

Cyprus

340. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 24, 1969, 1530Z.

439. Subject: Cyprus: Settlement Effort (or lack thereof). Reference: (A) Athens 1185; (B) Ankara 1906.²

1. As Mississippi prison farm warden used to say to inmates, "what we got here is a problem of communication." Embassy Ankara (ref B) is correct that so far there is little substantive change in GOC position (same is true of Turk Cypriots). Embassy Athens is correct that GOG "is standing behind roadblock it thinks Makarios has erected" (on local autonomy). Point of exercise we are proposing is: to get GOT to help persuade Turk Cypriots to make compromises which can be traded off for GOC compromises, and to get GOG to help persuade Makarios to make compromises which will elicit Turk response (in words of ref A we want GOG to help us in getting Makarios to take down "roadblock").

2. Maintenance of niceties of U.S. non-involvement in Ankara and Athens while we fairly heavily involved here in informal way with Greek and Turk Cypriots and GOG and GOT Embassies seems to us of questionable utility. Influence of Athens on Greek Cypriots and of Ankara on Turk Cypriots is undeniable. If GOT is going to continue to support Kuchuk and TCPA majority in their original position on local autonomy and GOG is going to support Makarios and Council of Ministers majority in their original position on local autonomy, then we have no ball game. What we are suggesting is help for moderates (led fortunately by two negotiators—Clerides and Denktash—on both sides) from respective motherlands by at least informally requesting GOT and GOG to support in general terms kind of compromise we have suggested.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.

² In telegram 1185 from Athens, March 22, the Embassy commented that it did not believe the Greek Government was forcing its views on Makarios but was supporting what it understood to be the position of the Government of Cyprus. In telegram 1906 from Ankara, March 21, the Embassy reported on discussions regarding the administrative grouping of Turkish Cypriot villages. (Both *ibid.*)

3. Timing for quasi-initiative (which does not involve formal démarches) we recommend is fortuitous. GOT Chargé Yavuzalp left yesterday (March 23) for Ankara and policy review with Chaglayangil in preparation for latter's anticipated meeting with Pipinelis in Washington in connection NATO anniversary. Before leaving he called to ascertain our views on possible compromises on local autonomy question. On Greek side, special committee of Council of Ministers now preparing paper on local autonomy which Clerides will take to Athens during his upcoming trip (now leaked to press). Would seem both Yavuzalp consultation with GOT FonOff and Clerides consultation with Pipinelis offer unique opportunities for GOT and GOG to give boost to compromise on local autonomy. Both Athens and Ankara claim they sincerely want get Cyprus problem off their backs. Only way to do so is to get local constituents to compromise. To be noted our thoughts on fundamentals of compromise (Nicosia 429)³ are midway between parties' current positions and are quite general as well as informal so USG not liable be accused of trying propound a specific compromise or of unfairly pressuring one party at expense other.⁴

Crawford

³ Dated March 21, it reported on a Cyprus airways strike. (Ibid., LAB 6–1 CYP)

⁴ In telegram 45225 to Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia, March 24, the Department instructed the Embassies "to weigh in with all parties" emphasizing U.S. concern with the lack of progress in negotiations and suggesting possible elements of an accord "without intimating we are presenting a preferred solution." (Ibid., POL 27 CYP) In telegram 47944 to Ankara, March 28, the Department reported that its approach had created the impression that a U.S. plan existed and necessitated apologies from Sisco to the Turkish Ambassador over the misunderstanding. (Ibid.) Komer defended his approach in telegram 2082 from Ankara, March 28. (Ibid.)

341. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, May 1, 1969, 1047Z.

2896. 1. Even my brief revisit to Cyprus² was depressing with respect Turk Cypriot predicament. The Greek sector's economy is boom-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Nicosia, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO. An error on the date-time line of the telegram dates it as April 1 instead of May 1.

² April 28.

ing, while the Turk Cypriots stagnate barricaded in their enclaves. The growing economic disparity between the two communities is even more visible. Despite this, I sense little give among the Turkish community in Cyprus or their backers in Ankara. Indeed Denktash's remarks almost suggested that the greater the economic disparity the more determinedly the Turk Cypriots would insist on the full measure of their "rights."³

2. Ambassador Belcher has reported on our brief talks with Denktash and Clerides.⁴ His rapport with the key actors on the scene is impressive indeed. He and I have also suggested in Nicosia 627 some new financial device to help break the deadlock. I would only add that in default of some such new catalyst to stimulate a compromise solution, GOC has powerful incentive to sit tight for another 2–3 years of gradual erosion of the Turk Cypriot position until latter are worn down. I need not remind Department of the possibilities of flareup implicit in the growing hopelessness of the Turk Cypriots. It is for this reason, and because their economic weakness and enforced idleness seem to be impressing itself more and more on Turk Cypriot thinking, that some kind of financial sweetener might have powerful appeal.

3. I know how hard it is for Washington (or any other potential donor) to think of new commitments at this time. In fact, however, any settlement which could be achieved by investing \$25–50 million over 2–3 years would be cheap at the price. Current dispute is costing US, UK, Greece, Turkey and UNFICYP countries, and the two Cypriot communities a great deal more than that. We would all probably end up saving money if we could substitute rehabilitation and development for what we are investing in now. Moreover, by directly tying any such package sweetener to an across-the-board settlement, we could avoid spending our money until we saw what we would get for it.

4. I recognize the difficulty of designing a financial package purely for the Turk Cypriots. However, for it to have appeal to them and Ankara, they must be given clear assurances that the bulk of it will be spent on them. We must also guard against the GOC using it as an excuse to avoid providing GOC funds which would normally be provided anyway to the Turkish community. But these pitfalls could no doubt be skirted by ingenuity and imagination.

Komer

³ Belcher reported on the two Ambassadors' discussions with Denktash in telegram 627 from Nicosia, April 30. He concluded that the disparity in economic situation might provide the "sugar coating" in the form of economic assistance for a "bitter pill" of compromise the Turkish community might have to swallow. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP)

⁴ Telegram 626 from Nicosia, April 30. (Ibid.)

342. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Belcher) to the Ambassador to Turkey (Handley)¹

Nicosia, June 20, 1969.

Dear Bill:

As I leave Cyprus and you arrive in the area,² I wanted to welcome you to the club and to pass along some thoughts that may seem parochially Cypriot from where you sit in Ankara, but that have been concerns of ours during the whole period I have been here.

To be completely frank, we have never felt—and this has been more the case recently—that our Embassy in Ankara was managing to get a penetrating look into the Turkish Government thought processes *about Cyprus*. As a concomitant, we have seldom felt that the Embassy went much beyond listening to Turkish presentations. The whole relationship has seemed to lack the continuous, candid and close give-and-take that one would expect between two friendly nations regarding one of their half-dozen problems of greatest mutual concern.

Seeing Bulak is all well and good, although there again we seldom see much indication that anyone questions his obiter dicta. Bulak is certainly a key figure in the *execution* of GOT-Cyprus policy. But unless the Turkish Embassy here is leading us astray, that is his main role. We know that the subject is taken up periodically by the Ambassador and Chaglayangil, and certainly he is a key player although Osorio-Tafall and others have discovered that his propensity for moderate generalizations let his visitors go away happy but with little of substance in their pockets, and his words often belie much harder underlying Turkish positions. Obviously the Prime Minister is also useful on Cyprus. But from several sides we hear that the real architect of Turkey's broad policy approach toward Cyprus is President Sunay himself with day-to-day details followed for him by a general on his staff. We reported this to you in Nicosia A-109.³

It is not my business to suggest any specific paths but I do feel there is a problem and I hope that you, as the newly-arrived Ambassador, will move to remedy it. The trouble in the past has always been that Cyprus stayed on the back burner of our diplomatic discourse with

¹ Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 72 D 476, Pol Turkey. Confidential; Personal. A copy was sent to Folsom. A notation on the letter reads: "Seen by Frank Cash, NEA/TUR, RSF."

² Belcher left post on June 23. Popper was nominated as his successor on May 27 and presented his credentials on July 18. Komer left Ankara on May 7. Handley was appointed on May 1 and presented his credentials on July 1.

³ Dated May 23. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 15-1 TUR)

the Turkish Government until on several different occasions it erupted to become our central concern with Turkey, costing us dear in scarce credit, and sidetracking other issues of importance. I can remember Ray Hare expressing sympathy with my views back in 1964 on the need to get into closer touch with the Turks on the Cyprus problem and his comment that this would be done but would take time. Years later we still apparently have no such dialogue despite the fact that at several times we have come very close indeed to war.

One other thought I would leave with you. There are obvious connections between certain aspects of and events in Turkish domestic politics which have either direct or indirect bearing on this problem. We have not had the advantage of reading Embassy Ankara's "think pieces" on the domestic scene—I do feel they would be helpful to us in interpreting this one—in view of the major if not controlling role played by the GOT as regards the Turk Cypriot community.

Dave Popper will, I am sure, appreciate anything you can do to keep all this in mind as you go about your arduous tasks.

With warm personal regards and best of luck in Ankara.

Sincerely,

Taylor G. Belcher⁴

⁴ Printed from a copy that bears Belcher's typed signature.

343. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, July 1, 1969, 1325Z.

973. Subj: Cyprus: Perspective June 1969 Versus June 1968. London (King or Spiers) pls pass Ambassador Popper.

1. In June 1968 outlook for and atmosphere surrounding Cyprus problem were optimistic. Positive attitudes prevailed in spite of nearness in time of violent events of 1967.² Today Cyprus has witnessed

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967-69, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.

² For documentation on the crises in Cyprus of 1964 and 1967, see *Foreign Relations, 1964-1968*, volume XVI, Cyprus; Greece; Turkey.

virtually no violence for unprecedented period of eighteen months and, in spite of this, atmosphere and outlook are not as good as in June 1968. In fact, in our darker moments we (and some of our diplomatic colleagues) experience disturbing feeling of uneasiness, of *deja vu*, regarding situation. What has happened?

2. One important factor is that nothing positive has happened lately. First half of 1968 witnessed real progress including substantial normalization and deconfrontation moves by Greek Cypriots and establishment of local talks. Since June 1968 precious little progress, particularly visible progress, has been made. Bloom is definitely off rose. Local talks are widely viewed as stalled on local administration issue. Normalization is practically dead letter since Greek Cypriots regard Turk Cypriots as completely unresponsive to earlier series of unilateral GOC normalization moves. In spite of repeated efforts by UNFICYP (particularly in Artemis Road area) there has been no real military deconfrontation since early 1968.

3. In short forward momentum has largely been lost. With public realization of and official disenchantment over lack of progress, hardliners—both Greek and Turk in official and non-official circles—have been regaining influence. For instance:

A. Intelligence reports (being circulated by MinInt DirGen Anastassiou, well-known hawk) claiming Turk Cypriot intention to provoke GOT military intervention which were disregarded in mid-1968 are now gaining currency. MinInt Komodromos appears believe this canard fervently (see NKI 326)³ and there are many other hardliners in GOC who want to believe it. National Guard G2 also taking line that Turk Cypriots preparing for offensive action and his view has infected Greek Embassy here.

B. Sensationalist press, primarily *Makhi*, repeats daily “big lie” of Turkish military preparations and partitionist intentions. This line is creeping into other papers and is beginning to be believed by less sophisticated Greek Cypriot readers. Entire press campaign is making Turk Cypriots uneasy as well, and beginning provoke reaction in Turkey (see para 1 Ankara 4401).⁴

C. Turk Cypriot press now beginning to respond by accusing Greek Cypriots of “war-like preparation” and of intention to break off talks after Turk reply on local administration, simultaneously blaming Turkish military activity for this action.

³ Not found.

⁴ Dated June 30, it reported Turkish views on the status of intercommunal talks. (Ibid.)

4. As we enter period of summer recess additional negative factors on slate are:

A. Fact that during their recess the Clerides–Denktash mechanism will not be available to adjudicate differences (e.g., as in Naoussa Street patrol episode).⁵

B. Lack of progress in subcommittees on electoral process and reintegration of Turk Cypriots into semi-government bodies.

C. Apparent judgment by Archbishop that departure of Pipinelis will preclude additional meaningful Greek pressure on GOC since colonels will be otherwise occupied.

D. Upcoming events which may be problem-making, such as human rights seminar (June 26–July 9) and Turkish elections (mid-October).

E. Possible loss of heart and concentration by Clerides due tragic illness of his only child.

5. In spite of foregoing, picture not completely black. We have indications that Turk Cypriot counter-proposals on local administration will move somewhat forward from their original position. Moreover, Denktash has now admitted that Clerides' compromise offer did, in fact, have some good points. Despite public view that talks stalled, fact is these are not dead and potential exists for further forward progress, however slow and painful, when Clerides and Denktash resume meetings.

6. Furthermore, neither National Guard nor TMT seems to have policy of looking for trouble. Solution of Naoussa Street patrolling issue and speedy defusing of recent shooting incident (UNFICYP reports National Guard did not return fire) tend to support this view.

7. All factors considered we would describe situation as in very delicate balance. It could go either way. Significant change in military status quo (such as large arms importation by GOC) or violent incident involving loss of life could cause serious deterioration. On balance, we moderately hopeful that UNFICYP and Western Embassies can contain situation and preserve calm until local talks back on track. In short, chances are we will get through summer without serious trouble. However, chances are not as good as they were last year.

Crawford

⁵ Reference is to a confrontation at Omorphita between Greek Cypriot and TMT fighters between February 10 and 12.

344. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, July 22, 1969, 1030Z.

1081. Subject: Cyprus: Makarios' Views.

1. *Summary.* In prompt follow-up to credentials presentation July 18, FonOff arranged my initial private discussion with Archbishop morning July 21. Makarios obviously sought convey impression of reasonableness, magnanimity and restraint. Portraying Turkish community as misguided, he foresaw probability of deadlock in inter-communal talks and proposed both sides agree refrain from use of force in this eventuality.

2. President received me alone, without customary interpreter, for interview lasting almost one hour. He began conversation with congratulations on Apollo XI success thus far and hoped for astronauts' safe return.² There no doubt he deeply impressed with every aspect of flight.

3. Turning to substance, I told Makarios that as I had said to Acting FonMin July 16,³ I brought with me no preconceived notions and no dramatic proposals for settlement. I assured Makarios of keen interest of Secretary and other Washington officials in a successful solution of Cyprus problem. Archbishop's wise guidance and leadership had, I noted, been a major factor in progress which had occurred since late 1967. We were confident that, given his unique position among his own people, he would continue to guide them toward a settlement which would assure interests of all parties in an independent Cyprus. I knew that President Nixon and the Secretary would be interested in his analysis of situation as it now stood.

4. Archbishop replied he thought matters had reached a difficult stage. He had hoped communal talks would have resulted in agreement three or four months after they had started. Instead, he feared they might be deadlocked. Turkish Cypriot leaders did not wish to clear ground for any agreement at least until after elections in Turkey. What would follow then he could not predict, but what he saw did not encourage him.

5. Archbishop particularly regretted that no great progress had been made on critical local government issue. Problem was that Turks

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, Ottawa, USUN, and USNATO.

² Reference is to the July 16–24 mission of Apollo XI that landed on the moon July 20–21.

³ Reported in telegram 1068 from Nicosia, July 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP)

were attempting to use negotiations on this matter to set up what amounted to a federation, in order to set stage for ultimate partition. Turks insisted that local government units be created on purely racial basis, even though this would result in quite infeasible administrative situations. He had no problem with drawing lines which would give Turks majority in certain areas and Greeks in others. But Turks wanted to go much further.

6. Resulting stalemate could only harm Turkish Cypriot community. Maintained by Turkish Government subsidy, it was being reduced to a parasitic status. Cyprus was in period of rapid development, with growing industry and prosperity. If Turks waited too long, they might never obtain their fair share of benefits.

7. This was why, Archbishop said, he especially regretted failure of Turks to accept Greek Cypriot proposal that local government issue be put aside and agreements on police and judiciary be implemented at once. Turks had assented, he continued, to police arrangements which would ensure that police stations in Turkish area were manned almost exclusively by Turkish policemen, with corresponding token Turkish representation in police posts in Greek Cypriot areas. This would enable each community to police itself, while giving the other the opportunity to keep watch over what was happening. Under such conditions, further steps could be taken to pursue deconfrontation, with mixed police units as well as UNFICYP forces patrolling areas from which two sides would withdraw their military personnel. But this obviously required Turkish agreement, of which no sign was forthcoming. Kuchuk and Denktash were moderates who might have been expected to be attracted by such a proposal; MinDef Orek, on contrary, was hardliner who, Archbishop understood, was taking position that Turk Cypriot community had nothing to gain from agreement with Greek Cypriots since it was doing quite well as things now stood.

8. If his fears were realized, Archbishop added, and deadlock occurred, he would propose that both communities agree that despite their differences they would not resort to force to solve them. "We must live together," he stated, "we are on the same ship." UNFICYP could continue to play an important role. In this connection, he could understand why states providing men and money for UNFICYP might wish reduce costs of UNFICYP operation. If they should find it necessary to do so, Greek Cypriot community would not object. He understood, however, that Turkish community desired force to remain at present level. This was good sign, since it indicated Turks did not intend to resort to violence. Greeks of course would have no objection if force were maintained at existing strength.

9. In tune with Archbishop's mood, I assured him US wanted to do all it appropriately could to facilitate a solution. We were convinced

it was not beyond ingenuity of negotiators to work through complex of details regarding local government issue and come up with something which would give satisfaction to both sides. It would be mistake for anyone to despair at this point, despite inevitable past frustrations. We hoped Turk Cypriot replies to Greek local government proposals would provide basis for new impetus toward agreement. With spiritual strength and goodwill I could see in Archbishop's approach to problem, I felt encouraged to believe this was not "impossible dream."

10. Concluding, I told Archbishop I was at his disposal at any time. He could count on me to do my best to keep USG fully informed, and he could count on continuing interest of USG in cause of just and lasting solution of Cyprus problem.

Popper

345. Memorandum of Conversation¹

SecDel/MC/7

New York, September 23, 1969, 4:45–5:15 p.m.

SECRETARY'S DELEGATION
TO THE
TWENTY-FOURTH SESSION OF THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY
New York, September 1969

SUBJECT

Bi-laterals with Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

U.S.

Secretary Rogers
Ambassador Phillips
Mr. James Irwin

FOREIGN

Foreign Minister Kyprianou
Ambassador Rossides
Mr. Jacovides
Mr. Anthoulis

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Irwin on September 23, and approved by R.L. Brown on September 25. Rogers and Kyprianou were attending the UN General Assembly meeting.

Foreign Minister Kyprianou spent almost the entire thirty minutes briefing the Secretary on the past and present situation in Cyprus. Nothing new arose in the talks other than possibly clearer statements by the Foreign Minister on just where the Cypriot government now stands on certain issues.

In discussing the past, Kyprianou said that of course the best solution for all concerned (Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus) would have been enosis. In 1967 they realized that since talks on enosis could only result in war between Greece and Turkey enosis would have to be set aside for at least the foreseeable future. Instead the Cypriot government felt it should concentrate its efforts on building an independent and sovereign state.

Kyprianou said there were two reasons why the London-Zurich solutions failed and why any future solutions will fail if they include them.

a. Cyprus was made an independent state which wasn't independent. Its sovereignty was curtailed.

b. The internal structure of the state was on a basis of division which went beyond ensuring mere civil rights.

He added "Cyprus is a small island and cannot have a state within a state. It should be a unitary state in which the minority have useful civil rights."

Kyprianou said that the relative peace and calm since January 1968 was due in large measure to the normalization steps taken by the Greek Cypriots. He referred specifically to the elimination of road blocks and the opening of roads. He then pointed out that the Turkish Cypriots still have some road blocks. Kyprianou really thought this was a useless act on their part for as he put it "enclaves are not a negotiating position. They can keep them." He felt that the Turkish Cypriots were really not happy with the existing situation. He recalled how he and his wife were warmly received and besieged with questions at a Turkish Cypriot reception. Kyprianou thinks their positions are imposed from the outside and that possibly after the Turkish elections the Turkish Cypriots could then go to Turkey and tell them how they really feel.

Although he did not want to be quoted Kyprianou felt that the communal talks had really reached a deadlock. He implied they may have made a mistake in encouraging the Turkish Cypriots to present proposals which, it turned out, the Cypriot government could not possibly accept. Ambassador Rossides pointed out the impossible political and economic problems inherent in the Turkish proposals. Kyprianou was quite clear in stating that the Cypriot government had "gone to the maximum." He said they had also possibly made a mistake by making all their concessions to begin with. Kyprianou stated that the logical compromise between Greek enosis and Turkish partition was the creation of an independent state. Since they had foregone much in giving

up enosis the Turks should respond likewise and forgo their demands for separate autonomy. Regardless of the fact that the communal talks were at an impasse they were providing peaceful conditions and should definitely continue. This peaceful climate might permit "action in the field (further normalization) which in turn might enable the talks to make progress."

When asked by Ambassador Phillips regarding the size of UNFICYP Foreign Minister Kyprianou replied "we are happy with the force as it is. However, if the Secretary General feels it can be cut down it is okay with us."

The Secretary concluded the meeting by telling Foreign Minister Kyprianou that he thought the solution to their problem was reason and the passage of time.

346. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Nicosia, October 11, 1969.

Dear Joe:

I appreciate your thoughtfulness in sending us State 169787 and 172042, detailing your conversations with Ed Tomkins and Ambassador Ronne.² They are fine summaries of the existing state of play in your negotiations, and most helpful as background here.

We will be alert to the possibility of using Cyprus as the site of Rhodes-type negotiations,³ if you can iron out the points still at issue with the Russians and the Parties. As you know, Jarring still maintains his offices at the Cyprus Hilton. This island is the obvious place for Rhodes-type meetings, unless one wants to leave the area altogether in favor of places like Geneva or Vienna. I should think it would be better to keep the Parties closer to home.

Meanwhile you have a cheering section in Nicosia rooting for you as you work on this intractable subject.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis; Official–Informal. A copy was sent to Folsom.

² Telegrams 169787 and 172042 to Nicosia, October 7 and 10, both reported on the Jarring mediation effort. (Ibid., POL 27–14 ARAB–ISR)

³ Reference to the negotiation of an armistice between Israel and the Arab states, January–March 1949, at Rhodes with Ralph Bunche serving as UN acting mediator.

Locally, as we have reported,⁴ we are in a deteriorating phase. The Clerides–Denktash talks are at a stalemate. Both sides are saying publicly that they will make no further concessions. The Government is orchestrating a tough publicity line,⁵ which culminated this week in three speeches by Makarios to National Guard audiences calling for resolute preparedness in any eventuality if the talks fail, extolling the old Greek virtues, and rejecting the idea of outside intervention either by the Greek and Turkish Governments or a five-power conference.

All this is quite disturbing. It does not please the Greek Government, which has had its Ambassador here comment to the Archbishop and which must be uncomfortable at the Archbishop's hints that he is being supported by Athens. Moreover, during a day-long field trip to outlying UNFICYP posts yesterday, I learned from the Deputy Commander that the attitudes of the two military organizations have perceptively hardened. At many points, magazines are now inserted into automatic weapons, and where local commanders would talk to UNFICYP officers they now hang back. I cite this not because I think any military action is imminent, but to illustrate the essential fragility of the current situation and the ease with which tensions can be raised here.

Why the Archbishop is doing all this is anybody's guess. My own feeling is that one prominent purpose must be to put more pressure on the Turkish community to make concessions. (The Archbishop has a strong case here; as we reported in our 1555, the Greek side has done virtually all the conceding so far.) The trouble is that the saber-rattling may have the opposite effect of making the stubborn Turks still more stubborn.

We believe the most helpful step in the near future might come from the Greek and Turkish Governments. We are encouraging another meeting of Pipinelis and Chaglayangil. The British are sending a new Ambassador to Ankara and will use the occasion to try to persuade Ankara to lean on the Turkish community here. Peter Ramsbotham will be travelling to Ankara at the beginning of December to lend a hand.

We think this is a useful approach. The Turkish community here is so dependent on Turkish Government support that they should be susceptible to strong pressures from that direction. Ankara has shied away from an activist role of late, but with the election behind us, maybe they can be induced to step up to the problem. We will keep you informed.

Warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dave

⁴ In an October 6 Official-*Informal* letter from Popper to Sisco. (*Ibid.*, POL 27 CYP)

⁵ Reported and analyzed in telegram 1555 from Nicosia, October 9. (*Ibid.*)

347. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, November 18, 1969, 1535Z.

5127. Fm: Popper. Subject: Cyprus: GOG Concern re Alleged U.S. Connection With Georkadjis.

1. At our meeting with FonOff Director of Turkish and Cypriot Affairs Theodoropoulos this morning, conversation turned to question of Cyprus National Front terrorism and difficulty in combatting it because of weakness in Cyprus police. Theodoropoulos explained GOG was not happy about Makarios using retired Greek National Police to advise Cyprus police but recognized necessity of some technical assistance.

2. Theodoropoulos then said he wanted to speak frankly about one aspect of terrorist situation which especially concerned GOG. They were distressed at possible consequences of developing feud between Georkadjis and Archbishop and were especially worried by former's political ties with Clerides. In all candor, Theodoropoulos added, he had to say that there were persistent reports that Georkadjis was working with or for Americans. He could not see how this could help situation.

3. Popper said he had heard such rumors, but that they were without foundation. USG was aware of danger of any association with a man of this background, and Popper could assure Theodoropoulos we would have no part of any such intrigue.

4. *Comment:* Foregoing is latest and most authoritative in series of allusions to alleged American support for Georkadjis we have heard in recent weeks. It underscores importance of keeping our skirts absolutely clean in this matter if U.S. interest in Cyprus is not to suffer severe injury. This is particularly essential at moment when Makarios–Georkadjis controversy is intensifying, with clear possibility that Clerides and United Party may become involved in murky, terrorist connected political maneuvering.

McClelland

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Nicosia.

348. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Nicosia, November 20, 1969.

Dear Joe:

I returned late last night from a most interesting six-day visit to Ankara, Istanbul and Athens, and am hastening to get this short note off to you before the pouch closes this morning.

The trip was enormously helpful for general orientation purposes, as much with our Embassy people in Ankara and Athens as with top Foreign Office officials in the two capitals. We have a perennial difference in point of view with Bill Handley and company, which we talked out fully, so that we at least understand why we hold our respective viewpoints.² I was impressed with the scope, complexity and urgency of the bilateral Turkish-American problems with which Embassy Ankara deals, and I appreciate why they would not wish to make a difficult series of negotiations any more difficult by dragging in discussions on Cyprus. I hope Embassy Ankara understands our feeling that in the overall US interest, we would be remiss if we were to let the Cyprus problem drift or to refrain from full contact with the Turks about it. We are perfectly happy to do this here in Nicosia if that is most helpful.

In Istanbul, I explored the relationship between the status of Greek and Turkish ethnic minorities resident in Turkey and Greece, and the Cyprus problem—a facet of the situation which is not critically important but nevertheless real. In Athens, we found a rather more confident mood than we had among the stubbornly determined Turks. We tried to impress on both sides the need for further accommodation if the Clerides–Denktash talks were not to wither away.

¹ Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 476, Pol US in Cyprus. Confidential; Official–Informal. Copies were sent to Folsom and Crawford. A notation on the letter reads: “Mr. Cash FYI.”

² According to a November 21 letter from Popper to Handley, the issue in dispute was the passage of information provided to the United States by one government to representatives of another: “We feel obliged to do this sort of thing fairly often because Nicosia is so much the center of discussion of the Cyprus problem” but the respective states involved frequently did not communicate directly. (Ibid.)

We have reported more fully on all the foregoing by telegram and memcon.³ It leaves the Embassy and me personally in a much better position to carry on. I am grateful to have had the opportunity to make the trip, and am happy that I was able to maintain the low profile that we all desired.

While I was away, a news agency carried a report that you might be making a trip to some Arab capitals. Evidently this was untrue, but the Foreign Office here thinks you might visit Cyprus in February. Naturally, all of us *devoutly* hope that you will find it possible to stop in Cyprus when you make the trip. I would of course love to see you personally, but equally important we relish every opportunity to remedy a certain feeling of remoteness and isolation which sometimes settles over us. So I am extending to you right now a most cordial invitation to put aside a little time for us when you make your visit.

My only regret about my recent trip was that I could not take Flo along. She has been in bed for several weeks with severe sciatica. She is coming along, but slowly. The Sherman Maisels will be here over Thanksgiving; I know that will help.

Warmest regards to Jean and to you.⁴

Sincerely,

David H. Popper⁵

³ See Document 347. Popper also reported on talks with Pipinelis in telegram 5139 from Athens, November 19. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP) Boyatt, who accompanied Popper, summarized the talks in a November 24 memorandum to the Ambassador. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 476, Pol US in Cyprus)

⁴ In a December 1 reply, Sisco suggested that visits by Tasca and Handley to Nicosia might improve coordination and understanding among embassies and indicated that he would try to work a visit to Cyprus into future travel to the region. (Ibid.)

⁵ Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.

349. Memorandum of Conversation¹

US/MC/1

Brussels, December 3, 1969, 10:15 a.m.

