and for when
political change may become possible.
I think this means making it clear
that the United States sides with the Uzbek people, not with the Uzbek regime.
Doing anything possible to crack open the closed Uzbek economy, keeping Uzbek's
intellectual and political life in some form, even in (inaudible), and improving
the resilience of neighboring countries in case unrest in Uzbekistan spills over
the borders, which it did after the Andijon massacre.
I think there are a
number of ways in which the United States and Congress can help the people of
Uzbekistan. A primary consideration should be opening the Uzbek economy, an
area where the OCE can play a limited role, but certainly, there is a role to
fill (ph).
I have to say opening up an economy that's been kept closed as
the Uzbek economy is extremely difficult. It'll involve maintaining a dialogue
with Russia and China on economic issues, working with the Europeans to maintain
a consistent front and the messages delivered to the Uzbek government that
economic reforms are essential to the welfare of the Uzbek people.
It must
be made clear that Uzbekistan will not have a full relationship with the United
States as long as it maintains such a punitive economic regime over its people.
I think it'll be vital to keep the flow of information open to Uzbekistan. This
can be done on the Internet, through broadcasting and providing information for
millions of Uzbeks living outside the country now.
Congress should maintain
its support for radio broadcasts like RFE/RL Voice of America, which I
understand is planning to close (inaudible) service. Broadcasting to Uzbekistan
should be expanded, not cut back. And support for Internet sites that provide
some of the key information on Uzbekistan ought to be a priority.
Millions
of Uzbeks are now working in neighboring states and near Russia. Many are
victims of abuses in these countries. There is a lot that can be done to
support groups that help these migrant workers in terms of media legal groups
that provide protection and broad areas of support for migrant labor.
It
should be made clear to the Kazak government, for example, that their attempts
or their desire to chair the OCE in the future is contingent on them providing
specific thought to migrant labor in their country. But as many as 2.5 million
Uzbeks may be living outside the country.
The population that can be
reached by (inaudible) very hard at the moment for the U.S. to support
operations within Uzbekistan when the government is still opposing this
operation. But a lot can be done to support those Uzbeks outside the country.
Many of those people will return to Uzbekistan in the future and could provide a
basis for a fuller relationship down the line.
Education is another critical
issue. Many Uzbeks express a deep anxiety about their children's future in a
country where education can suffer from government's heavy hand. Providing
opportunities outside the country is essential. It doesn't have to be in the
United States. Indeed, it may be more useful and cost-effective to support
higher education in Turkey, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Russia.
The U.S.
government should waive requirements for recipients of U.S. funding return to
their home country (inaudible). Those who do go back now may be subjected to
persecution. There's a need to support continuing intellectual life in
Uzbekistan that is free of the restrictions imposed by the government.
Education outside the country is one way to do that.
It will be critical to
support the neighboring countries around Uzbekistan to minimize the risks of
conflict in this region. Uzbekistan at the moment is peaceful in some ways, but
also simmering away. A level of discontent, particularly over economic
repression, is considerable. There's real risk of (inaudible) and other
tensions blowing up after any transition or even before that.
That conflict
is likely to affect the neighboring countries, which the Andijon massacre did.
Andijon shows very clearly how vulnerable typically Pakistan (ph) was. Pakistan
(inaudible) all need help building up their ability to withstand any shock that
(inaudible) Uzbekistan. This involves to a certain degree improving their
policing, the ability of their border guards to deal with issues such as
refugees.
There's an urgent need to improve public health systems around
this region, expand support for migrant labor, provide alternative transport and
energy arrangements for these countries so they're not subjected to the Uzbek
pressure. Uzbekistan controls a number of critical pipelines and roads
(inaudible) in the region. Those arrangements mean that they have quite a grip
on their natives (ph), and they don't hesitate in using that.
I think it's
necessary to recognize that it's essentially the criminal nature of the Karimov
government. Karimov created a massea (ph) regime that extracts from people and
concentrates it in the hands of a tiny number of very wealthy officials. The
popov (ph) foreign relations open trade, development of small businesses, anyone
down to the sellers of vegetables (inaudible) suffers from the predatory
behavior of this government.
There is a point of vulnerability for these
enormously wealthy elite (inaudible) amassed in their connections to the global
economy. The freezing of North Korean assets in the Banco Delta Asia and Macao
made financial institutions extremely reluctant to deal with the regime in
Pyongyang or any of the banks that have worked with (ph) proved a surprisingly
effective pressure point on that regime.
Congress should direct the pressure
spots (ph) and subject (ph) Uzbek companies, particularly those involved with
the criminal elite, to similar scrutiny in money matters of (ph) laundering and
impose measures that provide the U.S. government with critical pressure points
on an elite that is essentially filoting (ph) this country and creating broader
risks of instability around the region.
Congress should use the full range
of its powers when dealing with Uzbekistan. There are a possibility of
prohibiting assistance to the government of Uzbekistan and barring (ph) the
provision of creditor licenses for sale in military and police equipment and
security forces there.
