Docs 104-132
104. Contact Report/1/
No. 33
[place not declassified], February 21, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 125, Folder 4. No classification marking.
PLACE: Safe House "A"
PERSONS PRESENT: B. Ford and [name not declassified]
COVER USED: Pseudonyms
Discussion: Discussion Topic: Don Pedro
1. In accordance with instructions which I had received, I went over in detail the memorandum/2/ regarding the possible use, or exploitation, of Don Pedro. [name not declassified] attitude was completely negative. Even before I had finished the complete discussion of the points contained in the memorandum, he had attempted to interrupt me with strong objections. The complete list of objections is to be found in attached memorandum typewritten./3/
/2/Not further identified.
/3/Not printed. In part, [name not declassified] objected to Yd'goras because he represented "conservative elements and if a part of the new govt., would give Commies chance for come-back, since he would have little real desire in a positive program."
2. The most outstanding thing which I gathered from this discussion was [name not declassified] intense dislike of Don Pedro, and any possible collaboration with him on the part of the Junta or the Group to him appeared as a grave error. He summarized this attitude in stating that even if we discover that it is necessary to place Don Pedro in a position of use--that is to secure his help in having San Salvador as a base of operations, or in some manner to assist us in that country--whatever small part he plays will not be worth the trouble which will be created later on by incorporating him into the movement. He pointed out that, in weighing this, it would be his opinion, and he was certain that RUFUS would share this opinion, that no use could be made of Don Pedro.
3. I then explained several points which had been made in the initial discussion, of the written memorandum which had been given to me. However, [name not declassified] did not give in an inch and appeared to be adamant regarding the matter of doing any business at all with Don Pedro.
4. I advised him that, of course, they would be kept in constant knowledge of what was taking place with Don Pedro, and furthermore, the results of the conversations which might ensue.
5. At this time I returned to the Base and, after conveying the initial reaction of [name not declassified] to Jerry,/4/ I was advised that possibly this attitude should be changed slightly to the one that it would be possible to utilize him after his true assets had been obtained and reviewed by RUFUS and [name not declassified], an isolation process would have to take place; that I should advise [name not declassified] definitely that this consideration certainly would be thought of, if his assets did not appear actually to be real. I advised Jerry that I had not brought this matter up because it had not been in the memorandum, although Jerry advised me such information had been contained in the FT Task. I, in brief, outlined the information and reaction and objections of [name not declassified] to him and then advised him that I would return with this additional information for [name not declassified] benefit. Also, I advised that I wished to clarify the matter regarding Mr. Smith's/4/ obtaining an approval of approach to Pedro, and as to what reaction there had been at the time.
/4/Not further identified.
6. Checking again with [name not declassified] a short bit later, I advised him that I had been thinking about this matter while I had been gone and that I was extremely interested in finding out further his reaction on this thing. [name not declassified] said that he principally had absolutely no confidence in Don Pedro and that RUFUS shared this view also. I then advised [name not declassified] that, actually, if we discovered that no real assets or real use could be made of Don Pedro, certainly we wished to get him out of the way, either by neutralization, isolation, or, at last risk or cost, elimination. I said we could not allow this man to continue in his present state, in as much as he was actually doing harm to the Junta, and that we must find some way to fit him in or take him out of the picture.
7. [name not declassified] again stated his views as to the risks of taking him in and gave to me at this time a list of objections which he had verbally told me earlier in the afternoon. He again counselled extreme caution on any dealings with Don Pedro, stating that, at any time and at any place, Don Pedro would be willing to betray anyone for his own personal interests. I advised him that the utmost discretion would be used and that immediately after we had obtained from Pedro a list of his assets, we would make these facts known to RUFUS and [name not declassified], for their private investigation or survey of them.
8. I asked [name not declassified] if this whole subject of Pedro had not been approached previously by Mr. Smith, and [name not declassified] had advised that it had been and that RUFUS said that if the Group dictated that Pedro should be the leader of this, if it meant success for the movement, he, RUFUS, would become a soldier in the ranks to comply. [name not declassified] said if this eventuation should come to pass, he, although he would continue along with the movement, would be the first one to oppose him once he was established as the new leader of Guatemala.
[initials not declassified]
105. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
[place not declassified], February 24, 1954, 0409Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 2, Folder 2. Secret; Priority; PBSUCCESS; RYBAT. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
711. 1. HDQs considering pros and con of establishing covert official relationship with [name not declassified] to ensure full support PBSUCCESS objectives.
2. LINC desires your views soonest whether:
A. High ranking KUBARK official necessary or
B. Mature personable individual not necessarily top echelon;
C. Civilian or
D. Military status;
E. General approach adequate or
F. Specific knowledgeable approach required.
3. Appreciate your candid views receptivity [name not declassified] such proposition assuming properly laid on by HDQs.
106. Contact Report/1/
No. 37
[place not declassified], February 27, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 4. No classification marking.
PLACE: Safe House "A"
PERSONS PRESENT: [name not declassified] and Robert Ford
SUBJECT: RUFUS' Letters Received from the Field For Delivery to [name not declassified]
I delivered three letters to [name not declassified] from RUFUS on 27 February. Having read them, he came back and advised me of the contents.
1. Letter dated 18 February.
A. President Galvez of Honduras himself instigated a request through his foreign minister to RUFUS that he be given some indication that RUFUS was receiving aid from individuals in the United States.
B. He sent Fournier (first name unknown), a Costa Rican, to intercede for him in Panama. RUFUS himself had not been able to go to Panama because he is now under a stop-order from President Remon which prevents him from entering Panama.
C. RUFUS says that twenty men were sent to training camps on 19 February: six of them were radio men and 14 of them were saboteurs.
D. Good relations are now in existence between his Group and elements in the Salvadoran and Honduran governments.
E. More latitude is needed in the propaganda work. [name not declassified] interprets this to mean that wider use of funds with less control being placed on RUFUS is desired.
F. The record which RUFUS made in LINCOLN has been played in Salvador and Honduras.
G. RUFUS advised that Ydigoras has asked for back pay from the Guatemalan Government; he says that this mercenary move has had a poor effect in El Salvador and in Honduras.
H. Arenas visited RUFUS but on this occasion RUFUS was not in Honduras.
I. RUFUS has sent Lopez (first name unknown) to Mexico. The purposes for sending him have been covered in a previous cable traffic. RUFUS' letter gave no further amplification of these reasons.
J. End of letter dated 18 February 1954.
2. A second letter dated 20 February 1954.
A. [name not declassified] has not received [name not declassified] instructions; RUFUS is wondering what has happened.
B. [name not declassified] has not received money in Guatemala City as of 20 February; RUFUS wonders what is happening.
C. [name not declassified] has been instructed not to leave Guatemala before he sets up contact again with those individuals who were loyal to him, which is what [name not declassified] wishes to do; RUFUS advised that once [name not declassified] has re-established his contacts he will advise them that he is leaving the country.
D. Jose Luis Arenas visited him again on 20 February. This time RUFUS was in Honduras. Arenas, according to RUFUS, was completely willing to listen to all criticism and has accepted it with complete humbleness. RUFUS said that Arenas is willing to do whatever RUFUS orders. RUFUS claims that he advised Arenas to return to Guatemala clandestinely and then to seek asylum in the Salvadoran Embassy in Guatemala City. Subsequent information indicates that Arenas followed this course of action since it is now known publicly that has Arenas has requested refuge or exile in the Salvadoran embassy in Guatemala City.
E. RUFUS asked [name not declassified] to answer a letter from Roberto Barrios Pena; he asks [name not declassified] to tell Barrios Pena that he must realize that RUFUS has to answer the charges made against him by the Guatemalan Government. RUFUS did not wish in any way to implicate Barrios Pena; he replied to the charges of the Guatemalan Government only for the purposes thoroughly clearing the atmosphere. Barrios Pena, in his cable to RUFUS, complained that he, Barrios Pena, had been implicated in RUFUS' reply to the Guatemalan Government.
3. Second letter dated 20 February (the third letter which [name not declassified] received).
A. RUFUS claims that he has received 20,900 dollars and another payment of 5000 dollars; he states that Manuel has the rest.
B. [name not declassified] is ready to come to LINCOLN.
C. RUFUS has sent money to the propaganda group in Guatemala City; he did not indicate where, how, or in what quantity.
4. Postscript to second letter written on 20 February.
A. Manuel must stay in Nicaragua. RUFUS needs a military man in Honduras; he advises that he needs someone with more experience and more stature than Andres has.
B. No transmitter for the radio station in Salvador has arrived. This transmitter is necessary for successful radio operations.
107. Memorandum to Robert Ford of the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
February 27, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 4. No classification marking. A handwritten note on the memorandum reads: "Passed to [name not declassified] on 27 Feb 54. R.F." The memorandum was presumably prepared at PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.
SUBJECT
Brief for [name not declassified] so that he can include the information in his next letter to RUFUS
The Group is much disturbed over the relationship, and RUFUS' lack of cooperation with Andres. Andres has been able to see RUFUS but once since 4 February and then only for a short period of time.
RUFUS must co-operate fully, remembering that Andres is the Group's representative in the field. In order for the Group and [name not declassified] to keep informed on what is going on, it is imperative for RUFUS to keep Andres fully informed so that he in turn can notify [name not declassified] and the Group, of any and all new developments.
The Group and [name not declassified] will not be able to coordinate any aspect of the operation if RUFUS is acting on his own without notifying [name not declassified] and the Group.
Only this week RUFUS sent sensitive material to [name not declassified] via his own courier. This is exactly one of the things security-wise the Group is trying to correct. Three failures in the past were probably caused by insecure methods of operation, and definitely the recent "White Paper" was the result of an insecure courier.
If the Group is going to continue lending aid to the Junta, the Group will definitely not permit what has caused failure in the past to continue in the future. The Group wants to aid the operation but does not want to see it fail again because of the same old reasons of insecure means of operation and lack of coordination between the Junta and the Group.
The Group realizes that RUFUS has a tremendous job and is extremely busy, but he can never allow himself to be so busy as to be insecure and not to keep [name not declassified] and the Group, who are trying to help him, and supporting him, fully informed of all his actions and developments in the field. Because RUFUS is so busy, it is impossible for him to devote necessary time to details; and that is exactly where Andres, [name not declassified] and the Group can help him and advise him, provided they are kept fully informed.
108. Memorandurn for the Record/1/
Washington, March 2, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 4. Secret.
SUBJECT
Meeting with Seekford
1. At 1910 on 28 February, I picked Seekford up in my car at the corner of Massachusetts and Wisconsin. We drove for about an hour out River Road and I am certain were not observed.