UNITED STATES DELEGATION TO THE
FORTY-FOURTH MINISTERIAL MEETING OF THE
NORTH ATLANTIC COUNCIL
Brussels, Belgium, December 3–5, 1969

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

United States

The Secretary of State

Martin J. Hillenbrand, Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs

Gerald B. Helman, First Secretary, U.S. Mission to NATO

Turkey

Foreign Minister Caglayangil

Ozdemir Yigit (Interpreter), Turkish Foreign Ministry

Oktay Iscen, Turkish Foreign Ministry

The Foreign Minister reviewed the course of communal talks on Cyprus. He said that when the talks started, the two communities were on an equal footing but that the talks have shown the Greek community wants to make Cyprus into a Greek state. The Turkish community wants local autonomy but the Greeks offer nothing beyond local administrative facilities. The Turks want to maintain their identity as a community while the Greeks are willing only to grant some self-evident human rights, and those as a favor.

In brief, the Foreign Minister felt that the Greek community was trying to do through negotiations what it could not accomplish by force. They have sought to do this in various ways: by refusing to pay the salaries of Turkish state employees; by failure to spend anything on public works in the Turkish area; by denying the facilities of the state to the Turkish community; and by channeling foreign aid solely to the Greek community. The result is prosperity in the Greek community at the expense of the Turks. If there is to be normalization it must begin with these matters.

Secretary Rogers hoped that the two communities would work toward mutually acceptable arrangements.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1967–69, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Helman and cleared by McGuire and Brandt on December 4. The memorandum is Part III of IV. Parts I, II, and IV are *ibid.* The meeting took place at the U.S. Mission to NATO.

350. Editorial Note

In January 1970 the United States Government became aware of credible evidence of a plot directed against the life of Cypriot President Makarios by former Interior Minister Polykarpos Georkadjis. Information on the reported plot was passed to Archbishop Makarios on January 15 at Nairobi while the Cypriot President was making a stopover during an African tour. Cypriot officials increased security precautions and, following his return to Nicosia, Makarios ordered an investigation. He subsequently thanked Ambassador David Popper for passing on the information. According to a March 17 memorandum prepared in the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Directorate of Operations, of the Central Intelligence Agency, "The decision to warn Makarios was based on the fact that whatever one may think of him his continued survival is vital to the stability of Cyprus and this is in the interests of U.S. foreign policy." The memorandum added that the decision was also motivated by a belief that if Makarios had independently discovered the plot, he would have suspected U.S. involvement since Georkadjis had close contacts with U.S. officials during his long service as Interior Minister. (Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Office of the Deputy Director of Operations, Job 79–01440, Near Eastern Division)

In a subsequent interview, Makarios confirmed that he had been warned by U.S. officials of a plot: "We were about to have lunch. I was late in arriving and someone in the American Embassy insisted that he had an urgent message. We were in a hurry and I was not very pleased at the interruption, but I agreed to hear him. The message was this: 'According to reliable sources, when you go back to Cyprus there are plans for your assassination at the airport in Nicosia.' This was the first time I had heard of an attempt being made on my life. I smiled and said 'Thank you very much, but I don't think it is probable.' Actually, I didn't think the airport would be a suitable place for an assassination. But the American said, 'Be careful.'" (Lawrence Stern, *The Wrong Horse*, pages 86–87)

Additional documentation on the attempted assassination plot against Makarios is in the Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Operations, [file name not declassified]; National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30 1974; and *ibid.*, Box 1235, Saunders Subject Files, Greece, 10/1/69–12/31/69.

351. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS 314/02703-70

Washington, March 9, 1970.

COUNTRY

Cyprus

DOI

8 March 1970

SUBJECT

Reaction Following Attempted Assassination of Makarios

ACQ

[*less than 1 line not declassified*]

SOURCE

[*4½ lines not declassified*]

1. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*]) Comment: At 0710, 8 March an attempt was made to kill President Makarios by shooting him as he departed in a helicopter for Makhaeras Monastery. See Nicosia Embassy telegrams 288, 300 and 322).²

2. Shortly after noon, 8 March 1970, President Makarios returned to the Archbishopric from his visit to Makhaeras Monastery and closeted himself with some of his closest associates. The group of about a dozen people included Dr. Vassos Lyssarides, his personal physician; Andreas Azinas, Cooperatives Commissioner; Nicosia Mayor Odysseas Ioannides; Miltides Christodoulou, Government public information officer; Vaso Loiza, a female employed in the Office of the Director of the Cyprus Information Service; Ourana Kokkinou, a spinster long associated with EOKA and confidant of Makarios; and some of Makarios' relatives. Although Makarios was calm and in reasonably good humor considering his narrow escape earlier in the day, the others in the group were excited, angry and shouting to be heard. Makarios asked if the persons he had ordered arrested before he left for Makhaeras were in custody. Loiza said she had passed his message to the police, but did not know what had been done. Makarios was highly irritated, and told the group that he had ordered the arrest of former Interior Minister

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

² Telegram 288 from Nicosia, March 7, is in the National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Telegram 300 from Nicosia, March 8, and telegram 302 from Nicosia, March 9, are *ibid.*, POL 15-1 CYP.

Polykarpos Georkatzis and several others immediately after the attempt on his life. The group began shouting. During the bedlam of accusations against Georkatzis, Makarios abruptly left them saying he wanted to see a few of them privately.

3. Later, [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Makarios said he had felt very ashamed that his friends had so totally lost control of themselves. Concerning Georkatzis, Makarios said he had strong reason to believe that his former minister was behind the attempt to kill him. However, he did not think that Glafkos Clerides was involved or was even aware of the plot. Explaining further, Makarios said Georkatzis had conspired with men who were not known to be associated with him such as Costas Ioannides, an editor of "Gnomi" and supporter of Dr. Takis Evdokas. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*] *Comment*: Makarios did not intend to imply that Evdokas was conspiring with Georkatzis.) Upon reflection, Makarios decided that investigation and arrests should be made "in all directions" so that the general public would not conclude he was acting against Georkatzis for political motives. This would give the impression of an impartial investigation. In due course, when the police completed their investigation and advised him that they had sufficient evidence to convict Georkatzis and his fellow conspirators, the public would be informed. ([*less than 1 line not declassified*] *Comment*: of the 11 men in custody at noon, 9 March, several are National Front leaders: Costas Haralambous and Michaliakis Rossides, Costas P. Ioannides, presumably the person referred to above, is also in custody.)

4. By the evening, 8 March, Makarios was no longer certain whether Georkatzis should be arrested, and discussed his doubts at some length with his advisors. Lyssarides and Azinas contended that Georkatzis should be arrested. Makarios also had difficulty in deciding whether to make a public announcement that Georkatzis' apartment had been searched by the police. [*1½ lines not declassified*] In the end, he concluded that an announcement should be made to avoid³ hysteria, and vied with each other in trying to get Makarios' attention. Makarios himself was calm. He did not discuss what concrete steps he planned to take in response to the attempt to kill him.

6. [*1 line not declassified*]

³ A note on the cable at this point reads, "Missing Portion," referring to three lines of text that are missing. A note at the end of the cable reads, "Headquarters comment: Missing portion will be disseminated only if it materially affects the sense of this report." The missing portion was not found.

352. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 17, 1970, 1200Z.

390. Country Team Message. Subject: Cyprus: Greek Involvement in Double Enosis Scheme. Ref: State 37841.²

1. We have carefully sifted reports available here relating to involvement of GOG or elements thereof in plan, perhaps connected with attempt on Makarios' life, to promote double enosis solution. There is increasing evidence that some Greek National Guard officers, and some Greeks on mainland notably Aslanides, were plotting to achieve what they considered quiet solution to Cyprus problem and to cause trouble for present junta leadership in Athens. [*less than 1 line not declassified*] appear most authoritative reports we have seen on this score.³ If they are accurate, it appears that this fractional element had decided to turn what may have been its thoughts—resulting from entirely understandable frustration with Makarios' intransigence—into action. But we have not seen sort of repetitive indications we hope we would be receiving if highest levels of GOG had decided on double enosis course, or if there had been kind of highly secret discourse with Turkey which would appear indispensable prerequisite to adoption and successful implementation of such a plan.

2. What now seems fairly certain, however, and what perhaps is causing much of speculation about existence of a GOG master plan, is that some Greek mainland officers have been carrying on activities at variance with officially expressed GOG policy. As attested by several good reports received by DATT Nicosia (C-051), March, 1970, TR6823001670, March 2, 1970),⁴ as well as [*less than 1 line not declassified*] there are some GOG officers who have at minimum (A) talked up

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis; Noforn. Repeated priority to Ankara and Athens.

² Telegram 37841 to Nicosia, March 14, requested Embassy comments on the involvement of Greek officers and agents of the KYP in "double enosis" schemes. (Ibid.) In telegram 1245 from Athens, March 18, the Embassy responded to the Department's query by suggesting that while the senior Greek leadership was committed to a negotiated resolution of the Cyprus situation, officers stationed on Cyprus were probably involved in plots against Makarios. (Ibid.) Intelligence Information Cable TDCS DB 315/01245-70, March 18, reported that Makarios was skeptical about Greek officers' involvement in the attempts against him. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969-June 30, 1974)

³ Not found.

⁴ Not found.

enosis and (B) been involved with National Front in manner that appears to constitute somewhat more than surveillance of its activities which could be considered a justifiable KYP assignment. Perhaps most compelling evidence of mainland officer activity contrary officially stated policy is to be seen in GOG FonMin Pipinelis' comments to UK Ambassador Stewart (Athens 864).⁵

3. Evidence increasingly points to Georkadjis as man behind March 8 attempted assassination of Archbishop, even after bearing in mind Makarios' transparent effort to cast Georkadjis as the villain in mind of Cypriot public. What is more difficult to establish is connection Georkadjis may or may not have had with mainland elements.

4. One report from a previously reliable GOC source received by DATT March 13 and transmitted to addressees as C-052 Mar 70⁶ joins these two primary strands of prevalent suspicion by tying prominent junta officials into Georkadjis attempt and portraying the whole as part of coup plan against Papadopoulos. This is a tempting theory in that it would explain both paras (2) and (3) above. Indeed, Papadopoulos opponents may feel they can get at regime only by outside diversion (Cyprus). However, there seem many questionable elements to this thesis, e.g. why would disorder in Cyprus make junta more vulnerable instead of putting it more on its guard?

5. In short, we discern increasing evidence of Greek officer involvement in developments of last ten days. We believe these officers were pursuing some political objective looking toward creation of chaos in Cyprus as an avenue toward enosis with Greece and opposition to present Greek junta leadership. If their thinking went beyond this point—to the international consequences of an attempt to alter the political status of Cyprus—we have very little knowledge of it. We have no indication that double enosis was ever discussed with the Turks. Even if it had been, we seriously doubt Turks would be inclined to hook up with desperate, quixotic types involved here or would trust them to safeguard interests of Turk Cypriot community or of Turkey in probable bloody aftermath had attempt on Archbishop succeeded.

6. This is an unfolding scenario. Within a few days we expect to be able to evaluate more precisely the roles of the various players—dead and alive.

Popper

⁵ Dated February 25, it reported on Papadopoulos' meeting with the British Ambassador to Greece. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP)

⁶ Not found.

353. Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, March 18, 1970.

SUBJECT

Cyprus—Recent Developments and Current Assessment

Recent Developments:

On March 8 as-yet unidentified assailants narrowly missed assassinating President Makarios when they peppered his helicopter with bullets as it took off from the Archbishopric in Nicosia. After the attempt, suspicion focused on former Interior Minister Polycarpus Georkadjis and a right-wing terrorist organization, the National Front. Makarios forced Georkadjis to resign his ministerial post in 1968 after the Greek Government implicated him in an abortive attempt to assassinate Prime Minister Papadopoulos. The National Front is a secret terrorist group that vehemently opposes Makarios' policy of abandoning enosis (union with Greece) and negotiating with the Turkish Cypriots on the basis of a "feasible" (independent) solution to the Cyprus problem.

After being prevented by police from leaving Cyprus on March 13, Georkadjis was gunned down outside of Nicosia on March 15. The murderer or murderers have not been identified but the most plausible theory at this point suggests that co-conspirators in the Makarios assassination attempt were responsible for Georkadjis' death.

Greco-Turkish Implications:

Since Turkish Cypriots are not suspected of involvement in either of the recent shootings, the impact on the volatile intercommunal situation has been marginal. The negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities are expected to continue although little progress is expected in view of the entrenched positions of the respective protagonists.

While Athens and Ankara are concerned over recent events, they appear determined to continue their commitment to resolving the Cyprus question peacefully through the local talks. In spite of a growing volume of evidence implicating mainland Greek military officers

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I. Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret. A notation by Saunders on the memorandum reads: "Encorporated in daily Brief. HS"

in Cyprus in the recent shootings, we believe that Papadopoulos government does not condone such activities and that it is taking steps to bring such dissidents to heel.

Outlook:

We expect Makarios to retain his preeminent position as political and spiritual leader of the Greek Cypriots and to continue to play a major role in the sensitive on-going negotiations with the Turkish Cypriots. For all his faults—and they are many—only he commands the overwhelming popular support that is a stabilizing factor within the Greek Cypriot community and a base from which compromise and flexibility are at least possible in the talks. In the longer run, however, his narrow escape will set a precedent and remove a psychological restraint on others with similar intentions.

The Georkadjis murder is likely to lead to more intracommunal bloodletting as loyal former EOKA henchmen seek vengeance for the slaying of their patron and leader. Again, however, although it cannot be completely ruled out, we do not foresee this violence spilling over to the Turkish Cypriot community which is still uninvolved in the gun-toting turmoil of the Greek Cypriot community.

U.S. Position:

We are monitoring events closely and encouraging Athens and Ankara to continue pursuing their positive approach to this problem. We see little benefit in actively inserting ourselves into the situation in Cyprus at this time. In fact, we would like to conserve our capital at this time since we may find more pressing occasions to spend it in the future.

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.

354. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Davis) and the Officer in Charge of United Nations Political Affairs (Jones) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, March 19, 1970.

SUBJECT

Possible Cyprus Coup: U.S. Options in UNSC

The following options would present themselves under the various circumstances of a coup d'état in Cyprus.

1. Assumption: Coup d'état engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but *without* Greek Government approval.

Under these circumstances, the Cyprus Government would very likely request Security Council action. It is conceivable, as suggested in Ankara's 1633,² that the Greek and Turkish Governments would join in such a request. In this situation U.S. support for the request for Security Council consideration would seem to be adequate to counter any similar Soviet request.

2. Assumption: Coup d'état engineered by Greek officers in Cyprus, with enosis as objective, but *with* Greek Government approval.

In this contingency, Turkish military intervention would be almost inevitable. In the face of such developments, it would be desirable for the U.S. and the U.K. to move quickly for Security Council consideration, prior to any USSR request for a Security Council meeting. Presumably the Cyprus UN representative would in any event request UNSC action. Whether we and the British would join in a formal request for a meeting or simply support a Cypriot request would best be determined in light of the precise circumstances at the time.

3. Assumption: Cooperative action on the part of the Greek and Turkish Governments designed to bring about double enosis.

Once again the Cypriot Government could be expected to request Security Council action. Moreover the Soviet Union would probably

¹ Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 26. Secret. Drafted by Jones and Torp (NEA/CYP) and sent through Davies.

² In telegram 1633 from Ankara, March 19, the Embassy reported that Turkey had informed it of a Soviet démarche which laid blame for the attempt on Makarios on the Greek Government or its officers; that Turkey was receiving reports of planning for a coup against Makarios; and that the Greek Government had approached Turkey regarding joint action in the event of a coup attempt. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

join in or strongly support such a request. In such circumstances we would wish to move quickly in support of a Cypriot request, or on our own initiative but in cooperation with the U.K., to request Security Council action in order to beat the Soviets to the punch.

The precise terms of any UNSC Resolution would, of course, have to be designed to meet the exact situation. However, in any of the above circumstances we would seek action critical of the coup d'état calling for the end to any hostilities or violence, urging peaceful settlement procedures, and perhaps providing for some specific immediate UN measures to assist in restoring peace. Unless the specifics of the developing situation make it impossible, both in terms of the realities of the situation on the ground and broader political considerations, we would seek both in direct talks with the parties and in the UN to have the status quo ante restored.

355. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 28, 1970, 0915Z.

481. Subject: Cyprus: Analysis of Current Situation.

1. *Summary.* March 8 attempt on Archbishop and March 15 murder of one of island's key power figures have brought realignment of several elements in situation on Cyprus, affecting US interests. This tel analyzes changes that have taken place and seeks assess where we stand in regard future. Our conclusion is that normal conditions are being restored but that our position and prospects for intercommunal settlement may have been somewhat impaired.

2. Assassination Attempt/Georkadjis Murder: From his conversation with me March 26 (Nicosia 475)² and many other indicators it quite clear Makarios has chosen line he will use for diplomatic and quasi-public (press) consumption: Georkadjis organized unsuccessful attempt on President's life and was in turn eliminated by one or more of his co-plotters to prevent exposure. Greece was not involved although some involvement by disloyal individual mainland officers not

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, Moscow, London, USNATO, EUCCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

² Dated March 26. (Ibid.)

to be entirely ruled out. However, role of “foreign forces” unclear (leaving residue of ambiguity as to whether or not this could conceivably include Greece).

3. In fact, of course, situation with regard to assassination attempt and Georkadjis murder is anything but clear. Georkadjis does indeed appear responsible for attempt on President’s life, but where the lines go from him, if they go anywhere, remains to be proved.

4. GOG line, exemplified by its Embassy here, is that the plot stops with Georkadjis; no Greek officer did anything wrong; there certainly is no conspiracy tracing back to mainland. In reality we know that GOG suspects some of its officers misbehaved and is quietly investigating. If it finds traces of their associations with Georkadjis or improper eno-sist activity—or more—it will certainly remove culprits unostentatiously. Indeed we know (DATT C-072)³ that UN has already spotted a couple of mainland officer billets which seem to have been vacated recently without explanation.

5. Makarios doing his own quiet investigating, with different motives. He apparently has quite a lot of raw material to sift through including evidence provided by his involuntary palace houseguest, Kyr-iacos Patatakos, right hand man of Georkadjis during his last days, and various Georkadjis memorabilia including 50 tape recordings. One of President’s main objectives is certainly to root out all the domestic participants in plot against him. Another is to uncover every possible trace that may exist of mainland or other foreign involvement. He must try to satisfy himself either that there was none or at least that it was involvement of individuals unconnected with Athens. If any questions remain unanswered, his suspicious nature will cause him calculate that GOG or elements thereof may have been behind Georkadjis and that there may be repetition of March 8. But even if he should uncover something, we doubt he would expose it or take any action that would bring open clash with Greece. A falling-out could fatally impair military position of his government. More likely, he would hold information in hope of someday using it against opponents.

6. Makarios’ Internal Position: All considered, Makarios standing with his people about back where it was before March 8, or has even perhaps slipped somewhat. Assassination attempt produced outpouring of sentiment for him. However, this perhaps more than offset by simple public distaste for fact that at Archbishop’s orders Georkadjis was pulled off plane that would have taken him to self-exile and safety and 36 hours later he was dead. Georkadjis was after all an authentic EOKA hero in the struggle for Cypriot independence, and for eight

³ Not found.

years thereafter Makarios' strong man in cabinet. Yet there was not a word of sympathy or commemoration from the Presidential palace when he was killed. UNCIVPOL has heard echoes of disapproval around island. For the moment, this probably makes little difference to Makarios, who has seen his most dangerous enemy disposed of, and Glafcos Clerides, his only conceivable rival for presidency, compelled to disown his own past association with Georkadjis and virtually to suspend the activities of his own party.

7. Intercommunal Talks: Trauma of recent events has caused many to re-examine fundamentals and conclude as do Pipinelis and Clerides, among others, that a major corrosive factor leading up to recent events was lack of progress in talks and frustrations produced thereby. Ergo, these argue, as I did March 26 with Makarios, a decisive new push is called for in weeks ahead. His answer indicated that some new sense of momentum may be imparted and perhaps some small progress will result. But we cannot honestly believe it will be very much. Events of March have fortified conviction of Turks (Nicosia 393)⁴ that it would be folly again place themselves under a Greek administration, and there is not much chance that under present circumstances Makarios would consider granting them degree of autonomy they seek. On GOC side, we have noted weakening of Clerides, who has led voices of moderation seeking to offer Turks reasonable compromise. With the Archbishop, outside suggestions for greater flexibility have shed like water from duck's back in past and we see no particular reason why this month's happening will have changed his views substantially. Only dim possibility is if he concludes GOG was in some way behind attempt on his life and judges he had better get moving lest in frustration the junta tries again. And even in this far out case his penchant would be for manoeuvre rather than movement. Nevertheless, we are inclined to believe that interested third parties must continue to explore every possible approach to an intercommunal accord.

8. Off island, Pipinelis speaks with conviction of this being time for progress but we doubt his sentiments echoed in Ankara, which we assume likely be more cautious in handling Cyprus problem, not less.

9. Soviets and Communists: Russians and their friends have been both lucky and skillful. By adroit behind-scenes work, full extent of which only beginning to come to light (e.g. Moscow 1344)⁵ and timely propaganda they have asserted role as champions of independent Cyprus (and to certain extent of Turkey) against suspected US–UK–GOG machinations.

⁴ Dated March 17. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CYP)

⁵ Dated March 18; the Embassy reported the text of a Soviet statement on Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)

10. From here, the scenario has probably not yet fully played itself out. Rational Cypriot oligarchy has firmly concluded that it patently nonsense to think US had anything to do with recent events. Makarios would have US believe he thinks so too. At same time, we expect he will opportunistically continue to keep open his options for public insinuation of unspecified foreign complicity, including US and UK. Communists are cleverly keeping alive public speculation about a past USG association with Georkadjis. This and their general propaganda line condition at least some of Cyprus public to credit charges that US and in broader sense NATO had some role.

11. Possibility of More Violence: Instinct tells most Cypriots with whom we in contact that a period of calm lies ahead. They approve Government's apparently vigorous actions to disarm private armies. They aware that surviving captains of Georkadjis' organization have acknowledged their dead leader's part in attempt on Archbishop and have preached against revenge. At same time, no one has confidence that cycle of violence is at an end or that there will not be another attempt against President at some later stage.

12. *Conclusion:* In short, except in negative sense, there is little cause for satisfaction to US in what has happened or changes that have taken place over past weeks. Archbishop was not killed, and Greece and Turkey did not fall out. Talks will go on. But Clerides has been weakened; Turks and Turkey are more suspicious than ever; Soviets have made gains; USG is in minds of many identified in some nebulous way with Archbishop's apparent would-be killer; NATO in general and Greece in particular are mildly suspect. This is not a situation in which we can expect easy progress toward a Cyprus solution. Our effort should be to minimize disruptive factors and work carefully in many quarters to move things slowly back in direction that advances our policy objectives, particularly progress in talks.

Popper

356. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Davies)

Nicosia, March 30, 1970.

[Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 17 US in Cyprus. Secret. 3 pages not declassified.]

357. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey¹

Washington, September 24, 1970, 0109Z.

156982. Subject: Cyprus: Greek and Turkish Influence in Inter-communal Talks. Ref: Nicosia 1671² and previous.

1. We note as described reftel and related messages from Athens and Ankara that phase 4 which envisioned package deal proposals for solution appears have little steam behind it and little chance of proving more successful than previous stages in talks. Principal reason obviously is unwillingness of either Greek Cypriots or Turk Cypriots to make compromises required if solution is to be found. Both not only appear believe time is on their respective sides but to prefer situation as it exists today rather than compromise their positions.

2. Athens and Ankara appear resigned to acceptance status quo for time being. Therefore although we appreciate analysis and recommendations contained Nicosia's 1671 we do not feel this would be appropriate time to use US leverage to bring about Caglayangil/Palamas meeting or to push for vigorous Greek/Turkish action, as we believe forcing a meeting at this time would not be beneficial. To contrary, our

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Davis on September 23; cleared by Cash and Vigderman and in substance by Feldman (IO/UNP); and approved by Davies. Repeated to USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, London, and USUN.

² Dated September 22, it reported that an "atmosphere of bleak pessimism" infected both the ethnic communities and the Embassies of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus and urged efforts to get the two "mother" states to promote movement toward a solution. (Ibid.) In telegram 5279 from Athens, September 23, Tasca endorsed these views. (Ibid.)

reaction is that GOG and GOT fully aware of dangers inherent in situation and remain committed to preventing deterioration. We would hope that with negotiations at this low point, however, all parties concerned will do some hard thinking without our intervention with possibility subsequent GOG/GOT discussions as they feel advisable.

3. On other hand, addressees should continue encourage concerned parties toward compromise and maintenance of positive attitude re continuation intercommunal negotiations.³

Rogers

³ In telegram 1699 from Nicosia, September 26, Popper suggested that one means available to the United States to forward its objectives was arranging a Nixon–Makarios meeting at which the President would urge movement toward a settlement. (Ibid.)

358. Letter From the Ambassador to Cyprus (Popper) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Nicosia, October 6, 1970.

Dear Joe:

It was a pleasure to see you in Naples and to see how well you were coping with the various trials and tribulations of the world's most unsettled areas.

I know from my own talks with the other Ambassadors that the meeting with the President was a great morale builder.² This was not only because the President was so obviously buoyant, relaxed, and thoroughly master of the situation. It was also because he listened

¹ Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 74 D 139, Pol 17 US in Cyprus. Secret; Official–Informal. A notation on the letter indicates that Sisco, Davies, and Davis also saw it.

² President Nixon visited Europe September 27–October 4. The meeting with the Ambassadors took place on September 30. No record of this conversation was found. Briefing papers, including a draft Presidential speech Nixon heavily underlined, are in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 468, President's Trip Files, Presidential Visit to NATO Headquarters (AFSOUTH), Naples, Italy. According to an October 6 letter from Popper to Davis, the Ambassador came away with a sense that the decision for a Nixon–Makarios meeting had already been made prior to his presentation. Popper had informed Makarios that approval was likely. (Ibid.)

so knowledgeably to each of us and took note of our particular concerns.

I was of course delighted to get the President's indication that he would be seeing the Archbishop. Following up on the President's questions, we are preparing a Talking Paper giving our ideas on the points which might be brought up in a Nixon–Makarios conversation.³

We are considering here just how the more visible presence of the US in the Eastern Mediterranean should affect our operations in Cyprus. The change brought about by the President's visit and the movements of the Sixth Fleet is still too new to have produced any very obvious effect in Cyprus. This change coincides with evidence that the Soviets, on their side, are showing increased interest in Cyprus. When we have the results of the Archbishop's trip to the US, we will want to analyze carefully the possibilities for a somewhat higher profile on the island. But we will of course be very careful not to jump the gun on this until we are sure that the circumstances are right.

Meanwhile, we will plug away at the old themes—urging serious pursuit of the intercommunal negotiations, more normalization and de-confrontation measures, and greater contacts between the two sides. We will also be looking into ways in which we can more effectively counteract local Communist influence and propaganda. This last is not easy, but it must be done.

All hands appreciate your letter of commendation in connection with the passage through Nicosia of hijacked aircraft passengers.⁴ We were fortunate to be able to help. This is certainly one case in which the work itself was its own reward.

Every good wish.

Sincerely yours,

Dave

³ Transmitted in telegram 1758 from Nicosia, October 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

⁴ Not found. Fighting between Palestinian and Jordanian forces broke out on August 26. Beginning on September 6, Palestinian terrorist units seized a series of Western airliners, flew them to Jordan and held crew and passengers hostage. Syria invaded Jordan in support of the Palestinians. By September 27 Jordan had succeeded in releasing the hostages, expelling the Syrians, and defeating the Palestinians. See *Foreign Relations, 1969–1976*, volume E-1, Documents on Global Issues, 1969–72, Documents 45–77.

359. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon¹

Washington, undated.

SUBJECT

Your Meeting with Archbishop Makarios of Cyprus

Background

The principal U.S. concerns in Cyprus have been: (1) that tension between Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities not erupt and draw Greece and Turkey into war; (2) that the well organized Communist party not achieve predominance. As long as Makarios is there, the latter seems under control. But in 1964 and 1967 when Turkey was on the brink of invading Cyprus to protect the Turkish minority (20%), it was to a large extent the intervention of the U.S. President or his emissary which helped to resolve the crisis. The main purpose of this meeting is to establish a personal relationship—which Makarios has sought—as a basis for such future action if unhappily it should become necessary.

Director Helms also points out that Cyprus plays an increasingly important role as we search for friendly territory from which to support our Mid-East intelligence, communications and other efforts such as the U-2 flights monitoring the UAR standstill.²

Makarios follows a non-aligned foreign policy but inclines toward the West. He speaks English well.

Issues Makarios May Raise

1. He may ask that the U.S. press Turkey to force more flexibility into the Turkish Cypriot line in the negotiations between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. [These talks began after the 1967 crisis to try to rewrite the constitution and devise a governmental structure so as to provide more workable guarantees for the rights of the Turkish minority. We have tried to stay out of the middle.]³

2. Although Makarios acquiesced in our U-2 flights, the Cypriot press this week picked up the story that they are flying from the British sovereign base areas there. Makarios may cite it as a source of embarrassment.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret. Sent for information. A notation on the memorandum indicates the President saw it.

² A copy of Helms's September 23 letter is *ibid*.

³ All brackets in the original.

Talking Points

1. I appreciate the opportunity to establish personal ties. These have been important in times of past crisis. I also value the views of a non-aligned leader who understands the Western view of the world.

2. Your Beatitude appreciates our concern over Soviet presence in the Eastern Mediterranean and our hope that Cyprus will maintain its independent and non-aligned stance. The main objective of the U.S. vis-à-vis the USSR is to achieve a balance which will permit the nations of the area to make peace and to enjoy freedom from external domination.

