Radio Frequency Identification Technology In Operation Joint Endeavor

When someone refers to radio frequency identification (RF/ID) technology, do you have a puzzled look on your face? Are you lost when Total Asset Visibility is mentioned? Well, continue to read and become familiar with the technology, concept and some real-life observations about the RF/ID technology the Army is currently testing for use in the 21st Century. Just-In-Time delivery of parts and supplies may soon become reality for all units in the Army.

The Technology

Total Asset Visibility provides users with timely and accurate information on the location, movement, status and identity of units, personnel, equipment and supplies. Total Asset Visibility also includes the capability to act upon that information to improve overall performance of practices. This factory-to-foxhole concept allows managers and leaders alike to track supplies through different types of automation. RF/ID technology plays an important part.

There is a significant difference between RF identification and RF data communication. RF identification begins with the use of some components that may be unfamiliar: the RF tag, the hand-held interrogator, the fixed interrogator, the "burn station," and the fusion center.

The RF/ID tag is a device attached to an item for tracking while in transit. The tag has read/write memory, radio transmitter and receiver abilities, and provides omni-directional communication capabilities. The bottom line: this tag has the capacity to store about 50 pages of text for retrieval up to 300 feet away, and each tag has its own identification number to assist in tracking.

By using the hand-held or fixed interrogator, users can retrieve information about supplies and equipment from RF/ID tags. Both items have omni-directional communication capabilities and the ability to access information on several tags at once. The difference between the two interrogators is that the hand-held is exactly that, hand-held, while the fixed interrogator is designed for use in permanent and semipermanent facilities. The fixed interrogator also requires a host computer to view and store the information, but the hand-held interrogator has its own screen and memory.

Accessing the information from the RF tags is simple. While in transit, the RF tags are in a "sleep mode" (inactive), which conserves battery power. The tag is "awakened" when it passes a fixed interrogator or someone queries it with a hand-held interrogator. This allows the interrogator to collect the information required at that time. At a "choke point" (discussed in more detail later) the fixed interrogator will simply relay the fact that the tag (and the shipment) has been at that location. Once the tag arrives at a critical hub, leaders and managers need to know about the contents. They can access this information with a hand-held interrogator or a fixed interrogator if one is installed at that location.

Imagine the volume of tags that the Army can use. These tags are written to and read from a location called the "burn station." A "burn station" is a personal computer with special software and a modem or satellite transmitter and a fixed interrogator attached to it. The information about the shipment is entered into the burn station computer. Then information is loaded or "burned" onto the tag, either through the fixed interrogator or through the use of a tag "docking station." A "docking station" is a piece of hardware with an interface connection that allows tags to receive information from another computer system, the Automated Manifest System.

The information written to a tag at the "burn station" is critical for visibility in transit. At this point, via modem or satellite up-link, line-item data is sent from the "burn station" to the fusion center.

The fusion center is the central database for storing all shipment information. Fixed interrogation sites also upload movement data in transit to the fusion center. The primary fusion center is located in Cambridge, MA, and is operated by the US Department of Transportation. The fusion center in Cambridge interfaces with a fusion center operated by the Logistics Support Agency (LOGSA) in Huntsville, AL. Any soldier with Total Asset Visibility software and access authorization can view the information at the fusion center. Also, US Army Europe (USAREUR) operates an Internet web page that personnel can use to get information on shipments for or in Europe. Another integral part of RF/ID technology is the Automated Manifest System. It is a hardware and software system designed to automate the preparation of Transportation Control Movement Documents (TCMD) and manifest information, as well as shipment receipt processing. The Automated Manifest System hardware includes a computer, an optical memory card reader/writer (OCR), bar code readers, an RF/ID tag docking station, and a printer. The Automated Manifest System computer, via cable interface with the Standard Army Retail Supply System-Level 1 (SARSS-1), compiles all shipment data. This data can be written to an RF/ID tag through the "docking station" and downloaded to diskette for interface with the RF/ID "burn station" and/or written to an optical memory card by the OCR. The optical memory card, similar to a compact disk-read only memory (CD-ROM) or floppy diskette in function (but much more durable), can be used as a backup for RF/ID tags. The Automated Manifest System allows "burning" the actual TCMD with all line item data to the tags and then transmitting to the fusion center once transferred by diskette to the "burn station."

The Concept

To demonstrate the purpose of Automated Manifest System and RF/ID technology in Operation Joint Endeavor, we will track a shipment from the Defense Distribution Center, Susquehanna in New Cumberland, PA, to a receiving supply support activity (SSA) in Bosnia. Once a container or 463L ALOC pallet (a pallet used for air shipments) is filled at the depot, both a consolidated Automated Manifest System card and an RF/ID tag are attached to it. New Cumberland then sends all the line-item information (such as national stock number, quantity and document number) and the RF/ID tag serial number to the fusion center from their "burn station." The shipment is now ready to depart.

