As you know, CBP’s mission is two fold: to secure America’s borders while facilitating the free flow of legitimate trade and travel.

It’s a tough balancing act—and a huge mandate. And certainly, it’s not a mission we can accomplish alone. We work with many partners around the country—and around the world.

Here on our Southern border, Mexico is not only a neighbor and friend, but a vital partner in improving border interactions and trade relations. We have worked closely together—and will continue to work together on many programs.

Right now, we are working with Mexican officials to address border violence across the entire U.S.-Mexico border, as well as business resumption plans and a host of other shared issues.

Mexico is an important trading partner with the United States, and last year, I signed a Bilateral Strategic Plan with Mexican Customs that allows our two countries to work even closer on trade and security issues. Our trusted traveler programs, like SENTRI, NEXUS, and FAST, depend on our close cooperation with our neighbors in Mexico and Canada. In fact, these programs would not work without joint cooperation.

The Threat Remains
Working with our partners to better secure our borders is imperative in this age of terrorism.

We are a month away from the 7th anniversary of September 11. And, our National elections are little more than two months away. And, we know Al Qaeda has not gone away. Radical jihadists are still very much a threat to America—and to the entire civilized world.

And those of us charged with protecting our nation—AND keeping our economy vibrant—are acutely aware that despite all we have accomplished toward securing our nation and our global supply chain—we are still vulnerable.

Last year, we saw what happened in the United Kingdom when Prime Minister Tony Blair was leaving office and Prime Minister Gordon Brown, was coming in. In London, two days after Gordon Brown became Prime Minister, two car bombs were discovered and disabled before they detonated; however, only days later, Glasgow Airport was attacked. In Pakistan, we saw terrorists target an upcoming election as a window of vulnerability when Benizar Butto was assassinated last year.

These incidents, although a world away, remind us that we should never—can never—let down our guard.

Nor can we afford to become complacent.

We are entering a unique time in American history. This is the first change in Administrations since 9/11. For CBP, we know this is a time to maintain our operational focus and not be distracted by the high-profile events of the day.

Just because there hasn’t been an attack in America since 9/11, doesn’t mean that the terrorists aren’t planning and searching for any vulnerability…any chance to attack us again.

They have vowed to attack us again, even harder than they did before.

And, this, ladies and gentlemen, is the reality that the men and women of CBP live with as we clear more than 70,000 containers coming across our borders and over a million people into our country every day. CBP is also charged with carrying out our traditional mission of keeping illicit drugs, illegal aliens, agriculture pests and diseases, and harmful or illegal products out of our country. All of which remain challenging and dangerous to our country.

Protecting America—Moving Ahead
Since 9/11, we’ve accomplished a lot to build a layered, risk-based strategy that protects legitimate trade and travel, and secures our borders. A strategy that extends our borders by developing partnerships with other countries, with the private sector, and by using the most advanced technology available.

But, you and I both know we have much more work to do.

Today, I want to touch upon some of the highlights of where we are in our efforts to secure the supply lanes—and some of the challenges that lie ahead of us.

Customs-Trade Partnership Against Terrorism (C-TPAT)
One of the most important parts of our layered strategy is C-TPAT, Customs Trade Partnership Against Terrorism, our partnership with the trade—with many of you in this room today. C-TPAT enhances our security and better facilitates trade.

C-TPAT members, as you know, agree to incorporate supply chain criteria into their business practices. In return, CBP offers incentives, such as reduced cargo inspections at seaports and land ports of entry, as well as access to FAST—Free and Secure Trade—which offers lanes on both our northern and southern borders.

C-TPAT now has more than 8,500 members, covering over half of all imports into our country.

C-TPAT is a real success.

We’ve instituted minimum security criteria.

We are reviewing all applications within 90 days, and performing the initial validation within one year of certification.

We’ve conducted more than 8,500 validations—almost 1,300 were re-validations—in 87 countries around the world.

We’ve hired more Supply Chain Security Specialists.

We have new C-TPAT Field Offices up and running in Buffalo, New York, and in Houston. This makes a total of seven regional offices strategically located across the country.

Almost 630 Mexican manufacturers and over 540 Mexican highway carriers participate in C-TPAT. Last August, C-TPAT opened enrollment to Mexican long haul highway carriers, and there are now 15 companies in this sector that participate in the program. These are the carriers that move goods from the interior of Mexico to just south of the border. These carriers are an important link in the supply chains of our Mexican trade partners.