2. Seekford expressed his regrets for the compromise of the five paraphrased cables, and in a manner which appeared to be entirely sincere. I asked him how it was possible, with all of the security indoctrination which he had had, plus the great emphasis on secrecy based on all phases of PBSUCCESS, to have done such an unpardonable thing as to leave sensitive papers in a hotel room. He replied that he had no explanation, that it was a stupid, unpardonable thing to do, but that it was an act of thoughtlessness and carelessness. He expressed himself as most concerned over the effects on the operation and the OAS Conference./2/
/2/Reference is to the Tenth Inter-American Conference held in Caracas, Venezuela, March 1-28, 1954; see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 264 ff.
3. I told Seekford that while it was impossible to undo the past, it was his obligation and duty to remain under [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] for a long while to come. He said that he realized how important this was during the OAS Conference. I told him it was equally important for a much longer period, because the enemy might time their disclosures to coincide with expected paramilitary action on our part, and that this might be many months in the future. To this he agreed.
4. It was agreed that for the next month Seekford will remain in Chicago. We discussed two general areas where he could bury himself after that date--Alaska and the Pacific Northwest. While he is willing to go to Alaska, he prefers the Northwest [2 lines of source text not declassified]. He has never been in the Northwest and suggested as a possibility that he get a job until Fall as a fire watcher on a mountain top where he would meet very few people. Another possibility would be to get him a job as an engineer on one of the many construction projects that must be under way in that region. He believes that the Northwest would be more secure than Alaska, [2 lines of source text not declassified].
5. It is my impression that Seekford will be amenable and cooperative to any reasonable request on our part.
J.C. King
Chief, WHD
109. Letter From [name not declassified] to Carlos Castillo Armas/1/
March 1, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 4. No classification marking.
1. As the work progresses and grows more complex, we have to be extremely careful to adhere to the divisions of responsibility and agreements previously laid down, both in matters of political practice and finances.
2. I have no wish to cry over spilled milk and I get the impression that the Group does not either. However, there are factors from the past which are seriously disturbing. One of the principal ones is a discrepancy between the amount of money that Pablo says he passed you in January and the amount you acknowledged receiving in January. (Note to Ford: Details of the discrepancy should be available this evening from Pablo's side.)
3. During February there have been other problems of a serious nature. I feel completely bound by the Gentlemen's Agreement which we signed with the Group and I have every indication from the Group that it is abiding and will abide scrupulously by the Agreement. There are several points of the Agreement that I feel I must call to your attention again:
a. It was agreed that you and I would use only the Group's secure channels of communication. This has not been scrupulously observed.
b. It was agreed that the overall responsibility for propaganda was mine. The dispatch of your Secretary of Propaganda to Mexico does not reflect the spirit of this Agreement. It was further agreed that the propaganda budgets would be submitted, after full consultation with you, from the advisors in the field to me. This has not been done.
c. It was agreed that the overall intelligence function would be mine. On at least one very important occasion the qualified advisor was specifically excluded from a sensitive operation. In the preparation of the intelligence budget, the advisor was not consulted so that I do not have the benefit of his expert and professional advice.
d. The political field, as you know it was agreed, was also my responsibility. However, budgeting for that field has not been left to me.
e. It was further understood that I was to represent the Junta before the Group, yet communications have been sent directly to the Group. This is impractical since it puts us in a bad light before the Group and since the Group refers such communications to me anyway.
3. [sic] Apart from these specifics, the whole magnitude of the March budget forecast has somewhat appalled me, since I can see no justification for the tremendous increase from $65,000 to $111,000, without a corresponding expansion in actual operations.
4. Under the circumstances we must now proceed as follows:
a. The propaganda responsibility being mine, I am asking Juan Jose to consult with the propaganda advisors in the field and to secure from them their estimate of the funds needed for propaganda in March. Juan Jose has been asked by me to solicit your views on propaganda and on the propaganda budget in greater detail. Out of the information that Juan Jose brings back I will prepare the proposed budget and negotiate it with the Group.
b. Similarly, the budget estimates for political work, especially inside our target area, will also be provided by my sources and by the advisors. On this point, too, please give your full advice to Juan Jose. I will inform you of the final sum allotted.
c. On intelligence, I have asked Juan Jose to secure Andres' estimate and to bring back to me a proposal which I shall review and present to the Group.
d. On the military matters which are your sphere of responsibility and competence, I have solicited the views of Don Ricardo. He has given me his recommendations, which I have reviewed, in some cases changed, and in some cases accepted as they stood. I have negotiated for you the military budget with the Group and I have secured the approval of certain sums. These sums are being explained to you in a separate letter.
5. As soon as the political, intelligence, and propaganda budgets are complete and I have negotiated the necessary funds for them from the Group I shall let you know. Meanwhile, I have secured the Group's approval to maintain these activities on an interim basis until I can clarify the budgetary procedure.
6. If we both keep the foregoing in mind and remain on the terms of the Gentlemen's Agreement, I am sure that these difficulties will not again arise. In the future, the military budget will of course be your responsibility. Your advice on intelligence, propaganda, and political matters will be extremely valuable and I will make up the final budget based on the information I received from you and the advisors, plus my own considered review of the situation.
110. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], March 2, 1954, 0648Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 144, Folder 002. Routine; Immediate Action; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
SLINC 828. Lincoln SitRep Week 22 Feb-1 March 54, for Coordination Mtg.
1. Enemy:
While KUFIRE reporting from WSBURNT continues unsatisfactory, sufficient overt and semi-overt manifestations of govt and Commie intent have accumulated to justify assumption that WSBURNT moving into status of denied area. Such indications include:
A. Steadily mounting propaganda, including signature campaigns, against "intervention," a familiar pretext for internal repression and militancy.
B. Organization of local committees for defense of regime, coupled with proposal that large-scale military TNG be instituted.
C. Continuing expropriation landowners and demagogic stirring-up of squatters against current land system.
D. CGTG letter to AGIG (Assn of Industrialists) tacitly accusing industrialists of failure to push development of country and requesting reduction of electric and rail rates. This significant initial assault on free enterprise and preview of state-run, Communist-type industrialization.
E. Mounting threats to free press, including jamming anti-Red programs, arrest of anti-Red broadcaster Oscar Conde, etc.
F. Concurrent intensive deception and provocation campaign, with deception theme that Arbenz about to break with Reds and with frequent provocation rumors of imminent revolt, designed to flush out opposition.
Pace of above developments, if continued unabated, opens possibility of tacit conversion WSBURNT to denied area status by late summer or early fall 1954.
2. Friendly:
A. Due to internal and external obstacles, it has hitherto been impossible set approximate D-day based on reasonable assurances. Progress of events now indicates necessity, despite many imponderables still remaining and still to come, of fixing tentative date.
B. After thorough review of all aspects of the program, LINC believes best estimate of earliest possible D-day to be in first two weeks of June. Final date to be determined with HQs approval. This estimate based on considerations in following paras.
C. KUFIRE: Systematic exploitation SYNCARP KUFIRE assets and development independent assets, if vigorously pursued, can be accomplished next 90 days.
D. KUGOWN: Flow of guidance and materials to controlled assets is presently increasing and will continue. Proposed hemisphere-wide anti-Red conf scheduled for 15 Apr and exile labor mtg May 1 (being developed by Nebecker) should provide outside KUGOWN impetus. Key to KUGOWN effort inside WSBURNT is SHERWOOD siting and initiation of programs. These must go into effect not later than 1 April to provide 60-day KUGOWN buildup.
E. KUHOOK:
1) Firming up SYNCARP/SKIMMER relationship to insure reliability of Calligeris. Ontrich will undertake this week.
2) Based on Ontrich preparations, Cadick is to examine staging sites, staging preparation, transport facilities, etc., to insure Calligeris capability implement logistics plans. Cadick trip to be completed approx 10 March.
3) SCRANTON trainees will graduate approx 25 May, according present plans.
4) Twenty-seven sabotage trainees will graduate 15 March. Leader trainees will graduate SARANAC approx 1 May allowing thirty days implement organization inside target area.
F. Above proposed scheduling necessitates following immediate actions:
First: Immediate implementation SHERWOOD on Santa Fe, to be in operation 1 April at latest. Santa Fe is only solution, since negotiations with [name not declassified] now appear postponed, [name not declassified] consent on basis experience is doubtful and KMFLUSH site does not fully assure permanence. Full effort must be made minimize security drawbacks Santa Fe site to provide vital KUGOWN facility.
Second: Expedite and fulfill objective ensuring [name not declassified] complete support as contemplated.
Third: Postpone all black flights two weeks.
3. Significant Operational Details:
A. General: Separate program underway to locate, develop and expand operational assets completely independent known SYNCARP assets for purposes seeking objectivity in KUFIRE reporting and acquiring outside support for PBSUCCESS. Foregoing need highlighted due recent evidence Calligeris freewheeling and still unresolved security of SYNCARP. [name not declassified] fully cognizant and attempting bring Calligeris into line.
[Omitted here are 2 pages of specific operational details.]
111. Memorandum From [name not declassified] to DC/P, C/CE, and C/PP, Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, March 8, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 65, Folder 8. Secret; RYBAT.
SUBJECT
Agrarian Reform/2/
/2/See Document 35.
1. It is my firm opinion, based upon everything I have read to date upon agrarian reform, that it is imperative we examine this matter closely and be prepared to accept it as originally conceived as part of our political program. I believe it is essential that we do so and that the gains so made and the progress under this reform not be lost while changing governments. If we are able to adopt this quickly in our program and propagate rapidly, it is believed that we will obtain considerable support from the campesinos wherein lies the strength of the enemy. In this regard we would then be able to provide for support within the CNC, attempting to subsidize and defect this organization as much as possible.
2. As a corollary to the above effort I believe we should concentrate soonest on mounting an operation to defect Major Martinez, assuring him that the agrarian reform would be fully accepted by the new government and that he would be the director to insure that it is properly carried out in the best interests of the people. This could be a very important defection target and, if successful, could largely contribute to our ultimate success.
[initials not declassified]
112. Dispatch From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
HUL-A-176
[place not declassified], March 9, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 101, Folder 4. Secret; RYBAT.
SUBJECT
Calligeris' Status in Honduras
1. In an informal memorandum dated 1 March 1954,/2/ Stephen R. Lugton reported that Calligeris had been in contact with the Minister of Foreign Relations in Honduras. The Minister told Calligeris that President Galvez would be much more willing to support Calligeris as far as freedom of movement, black flights, etc., are concerned if Galvez would receive confirmation of the sensitivity and authenticity of the Calligeris movement from a third party./3/ Calligeris told Lugton that until the "Group" makes the necessary gestures to Galvez via whatever channels they may choose, he will be limited in what he can accomplish.
/2/Not found.
/3/The same information was reported to [name not declassified] on February 27; see Document 106.
2. The above is submitted for your information and possible guidance in levying an appropriate request on ODACID.
Jerome C. Dunbar/4/
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates another officer initialed for Dunbar.
113. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 9, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 154, Folder 1. Top Secret; Eyes Only.
WEEKLY PBSUCCESS MEETING WITH DD/P
PRESENT
Mr. Lampton Berry, Mr. Ray Leddy (Department of State); [5 names not declassified]
1. Mr. [name not declassified] opened the meeting with comments on a paper entitled "Points for consideration concerning informant". It was agreed that the identity of Mr. X, who is in contact with Mr. Leddy, should not be disclosed at this time except on a strictly need-to-know basis. Mr. [name not declassified] said that this contact fell in a vague and shadowy field where it is not clear when does such a case come into the zone of being a Bureau matter. Mr. [name not declassified] suggested getting in touch with Mr. Dennis Flinn, Deputy Director for Security of the Department of State because X comes from a hostile Embassy and has begun to talk. It is suggested that the Bureau be notified of this development for the protection of Mr. Leddy and in order to prevent them from wasting time running after false scents. If by any chance the Bureau has a case, the Department of State would not want to cross wires. It is our hope that the Bureau would not wish to assert total jurisdiction. Information received from informant X is extremely interesting. Details are covered in memorandum referred to. [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] (Action: [name not declassified])
2. Mr. Berry then stated that he and Mr. Leddy were there to take stock of the present situation, to determine where we stand now and what are the future prospects. Are things going downhill so fast in Guatemala that PBSUCCESS as it now stands may not be enough. Consideration must be given to the much greater pressure which may come from Congress and public opinion on the present Administration if the situation in Guatemala does deteriorate. It may be necessary to take more calculated risks then before. At the end of the Caracas Conference we should have a clearer view of our position and a re-assessment of the situation should be made at a briefing and discussion with the new Assistant Secretary of State, Mr. Holland,/2/ General Smith and Mr. Dulles. Mr. [name not declassified] replied "Let Caracas run its course and see what comes out of it." We agree to the need of making progress reports to policy chiefs of this Government so that we may obtain additional reassurances that the rug will not be pulled from under us in the future as occurred in the Li Mi case. Mr. [name not declassified] then asked Mr. Berry exactly what was meant by possible additional calculated risks. Messrs Berry and Leddy replied: (a) We might reconsider exploiting the conclusion arrived at by Trujillo last year and transmitted to Perez Jimenez that the best way to bring about the fall of the Arbenz government would be to eliminate 15-20 of its leaders with Trujillo's trained pistoleros. (b) State might consider overt action along the lines of no more shipping to Guatemala, no more oil, no more air passengers or transport. (c) PBSUCCESS program through Phase IV appears insufficient to do the job and it is feared that Phase V shows the U.S. hand. Mr. Berry then said that in his opinion the "gut point" of the operation is where does the Guatemala City garrison stand, and asked [name not declassified] if he could answer that question. [name not declassified] replied that he thought the operation could be brought to a conclusion by 15 June; that the program was complex but that we believe the Agency has the capability of doing the job. The radio program is to begin on 1 April and the last part of it, at D-Day, a terror program, is based on Orson Welles and is most effective. [name not declassified]--the build-up by training, equipment, etc.--is like a boiler under steam pressure; it cannot be stopped once it gets to a certain point. Mr. Berry repeated that the important question is where does the Guatemala City garrison stand, and asked [name not declassified] if he knew. [name not declassified] replied that PBSUCCESS is a complex, top secret program which includes ghost voicing, deception, mines, bazookas, and fire power. It is difficult to explain without the wall map and charts available at Lincoln. There remains a lot to be done but it is believed it can be done by June. While it is fine to talk about the OAS Conference and the need for a re-assessment of its conclusion, once we get beyond a certain point we do not believe that we can stop the operation. Mr. Berry--"This is a much more optimistic rsum than we had any reason to believe based on reports so far".
/2/Henry F. Holland replaced John M. Cabot as Assistant Secretary of Inter-American Affairs on March 1, 1954.
Mr. [name not declassified]--"We have not yet come to the point of any reasonable assurance of success".
Mr. Leddy--"What is the chance of U.S. exposure?"
Mr. [name not declassified]--"There is no official estimate yet. We have been concerned from the very beginning about keeping so much activity under a basket. There has already been one flap, although not the fault of anyone at this table. We have to be concerned and would like to know what is the position of high government authority if things go wrong."
[name not declassified]--"Once arms are in the forward area, and according to present plans this will be in 30-40 days, we are practically committed. All the controls we have are not adequate to assure complete control from that point on. After 1 April we will be too far committed to call off the operation."
Mr. [name not declassified] to [name not declassified]--"Don't worry".
Mr. [name not declassified] to [name not declassified]--"Your job is to carry out instructions. You are to get the job done".
[name not declassified] to Mr. Berry--"Everything we do may be plausibly denied if uncovered".
Mr. Berry--"We must bring our top-level people up to date one month from now."
Mr. [name not declassified] to [name not declassified]--"Watch out for compromising pieces of paper."
Mr. Leddy--"Because of disclosures by the Guatemalan Government and the appointment of a new Assistant Secretary of State, we must consider the 'broad' approach to PBSUCCESS from the viewpoint of the Department. We need a general go-around with consideration being given to (a) is PBSUCCESS the way to handle this operation (b) if it is the way to handle it are we using all possible means not attributable to the United States to carry the operation to a successful conclusion. If attributable to the United States, it should not be done. High level State thinking is that an act which can be pinned on the United States will set us back in our relations with Latin American countries by fifty years."
[name not declassified] then expressed himself as opposed to the elimination of 15-20 Guatemalan leaders as a possible solution to the problem, although stating that such elimination was part of the plan and could be done. Mr. Berry then said that knocking off the leaders might make it possible for the Army to take over. [name not declassified] replied that it is an illusion to believe the Army has control. The Army is losing control to organized and armed labor and police. The 1952 revolution in Bolivia could be repeated, where for the first time in Latin American history armed labor defeated the Army. Mr. [name not declassified] stated that it is not certain that the Army has lost control. Mr. Leddy said that he was much surprised at [name not declassified]'s statement about the armed strength of labor because according to an Embassy report of two weeks ago there is no known training of labor groups and it must be that the Embassy needs jacking up in its reporting. [name not declassified] said that our information came via RUFUS' nets and was a third country operation. Mr. Leddy then asked is it feasible to buy up the top Army command. [name not declassified] replied he did not know but we are prepared to launch an operation towards the defection and recruitment of [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] and possibly Arbenz. Mr. Leddy replied this merits going into, but in his opinion the chances of defecting Arbenz are much less than 50-50. A discussion followed of using [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] as a one-man team on high-level defections, and Mr. Berry raised the question what would happen to RUFUS forces who already have arms if through successful defections inside Guatemala Arbenz was overthrown. Mr. Leddy said he opposed [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] it was U.S. Government, but [less than 1 line of source text not declassified]. He reiterated--"When we get to the point of making a decision where our action will successfully attribute to the United States Government the support of a revolution, it is our thinking at this time that we should not get on with it." He asked--"Is it possible to provoke an incident where OAS will intervene?"
[name not declassified]
114. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, March 10, 1954, 2051Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 42, Folder 3. Secret; Immediate Action; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by King.
41591. 1. Toriello stated today Caracas he would present documentary proof intervention. Not known what information he may divulge. You are directed prepare for possible descent by press representatives seeking confirmation allegations Toriello may make. Prepare take appropriate evasive action or be ready with cover story protecting Base LINCOLN and all Safe-Houses.
115. Contact Report/1/
No. 48
[place not declassified], March 12, 1954, 9:40 a.m.-12:10 p.m.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 12. Secret.
PLACE: War Room
STAFF PRESENT: [2 names not declassified], W. Robertson, [8 names not declassified]
Discussion:
[name not declassified] spoke first, indicating this would be a quick review since there was a Telecon being set up for 11 a.m. for a discussion of all matters to be taken up at the meeting.
On arrival at HQs he was briefed by J. Esterline that evening on the situation as JE saw it. Tuesday/2/ [initials not declassified] attended a policy conference which included two representatives (R. Leddy and L. Berry) from State Dept. in addition to the normal coordinating committee./3/ He stated that the State Dept. has become apprehensive over PBSUCCESS and that a statement was made in official language at this meeting that the official view of the State Dept. would be that they would not under any circumstances support PBSUCCESS if it meant that the U.S. government would become involved in any way; that the State Dept. was not willing to sacrifice its principles of non-intervention for the Guatemalan cause. [initials not declassified] said he insisted that it be read in the record that the statement be qualified that the U.S. government would not be involved beyond notional or plausible denial. [name not declassified] stated his feelings on the subject and his attitude toward the problem since it was laid on by NSC. He said that we made no commitments that the U.S. could not be pulled out of and if we do pull out now we lose face among the anti-Communists and we would never be able to mount an operation of this kind in Guatemala again. [name not declassified] stated that in approximately 10 days the situation would be such that whereas we may desire to pull out, it would not alter the course of events; we could not pull out. In 10 days the movement would be beyond recall.
/2/March 9.
/3/See Document 113.
[name not declassified] was asked if we felt that we would be able to carry this off satisfactorily. He answered "yes" and he gave the first part of June as the date of readiness at which they seemed surprised.
He insisted that he had to have a vote of confidence, that there would be no change in PBSUCCESS. Mr. Wisner said that all discussions on a policy level were to be heard by [initials not declassified] but as far as [initials not declassified] was concerned we were to continue with the operation and as far as CIA was concerned there was not any thought whatever of pulling back. We were to pull for the earliest date of readiness.
Mr. Leddy was informed that [name not declassified] was being made available to exploit all defection possibilities. Mr. [name not declassified] is at HQs now working with personnel there on a defection plan.
Pessimism exhibited by State Dept. made the meeting most unsatisfactory from that angle.
J.C. King is going to bring Leddy and Berry to LINCOLN in the near future, perhaps the early part of next week and we must be prepared for a critical attitude from them.
[initials not declassified] asked that Gen. Cabell be requested to modify his order closing FJHOPEFUL and this is being extended for the duration of PBSUCCESS.
The question of someone to speak to Somoza came up. Maj. Gen. Charles Mullen, who has had extensive experience in Latin America and who founded the Military Academy in Nicaragua, was named but he had not been approached. [initials not declassified] was authorized to go talk to Gen. Mullen and it was planned that the general would go to visit Somoza and utilize Pres. Galvez in Honduras and to Salvador to acquire unofficial assurance from them of cooperation. Exact plans for Gen. Mullen have not been formulated. [initials not declassified] went to Arizona and talked to Gen. Mullen who was fully alert to the problem and in a very short time was able to discuss the problem with [initials not declassified] from M's point of view, with suggestions which were very much in line. Gen. Mullen agreed to undertake the job.