3. I appreciate your government's facilitating reception of the hijacking hostages and cooperation in "helping us with our peace initiative" [a delicate way to refer to our U-2 flights]. We will continue our efforts to get peace talks started. We negotiated a basis for talks last summer, but that has been undercut.

4. The negotiations between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities on Cyprus are for President Makarios and his countrymen to work out. The U.S. cannot help but have a concern for their successful outcome—both because of our desire to see violence avoided among our friends and because of the importance of a stable Cyprus to the stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. I am counting on Your Beatitude's wisdom to achieve a positive result.

5. I appreciate removal of Cypriot ships from trade with North Vietnam. Trade with Cuba remains a continuing concern of the United States and I hope that it may be possible for Cyprus to reduce its involvement in that commerce. These restrictions are both important to U.S. policy. [The U.S. has pressed persistently for the removal of ships flying the Cypriot flag from the North Vietnam trade (successfully) and from their growing involvement in the Cuban trade (65% of non-Communist shipping).]

Secretary Irwin's memo is attached.⁴ Its main points are reflected above.

⁴ Attached but not printed. The President met with Makarios on October 25. See Document 360.

360. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, October 25, 1970, 10 a.m.

PARTICIPANTS

President Nixon
Archbishop Makarios, President of Cyprus
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs

The President opened the conversation by giving background on his offices in the White House and Executive Office Building. He then turned to substance.

The President said, "We follow your development with great sympathy. We understand your foreign policy of technical neutrality." Archbishop Makarios replied "Because of our geography and our peculiar conditions we follow a non-aligned policy but by history and tradition and conviction we belong to the West. We are not like other non-aligned countries that are really pro-east. At the Belgrade conference of non-aligned countries we defended the Western point of view so much that I was afraid we would lose our non-aligned status."

The President said he hoped that the Middle East would not explode. He appreciated Cyprus being made available as a staging place during the evacuation of the airline hijacking hostages from Jordan.² Archbishop Makarios responded that Cyprus was always available for any peaceful purpose in the area. He added that while, of course, he was strongly for peace in the Middle East it was important to understand the Israeli point of view. Israel felt extremely threatened.

The President then said, "We are working very hard to get the ceasefire extended and eventually to get talks started," and asked for the Archbishop's advice. Makarios said, "I don't give advice to the President of the United States. However, peace in the Middle East will take time. First, some Arab countries disagree with the initiative for domestic reasons; these are usually countries far away. Second, the U.S. proposal provides a good and fair basis for a settlement. However, in your desire for a settlement you may have been too pro-Arab and therefore may have emboldened them too much. The crisis would be more easily settled if the two super-powers would agree." The President

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Nodis. No drafting information appears on the memorandum. The meeting took place in the Oval Office.

² See footnote 3, Document 358.

added: "Still the moral influence of small countries is important. We are grateful for your support of the decent principles in the West."

Makarios commented, "Some people feel we are moving left. Of course, Communists exploit every problem but we will not become like Cuba, partly because Cypriots are a deeply religious people." The President said, "The tragedy in the world is the flight from religion. You can't fight Communism with materialism."

Makarios said, "People who are for Communists are not necessarily the pro-Communists. They don't know what Communism is. For example, I had banned atheists from the voting rolls and a Communist had protested to me that he was not an atheist. Most Cypriots think it means improving life, but the main thing to remember is that Communists support me because I am popular; I don't support them to become popular; I have never appointed a left-wing person to any significant post. They support me because they can't do otherwise and I accept their support because it is a good way of keeping them under control. The simple people of Cyprus have more confidence in me than in anybody. I don't rely on the army or on the police force; my strength is my goodness. I am Archbishop for life, and the fact that I don't particularly want to continue as President makes me stronger."

Makarios commented that the U.S. Ambassador to his country "is an excellent person." The President said, "I want very close relations." In response to Makarios' remark that Cyprus was one of the smallest countries in the world, the President said, "But it has a wise leader."

Makarios then spoke about his plans to visit Japan and about his education at Boston University where he had had to interrupt his studies to return to Cyprus for the independence struggle. He noted that "They brought me back, even though I didn't have the degree, to get an honorary degree."

361. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, December 1, 1970.

SUBJECT

The Cyprus Situation

Early last month we reported that intercommunal tension between Greek and Turk Cypriots had been mounting, primarily because of recent hardening in the Cypriot government's attitude toward the Turks. Our Embassy in Nicosia continues to report that Makarios is assuming a "steadily more defiant attitude." In a recent speech, the Archbishop—who has hitherto refrained from acknowledging deadlock in the talks—openly blamed Turkish intransigence for the stalemated talks, asserted that he had reached the limit of his concessions to the Turkish Cypriots and claimed that, on no account, would he accept a solution imposed from the outside.

Two explanations have been suggested:

1. Ambassador Popper feels that Makarios may have simply concluded that the Turk position is at a disadvantage and that the governments of Greece and Turkey are too preoccupied with domestic matters to bother about Cyprus. Additionally, the Archbishop may feel bolstered by whatever international recognition and acceptance he earned as a result of his high-level contacts during his recent travel abroad.

2. An alternative explanation is that Makarios is simply taking a hard line to deflect right-wing enosis during the trial of those associated with the assassination attempt on him last summer.

On the Turk Cypriot side, their gloom and frustration has been increased by the government's apparent harder stand, a situation which could erupt into some more violent measures on their part. They continue to believe that little progress is in store for them as long as Makarios—whom they believe wants to retain the status quo—is on the scene.

Operationally, this problem resolves itself into the fact that the issue will be discussed on the sidelines at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels with an eye to urging the Greeks and Turks both to try to help keep the lid on with their respective clients. The British have

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Top Secret; Sensitive; Contains Codeword. Kissinger initialed the memorandum, indicating that he had seen it.

told us that they will press discussion of the subject with Turk Foreign Minister Caglayangil at the NATO ministerial meeting in Brussels, and Secretary Rogers will speak to both Caglayangil and Palamas.² However, both U.S. and UK agree these approaches should be low-key.

² The meeting took place December 2–5 in Brussels. No record of bilateral discussions of Cyprus was found.

362. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 6, 1971, 0740Z.

201. Subject: Cyprus: Makarios Takes Hard Line on Intercommunal Problem.

1. At the end of my Feb 3 meeting with President Makarios² I told him that on return to US for consultation I would like to carry back with me his latest thinking on general status of intercommunal problem. Speaking personally, it seemed to me Archbishop could look to future in two different ways. On one hand, he could conclude that with all its faults, existing situation was best that could be obtained from Greek Cypriot standpoint. This would mean dragging intercommunal negotiations on indefinitely, and hoping that in course of time through superior numbers, talent and economic strength, Govt might gradually consolidate its control of entire island.

2. I said that while this course had advantages, it also entailed serious dangers. Intercommunal peace could never be assumed: any incident or irresponsible act might lead to violence. No one could guarantee that destabilizing developments would not cause trouble either from inside or outside country. Moreover, over time, Turk Cypriot provisional administration seemed to be slowly consolidating its position. All in all, status quo was bound to have a fragile foundation.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

² Reported in telegram 187 from Nicosia, February 4. (Ibid.) Popper also held meetings with Clerides, reported in telegram 225 from Nicosia, February 9; with Denktash and Inhan, reported in telegram 237 from Nicosia, February 11; and with Panayotakos, reported in telegram 224 from Nicosia, February 11. (All *ibid.*)

3. In these circumstances I suggested Archbishop might well take advantage of his current position of strength, within his own community and generally, to follow an alternative course: i.e., to make an extraordinary effort now to reach intercommunal agreement. Turk Cypriot side had agreed that Cyprus should be unitary state. Denktash had been talking to Clerides in terms of "image of partnership"; to me this meant that it might be possible by cosmetic means to satisfy Turk Cypriots without bifurcating central govt authority. If Greek Cypriot side could give Turk Cypriots some kind of voice at central govt level which would not impair functioning of central govt on majority basis within limits of constitutional guarantees for Turk Cypriots, then it might be possible to reunite all Cypriots under GOC control. Was this not, I concluded, the more desirable objective for him and for Cyprus in longer terms?

4. Archbishop's reply was that, since he did not want violence and did not believe that Turk Cypriots did, he would be prepared to tolerate present de facto situation for a long time to come. It was far from ideal, but GOC could live with it. He was not willing to pay price demanded by Turk Cypriots to move toward intercommunal settlement. He simply would not agree to anything which could lead to partition, cantonization or federalism. Turk Cypriots could have local autonomy in form offered by Clerides, or they could have representation in executive branch of central govt in form of vice president and some ministers, but they could not have both. He could defend local autonomy proposal since it could be said that Turk Cypriots were already exercising local autonomy. But he would make no further concessions because he thought Turk Cypriots were trying to whittle down Greek side's position bit by bit. Turk Cypriots would have to choose among alternatives as he had just outlined them.

5. I came back to "image of partnership" concept and said that surely some way would have to be found for Turk Cypriot community to have a voice, though not a veto, at central govt level. Archbishop was very firm: if Turk Cypriots obtained local autonomy, they could not be represented as a community in central executive. They would elect members to House of Representatives, but would have no vice president and no Turk Cypriot community representative in Council of Ministers. I closed conversation by saying that I frankly did not see much possibility of progress in intercommunal talks unless this position was changed—in ways in which I thought GOC could well afford to move.

6. *Comment:* This is hardest official version of GOC position I have heard. We must assume Archbishop wants us to believe he would rather go on indefinitely as at present than make any substantial concession to produce an intercommunal settlement. His attitude may be the upshot of his difficulties in contending with Greek Cypriot right-wing extremists. More probably, it is only latest reflection of his

consistent and stubborn refusal to approach intercommunal problem in magnanimous spirit which could lead to agreement. Conclusion we reach is that progress toward settlement is unlikely in absence of very strong internal or external pressures. We see no evidence that such pressures will be generated in near future, unless GOG–GOT dialogue develops in that direction.

Popper

363. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 15, 1971, 1155Z.

404. Subj: Cyprus: The Gut Issue in Intercommunal Negotiations. Ref: Nicosia 362, 237; A-07.²

1. My conversations with Clerides and Denktash in last week have thrown into sharper relief what we consider fundamental point of difference between Greek and Turk Cypriots in intercommunal negotiations: the ultimate locus of decision-making authority for settlement of intercommunal differences.

2. As previously reported,³ Denktash has responded to Clerides' Nov 30 plan providing for local Turk Cypriot authority at village and area level by suggesting it be supplemented by exercise of Turk Cypriot community authority at central govt level. He has introduced series of alternative proposals with this objective. Common feature of all of these is that in last analysis intercommunal problems must be "coordinated," probably by Greek President and Turk Cypriot Vice President acting together to maintain "partnership," which (as contrasted with "minority rights") GOT and Turk Cypriots say is sine qua non of a satisfactory constitutional settlement.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

² In telegram 362 from Nicosia, March 4, the Embassy reported on the Ambassador's March 2 talk with Denktash. (Ibid.) Telegram 237 from Nicosia, February 11, reported on Popper's February 11 discussion with Denktash and Inhan. (Ibid.) Airgram A-7 from Nicosia, January 16, reported Clerides' views. (Ibid., POL 15-5 CYP)

³ Not further identified.

3. The word "coordination" in this context entails a requirement for agreement by the two sides. This seems to us to amount to a demand for a Turk Cypriot community veto in specific fields. Existence of such a veto under London-Zurich Constitution, though for different range of subjects, had been major factor in 1963 constitutional breakdown. Early in intercommunal talks Denktash renounced London-Zurich veto; now he seems to have reintroduced concept.

4. Denktash's latest version central intercommunal institutional structure provides for creation of central authorities of local govt by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, with representatives of these authorities to coordinate settlement of intercommunal problems. When Clerides objected on Mar 8 that this involved formation of "govt within a govt" and that structure was not connected with existing central govt machinery, Denktash said he had suggested that the two authorities report to President and Vice President respectively. Alternatively, he proposed that joint secretariats drawn from officials of various ministries could act as a standing committee for all local govt matters and advise President and Vice President.

5. Current status is that Clerides has told Denktash he thinks latter's proposals involve a veto, and that each man has said ball is in other's court to make further proposals. Denktash has told us (Nicosia 362) that where agreement between President and Vice President could not be reached, courts would be asked to rule, applying constitutional provisions which would spell out Turk Cypriot rights. Clerides' rejoinder is that, while human rights cases may be susceptible to judicial determination, local improvement and development projects involving allocation of funds and resources, as well as other types of contentious political issues, are not. Discussion has stalled at this point.

6. Clerides has made logical point that failure under Denktash proposals to create a single decision-making authority is inconsistent with agreement by all parties, including GOT and Turk Cypriots, that there should be a unitary govt in Cyprus. When I pressed Denktash on this matter, he took line "unitary govt" meant a govt of the London-Zurich type, which included concept of veto. To Greek Cypriots, this means Turk Cypriots are demanding 50-50 partnership in most critical area of dispute.

7. We have felt that 18 percent Turk Cypriot minority cannot realistically expect to enjoy such privileges; indeed, Turk Cypriots appeared to have abandoned them in agreeing in 1968 to renounce London-Zurich vetoes and in accepting idea of unitary state. We believe Turk Cypriot community must have a strong voice, but not a veto, at the center—that in last analysis govt must be able to make necessary decisions. Rights of Turk Cypriot community would have to be preserved by guarantees: internal, through constitutional provisions and

recourse to courts wherever possible; external, through maintenance at least temporarily of mainland Greek and Turkish army contingents in Cyprus, treaty guarantees like those of London-Zurich agreements, and provision for a UN or other channel to receive and handle allegations concerning denial of human or community rights.

8. I will continue to explore with the protagonists the implications of Denktash's proposals, in order to determine whether any further progress can be made. This will at least make underlying issue quite clear and may help to set stage for new mediation effort, which we foresee looming up as intercommunal negotiators eventually conclude they have reached end line in their talks.

Popper

364. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, April 13, 1971, 1511Z.

1764. Subj: Cyprus: Greek-Turkish Bilateral Agreement. Ref: Athens 1630.²

1. I asked Palamas flatly today whether Greece and Turkey intended to negotiate agreement on Cyprus, pointing out that experience had seemed to show that continuation of intercommunal talks best present approach to Cyprus problem. Palamas said that Makarios in fact wanted no agreement, and his intemperate talk about enosis could only be harmful. If no agreement could be reached through intercommunal talks, Greece and Turkey would have to look for other solution. In fact, present situation one of de facto partition. Alternatives were return to London-Zurich agreements, which Makarios had already rejected, agreement through intercommunal talks, which Makarios refused to allow to succeed, or continuation of present de facto partition. However, as Pipinelis has made clear, in deadlock of this kind, with its inherent dangers, Governments of Greece and Turkey could not stand idly by.

2. I observed that bilateral Greek-Turkish agreement unlikely to be accepted by Makarios who had big potential for causing trouble.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Limdis; Noform. Repeated to Ankara and Nicosia.

² Dated April 7; the Embassy reported on a conversation with Chorafas who hinted that Greece and Turkey were considering bilateral talks on Cyprus. (Ibid.)

Palamas said that basically any agreement reached by Turkey and Greece should be acceptable to Cypriot population who most involved. I reiterated my concern and noted that if Governments of Turkey and Greece able to reach far-reaching agreement of this kind, they should seek to exert such influence as they had to assure the success of the intercommunal talks.

3. In reply to my query, Palamas said he looked quite favorably upon new Turkish Government³ which he considered quite capable, referring specifically to the new prime and foreign ministers. He disagrees with opinion expressed by Greek Cypriots that this government would be more difficult to deal with on Cyprus issue. Palamas said GOG seeks to broaden basis of relations between the two governments, which now as in past continue to express themselves to too great a degree through the Cyprus issue.

4. *Comment:* While I doubt Governments of Greece and Turkey will reach an agreement in near future over Makarios' head, situation clearly calls for renewed effort to push intercommunal talks. While Ambassador Popper can undoubtedly shed light on this point, I can hardly believe that Makarios would take an agreement involving double enosis without fierce resistance with, at the present time, unforeseeable consequences. On the other hand, the Prime Minister here attaches great importance to good relations between Greece and Turkey because of the Soviet threat, and he wishes to get the Cyprus issue removed as the determinant of relations between the two countries. It is clear that bilateral talks have taken place over Cyprus and will continue in future. We are analyzing in separate cable political implications in Greece of an effort to achieve bilateral settlement. We would be interested in Ankara's and Nicosia's views on this subject.⁴

5. Request addressees give fullest protection to this information and source.

Tasca

³ On March 12 the Turkish military intervened to force the resignation of Prime Minister Demirel. Nihat Erim formed a multi-party coalition government on April 7.

⁴ In telegram 655 from Nicosia, April 24, Popper commented: "I believe Amb. Tasca is absolutely right in urging caution regarding any rash Greek-Turkish bilateral action which would result in Makarios precipitating a new Cyprus crisis. At the same time, since Greece and Turkey are obviously going to step up their bilaterals on Cyprus . . . situation demands we seek to induce Athens and Ankara to focus their talks on ways and means of producing some progress in Cyprus intercommunal negotiations." (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP) In telegram 2608 from Ankara, April 16, Handley commented that Erim's government would be more active on Cyprus issues and was conducting a policy review. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969-June 30, 1974)

365. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, April 27, 1971, 2207Z.

72068. Ref: Athens 1918.² Subject: Cyprus: US Policy.

1. We agree with your succinct analysis that our major Cypriot objective is solution which will remove Cyprus as point of contention between Greece and Turkey, thus ensuring latter's cooperation within NATO and maintenance of our security position in Eastern Mediterranean.

2. For accomplishment this objective we believe solution to intercommunal problem must be one acceptable to both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots. It should not be assumed as Palamas has suggested that whatever is acceptable to Greece and Turkey would be acceptable to two communities. Attempt to bring about solution contrary to wishes of either community could set off crisis resulting in very Greco-Turkish confrontation which we have been striving to avoid since 1960.

3. We believe that Athens and Ankara do have substantial role to play in working out solution acceptable to Cypriots and that Greco-Turkish discussions parallel to intercommunal talks would be acceptable to both communities, if it is clear from beginning that intention of Athens and Ankara is to facilitate Cypriot negotiated settlement. In this connection we note that Pres Makarios during April 23 meeting with Amb Popper (Nicosia 646)³ indicated he would find such discussions acceptable.

4. As you have noted, in addition to parties referred to above other elements within and outside Cyprus occupy important positions vis-à-vis implementation of solution. This includes of course the 30 percent of Greek Cypriot population which adheres to Communist Party, and which would have considerable potential for troublemaking should search for solution appear to be for other than an independent Cyprus.

5. Your further thoughts and those of other addressees welcome, especially in context current policy review (State 069411).⁴

Irwin

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Davis; cleared by Cash, Churchill, and Curran (S/S); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara.

² Dated April 23; the Embassy suggested that the major U.S. objective was to prevent Cyprus from becoming a point of contention between Greece and Turkey, thus ensuring Turkey's cooperation with NATO and security in the Eastern Mediterranean. (Ibid.)

³ Ibid.

⁴ Dated April 23; in it the Department outlined a program to review Cyprus contingency plans and requested Embassy comments. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 1–1 CYP–US)

366. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, May 11, 1971, 1153Z.

744. Subj: Cyprus: Intercommunal Talks. Ref: State 78126.²

1. It may be natural for us on the scene to be more impressed with new potentialities for trouble in Cyprus than others. Nevertheless, we believe Cyprus situation has materially changed since advent of Erim gov.³

2. What is new is that Govt's vigorous assertion that it will give intercommunal talks one last clear chance. If as Turks expect this produces no agreement, talks would presumably be broken off and other measures starting with enhanced separate status for Turk Cypriot community, with Turkish support, would follow.

3. This may be only war of nerves technique, but on a "worst case" planners' basis we think it must be taken with some seriousness. Turks have not merely resumed square one position, as Deptel asserts; they have thrown up prospect of a Cyprus without the stabilizing presence of the intercommunal talks—a new situation as compared with the status since Spring 1968. If Greeks and Greek Cypriots do not respond in some way to Turk demands, it will be difficult for Turks not to follow through on their threats.

4. We are not predicting dire developments in the short term. But we do think that urging all concerned to keep the talks going—which is obviously right as far as it goes—will not in itself prove sufficient in the longer run. Contingencies and options paper lays out various courses of possible action which merit re-examination in light of changed circumstances.

5. Paras 3 and 4 State 78126 suggest that no one except possibly Turk Cypriots would see advantage in breaking off intercommunal negotiations, and that GOT could control them. We agree GOC/GOG have much to gain from keeping talks in being indefinitely, in belief

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

² Dated May 6, 1971; *ibid*.

³ In a May 4 letter to Sisco, Popper commented: "Over the last six months we here have been of the belief that the existing *de facto* situation in Cyprus could be prolonged for months, or even years: Makarios clearly wanted it that way and a weak and preoccupied Turkish Government did not seem able to stir up any trouble by decisive action. The Erim Government has changed all this. It speaks with a voice which is at once far more knowledgeable and technically more proficient than its predecessor, and with a vigor that has been quite lacking on the Turkish side since intercommunal talks started." (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 17 US in Cyprus)

that Turk Cypriot community will gradually crumble. This GOT is now saying it is determined to exclude developments which would lead to talks' collapse, through chain of events in which either side might take the decisive step.

Popper

367. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 20, 1971.

Cyprus

We have received reliable information that the Turkish Government has abandoned its three-year policy of relying on the intercommunal talks in Cyprus to bring about a solution of the problem there and are instead looking toward a negotiated solution based on partition of the island between Greece and Turkey (double enosis). You will be briefed separately on the intelligence information which leads us to this conclusion.² As you know Ankara and Athens are now moving toward a Greco/Turkish dialogue aimed at resolving the Cyprus problem. We have stressed to both Governments that their discussions should be supportive to the on-going Cypriot intercommunal talks.

Double enosis has long been Turkey's preferred solution to the Cyprus problem, for it would not only insure the status of the Turkish-Cypriot minority on the island, but would also permit the basing of Turkish troops in Cyprus and thus resolve their security concerns. The Greek Government has from time to time favored this solution as well, but in general has failed to push the double enosis solution. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, are very strongly opposed to partition and double enosis. They have successfully resisted prior attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem on these grounds.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Long and Davis and concurred in by Churchill, Cash, and Davies. Sisco did not initial the memorandum and a note on another copy indicates it was not sent to the Secretary. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1–1 Contingency Planning)

² Not further identified.

We believe that President Makarios, with the full support of the Greek Cypriots, will react vigorously if he suspects that the Ankara/Athens dialogue is designed not to play a supportive role to the intercommunal talks, but rather to formulate a double enosis solution which would then be imposed upon the Cypriots. The Turkish Government has been unable to accept the fact that the Greek Cypriots are the controlling factor in this situation in that the Greek Government cannot force the Greek Cypriots to accept a solution which is so basically opposed to their policy aims. In the event that such an imposition is attempted, the Greek Cypriots could foment a crisis on the island, knowing that the great powers would be forced to intervene unilaterally and through the UN and would probably return the situation to the status quo ante.

In the next few days, we will be taking action here and in the capitals to strongly re-state our basic policy line that the only viable solution to the Cyprus problem is one agreed on by the Cypriots themselves, that intercommunal talks seriously engaged in by both parties represent the most feasible means to achieve such a solution, that the Greco/Turkish dialogue can be helpful only if it plays a supportive role to the intercommunal talks, and that imposed solutions are not feasible. We will be asking you to take this line with the Greeks and Turks at the NATO Ministerial Meeting next month.

368. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, May 27, 1971.

Background Information on the Cyprus Issue

Since early 1968, the Turk and Greek communities have been engaged in a long and difficult series of discussions designed to reach a new constitutional arrangement for the island. These talks were initiated

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Long on May 26 and concurred in by Davis, Cash, Churchill, Floyd (EUR/RPM) and Van Hollen (NEA). A notation on the memorandum indicates that Sisco signed it. Eliot sent a copy to the White House on May 27. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 491, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin-Kissinger, 1971, Vol. V)

after the serious crisis which erupted late in 1967. Our primary interest in Cyprus is to achieve a Cypriot solution which will remove Cyprus as a bone of contention between our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey.

The basic constitutional question which stubbornly resists resolution is the conflict between Turk-Cypriot demands for bi-communal autonomy and Greek-Cypriot demands for a unitary government within which the Turkish minority would be guaranteed fairly extensive civil rights. Neither party, nor their respective "parent countries," have budged from these basic stances. As a result, there have been no constitutional breakthroughs in the intercommunal talks, during the three years they have been underway. The negotiators from time to time have been forced to concentrate on less basic issues (e.g. partial refugee resettlement, freedom of movement between the two communal areas, and dismantling of quasi-military barricades).

There are now danger signs that mounting frustration on both sides may bring about complete impasse in the talks, and thus threaten renewed intercommunal strife. There are also intelligence indications, reported to you separately,² that the new Turkish Government under Prime Minister Erim has come to the conclusion that partition and double enosis (annexation of the two parts to Turkey and Greece) represent the best solution to the Cyprus problem. The Turks are seeking a direct dialogue with Greece to discuss the future of Cyprus and will be meeting with the Greeks in this connection at the NATO Ministerial.

We believe, and are emphasizing with the Greeks and Turks, that the Cypriot intercommunal negotiations continue to represent the best procedure for resolving the Cyprus problem. We believe a Greco/Turkish dialogue could serve a useful supportive role if restricted to giving new impetus and breathing new life into the Cypriot negotiations.

In the meantime we are consulting with our concerned Ambassadors in the interest of sharpening our contingency studies, and in Brussels have shared our apprehension with the Secretary General at NATO. Brosio also believes that the only practical approach to the problem is to plug away at the intercommunal talks, and will so stress at Lisbon in conversations with Olcay and Palamas.

² See footnote 2, Document 367.

369. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Turkey¹

Washington, June 4, 1971, 2104Z.

100122. Subject: Cyprus: Review of Contingencies and Options. Refs: (A) State 90020; (B) Nicosia 826; (C) Ankara 3781; (D) Athens 2733; (E) State 88843; (F) USNATO 2291; (G) State 88485; (H) Moscow 3311; (I) State 88810; (J) USUN 1411.²

1. We wish to commend all action addressees for their excellent responses to our request for a "no-holds-barred" review of selected options on Cyprus. Result has been extremely useful and thought-provoking series of cables which have been of great value to us. Following summarizes results of this review, with comments on situation as we see it.

2. All seem agreed that although intercommunal talks in danger, they will probably continue through summer months. Continuing stalemate in talks, however, appears to have induced Turkish side to cast about for alternative to status quo which works against them. One such alternative is now being explored—a direct dialogue with Greece as a means of breaking the impasse. This dialogue itself as it gets underway may produce (a) nothing, (b) referral for consideration

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; No-forn; Exdis. Drafted by Davis and Long; cleared in NEA, INR, EUR, and S/S; and approved by Sisco. Sent to Ankara, Nicosia, Athens, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN. Repeated to London, EUCOM, and USDOCOSOUTH.

² In telegram 90020, May 21, the Department of State requested the three Embassies' (Ankara, Athens, Nicosia) thinking on ways to proceed with the Cyprus issue given the dangerous stalemate on Cypriot intercommunal talks. The Department believed, despite rising frustration on all sides, that the talks were the best solution. In telegram 826 from Nicosia, May 21, the Embassy expressed pessimism about the outcome of intercommunal talks and suggested the United States should be prepared to seek an accommodation with the Soviet Union on the Cyprus issue at the United Nations. In telegram 3781 from Ankara, May 29, the Embassy suggested encouraging dialogue between Athens and Ankara with the option of U.S. mediation if the dialogue matured. In telegram 2733 from Athens, June 3, the Embassy, while agreeing with Nicosia's outlook, suggested a low profile approach while waiting for developments in Greek-Turkish discussions and the intercommunal talks. The Department, in telegram 88843, May 20, requested the three Embassies' comments on policy in the event of a breakdown of intercommunal talks and joint Greek-Turkish efforts to divide Cyprus. Telegram USNATO 2291 from Brussels, May 22, reported Brosio's views on Cyprus. In telegram 88455 to multiple posts, May 20, the Department commented on possible Soviet reaction to the breakdown of intercommunal talks. In telegram 3511 (not 3311) from Moscow, May 26, the Embassy assessed likely factors in a Soviet response to a renewed Cyprus crisis. In telegram 88810, May 20, the Department requested the three Embassies' comments regarding the impact of the breakdown of intercommunal talks. In telegram 1411 from USUN, May 27, the U.S. Delegation reported on the attitude of UN member states toward Cyprus. (All *ibid.*)

by communities of points of agreement reached between Greece and Turkey, or (c) agreement to attempt a dynamic solution through pressure on Makarios and the GOC, perhaps looking toward double enosis.

3. Should Greece and Turkey decide on latter following would appear to be most likely result, dependent on nature and extent of pressure: Significant portions of Greek Cypriot community (Makarios, right-wing total enosists, and AKEL) would oppose the move despite Greek pressures to accept it and could probably prevent a swift, painless accomplishment of Greco/Turkish objective. This would in all likelihood activate international community in face of probable Cyprus crisis.

4. We note your unanimity of opinion that it would not be in USG's interest if such contingency came to pass, i.e., dynamic solution such as double enosis could not be easily imposed and an attempt to do so would almost surely result in another crisis, which would (a) draw Soviets into Cyprus situation more deeply than ever before, (b) expose our Greek and Turkish allies to intense pressure for public retreat, and (c) place US in position in which high expenditure of political capital and an alienation of one or more of parties would likely result.