Uzbekistan is in clear breach of the International
Freedom of Religion Act, which allows for an array of measures to be taken
against the government there. It is worth signaling to the Uzbek people that
the United States stands for economic, religious, and political freedom.
There's also a greater need to support civil society in the very limited ways it
can be supported at the moment within Uzbekistan. Congress should provide
broader support to those groups, particularly those involved with protecting
human rights. Human rights defenders have come under particularly critical
pressure in Uzbekistan. They should be a focus of diplomatic and international
support in order to keep alive at least some fragment of civil society in this
country. Thank you very much.
TURNER: Thank you very much, Mr. Templer.
And let me just say that we, once the three panels have had the opportunity to
make some remarks, we're happy to take questions. At my right, there's a
microphone, if you think you need that. We look forward to having a candid
discussion.
To my immediate left is Olga Oliker. She's a senior
international policy analyst for the Washington office of Rand.
And as I
understand it, your research is focused primarily on security issues relating to
Russia centrally in the caucuses, trans-national threat, organized crime,
terrorism, and human trafficking, security technical (ph) reform, and general
U.S. foreign and defense policy.
And among her recent publications is U.S.
Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities and Military Roles.
We're
thrilled to have you join us this morning and look forward to your remarks.
Thank you.
OLIKER: Thank you very much. It's an honor to be here today.
Two years after Andijon, it is actually -- I mean, any time's a good time. But
it's also a good time to ask what the lessons of that experience were and what
the implications are for U.S. policy. And the core question at the root of this
is what should the U.S. do about oppressive regimes in general and Uzbekistan in
particular. What options are available? And what policies have the best chance
of success?
And what I'd like to do before I address that specifically is
take a step back and say that the United States is not terribly good at
promoting democratization abroad. And it's not for one to try (ph) it.
Human rights and democratization angle have been a component of U.S. foreign
policy for a long time. Cold War ideology -- communism versus democracy. After
the Cold War, we took great pride in a certain (ph) spread of democracy. After
September 11th, we tried to spread democracy even further.
And at the root
of this are two things. One is the very basic notion that more freedom is
better than less freedom, from a purely moral and ethical viewpoint. The second
is actually security (inaudible). And both the Clinton and the Bush
administration national security strategy from various other statements made the
case that democratization promotes security, particularly on the face of danger
from internal radical and particularly religious radical groups. The logic here
(inaudible).
First, absent legally sanctioned means of (inaudible), radical
movements, religious or otherwise, become far more appealing. Second, in the
absence of various (ph) secular political alternatives, houses of worship and
religious communities have often become the only means for people to gather and
voice complaints creating a religious aspect of political opposition where there
might not otherwise be one.
Third, without legal non-violent opposition, the
likelihood that political opposition will be violent increases as does the
likelihood of a violent government response, which is -- one could very well
argue what you saw happen in Andijon. Fourth, by making opposition illegal, the
likelihood that opposition accidentally (ph) further radicalizes arrest (ph) and
imprisonment their own (inaudible), is increased. So that's the argument.
And this is something we've been at for a while, both to do good and to make
ourself safer. But while we seem (ph) to see democracy take root and blossom
here and there, it's not a great answer (ph). And in Central Asia since
independence, as my colleague has said, it's not very good at all.
We've
seen increased authoritarianism in every state in the region. Even Kyrgyzstan,
which managed to have a color (ph) revolution in response to that rising
authoritarianism, has a long way to go before it looks like a democracy or a
stable state.
There are three reasons that we have trouble democratizing.
One, local leaders think the transition is dangerous. They don't buy the
argument that I just laid out (inaudible) safer. First, because they know that
it won't take them personally (inaudible) who are going to leave their job.
Second, because they're looking at another set of arguments, perhaps not in a
clear academic sense, but they're looking at a set of arguments that there is
academic evidence (ph) of war, which is that well-established democracies are
less prone to conflict and domestic unrest and terror attacks. There's a
sizeable body of literature that demonstrates pretty conclusively that
transition to democracy could be pretty dangerous, more prone to conflict,
unrest, maybe even terrorism, more so than keeping an authoritarian system in
place perhaps or even transitioning to a new one.
The forces of
democratization unleashes a political and economic discontent (ph). In the
absence of institutions with stable (ph) democracy have certainly led to
violence in the past.
Thus, even if one expects a mature (ph) democracy a
stable structure, it seems clear the transition can be volatile and dangerous
and, as some less (ph) American examples show, reversible. So it's reasonable
to see why some of the local leaders think that democratization in this country
can lead to chaos and maybe even religious radicals (inaudible).
Now, I'd
argue that they're certainly right to be concerned about their jobs. But
they're missing a few things in the argument that democratization is dangerous.
First, the fact that transitions might be more prone to conflict doesn't mean
that they are guaranteed to fail spectacularly. While there have been some
impressive failures, there have also been a number of successes, which have made
the lives of the population of a country (inaudible) more secure.