After leaving the depot, the container arrives at the air point of embarkation or sea point of embarkation (APOE/SPOE), where a fixed interrogator detects the RF/ID tag and alerts the fusion center to the container’s arrival. The container leaves the APOE/SPOE and arrives at another APOE/SPOE, where another fixed interrogator tracks the shipment. Fixed interrogators are placed at key points (often referred to as "choke points") along the route to Bosnia, including the transportation hub at Kaiserslautern, Germany; the US post at Kaposvar, Hungary; the Sava bridge in Croatia and the receiving SSA. These interrogators effectively report the progress of shipments so units can track the container to its final destination.

The SSA is equipped with a SARSS-1 computer, Automated Manifest System, RF/ID "burn station," fixed interrogator, and several hand-held interrogators. Once a container arrives, SSA personnel download and process the supplies for receipt into their SARSS-1 system. With the Automated Manifest System, the soldiers have the option of simply reading the Automated Manifest System optical memory card and performing a batch receipt of all items with a few simple keystrokes, or soldiers can process each item from the shipment using portable data collection devices (PDCD) of the SARSS-1 system. The PDCDs use radio frequency to transmit receipt data (such as national stock number, quantity and document number) directly to the SARSS-1 computer. The soldiers can process all receipts interactively right on the SSA’s receiving docks! Also, using the hand-held interrogator, SSA personnel can read the RF/ID tags on containers awaiting processing to identify the contents. This is especially useful when customers are awaiting critical supplies or repair parts for the SSA to quickly locate, process and ship those items. When the SSA needs to ship equipment to any other location, the SSA can generate optical memory cards and RF/ID tags and then transmit all shipment data to the fusion center, just like the continental US depot. This allows senior leadership to track supplies to, within, and out of the theater of operations.

The Reality

We have explained what the RF/ID technology is intended to do from a technical point of view and demonstrated how it works conceptually. Now we will give some observations on the effectiveness of RF/ID technology in Hungary and Bosnia during deployment to and sustainment operations in Operation Joint Endeavor. These observations are written from the perspective of a main support battalion SSA officer and S4 deployed in Lukavac, Bosnia, and an S4 from the intermediate staging base (ISB) in Kaposvar, Hungary. We had hands-on experience with the technology on the ground. We will identify shortcomings we observed, improvements already made or that are in progress, and our ideas for more improvements.

Deployment

Operation Joint Endeavor was the first time RF/ID technology was used in a large-scale deployment. It was fielded to the 1st Armored Division less than six months before the deployment and one month before deployment for the ISB. The technology improved the information flow and visibility of unit equipment during deployment and of incoming supplies during sustainment. Sometimes, though, expectations for the technology exceeded the reality. The full potential of RF/ID technology was not always used because of lack of training and equipment or shortcomings with the equipment.

When the 1st Armored Division deployed, units used 20-foot military-owned demountable containers (MILVANs) to ship equipment. All MILVANs had RF/ID tags. Many units used more MILVAN containers than had been anticipated, and so these units also needed more tags. The number of "burn stations" was insufficient to support the operational needs. Units had to go to other "burn stations" such as the one in Heidelberg, Germany, to get tags burned. This solved the problem, but was time and manpower intensive. This problem has already been addressed by fielding more "burn stations" in units in the division.

At the trailer transfer points and container holding yards between Hungary and Bosnia, RF/ID technology helped to identify containers but was limited by many factors. Many tags were crushed during transport because containers were loaded end-to-end on train cars or 40-foot trailers. Since the standard operating procedure was to put tags on the doors of the containers without any protection, the tags were crushed when the two containers were pushed together during loading or unloading. Some tags were stolen by local children for souvenirs. Some fell off when the plastic strips frequently used to hold the tags became brittle from the cold and broke.

According to the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA) Operations Support Office, DLA’s focal point for Automated Identification Technology (AIT), tags are already being improved to make them smaller and more sturdy. DLA also has considered modifying containers with slots on the container doors to hold the tags. This could be cost-prohibitive, however, because most MILVANs are leased and not owned by the government.

Once containers came to holding yards, often soldiers did not have interrogators to query incoming tags. If the soldiers did, they frequently were not trained to use them. Units passing through did not always know what key information was needed for interrogating the containers. Many units resorted to the old-fashioned spray-paint method. Once these units reunited with their containers in Hungary or at any other point (after rail transportation), soldiers would spray-paint unit designation on all four sides. This was a step that was not taken before deployment because units believed that the RF/ID tags would provide better visibility than spray-paint. Soldiers still relied more on paper copies of manifests prepared in the rear to discover what was in MILVANs rather than on RF/ID tags. The availability of hand-held interrogators improved during the deployment. Allowing units to keep the interrogators should help solve the problem.