5. *Comment:* From your analyses, which closely parallel our own, it clear that it is in interest USG to forestall such a contingency, but without alienating Greece or Turkey and without slamming door to possible alternatives to exclusive reliance on deadlocking intercommunal talks. Thus, USG should encourage Greco/Turkish dialogue—but as a means to help breathe new life into intercommunal talks, not as replacement for them. We should make our view clear to Athens and Ankara but in positive sense of supporting a dialogue supportive to intercommunal talks, rather than in negative sense of coming down against any particular Greco/Turkish agreement or action at this stage. Since dialogue probably will take some months to mature and we should be able to gauge its progress, no action on our part at the moment other than continuation of present stance would either be necessary or helpful.

6. Some discussion was also carried out in reftels as to actions USG might consider relative to mediation effort or use of Nicosia's constitutional compromise proposals (A-31, 1970).³ Consensus would appear to be that time is not right for either US, UN, or third-party mediation. We agree with assessment that present situation is such that mediation

³ Dated March 3, 1970; in it the Embassy discussed the constitutional organization of Cyprus. (Ibid., POL 15-5 CYP)

would likely fail. Basic prevailing conditions will have to change before it will be possible to bump one or both of communities from their bedrock positions. In our view, Greco/Turkish dialogue will present best means for imparting such movement.

7. We expect to have contingency/options exercise completed within next days and will be sending you results. Exercise has benefitted materially from your efforts.⁴

Irwin

⁴ Further comments on contingencies were forwarded to the Department in telegram 929 from Nicosia, June 7, and in telegram 2799 from Athens, June 7. (Both *ibid.*, POL 27 CYP)

370. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, June 4, 1971, 0755Z.

911. Subj: Cyprus: GOC Formally Complains about US Position in Cyprus Problem.

1. *Summary:* For reasons not yet entirely clear but presumably related to Archbishop's current trip to Moscow,² GOC has decided complain formally about alleged pro-Turkish bias of US policy toward Cyprus. In preliminary response we have strongly rebutted.

2. Over past month FonOff DirGen Veniamin has obliquely referred to unspecified "unsatisfactory" Embassy action vis-à-vis Turkish community and said he would be calling us in to review these in their totality. On June 3 Veniamin did call in DCM and made following formal oral presentation "at request of President Makarios and FonMin Kyprianou":

3. Veniamin began by listing several instances of Embassy contacts with Turkish community in Cyprus which in the aggregate, he asserted, lent support to Turkish efforts win recognition for their administration as in some way legal and permanent. Veniamin chronicled

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Priority. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN.

² June 2-9.

Agricultural Attaché visits to “self-styled” Agriculture Minister Plumer; donation of books to union of Turkish Cypriot architects and engineers “without intention to do so having been previously communicated to FonMin”; donation of medical books to six Turkish hospitals “which are illegal,” again without prior information to GOC; donation of books to “self-styled” DefMin Orek for use of his “Ministry”; designation of Second Secretary Arthur Giese in TCPA Information Bulletin as American Embassy officer “responsible for Turkish Cypriot administration”; call on TCPA member for education Suha by Giese and his replacement Michael Austrian—“without prior call by latter on GOC MinEd”; invitations extended by US DefAtt to May 27 “dinner” to GOC DefMin Komodromos, to Orek also as MinDef and to General Tanyar as Deputy Commander of Cyprus Army—“a force which no longer has status.” (Note: this last was not a dinner but large reception for US Armed Forces Day. To such receptions, in keeping with our position that constitutional situation is frozen until solution reached we always invite GOC officials and such few Turks as held constitutional positions between 1960 and 1963. Customarily Turks do not appear because of presence of officials representing “illegal” GOC. In this case neither Komodromos nor Orek came. Tanyar did, but in Turkish not Cyprus army uniform.)

4. Veniamin then referred to USG use of term “unified” instead of “unitary” Cyprus on three occasions: Ziegler’s statement at time of Makarios’ visit;³ Amb Phillips’ address to Security Council at Dec 1970 meeting on UNFICYP renewal,⁴ and statement of Amb Bush at similar May 26 meeting.⁵ Veniamin said US is only country in world to use word unified rather than unitary and implications of this seem clear; USG obviously has in mind the imposition of a federal system on Cyprus.

5. Wrapping up this catalog, Veniamin said GOC forced conclude that USG has decided propitiate Turkey at expense of duly constituted Govt of Cyprus for reasons of military expediency. Despite GOC’s high regard for USG and value it attaches to US friendship, it has been subjected by US to “pressures and provocations” and is a “victim of appeasement.” With specific regard to intercommunal talks, USG has pressed GOC concede more and more to Turks without urging matching concessions from them.

³ A copy of the text of the Ziegler briefing after the October 25, 1970, meeting between Nixon and Makarios is in the National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974).

⁴ For text, see Department of State *Bulletin*, January 11, 1971, pp. 70–71.

⁵ For text, see *ibid.*, June 28, 1971, pp. 842–843.

6. Veniamin repeated that *démarche* had been long in preparation and was being presented at personal instruction of Makarios. We should not think its timing related in any way to President's current visit to Moscow. Amb Rossides being instructed make parallel presentation to Dept.⁶

7. DCM said he would convey details of this formal presentation to Amb Popper, etc. Formal reply might be expected from him. DCM asked, however, that his own following interim observations be passed upward:

8. It highly regrettable that GOC seems to have developed such misconceptions re USG Cyprus policy. Greece and Turkey are our friends; we do not measure our friendship in terms of size of armies; our relations are in balance. In Cyprus we recognize only one Govt with which we seek closest friendly relations as symbolized by meeting between President Nixon and Archbishop last year.

9. In interest of GOC, of Cypriots generally, and of peaceful solution to this island's problem we maintain certain contacts with leadership of Turkish community. We have done this since 1963 and will continue to do so. Ambassador has instructed all Embassy officers not to make any change in past patterns or lend themselves in any way to present efforts of Turkish community's administration to win recognition as an entity equal to sovereign Govt of Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots know this. Indeed, they complain bitterly that our undiluted recognition of President Makarios' gov't has contributed substantially to failure resolve Cyprus problem.

10. We are not a party to intercommunal talks. We have offered become involved in any useful way if parties wished, but they have firmly said they do not. In these circumstances we have followed policy of benevolent surveillance. This has permitted us to make suggestions from time to time, but the record shows absolute impartiality of such suggestions. For example, our position at present stage of negotiation, as communicated to both parties, is that Denktash should take a step forward to match that of Clerides on Nov 30. There has been no pressure, provocation or appeasement.

11. We have attached no legalistic significance to use of "unified" as opposed to "unitary." We have used both in the past. There is no hidden meaning in this.

12. As to specifics of GOC dossier, we recognize Orek and Plumer individually as "ministers" and will continue to do so in absence constitutional solution. We deal with GOC ministers also holding these

⁶ No record was found.

portfolios as representatives of a recognized govt—there is a material difference. We give books to groups in both communities without regard to politics. We will continue to do so. We have a Turkish language officer as we have several officers who speak Greek. Our officers work in fields where their abilities lie. Regardless of what TCPA Bulletin may say neither Giese nor his replacement Austrian is the Embassy representative to a “Turkish Communal Administration.”

13. Finally, fact that there is one stable and recognized Govt of Cyprus today and that we have situation of relative stability on Cyprus is due in no small measure to exercise of United States’ influence as a world power working impartially between friends. This contrasts with role of others who rely on propaganda rather than engaging in friendly, helpful persuasion.

14. Veniamin expressed appreciation for these remarks which he said constituted welcome reaffirmation of US policy approach to Cyprus problem. He promised this interim reply would be conveyed upward.

15. *Comment:* While Veniamin denies it, seems obvious to us that timing of his *démarche* was dictated by Makarios’ present visit to Moscow. Makarios could be trying to justify to us his current warming to Soviets; or he could be trying to nudge us out of our balanced position and towards GOC’s, through implicit threat of still greater pro-Soviet gestures if we do not comply. Perhaps there are other motives. Whatever the purpose, we feel we must resist this transparent pressure ploy. It is first evidence of Makarios’ change in position toward us in response to recently altered Cyprus situation, and sharpest presentation Embassy has received in my two years here.

16. Obviously we could not allow this sort of distortion of US policy to go without firm reply. I know Dept will answer Rossides’ presentation when made in similar vein. In terms of further action locally I will request appointment with Makarios promptly after his return from Moscow to reinforce essentials reply already made.⁷

Popper

⁷ In telegram 970 from Nicosia, June 11, Popper reported on the verbal protest he delivered to Kyprianou. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

371. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to the Under Secretary of State (Irwin)¹

Washington, June 10, 1971.

Cyprus Policy Assessment

The Problem

While intercommunal peace has been maintained on Cyprus since the 1967 crisis, there has been little progress toward establishing a new constitutional order in which Greek and Turk can live together. Intercommunal negotiations have limped on since June 1968, without significant consequence, with both Athens and Ankara experiencing growing frustration with the continuing stalemate. In response to this frustration, a Greco-Turkish dialogue has been initiated for the purpose of expanding the search for resolution of the Cyprus Problem which has twice brought the two countries into confrontation.

The Dialogue: Hopeful, But Not Without Dangers

We encourage close Greco-Turkish association on the Cyprus problem and believe that a Greco-Turkish dialogue can serve a useful supportive role for the purpose of breathing new life into the talks. The GOG and the GOT may be able to reach compromises which the communal negotiators for domestic political reasons can not reach themselves. Also, compromises already reached by the "parent" countries could have increased chances of acceptance on the island.

Looking ahead, however, we see potential dangers in the Greco-Turkish dialogue; dangers which we intend to carefully monitor and be prepared to raise with the parties if necessary: (1) Greece and Turkey, if frustrated in their attempts to resolve the constitutional impasse, may seek subsequently to bring about a dynamic solution such as partition; (2) Makarios and the GOC may suspect that the Greco-Turkish dialogue poses a threat and overreact; and (3) Turkey may overestimate Greece's ability to secure Greek Cypriot acceptance of the results of the dialogue and become disillusioned with future prospects of working with Greece for peaceful resolution of the problem.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Davis and Long on June 8; concurred in by Churchill, Pugh, and Davies.

U.S. Posture

After considering the inherent opportunities and dangers involved, we have decided our interests will be best served through a policy which continues our positive support for the intercommunal talks, while stressing with Athens and Ankara the need to use their dialogue in support of the intercommunal negotiations as a means of breathing new life into the Cypriot talks. As we monitor the Greco-Turkish dialogue, we should be able to identify emergence of any of the dangers cited above, and will be prepared as appropriate to make known our strong belief to both Athens and Ankara that a viable solution must be based on Cypriot acquiescence; and pointing out as may become necessary that an attempt to impose a solution would not only be dangerous to carry out, but could generate the very crisis we all are striving to avoid.

The attached telegram² outlines the exchange of views we have shared with the field and our joint conclusions reflected in the above analysis. In addition you may want to read Part I of our as yet unclear revised policy statement.³

² Telegram 100122, printed as Document 369.

³ Attached but not printed is the country policy statement on Cyprus.

372. National Security Study Memorandum 130¹

Washington, June 18, 1971.

TO

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Director, Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

Cyprus Planning

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-185, National Security Study Memoranda, NSSM 130. Secret. A copy was sent to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The President has directed a review of our policy toward Cyprus in the light of recent changes in the situation. A paper should be prepared under the NSCIG/NEA which would explicitly address:

- likely developments in the situation with which the U.S. may be confronted;
- the effects of those developments on U.S. interests; *and*
- the options open to the U.S. in each possible situation.

This should be submitted to the Senior Review Group by July 2, 1971.²

Henry A. Kissinger

² See Document 375. According to a June 14 memorandum from Saunders to Kissinger, Saunders would prepare a similar study for Kissinger. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Material, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

373. Memorandum From the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Davis) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco)¹

Washington, June 22, 1971.

SUBJECT

Cyprus: Makarios Maneuvers

Background

The Greeks, in what appears to have been a ham-handed try at pressuring Makarios, have sought the GOC's acceptance of an Athens-formulated constitutional compromise. The GOC Council of Ministers, after reviewing the proposal which was presented by Athens as a demand on the GOC, rejected it.²

¹ Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1 Cyp. Secret. Sent through Davies.

² The proposals were made in the form of a June 18 letter from Papadopoulos to Makarios that was published in the July 12 issue of *Der Spiegel*. On June 24 Makarios replied with a letter rejecting the proposals. Extracts were also published in *Der Spiegel*, September 6.

Analysis

In rejecting the GOG's you-must-accept-this proposition, Makarios has again demonstrated that he will not bend to outside pressure. In advance of what was almost a certain GOC refusal, Makarios leaked parts of the Greek proposal, portraying the latter as betrayal of the Hellenic ideal and an attempt to sacrifice Cyprus to Turkish demands. According to intelligence reports,³ Makarios, in discussing the Greek proposal with his colleagues, stressed that if the junta is determined to compromise the Cyprus cause, it must first find a way to remove him.

This may be precisely what the junta has in mind. According to Dountas, the Greek DCM in Nicosia, the Greek proposal never stood the slightest chance of acceptance by Makarios and was handled under instructions from Athens in such a manner that rejection was a foregone conclusion. A possible conclusion is that Athens deliberately handled the proposal in a manner to provoke a GOC rejection, thus relieving Athens of a long-standing commitment to pursue a joint policy on the Cyprus problem. An intelligence report indicates that the Greek proposal was presented to Makarios with the admonition that if he rejected it, Athens would be freed from its earlier commitment.⁴

On the other hand, it may well be that, facing pressure from Ankara for Greek intervention with Makarios, the junta used this on-the-surface clumsy approach to demonstrate its lack of influence in Nicosia and to provide Makarios with an opportunity through the Cypriot press to surface a threat of outside intervention.

Regardless of Athens' intention, Makarios is proceeding, as Embassy Nicosia points out,⁵ to cover his rear while striking out on all fronts. With the leftist and rightist press in full cry identifying the threat as emanating from Turkey, NATO, and the United States, Makarios has informed UN representatives on the island that the GOC will not submit to outside pressure, that in event of the latter he will raise the matter with the Secretary General and the Security Council. The Communist press, as might be expected, has named the United States as behind current threats to Cyprus and Makarios, and reminded the Cypriots that the Soviet Union, as in the past, stands between Cyprus and NATO sponsored machinations.

Separately, but obviously not unrelated to the Greek proposal and alleged pressure, Clerides is said to be preparing a constructive re-

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Intelligence Information Cable TDCS 315/03466–71, June 22. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

⁵ Reported in telegram 1044 from Nicosia, June 21. (Ibid.)

sponse to Denktash's letter of April 27, with the understood intention of keeping the door open for continuation of the intercommunal talks.

The Clerides response could intentionally bring about some flexibility in the intercommunal negotiations as a means of assisting Makarios to frustrate pressure from Athens and Ankara. In a conversation with Ambassador Popper immediately before the latter's current trip, Clerides said he intended to propose to the Council of Ministers a new approach.⁶ He added that he personally favors the handling of Turk Cypriot communal affairs by Turk Cypriot members of the Cypriot House of Representatives sitting separately; with their legislation to be promulgated by the Vice President and administered by a Turk Cypriot Minister of Communal Affairs. He would foresee a Ministry of Local Affairs headed by a Turk Cypriot to be nominated by the Turkish community. This Ministry would have authority over all District Officers, one of whom would be Turkish, and over all local government affairs. There would be a unified police force, of which 20 percent would be Turk Cypriot, except in exclusively Turk Cypriot areas where the police force would be entirely Turkish Cypriot.

Although Ambassador Popper doubts that Makarios or the Council of Ministers could be persuaded to give Turk Cypriots such a large voice in the Cyprus Government, Clerides' thinking, if sincere, does indicate more flexibility than we have previously seen or heard.

U.S. Role at This Time

Given Makarios' rejection of the Athens constitutional compromise proposal, the ball is in his court. If Clerides' response to Denktash's April 27 letter results in some flexibility in the negotiations, Makarios will anticipate some degree of relaxation of the pressure which he is currently under. If the Clerides proposals have merit, we should be prepared to wade in with Ankara for an equivalent step.

In the meantime, we should actively pursue our policy of stressing with Athens and Ankara that we see their own cooperation and dialogue as a useful input for the intercommunal negotiators. At the same time, we should be prepared should we be approached by either Athens or Ankara in the interests of other than a negotiated solution to point out our fears that an attempt to resolve the problem through means other than negotiations would be dangerous indeed and could seriously threaten our mutual interests.

⁶ Reported in telegram 1006 from Nicosia, June 16. (Ibid.)

374. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, July 17, 1971.

CYPRUS SITUATION

The negative elements always inherent in the Cyprus situation are more pronounced now than at any time since 1968. There are three new factors to be considered.

First, the evidence is very strong that the Government of Turkey has decided that the status quo on Cyprus operates to its disadvantage and that of the Turk Cypriot community on the island. As time passes, more Turk Cypriots emigrate and more are re-integrated into Cypriot economic life, thus weakening the Turk Cypriot enclaves. In addition, the enclaves are not economically viable; it costs the GOT \$25 million in hard currency annually to keep them afloat. If it is correct that the Turks/Turk Cypriots are not prepared to accept the Cypriot status quo much longer, we can anticipate increasing pressure for a "solution" through the successful (from the Turk point of view) conclusion of the local talks, or, failing this, through the imposition by Greece and Turkey of a previously agreed arrangement, or through unilateral action by Turkey forcibly to partition the island.²

Second, since the overthrow of the Demirel Government, the military in Turkey has assumed a more direct and influential role in the policy-making process. The Turkish General Staff is more oriented toward direct action (read military intervention) on the Cyprus problem than are civilian political leaders. I think we can safely assume that voices calling for a forcible solution of the Cyprus problem are heard more frequently and nearer the center of power in Turkey than in the past.

¹ Source: Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 1. Secret; Exdis. The memorandum was prepared by Boyatt. A note on the first page reads: "Hold for Sisco. Do not send." Sisco wrote: "I agree with recds—JJS. An attached note text reads: "JJS—For your use in orally briefing the Secretary—Roger Long." The memorandum was concurred in by Pugh, Churchill, and Davies. A summary of the information in this memorandum was forwarded to Kissinger in a July 30 memorandum from Eliot. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

² The Embassy in Cyprus reported on growing talk about Turkish partition plans in telegram 1214 from Nicosia, July 14. In telegram 4869 from Ankara, July 15, the Embassy in Turkey commented that it had no indications of Turkish preparations for a move against Cyprus. (Both *ibid.*)

Finally, Turkey's new Prime Minister, Erim, is himself a factor. He has a long and intimate association with the Cyprus problem and was the chief Turkish negotiator in 1963–64, a period when solving the Cyprus problem by geographically partitioning the island and giving a piece to Turkey and one to Greece was much in vogue (this was the essence of the Acheson Plan of 1964). Archbishop Makarios foiled partition attempts in the mid-60's and, in my judgment, he would make every effort to do so again—including bringing Greece and Turkey into conflict to avoid what to him is anathema. The Archbishop's implacable opposition to partition and the GOT's apparent belief that partition may be the only acceptable solution are cause for concern.

Counterbalancing these negative elements is the fact that the local talks during the past three years have made substantial progress, although the currently crucial problem of local autonomy remains unsolved. The two local negotiators, Clerides for the Greek Cypriots and Denktash for the Turk Cypriots, are in basic accord on the organization of the executive, judicial, and legislative branches of government. They have also reconciled differences on organization of the police force (a major step) and the definition and constitutional enshrinement of various communal rights for Turk Cypriots. There is still substantial disagreement on the very important issue of how local autonomy—which all sides agree the Turk Cypriots should have—is to be structured. However, the fact that agreement on local autonomy has not yet been reached should not obscure the great progress already made in the local talks on other important and difficult areas.

I do not believe that the situation is acute at the present time, although it could become so in very short order. The local negotiators, Clerides and Denktash, have another scheduled meeting on July 26, and Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay will be meeting with his Greek counterpart, Palamas, in New York in late September during the General Assembly session. After we have the results of the July 26 meeting on the island, it might be well for me to call in the Greek, Turk, and Cypriot Ambassadors to review with them the progress that has already been made in the local talks (a fact often forgotten in the flurry of propaganda and negotiating postures) and to urge them to continue to intensify and support the local talks, particularly since they have come so far. Proceeding in the above fashion would make clear our continuing support for the local talks and by implication our rejection of adventurous "dynamic" solutions. By the same token it would not close out any future options. I will take another look at this after the July 26 meeting on Cyprus and before Olcay and Palamas meet in New York and recommend how I think we should proceed.

375. Paper Prepared by the National Security Council Staff¹

Washington, August 6, 1971.

ANALYTICAL SUMMARY

Cyprus Contingencies

Introductory Comment

In response to NSSM 130,² the IG/NEA has submitted the paper at the next tab, “US Policy Toward Cyprus Contingencies and Options.”³

The framework for contingency thinking in the IG paper begins with the last line of page 17 and continues through page 35. The rest is background. It was written as a broad framework for handling any possible contingency, not just those arising from the present situation. So one of the purposes of this Analytical Summary is to relate that rather abstract presentation to the present situation.

The Analytical Summary which follows is in two parts:

—*Part I* describes the present situation, how it came about and the contingencies it is most likely to produce. It weaves in material from the first half of the IG paper but does not attempt to summarize or parallel it.

—*Part II* is a direct summary of the IG paper’s discussion of the most likely contingencies. Again, we have concentrated on those contingencies more likely to arise from the present situation. We have skimmed over—after describing them—three which seem more remote.

In short, trouble could come in one of two ways: (1) As the talks between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots communities about a permanent constitutional arrangement move closer to impasse, Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots with or without Greek cooperation will be increasingly tempted to make some move that could precipitate a crisis. This is the slow-burning fuse, more likely leading to a crisis, if any, after September than now. (2) Incidents between the two communities on Cyprus have increased and, although Ankara has told the Turkish community not to respond to recent Greek Cypriot provocations, and CIA has no evidence of Turkish military preparations, accidents could ac-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-059, SRG Meeting—Cyprus 9/8/71. Secret. No drafting information appears on the paper, but it is attached to a September 7 memorandum from Saunders and Kennedy to Kissinger.

² Document 372.

³ The 35-page paper is attached but not printed.

quire a momentum of their own. Such incidents in 1964 and 1967 led ultimately to the threat of Turkish invasion.

The issues for discussion are these:

1. With impasse in the intercommunal talks foreseeable, should there be an effort to rejuvenate them or rather to find an alternative? What role should the US play? [Contingency A.]⁴

2. If Greece and Turkey or Turkey alone decide, as an alternative to the talks, to try to impose a solution after their talks in September, what should be the US posture? [Contingencies B and C]

3. What should the US do if a local incident escalates, especially if Turkey threatens to invade? [Contingency F]

⁴ All brackets in the original.

376. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, August 11, 1971, 3:55–4:18 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin, II

Joseph Sisco

Christopher Van Hollen

Thomas Boyatt

Defense

Armistead Selden

Brig. Gen. Devol Brett

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

Brig. Gen. Francis J. Roberts

¹ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. No drafting information appears on the document. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room. Davis sent these minutes to Kissinger on August 16 with copies to Kennedy and Saunders. (Ibid.)

CIA
Lt. Gen. Robert E. Cushman
John Waller
William Parmenter

NSC
Harold H. Saunders
Samuel Hoskinson
Col. Richard T. Kennedy
Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that the State Department would prepare:

- a paper on possible ways to prevent an outbreak of fighting over Cyprus;
- contingency planning in the event of an outbreak;
- a scenario for possible UN or European mediation, including what we would wish to see come out of such mediation.²

Mr. Kissinger (to Mr. Sisco): Can you bring us up to date on the situation. I understand there is no immediate decision required, but we want to know what preparatory work we should do and where we would like to see things come out.

Mr. Sisco: I would like to start with 1960 and the independence of Cyprus. There were three main forces involved: (1) the Greek Cypriots, backed by Greece, who wanted union with Greece; (2) the Turkish Cypriots, backed by Turkey, who generally favored partition; and (3) the British whose objective was to preserve their military and strategic position. The Bible for independence was the London-Zurich agreements of 1960, which contained three elements: (1) it left the British in occupation of their sovereign bases; (2) a treaty of guarantee, which gave the right of intervention to the Greeks, Turks and British if any move were made to alter the constitutional status; (3) a treaty of alliance which permitted the stationing of Greek, Turkish and British troops on the island.

The first crisis came in 1963 when Makarios tried to alter the constitutional basis of the government by trying to eliminate the veto of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President in foreign affairs, defense and fiscal matters. In 1964, there was a second crisis, and we intervened very directly. George Ball and I flew to the island and defused the situation at a great price. The situation became more heated, and we called on the Security Council and got a UN force on the ground. We had to intervene with the Turks in the most forceful manner—you may have heard of the famous (President) Johnson letter. Subsequently, we

² See Tabs A and B to Document 378.

launched Dean Acheson, who came up with a plan for a form of partition which was sensible but didn't work.

We had a similar crisis in 1968, when Cy Vance went out and succeeded in defusing the situation. Following that, we launched the inter-communal talks which are now foundering. Makarios was looking at the increased Turkish activity and was concerned at the possibility of the Greeks and Turks getting together and "imposing" a solution. As you know, he went to Moscow.

If we assume that the inter-communal talks will end, we need to do some planning on possible ways to prevent an outbreak, and also some contingency planning if shooting starts. We also need to develop scenarios for a substantive meeting, probably focussed largely on the UN. I think we have three options here:

(1) Get the UN involved in some form of mediation. Makarios is likely to move in this direction, since the UN has historically broadly supported his position. This would deflect moves by either Greece or Turkey.

(2) U.S. mediation, and we will develop some pros and cons on this for you.

Mr. Kissinger: And what we would try to bring about.

Mr. Sisco: (3) Mediation by a prominent European such as Brosio or Lester Pearson. We could get together with key European countries, since this is a NATO problem, and try to stimulate mediation in some way. Of course, these ideas have not been staffed out.

Mr. Irwin (to Mr. Sisco): Would you comment on the status of the negotiations and the possibility of Makarios moving to the UN. Would this be good or bad and what specifically would it mean?

Mr. Sisco: It is possible that Makarios may move quickly to the UN.

Mr. Kissinger: How?

Mr. Sisco: There is a UN presence on the ground in Cyprus. He could inform the UN representatives there or he could move directly to the Security Council, asking them to launch a mediation effort. In this connection, the Turks are as nervous about the UN as the Israelis are.

Mr. Kissinger: What would we do?

Mr. Sisco: We would be in a difficult position. This would preempt the situation for Makarios and close off the other options.

Mr. Kissinger: Would we support his move to the UN?

Mr. Sisco: We would be hard put not to go along. It would be difficult for the U.S. to try to block UN mediation, although the Turks would be sure to ask us to.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom would we pay a price if we opposed it?

Mr. Sisco: With Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: My impression of Makarios is that he is a very cool customer. We can't antagonize him.

Mr. Sisco: He is an evil man of the cloth. Even though the Greeks are more amenable now to cooperation with the Turks on Cyprus, when the chips are down they will inevitably back the Greek Cypriots.

Mr. Kissinger: So we would have to choose between Turkey and Cyprus.

Mr. Sisco: We have generally supported Turkey all along.

Mr. Kissinger: If we came out against UN mediation, what would be the cost?

Mr. Sisco: It's a question of the impact on Greece and Turkey. I believe we would have to give some support to Turkey. If we supported Makarios' efforts—which would mean, in effect, supporting the status quo—we would increase Turkish nervousness and possibly encourage Turkish thinking that they might have to take military action. We would inevitably be in the middle of two of our principal allies. Tom (Boyatt), what do you think?

Mr. Boyatt: If we were faced with UN mediation, we would have to offer the alternative of European mediation.

Mr. Sisco: Makarios wouldn't buy U.S. mediation. It's a question of what adjustments we might make in the form of UN mediation.

Mr. Irwin: And what suggestions we might make to make it a positive mediation.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we consider a reasonable posture? Does anyone have any ideas?

Mr. Irwin: We don't know.

Mr. Sisco: We have some ideas but we haven't surfaced them yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Certainly any agreement by the two sides is better than anything we might do.

Mr. Irwin: It's a question of how we can take advantage of the mediation.

Mr. Kissinger: It's essential that we know in what direction we want the mediation to go. Are we agreed that if Makarios goes to the UN, we would try to tilt toward Turkey? Is that a fair statement?

Mr. Sisco: It's fair as a generality.

Mr. Kissinger: We wouldn't necessarily go along with UN mediation?

Mr. Sisco: We would have great difficulty in taking a position against it.

Mr. Irwin: If we would move the UN mediation in the direction we like, it might be possible to get the Turks to go along.

Mr. Sisco: We could take the position that although it might not be the best possible undertaking, what could they lose?

Mr. Kissinger: They would have the majority of the UN against them.

Mr. Sisco: The UN can't prejudge the substance in any way.

Mr. Kissinger: Unless Makarios goes back to the UN with a proposed formula. I wouldn't underestimate his deviousness.

Mr. Sisco: That's quite possible. While there is a greater Greek desire to work with the Turks than before, they have always broken off at the critical point to support the Greek Cypriots.

Mr. Irwin: If they are pushed to the point of conflict, they will always support their brothers.

Mr. Sisco: But they might support the UN. We have no concrete judgments, but we will produce a paper for you very quickly on this.

Mr. Kissinger: We'll wait for that. (to Mr. Saunders) Do you agree?