Moreover
(ph), some of the same problems that affect (inaudible) democracies (ph) also
affect (inaudible) that have no established institutions of succession (ph),
which is the case for most of the Central Asian countries. If transition is
inevitable, is it not better for the states and the region and the world
(inaudible) toward a less stable (ph), less conflict-prone and more equitable
system than one that is less on all of these counts? But (ph) that's not the
question (inaudible).
The second reason I think the United States has
trouble democratizing is -- or democratizing other countries (ph) -- is that not
everyone in the United States buys the argument that more political (inaudible)
is better than less or that working towards better systems in the long-term is
the right thing to do now. (inaudible) clamps down on radical opposition is
clear, both at home and abroad when (ph) you're scared (ph) of (inaudible) both
at home and abroad.
(inaudible) the argument gets made that getting a
certain country's cooperation (inaudible) is more important than to secure (ph)
them and us against longer-term threats that are a product of the political
system (ph). This is the argument that we've heard in the past (ph). And it's
an argument that has been a major factor in this policy in Pakistan also
(inaudible). And it (inaudible).
First, we have policies that take the
pressure for reform off. And second, even if we try to keep the pressure on, it
falls into question do we have credibility in the country we're working in and
elsewhere.
Moreover, when the U.S. is itself complicit in abuses and it
does continue to support oppressive regimes, when it looks at the critical (ph),
it's very hard to preach very effectively from the bully pulpit.
The third
reason the United States has had trouble is that we're not very good at
fostering democratic reform in less than (inaudible) environments. Reform has
been most successful when the international community was united with local
leadership and where international institutions were able to offer (inaudible)
incentives.
Great (ph) local government officials who are willing to risk
personal failure and perhaps even more for the sake of their country's future
have also been very helpful. When these things are absent, these mechanisms are
less clear. And often U.S. program support (ph) under one set of circumstances
are implemented in a very different set of circumstances where they almost
frequently (ph) don't work.
An effort to train judges, according to global
standards of human rights, works very well when the judges are (inaudible) than
when they get home and they're going back to a system that wants them to try to
implement them. It doesn't work all that well when the judges face (ph) every
disincentive and continue to resist (ph) everyone who comes before their court
once they get home.
But because programs have not necessarily been developed
with more difficult countries in mind, neither the (inaudible), which are often
about how many people have been trained, not about whether the training has
changed behavior, are appropriate (inaudible).
So what does this mean?
Well, I think it means we need to have some real debate and get some real
understand within this country on how reform doesn't (inaudible) promote
security, what short-term tradeoffs we are and are not going to make. Second,
if we are to try to come up with some, we need to get better at it in countries
where efforts are still underway.
And the we in this case is not just the
United States, the U.S. government. It's also NGOs and I.O.s that are involved
in this. We need to relook at political reform (ph) agendas and do a better job
of designing programs that make sense. We can take the lessons of to do or what
not to do from economic (inaudible) development and reform efforts because the
question (inaudible) conditionality in this case (ph).
Conditionality works
when conditionality makes sense. Expecting to end (ph) programs that you want
more than they do is unlikely to be effective. Supposing (ph) they really do
want (ph) (inaudible).
It's also a question of metrics. What are these
programs expected to accomplish? The wrong answer to train x number of police
officers, lawyers or whomever else. Increase (inaudible) human rights is the
right answer. How do you measure (inaudible)?
Well, you can measure that.
You look at condition (ph) rates. You look at people that come to trial. You
look at media reporting and freedom variance (ph). You look at representation
in government and whether the laws that are passed seem to reflect that
representation. So these (inaudible).
And then once they're used (ph), you
have to end (ph) programs that don't work. You don't support programs that
might assist the repression. You evaluate consistently, effectively, and from a
distance. You don't ask the people who are implementing the programs to
evaluate them. So Congress actually has a tremendous role here in ensuring that
the oversight of (inaudible).
And then there's a question of what to do
with countries that are really not interested in change. And you (inaudible).
Mostly, though, you wait.
In the case of Uzbekistan, Karimov turned away
from the U.S. because he's scared for his regime. He's scared of transition.
Once he leaves, which he'll most likely do only because of ill health or death,
a few things are possible.
One is (inaudible) that leads to unrest, which
Russia might try to help (inaudible). And we can see any number of ways that
that goes badly.
Another is accession (ph) is reasonably well managed. In
which case, the (inaudible) leader had a certain confidence and power, was able
to define a new foreign policy. And in this case or even a previous case when
somebody does come to power, the U.S. may very well be courted (ph) again and it
might have some leverage. And perhaps the new leader might even have
(inaudible) reform (ph).
In the meantime while we're waiting for that to
happen, there are a few other things we can try to do. We could try to convince
Uzbekistan's other partner that they should be concerned about the status quo,
that the way things are set up more Andijons are possible and that transition
could endanger them. This may not have great prospects of success, given the
partners in question, but, you know, Russia can undergo a regime change
(inaudible). So never eliminate any possibilities.
Sanctions and visa
restrictions are another issue. E.U. (ph) sanctions (inaudible) put Uzbekistan
on notice. I mean, you're not going to get a huge impact out of sanctioning a
closed economy. It's unlikely for (ph) change.