Gen. Mullen was to try to proceed to Washington on 12 March or, if not able to go on the 12th would go on Sunday./4/ (A phone call from JCKing during the meeting provided the information that Gen. Mullen had arrived in Washington on the 11th.) He will be in Washington on Monday and will then proceed to Lincoln. He will spend one day or evening in [place not declassified].
/4/March 14.
Jake Esterline had prepared a paper pointing out the maximum danger for SHERWOOD. Tracey Barnes now has the paper and is going to try to get State Dept.'s concurrence on this establishment. SHERWOOD represents the maximum danger, the closest that they can come to proof of U.S. participation. We must push for a Nicaraguan site for SHERWOOD. It must be tested, ready to go, so it can be used for black broadcasts. A Nicaraguan site for SHERWOOD is vital.
Hediger's return was arranged and he will be discharged upon his return to Washington. The man Hediger recommended is to be acquired. Hediger is not to cut in on anything else.
It was requested that the [name not declassified] case be expedited.
[initials not declassified]--Re the OAS conference, the Dulles speech was moderate and support was obtained.
[initials not declassified] said that Wisner told him that the long cable which we sent on the 9th was sent directly to [place not declassified] after being read at HQs.
JCKing phoned at this point.
JCKing-[initials not declassified] phone message contained following items of information:
Statement was made that [name not declassified] is in charge at Guatemala Station and [name not declassified] is coming out.
Gen. Mullen arrived in Washington Tuesday night and is now being briefed. His passport and visas won't be ready till Monday. Gen. Mullen is seeing Allen Dulles this morning at 11 a.m.
State Dept. still has not endorsed the recommendation that Gen. Mullen go to visit all 3 countries.
[initials not declassified] said that at present Washington is forced to obtain approval on every cent they spend for PBSUCCESS. Until otherwise informed, we will continue to charge expenditures to specific tasks. We have no authority for expenditures other than those against specific tasks. There is a finance officer assigned to the PBSUCCESS support staff at HQs in Washington. His name is [name not declassified] and he is coming down early next week. We must anticipate our task requirements for the next 30 days so that we will have no problems financially.
The next portion of the meeting is covered by Contact Reports of WRobertson and [name not declassified].
Meeting adjourned at 1210 hrs. Prior to the close of the meeting there was another phone call from Washington (from Esterline) in which [initials not declassified] was informed that the Chief, FED, had withdrawn approval on the availability of [name not declassified]. Esterline was told that the boss said to have the best men and that [name not declassified] was the best so they were requested to re-open the subject. [name not declassified] is qualified and is needed right away. A cable will be sent (LINC 1032)/5/ on that after the meeting. There are no other capable candidates to replace [name not declassified].
/5/Dated March 12. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 2, Folder 5)
116. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, March 14, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 6. Secret. Prepared on March 15.
SUBJECT
Conference Between the DCI and Secretary of State on 14 March 1954
1. Mr. Wisner informed Mr. Barnes and Col. King that at a meeting between the Director and the Secretary of State yesterday the following decisions and/or actions were arrived at:
A. The Secretary believes that there should be at an early date a review of the PBSUCCESS operation.
B. The Secretary's conclusion, after two weeks of observation at the Caracas Conference, is that he sees no reason to change the tempo of PBSUCCESS, but "don't get caught".
C. Will we give careful thought and study to the establishment of an overt liberation committee consisting of refugees from Guatemala who are not actively engaged or tied into PBSUCCESS. The objectives are two: 1. To divert attention from covert activities; 2. To use as a sounding board for propaganda. The danger of producing confusion is realized. This is a request for study, not an instruction to set up a new committee. The study should include location of already active overt liberation committees, the existence of any prominent Guatemalans in exile who are not members of such committees, the most suitable country in which to set up such a committee. Mr. Wisner suggests consideration of a notional committee. Action: [name not declassified].
D. Toriello. The Secretary gained the impression from his observation of Toriello during the Caracas Conference that Toriello may be an opportunist and a possible subject for defection. We are requested to prepare a memo for the DD/P containing what is immediately available of background information on Toriello. In this should be included whatever information [name not declassified] and [name not declassified] may have. A thorough study, including CE aspects, is to be immediately initiated. Action: Esterline.
[Omitted here is a paragraph unrelated to Guatemala.]
J.C. King
Chief, WH
117. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida, to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
[place not declassified], March 23, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 3. Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
SLINC 1229. 1. Although recognize difficulty your taking effective counteraction nevertheless ERRATIC must demonstrate soon real qualities of being able work in harness or else.
2. SYNCARP sources inside WSBURNT reporting ERRATIC spreading word he and Calligeris now in close accord inferring latter is his junior and takes orders from him.
3. This could be very injurious all around and cannot be tolerated. Obviously PBSUCCESS is and will build up Calligeris thus para 1 above becomes mandatory.
4. Appears ERRATIC has swung form mudslinging to subordinating Calligeris. Use theme of all anti-Commies working together and cut out the personal buildup as above as many would-be followers would rebel against ERRATIC.
118. Memorandum From [name not declassified] to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division, Central Intelligence Agency (King)/1/
March 26, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 134, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
K-Program Plan
1. Background
Within the purview of PBSUCCESS and designed to further the attainment of its immediate ends, it is planned to assign Page for a period of approximately 90 days to Guatemala, where he will be charged with the execution of a defection program, targeted to bring important segments of the Guatemalan executive apparatus under American control.
2. Relation to PBSUCCESS
K-Program is not conceived as a practicable alternative to the basic plan, envisaging the overthrow of the Arbenz regime through the instigation of an internal uprising engineered by the indigenous resistance organization from the outside. Rather, the program is designed to render a material contribution to the accomplishment of PBSUCCESS by a harnessing to its purpose important elements of the Army command and of the executive branch of the Guatemalan government.
3. Labor Program
Under K-Program it is contemplated to defect leading trade union officials and to activate those elements in the Guatemalan trade union movement not yet under Communist sway. For the purpose of this program Page will be provided with the services of an operational assistant who has bona fide labor organization and cover.
4. Personnel
[name not declassified] will be assigned to Guatemala as Page's field assistant. He will serve as communications clerk, interpreter, bodyguard, and discharge all housekeeping chores incidental to K-Program.
5. Schedule
Page and [name not declassified] will proceed to Guatemala on or about 15 April 1954. The labor assistant should become available not later than 20 April.
6. Official Position
For the duration of the program, Page will be stationed in Guatemala as a senior official of the Central Intell. Agency serving as the personal representative of [name not declassified] in his capacity as Chief of the Project. Although Page will operate independently of the Guatemala station, it is understood that the station's overt and covert assets will be committed to the support of K-Program. This arrangement is not meant to derogate from [name not declassified]'s status as Chief of Station. It is anticipated that he and Page will work in closest harmony toward the implementation of the program.
7. Accreditation
Ambassador Peurifoy will be apprised of Page's mission in broad outline and be requested to render him the necessary support within bounds of diplomatic propriety. It will be intimated to Peurifoy that Page is a ranking and responsible official of the C.I.A. and that he is operating independently of the local station. Mr. Frank Wisner has offered to write Amb. Peurifoy a personal letter along those lines. (This letter should refer to Page under his assumed identity.)
8. Personal Cover
Page will represent himself and live the cover of an American of independent means, spending a prolonged period of time as a tourist recuperating from the rigors of idleness. His standing will be backed by a New York investment counselor, Mr. [name not declassified] notionally entrusted with the administration of Page's account. In Page's name Mr. [name not declassified] will open a checking account with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] New York, with an initial deposit of approximately $30,000. The foregoing arrangement has been designed to protect Page against untoward leakage as the result of perfunctory checks, but is unlikely to stand up to severe scrutiny. It may lend surface credence to Page's disassociation from any official connection with the United States Govt.
9. Operational Cover
Inducement approaches and contacts of an operational nature will be executed in a manner adaptable to the over-all cover of PBSUCCESS. The foregoing notwithstanding, it may in some instances become necessary to imply that the United States Govt. does not disapprove of the underlying purpose of this program and that, even without official cognizance, all commitments will be met. Where success or failure of the whole program may hinge upon a "plausible admission" of government backing, the circumstances will be presented to higher headquarters for their decision. In a case of overriding importance, the legitimization of Page should require official backstopping, and since time is of the essence, Page will be authorized to attempt at resolving the issue locally in consultation with Ambassador Peurifoy.
10. Personal Security
According to Mr. [name not declassified], acting chief of the Guatemala Station, the Guatemalan authorities, in case of compromise, are unlikely to go beyond expelling Page. This, however, should not be taken for granted and their resort to more drastic means, such as interrogation under duress, should not be ruled out altogether. All reasonable precautions will be taken to prevent surreptitious detention unbeknownst to the American Embassy.
11. Communications
In order to communicate with Lincoln, Page will be authorized to avail himself of the pouching and cabling facilities of Guatemala Station. In addition Page will be authorized the use of one-time pads for the encipherment and decipherment of communications whose contents he wishes to withhold from local station personnel. For emergency purposes, such as a breakdown of communications via [3-1/2 lines of source text not declassified] Page and his field assistant have been trained.
12. Equipment
In addition to one-time pads and carbon system, Page will be issued a Leica camera with a document reproduction attachment. He will further be provided with strip film and a few of the elementary concealment devices in which to hide strip film. ([name not declassified] will be trained in document photography and the developing of strip film.) If operationally necessary, the equipment may be loaned out to indigenous agents and a replacement will be provided upon request.
13. Transportation
For the duration of his stay in Guatemala, Page and the labor assist-ant, will each be authorized the full-time use of an American-make car to be purchased locally. Locally available means of transportation, including commercial aircraft, railway, ships and taxis are authorized.
14. Entertainment
A representation allowance not to exceed $1,000 during a period of thirty days will be provided for purposes set forth in AFR 30-6, paragraph 2. The style of entertainment will be dictated by local standards and by the nature of Page's cover.
15. Operational Expenditures
Page will be authorized to expend without prior approval up to and including $1,000 for developmental purposes in each case, with a maximum of $10,000 per month set aside to cover such expenditures. One-time expenditures over and beyond $1,000, and any expenditures in fulfillment of a commitment providing for recurrent payments extending over a period of more than one month shall require prior headquarters approval.
16. Finances
Expenses other than those directly related to the conduct of clandestine operations (e.g. payment of agents) will be paid by draft against Page's account with the [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] whenever this is considered appropriate. In addition, a letter of credit will be opened with a Guatemalan Bank, preferably a [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] correspondent in that country, in the amount of $5,000. Other expenditures will be defrayed from funds made available by Guatemala Station.
17. Accounting
All operational expenditures will be accounted for by voucher, setting forth the nature of the transaction in as much detail as compatible with local security conditions. Whenever possible receipts will be submitted, but in lieu thereof a written statement to the effect that a receipt was not obtainable will be accepted. Personal expenditures incurred by personnel connected with K-Program, if Agency funds are involved, will be accounted for as soon as possible, and reimbursement will be effected as soon as compatible with local security.