Mr. Saunders: Yes.

Mr. Sisco: We might counsel the Turks that the intercommunal talks are still the best vehicle to maintain flexibility. This might have a good effect on the Turks and buy a little more time. We want to avoid U.S. mediation. The final Acheson formula was that we would accept anything the parties would agree to, and that is where we are now.

Mr. Kissinger: Once Makarios launches himself, persuasion alone won't help. What could we do to him?

Mr. Sisco: The thought of Turkish invasion scares hell out of him. That's why he is playing the Moscow game.

Mr. Kissinger: Moscow won't support him far.

Mr. Sisco: They're fishing in troubled waters. They don't want a war there, but they're willing to exploit the situation. They would give strong support to UN mediation.

Mr. Irwin: The Russians will use their new-found strength in the eastern Mediterranean.

Mr. Boyatt: We might have some interest in opposing UN mediation before Makarios acts.

Mr. Kissinger: But once we mention mediation and say European, he will say UN.

Mr. Sisco: That would get us out ahead, and we don't want that.

Mr. Selden: We could let someone else do it.

Mr. Sisco: That's what I mean by European mediation.

377. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, August 25, 1971, 1105Z.

4435. Subj: Cyprus: Next Steps. Ref: State 147911.² For Sisco From Ambassador.

1. *Summary*: In response to your request for my views on Cyprus mediation effort, I suggest that we consider having Secretary urge Greek-Turkish agreement on mediation effort for submission to UNSYG. Prospects for SYG's developing agreement on mediation with Greece, Turkey and Cyprus seem slight, but at least it might buy us time if, as appears likely, intercommunal talks cannot be revived. My recommendations made on assumption that Makarios still holds most of trump cards and can spoil any initiative he does not like; that Turkish Government believes time is working against it on Cyprus and that it will take unilateral initiative at some point to prevent further deterioration of its position; and finally that it is unlikely Makarios and Turkish Government will be able to agree on terms of reference for mediation effort which could lead to a solution. In circumstances our best hope may be to involve our two NATO allies in formulation mediation proposal which would, to some extent, preempt Makarios recourse to UN and might inhibit both Makarios and Turkey from taking unilateral action on Cyprus. *End summary*.

2. My thoughts on next steps in Cyprus are based on three assumptions. I believe that we must keep foremost in our thoughts fact that Makarios still holds most of the trump cards. He has Greek Cypriots behind him, some degree of support from Soviet Union and broad support in the UN. He has demonstrated that he is not subject to dictation by Greece and, indeed, he has the capability for resisting any initiative which is unacceptable to him. Second thought we need to keep in mind in that regardless of whether Turkish Government has decided on some course of unilateral action Turks recognize time is working against them on Cyprus. It is doubtful whether Turkey can acquiesce in continuation present situation if intercommunal talks cannot be revived or if some other form of negotiation cannot be initiated.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, London, Nicosia, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN. A notation on the first page reads: "Sent to San Clemente." A summary of the telegram was included in Kissinger's evening notes, August 25. (Ibid.)

² Dated August 12, it requested comments on the possibility of a new mediation in the Cyprus dispute. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

Third point I see as basic to this situation is irreconcilability of Makarios and Turkish Government's views on bases for negotiations and therefore on role for mediator.

3. I think that the time has come for U.S. to consider taking more active role before events move in new and adverse direction. Recent messages (USUN 2310 and Nicosia 1482)³ have further clarified situation following Makarios' public statement of what has been implicitly recognized privately: Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot positions are virtually irreconcilable through medium of intercommunal talks as presently constituted. It is now clearer that GOT objections to UN mediation remain as strong as ever; Makarios is being propelled by his fear of Greek-Turkish understanding in precisely this direction; and Greece is closer to Turkish position on UN involvement than to that of Makarios, but must for reasons of Greek-Cyprus relations maintain certain degree of ambivalence.

4. In view of present facts of situation I must remain basically pessimistic over Cyprus mediation effort. Perhaps best that we can achieve is to buy some more time, which in the case of Cyprus is always worthwhile. What I am suggesting is that we approach the question of mediation with our eyes open and that, as in the case of intercommunal talks, we make the process of entering into mediation as protracted as possible, since such an effort is, under present circumstances, unlikely to succeed. One of valuable aspects of merely entering into mediation effort is to inhibit both Makarios and Turkish Government from taking unilateral action.

5. We should also, of course, strive to make mediation meaningful, and best prospect it seems to me lies in bringing Turkey in at the initial stage. In this regard, timing may be crucial, in view of exaggerated hopes Turks seem to attach to Olcay-Palamas talks. Secretary might want to consider suggesting to Olcay and Palamas that they try to reach agreement on mediation proposal in their talks in New York. If they succeed they could then approach UNSYG to see whether he would be prepared to undertake mediation effort and to explore ways in which it could be launched. U.S. would of course be in position also to weigh in with SYG at that juncture to urge him to accept task. Greece and Turkey would be able to view mediation effort as their creation, knowing it also enjoyed endorsement of U.S. It would then be up to the Secretary General to negotiate with Makarios on the acceptance of the Greek-Turkish proposal. Alternatively, Greece and Turkey could

³ Telegram 2310 from USUN, August 18, reported on comments made by Turkish representatives on the Cyprus situation. Telegram 1482 from Nicosia, August 18, stated the Embassy's preference for a UN rather than a U.S. mediation effort. (Both *ibid.*)

transmit to SecGen their ideas of mediation and at same time request those of Makarios. SecGen would then be charged with negotiating out agreed terms of reference, or some other solution or approach based on the principle of negotiation rather than unilateral action. Thus Makarios' demand for UN mediation would have been met in circumstances which should keep UN situation manageable.

6. I realize that approach which I am suggesting is filled with complications, particularly finding suitable mediator, but I can see no alternative means of launching mediation effort that would not be rejected out of hand by at least one of parties involved. Positive advantages of this formula are that Turkish objective of prior agreement with Greece before next stage in negotiations would be met, while Greece would be extricated from predicament of having to guarantee agreement of Makarios to Greco-Turkish understanding. Fact that mediation launched by joint proposal of our two NATO allies involved would help protect U.S. interests.

7. I may have further thoughts after I see Palamas on Cyprus. In my discussion with him (State 152029)⁴ I do not intend to allude in any way to U.S. policy review. There are other bases for exploring further with Palamas question of Greek position on intercommunal talks, mediation, and London-Zurich accords, which are areas in which we need further clarification of GOG's current thinking.

Tasca

⁴ Dated August 19; in it, Sisco instructed Tasca: "In approaching Palamas re GOG position on future of Cyprus problem, your discussions should be couched in terms of recent press speculation on possible UN mediation rather than of US policy review. We should not like to tip our hand in this still very tentative stage of our thinking." (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

378. Action Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, September 1, 1971.

Cyprus: Strategy Papers

In accordance with the consensus at the August 11 SRG meeting on Cyprus,² NEA has prepared two papers dealing with the evolving situation.

At Tab A is a strategy paper exploring options for controlling the Cyprus situation by diplomatic mediation designed to sustain the ongoing local talks. I recommend that the U.S. role involve quiet and indirect support of mediation under some form of UN aegis.

At Tab B is a contingency paper outlining appropriate U.S. responses to outbreaks of violence on the island. Our reactions would vary depending on circumstances, but generally involve direct U.S. diplomatic activity (usually in conjunction with the U.K.) in Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, and Washington, and support of UN efforts on the ground in Cyprus and in New York.

Recommendation

That you approve the approach outlined in the strategy paper at Tab A. This approach, and the contingency paper at Tab B will be discussed at an SRG meeting now scheduled for September 8.³

Tab A⁴

Cyprus: Strategy Paper for Next Steps

Situation

Ten years of experience with the Cyprus problem demonstrate one constant: when the parties to the dispute are not negotiating, the

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Boyatt on August 27, concurred in by Davies, and cleared by Thornton (S/PC). Tabs A and B were sent to the White House, which in turn sent them to the members of the Senior Review Group on September 4 for discussion at the September 8 meeting. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

² See Document 376.

³ Rogers initialed the approve option on September 3.

⁴ Drafted by Boyatt on August 27; concurred in by Davies, Sisco, and S/PC; in substance by Churchill, Pugh, and Armitage; and in information by Richard Davies (EUR).

probability of violence increases exponentially. Since June 1968, the local talks have kept the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context. In addition, this instrumentality has provided what is the unique advantage of having the people directly concerned discuss those problems which directly concern them.

On August 9, the Turk Cypriot negotiator, Denktash, tabled a paper setting forth the "final" Turkish Cypriot position. He insisted on and made all Turk Cypriot compromises made thus far contingent upon the establishment of a separate and autonomous Turk Cypriot administration from the village to the national level. He also raised the need for a specific GOC disavowal of enosis (union with Greece) and injected the question of international guarantees. Archbishop Makarios subsequently declared the talks "deadlocked," although neither party has made a move to break off negotiations.

With the local talks approaching termination and frustration levels rising on all sides, the possibility of an outbreak of violence is greater than at any time since 1968. Rather than react to a violent development the Cyprus situation would be better dealt with by seeking to revive US/UK/UN diplomacy. The goal of such a diplomatic effort would be preservation of negotiations to avoid a confrontation on the island which would sooner or later bring in Greece and Turkey on opposite sides. There are several options and variations thereon; all of them involve some form of mediation.

Mediation Option I: UN

UN mediation has clear advantages. First, the UN is already seized of the problem and is on the spot. Both the Secretary General and the Security Council are involved in the Cyprus problem as a result of the March 4, 1964 (and subsequent) Resolutions⁵ and the presence of the United Nations Force (UNFICYP) on the island. Second, with the UN out in front, Greek, Turk, and Cypriot fire would be concentrated on that organization rather than any specific country. Third, the UN provides a broad cover for both neutral mediation and, at a later stage, perhaps the guaranteeing of the results of that mediation. There are, however, problems with the UN being the focus of activity. The Turks/Turk Cypriots have already expressed their antipathy toward UN mediation, preferring instead the convening of the London-Zurich guarantor powers. Moreover, in a UN mediation effort US inputs would necessarily be diluted by the views of others, and it is difficult for the UN as an institution to bring pressure to bear on the parties.

⁵ Text of Security Council Resolution 186, March 4, 1964, is in *American Foreign Policy: Current Documents, 1964*, pp. 566–567.

Variant A. By far the most preferable variation of the UN mediation option would involve consultations among the Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots which would result in joint agreement on a mediator and the principles upon which mediation would be based. The initiative for the consultations could be undertaken by any one of the parties, preferably Turkey, or perhaps could be jointly undertaken by Greece and Turkey through their dialogue. Once the parties had agreed on a person and on guidelines, U Thant could formally give the individual his blessing and the mediation would proceed. A retired senior statesman (e.g., Lester Pearson) or an internationally-renowned legal expert (e.g., Edward Hambro of Norway or Pierre Laline of Switzerland) would be preferable to a currently active "super star." The latter might raise hopes too high with the danger that the failure of his mission would bring increased tension.

Variant B. Archbishop Makarios could unilaterally request U Thant either to undertake a mediation effort on the basis of the March 4, 1964 Resolution or to activate his good offices under the December 22, 1967 Resolution.⁶ The problem here would be that the Turks might reject the concept of mediation because it was a Makarios proposal. In any case, were the Archbishop to take a UN initiative, the US would be forced to support the effort.

Variant C. It is possible that U Thant or his Special Representative on the island, Mr. Osorio-Tafall, might take the initiative to regenerate the SYG's good offices. The local talks were convened by Osorio-Tafall, acting under the SYG's good offices mandate, and he then withdrew stating that he would be available for mediation should the sides reach a deadlock. U Thant's next report to the SC on Cyprus will be in December in connection with renewal of UNFICYP's mandate. He could choose to move in this framework.

Mediation Option II: US

The argument for US mediation is that our position as NATO leader and primary ally of Greece and Turkey, as well as our active mediatory roles via the Ball and Vance Missions to defuse crises, give us the primary responsibility for the Cyprus problem. Since the US is the repository of a great deal of experience with the Cyprus problem and the country most able to influence all the parties, it is incumbent upon us to shape the Cyprus situation in a positive way before there is a crisis and before we are compelled to intervene under the worst possible conditions. Theoretically, this position has much merit. However, as a practical matter in the present circumstances there should be no direct

⁶ Security Council Resolution 244; text is *ibid.*, 1967, p. 372.

US mediation. The reasons are that such an effort would immediately put the US in the middle of a three-cornered struggle of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots and expose us to criticism from all sides. In addition, our influence would be wasted too early in the game. A direct US intervention should be preserved as a last ditch option in the case of an uncontrollable outbreak of violence.

Mediation Option III: Independent

A third variant on mediation would be the appointment of a neutral, non-political third party (preferably European) as mediator. This option would probably not emerge spontaneously, but could be stimulated by the US, acting in concert with the UK, or within the NATO framework. For example, Italy, with its interest in playing a significant role in "Mediterranean" diplomacy, might be stimulated to perform the mediatory function. Also, Italy has outstanding candidates such as elder statesman Manlio Brosio or legal expert Roberto Ago. Independent mediation, like a UN effort, has the advantage of placing someone else out in front. Another positive factor is that lack of direct involvement with the UN would make an independent mediator more palatable to the Turks. The main problems would be the difficulty of finding a willing candidate and again the inevitable dilution of US inputs and lack of influence on the countries concerned.

US Diplomatic Strategy

Given the dangers inherent in the situation on the ground, the need for the US to keep the Cyprus problem in a negotiating context and the considerations involved in mediation, it would be best for the US quietly to reactivate its diplomacy vis-à-vis Cyprus. In general terms, our goal should be to insure that in the case of a real stalemate in the intercommunal talks and increasing violence on the Island a mediation effort can be quickly and efficiently mounted. The ideal kind of mediation would be that outlined in Option I A, i.e., a UN-sponsored effort stimulated by the parties and involving a mediator and guidelines previously agreed upon. The next most feasible approach would be Option III. In either case the US role should be that of an *amicus curiae* providing behind the scenes ideas and support.

At the very minimum, if we are successful in proceeding with mediation, the negotiating process will be spun out and time will be gained. At the maximum, breakthroughs might be achieved which would either solve the Cyprus problem or provide for a more stable *modus vivendi*.

Next Steps:

1. We believe Assistant Secretary Sisco should call in the Turkish, Greece, and Cypriot Ambassadors (with supporting actions in the cap-

itals) and ask them to clarify their positions as reflected in the latest documents exchanged in the local talks. In addition, he should discuss with them where we go from here on the Cyprus problem, emphasizing the U.S. desire for diplomacy and negotiation, and probing reactions to UNSYG good offices (which Makarios has already floated in the press).

2. The next step would be determined by events in the coming weeks. The Foreign Ministers of all the parties will be in New York for the UNGA and, if stalemate and crisis seem imminent, Secretary Rogers will consider exploring with the Foreign Ministers (particularly Olcay of Turkey) some form of mediation as generally outlined in Option I A.

Tab B⁷

CYPRUS: CONTINGENCY PLANS FOR VIOLENT INCIDENTS

The historical record shows that serious intercommunal violence has often erupted in Cyprus. An action-reaction escalation of violence could bring Greece and Turkey into confrontation as in 1964, 1965, and 1967. With the local talks between Greek Cypriot and Turk Cypriot negotiators now approaching deadlock and with frustration and uncertainty increasing, the coming weeks and months will be particularly delicate.

Our contingency plans are based on past Cyprus crisis management and are geared for quick reaction to contain violence. U.S. responses vary depending on the kind and scale of the incident, which side initiated the violence and for what reason.

Procedure in Case of Accidental Incidents: In the case of an accidental shooting incident, a small scale provocation, or a loss of control by the Greek or Turk Cypriot leadership of a sizeable portion of its military forces or civilian population, initial US responses would appropriately focus on Cyprus itself.

1. The United Nations force on the ground (UNFICYP) has in the past, and could today, successfully interpose its troops between the local opposing groups.

2. Our Embassy in Nicosia would encourage rapid UNFICYP interposition and would make strong representations (probably in conjunction with other Embassies and U Thant's Special Representative) calling for either the GOC and/or the Turk Cypriot leadership to restore discipline and order within their ranks.

⁷ Secret. Drafted by Boyatt on August 27, concurred in by Rodger Davies and Sisco; in substance by Churchill, Pugh and Richard Davies; and in information by Armitage.

3. On the international diplomatic level we would encourage joint US, UK, UN diplomatic démarches in London, Washington, New York, Athens and Ankara in support of efforts on the Island to contain the violence.

Procedure in Case of Premeditated Violence on a Small Scale: Premeditated violence, by either the GOC or the Turk Cypriots, is always a possibility. Because the vast majority of the mainland Greek troops on Cyprus were withdrawn in the wake of the 1967 crisis, Cyprus is today virtually defenseless relative to Turkey. For this reason Makarios would surely not go so far as to generate incidents which might invite mainland Turkish intervention. However, it is conceivable that His Beatitude might stimulate incidents simply to get the UN more involved by obtaining an increase in the size of UNFICYP and/or diplomatic intervention by the Secretary General or the Security Council. In such an event, the scale of violence would probably be kept as small as possible and U.S. reaction would be as described in steps 1, 2, and 3 in the above paragraph.

Procedure in Case of Large-Scale Violence: By far the most dangerous contingency would be a decision by the Turk/Turk Cypriot side to provoke violence as a prelude to Turk military intervention for the purpose of forcibly partitioning the Island. In this event our primary task would be to persuade the GOT that such a violent course of action would be self-defeating.

1. We would encourage UNFICYP to interpose its forces. If the fighting is on a large scale UNFICYP interposition might be futile (as in 1967). Certainly in the case of an invasion from Turkey UNFICYP would not take preventive action.

2. In concert with the UK, and other interested parties, the U.S. would make representations in Ankara, Washington, and London to convince the Turks that the GOC's ability to generate a full scale international crisis would inevitably bring mainland Greece into conflict with Turkey, activate the international community against what would be regarded as stark aggression, and possibly involve the Soviet Union in a manner inimical to Turkish interests.

3. A corollary diplomatic move would be to activate the United Nations. U Thant's Special Representative on the Island and UNFICYP would no doubt be involved ab initio in efforts to stop the fighting. In addition, we could consider an emergency session of the Security Council with a view to mobilizing support for an immediate cessation of hostilities.

4. NATO would be involved in a full-blown Cyprus crisis. Since the 1963–1964 period, the Secretary General has maintained a Watching Brief. If serious hostilities were to occur, we would activate the NATO Secretary General (as in 1967) to support our diplomatic efforts to counsel moderation and achieve an end to the fighting.

5. Finally, our ace in the hole in a crisis on the scale outlined above remains the Special Presidential Mission. Both were crucial in stopping the shooting in 1964 and 1967 respectively. This option should be preserved as a last ditch effort to avoid or resolve a Greco-Turk confrontation caused by serious fighting on the Island.

The Soviet Dimension: The attitude of the Soviet Union in the event of serious intercommunal violence is difficult to predict. The Soviets appear to have two distinct and partially conflicting policy goals. On the one hand, a constant in Russian policy has been preservation of the independence and territorial integrity, i.e., the "non-NATOization," of Cyprus. On the other hand, the USSR has courted Turkey fairly consistently in recent years. The most probable course of Soviet diplomacy would be to make threatening noises against outside interventions while attempting to cool off Makarios in order to avoid the possibility of such interventions. In any UN activity they would probably come down on the side of a small independent nation but not strongly enough to badly irritate Turkey. In short, in the case of a Cyprus crisis, I would anticipate that the Soviet policy would be verbal as indeed it was in 1967.

Converting a Crisis Into Progress: In the past, Cyprus has presented opportunity in crisis. If the situation, either by accident or design, should deteriorate to the point where there is large scale fighting and the threat of Turk invasion, and if such a crisis can be defused by diplomacy, then we should give active consideration to steps which might subsequently be taken to assist in removing the basic causes of strife between the two communities. An example of this procedure was the successful US/UK/UN drive to initiate the local talks in 1968 following the Vance Mission's successful resolution of the 1967 crisis.

379. Telegram From the Embassy to Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, September 7, 1971, 1620Z.

4691. Ref: Athens 4625.² Subj: Cyprus: My Meeting with Palamas Following Makarios Visit.³ Department please pass EUCOM and USDOCOSOUTH.⁴

1. *Summary*: Palamas has told me that Makarios visit did not go well. Prime Minister was quite blunt with Archbishop, and they parted with differences unresolved. However, he thought Makarios now recognized Greece would have final say in any question over Cyprus in which its vital interests involved. This particularly true of any attempt by Makarios further to involve Soviet Union in Cyprus problem. If Makarios takes any initiatives that get him into trouble with Turkey, he will be on his own. On the other hand, Greece will not permit Turkey to alter London-Zurich agreements by unilateral change in status quo. Palamas does not know what proposals Olcay may put forward in their coming talks in NYC. Makarios now expected to abandon intercommunal talks and sit tight in Cyprus, trusting on Soviet Union to prevent Turkish intervention, while instructing Kyprianou to seek UN involvement. Turkey opposed to UN mediation, and Greece itself doubts usefulness of new UN involvement. My chief impression from meeting with Palamas is that GOG will now take tougher line with Turkey, but there at least common ground of London-Zurich accords. However relations with Makarios are in bad state indeed, and we cannot exclude reaction by Greece to any future moves by Makarios that involve Greek interests. Under circumstances we should give closer consideration to question of our own Cyprus policy. *End summary*.

2. On September 6 I met with Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Palamas for more than an hour in discussion devoted almost entirely to Cyprus. I began conversation by asking Palamas to brief me on Makarios visit, which had ended only a few hours before. Palamas said that official communiqué indicative of how visit had gone. For first

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Ankara, Nicosia, London, Moscow, USNATO, and USUN.

² Dated September 2, it reported the importance the Greek Government attached to Makarios's visit. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

³ September 3–6. In telegram 1647 from Nicosia, September 9, Popper reported on the meeting from the perspective of Kyprianou. (Ibid.)

⁴ A notation on the telegram reads: "Not passed."

time in meeting between Makarios and Greek Prime Minister, it had been impossible to issue usual communiqué stating that there was complete identity of views between Athens and Nicosia. In fact, Makarios visit had fully exposed differences that existed between Greek and Cypriot Governments. Makarios not prepared to make meaningful concessions to Turks, not prepared to return to London-Zurich accords, and apparently thought he could sit out situation without Turks taking action. Not only had Archbishop discounted possibility of Turkish intervention, but he had said Soviet Union would prevent such intervention even if it were attempted. I asked Palamas whether he believed Makarios had commitment from Soviet Union. He replied that he had no way of knowing, but he was convinced that communiqué issued after Makarios' Moscow visit did not reflect what really agreed upon by Makarios and Soviet leaders.

3. Palamas said Prime Minister Papadopoulos had done an excellent job during his meetings with Makarios. He had been extremely tough with Archbishop. Palamas thought that for first time Makarios aware that he could no longer manipulate Greece to suit his own aims. As an example of tone of meetings, Prime Minister had pinned Makarios down on question of his provocative statements. After Archbishop had made it plain he prepared to ride out any storm, Papadopoulos had said that if this were his intention, why did he continue to make statements about enosis? Did he really want enosis? Archbishop said that in his heart he desired enosis, but given realities of situation he would have to say he was against it. Prime Minister had retorted, "Then why don't you just come out and say you want independence and have done with it?" Makarios had given usual excuses of his vulnerability to criticism by his own community. Papadopoulos had said that was Makarios' own problem, but he wanted to make it clear that where Greece's vital interests were involved, Greece intended to have the final say.

4. I asked Palamas what he expected next, given situation he had described. He replied that he expected Makarios to go back to Nicosia and "sit there and do nothing," and in certain circumstances doing nothing was itself a kind of action. At same time he expected that Kyprianou would be instructed to inform UNSYG that intercommunal talks had reached impasse and to ask that UN take more active role in Cyprus situation. Makarios' recourse to UN could take several forms. He might ask UNSYG to use his good offices, or he might make more formal approach which could involve Security Council. I said that UN good offices could conceivably involve some form of mediation. What were Greek Government's views on mediation? Palamas said he doubted that new UN initiative would prove useful, but in any case Turkish objections to UN mediation were well known. In general Greece would not be happy with bringing Cyprus problem back into UN. However,

during his visit to New York he would take opportunity for discussion with UNSYG on what should be done next.

5. Palamas said that he would be leaving Greece on September 19 for two-day official visit to London, where he had been invited for conversations with Foreign Secretary. He would then travel to New York by ship, arriving September 29. He would have to return to Athens on October 10 or 11. In addition to meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Olcay, he would like opportunity to discuss Cyprus with Secretary Rogers. I said that I thought such a meeting would be useful, and I would certainly pass along his request.

6. On meeting with Olcay, I asked Palamas what position he expected Turks to take. Palamas said he did not really know what GOT would propose. He did know, however, that Turkish Foreign Ministry was still talking in one way and Turkish military acting in another. From reports GOG receiving from Ankara it obvious that Turkish military activities on Cyprus have full approval of Turkish military leadership. At this point Palamas said that he wanted to make one thing quite clear. If Makarios embarked on initiatives on his own without consulting Greece and these provoked reaction from Turkey, he should not expect help from Greece. On other hand, if Turkey takes initiatives that involve its relations with Greece, then it no longer a matter for Makarios. For example, Greece does not intend to permit Turkey to alter London-Zurich agreements. Any attempt to establish by administrative means a permanent Turkish Cypriot enclave would be de facto partition and violation of London-Zurich agreements, "and this we will never permit."

7. I asked Palamas where Greece stood on London-Zurich accords, in view of impasse in intercommunal talks. Palamas replied that Greece took view that London-Zurich accords were valid. Greece would be prepared to consider any improvements in them, but until such improvements agreed upon, all parties still bound by accords. In this regard Greece would not permit Turkey to take any steps that would "make them worse rather than improve them."

8. I then asked Palamas if he could enlighten me on what PM had in mind when he spoke at Thessaloniki about "bitterness" over Turkish failure to reciprocate friendly gestures by Greece. Palamas said that he had not been informed in advance of what PM had intended to say about Cyprus, but that he had raised question with PM afterwards. PM said he was angered that after having made conciliatory gestures, Denktash's last letter to Clerides had contained preposterous claims for equal partnership of Turkish Cypriot population of 18 percent with Greek 80 percent. This had played right into Makarios' hands. Palamas said that Archbishop in his meeting with Prime Minister obviously delighted with Denktash reply, saying it proved what he had said all along:

that Turks were not prepared to negotiate. Prime Minister's views on Denktash reply had been communicated to Turkish Ambassador, who had tried to claim that Denktash's views not necessarily those of GOT. Palamas said he dismissed this argument as disingenuous.

9. Summing up his gloomy view of situation on Cyprus, Palamas said that extremes aid each other. Turkish rigid and unreasonable attitude encouraging Makarios' stubbornness and vice versa. In circumstances the Alliance, and particularly U.S. and U.K., would be well advised to take closer interest in developments on Cyprus. Greece had been doing its best to moderate situation but there real danger that Makarios would try to involve Soviet Union, which together with growing strength of local Communists on Cyprus, could create dangerous situation. (See [*less than 1 line not declassified*] on Greek concern over Makarios' intentions vis-à-vis the Soviet Union.)

10. Palamas said that when he had spoken of Greece having final say in questions involving Greece's vital national interests, his statement meant to cover such situation as Makarios involving Russians. I said that Makarios had independent ability to take initiatives which Greece could not easily control. Palamas replied, "And the Prime Minister, in that case, has some initiatives that he can take in Cyprus." Palamas went on to say that while U.S. and U.K. most closely concerned, NATO as a whole needed to be informed on current Cyprus situation, and he believed Secretary General should under his watching brief bring to attention of NATO members dangerous situation developing in Cyprus following other unfavorable developments in Iceland and Malta.

11. Finally, I asked Palamas what he could tell me about Grivas' disappearance.⁵ Palamas said PM informed on September 1 and had immediately gotten in touch with him. They had decided that Makarios should be told right away and this was done. PM quite disturbed by this development. Greek Government trying to find out what Grivas planning and where he was, but so far without success, "although it seems he is in Cyprus." Palamas asked if we had been able to find out anything, and I said that we had no information on Grivas' whereabouts or intentions. I asked Palamas what he expected to come of Grivas affair and he said, "Nothing good, of that you can be sure."

12. *Comments:* Palamas apparently reflecting not only his own views but those of PM. He is pessimistic, frustrated, but, I felt, also determined that Greece is not going to be made to suffer the consequences

⁵ Grivas, the former leader of EOKA and ex-commander of the Cypriot National Guard, who had been living in retirement in Athens since his departure from Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1967 crisis, disappeared from his home around September 1.

of Cypriots' refusal to compromise. He is obviously unhappy with Turkish unwillingness to be more forthcoming in its relations with Greece or in negotiations on Cyprus. But it seems Palamas—and PM—have even bitterer feelings toward Makarios. The main message that I believe Palamas wanted to get across was that Greece is no longer prepared to have Makarios determine its Cyprus policy and reserves its position on what it will do if Makarios again involves Greek interests. This would be particularly true, I feel, of any attempt by Makarios to more deeply involve Soviet Union in Cyprus problem. At same time Palamas emphasized that Greece will not stand idly by if Turkey attempts alter status quo on Cyprus.

13. I have three specific recommendations following my conversation with Palamas:

A. Generally, I think my conversation with Palamas strengthens the view that U.S. interests likely become more involved in Cyprus and that we should give greater urgency to review of U.S. policy and options.