During deployment, choke points had not been fully established in theater, so tracking a "lost" container was often difficult. When choke points were set up, there was still some confusion because the choke points were not all named so that soldiers could recognize their locations. Sometimes, units knew what choke point a container had recently passed, but had no idea where that choke point was. For instance, one of the choke points in Lukavac was named "Kaiserslautern Gate 1" for a while because the equipment had been brought from Germany, but the choke point had not been updated to reflect its new location. Choke points must be established in theater as early as possible, even if they must be relocated later as main supply routes change. Choke point interrogators should have descriptive names that units can recognize so they can effectively track materiel.

Sustainment

During sustainment, most supplies coming into the division warehouses were tagged. The RF/ID tags on incoming shipments survived much better than those that had been on MILVANs during deployment. Less than 10 percent of tags were damaged, lost or had battery failure. MILVANs of supplies coming into theater were most often brought by palletized load system (PLS) trucks. A PLS truck transports only one MILVAN, so tags are not crushed between two MILVANs being loaded on one trailer, as tags were during deployment. Also, tags coming in on trailers from Germany (the Eagle Express) and air pallets from the United States usually arrived in good condition. Visibility of incoming supplies was very good, once units knew about the availability of the information on the computer Internet.

Visibility and reliability were somewhat weakened because of problems once shipments reached Bosnia. Sometimes tags were not removed from trailers or MILVANs when they arrived at an SSA. Therefore, units would "see" (on Total Asset Visibility or the Internet) their supplies returning to Germany, but actually the supplies had been downloaded. Only an empty trailer and a tag were going back to Germany. SSAs would reuse the tags. However, because of training and hardware deficiencies, some tags would have new information written to them, but the new information was not forwarded to the fusion center. This had the same effect as tags not removed from trailers or MILVANs: units saw supplies returning to Germany or going to other places in theater when in reality the supplies were at their destinations.

The biggest challenge for SSAs using RF/ID technology in Bosnia was the lack of integration of all the warehouse automation systems. To prepare a shipment of serviceable or unserviceable excess for retrograde, soldiers used SARSS-1 to prepare turn-in documents. They then scanned the documents and input the information into the Automated Manifest System to produce a TCMD hard-copy and to burn the tag (once the Savi docking station was fielded to allow this). Finally, soldiers had to input the same information into the "burn station" so that it would be transmitted to the fusion center, since the Automated Manifest System did not have communication capabilities to send the information directly. Initially, the input was through the keyboard. This meant less information was sent to the fusion center than was actually on the tag because it was too time-intensive to retype all the line-item information into the "burn station." Later, SSAs were able to transfer the information on a floppy disk from the Automated Manifest System to the "burn station," but this was done through disk operating system (DOS) and was a very complicated process.

As the operation progressed, the ability of the SSAs to properly burn tags for retrograde improved greatly thanks to training they received from the contractors, USAREUR Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, and other outside agencies, as well as the continually improving software and hardware. The TCMD function of Automated Manifest System and the Savi docking station that hooked directly to Automated Manifest System were the two most important improvements. However, the communication between SARSS, Automated Manifest System, and the "burn station" is the critical step in making the technology a time-saver rather than an additional burden to the SSAs. This improved integration is happening in units now.

Hand-held interrogators were available at the SSAs, but were frequently not used unless the warehouse had a large backlog of supplies to process. When this was the case, the interrogators were extremely useful in identifying high-priority shipments for expedited handling. Soldiers were able to work smarter, and item managers were able to get the supplies that their customers really needed.

Two other concerns with tags were availability and handling. The number of tags was limited. SSAs sometimes stockpiled the tags because a retrograde system and accountability for tags were not well established. Also, batteries in tags had to be turned over once they arrived at their destination. If batteries were not flipped as a tag passed choke points enroute to Germany, units perceived that their supplies were returning to Germany although the shipment had been downloaded at its destination. Batteries were limited. The standard operating procedure was to use a new battery every time a tag was reused to ensure that the battery was good. A tester for the batteries would save a lot of money. The life of the batteries was generally long, and they could have been reused if the confidence in their charge had been there. A new tag is also being developed that would use AA batteries instead of the special flat batteries in use. This should make batteries more accessible and cheaper.

RF/ID technology is rapidly evolving. Soldiers in Operation Joint Endeavor saw many improvements in the short time they were deployed. The technology helped soldiers on the ground in units and in the SSAs. It let managers at the materiel management centers and units better manage supplies. RF/ID technology saved time and money.

To be truly successful in the future, however, this technology must be fully integrated with the other automation systems that warehouses are using. Standard procedures must be developed to eliminate the roundabout methods of information transfer. Soldiers must be trained in this technology during advanced individual training so they are familiar with the concepts and the importance of this technology in making their work easier. We have a powerful tool at our fingertips. We only need to fully realize and exploit RF/ID potential.

About the authors

The authors are Quartermaster graduates of the Combined Logistics Officer Advanced Course 97-1/2 at Fort Lee, Virginia.

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