[name not declassified]
119. Memorandum From C/[title not declassified], Central Intelligence Agency, to All Staff Officers/1/
Washington, March 31, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 145, Folder 12. No classification marking. Marked "Hand Carry." A handwritten note at the bottom of the page reads: "Elimination List. April [illegible]--Rip is taking a copy of list of names for checking with the Junta. April 7--Original Memo with attached Biographic data has been passed to [title not declassified]. Returned by [title not declassified] on 1 June 1954."
SUBJECT
Selection of individuals for disposal by Junta Group
C/[title not declassified] has requested a list of names be compiled for study by Staff Officers to determine if they meet the latest criteria for inclusion on the Junta's disposal list.
Consideration for inclusion on the final list should positively establish that the individual falls into one or more of the following groups:
1) High government and organizational leaders whose outward position has not disclosed the fact they are motivated and directed by the Cominform and who are irrevocably implicated in Communist doctrine and policy.
2) Out-and-out proven Communist leaders whose removal from the political scene is required for the immediate and future success of the new government.
3) Those few individuals in key government and military positions of tactical importance whose removal for psychological, organizational or other reasons is mandatory for the success of military action.
This document is routed to Staff Officers for deletions, additions, and/or comments. It is requested that a final list of disposees be approved promptly to permit P.M. planning to proceed on schedule.
The following list of individuals for consideration has been assembled from old lists supplied by the Junta and from recent intelligence available at Lincoln. Your careful consideration is requested in making additions or deletions./2/
/2/The phrase "recent intelligence available" is underlined and a marginal note reads: "no, not done." The list is attached but not printed
Each officer is to indicate his concurrence by placing his initials after each name on the attached list which he believes should remain on this list. Exceptions, additions or deletions are to be noted on the pages following the attachment.
120. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, April 6, 1954, 2256Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 7, Folder 8. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.
45322. To: [place not declassified] (for SKILLET from Whiting). Re: [telegram indicator not declassified] 071; LINC 1585./2/
/2/Neither printed. (Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 13, Folder 1 and Box 142, Folder 4, respectively)
1. Approached Air Force headquarters in effort obtain approval and assistance for implementation your recommendation. Air Force points out that probable reason for local inability take action is existence of clause in basic contractual agreement forbidding U.S. military mission engage any intelligence activities. This clause likewise inserted similar military assistance agreements numerous other countries with result that any action WSHOOFS which could be construed as violating this clause would prejudice position and standing military missions in other areas as well as WSHOOFS.
2. In view these circumstances, Air Force disinclined instruct ref identity A this matter and in addition there may be problem of providing properly qualified expert to do job.
3. Our best recommendation is that you endeavor deal with negative reply in manner best calculated gain some credit by pointing out that inability comply with request is measure of our good faith, living up to strict terms contractual agreement. You might also request that if some other method of meeting problem could be suggested by WSHOOFS authorities this would receive most favorable consideration possible. For your own information, a request coming from head of WSHOOFS government would, to some extent, mitigate possibility damaging consequences of affirmative response to request. However, technical problem of effect on status military missions other countries would remain.
4. Greatly regret our inability help you solve Air Force angle this problem. Concerning para 5-B of reference, [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] hereby requested submit on urgent basis any plan or proposal which it considers feasible to this end, including possible utilization some KUBARK agent assets. This point not to be discussed with WSHOOFS officials pending Headquarters consideration.
121. Memorandum From the Deputy Director for Plans, Central Intelligence Agency (Wisner) to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division (King)/1/
Washington, April 8, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 158, Folder 5. Secret; Eyes Only.
SUBJECT
Guatemalan acquisition of Iron Curtain arms
1. The addressees of the original and copies of this memorandum have been alerted to the extreme importance of the subject matter, and [name not declassified] has been requested to get on top of this matter and give it highest priority attention during the forthcoming days and until we have pressed the matter to conclusion. Each of the other addressees has a role to play in connection with the matter, and while contributions of ideas and recommendations are solicited from them--it is most important that the handling of this matter be coordinated in one place, viz. [name not declassified]. This would apply in particular to any propagandistic exploitation of this matter and no directives should be given about it without prior clearance as indicated.
2. Toward the close of our briefing session with Assistant Secretary Holland this development was the subject of extensive discussion. Everyone present, including the Director and Deputy Director, was impressed with the significance of the opportunity afforded to us if this matter is properly handled and dealt with. The obvious first phase is a concentration on the intelligence aspect of the matter and until we have firmed up the intelligence concerning the shipment and its time and method of delivery, including the identification of the vessel or other means of transport, no other action of any kind should be taken. If we are able to pin this one down and develop intelligence concerning the shipment, there are a number of means of exploitation which will have to be considered at a very high policy level, and the possibility exists that strong measures may be taken.
3. It is our current thinking that we should take no action at this stage to deter or interfere with the shipment, but rather allow events to take their course at least to the point when exposure would be most compromising to the Guatemalans.
4. In a conversation with Admiral Espe yesterday afternoon, I called his attention to this matter and underscored its importance. I proposed to him and he agreed to an "intelligence partnership" with regard to this shipment. More specifically, I suggested that we keep each other fully informed of whatever might come to our attention respectively about the shipment and that our joint resources be concentrated upon the obtainment--through secret means--of all possible information about it. I have recommended to [name not declassified] that he follow up on this opening conversation with Admiral Espe or his Deputy, and I think that it is important that this be done at an early date. In this follow-up [name not declassified] should emphasize the importance of avoiding any showing of our (US) knowledge or interest so as to avoid a premature flushing of the covey.
Frank C. Wisner/2/
/2/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
122. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 3, Folder 3. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence and the CIA Station in [place not declassified].
[place not declassified], April 8, 1954, 0847Z.
1690. 1. Important emphasis be placed on all evidence connecting WSBURNT with recent attempt against [name not declassified]./2/ Desire to know true sponsors of movement; where and how trained; origin of weapons and supplies plus any documentary evidence implicating WSBURNT.
/2/The Nicaraguan Government announced on April 5 the capture of an armed group allegedly planning an attack on Somoza; see Gleijeses, Shattered Hope, pp. 293-294.
2. Understand Diplomatic Corps invited to inspect weapons. Could you obtain photos and description including markings?
3. Jose Maria Tercero Lacayo in hands local authorities allegedly stated group trained in WSBURNT and sent [name not declassified] for this mission. Can you obtain details of interrogation?
4. Alberto Baez Bone allegedly former member WSBURNT army, a Luis Baez Bone, KMFLUSH exile in WSBURNT was connected with Communist front organizations. Are they identical? Where is Baez now? If captured, attempt obtain full details of interrogation.
5. Jorge Rivas Montes, Honduran, known leader of Caribbean Legion reportedly in charge WSBURNT Carib/Legion Training Program. Whereabouts unknown.
6. Francisco Ibarra Mayorga, Lt. Guillermo Duarte and Guillermo Suarez Rivas reportedly took asylum in WSBURNT Embassy. These plus Adolfo Alfaro and Hernan Robleto reported in [name not declassified] Embassy may become available for interrogation if [name not declassified] criminal law decision invalidates political asylum.
7. Juan Martinez Reyes, known KMFLUSH arms dealer.
8. Rifles and MG's reported by Pivall as Mexican make; FBIS reports arms bore [name not declassified] marks.
9. Cable info priority as received.
123. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, April 10, 1954, 0111Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 142, Folder 4. Secret; Priority; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by Wisner.
45998. To: [place not declassified] (for SKILLET from Whiting). Refs: A. [telegram indicator not declassified] 109; B. [telegram indicator not declassified] 111; C. [telegram indicator not declassified] 108; D. [telegram indicator not declassified] 091./2/
/2/None printed; telegrams 109, 111, and 108 are dated April 8, April 9, and April 8, respectively. (Ibid., Box 13, Folder 2) Telegram 91 is dated April 7. (Ibid., Folder 1)
1. Ref A: Double Uncle.
2. Both ODACID and KUBARK seriously concerned about extent of SKILLET's/3/ personal involvement as revealed by above references. We had never contemplated that SKILLET would be projected into firsthand discussion of details this operation with such persons as Pres. WSHOOFS and Chief of Air Staff. Unable to state at present time what effect this exposure will have on ODACID judgment re continuation operation in present form, but we already on notice very strong feelings of doubt re advisability trying maintain present timetable. At high level meeting scheduled for tomorrow we hope obtain some clarification ODACID position and will communicate results this discussion.
/3/A handwritten marginal note reads: "Amb to Honduras, Whiting Willauer," and an arrow points to "SKILLET."
3. Will also raise at this meeting your question Ref C re what assurances, guarantees SKILLET authorized give Pres. WSHOOFS if this subject raised by him. However, should point out that SKILLET's giving of special and additional official guarantees as quid pro quo for his cooperation this matter would be clear indication if not acknowledgment ODYOKE official responsibility. This would remove last vestiges of carefully erected and tediously maintained basis for denial official responsibility.
4. Re request arrangement invitation WSHOOFS Defense Minister (Ref B) and also timing deliveries and arrangements storage matériel (Ref C), more time will be required before any approval can be given these proposals let alone action taken thereon. At present we much prefer hold matériel in place rather than send it forward and hand it over to tender mercies WSHOOFS who might refuse release it at critical moment or even use this possession as bargaining or evidentiary weapon against us.
5. Concerning para 3 (Ref D) Whiting understands that instructions have already gone forward from ODACID authorizing delay of brief but unspecified period of action re military treaty. We continue to feel negotiation this treaty and any news releases which could be made concerning it of great impact upon WSBURNT military thinking. Therefore extremely important progress this as rapidly as conditions permit. Your judgment as to timing requested in light of foregoing.
6. SKILLET may rest assured all his messages being closely followed by Whiting personally and that Whiting fully aware of pressures under which everyone connected this matter laboring.
124. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to the CIA Station in [place not declassified]/1/
Washington, April 10, 1954, 1637Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 9. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wisner. Repeated to PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida.
46015. Re: DIR 45998./2/ For SKILLET from Whiting.
/2/Document 123.
1. High level meeting referred to in ref scheduled for this afternoon following which SKILLET will receive further guidance./3/ However in meanwhile Whiting requested by Starke convey to SKILLET following personal message.
/3/On April 10 Wisner briefed Assistant Secretary Holland on PBSUCCESS and Holland, shocked by security lapses, demanded a top-level review of the project. (Cullather, Operation PBSUCCESS p. 101) See Document 127 for CIA's response.