Moving forward, C-TPAT will give thoughtful consideration to expanding into new sectors that can increase international supply chain security.

Next Generation: CSI—and SFI
Our partnerships overseas are also vitally important to our strategy.

CSI helps to make our borders the last line of defense as opposed to the first line. Through the Container Security Initiative (CSI), we are working with other countries to identify high-risk shipments before they are loaded on board a ship bound for the United States.

We currently have officers assigned overseas in 58 CSI ports around the world. The CSI program covers 86 percent of the shipments coming to the United States.

As you know, last October we launched pilots in Pakistan, Honduras, and the United Kingdom, to test the concept of 100 percent scanning of all containers bound for the U.S.

This Spring, we submitted a report to Congress on what we have learned from the pilots. Simply put: we learned that scanning U.S.-bound maritime containers is technologically and operationally possible, but it is also filled with challenges.

CBP will be responsive to the mandates of Congress, but we also want to ensure that 100 percent scanning does not negate the layered, risk-based strategy that’s now in place.

And, no one should be misled that 100 percent container scanning equals 100 percent security.

Automated Commercial Environment (ACE)
We’ve also made significant progress with regard to modernizing the Automated Commercial Environment system—known as ACE.

Today, ALL land border ports of entry are equipped with ACE electronic truck processing capabilities—and 99 percent of all manifests are now filed electronically. Receiving this information prior to a shipment arriving at the border is central to CBP’s ability to both secure the border…and move trade more efficiently.

This fall, we planned to expand ACE electronic manifest to include ocean and rail shipments, but this anticipated release will be delayed until April or June of next year due to problems we encountered while testing new software. However, we will continue to integrate and replace virtually all CBP trade processing systems with ACE by 2012.

Trusted Traveler Programs
As I mentioned, CBP participates in Trusted Traveler Programs, such as FAST and SENTRI—that provide expedited clearance for international travelers who have successfully completed background and fingerprint checks, and have been interviewed by CBP.

DHS and the State Department have also been phasing in the Western Hemisphere Travel Initiative that requires all travelers—U.S. citizens and foreign nationals alike—to present a passport or another acceptable document establishing identity and citizenship.

With this information, we can query a number of data bases, including the watch list, enforcement lookouts, previous violations, and outstanding warrants in the National Crime Information Center.

Last year, we caught more than 26,000 criminals, ranging from murderers to drug dealers. And so far this year, we’ve turned back more than 300 people listed by other agencies as having terrorist connections.

In January 2007, WHTI requirements were implemented for air travel, and traveler compliance rate has been a successful 99 percent.

This past January, we implemented WHTI at land border ports, requiring a government issued identification, along with photograph and birth certificate.

Border Wait Times
And now, let me speak to the issue of border wait times. I know this is an issue of great concern to you—and to CBP.

But I want to make one point clear: I will not apologize for CBP doing its job. We WILL continue to do what we need to do to protect this country. That is our job. And, we will not shrink from our responsibility.

CBP is charged with verifying the credibility and integrity of every person who crosses our land borders, every passenger who lands in our airports, and every product that lands on our shores. And, as Secretary Ridge was fond of saying, “we have to be right 100 percent of the time—a terrorist only has to be right once.”

We cannot—and will not—take that chance.

And, while anger may be directed at CBP and our Officers on the front line, remember that CBP is only a piece of the process. Along with GSA, we have some control of the port of entry facilities, but we do not have control of the bridges, roads and tunnels on both sides of our land borders that lead to these facilities—and they contribute greatly to the movement of traffic.

Through the years, those who planned and built infrastructure at our ports of entry did so for the short term. Plans that should have looked 10…20…50 years down the road, were often very short sighted.

In the past, for example, the legacy agencies that now compose CBP approached the land port facilities with distinct operational mandates and facility requirements. As a result, the facilities rarely received the attention and focus necessary to ensure a deliberate, consistent program of improvements across the border.

Most improvements were small and local, and did not fully address broader regional, state and federal coordination within the transportation and law enforcement communities. In fact, the facilities that we now operate represent years of neglect and deterioration.

Today, the average age of our facilities is over 40 years. Many were constructed before 1960 and have yet to receive a substantial renovation.

Yet, even as our facilities continue to deteriorate, we are asked to process ever increasing volumes of trade and travel. We have also had to overlay new security architecture of radiation portal monitors and other technology tools on these facilities that were not designed to accommodate them.