It draws a line in the sand,
though. And the Uzbek government clearly sees that and feels that it has to
respond. And it also keeps a dialogue going, in a sense. And it keeps the
issue alive (ph).
You know, it's worth considering as long as lines of
communication are open asking the Uzbeks if there is anything that they're
willing to do to get the sanctions lifted. And perhaps it's not anything that
we particularly want. In which case, we're all back to waiting.
The other
thing is the United States and other partners can and should do is keep lines of
communication open. One aspect of this is what my colleague just spoke of in
terms of helping improve the alternatives -- the media alternatives available to
the Uzbek population or keeping lines of communication open with the Uzbek
people.
The other is talking to the government. It doesn't punish
Uzbekistan when the U.S. doesn't talk to them. It does preclude communication
about dissidents, about human rights, and about possible shared security
threats.
Pursuing shared interests doesn't necessarily mean helping tyrants.
You don't have to train their security forces to find out what they see coming
over the border. The U.S. would be wrong to assume that its security threat
reception (ph) is shared by Uzbekistan. It's not.
But there are some
overlaps. And there is (inaudible) to gain from them. And by exploring that,
there might also be a capacity to gain some leverage here and there.
The
most important thing we can be doing (inaudible) is not repeat the mistakes we
made in Uzbekistan elsewhere. We need to get better about how we implement and
how we evaluate our reform efforts.
If we're to promote reform in the
interest of security as well as for moral and ethical reasons, we need to square
(ph) this long-term goal with our (inaudible) and find ways to mitigate the
short-term problems in the interest of the long-term. And we must in this
context be consistent in our actions (inaudible) country and about (ph) issues.
Or else we'd better have a pretty good explanation for why we're not.
There
are a lot of benefits of transparency for us as well. Thank you very much.
TURNER: Thank you very much.
Our final speaker on the panel is Daniel
Kimmage. He is the Central Asia analyst at Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty
where he writes and edits the Central Asian sections of RFE/RL's flagship daily
publication, Newsline, as well as RFE/RL's weekly roundup on Central Asia.
Mr. Kimmage also writes about the Arab world and Russia with a particular focus
on the ideology of Islamic movement. He has testified several times to the
commission. And we're thrilled to have him back.
Welcome.
KIMMAGE:
Good morning. I would like to start by thanking the commission for having me
here today. Almost two years to the day after I directed the commission in the
aftermath of the violence at Andijon. Today I will discuss the deadlock of
Uzbekistan's relations with the West and try to answer the question is there any
way out of this intense (ph).
The views I express here are my own and not an
official position of my employer, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty.
It is
depressingly simple to summarize the domestic situation in Uzbekistan two years
after the authorities there crushed (ph) (inaudible) in Andijon. The economy is
no more open or equitable today than it was a few years ago. The political
system is no more democratic. The media are no more free to play a positive
role in society. And the rights of citizens are no safer from the arbitrary
depredations (ph) of unaccountable officials.
In fact, the only elements
(ph) that disturb the strictly enforced tranquility of Uzbek domestic politics
is that President Islom Karimov's term ends this year and he is constitutionally
barred from running in the reelection.
Now, the post-Soviet history of
Central Asia offers us many examples of dubious referendums and constitutional
chicanery that will allow presidents to serve indefinitely. And such a solution
is a legal problem maybe (ph) in the office (ph) of Uzbekistan.
For now,
however, official Tashkent is silent, and no moves to anoint a successor are
evident. What is important to stress is that there is no evidence that positive
change is possible under Karimov. And there is no evidence of any preparations
that are underway for a succession that would open the door to the possibility
of positive change.
So what can we do? And before I look at the possible
solutions for a U.S. and European policy (inaudible), I think we need to
acknowledge some partial truths about our relations with Uzbekistan. The first
is that the West has a little leverage over Uzbekistan.
The second is that
the government of Islom Karimov will never agree to an independent international
investigation of unrest in Andijon. Third, is that European sanctions against
Uzbekistan have not been effective. And the fourth is that prospects for
positive change inside Uzbekistan and improved relations with the West are
extremely slim as long as Karimov remains in power.
The Uzbek regime under
Karimov is an undemocratic serial violator of human rights. It is beholden
(inaudible) economically predatory elite. We should not expect this to change
in the near future. Nor should we expect that the absence of Western policy
makers can bring about such a change.
Western policy toward Uzbekistan
proceeds from the very simple belief that democracy, the rule of law, and free
market economy are the best guarantees of stability and prosperity. Clearly,
then relations with Uzbekistan pose an enormous challenge.
To make matters
worse, current Western policy is premised on a demand for an investigation that
Uzbekistan will not accept and on sanctions that have not proved effective. So
is there a way out?
I think there are two possible ways out of this dilemma.
Neither one is likely to solve all of the problems that bedevil the West's
relations with Uzbekistan. Bearing in mind this crucial caveat, I would like to
look at these two solutions and tell you which one I think is better.