"SKILLET should not have any further direct contact with local authorities or other non ODYOKE individuals with regard to any aspect of Success except pursuant to and within limits of specific instructions and authorization from HQs ODACID and KUBARK. Starke very concerned with regard present extent official exposure and considers that this raises serious question desirability continuing operation as previously planned."
2. In light of the foregoing and without in any way purporting to prejudge outcome of basic policy decision re continuation and timing success Whiting suggests SKILLET may wish consider and offer recommendations concerning best means softening impact local authorities SKILLET's withdrawal from direct contact. Realize possibility they may interpret such breakoff as evidence complete reversal ODYOKE position regarding all aspects this matter. Also on assumption policy decision may favor continuation project in something like present form recommendations SKILLET and Princep for re-establishment indirect channels communication will be needed for consideration here.
125. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, April 10, 1954, 1828Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 1. Secret; Priority. Drafted by Wisner.
46048. From Whiting.
1. FYI. High level meeting this afternoon being held at request identity A who has expressed strong doubts and reservations and purpose is to give him basic intelligence briefing and outline general concept of Success. Discussion of operational details will be held to minimum.
2. Plan generally take following positions:
A. Basic reason for PBSUCCESS in first instance was top level direction to accomplish planned result.
B. ODACID still primarily in charge basic policy decision and having approved our present plan at highest level we propose proceeding as scheduled unless directed otherwise by ODACID or unless operational considerations dictate modification plan and timing.
C. Regarding situation WSHOOFS believe no decision should be made before we obtain full knowledge all facts which LINCOLN obtaining from ONTRICH today.
D. Believe despite SKILLET exceeding authority situation may not prove irreparable operationally.
E. Any substantial delay present plan by ODACID would be serious and might mean any new effort thereafter would require starting from scratch or worse.
3. Will advise soonest outcome meeting which we feel certain will not produce any final decisions.
126. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
[place not declassified], April 11, 1954, 0935Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 3, Folder 4. Secret; Operational Immediate; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS.
1776. Ref: A. DIR 44842; B. LINC 1777; C. [telegram indicator not declassified] 126, para 4; D. LINC 1778./2/
/2/References A and B are ibid., Box 142, Folder 4. Reference C is ibid., Box 13, Folder 2. Reference D has not been found.
1. Following summation situation represents LINC's views based upon debriefing Ontrich who arrived 0000 April 11:
A. Galvez weakened and equivocated [less than 1 line of source text not declassified] to degree that required firm action to establish definite cooperation. Latter action taken by SKILLET who, while keeping Skimmer version and stressing ODYOKE non-intervention, kept Galvez in line while using Iden A and Ontrich to press for firm operational details.
B. SKILLET demonstrated exceptional political skill in keeping Vice Pres from resigning thus holding govt together for PBSUCCESS. This action endeared SKILLET to Galvez. Latter apparently now leaning on SKILLET as source of strength during current politically unstable period preceding elections.
C. Excellent security appears present despite above maneuvering. Only Galvez, Vice Pres, ForMin and Chief Air Force cut in within WSHOOFS. No documentary evidence nor witnesses to SKILLET talks. Plausible denial remains intact.
D. Galvez has general understanding with Osorio/3/ to act against WSBURNT together. SAFFRON-1, firm Calligeris supporter, due see Osorio next few days. More Galvez becomes committed in interim, stronger will SAFFRON-1's pressure on Osorio be. Osorio's support also requires ODACID approach in manner believed in progress at HQs level.
/3/President of El Salvador.
E. Removal MinDefense is essential earliest but is not a prerequisite for running initial flights. Time factor important as security weakens with every day's delay once flights initiated. Need HQs action.
F. LINC withdraws objections to intermediate storage at [name not declassified] as recent reports indicate increased enemy activity both sides of border. Thus gear would be moved from [name not declassified] direct with minimum delay into target areas.
G. Objectives re evidence of ODYOKE participation withdrawn view above clarification as now evident WSHOOFS would be thoroughly implicated once permitting arms enter country. Re-affirmation Skillet's role would prove extremely important to sustain Galvez's courage follow through. Believe Galvez's position too unstable vis-a-vis Carias to double-cross Calligeris. Thus conclusion is that Galvez will be most anxious move gear into target country rapidly as possible.
H. Test flight already laid on for 1730 April 11, per ref C. LINC strongly believes that Galvez must not be allowed to falter now that he has authorized flights and once gear arrives he has little choice but to follow through. He very anti-Communist and desires elimination WSBURNT but recognizes his own weakness to act, PBSUCCESS provides his answer.
2. Certain essential factors appear more firmly established than ever, namely:
A. Situation developing rapidly and favorably in WSBURNT. Archbishop's call for national crusade against Communism. Friction, distrust and uneasiness apparent in govt. People fully expecting change in government. Thus greatest time problem is to hold off abortive action and real action must not be delayed beyond present schedule.
B. Political instability in WSHOOFS dictates adherence to schedule as any delay will only jeopardize this ally. Loss of WSHOOFS could mean loss of DTFROGS as above.
C. Failure continue maximum effort to meet present ops plans which still intact and capable fulfillment unquestionably means loss of current year and possibly last chance overthrow Communists short direct military intervention.
3. View above factors and ref C LINC acting within authority ref A has determined to run a test black flight on schedule 11 April per ref D.
4. If HQs desires further explanation of foregoing, it is requested Dunbar be contacted by telephone soonest.
127. Memorandum Prepared in the Central Intelligence Agency/1/
Washington, April 15, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only. A handwritten note at the top of the page reads: "Presented by Wisner to State Dept. (Holland). File Policy folder."
SUBJECT
Disadvantages and damages resulting from a decision to discontinue or substantially modify PBSUCCESS
a. Pulling the plug on Calligeris and his organization with attend-ant possibilities of open recrimination as well as probable collapse of internal and external Calligeris organization. Difficulty, if not impossibility of reviving and revitalizing this organization and these individuals.
b. The possibility that there might be an attempted and abortive coup on the part of elements of the Calligeris organization; the results of such a fiasco both in terms of wiping out elements of potential resistance against the regime and charges and recriminations, are believed to be sufficiently evident to avoid the necessity for a fuller spelling-out here.
c. Sudden letting-down of Somoza which, coming on the heels of recent strong reassurances of continuing support and at a time of great pressure upon Somoza, might also result in open recriminations and great difficulties in obtaining his future "cooperation" with any form of covert venture which he might have reason to believe was stimulated or backed by us. If he chose to be very tough about the matter he has within his direct or potential control a lot of people and a lot of hardware which could be "worked on" or used by him to our considerable embarrassment.
d. Pulling the plug on the situation in Honduras which has been carefully built up to the point of our apparent ability to obtain the cooperation from Galvez and Co., which we need. According to the local estimate of the situation, the key members of the Honduran Government are currently not only committed to the support of the operation but are anxious to proceed vigorously. A reversal of direction at this time might have the effect of driving Gomez into a state of neutralist funk and would, in any case, make it extremely difficult to obtain his cooperation in the future.
e. The killing-off of this operation at the present time, if not accompanied almost simultaneously by a substantial new program of similar nature, would soon be known to the Guatemalan Communist regime and would tend to reassure that regime and strengthen its position. Doubtless the collapse of the Calligeris organization would be seized upon by the Guatemalan regime and widely heralded within the country--as well as outside--as proof of the "strength and rectitude" of Arbenz and Co.
f. Both State and this Agency would be immediately faced with the $64 question: "What are we going to do about Guatemala, and what can we do that would be effective?" We are on notice of the fact that in the upper echelons of the Administration it is expected that something will be done--of a drastic nature--to remove the menace of Communist-controlled Guatemala. Moreover, there seems to exist a considerable degree of expectation in certain quarters of the Congress that something is brewing, and in any case, that something must be done. These are real factors in the problem which must be taken seriously into account. There is also the question of public opinion, with noticeable indications of a rising feeling of concern about Guatemala and the ever-present possibility that this will crystallize in terms of a demand for action. The significance of this last point is not that it is or would become a partisan political issue domestically, but rather that an accumulation of pressures of the kind referred to could have the effect of forcing action on a too-hasty basis and possibly with fewer assets than are believed to be available at present. Any action taken after a public clamor would be much more demonstrably attributable to us than action taken prior to such public debate and demand.
g. It remains our estimate that there has been a continuing and increasing disintegration in the political situation in Guatemala and in surrounding countries, and that if the present trend is unchecked, it is entirely possible that governments in addition to that of Guatemala's may fall prey to Communist infiltration, subversion and ultimate take-over.
h. Finally, there would be a serious adverse effect upon the morale of our own personnel if the operation were to be abruptly called off. This is, of course, not vital inasmuch as our people are professionals and are supposed to take their orders in good part and carry them out conscientiously. However, there would be an inevitable, intangible loss of heart and taste for an attempted subsequent resumption of an operation of this character, and this would be understandable
The foregoing points are not submitted by way of argumentation. They simply represent our best efforts to outline the principal deterrents and difficulties which would result from a decision to jettison the operation at the present time. Some, if not most, of these difficulties and detriments would tend to be the greater as we proceed further into the operation and become even more engaged than we now are.
128. Telegram From the Central Intelligence Agency to Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
Washington, April 17, 1954, 2043Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 8, Folder 10. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Drafted by [name not declassified], cleared by King, and approved by J. D. Esterline.
47076. On 14 April, ODACID informed all West European Stations/2/ (summary follows):
/2/Telegram 323, April 14; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1098-1099 (Document 24).
A. ODACID increasingly concerned WSBURNT frantic efforts obtain arms and evade ODYOKE embargo by purchasing European market. Such arms may be used to counterbalance anti-Communist elements WSBURNT army or against neighbors. Current tension from KMFLUSH developments may create opportunity for above.
B. To define ODYOKE position to all govts and supplement previous statements to various govts, notify appropriate govt officials of ODACID concern this situation for free world and ask for their views what prompt measures necessary to control export and transit of arms to check clandestine delivery to WSBURNT. But stress on ODACID desire for "active cooperation" in view danger of undue WSBURNT strength in currently unstable area if such arms obtained.
129. Telegram From Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida to the CIA Station in Guatemala/1/
[place not declassified], April 18, 1954, 0238Z.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 3, Folder 6. Secret; Routine; RYBAT; PBSUCCESS. Repeated to the Director of Central Intelligence.
1959. 1. HQs states ODACID reluctant involve any their people operational aspects PBSUCCESS; therefore, you will instruct Page that until notified otherwise, he should not request assistance of JMBLUG. Whiting letter re Page trip to WSBURNT being held HQs pending complete clarification foregoing with ODACID.
2. Page should be advised that present ODACID position re participation ODYOKE persons in PBSUCCESS makes it even more necessary that he:
A. Contact Soccer only under maximum security conditions.
B. Absolutely avoid Soccer participation in operations.
130. Paper Prepared in Operation PBSUCCESS Headquarters in Florida/1/
[place not declassified], April 21, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 231677/1, Box 102, Folder 2. Secret. Transmitted to the Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division under cover of a memorandum from Jerome C. Dunbar.