Well over half of our facilities are over capacity and have no room for expansion. Many are configured in ways that actually limit the flow of traffic. Over two thirds of the buildings within the ports are at—or beyond capacity—to support our operations and lack the option to even expand. We recognize the problem, and are doing long-range planning for improvements within our port infrastructure.

Beginning in 2003, CBP began—and has now completed—a Strategic Resource Assessment of every land port of entry along both the northern and southern borders. During that assessment, CBP evaluated the facility against more than 60 criteria to identify deficiencies that impede our operations, impose unacceptable health and safety concerns, limit capacity for anticipated workload, and reduce our operational efficiency.

As a result, we are now able to work more effectively with our partners at the General Services Administration to target limited federal dollars towards facilities with the greatest need.

More recently, we have begun to move beyond our own planning processes, and are working to establish better planning relationships with the Federal Highway Administration and state departments of transportation.

We are partnering in projects where transportation dollars can be used to implement needed improvements in port infrastructure.

We have even begun to explore public/private partnerships as other opportunities to garner needed investments.

I want to commend Congressman Reyes for introducing legislation that would increase spending and capital improvements at our ports of entry. His bill also calls for increasing the number of CBP officers and Ag Specialists and support personnel. And, the bill authorizes funds to the GSA Administrator to improve our existing port facilities—and gives priority to ports that are most in need of repair.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. This legislation goes a long way toward bringing funds to the ports of entry. Passage of such legislation would improve CBP’s ability to both secure the border—and move trade and travelers across more efficiently.

But, we recognize that we are only a part of the solution.

As I mentioned—and as you know—the land ports of entry are themselves part of a larger, more complex network of infrastructure designed to facilitate the flow of legitimate traffic and commerce across our borders. Although we are committed to doing our part, we need to do more to address your concerns.

CBP can support and promote trusted traveler programs, like SENTRI or NEXUS, within our facilities, but they will provide little relief if the roads leading up to our facilities do not allow program users to circumvent traffic from non-users. Even more fundamental, the roads themselves on either side of the border must possess sufficient capacity to process traffic into—and out of—the port facilities.

Accomplishing these improvements requires commitment from more than CBP. Our federal partners from the transportation and state departments, alongside state and local agencies, must commit to improving the entire surrounding infrastructure.

We must also explore broader regional solutions to alleviate demand at individual ports of entry. And, we must engage our international partners to make sure that infrastructure leading into CBP’s facilities is adequate to address growing demand for capacity.

These commitments would open up a variety of possibilities for improving the efficiency of the border infrastructure without preventing us from securing our borders and protecting our nation.

Possibilities, like intelligent traffic information systems designed to direct travelers to areas of greatest capacity; redistributing demand away from current peak times; and planning for regional capacity, rather than facility capacity, to build flexibility into the entire regional network.

We are committed to open, consistent engagement with our partners. But we are also adamant that whatever the solution, it cannot—and must not—impede our ability to secure that nation’s borders.

Conclusion
As I said in the beginning, we are entering times of change and potential vulnerability, and we’re constantly aware that the potential for another terrorist attack continues to loom large.

Here in these final months of the Bush Administration—and in an election year that will determine who will lead our country during the next four years—it’s important that CBP keep its focus on our mission.

Terrorists—and all those who would test our resolve and test our nation—must know that the transition between Administrations does not mean we are stopping progress on programs that our nation—and Congress—have deemed important to our national security.

Terrorism is not a Democratic or a Republican issue. It is a global issue that will confront the President’s successor…and Secretary Chertoff’s successor…and mine, and will continue to affect us all.

A new Administration will bring new faces and new ideas, but as a nation, we are united in our commitment to securing our country and our economy. And, I know the dedicated men and women of CBP will not take their eyes off this goal.

Only with the help of our partners—here in the U.S. and abroad—and the support of Congress and leaders like Chairman Reyes—have we been able to create and implement the programs I’ve mentioned today.

I am proud of all we have accomplished together, and I believe we all readily acknowledge that our strategy and its successful implementation would not be possible without the dedicated, hard working men and women of Customs and Border Protection.

But as I remind them, as dedicated as we are, our adversaries are just as dedicated to attacking us. The mission of CBP is to ensure our adversaries do not achieve their goals.

Thank you for inviting me here today.

Note: This reflects written version of remarks.