The
first approach is to pursue more active engagement with the Karimov government.
The second is to pursue a more consistently tough and principled policy with an
eye to a post-Karimov Uzbekistan.
Now, more active engagement with the
Karimov government would involve some or all of the following steps.
De-emphasizing the demand on investigation of the Andijon events, allowing E.U.
sanctions to expire, moderating official statements on Uzbekistan, actively
pursuing ties in areas the Uzbek government sees as relatively apolitical such
as cultural and educational exchanges, and maintaining cooperation and perhaps
even expanding it on counter-terrorism and counter-narcotics. Finally, active
engagement would involve seeking to encourage incremental change in areas where
the Uzbek government has signaled they're willing to make those changes.
Looking at the other side, a tougher policy based on existing approaches
(inaudible) regimes Belarus, Burma, Zimbabwe, and North Korea would involve some
or all of the following steps: retaining the demand for an investigation of the
Andijon events, toughening E.U. sanctions to cover the leading figures in the
regime, including the president and members of his family, actively
investigating criminal ties and related financial interests of leading regime
figures through such avenues as the U.S. Treasury Department and legislation
modeled on current approaches to (inaudible) that's designed to put financial
pressure on the regime without (inaudible) population (ph), barring all regime
figures determined to be complicit in illegal financial activities and rights
violations from entry to the E.U. and the United States, ending all E.U. and
U.S. financial assistance to the Uzbek government, clearly and publicly linking
these punitive measures to specific violations by the Uzbek regime and
specifying the concrete steps they need to take to remove these measures such as
an independent investigation of the Andijon events, incentivizing movement
toward reform by linking it to renewal of assistance programs and the
reintegration of Uzbekistan into the international community, and finally,
establishing a future of Uzbekistan program to use the knowledge and ability of
the many Uzbek journalists and scholars who the regime has forced abroad by
working in coordination with organizations (inaudible), the National Endowment
for Democracy, the future of Uzbekistan program with the support exiled Uzbeks
in an effort to understand better what is happening inside Uzbekistan and look
for ways to remedy the disastrous state of affairs there as soon as there is
real opportunity for change.
The program would also involve the creation
of a Web portal with materials in Uzbek and other languages to provide
information on alternative perspectives as well as a forum for Uzbeks abroad to
exchange views and maintain a sense of community.
Now, looking back at
these two possible avenues, I think based on the experience of past years, which
will (inaudible) general expectations on what the outcomes would be, if current
policy is maintained, if we pursue more active engagement or if we pursue a
tougher policy, the current policy, which is, I think, ineffective combination
of good cop, bad cop is maintained, we can expect little or no change in
Uzbekistan and little or no change in our relations with Uzbekistan.
If a
policy of active engagement is adopted, I think we can expect the following:
little or no change inside Uzbekistan, a loss of Western credibility among
(inaudible), a significant loss of Western credibility among observers who will
compare Western policy toward Uzbekistan with policies toward nations such as
Belarus, Burma, and Zimbabwe. And finally, greater consolidation within the
Uzbeks will lead to (inaudible) policies of the current regime.
(inaudible) principle policy is adopted, we can expect the following: a
short-term deterioration of relations with Uzbekistan, which, given the current
state of affairs, will have a negligible effect on overall relations. We can
expect the loss of Germany's military facility in Termuth (ph). We can also
expect increasing ferment (ph) within the Uzbek elite as those segments who are
opposed to current policy begin to chafe (ph) at the costs of their personal
interests abroad impress (ph) with a different approach to domestic policy and
relations with the international community.
And finally, I think a tougher
policy would lead to greater credibility of the Uzbek people, the vast majority
of whom have no opportunity for economic or personal advancement under the
current regime.
In light of the preceding, it is my recommendation that
the United States and European Union take a tougher, more principled stance on
Uzbekistan in line with existing policies toward such regimes as Belarus, Burma,
and Zimbabwe. Thank you for your time.
TURNER: Thank you very much.
And I thank all the panelists for their very interesting contributions.
I'm
happy to open it up right now to our audience here. I've been asked, if you
could, speak at the podium to my right so that we can have for the transcript
that will be taped of this briefing the questions that you pose be clearly
understood. For those who have questions, we'd be happy to take them.
I'd
be happy to start with one question that was alluded to (inaudible) to any of
you that would like to take it.
And as you just indicated, President
Karimov's term is said to end at the end of this year. And, of course, we're
aware in Russia that President Putin's term is to end early next year. I'm
curious to know whether any of you (inaudible) to the extent that it seems
(inaudible) will, in fact, honor his term limit and step down and there will be
some sort of transition in Moscow. What, if any, did that decision that's been
made in Moscow may have in Tashkent?
KIMMAGE: My basic sense is that the
foundation of Uzbek/Russian relations is largely pragmatic (ph) based on
Russia's need to obtain imports to Central Asian (inaudible), much of which
passes through Uzbekistan. I think the pragmatic (ph) basis of that
relationship (inaudible) whether or not President Putin honors his (inaudible)
step down (inaudible) Uzbek regime also (inaudible). That said, there has been
under the rubric (ph) of General (inaudible) over the last (inaudible) years has
been a slightly (inaudible).