B. Given Greek mood, it would be particularly useful for Secretary to meet with Palamas in New York and I strongly urge such a meeting.

C. I suggest we discuss with NATO SecGen usefulness of his reporting to Alliance on current Cyprus situation.

Tasca

380. Minutes of the Senior Review Group Meeting¹

Washington, September 8, 1971.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-112, SRG Minutes, Originals, 1971. Secret. No drafting information appears on the minutes. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room from 4:27–4:37 p.m. Jeanne Davis sent the minutes under a covering memorandum to Kissinger on September 10 and also sent copies to Kennedy and Saunders. Kissinger initialed the transmittal memorandum.

State

John N. Irwin, II

Joseph Sisco

Thomas Boyatt

Defense

Warren Nutter

James H. Noyes

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

B/Gen. Francis J. Roberts

CIA

Richard Helms

John Waller

Treasury

Charles E. Walker

John McGinnis

NSC

Harold H. Saunders

Samuel Hoskinson

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Adm. Robert O. Welander

Mrs. Jeanne W. Davis

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that, while we should try to keep the parties engaged and that almost any instrumentality would be acceptable, there is nothing we need do at the moment.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Boyatt) I see you have a map.² What does it tell us?

Mr. Boyatt: (Referring to a map of Cyprus) The areas in red are the Turkish Cypriot enclaves within which the writ of the Cyprus Government does not run.

Mr. Kissinger: Are the groups in these areas armed?

Mr. Boyatt: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: Where do they get their arms?

Mr. Boyatt: From Turkey.

Mr. Kissinger: Illegally?

Mr. Boyatt: Technically illegally. They make some of their own also. As you can see from the map, this is a good argument against partition: these enclaves are too spread out.

Mr. Kissinger: And they want a Minister for Communal Affairs who is theirs?

² Not printed

Mr. Boyatt: They want what amounts to ethnic autonomy, with a chain of command from the village level to the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. As a minimum, they want the institutionalization of the status quo. Their compromise position is a Minister for Turkish Affairs, which Makarios won't accept.

The blue areas are the British sovereign bases.

Mr. Kissinger: If I understand correctly, the intercommunal talks are deadlocked now and there will be a meeting between the Turkish and Greek representatives at the UN. Makarios may try to sabotage this meeting by making a preemptory move into the General Assembly. I assume there is no way to prevent such a move?

Mr. Sisco: The situation isn't quite that explicit. If Makarios moves in the UN, it is more apt to be to the Security Council. I think the situation will remain calm until after the General Assembly meeting. Although we should try to keep the parties engaged one way or another, we have no substantive position to sell and there is not much for us to do at the moment.

Mr. Kissinger: I thought we were going to talk to the parties at the UN?

Mr. Sisco: Only in the normal course of the Secretary's discussions with the Foreign Ministers in New York.

Mr. Kissinger: You're not going to call in the Ambassadors?

Mr. Sisco: We haven't decided yet.

Mr. Kissinger: What would you say to them if you call them in? Could we see a telegram of talking points indicating the approach you might take?

Mr. Sisco: We don't know yet since we haven't decided whether or not to call them in.

Mr. Kissinger: Would you decide to call them in first and then decide what you're going to say?

Mr. Sisco: Not necessarily. I think it would be largely a listening exercise.

Mr. Irwin: I think the situation has evolved somewhat. When we thought there was a possibility of Makarios moving quickly into the Security Council, we were thinking of calling in the Ambassadors. Now Joe's bureau (Bureau of Near East and South Asian Affairs) thinks that Makarios won't go to the Security Council until after the September General Assembly meeting, so it is less urgent.

Mr. Sisco: I think the Greeks and Turks will get together. The Greeks will say that the only thing that would create a crisis would be if the Turks take some step to upset the status quo. It is difficult to see how the Greek and Turkish Governments could agree on some action which would stimulate a crisis. I assume the Cypriots in New York may explore with U Thant the possibility of some new UN mediation effort, and we could then look at it in that context. There is nothing we

can do at the moment that would have any real meaning. The Cypriots are dedicated to the status quo, and the Greeks are not interested in upsetting it. If there are any new moves, the parties will come to us and to the other Security Council members. We have no substantive solution to sell. We are satisfied with the status quo, but any instrumentality of engagement agreed between the parties ought to be acceptable. But there are differences even here. The Cypriots want to go to the UN, but the Turks are very reserved about that. The Turks want to use conferees under the authority of the London/Zurich agreements, but Makarios is very reserved about this. The Greeks have told Makarios that the greatest danger stems from his playing footsie with the Russians and bringing in Russian political support. We don't know what impact that might have had on Makarios. However, contrary to usual practice, there was no communiqué following Makarios' recent trip to Greece and Makarios has said very little about it, so there were obviously some differences.

Mr. Kissinger: So it is agreed there is nothing we need to do now.

381. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey¹

Washington, September 13, 1971, 1722Z.

167530. For Ambassadors Tasca and Chargés Crawford and Cuthell. From Sisco. Subj: Cyprus.

1. As a result of very good and detailed reporting, I believe we now have a clearer picture both of the results of the Makarios-Papadopoulos talks and the strategy which GOC intends to pursue over the coming weeks. It seems clear that GOC will "seek the advice" of the SYG and that there is not apt to be too much common ground between GOG and GOT as to how to keep the parties engaged as an alternative to possible further deterioration in the situation.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 69–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exdis. Another copy is also *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Drafted by Sisco, cleared by DePalma and Eliot, and approved by Rogers. Repeated to London, USUN, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, and EUCOM. In a September 13 memorandum to Kissinger transmitting the telegram to the White House, Eliot stated: "I am attaching for your information a telegram the Secretary today sent to our Embassies in Ankara, Athens, and Nicosia which I thought you would like to see in light of the recent Senior Review Group meetings on the subject." (*Ibid.*)

2. In reviewing all of the cables carefully, and you are all to be congratulated on the reporting, it is clear that we need to focus on two ideas that have come from you at this stage. First, Ambassador Tasca's sensible thought that when Secretary sees Palamas and Olcay he encourage them both to come up with some kind of a mediation proposal that is somewhere within the ballpark in so far as GOC is concerned.² It seems to me also that this idea can be combined with the other idea which your cables elucidated, namely the idea of a third party presence at continuing intercommunal talks. The trick, of course, will be to try to find the right balance in "UN involvement or noninvolvement" plus having the Secretary General designate an individual who would have sufficient stature, force, and subtlety to inject some fresh ideas in the situation. We are under no illusions that the Cyprus issue is immediately susceptible to political solution. But it is clear that our interest would best be served if some form of continuing instrumentality keeping the parties engaged can be found.

3. I have not had an opportunity to discuss this matter fully with the Secretary but will do so before we go to New York, since not only will he be heavily involved as in the past in Arab-Israeli talks, but much of his time will also (in addition to Chinese representation) be taken up with India-Pakistan matters, and now Cyprus in a much more intensive way.

4. Assuming that we will want to encourage GOG and GOT to develop a mediation proposal along the above lines, what are your thoughts as to the individual that might be named by Secretary General. While I personally know and have respect for Osorio-Tafall he does not strike me as the kind of individual that can give talks the new starch that is required. In preparation for the Secretary's talks in New York, I would like your views on this and any other thoughts you may have.³

5. I hope you would include in your observations the relative advantages and disadvantages of a non-American as against an American being designated. From this end, I can tell you our preference would be in any next stage that it be a non-American, though we obviously cannot afford to close any doors since Cyprus issue can reach a new and more serious stage over coming months.

Rogers

² See Document 379.

³ In telegram 1682 from Nicosia, September 15, Popper reiterated a preference for using a UN mediation to restart intercommunal talks. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974) In telegram 4866 from Athens, September 15, the Embassy stated its view that a non-American mediation was preferable. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP) No response from the Embassy in Turkey has been found.

382. Telegram From Secretary of State Rogers to the Department of State¹

New York, October 7, 1971, 1514Z.

Secto 80/3245. Memorandum of Conversation: Under Secretary Palamas (Greece). Part II of III: Cyprus. October 6, 1971; 5:00 PM. 35 A Waldorf.²

1. Participants: Greece—Under Secretary Palamas, Ambassador Pesmazotlu; US—The Secretary, Mr. Sisco, Mr. McCloskey, Mr. Boyatt (reporting officer).

2. *Summary*: Palamas and Olcay have developed compromise procedure for sustaining negotiating process on Cyprus problem which involves: (A) continuation of local talks; (B) addition of Greek and Turk technical experts as participants; (C) utilization of SYG good offices as framework for continuation of talks and addition of mainland participants. USG supports this positive approach by parties concerned in dealing with problem. *End summary*.

3. Palamas opened discussion of Cyprus problem by summarizing his talks with GOT FonMin Olcay which characterized as conducted in spirit of compromise.³ Although GOG and GOT differ on substance of Cyprus problem they agree on need for procedural device to preserve negotiations and avoid outbreaks of violence leading to crisis. Specifically two governments in agreement on three points:

(A) Inter-communal talks constituted best negotiating procedure and should continue.

(B) Inter-communal talks should be re-enforced by participation of GOG and GOT technical experts who would join as observers.

(C) GOG and GOT agreed that most viable framework within which local talks should be continued and expanded to include Greek and Turk experts was SYG's good offices mandate.

4. On procedural details Palamas stated that Archbishop Makarios would be inclined to reject anything proposed by Greece or Turkey. Therefore, to avoid this negative reaction U Thant should take initiative and propose continuation of talks and addition of GOG and GOT

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 7 GREECE. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated priority to Ankara, Athens, London, Nicosia, and USNATO.

² Separate memoranda of conversation, dealing with the Chinese representation question and the progress of democratization in Greece, reported in telegrams Secto 88 and 92, both October 8, are *ibid*.

³ The talks took place in New York where both men were attending the UN General Assembly session.

experts. Fact is both Ankara and Athens want compromise and can contribute to progress by inducing both communities to compromise.

5. Palamas reported that in his earlier talks with U Thant latter proposed that he issue report containing his ideas on substance of Cyprus problem. Greece would not object formally because U Thant's concepts would undoubtedly support GOC position. However, Palamas said he personally believed substantive comments by U Thant at this stage and in this form will be definitely unhelpful because they would undoubtedly generate GOT rejection of UN views and possibly UN procedural role as well. Palamas expressed hope US would be able to help with U Thant in this regard.

6. Secretary responded by expressing pleasure that allies had made positive progress on difficult problem. US had been thinking along similar lines and procedure outlined by Palamas seemed to us to be very good idea indeed. Palamas interjected thought that not only would this procedure keep talks going it would also keep the Cyprus problem out of SC and therefore keep the Soviets out of it.

7. Pursuing question of UN role further Palamas added his personal thought that any UN substantive views could be folded into procedure by addition to local talks of UN technical expert. December resignation of Osorio-Tafall and need for UN SYG to appoint new special representative might provide opportunity for such a move. Sisco noted that this last idea gave additional balance since it went a long way toward meeting desire of Archbishop Makarios to have active UN role.

8. Secretary closed by stating USG would support in every way creative effort by parties directly concerned to deal with Cyprus problem.

Rogers

383. Letter From the Counselor of Embassy in Cyprus (Crawford) to the Officer in Charge of Cyprus Affairs (Boyatt)¹

Nicosia, November 19, 1971.

Dear Tom:

"How can we come to any conclusion other than that Greece supports Grivas when every instrumentality responsive to Greek control is being used to support Grivas against Makarios?"

These words to me by Chris Veniamin some days ago prompt this letter. I am not sure that our disseminated telegraphic reporting has conveyed the full flavor of the picture we here see emerging ever more clearly. In part, our reporting hesitancy has been deliberate: we would not like to be charged with building a completed edifice from straws in the wind. We also know that [*less than 1 line not declassified*] Athens will not buy any suggestion that something could be afoot of which they were not aware. Therefore, our efforts gradually to convince must be based on fact as facts accumulate. Let's see what we have in hand as of this moment:

Item—The Communists' 40% showing in the 1970 elections shocked and angered the GOG. According to the Greek Embassy here, the conclusion was reached that something had to be done about Cyprus. At that time, the concern about building assets was related more to the spread of Communist influence on the island, under the umbrella of Makarios' bland detachment, than to solving the Cyprus problem in the interests of good relations with Turkey, although this, of course, remained an important Greek interest.

Item—One of the first manifestations of the GOG's stepped up anti-Communist action program was the suddenly improved financial position of SEK. The GOG Labor Minister visited Cyprus and from that time on money was no obstacle in SEK's drive to expand.

Item—Erim's entry in March 1971 led to a new sense of urgency on the part of both GOT and GOG in terms of the search for a solution. I speculate that this reinforced the GOG's earlier conclusion based on its anti-Communism that existing assets had to be strengthened and new ones created.

Item—In the press field, Greece bought *Mesimorini*, helped *Aghon*, and possibly acquired some influence in *Eleftheria* even before Grivas' return. Coincidentally with his return, *Proini* sprang into being and *Patris* suddenly discovered enough money to start publishing twice a week to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Official-Informal. Copies were sent to Brown and Draper.

increase its circulation. Last week *Cosmos Simera*, glossy and skillful as a bi-weekly magazine, reappeared in the stands after an 18-month suspension caused by financial difficulty. To no one's surprise, it boosts Grivas and runs down Makarios in a sophisticated way. In December, we are to have a visit from GOG Under-Secretary to the Prime Minister, Byron Stamatelopoulos. His visit will wrap up already agreed arrangements under which the Athens News Agency will start to service all the Greek Cypriot newspapers, at a subsidized rate of £40 each monthly.

Item—Sports. We hear that Col. Papapostoulou (the name sounds familiar)² recently “retired” from the Greek army and has gone to work for Aslanides. Aslanides set up in Cyprus the extension to Cyprus of Pro-Po, the Greek football pool. The extension was a thinly disguised device to channel funds to the anti-Communist clubs.

Item—Commerce. Michael Savides and a strong team representing the Chamber of Commerce returned last week from a visit to Athens at the invitation of their opposite numbers. On his return, he announced that a new dynamic program of commercial and economic cooperation had been agreed. Extensive new private investment in Cyprus by Greeks is forecast, etc.

Item—Education. GOC Education Minister Frixos Petrides was invited to Athens at the same time as the Savides team. Returning, he announced that there will be new programs to coordinate Cypriot education more closely with the mainland.

Item—Fighters. In September, Elias Ipsarides and a large PEMA group was given red carpet treatment in Athens and an expenses-paid trip around Greece. As you know the ex-Fighters clubs subsequently came out strongly in favor of Grivas.

Item—Youth. PEON in mid-summer was invited on a trip similar to PEMA's. According to Tassos Papadopoulos, who is close to PEON's leadership, the association was assured of unstinting financial support. PEON's present position on Grivas is that both he and Makarios are good fellows and must work together for advancement of the national cause.

Item—National Guard. From many sources we hear about the kind of indoctrination mainland officers are giving Cypriot recruits. In this, Makarios is portrayed as the man who sacrificed the national cause—which could have been achieved by the Acheson Plan—for the sake of personal ambition, and who is prepared to undermine Hellenic interests by his encouragement of AKEL and invitation to the Soviets to in-

² In a December 2 reply to Crawford, Boyatt noted that Papapostoulou was “widely rumored to have been involved in the March 1970 attempt to assassinate Makarios and the subsequent successful murder of Georkadjis.” (Ibid.)

volve themselves in the Cyprus problem. Grivas is depicted as the authentic national hero who has returned to steer the island back to the enosis course. To achieve this goal, it is acknowledged, Greeks must be realistic. A territorial price will have to be paid to Turkey, but this involves little more than recognition of the present reality, which is that the Turks are independently administering their own portions of the island thanks to Makarios' past blunders. You will note the parallelism of this line and that taken by Ambassador Panayotacos with Ambassador Popper on November 19 (Nicosia 2053).³

Item—the biggest one—Grivas.

Let us look at another dimension. From a variety of reports, you know that Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are ready on short notice to have the former support the latter in a move out of their existing enclaves in NE Cyprus, to consolidate themselves in a solid zone of physical control based on a line running from Kyrenia through northern Nicosia and down to north Famagusta. The Turkish Embassy here, for example Counselor Tunabas, acknowledges that some blood would be spilt on both sides but points out that creation of a demarcation line will in the end be the only solution and that "a solution must entail some sacrifices."

And a final dimension. We have had some glimpses into private channels of communication between Athens and Ankara. During a visit here, Acet's deputy referred to a link using Papadopoulos' private secretary (name not given) and Ambassador Turkmen. Specifically, he spoke of a message received on this channel in which Papadopoulos had signified his support of double-enosis as the only solution. A military channel also seems to exist, using the Greek military Attaché in Ankara. At a higher level, we would be curious to know the content of exchanges now taking place in Athens between TGS Chief of Staff General Tagmac and his Greek counterparts. Locally we are aware of a "hot line" between "Bozkurt" and General Kharalamvopoulos. For example, General Leslie⁴ tells us of tense situations in which he has found his own (inimitable) phrases used with the Turkish Fighter leadership coming back at him an hour or two later from Kharalamvopoulos.

At the present time the facts carry us only to the conclusions that: Greece is embarked on a coordinated effort to build its assets in Cyprus; these are essentially being used in support of Grivas and against Makarios; Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are militarily ready to carve out control of northeastern Cyprus; there exist coordinating

³ Dated November 19, it reported that the Greek Ambassador had informed Popper that Grivas was ready to settle for a partial enosis solution. (Ibid.)

⁴ Edward M. Leslie, Chief of Staff, UNFICYP.

mechanisms between the GOG and GOT; and, while Greece and Turkey are willing to give negotiations and diplomacy a further try, they are telling us it's the last, that June 1972 is the limit, and that double-*enosis* may in the end be the only way of solving the Cyprus problem once and for all.

Most of the foregoing is not new to you. It is the summation that, I feel, provides useful food for thought.

I ask myself if, when the time comes, if it does, or before it does, our Government wants to stay silent, say "no" with conviction, say "no" with tongue in cheek, or say covertly "yes" to buy into the planning of our allies. As you know, there are the very faintest of indications that the British may already be privy. A whole separate letter could be written concerning the script that could be devised were we ever to decide to say "yes." I do not believe we need decide now or hastily. Greece and Turkey are still on the diplomatic track and our efforts should be to help that succeed. But if and when it shows signs of not paying off, we judge that they are likely to consider putting into motion the alternative machinery that is being readied. By that time we will need a USG position carefully thought out and approved at the White House level.

The Ambassador has seen the foregoing and agrees that it summarizes the situation, as we see it, fairly.⁵ He suggests that you show this letter to Rodger Davies.

Warmest regards,
Sincerely,

Bill

⁵ In a December 7 letter to Boyatt, Draper found himself in "general agreement" with Crawford's presentation, but noted some evidence that the Turkish Government was not sold either on the idea of a double *enosis* solution or on cooperation with the Greek junta. (Department of State, Cyprus Desk Files: Lot 75 D 41, Pol 26-1)

384. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Greece¹

Washington, November 24, 1971, 0255Z.

214961. Subject: Cyprus: Grivas Situation. Ref: State 214614.²

1. We have carefully considered point made in Athens 6187³ that GOT pressure on Greece is main factor in increasing consensus within GOG for double enosis "solution" to Cyprus problem. While it is clear that GOT is, of course, keeping up pressure for solution to Cyprus problem, Department does not feel this is primary causal element in GOG's attraction for double enosis. In fact, increasing sympathy for double enosis among prominent Greeks seems to have momentum all its own, based on equal parts of pressure for a solution, dislike of Makarios, desire for enosis even if flawed enosis and fear of Communist penetration of Cyprus.

2. Department's reading of developments over past several months is that GOT pressure for Cyprus solution peaked late last summer shortly after Erim government took over. At that time GOT at all levels appeared to be pushing for "dynamic" solution to accompaniment of cheers from Turk-Cypriot community. We believe firm representations by USG initially in Ankara and later in New York and Washington emphasizing that USG continued strongly to support peaceful, negotiated settlement of Cyprus problem was very important factor in defusing Turkish demand for solution to Cyprus by end of 1971. In any case, we feel that further representations in Ankara on this subject are not necessary, at least for present.

3. Department would also like to comment on points made in para 8 of Athens 6177.⁴ We agree wholeheartedly that US approach to GOG on Grivas be presented in way that does not bring into question Greek veracity. Démarche outlined in reftel was drafted with this in mind.

4. Athens 6177 also recommends that US not leave impression "that we prepared to make contribution to solving Cyprus problem substantial enough to give us voice in such considerations as future of

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Boyatt; cleared by Silva, Dillon, and Fry (S/S-O); and approved by Davies. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, USNATO, London, and USUN.

² Dated November 11, it reiterated concern about Grivas's actions even in the event that he was ready to support a Greek Government plan for "double enosis." (Ibid.)

³ Dated November 19, it commented on the need to lessen Turkish pressures on Greece. (Ibid.)

⁴ Dated November 19, it stated the Embassy's view that Papadopoulos had not sent Grivas to Cyprus and discussed options for dealing with Grivas. (Ibid.)

Grivas." We believe USG efforts from 1963 to present to bring peace provide basis for this manifestation of interest. Fact is that over period of almost a decade USG has made substantial contributions to efforts to solve the Cyprus problem. Ball, Acheson, and Vance missions of 1963, 1964, and 1967 are high points of a whole series of US initiatives, most recent of which have been our efforts to get local talks started in 1968 and our continuing efforts to revive them at present stage. As historical record clearly indicates, USG involvement in Cyprus problem both in crisis resolution and problem solving terms does give US voice in anything bearing on problem including "future of Grivas." It is worth recalling that prior to November 1967 crisis there was discussion within USG as to whether or not USG should request GOG to recall Grivas. While debate was in progress, with many claiming status of Grivas was not US concern, Grivas directed violent attack on Turk-Cypriots which caused 1967 crisis and this, in turn, involved USG directly in Cyprus situation under worst possible conditions.

Irwin

385. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus¹

Washington, December 8, 1971, 0514Z.

221062. Subject: GOT Ambassador's Call on Sisco: Cyprus.

1. GOT Ambassador Esenbel raised subject of Cyprus with Assistant Secretary Sisco by drawing attention to statement in SYG's report that latter would discuss his procedural proposal in more detail during SC meeting on UNFICYP renewal. Esenbel also mentioned critically SYG's invitation in report to SC to discuss substance of Cyprus problem.

2. Esenbel emphasized that GOT very much opposed to substantive intervention by SC into Cyprus problem and expressed GOT's desire for automatic UNFICYP renewal without substantive debate.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. II 1 Jan 1970–31 Dec 1971. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by Ogden and Boyatt, cleared by Dillon and J.S. Brims (S/S-O); and approved by Sisco. Repeated to London, USNATO, and USUN.

3. Assistant Secretary Sisco replied that he had examined carefully text of SYG's initiative and text of GOT reply.² In light of imminent SC consideration of Cyprus he wished to make following points:

A. First and foremost, Sisco emphasized he agreed with Esenbel that it was in no one's interest to have substantive, extended and heated SC debate. Frankly, this would benefit only Soviet Union.

B. In our view, decisive element in containing SC situation would be acceptance by all parties of SYG's proposal on SYG's terms.

C. Sisco went on to point out that we considered GOT response as positive although it was true that GOT was basically restating its position, particularly in relation to details of mandate. Sisco offered opinion that SYG's proposal was formulated in sufficiently positive terms to permit GOT to take strongest possible posture of accepting it without qualifications. Obviously there would be differences on modalities, but these could be discussed later once talks had begun.

D. Sisco said that while US not party in this arrangement, we did believe that if GOT could endorse SYG's proposal in more unqualified way, this would give US opportunity to urge U Thant to make very strong representation to Makarios to accept SYG's initiative. In this situation USG was also prepared to weigh in with Makarios.

4. Ambassador Esenbel then asked Sisco how USG would like scenario to proceed over next several days. Sisco responded that most positive development would be unqualified acceptance of SYG's initiative by all three parties before SC meeting. Next best would be for GOT to make very clear it accepted fully SYG's proposal. Esenbel interjected that he considered Turkish acceptance to be positive statement. Sisco replied that there could be no question about this, as he had indicated earlier. However, Sisco noted that Turkish qualifications had been registered. Sisco then reviewed the language of the SYG initiative to point up how close it was to Turkish position and Turkish interest. SYG language emphasizes that talks principally between two communities with SYG representative providing good offices and GOT and GOC participating via constitutional experts.

5. Esenbel emphasized extent to which GOT had already compromised on UNSYG's proposal by recalling that when subject of UN participation in local talks had first been raised by Sisco, Esenbel had said to him this type of an approach would probably not be accepted by GOT. Now GOT had accepted and Esenbel saw no need for SC intervention which could only be unhelpful.

² On October 4 the Greek Government announced that both it and the Government of Turkey had accepted the Secretary General's proposal for the appointment of a UN Special Representative to the intercommunal talks.

6. Sisco then summarized by stating that at this juncture US, like GOT, would like to see automatic renewal of UNFICYP and limit action of SC consideration to nonsubstantive discussion on Cyprus problem. However, best way to achieve this was to get local talks revived before SC met. If GOT could make contribution in this area then SYG and US could press Makarios to accept also.³

Johnson

³ At its December 13 meeting, the Security Council adopted Security Council Res. 305 by a vote of 14–0 with China abstaining. The resolution funded UNFICYP for a further 6 months with the expectation of a scaling down of its operations. Meanwhile, the Secretary General announced he would send representatives to Athens, Nicosia, and Ankara in an effort to reactivate the stalled intercommunal talks.

386. Memorandum of Conversation¹

Washington, December 14, 1971.

SUBJECT

Denktash Views on Cyprus Situation

PARTICIPANTS

Rauf Denktash, Leader of Turk Cypriots
Thomas D. Boyatt, Director of Cypriot Affairs
Roger A. Long, Political-Economic Officer

Rauf Denktash, Turk Cypriot leader and negotiator for his side in the intercommunal talks, called on Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz of International Organizations on December 14. Although NEA officials were fully engaged with Indo-Pak and Middle East crises,² Assistant Secretary Sisco saw Denktash for a brief “hello.” Messrs. Boyatt and Long of the Cyprus country directorate accompanied Denktash on the call. The conversation was reported in State 225745.³

Following Denktash’s call on Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz, I took him to lunch where he, Roger Long and I had an extended, varied, and lively discussion. The following points of interest emerged.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential. Drafted by Long and Boyatt. Copies were sent to Ankara and Nicosia.

² Reference to the December 4–12 clash between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. The United States sent elements of the Seventh Fleet into the crisis area.

³ Dated December 15. (Ibid.)

1. *SYG Proposal*—Denktash was quite relaxed about the new negotiating procedure in which representatives of the UN, Greece and Turkey would participate. He felt this would be helpful in that the added participants could suggest fresh approaches as stalemates occur. He also accepted the idea that, since Greece and Turkey would have to live with any eventual settlement, it was good to have them participate in the formulation of such a settlement. In addition, the participation of the “mother” country and the “father” country would give the Greek and Turk communities respectively added confidence in any compromises reached.

2. *Prospects for Settlement*—Several times Denktash said that the time to have reached a settlement was in 1968 when *he* and the Turk Cypriot community were psychologically prepared to make fairly major concessions to the Greek Cypriots. He said that if he and Clerides had gone away by themselves for a few months they could have reached a settlement. His only demand would have been recognition of Turk Cypriot partnership status, which he said would not have been as detailed or as strong as his 1971 local autonomy demands. He stated that he would have conceded everything else to Clerides. Instead, he and Clerides talked on Cyprus and it gradually became clear that Makarios was controlling Clerides. In the three years since the talks started Denktash’s views had changed. He now is much more of the opinion that Makarios will not permit a settlement acceptable to the Turk Cypriots.

I told Denktash that in my personal view he could have either the kind of autonomy he wanted or the kind of guarantees he felt necessary, but not both. I asked, on a hypothetical basis, whether Denktash would choose full autonomy or the present set of international guarantees if the choice had to be made. Denktash replied that he would choose the guarantees. I told Rauf that in that case it was a good thing that he was prepared to start *de novo* on constitutional issues as he had told the press before leaving Cyprus and had confirmed to Martin Herz.

3. *Normalization*—A good bit of the discussion was devoted to “normalization.” In general, Denktash was receptive to the idea of normalization which would include not only concessions by the Greek community but by his community as well. Of course, things got a bit more sticky once details were discussed but at least Rauf was prepared to discuss the establishment of a variety of normalization subcommittees under UN aegis not excluding one on “that damned Kyrenia Road.” I repeated the point I made earlier (State 225745) that a *visible* normalization move by the Turkish side was important in getting a lot more normalization out of Makarios.

4. *Deconfrontation*—On the subject of disengagement and deconfrontation of military forces, Denktash made the usual Turk Cypriot

point, viz., it is unfair to ask Turk Cypriot fighters and Greek Cypriot National Guard to each withdraw 100 yards when the Turkish position is only 200 yards deep and mobile Greek forces have the entire island into which they can withdraw. I acknowledged Denktash's point and suggested that deconfrontation should be approached in a different way. I asked Rauf what would be his reaction, for example, to the proposition that National Guard troops withdraw into their barracks and in return the Turks would replace TMT fighters with policemen. To my surprise Denktash replied that he thought this suggestion had merit and was certainly worth exploring. *Comment*: I think we should follow up on this one with UNFICYP and Denktash when he returns.