COMMUNISM IN CENTRAL AMERICA
The Communist movement in Guatemala and Central America is part of the world movement of Communist Parties. All Communist Parties, acting under the direction of the Soviet Union, follow the same general pattern in seeking to capture free social institutions and democratic governments. Some operate openly and others clandestinely, but all are integral parts of the world wide Communist effort. Communism as an ideology, in Guatemala as in other countries, is only a creed for a small militant and power-hungry group. Communist successes are largely the result of an effective use of operational techniques designed to effect the greatest possible degree of control over the most important elements of the local political structure.
In Guatemala these elements are infiltrated at top levels by Communists with the result that the government and economy are effectively controlled by the Party. President Jacobo Arbenz and other prominent government and military officials are not members of the Communist Party. However, Arbenz has used the Communists to further his own political ambitions, and to a great extent he is now dependent upon them for the support which he needs to stay in power. For all practical purposes he and his chief aides follow the Communist line in their speeches and actions, and they have relied in an increasing measure upon the advice of Communist leaders. The latter constitute the real government of Guatemala in the sense that they have a decisive influence on all important moves, either directly through government officials or through pressure tactics on the part of controlled organizations. As long as the Army, few officials of which are under Communist influence, continues to support Arbenz, it is likely that Communist power will grow.
The most influential Communists and pro-Communists in Guatemala at the present time are the following:
Jose Manuel Fortuny
Secretary General of the Communist Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT).
Carlos Manuel Pellecer
Secretary of Disputes of the General Confederation of Guatemalan Workers (CGTG). Deputy in National Congress.
Augusto Charnaud MacDonald
Secretary General of the Party of the Guatemalan Revolution (PRG). Minister of Government.
Victor Manuel Gutierrez
Secretary General of the CGTG. Deputy National Congress.
Leonardo Castillo Flores
Secretary General of the National Farm Workers of Guatemala (CNCG).
Julio Estrada de la Hoz
Secretary General of the Party of Revolutionary Action (PAR). Deputy National Congress.
Dora Franco y Franco
Secretary General of Alliance of Guatemalan Women (AFG).
Humberto Alvarado
Head of PGT Youth Commission which controls AJDG.
Cesar Augusto Cazali Avila
Secretary General of Democratic University Front (FUD).
Waldemar Barrios Klee
Chief of Lands Section of National Agrarian Department and Assistant to Director.
All of the above occupy positions in which they can wield considerable influence over the attitudes and activities of the government. It will be noted that aside from the three deputies only two hold government positions. The majority are directors of mass organizations which have been formed as centers for Communist propaganda and agitation.
One of the principal Communist objectives in Guatemala, as elsewhere, has been to gain control of propaganda media. The government radio station TGW is under the direction of Carlos Alvarado Jerez, a Communist, and the official government paper, Diario de Centro America, gives considerable favorable publicity to Communist-front activities. In addition, there are three other Communist-line papers. The leading Communist-front groups are the National Peace Committee, the AJDG and the FUD. In the case of virtually all front organizations a PGT member will be found in a key post, usually Secretary General or Organizational Secretary.
Guatemala has become the focal point of Communism in Central America, and during recent years it has encouraged the growth of Marxist ideas in the neighboring countries of Honduras, Nicaragua, and El Salvador. Guatemalan Communists have also been actively engaged in the development of intelligence nets, not only in Guatemala itself, but in the bordering countries. The most active centers of Communist activity in Honduras have been along the border in the area near San Pedro Sula. The Guatemalan Consul in that town directs this activity, and Col. Jose Luis Morales, Guatemalan Military Attach in Tegucigalpa, is in charge of Guatemalan Communist activities for Honduras as a whole. During recent months there has been a noticeable expansion of Communist efforts in Honduras, and the number of Guatemalan agents crossing the frontier has increased. Several agents have been sent into Honduras as ostensible exiles with instructions to join opposition groups, especially that headed by Lt. Col. Carlos Castillo Armas. The most recent group of such agents included Capt. Marco Antonio Garcia, Francisco Pereira and Francisco Contreras.
In El Salvador the best organized Communist movement is in the railway workers' union. Communists have planned the assassination of several Salvadoran officials, and Communist plots against the government have been discovered and prevented. During 1953 many Communists were picked up by the police and deported. One such group was suspected of being implicated in an assassination plot against Foreign Minister Roberto Canessa. All of these Communist exiles found a safe haven in Guatemala. Miguel Marmol and Virgilio Guerra, Salvadoran Communists, are active in the Guatemalan labor movement, and there is a group of young Salvadoran leftists under leadership of Manuel Otilio Hasbun, formerly President of the General Association of Salvadoran University Students. The latter were warmly welcomed by Gutierrez.
Exiles from El Salvador, Nicaragua, Honduras, and the Dominican Republic have committees in Guatemala, which work in conjunction with the PGT. The Salvadoran Democratic Association meets in the PGT's Tribuna Popular. Leftist exiles from many other Latin American countries are also present in Guatemala./2/ They are given jobs or otherwise provided for by the PGT or its affiliated organizations. The Nicaraguan group is headed by Edelberto Torres Rivas, Secretary General of the AJDG, and Armando Flores Amador. Some of the Nicaraguan exiles were involved in the abortive coup in Nicaragua in April 1954, and there are indications that the PGT and the Guatemalan government may have given some support to the preparations for that revolutionary attempt.
/2/A handwritten marginal note reads: "2 offices, I presume!"
Over the past five years many prominent Guatemalan Communists and Party sympathizers have travelled to the Soviet Union and the satellite countries. Four Guatemalans attended the Peking Peace Conference in October 1952. In November of that year four delegates were named to the Vienna Peace Congress, and in the following month thirteen Guatemalans attended the WFTU Social Security Conference in Vienna. The Guatemalan delegation to the Budapest World Peace Council in June 1953 included Lt. Col. Carlos Paz Tejada and Major Marco Antonio Franco. During the period from June to December 1953 a total of 48 Guatemalans visited the Russian orbit and eleven of these went to Moscow. In December 1953 Gutierrez returned from Moscow at the head of a delegation which had toured the Soviet Union after attending the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) Congress in Vienna. Fortuny departed for Moscow in November 1953 and returned to Guatemala on 8 January 1954.
Communists have gained control of the Guatemalan labor movement principally by means of a drive to create strong organizations under Party control. Guatemalan labor unions were consolidated into a single main federation, the CGTG, in 1951 under the close supervision of Confederation of Latin American Workers advisers (CTAL). Affiliation of the CGTG with the CTAL and the WFTU followed in 1953. Today organized labor is a militant and significant force in Guatemala. The CGTG has more than 500 affiliated unions, and a total of approximately 300,000 members. The Secretary General is Gutierrez, member of the Political Committee of the PGT, and every other key office of the CGTG is held by a Communist Party member. Gutierrez, Pellecer and Victor A. Leal were elected to the General Council of the WFTU in November 1953. At the Second National Congress of the CGTG in January 1954 it was proposed that Guatemala resume relations with the Soviet Union and "foreign intervention" was protested. At CGTG headquarters in Guatemala City the red Communist flag flew beside the Guatemalan emblem. The principal foreign delegate to this congress was Giuseppe Casadei, member of the permanent staff of the WFTU Secretariat in Vienna. This is the first instance in which a permanent WFTU staff member has attended a national meeting in any Latin American country.
Guatemalan Communists adopted Agrarian Reform as their central theme in 1952, and Communists took an active part in committee hearings on the Agrarian Law in Congress. This law created the National Agrarian Department, which is the central administrative agency, and Communists have heavily infiltrated this organization. The head of the Lands Section is Barrios,/3/ who assumes charge in the absence of the director, Major Alfonso Martinez. The Secretary General is Maria Jerez de Fortuny, wife of the PGT chief. Seven of the twenty Agrarian Inspectors are PGT members and another eight are believed to be affiliated with that Party. In addition, another twelve employees are known PGT members.
/3/A handwritten marginal note reads: "Waldemar Barrios Klee--was acting chief during Major Martinez' absence--The listing on page 2 of this document is correct."
Martinez has steadily lost ground in his efforts to have agrarian changes carried out in an orderly manner. In pressing Martinez for rapid implementation of the law the PGT leaders have clearly demonstrated that they regard the present situation as transitory and merely the foundation for the eventual transformation of Guatemala into a Socialist state. The Agrarian Reform program has provided the Communists with weapons which may be useful as their struggle for domination continues. The State has now become by far the country's largest landholder, since the private lands expropriated under the law have been turned over to the peasants only in life use. The PGT has been successful in identifying itself with the changes being made under Agrarian Reform, and is counting on this situation to break the power of the landowners and United Fruit and bring about its domination of the government. Of late the Party has inspired illegal land seizures which have led to violence in some sections. Pellecer, the most aggressive of the PGT leaders, has been assigned the task of inciting the peasants to invade private property. Arbenz himself has described Agrarian Reform as the "most transcendental force in our economic and political life."
In manners such as these, given sufficient freedom in which to operate and faced with ineffective opposition, the Communist organizational and operational techniques tend to confuse and corrupt a country until it can be brought under effective control. The penetration of Communists into selected agencies enables the Party to force policy and personnel changes, nullify opposition and strengthen its capabilities. Communists seek power through the exploitation of any issue and the discontented elements of any group.
131. Memorandum for the Record/1/
Washington, April 21, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 151, Folder 1. Secret; Eyes Only. Drafted on April 22.
SUBJECT
Synthesis of Ambassador Peurifoy's Remarks Relevant to PBSUCCESS Made at a Meeting 21 April 1954
PRESENT
Ambassador Peurifoy; [5 names not declassified]
1. Ambassador Peurifoy described the general situation as having worsened beyond that described in his February report./2/ As an example of this, he cited his belief that the Guatemalan Government is leading up to suppression of the independent press. He concluded that the usual diplomatic methods did not suffice to correct the situation and inferred that more drastic and definitive steps to overthrow the government must be taken.
/2/Neither the report nor a more detailed reference to the report has been found.
2. Ambassador Peurifoy commented that despite the poor situation, there were some events such as the Archbishop's letter/3/ that are definitely encouraging. He said this letter has reached the man in the street and is well received. He suggested that our propaganda not fail and to continue to exploit the letter and tie it into other opportunities.
/3/On April 4 Guatemalan Archbishop Mariano Rossell Arellano issued an anti-Communist pastoral letter, the text of which has not been found. The Embassy in Guatemala City provided an overview of the letter and its impact in dispatches 852, 856, and 871, April 12, 14, and 23, respectively. (National Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files, 814.413/4-1254, 714.00(w)/4-1454, and 714.00(w)/4-2354)
3. The government, he said, is absolutely under control of a small Communist group and the government as a whole is moving in the direction of Communism. Such things as withdrawal of military pacts and other economic sanctions may irritate these people but will not stop them.