Unless there is far-reaching political changes
in Russia, I think the basic pragmatic (ph) basis for cooperation based on
mutual economic interest and what I would call regime solidarity around a mutual
refusal or a mutual rejection of certain democratic values, I think those are
the factors (ph) (inaudible).
TURNER: And the other part of my question
is you don't see the -- if President Putin honors his term limit does he set any
sort of precedent in the region. And do you think that Karimov as president
himself will therefore honor his term limit or would have (inaudible)?
TEMPLER: I don't think (inaudible). He may step down (inaudible).
OLIKER:
The Russian government is one of those governments that does feel that
transitions are unstable and dangerous. The Russian government has put a great
premium on stability in Central Asia. Russia comes to this in part because they
have had such a rough time with its own transition, which generally in Russia is
seen as largely completed, therefore, it's less of a problem for Russia to have
a transition of government.
It does in principle have institutions in
place. Although it may still be a tumultuous time, it's very unlikely that the
Russians will pressure the Uzbeks to do something similar because they see it as
a very different case.
TURNER: OK. One other question that I have is
written down here. While other folks are still coming up with their -- and, I
believe, Mr. Kimmage alluded to the -- or, I think -- the Kazaks currently are
making a push to chair the OSCE in 2009. And I'm curious if you or any of the
other panelists have a view.
Clearly, the governments in Astana and
Tashkent don't have the most firm of relationships. But I'm curious if you see
a role for Kazakhstan to play in the runup to their (inaudible) possibly if they
are rewarded with the chairmanship of the OSCE, what role they could play
currently or...
KIMMAGE: I think that looking at the general question of
Kazakhstan (inaudible) -- I think it's an opportunity (inaudible) to take
Kazakhstan's leadership at their word (inaudible) their statements that they
would like to assume a leading regional role. And I think the OSCE chairmanship
is a good chance to hold them to that and also a good chance to allow them to
show some of the areas (inaudible).
On the specific issue of what role
Kazakhstan can play with Uzbekistan, I think we have to be realistic, that it
would be limited. There are certain technical areas, I think, in which they
could play a positive role, given the large number of Uzbek migrant workers that
(inaudible) Kazakhstan.
I think that if Kazakhstan were to either be
actively pursuing the (inaudible) chairmanship or would receive the
chairmanship, I think that this would be a good venue for (inaudible) in
Kazakhstan. I think you could actually make a fair amount of progress on
technical issues such as that. On the larger global question of political
reform in Uzbekistan, I don't think it's (inaudible) to expect the Kazaks
(inaudible) OSCE chairmanship to be able to move to retain Tashkent to bar (ph)
their core (ph) democratization.
We should also bear in mind that
(inaudible) personal opinion (ph) is perhaps time for the OSCE chairmanship (ph)
(inaudible) country. And (inaudible) would most likely enforce (inaudible) as
more of the correct religion (ph) in the other countries.
That said, we have
to bear in mind the limits of political reform in Kazakhstan (ph) (inaudible).
And if they proceed forth (ph) with the chairmanship, (inaudible) political
position (inaudible) that will recognize (ph) (inaudible). So I don't think
(inaudible) to expect Kazakhstan to push Uzbekistan (inaudible) democracy.
That said, I think you could exert (ph) a positive role (ph) (inaudible).
TURNER: Do the two of you have anything to add on this?
TEMPLER: I do
think it's an opportunity to encourage the Kazak government to, as Daniel said,
take a number of technical steps (inaudible) really living up to (inaudible). I
don't think it necessarily means (inaudible) or radical change throughout the
region.
But it's certainly an opportunity to (inaudible) them on issues
(inaudible) treatment of migrant workers, critical issues (inaudible) large
number of these people who cross the border. And it's an issue -- it's an
opportunity to (inaudible).
But I don't think we'll see Karimov be
cooperative with us. He hates the idea of Kazakhstan being a regional leader.
He hates (inaudible). It's interesting that the recent finding of this energy
(inaudible) of Central Asia which (inaudible) on the positive Karimov
(inaudible).
I don't know whether he was not appointed or not (inaudible),
whatever (ph) it was. But although (inaudible) Uzbekistan (inaudible) transit
countries (inaudible) general (inaudible) Kazakhstan and Russia over this
agreement (ph).
President Karimov is finding (inaudible) think that does
have some impact on him. But I think certainly this is a definite opportunity
with (inaudible) chairmanship. I think they should get the chairmanship. But I
think they should be held to certain standards as they do that. And that's
partially engaging in this debate with the Kazaks and engaging in help (ph) as
well, helping them (inaudible). I think that's something that the U.S.
government should be engaging in (inaudible).
TURNER: Thank you.
We
have a question over here.
QUESTION: Hi. I have actually more of a
comment. I have to agree with Mr. Kimmage on engaging the journalists and
exiled Uzbeks in building the future of Uzbekistan. I represent the Association
for Human Rights in Central Asia. Our headquarters are located in France, but
I'm a representative here.