5. *Internal Political Situation in Turk Cypriot Community*—The most important point on this subject was Denktash's frank admittance that his ability to "impose" an intercommunal settlement had decreased radically since 1970. He said that particularly in the 1968 period, the Turk Cypriot community felt that a settlement could be reached and that the right man to reach that settlement (i.e., Denktash) was available to reach it. As time has dragged on without a settlement, however, more and more Turk Cypriots have lost faith not only in the general prospects for reaching a settlement but in particular in Denktash's (or anyone's) ability to do so. When asked if this meant that Turk Cypriots are becoming more belligerent in their interaction with the other community, Denktash said this was not the problem but that a certain lack of confidence in the possibility for reaching a settlement had developed.

6. *Comment*—Both in his call on Martin Herz and later during our follow-up luncheon and talk, Denktash was his usual articulate, forceful and intelligent self. He did, however, generally come through as much more positive and creative than he has in recent Embassy reporting. Perhaps he consciously tried to project a constructive aura or perhaps release from the confines and demands of the community makes him more statesmanlike. Either way, Rauf Bey put himself across as a determined, but sensitive and rational, leader of his community. Denktash was definitely in good spirits and enjoyed the give and take of our discussions. Physically, he said he was in good shape and said his health was 80 per cent improved. He did, however, complain that the constant pressure of his many responsibilities and lack of progress on the Cyprus problem had induced a certain malaise. As an example, Denktash explained that he simply was no longer interested in recreation or entertainment and everything seemed rather flat. I got the impression that Rauf could use a vacation.

387. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon¹

Washington, December 17, 1971.

SUBJECT

Progress on the Cyprus Problem

The news of crises invariably receives total attention while news of progress usually gets buried. I would like to call your attention to some quiet, but hopeful developments.

For several months we have been working hard to avoid another crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean. As you know, this summer the local negotiations which were basic to the containment of the Cyprus problem broke down and violent incidents began to increase. In the face of a deteriorating situation, we suggested a third-party presence to reinvigorate the negotiations. This idea was developed by Greece and Turkey and then elaborated and formally proposed by U Thant as a new negotiating procedure. I supported this proposal during my bilateral meetings with the Foreign Ministers of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus in October.² Subsequently, we made diplomatic representations here and in Athens, Ankara and Nicosia urging acceptance by all parties.

On December 13 the Security Council met to consider Cyprus. We were successful in getting a noncontroversial resolution extending the UN force on Cyprus for six more months, which will aid greatly in maintaining a peaceful atmosphere in which negotiations can proceed. In addition, Cyprus accepted the Secretary-General's proposal without qualifications. This breakthrough together with earlier acceptances by Greece and Turkey (the latter with qualifications) will in my view make possible the resumption of the negotiations in the near future. I believe our representations were very important, if not crucial, in getting the parties back to the negotiating table.

We will, of course, closely monitor the evolving situation in order to assist the parties whenever our efforts would be appropriate and helpful. On the Cyprus front the new year has a hopeful cast.

William P. Rogers

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files, Middle East—Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Confidential.

² See Document 382. Rogers's talk on Cyprus with Kyprianou was reported in telegram Secto 149, October 8. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL CYP–US) His talk with Olcay was reported in telegram Secto 117, October 8. (Ibid., POL 7 TUR)

388. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, January 21, 1972, 1535Z.

145. For Assistant Secretary Sisco from Popper. Subject: Cyprus: Need for Progress on Deconfrontation.

1. I think your proposal for a new pitch on deconfrontation² comes at a propitious time and that it will be helpful to broach it to parties in near future.

2. I would, however, justify the proposal on grounds somewhat different from those you have cited. Increased tension in Cyprus today is due less to intercommunal conflict and differences than to clandestine activity within Greek Cypriot community itself. Recent Green Line shooting has again demonstrated what Aug 1970 Trilomo incident indicated—that each community, acting under mainland patron's guidance, can confine and control incidents when they occur, if it wishes to do so. UNFICYP is an important adjunct of the process. As I see it, your proposal is particularly useful now because it would come at a time when all parties are casting about for some suggestions or steps which would serve them as alternatives to flatly negative confrontation when new intercommunal talks get underway. Apparently with this objective, both sides are talking in terms of deconfrontation, normalization, "freeze," or *modus vivendi* as subjects for early discussion.

3. Thus, Denktash has hinted at the possibility of replacing fighters by police on Green Line (Nicosia 132).³ Makarios is looking toward demilitarization which would end with disbandment of on-island military forces (Nicosia 2228 and 137).⁴ And within the last few days General Haralambopoulos, Greek National Guard commander, mused to UNFICYP Acting Chief of Staff Thornton that he wondered how UNFICYP would view a unilateral voluntary pull-back by National Guard forces to their camps throughout the island, adding that he might

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Priority; Exdis; Noform. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, USUN, London, and USNATO.

² In telegram 9607 to Ankara, Athens, Nicosia, and USUN, January 20, Sisco suggested a deconfrontation proposal based on the following points: 1. All Greek Cypriot National Guardsmen withdrawn to barracks and where necessary replaced with policemen; 2. All Turk Cypriot fighters at points of confrontation replaced by Turk Cypriot policemen; 3. Prohibition of automatic weapons in areas of close confrontation; 4. No change in territorial status quo; and 5. Above four points guaranteed by UNFICYP. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

³ Ibid.

⁴ Telegram 2228 from Nicosia, December 22, 1971, is *ibid.* Telegram 137 from Nicosia, January 21, was not found.

be willing to consider this. (Predictably, indication that Haralambopoulos has raised matter with Cyprus Government. We wonder whether he has discussed it with GOG during his recent shuttle trips to Athens.)

4. It is important to recognize that each party approaches deconfrontation on a basis strongly tilted against the other side. Makarios links it to withdrawal of mainland contingents, thus increasing freedom of Greek Cypriot majority to deal with Turk Cypriot minority on its own. Denktash thinks of it in connection with financial advantages to Turk Cypriots. It is possible that mainland Greek officers are toying with it in terms of future moves by enosis-double enosis groups. In short, when both sides are presented with a balanced and comprehensive formula, the odds are that they will boggle at it rather than agree. Nevertheless, as indicated above, I think the time is right to make a real try.

5. I believe the formula contained in your telegram is equitably balanced. I would suggest that formula be made more specific with respect to how far back Turk Cypriot fighters move. In enclaves this should be a meaningful distance, though in an area like Artemis Road, Larnaca, it would have to be less. UNFICYP would monitor and supervise rather than guarantee execution, and it would have to be understood that if either side took advantage of situation to change territorial status quo, the other would be automatically freed from all deconfrontation restrictions and guarantor powers (and/or UN Security Council) would afford full support to restore status quo ante.

6. I fully agree that a proposal of this character would be more effective if it were made by the UN and supported by others. But rather than raise it in New York and Nicosia simultaneously, I suggest that it might be better if the proposal were worked out in New York with Guyer alone and if then Guyer brought it with him as he went round the Nicosia-Athens-Ankara circuit. Depending on initial reactions, Osorio could then unveil best possible official proposal at early state in resumed talks.⁵

Popper

⁵ In telegram 338 from Athens, January 19, and 484 from Ankara, January 20, the Embassies in Greece and Turkey endorsed the proposals contained in Sisco's telegram. (Both *ibid.*)

389. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB 315/00987–72

Washington, February 4, 1972.

COUNTRY

Cyprus/Czechoslovakia

DOI

January 1972

SUBJECT

Purchase of Czechoslovakian Arms by the Government of Cyprus.

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[1 line not declassified]

1. In early February 1972, President Archbishop Makarios disclosed to his closest advisors that he had purchased arms from the Government of Czechoslovakia. He later confirmed the arms purchase to the Commander of the Cypriot National Guard, Lieutenant General Haralambos Haralambopoulos. In disclosing the purchase, Makarios said that the arms are intended for use by the Cypriot police in countering any attempts at armed violence by groups loyal to retired Lieutenant General Georgios Grivas. Makarios said that the arms had been delivered by ship to Cyprus in late January and were off-loaded in the vicinity of Xeros. The arms were then taken by truck to the Archbishopric located within the old walled city of Nicosia. The President stated that the cost of the arms package was 500,000 pounds sterling (approximately U.S. \$1.3 million). Although he did not indicate the type of arms involved, Makarios said that the transaction was similar in terms of type and quantity to the 1966 arms purchase from Czechoslovakia. ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment:* The figure of 500,000 pounds appears very high. The 1966 purchase of Czech arms amounted to approximately U.S. \$427,000. This purchase consisted of both arms and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition—the major arms items included 1500 rifles, 100 submachine pistols, 700 submachine guns, 140 light and heavy machine guns, 30 anti-tank guns, and 30 82-MM mortars.) (*Source Comment:* The President did not specify the date he had completed the transaction for the date of delivery. Although he did not mention the quan-

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

tity of arms purchased, Makarios noted that it took 50 truckloads to complete the transfer from the Xeros area to the Archbishopric. The transaction was made in the strictest secrecy.)

2. (*Headquarters Comment*: See TDCS DB-315/00977-72² from another reliable source for a report in which Makarios was reported to have said that the arms transaction cost over 600,000 pounds.) (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment*: An additional reliable source has reported that according to a unit of the Greek Central Information Service /KYP/ in Cyprus, the subject of acquisition of bloc arms arose first following the return of Makarios from Moscow in June 1971, then again in connection with the October 1971 trip to Czechoslovakia by Dr. Vasso Lyssarides. This source believes that the Lyssarides trip was for the specific purpose of arranging the details of the arms purchase on behalf of the Cypriot Government. Source further believes that Makarios decided to purchase these arms for three reasons: because of his uncertainty following his disagreement with the Greek Government in June 1971; because of his suspicion that the Cypriot National Guard does not fully support him; and because of the internal developments in Cyprus since the arrival there of Grivas.)

3. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

² Dated February 4, it reported that on February 1, Grivas supporters had informed the Greek Government of the Czech arms shipments, and that Makarios had confirmed that the shipments were being made. (*Ibid.*)

390. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 7, 1972, 1615Z.

258. Subject: Consequences of Makarios' New Arms Deal with Czechoslovakia.

1. *Summary*: Assuming information that Makarios has imported a large new consignment of arms from Czechoslovakia is correct, we conclude that an important new element of tension has been added to an

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated priority to Athens, Ankara, London, Prague, USUN, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, and EUCOM. Another copy of the telegram is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, DEF 19-6 CZECH-CYP.

already most unstable situation. There will be deleterious effects on imminent Turkish contingent rotation, enlarged intercommunal talks, prospects for U.S. deconfrontation proposal, GOG relations with Makarios, and to much lesser extent on GOT relations with GOG. Makarios' bid for more security in the longer term could precipitate and hasten the very kind of challenge he is seeking protect himself against.

2. It now seems almost 100 percent sure that Makarios has secretly imported new weapons to arm an internal protective force of approximately 2,000 men, that these arms came from Czechoslovakia, and that transaction is at least double the size of that concluded in August 1966. Being a shrewd analyst as well as a determined brinkman, Makarios undoubtedly calculated the angles closely and concluded this move was essential to protect himself against a direct challenge from Grivas, whom he believes to be backed by Greece. But the medicine is of a sort used in extremis; it could provoke the challenge he seeks to defend against; and it will cause a lot of headaches to others, not least to USG. To take a quick look at some of the most likely consequences:

3. Next rotation of Turkish treaty contingent (TURDYK) is scheduled for Feb 23. (Since there was 7 month gap between last two rotations of 50 percent of contingent, there is 5 month interval this time, to keep on 12 month cycle for rotation of entire contingent.) Usual negotiations—angry bickerings would be a better description—are going on about list of equipment GOC will authorize for import with contingent. According Turkish Embassy, GOC, trying make up for its display of relative reasonableness last time, has been especially picayune in initial cuts this time. Also from Turkish Embassy we aware TGS has long been restive with having submit its equipment requirements for contingent to GOC scrutiny and—in its eyes—demeaning cuts. Makarios' import of arms gives GOT every excuse to be very tough, perhaps to point of saying contingent will import what it wishes without GOC scrutiny, and interference will be met with force. We are already hearing noises along this line and UNFICYP, which is the traditional middleman in working out rotations, is very apprehensive.

4. It goes without saying that psychological boost given atmosphere by Guyer's successful trip, with its resultant prospect that new talks will begin later this month has been blunted by arms importation. Fortunately, everybody had been brought on board before the news broke; otherwise Turkish Cypriots and probably Turkey would have been a lot harder to convince. As it is, Turks both mainland and local will start new phase with an even more than usually bitter taste in their mouths about Makarios' life style.

5. The U.S. deconfrontation proposal has been dealt a particularly hard blow. From UNFICYP Commander General Chand we understand Guyer carried the ball as we had asked, speaking to the parties in a general sense and leaving the specific suggestions, in writing,

with UNFICYP for appropriate follow-up. One half of this was done promptly after Guyer's departure. National Guard Commander Haralambopoulos promised Chand complete cooperation if Turkish Cypriots were willing move as proposed. Turks, as Chand noted to us February 5, would have been very hard to move anyway. Now they have intense emotional and some real justification to perpetuate their preferred intransigence.

6. It seems hard to believe that the state of real, as opposed to oratorical relations between the GOG and Makarios could get worse than it has been since last summer's refusal by Makarios to accept Greek suggestions for compromise, and Grivas' subsequent return. (We're not saying the two are necessarily related, but such is now the case.) From Greek Embassy, which is undoubtedly understating the case, we are aware GOG feels Makarios has disregarded its strong advice against purchasing arms from the bloc; has acted behind its back; is throwing down a public gauntlet by showing that he does not trust intentions of mainland National Guard officers and therefore of Greece itself; and is playing his old game of building up Communists against "nationalists." Despite public denials, some harsh words have already been said by Haralambopoulos and Panayotacos, and more are likely to be.

7. GOG-GOT recent and cautiously evolved understanding, about not letting Cyprus be the determinant of their relations and a possible cause of war, is not very robust. The suspicions, particularly in Ankara, that Greeks will in the last analysis get together against Turks, whatever the temporary realism and reasonableness in Athens, is omnipresent. GOT will, we suspect, feel GOG should have done more to prevent this, and will expect more than is possible to remedy it. We doubt the better understanding about Cyprus will rupture because of arms transaction, but there seem likely to be some strains.

8. Finally, the core issue is whether Makarios has really improved his security situation. Once 2000 or whatever number of men he intends for special constabulary have been recruited and trained in use of these new weapons, the answer will probably be yes, whether one is considering a threat from Grivas and/or a dynamic solution push by Greece and Turkey. Until his new force has been created, however, Makarios' deterrent is an intense irritant that could have an effect opposite from that he intends.

9. We will comment in a separate message on what steps USG might take to minimize the potentially disruptive consequences, reviewed in foregoing, of Makarios' latest move, and to keep process of negotiation moving forward.²

Crawford

² Not found.

391. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 9, 1972, 1710Z.

722. Subj: Cyprus: Next Moves by Greek Government.

1. *Summary:* Greek Government has so far shown restraint, but Czech arms import, growth of Communist Party on Cyprus, and threat of Soviet involvement may be beginning tip scales in favor of some Greek initiative to protect its national interests in Cyprus. In such event Greece may make further attempt, either alone or in concert with Turkey, to induce Makarios to abandon his intransigent position on compromise solution. We should be prepared to put forward suggestions of our own in this context that will keep situation in path of negotiation. *End summary.*

2. Until now we have sought to avoid speculating on possible Greek moves once it concluded that situation in Cyprus was threatening important Greek interests. While Greek Government's relations with Makarios were precarious they were manageable, and a complementary feeling of good will between Greece and Turkey was slowly growing. Greek interests seemed temporarily best served by a continuation of intercommunal talks, even if prospects for reaching a solution through them were not great. Under those circumstances, attempting to determine what might cause change in Greek position and what action Greece might take as a result was highly speculative exercise indeed. Now, however, in wake of import of Czech arms by Makarios we consider time has come to offer some thoughts on how Greeks may assess their interests in Cyprus and what steps they could take. We caution, however, that our comments are based more on logic of situation than on evidence.

3. Cyprus at present time mainly important to Greece for negative reasons. While Papadopoulos could become national hero through successful union of island with mother country, risks are too great. Cyprus remains extremely important to Greece, however, because of (A) possibility of military conflict with Turkey over Cyprus; (B) effect of national crisis over Cyprus on tenure of present Greek regime; and (C) threat of Cyprus to Greece should it become center of Communist subversion and potential Soviet base.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27–CYP.

4. Any of these problems could be serious for Greece, the regime, and Papadopoulos personally. Until now, however, the Greek Government has shown considerable restraint in dealing with Cyprus. Dangers of taking initiative, whether in concert with Turkey or alone, have outweighed dangers of allowing Cyprus problem to remain unsolved. It is now beginning to appear, however, that scales may have come even or perhaps even tipped the other way. Thus, from point of view of its own national interests, Greece may decide that some action is better than allowing situation to continue to drift to point of possible no return.

5. Since past experience has demonstrated that Greece cannot reach an agreement with Makarios that is satisfactory to GOG nor can it coerce him into doing what it wants, the question will arise whether stronger pressures on Makarios could succeed.

6. Greek Government may soon reach conclusion that importation of Czech arms, (which they may fear for distribution to leftist and Communist elements supporting Archbishop), growing strength of AKEL, and possibility if not probability that situation will develop in such a way that Makarios will call for Soviet help are creating situation which Greece can only neutralize by inducing Archbishop to give in on compromise solution. In such event, following courses are open to GOG:

A. Arrange Makarios' removal from power, possibly to some other ecclesiastical position, and hope that ensuing confusion on Greek Cypriot side could be brought under control before it degenerated into chaos;

B. Reach an agreement with Turkey on the terms for an interim settlement and present Archbishop with form of ultimatum, while taking steps to prevent violent reaction by forces under his control;

C. Reach an understanding with General Grivas that Greek Government would not look unfavorably on a mounting campaign of intimidation against Cypriot Government, which would eventually so weaken Makarios' position that he would be forced either to resign or acquiesce in Greek proposals for intercommunal solution giving Turk Cypriot greater autonomy than he is now prepared to concede; and

D. Mount political action campaign to discredit Makarios with his own community and to build up prestige of alternative leadership, presumably Clerides, with expectation that—under a somewhat longer timetable—Archbishop could be forced out of office.

7. There are obviously variations and combinations of possibilities enumerated above. All are dangerous, and we strongly doubt that Greek Government would resort to any of them unless it concluded its interests seriously threatened by Makarios' policies and actions. We have no evidence that GOG has embarked on new campaign of pressure on Makarios, but possibility that it will feel obliged to do so is

becoming real. Question then arises what should U.S. do once evidence is in that Greeks are preparing to move.

8. If a situation such as we have described should develop, then we can assume that Greek Government has reached a very difficult and serious decision based on its own interests. Under these circumstances U.S. counsel of moderation, support for intercommunal talks, and expressions of concern that NATO allies may be drawn into conflict will no longer suffice.

9. We believe we should begin now to consider how we can work in conjunction with our NATO allies, Greece and Turkey, with British, and with UN to bring maximum influence to bear on Cyprus situation. We favor strong effort involve UN in custody of Czech arms and concerted effort to induce Greece and UK take more serious view of threat to peace on Cyprus from Grivas.

10. In addition, time has clearly come, as Nicosia has already suggested, for USG to do some serious contingency planning.² We would welcome Department comments, as well as those of Ankara and Nicosia.

Tasca

² See Document 390.

392. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB-315/01126-72

Washington, February 9, 1972.

COUNTRY

Cyprus/Greece

DOI

January–Early February, 1972

SUBJECT

Makarios' Views on the Current Internal Cyprus Situation

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 1292, Saunders Subject Files, Greece 1/1/72-4/30/72. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[1 line not declassified]

Summary: President Makarios feels that he has won the first round in what he considers to be the preliminary activity preparatory to a coup attempt against his government by the followers of retired Lieutenant General Georgios Grivas. Makarios bases his feeling on recent conversations which he has had with former Greek Ambassador, Constantinos Panayiotakos, with the Commanding General of the Cypriot National Guard, Lieutenant General Haralambos Haralambopoulos,² and on the reporting of the Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service (CIS). Given this, Makarios has outlined a program which he hopes will lead to a reduction of inter-island tension, while leaving no room for doubt by the Grivas' forces that he intends to deal them a death blow if given the opportunity. *End summary.*

1. President Makarios is confident that he has out-manuevered the forces of Lieutenant General Grivas, which the President believes are preparing a coup d'état. The President believes that the victory is only one round in what may become a bloody struggle, and that the victory was won essentially on the political front. He feels, nonetheless, that he has set back the planning and timing of the Grivas forces. The President's confident attitude is based on a number of considerations, but primary among them is the impression which he has gained through conversation with former Greek Ambassador, Constantinos Panayiotakos, and with National Guard Commander Haralambos Haralambopoulos. The President is not totally convinced of the sincerity of the Greek Government (GOG) but feels that there now exists a better atmosphere for the establishment of a basic understanding and cooperation between the GOG and the Cypriot Government (GOC). The President has been most concerned over the lack of cooperation between these governments and discussed the subject with Panayiotakos on 4 February. Panayiotakos stated that prior to his return to Athens to assume his position as Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, he wished to assure Makarios that the GOG was anxious for better relations with the President. To this end, Panayiotakos stated that incidents involving Greek officers at the time of the unloading of the Czech arms could

² These discussions were reported in Intelligence Information Cables TDCS DB 315/01167-72, February 10, and TDCS DB 315/01053-72, February 7. (Both Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate of Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables)

have been avoided had the President seen fit to inform Haralambopoulos of the arrival of the arms and had requested assistance for transportation and storage. ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment*: The Cypriot daily *Eleftheria* reported on 3 February that an unidentified Greek major had been arrested in the vicinity of the Mitsero Mines magazine area, where the arms were first stored. The article stated that the officer had refused to disclose his identity and was later released following representations by Haralambopoulos.) President Makarios replied that it had been impossible to inform Haralambopoulos, as he did not wish to include the Greek side in a matter as delicate as importation of arms. Makarios also recalled for Panayiotakos' edification, a September 1971 conversation which he had had with Haralambopoulos concerning Makarios' desire to import Eastern European arms. Based on this conversation, Makarios stated, he had felt that the GOG did not wish to be involved. ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment*: TDCS DB-315/01092-72³ [less than 1 line not declassified] reported the September 1971 conversation between Makarios and Haralambopoulos.) Makarios assured Panayiotakos that the arms were under his control and were intended for use only by the Cypriot security forces. During a second conversation with Panayiotakos, on 6 February 1972, Makarios received assurances that GOG would not allow Grivas to move against the President. In later conversation with Haralambopoulos, Makarios was told that the Greek forces in Cyprus (ELDYK) are in a position to cut short any move by Grivas against Makarios. ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment*: The assurances of Panayiotakos and Haralambopoulos have not given the President cause to rest any easier. The statements, to the contrary, lead him to believe that perhaps as he had suspected, the GOG has Grivas under its direct control, perhaps in an ELDYK camp. The important aspect of the exchanges is the fact that Makarios feels he may have Athens worried. The representations of Panayiotakos and Haralambopoulos, and the recently announced ten-day delay in Panayiotakos departure date from Cyprus reflect Athens' concern.) ([less than 1 line not declassified] *Comment*: Panayiotakos was scheduled to depart Cyprus for Athens on 9 February 1972.) Makarios thus feels that his decision to import arms from Czechoslovakia served notice to the followers of internal Cyprus affairs, that he is not going to be muscled into accepting a settlement to the Cypriot problem and, based on CIS reporting, he understands that the importation of Czech arms has both demoralized and confused the coup plotters.

³ Dated February 8, it provided background on the Cypriot purchase of Czech weapons. (Ibid.)

2. Given the position in which he now finds himself, Makarios has decided that the time is right to move for a relaxation of tension in the Greek-Cypriot community. To this end, Makarios has outlined a short-termed program which, he hopes, will have the desired effect in calming inter-island tensions, while not leading those who plot against him to believe that he has grown less resolute in his resolve to meet force with force. The program is intended also to clarify the GOC's position on the question of a settlement to the Cyprus problem, presenting Makarios as a leader of all the people of Cyprus. The program will take the following lines:

A. President Makarios will make a public statement dealing with internal conditions. He will outline the position of the government on the reconvening of intercommunal talks and cover the activities of the followers of General Grivas.

B. Government spokesmen will portray the internal situation as improving, while seizing on the reconvening of the intercommunal talks to focus public attention from recent events.

C. The GOC will attempt to enter into official exchanges with the GOG on GOC/GOG relations, with the hope of reaching agreement on a common approach to the solution to the Cyprus problem.

D. Measures will continue to be taken by Cyprus security forces against the activities of all illegal organizations. The police force will be strengthened by the addition of one thousand new recruits.

E. President of the House of Representatives and leader of the United Party, Glafkos Clerides, will undertake to unite the Cypriot rightwing under his leadership. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]* *Comment: TDCS DB-315/00596-72*⁴ *[less than 1 line not declassified]* reported that Clerides has refused the urging of representatives of rightwing groups to organize them under his leadership. Apparently Makarios now sees it in his interest to have Clerides attempt this union. An earlier, similar attempt was reportedly made by Makarios and Clerides.)

3. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

⁴ Not found.

393. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Rosemary Neaher of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 10, 1972.

SUBJECT

The Cyprus Situation

You have been reading in your brief of new elements of tension in Cyprus. We promised you a fuller picture. The situation is beginning to move more quickly; the following should bring you up to date.

The talks

The new and expanded intercommunal talks have been held up by haggling over their format. Turkey's final assent is expected soon, and talks could begin before the month is out unless present tensions prevent that.

The new talks would have a UN representative, a mainland Greek and a mainland Turk constitutional law expert join the Greek and Turk Cypriots. As you may recall, the genesis of this was in the meeting between the Greek (Palamas) and Turk (then Olcay) foreign ministers at the UNGA last fall. They agreed to add the mainland representatives, thereby creating a four-party format. U Thant insisted on the inclusion of a UN person in order to make the format sellable to Makarios who sees protection in a UN role. It is this five-party arrangement that has bounced around for several months.

The Greeks accepted outright and have said they will go along with any arrangement which would launch new talks. Makarios agonized at the thought of being pressured in new talks by mainland representatives; he sought assurances that the UN would indeed be involved and then stole the thunder from Turkey by promptly accepting. Turkey was left as the chief hold-out.

Turkey's problem is the inclusion of the UN representative. They feel this will undercut new pressure on Makarios injected by the mainland representatives. Recalling their problems with past special UN mediators, Turkey has insisted on clarifications from the Secretary General's special advisor on Cyprus that any UN representative not be a

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret. Sent for information. Sent through Haig who initialed it. Kissinger wrote the following notes on the first page: "Excellent paper" and "I want to be told before GOG is given any more advice. I am afraid our meddling will land us squarely in situation?"

“mediator” per se but be on hand with his “good offices” and that the mainland representatives be actively involved. Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken said this week that Turk needs on this score were on the point of being met and opined that talks could begin by the month’s end. Matters stand there.

This procedural debate has been lengthy, but even if talks now begin, there will be a long debate over the agenda. On the one hand, Makarios has made it clear he does not believe mainland representatives belong in talks between the local parties on the constitutional questions at stake, on which he believes he has already made maximum concessions to the Turk Cypriots. He is lobbying for broad discussion including the international aspects of the problem such as withdrawal of Turk mainland support. The Turks, on the other hand, are adamant that new talks zero in precisely on the constitutional stalemate; they want none of the past treaties (London-Zurich accords) or constitutional points already agreed upon undercut. Assuming progress at that level, they could envisage broadening the agenda at a later date.

The UN special representative who will be involved has been turning over possible new approaches to the talks beyond the simple reliance on the trading of position papers between the two locals which characterized the last phase. He is thinking of (a) trying to consolidate areas of common agreement from past talks and (b) talking about interim or permanent measures which would help the communities live together without confrontation in the current situation of de facto separation. State has also been developing some ideas on deconfrontation—mutual withdrawal by the two communities from lines of confrontation around the island—if there came a time when they might help the UN representative. Interest by the parties in deconfrontation has been evident but Ambassador Popper now feels the issue has been dealt a blow by the reports of Makarios’ new Czech arms.

Grivas

The clandestine re-appearance of General Grivas on Cyprus and the resulting war of nerves between him and Makarios has added a new element of tension.

To put this in perspective, Grivas was the famous pro-enosis and fanatical anti-communist Greek Cypriot who fought against the British in the mid-50s, almost hand in glove with Makarios’ struggle on the political level. With independence and the guarantees given to the Turk Cypriots he pressed on for enosis and became heavily involved in the terrorism of the sixties which twice brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war. Those events convinced Makarios and Greece to drop their campaign for enosis and turn to intercommunal talks. Grivas, anathema to the Turk Cypriots and to Makarios by them as a political

rival, was moved to confinement in Greece where he remained until his "escape" last fall.

A number of factors have made Makarios certain if not all but sure that Greece is behind the plot. We do not really know.

For one thing, Grivas' escape came shortly after Makarios' resistance to Greek pressure last summer to be more forthcoming in the talks, immediately before the Olcay/Palamas talks in New York. These facts against a backdrop of increasing Greco-Turk consultation on the Cyprus problem have led the Archbishop to suspect a plot against him unless he reaches a compromise, presumably satisfactory to the Turk Cypriots. The alternative would be to risk confrontation with Grivas leading to enosis and, again assuming Greco-Turkish dialogue, satisfactory results for the Turk Cypriots, i.e. double enosis or partition.