4. It was the Ambassador's opinion that the country is now in a receptive mood and that various groups, particularly the students, are believed to be ready to act. As an example of the atmosphere in Guatemala City, he said that most people are armed when they go to social functions and that all Latin American diplomats are armed wherever they go. The Ambassador saw little to be gained from economic sanctions and from OAS action and agreed with the view expressed that the United States would face less of an outcry if it achieved a successful coup than it would during a long trying period of sanctions which, in any case, will possibly not be effective. He did not think, moreover, that Latin American countries, with the possible exception of Mexico and the Argentine, would go after the United States following a reasonably secure coup. In connection with the consideration of economic sanctions he pointed out that in Guatemala time is running against us.
5. He expressed the opinion that Pellecer has not split with Arbenz and doubts that Pellecer will get an overseas assignment since he and Gutierrez, who are in fact running the country, are too important to Arbenz. As an example of Pellecer's current political thinking, he recommended we consult Pellecer's speech made recently at Chimaltenango. In reply to a question as to Diaz' present position, Ambassador Peurifoy stated that he had been advised that Diaz is "out" as a result of a disagreement with Arbenz over the choice of the president of congress. Ambassador Peurifoy is inclined to doubt this as he believes that if it were true Diaz would have made an attempt while he was still in command.
6. With regard to the arming of labor elements Ambassador Peurifoy said he did not doubt that some arms have reached the campesinos.
7. As to the attitude of the army, Ambassador noted that there are all sorts of reports but that it is his view that the army is opportunistic and would move against the government if they thought it to be to their advantage. He said that the army is in a vulnerable position because Arbenz could gradually remove suspected officers from key positions and replace them with others. Ambassador concluded that time is running against us, particularly with regard to the army. The political situation is worsening he believes as the other parties of the national front, while they are not Communist, are falling more and more under the influence of Communist leadership.
8. In speaking of the need for action in Guatemala, the Ambassador said, "If we maintain the status quo, we shall in the end have to use 'those gallant marines.'"
9. He stated the belief that hard hitting speeches against Guatemala by personages in the United States Government could be counterproductive and would particularly alienate those non-Communists whose actions are influenced by nationalist emotions.
10. He expressed doubt as to the feasibility of the "cotton plan" and believed that the alternative plan to blow up cotton gins owned by the Arbenz coterie would be desirable. He stated occasional sabotage of pipelines, one or two bridges and installations in the Puerto Barrios area would cause great commotion in the country.
11. He specifically recommended a leaflet air drop on Guatemala City on May Day and suggested the leaflet material should include some reference to the Archbishop's letter.
12. In reply to the question as to whether Toriello is salvageable, the Ambassador replied in the negative and he suggested he be eliminated.
13. He pointed out that some of the project's buildup phases could in themselves precipitate the fall of government.
14. Mr. [name not declassified] asked the Ambassador whether he thought the project is exerting pressure on the government. The Ambassador replied in the affirmative and added that one hears about RUFUS coming back and the rumor has even set dates for such a coup such as Holy Week and now May Day. He concluded that there is in this connection considerable nervousness on the part of the government.
132. Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Director for National Estimates (Bull) to Director of Central Intelligence Dulles/1/
Washington, April 22, 1954.
/1/Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Job 79-01025A, Box 143, Folder 1. Top Secret.
SUBJECT
Review of NIE-84: "Probable Developments in Guatemala"
The Board of National Estimates has reviewed the conclusions of NIE-84, "Probable Developments in Guatemala", which was adopted by the IAC on 12 May 1953./2/ In the course of this review the Board consulted with Ambassador Peurifoy, DD/P/WH (Col. King), OIR (Mr. Burgin), and G-2 (Col. Hennig), but the present memorandum has not been formally coordinated. Discussion of critical aspects of the problem is contained in the Enclosure.
/2/For text, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. IV, pp. 1061-1071 (Document 15).
Conclusions
1. We consider that the conclusions of NIE-84 remain essentially valid. In particular, we reaffirm the first conclusion, as follows:
The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. Their influence will probably continue to grow as long as President Arbenz remains in power.
2. The Communists now effectively control the political life of Guatemala. Arbenz' decisions on domestic and foreign policy are reached, not in the official cabinet, but in a kitchen cabinet composed of Communists and pro-Communists. There is no prospect of a break between Arbenz and the Communists.
3. There has probably been an increase in popular disillusionment with the Arbenz regime. There is certainly increased desperation among opposition elements./3/ In present circumstances, however, the possibility of effective internal political action to alter the situation does not exist. We believe that effective revolutionary action would require the active support of a major portion of the Army.
/3/In an April 19 briefing memorandum for Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs Holland, John W. Fisher of the Office of Middle American Affairs agreed: "The Guatemalan political opposition, both at home and in exile, is numerous but hopelessly disorganized and demoralized." For text of the memorandum, see ibid., pp. 1099-1100.
4. The disposition of the Army toward the regime is therefore crucial. We note indications of unrest, even of disaffection, within the Army and consider that a revolutionary potential now exists there. We do not believe, however, that the Guatemalan Army is likely to take spontaneous action against the Arbenz regime.
5. The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolution potential in the Army, and, with the passage of time, may succeed in doing so.
6. The solidarity of the other Central American states in opposition to Guatemala has weakened during the past year and may further decrease.
7. In view of the foregoing considerations, we believe that time is on the side of the Communists in Guatemala.
Harold R. Bull/4/
Lt. Gen. USA (Ret.)
/4/Printed from a copy that indicates Bull signed the original.
Enclosure
The Growth of Communist Political Influence
1. The first conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:
The current political situation in Guatemala is adverse to US interests. The Guatemalan Communists exercise a political influence far out of proportion to their small numerical strength. Their influence will probably continue to grow as long as President Arbenz remains in power.
2. This conclusion remains valid. Under the patronage of Arbenz, Communist influence in Guatemala has grown during the past year and will probably continue to grow. This growth is not the result of any innovation, but of a year's further development along the lines previously established. For example:
a. There has been further development in the organization of rural workers as a political force under Communist influence and control (as was anticipated in the sixth conclusion of NIE-84). The Communists have demonstrated a capability for the rapid mobilization and assembly of considerable numbers of these workers for political demonstrations.
b. The Communists are probably also capable of mobilizing up to 20,000 of these workers as an armed militia available to support the regime in an emergency. We cannot confirm reports of the existence of such a para-military force, but would consider it a logical development in the circumstances. There is good reason to believe that the required quantities of small arms have been distributed and cached under the control of the Communist agrarian organizers. It is not apparent that this putative militia has received any appreciable military training. Even without such training, however, a substantial number of rural workers, armed and organized, could exert considerable political and military force.
c. The Communists have strengthened their control of the pro-Arbenz political parties. The Communist Party itself is small, but crypto-Communists control the other parties in the pro-Arbenz coalition and through them effectively control the political life of the country.
d. There is good reason to believe that Arbenz' decisions on Guatemalan domestic and foreign policy are reached, not in the official cabinet, but in a kitchen cabinet composed of four Communists and six pro-Communists.
Arbenz' Commitment to the Communists
3. The third conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:
President Arbenz still exercises personal control of the Administration and of the Army and the Police. It is still possible for him to break his ties with the Communists and to moderate the policies of his Administration, but it is highly unlikely that he will do so.
4. This conclusion remains valid, but the likelihood of a break between Arbenz and the Communists is even more remote than it was a year ago. He is too deeply committed, emotionally and politically, to extricate himself.
The Absence of Effective Political Opposition
5. The key sentences of the seventh conclusion of NIE-84 read as follows:
There is no likelihood that [internal]/5/ opposition could alter the course of the Government by political action. It could not succeed in a revolutionary attempt opposed by the Army.
/5/Brackets in the source text.
6. We believe that this conclusion remains valid. There has probably been an increase of popular disillusionment with the Arbenz regime. There is certainly increased desperation among opposition elements. In present circumstances, however, the possibility of effective political action does not exist. We continue to believe that effective revolutionary action would require the active support of a major portion of the Army.
The Position of the Guatemalan Army
7. The eighth conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:
The Army is the only organized element in Guatemala capable of rapidly and decisively altering the political situation. Although a quick change of attitude is always possible, there is no present reason to doubt the continued loyalty of the Army high command and of most of the Army to Arbenz. The Army under its present leaders could not be expected to take revolutionary action unless they became convinced that their personal security and well-being were threatened by Communist infiltration and domination of the Government . . .
8. We consider the probable action of the Army to be the critical factor in the situation. In modification of the second sentence of the quoted paragraph, we note certain indications of unrest, even of disaffection, among Army officers which suggest that the precondition for revolutionary action specified in the third sentence may be approaching fulfillment. G-2 (Colonel Hennig), however, would reaffirm the second sentence, stressing the watchful control which Arbenz exercises over the Army command, the considerations of personal advantage which bind key officers to the regime, and the disposition of the rank-and-file to follow their leaders. This difference is a matter of emphasis rather than of essential substance. All would agree that a revolutionary potential now exists in the Guatemalan Army, but that the Guatemalan Army is not likely to take spontaneous action against the Arbenz regime.
9. The Communists will be concerned to neutralize the revolutionary potential in the Army. With the passage of time they may succeed in doing so by: (a) a gradual purge of disaffected officers; (b) subversion of the enlisted personnel; (c) a gradual reduction of the military capabilities of the Army by the government's failure to replace used weapons, equipment, and ammunition; and (d) development of a Communist-controlled workers' militia as a counter-balancing force. There are current indications of action along these several lines.
The Position of Other Central American Republics
10. The ninth conclusion of NIE-84 reads as follows:
. . . The Governments of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua . . . are fearful that the trend in Guatemala will lead to Communist subversion and social upheaval in their own territories. They are probably giving serious consideration to the possibility of effecting a political change in Guatemala through clandestine support of revolutionary action there. It is highly unlikely, however, that they would or could mount an open military intervention in Guatemala.
11. This conclusion remains valid. Prospective US military aid to these countries will take time to become effective and is not likely to alter the situation substantially. To the extent that it reassures them regarding their security against Guatemalan retaliation, it may embolden these countries to render clandestine support to revolutionary activities in Guatemala. Open military intervention would be a doubtful adventure at best, all the more so in view of Latin American sensitivity on the subject of intervention as recently demonstrated anew at the Caracas Conference.
12. The current imbroglio between Nicaragua and Costa Rica has weakened Central America solidarity in relation to Guatemala. If long continued, it may cause Costa Rica to look to Guatemala for support. The approaching election in Honduras presents opportunities for Guatemalan intrigue in that country and the possibility of an adverse change there.
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