And we also have to say that after the Andijon
events the refugees who escaped Andijon -- their escape ruined the image of
Karimov in the international arena. But as you know, a lot of these refugees
are coming back. And, of course, their return to Uzbekistan is improving their
image -- Karimov's image, in particular, within Uzbekistan and maybe even in an
international arena.
So what we have to do -- we have to figure out what
is going on. Why are the refugees coming back? There is obviously pressure put
on their relatives. But there may be other reasons that they do not get support
from the countries they are located in.
And it would be very good to engage
the civil society of Uzbekistan along with the journalists and help also
refugees so that they cannot return and to not improve the image of Karimov. We
have to put pressure (inaudible) pressure along with the European Union on the
government of Uzbekistan and Karimov, in particular, personally on him.
So
active engagement (inaudible) civil society of Uzbekistan and journalists for
(inaudible). It's very important to help them and actively engage them. So
it's more of a comment.
TURNER: Thank you for that.
QUESTION: Thank
you.
TURNER: I don't know if anybody wants to comment on her comment. But
if anybody has any further questions, we'd be happy to take them.
FINERTY:
Actually, I have two questions, if it's OK. I'm John Finerty. I'm from the
commission staff. Just to get back to the idea of Karimov and the change of
leadership (inaudible).
And there's a lot of talk now about the elections in
Russia and in South (ph) Pakistan (ph). (inaudible) supposedly the only
maintainer of stability there. And if he leaves, the whole country would be in
trouble. And people want him to stay in office because otherwise it'll be
unstable.
My first question was the Uzbekistan situation (inaudible)
something could happen to him or happen to another (inaudible). Gentlemen, even
if there is no (inaudible) relations with Russia, we have to (inaudible). But
is there an Uzbekistan bench (ph), so to speak, whether leaders (inaudible) the
people who might (inaudible) oriented or more (inaudible)?
OLIKER: I think
Russia (inaudible) succession. Russia has a growing economy. It has increased
institutions (ph). I think the instability argument is made by people who, you
know, are afraid that after (inaudible) who knows, and they may try to
orchestrate a certain amount of instability to try to keep them around.
Uzbekistan, I think, is facing a real threat because it doesn't have
institutions. It has an incredibly (ph) closed economy. And Russia has a
system that's questionable on any number of grounds, but it's not as fully
authoritarian, by any means, as Uzbekistan. So there is one person (ph) who
really is at the core of the problem (ph).
But I think the danger in
Uzbekistan is much more real. And where in Russia the (inaudible) we know is
the (inaudible) because we're told by the Russian media, by the Russian
government officials, by various analysts because (ph) people (ph) are in the
running (ph).
In Uzbekistan the (inaudible) is a matter of criminology
(ph) type speculation that lets you know we looked at Karimov's family and you
look at the people around him and we'll try to figure out who's standing close
to whom when, which means that you can get speculation. You can get names. But
nobody has any answers (ph).
KIMMAGE: I'd like to differ slightly with my
colleague. I think the difference between Russia and Uzbekistan -- there is a
big difference -- is less one of the strength and vibrancy of institutions and
more one of the level of elite (ph) consolidation (ph).
I think that a
larger portion of the Russian elite by which I mean the people who are in
positions of power and control commanding (inaudible) and the Russian economy,
which is certainly generating a lot of oil and gas-based revenue right now.
Those people are generally in agreement on where to go -- they may not be in
concrete agreement on every aspect.
They may not be in agreement on who
should succeed Putin. But I think there is a fair amount of consolidation (ph)
in the elite. I don't see evidence of particularly strong institutions in
Russia from parliament to courts to ministries. But I do evidence of a more
consolidated (ph) elite.
In Uzbekistan I think that we see both enhancements
(ph) of institutions and the potential for significant squabbles (ph) within the
elite in the absence of a president who is a guarantee of stability in the sense
that he is the arbiter of disputes within the elite. It cannot be resolved
through any sort of formal nualbut (ph) mechanisms.
He brokered (ph) the
disputes. He maintained the order through (inaudible) patronage. But it is, I
think, a less consolidated and stable (inaudible) than the one in Russia.
And as for the back bench (ph), I agree completely it's a matter of criminology
(ph) and speculation. And I have no more information than anyone else here.
TEMPLER: I think the vulnerability in Uzbekistan comes in part from the
consolidation of the elite, but also their (ph) passion (ph) (inaudible)
economic issues. In a country where -- and Russia (ph) may have been the
critical energy (inaudible) lever (ph) (inaudible).
But in Uzbekistan, it
goes down to feeding (ph) the souls (ph) of women selling onions at the bazaar,
the degree to which the elite (inaudible) consolidate the control (inaudible)
economy (inaudible) extraordinary (ph). And therefore, the (inaudible) risk of
competition (inaudible).
Uzbekistan is at serious risk of a number of
(inaudible). One is a transition (inaudible) somewhere or another combined with
(inaudible). It's very dependent on (inaudible) and gas (ph). (inaudible) any
sort of slump (ph) obviously would reduce (ph) (inaudible).
There's such a
low assumption (ph) base (ph) (inaudible) domestic economy that you've got very
little resiliency (ph). The Russian economy (inaudible) much larger growing
(inaudible). Uzbek's economy is consolidated (ph) very significantly (ph)
(inaudible) point of Karimov's family (inaudible).
That makes (inaudible) as
much (inaudible). Uzbek is looking a lot like some of the West African
countries (inaudible) absolutely hate (inaudible). It's looking a lot like West
African countries with no institutions with one very critical ruler (ph)
(inaudible) state, very little resilience (inaudible) very little (inaudible) to
create any (inaudible).
It's looking, I think, very (inaudible).
OCHS:
I'm Michael Ochs with the Helsinki Commission staff. I'd like to ask our guests
a very unfair question and ask them to engage in a bit of counter-factual
history (ph) speculation (ph).
Up until Andijon, we had working relations
with the Uzbeks. Things were bad domestically, but there was some sort of
relationship, and things were fair, at least as far as Tashkent/Washington
relations were concerned and Tashkent/E.U. relations.
Where do you think
we would be today if Andijon, this one cataclysmic event -- where would we be if
it had never happened? I recognize it's a very unfair question.
TEMPLER:
Even before Andijon the relationship had got pretty rocky because the Uzbeks
were simply not living up to their side of a whole array of agreements the U.S.
government agreed to. And there was an increasing level of frustration.
I
think the real drop-off after Andijon came not just (inaudible) immense
frustration and a sense of so little being achieved. Unfortunately, what
happened is that Karimov obviously calculated that Americans' desire for
cooperation on terrorism was so great that he didn't actually have to deal with
the other things that he signed up for (inaudible) agreement.
So he just
did nothing (inaudible) in those years when the U.S. government (inaudible)
offering assistance to help the economy (inaudible). So I think the
relationship would have (inaudible). I think Andijon made no (inaudible).
OLIKER: I agree. (inaudible), you know, the relationship (inaudible) Andijon
was (inaudible). It was not a cause. Both countries thought they were doing
the other a huge favor and that (inaudible) were ungrateful. And relationships
were deteriorated. What Andijon did was it demonstrated to Karimov that, yes,
they really are not on my side. He'd been thinking that for a while. And it
demonstrated to the U.S. that, yes, they really are not living up to any of the
promises they made on (inaudible).
KIMMAGE: While I agree that relations
with Uzbekistan have reached their apex before Andijon, natural limitations had
already been discovered, there was one very important effect that Andijon had,
which is that it trapped both sides into certain (inaudible). It had left us
(inaudible) actually the primary effect.
I don't think that there were any
great secrets about the extent (inaudible). I don't think there were any great
secrets about the unease with the West or the cooperation with Uzbekistan. But
there was much more wiggle room (inaudible).
Now what you would have is
Uzbekistan's president is the author of a book that essentially says we are not
going to let anyone push us around. He's on the record innumerable times on
Uzbek television saying that the West is engaging in information war.
We
are on the record with certain demands (ph). We are on the record with charges
(ph) against Uzbekistan. This is a different situation when it comes to
relations within (ph) countries (inaudible). So what I think the difference is
that there were certainly many problems, but a lot of those problems were
discussed still (ph) behind closed doors where there was wiggle room.
Now
what you have are extremely divergent and very strong stated (ph) public
positions (ph) in the wake (ph) of Andijon. We didn't have that (inaudible).
And I think it leads us with fewer options (inaudible)>
TURNER: Another
question?
QUESTION: Yes. My name is Rachel Welstein (ph). And I'm with
the Department of State's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor. And this
question is for Olga Oliker.
In particular, in your remarks you said that
the U.S. security perception may not necessarily be shared by Uzbekistan.
(inaudible) engage them on that front. And I was just wondering if you could
elaborate on what type of security engagement you think we'd maybe (ph) have
that will enact (ph) our policies and not help (ph) Karimov.
OLIKER: I
actually think to a large extent it's about keeping the lines of dialogue open.
We talk to countries like North Korea and Iran now because there are things that
we want to advance. And you don't know until you talk whether (inaudible)
exceptions (ph).
I am not saying that you help them. I am saying that we
talk.
QUESTION: Thank you.
TURNER: I'd like to thank all three of our
panelists. And as you came to listen to them this morning, I think this will be
the start of a renewed focus by the Helsinki Commission on this very, very
critical region.
I would remind those of you who are interested that the
commission is holding a full hearing next Thursday morning on the topic of
Russia. The title is In Transition or Intransigent. You can get more details
from our Web site, which is at csce.gov.
We're also co-hosting a briefing,
I believe, on Tuesday afternoon with the Albanian caucus and the caucus on
trafficking of persons. So details on both of those events can be found on our
Web site. And you all can look forward to many other events upcoming in the
following months. Thank you all very much.
[Whereupon the briefing ended at
11:14 a.m.]
END
|