In reaction, Makarios has stiffened in the face of a threat. As you know, he has clandestinely imported sizeable quantities of Czech arms almost certainly for the arming of a private police force outside the Greek-controlled National Guard.

The introduction of these new arms has sparked reactions in Turkey and Greece. Whether these flow from the fact that they have been involved in the Grivas episode with the idea of precipitating double enosis or whether they view it as a further eroding factor for the new talks, the issue is that our allies are once again concerned enough about Cyprus perhaps to be moving toward some drastic step which would confront us with difficult choices.

Greek-Turk Relations and the New Situation

On the one hand, Greece and Turkey have recently embarked upon a new period of cooperation over Cyprus. Both sides have privately and publicly insisted that Cyprus not become an issue between them and both shared the initiative in reviving the intercommunal talks as the best framework for solution. It has been their reasonableness which has kept negotiations over procedures for the talks from breaking down. The US has encouraged these efforts.

On top of this cooperation, we have had reports that officials on both sides continue to talk about a so-called "dynamic" solution ending in double enosis (partition) as the best way out. Ambassador Popper hears this not only from Turks and Turk Cypriots but also from mainland Greeks and elements of the Greek-Cypriot establishment.

Makarios' recent importation of arms has upset both Greece and Turkey and reopened the possibility of a solution imposed on Cyprus by the two of them.

—The Turks have gone on record to express their grave concern and to indicate privately that they may have to ship new arms to their community. The Greeks are aware of this. We also have a reliable

report that in its dialogue with Greece, Turkey has indicated that Makarios must go.

—Palamas has told Tasca Greece is urging Turkey to keep cool while it tries to deal with the situation. He also implied that Makarios was the obstacle. Tasca gained the impression Greece would like to see him replaced.² Greece plans on the following steps:

—Makarios will be told tomorrow that he must turn the Czech arms over to UNFICYP control and that he must form a government of “national unity” (presumably involvement of the Turk Cypriots) in Cyprus.

—If Makarios refuses, the GOG will make its demands public and will also inform the UN and UK.

—Greece does not want violence nor will it make use of Grivas but if Makarios resists, the GOG will take its case directly to the Greek Cypriot people.

—If Makarios refuses to form a government acceptable to Greece and is backed by Greek Cypriots, then Greece may withdraw from the island.

Ambassador Tasca, who has already expressed hope to the GOG that they are not entertaining the thought of a “dynamic” solution, has now told Palamas he believes that the GOG plan is highly dangerous given the support Makarios has among Greek Cypriots.³

To buy time, State—with our clearance—has instructed Tasca to make the following points to Papadopoulos: The GOG scenario may have the effect of consolidating support behind Makarios and impelling him towards Soviet support. All diplomatic options to resolve the Czech arms problem should be exhausted. One course could be a GOG–GOT démarche to the UNSYG which the US is prepared to support and would ask the UK, Canada and others to make parallel approaches to the UN. At a minimum, the US hopes that Greece will hold off with its scenario to permit discussions among the NATO allies.⁴

Meanwhile, a Greek Cypriot official has told Ambassador Popper that Makarios had acquired the arms because of overwhelming evidence of Greek complicity in Grivas’ movement to precipitate double enosis. He maintained that Makarios had every right to defend himself and his regime and urged the US to help stop Greece from talking about a political settlement on the one hand while conspiring with Grivas on the other. He did suggest that there could be a trade-off of the Czech arms for a return of Grivas to Greece and urged the US to play

² Reported in telegram 690 from Athens, February 8. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP)

³ Reported in telegram 742 from Athens, February 10. (Ibid.)

⁴ See footnote 2, Document 394.

a role in working this out. But he also said it is obvious to Cyprus that the Greeks are using the arms pretext as a first step toward partition in collusion with Turkey; he believes it would never work and would only set Greece and Turkey against each other.⁵

The Situations the US May Face

We have traditionally maintained that the intercommunal talks best address the US interest in defusing tensions on Cyprus and hence tensions between Greece and Turkey. We have taken a position of supporting Cypriot independence, and we have cultivated a relationship with Makarios in that context.

The situation we now face is one of apparent increased Greek and Turkish interest in imposing a solution regardless of the fate of Makarios, or possibly even regardless of the independence of Cyprus. At the very least it seems that Greece and Turkey may have agreed that (a) Makarios must settle this problem in a way satisfactory to the Turks and Greeks (a national unity government which could mean either Turk Cypriot participation in it or, a step further, partition) or (b) Makarios must go. In short, if Greece and Turkey are determined to force a situation which would violate Makarios' view of a unitary independent state, or, further, partition Cyprus, the US will face difficult choices between the wishes of our allies and our established opposition to dismemberment of UN members.

The following are the situations we may face and the principal implications:

Situation 1: There remains a chance simply to diffuse the tensions created by the arms issue. This could come about if we could focus attention on the tensions raised by the arms problem and get everyone back on the track towards resuming talks and forgetting any dynamic overall solution now. Our instructions to Ambassador Tasca to urge the GOG to hold off on its ultimatum to Makarios and concentrate instead on exhausting diplomatic options to resolve the arms problem are one step in this direction. The suggestion has also been made on Cyprus that a trade-off to diffuse tensions be arranged by returning Grivas to Greece in exchange for Czech arms being turned over to UNFICYP. The Cypriots have asked us to become involved in working this out with the Greeks.

Implications: The US definitely has an interest in isolation of the arms issue and getting on with the talks. However, it is much less clear that we want to be in the middle in a dispute within the Greek-Greek

⁵ Reported in telegram 281 from Nicosia, February 10. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

Cypriot community. If we tried to negotiate the return of Grivas to Greece, we would have to take into account that Greece may well be taking advantage of Grivas' presence on Cyprus to pressure Makarios and may not want such a trade-off. [Intelligence reports suggest that the Greeks may even have Grivas in one of the Greek Cypriot National Guard camps—for release at the proper moment.]⁶ Athens has already tried privately to force Makarios on the arms question and has now surfaced its proposal to issue an ultimatum to him. We would have a question whether:

—we want to pressure Athens off a course it may have already decided on;

—we want to line up with an initiative on trade-off that essentially meets Makarios needs but may not do much to produce his flexibility in the talks;

—we want at all costs to see the talks resumed even though Greece and Turkey are fed up with Makarios.

The argument for involving ourselves is that this may be far easier than dealing with either of the two situations that follow.

Situation 2: The Greeks go ahead and issue their ultimatum to Makarios to conform or step down; he resists, rallies his people against external pressure and perhaps takes his case to the UN. The assumption here is that the Greeks take a strong stand hoping Makarios will acquiesce but waver before following their strategy through to the conclusion of quickly deposing Makarios.

The main *implication* here would be that the US would be caught between Makarios' call for support in the face of external pressure and Athens' defense that it is attempting to solve a problem as it sees fit. Makarios would get Soviet and perhaps Chinese support (their position is that the local parties solve their own problem) at the UN. The US would be allied with Greek and Turkish intervention. This situation would be the worst of two worlds. It would not involve decisive enough action to solve the problem and it would generate worldwide pressure on us to pull the Greeks and Turks off. Whereas there is a theoretical option of acquiescing in a decisive Greek move, the proposed Greek action of issuing an ultimatum and waiting for reaction seems doomed to failure.

Situation 3: Greece and Turkey have already decided to cooperate in a dynamic solution to impose a solution or partition Cyprus. They are beyond backing off from this course, actively engaged in deposing Makarios and installing a new Cypriot government.

This would put us squarely between our interests in having Greece and Turkey resolve the issue to the benefit of good relations between

⁶ Brackets in the original.

them and in not seeing intervention in or dismemberment of Cyprus by our two NATO allies. The US in the least would be faced with weathering the storm of intervention on Cyprus by NATO allies who would justify their moves as guarantor powers of the London-Zurich accords or worse, face a situation of partition or double enosis in opposition to our principle of not endorsing the dismemberment of UN nations. If there is to be action, however, this would be better than some indecisive intermediate step. The additional argument against acquiescing in any such move is that it stands a good chance of failing.

In Conclusion

This memo is intended simply to provide background on steps taken to date and a framework within which to think about where events might go from here. If this heats up any more, it may be necessary to call a WSAG meeting.

394. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 10, 1972, 2321Z.

750. Ref: State 023559.² For Secretary from Ambassador Tasca.

1. On receipt your message I immediately sought interview with Prime Minister, explaining that despite late hour I had important message from Secretary which could not wait until morning. Few minutes later I received answer that PM in bed, not well, and could not see me before morning. I replied that unfortunately this not good enough. Washington taking very seriously question of note to Makarios, which in fact constituted ultimatum. It essential I be able to discuss this problem with PM.

2. Prime Minister's private secretary and interpreter, who closest confidant, shortly called back to say PM could see me at 0830 tomor-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia and Ankara. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.

² Dated February 10, 1950Z, it instructed Tasca to call on Papadopoulos and urge him to use all diplomatic channels to find a solution to the Czech arms crisis. At a minimum, Tasca should request that Greek action be postponed to allow for discussion with the United States and the NATO allies. (*Ibid.*)

row morning (February 11). I said I wanted to know for certain that this would allow time for me fully to discuss problem before Panayotakos carried out his instructions. Reply to this message was that PM could not meet me before 0830 tomorrow.

3. In course of passing my messages to PM I got through to Papadopoulos content of your message, and there no question but what he fully aware our position. I will deliver your message in person to him at 0830 tomorrow, which should give PM time to change Panayotakos' instructions, if he is willing to do so.

4. British Ambassador has just called me (0120) to say he has received instructions to take same position as US with GOG and was seeking to do so.

Tasca

395. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 11, 1972, 1000Z.

288. Subject: Czech Arms.

1. Panayotacos is with the Archbishop now. Call began at 1000 hours local (0800 GMT).

2. From here it seems patent that Czech arms transaction is only a pretext for achievement of a long held GOG (Papadopoulos) desire to unseat Makarios. It looks very much as if Greece has set the wheels in motion and is unlikely to be talked out of its plans. Full picture is not yet in, but it would seem that National Guard units loyal to Greece are being positioned to take over key installations in Nicosia on signal. We assume the signal will come sooner rather than later. GOG must realize that delay will give Makarios more time to marshal his physical and diplomatic defense.

3. As a matter of naked power—which it was said it will not use—Greece may be able to pull this off. If Greece intends to use the National Guard for this purpose, is not really counting on mass support and is willing take the international onus, it can probably seize

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Athens, Ankara, USUN, London, and USNATO. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 12–5 CZECH.

control of the Presidential Palace and other vital Govt installations. But if this is not its intent, its planning is based on some incredibly bad estimates. Two comments made by Palamas to Amb Tasca stand out.²

4. Palamas quotes Panayotacos as being “quite certain Greek Cypriots would choose Greece over Makarios.” If we are talking in terms of popular will rather than recourse to violence that is ridiculous. The feeling for Hellenism is strong here, but the junta is held in low esteem and the admiration which Greek Cypriots have for Makarios would, if translated into votes, turn any Western democratic politician green with envy.

5. Palamas’ other statement which seems baseless is that because of Czech arms deal Makarios is in a weak position to appeal to UN. To us the case seems to be quite the contrary. Makarios should not be hard put to demonstrate that arms were imported to counter a conspiracy aided and abetted by Govt of Greece. In a Security Council context we think he would find many supporters, not the least the Soviets. We would not be surprised to see Soviet Amb Barkovsky be Makarios’ next caller after Panayotacos.

Crawford

² See footnote 2, Document 393.

396. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 11, 1972, 1121Z.

762. Subj: Cyprus: Meeting with Prime Minister on Delivery of Greek Note to Makarios. Ref: Athens 760; State 023559.²

1. I called on Prime Minister this morning at 0830, in accordance with appointment we arranged last evening. I went over Secretary’s message with Papadopoulos point by point. Under point (C) I ex-

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Ankara, USUN, USNATO, and London. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.

² Telegram 760 from Athens, February 11, 1020Z provided a summary of Tasca’s discussion with Papadopoulos. (*Ibid.*) Telegram 23559 is summarized in footnote 2, Document 394.

plained why we viewed Greek initiative as potentially highly dangerous, pointing out again, as I told him I had pointed out on other occasions to Palamas, options open to Makarios in reacting to any pressure. I presented point (D) by stating that an indication of how seriously the U.S. felt about issue of Czech arms was not only our view on desirability that all diplomatic possibilities be exhausted, but that we prepared to make all-out effort to see that such diplomatic possibilities for settling the issue had the maximum chance of success.

2. Prime Minister then made lengthy statement of his position on problem which he introduced by asking what it was that made U.S. consider Greek initiative highly dangerous. I gave him possible scenario of what could happen if Makarios felt undue pressure were being placed upon him, referring as I developed the scenario to statements made by Palamas supporting our fears that events might actually develop in this way. I mentioned publication of letter, possible demonstrations of support for Makarios, reaction by Grivas, possibility of violence, and prospect of Security Council being quickly drawn in where Makarios would have friends strongly supporting his position against Greek Government's unbearable pressures upon him. I then gave PM my own personal estimate that China and Soviets and many countries of Third World would support Makarios against efforts of the Greek Government to put him in extreme difficulty.

3. Prime Minister, after this explanation, said he was surprised by our characterization of Greek action program as "highly dangerous," and he was surprised by U.S. position on Greek program. He said facts were that Makarios bought arms to give to the Communists in Cyprus because they were solidly backing his policies with Lyssarides' men, and it certain that bloodshed would ensue. Greek Government not only one of the forces for guaranteeing peace on island but is also government of country with blood relationship to Cypriots. Greek Cypriots are also Greeks. It is an historic fact that Hellenism has been cursed by civil war and fratricide. It historical necessity to find as soon as possible peaceful way of dealing with situation and to find most appropriate measures to avert clear dangers which could ensue. This action program had been very carefully studied and cannot be taken as action by one government interfering in internal affairs of another government.

4. Prime Minister said letter, which would be delivered at 1000 this morning to Makarios, is a statement, a kind of announcement, to Cypriot Government urging them to deliver Czech arms to the United Nations and also then urging them to undertake actions within their Government which would restore national unity. This action could be whatever ways and means Cypriot Government feels would be best, and only very very delicately is it implied and hinted that one of the means for restoring national government would be reshuffle of Cypriot

Government. No mention whatever made of Makarios having a major or minor role in it. The only mention of government is that it should be composed of men of great integrity and trust.

5. Prime Minister added: "If this action is considered as a highly dangerous one, I just wonder what action wouldn't be? Would you rather we left the field to the Turks and allowed them to carry out their threat of sending arms in turn to Turkish Cypriots, which they will probably do at the time of rotation of Turkish contingent, which would encourage highly dangerous situation?" To back his certainty that Ankara considering sending arms to Cyprus, he quoted from report of conversation between American Ambassador in Ankara and Greek Ambassador there, who had spoken to officials of Turkish Government. American Ambassador had said that Foreign Minister Bayulken told him that GOT was considering restoring balance which had been upset by sending arms to Turkish Cypriot community. Turkish Ambassador to Washington had said much the same. Prime Minister added that contacts of American officials in Ankara show that Turks not intending to take hasty action, and in any event no action in the immediate future. However, Turkish Ministry of Defense appears far more worried about issue of Czech arms than Turkish Foreign Ministry.

6. With this picture in mind and with logic and sequence of his views expressed briefly, and with real surprise at characterization given to GOG action program as "highly dangerous," he felt obliged to state that Greek Government feels "national imperative to keep same stand regarding letter which will be delivered at 10 o'clock today." However, Prime Minister said letter would not be made public today or tomorrow, February 11 or 12. He hopes that within next 24 hours U.S. will do its best to urge and convince Makarios to hand over arms.

7. In response I expressed my deep regret to Papadopoulos that he did not see fit to postpone sending letter, until we could have further opportunity for discussion. He said he would be pleased to discuss matter further, perhaps even later today. I said I thought this would be most useful.³ I asked him whether I could report to my government that he fully supported principle in para (D) on the desirability of exhausting all diplomatic possibilities. His answer was "most certainly." Finally, I asked him if we could have copy of letter. He said he would send a copy to me later in morning after letter had been delivered to Makarios.⁴

Tasca

³ No record of a subsequent meeting was found.

⁴ Telegram 772 from Athens, February 11, 1324Z, contained the text in addition to an Embassy commentary. (Ibid.)

397. Memorandum From Harold Saunders and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹

Washington, February 11, 1972.

SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting on Cyprus—February 11

The Situation

The *view from Athens*: Papadopoulos has set the wheels in motion for a squeeze play against Makarios and seems determined to follow through. He turned down flatly our request that he at least delay presenting his ultimatum on the grounds that it was a "national imperative."² In Nicosia there is evidence the Greek Cypriot National Guard units loyal to Greece are being positioned to take over key installations and it is assumed that the signal to do so will "come sooner rather than later."

The *view from Nicosia* is that if Greece really intends to move with the National Guard, is not really counting on popular support and is willing to take the international onus, it can probably seize control of the Presidential Palace and other vital government installations. But if this is not its intent and it is depending on popular support, its planning is based on some "incredibly bad estimates." Ambassador Popper points out that contrary to the apparent Greek view, the Greek government is held in low esteem in Cyprus and Makarios has strong public support.³ Most observers believe that Makarios will turn down the Greek ultimatum, thus forcing the crisis to a head.

The *view from Ankara* is that the Turks are upset about the situation, especially the importation of more arms in the Greek Cypriot community, but for the moment at least intend to let the Greeks settle their own problems. They are treating the whole affair in unusually low key and say they will try to leave the whole matter to the parties directly concerned as long as the security of the Turk Cypriot community is not threatened. From all indications the Turks and Greeks have been in close communication as the crisis has developed and it is just possible that there is more collusion than we know.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-084, Senior WSAG Meeting Cyprus, 2/11/72. The tabs and appendixes to the memorandum are attached but not printed.

² See Document 396.

³ See Document 395.

The Issue

The issue in the Cyprus question arises from two factors:

—The government in Athens appears to have decided to make a major effort to change the character of the Cypriot government or even to force Makarios to resign. They feel they are in a position to do this by use of the military on the ground—the Greek Cypriot national guard and the terrorist forces responsive to General Grivas. Such a change would, in Athens' eyes, be a prelude to a Cyprus settlement along one of two lines: (a) it could presage formation of a cabinet which would be more flexible than Makarios has been in negotiating a settlement with the Turkish community; or (b) it could be a prelude to partition of the island between Greece and Turkey. In the first case, the independence of Cyprus would be preserved; in the second, Cyprus would cease to exist as an independent nation.

—As this Greek plan moves ahead, the following elements will come into play: If Makarios is still free, he will turn to the international community in the UN Security Council and ask for protection against an attack on the integrity of his state. If he is jailed, the Soviets or some third-world power may take the case to the UN. In either case, the Soviets will back Cyprus in the UN and might conceivably even use Soviet naval forces to intimidate Greece. The US could then be called on to defend a NATO ally against this kind of Soviet threat. At the same time, NATO opinion and much opinion in the US Congress—which are already unfriendly to the government in Athens—would stand against the Greek action. While the Turks would probably remain silent on the Greek effort to achieve a Cyprus solution, they would be concerned by the Soviet involvement.

This collection of elements explains why US policy has been to try to push a Cyprus solution ahead of us rather than supporting dramatic solutions. For this reason, we have supported intercommunal talks between the Greeks and Turkish Cypriot communities. We knew that a solution which the Turks could accept was unlikely to come out of those talks but feeling that the talks could help to avert violence and keep open the door to an ultimate settlement. Coupled with these slow talks, we have recently thought about introducing the idea of steps toward deconfrontation between the two communities on the island in order to reduce the possibilities of violence there and permit the island to lead a more normal life.

Against this background, the principal issue now is whether the US is to confront the government of Greece to back away from following the course on which it has embarked to its logical conclusion, the forceable removal of Makarios. The vehicle for a way out could lie in an arrangement which would have Makarios turn over the arms he has acquired to the UN while the Greeks take General Grivas off the island and remove the military threat to Makarios.

The issues to be discussed at the WSAG, therefore, are whether we get into that kind of confrontation with the Greeks, and, if not, how we might handle the problem that we would then be faced with and may be faced with in any case.

Your *talking points* (at tab) cover the options that follow from the above.

Also included in this book are:

—“*Situation and Cables.*” The latest CIA sitrep as it becomes available and key cables.

—“*Background Paper.*” This is the general paper you read last night.

—“*Contingency Papers.*” These are general papers prepared for your last SRG meeting on Cyprus. At this tab is a guide to the relevant portions.

398. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 11, 1972, 2:34–3:14 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPATION

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. John N. Irwin, II

Mr. Joseph Sisco

Mr. Thomas Boyatt

Mr. Martin Herz

Defense

Mr. G. Warren Nutter

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

CIA

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

Mr. John Waller

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-084, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

NSC

Gen. Alexander M. Haig

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Harold H. Saunders

Mr. Mark Wandler

It was agreed that:

—We would send a cable to our Embassies in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, giving our analysis of the situation and asking for their views.²

—We will not take any actions during the next 24 hours.

—Ambassador Tasca will use his meeting with Prime Minister Papadopoulos as a listening exercise.³

Dr. Kissinger: What's the problem?

Mr. Karamessines: I can give you a brief rundown on what's been happening, although it has been slightly overtaken by events. We also have two Embassy cables which just came in.⁴ Do you want to start with the briefing or the cables?

Mr. Sisco: Let me go first because I have the cables, and they give us the most up-to-date information. Essentially, the Greek Government has given Makarios an ultimatum—and I don't think it is inaccurate to describe it as an ultimatum—which is composed of two elements. First, the Greeks want Makarios to place the arms which he just received on a secret basis from Czechoslovakia under UN control. Second, they want to see a new government in Cyprus, a government of national unity without Makarios. I think the Greeks are using the Czech arms issue to bring about a new Cypriot government which will be more responsive to Athens.

Dr. Kissinger: Why are the Greeks doing this now?

Mr. Sisco: Primarily, I think, because the arms issue has given them a pretext. I am also sure that Greece and Turkey have talked about this situation, and I feel—although I am waiting for Tom [Karamessines]⁵ to provide the evidence—that there has been a certain amount of collusion.

Mr. Karamessines: You are right, Joe. The Turks have indicated that the Greeks have talked with them. Turkey has agreed to stand by for the moment.

Mr. Sisco: Last night we cleared a cable with you, Henry, setting out the line that Tasca [U.S. Ambassador to Greece] has already

² Document 399.

³ As instructed in telegram 25233 to Athens, Ankara, Nicosia, USUN, and Moscow, February 12. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

⁴ Telegrams 760 and 762 from Athens; see Document 396 and footnote 2 thereto.

⁵ All brackets in the original.

taken.⁶ Tasca pointed out to the Greeks that their move could be dangerous and that it could precipitate a crisis. He asked them to hold off giving the ultimatum to Makarios. The Greeks came back today, saying they were going ahead with it.⁷

Dr. Kissinger: What is the deadline? How much time are the Greeks giving Makarios?

Mr. Sisco: There is no deadline. They don't say they are giving Makarios 24 or 48 hours.

Adm. Moorer: They just say "after a new government is formed."

Mr. Sisco: The latest cable we have says that Makarios rejected the ultimatum.⁸

Dr. Kissinger: Yes. I saw the cable.

Mr. Sisco: Let me give you my analysis. Makarios has hinted, through his Under Secretary, that if the U.S. offers its good offices, he would consider making a deal. He would turn the arms over to the UN in return for General Grivas leaving the island.

Dr. Kissinger: What kind of arms did he get from Czechoslovakia?

Mr. Karamessines: He received enough light and medium weapons—including ammunition—to equip 2,000 men. We estimate that the total deal is worth \$1.3 million. About 6,500 crates were delivered, and approximately two-thirds of them contained ammunition.

Dr. Kissinger: How did Makarios do it? What are our choices?

Mr. Sisco: First I think we should see what we can do to encourage the UN—with a new Secretary General—to play a role of good offices. Or we can play the role of good offices ourselves. The Cypriots will pull out their Russian support very early in the game. We should expect the Russians to give a good deal of support to Makarios, and we can also expect the Chinese to take a position parallel to that of the Soviets.

I guess that if there is no quiet diplomatic process underway to tone down the situation, the Cypriots are likely to take the problem to the Security Council—where they will try to prove that Greece is dismembering Cyprus. They will try to get all countries committed to an independent Cyprus. We will probably be under pressure from Greece and Turkey to give them support. The public attitude will probably be that Greece is trying to change the government of Cyprus.

From the point of view of domestic politics in the U.S., it will be easy to draw an analogy between Greece vis-à-vis Cyprus and India vis-à-vis Bangladesh. Critics will say, for example, that we tried to get

⁶ Reference is to telegram 23559 to Athens, February 11; see footnote 2, Document 394.

⁷ See Document 396.

⁸ Not further identified.

India because of Bangladesh, and they will say we are responsible for the dirty colonels in the Greek Government.

Dr. Kissinger: You can follow the Bangladesh model very well.

Mr. Sisco: I was just trying to draw the analogy. You know, it's very tempting to make the argument that we should just stand by now and do nothing. It's tempting to say we should let Greece do what it wants—and if that means that Makarios falls, so be it. Makarios has been a thorn in the side of all concerned parties, anyway. If Greece pulls off a *fait accompli*, there probably won't be many tears shed.

But, of course, everything is not so simple. Early on in the game, this whole situation will be put into a U.S.-Soviet framework, a free world-communist framework, a neutral-NATO framework.

Dr. Kissinger: When will that happen?

Mr. Sisco: It has already started, Henry. And it will move even faster. I think we have only two real alternatives. We can go with the good offices of Waldheim and the UN or we can go with American good offices. If you want, I can lay out the pros and cons of both approaches for you.

Mr. Karamessines: There is one other factor I would like to mention at this point. As you probably know, the intercommunal talks are due to resume, under a new formula, in late February. (to Dr. Kissinger) You were asking before why the Greeks are moving now. The Czech arms issue is one reason. It is also a fact that both Greece and Turkey have compatible systems of government now. It may be that the Greeks want to move before the new talks start. Otherwise, actions taken after the talks begin would look worse than they do now.

There is one other thing. Makarios may be prepared to turn over the arms to the UN. But I understand there may be periodic UN inspections. How would he react to that?

Mr. Sisco: We can be flexible. It's not a great problem. We must remember that this situation can lead to a war, even viewed in the context of the Peking trip.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would be fighting? I thought Greece and Turkey were in agreement.

Mr. Sisco: Let's say Makarios turns down the ultimatum. There have been hints from Greece that they would pull out and let Grivas go at Makarios. There could then be Turkish intervention. This would then mean that Greek forces could go in.

Dr. Kissinger: They can't pull out and then go back in.

Mr. Sisco: When the Greeks talk about pulling out, they are referring to their officers in the National Guard.

Dr. Kissinger: How would it be possible to have a scenario like this if the Greeks and Turks agree?

Mr. Sisco: One way it could come about would be if the Soviets did some saber-rattling and if the Turkish Government backed Cyprus, against another NATO member trying to dismember Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Greece and Turkey presumably would not move in. Presumably, the Greek National Guard and Grivas would go after Makarios. Isn't that right?

Mr. Sisco: In my judgment, that may be the first round. There are different points of view, though, about which side has the most popular support. There are different points of view, too, about the loyalty of the National Guard—and to which side it is loyal.

If Grivas is unleashed, the Turkish minorities in many areas will be attacked by Greek Cypriots. Where the Turkish minorities are concentrated, they will hit Grivas. Grivas doesn't have more than a couple of hundred men. He is banking on a strategy of mass support. Does he have this support? That is a difficult judgment to make. If Grivas is unleashed, how long will it be before Greece and Turkey intervene to finish the job?

Mr. Karamessines: I don't think there is any danger of this becoming an international war. After all, Greece and Turkey are in cahoots.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't it better that they are in cahoots?

Mr. Karamessines: I'm not so sure about that. The Greeks have the firepower to seize the situation if they want to. There is a big question, though, about whether the population will be content with this type of a solution.

Dr. Kissinger: If it is such a big question, why would the Greeks attempt to do it?

Mr. Sisco: They are trying to remove Makarios, within the concept of a unified Cypriot Government. If it doesn't work, there is a possibility of getting direct Greek and Turkish intervention. That would result in enosis, a carving up of Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Why do we care about that? It wouldn't be a great disaster.

Mr. Sisco: I basically agree with you.

Mr. Irwin: The danger, I think, is a possible Soviet involvement.

Dr. Kissinger: The real danger is a protracted civil war, essentially a guerrilla war, in Cyprus. If the problem can be solved in 24 hours, though, why would it bother us?

Mr. Sisco: Because it will be presented as NATO aggression directed against a neutral country.

Dr. Kissinger: I think we have two problems. The first is what will happen, and the second is how it will be presented. If we have a fast-moving situation, that will present one set of problems. If it is a

prolonged situation, developing over a period of weeks, we will have another set of problems. What is our expectation?

Mr. Sisco: My guess is that we will have a prolonged problem.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) Jack, what do you think?

Mr. Irwin: One issue we have to consider is what the Soviet interest is in all of this. What did they [the Soviets] do the last time?

Mr. Sisco: We never really knew what they were willing to do because our good offices brought about a political solution.

Dr. Kissinger: Weren't our good offices used after the civil war started?

Mr. Sisco: That was in the first round. The second round was different. Makarios upset the status quo, but there was no actual Turkish intervention.

Dr. Kissinger: What year was that?

Mr. Sisco: 1967–1968.

Dr. Kissinger: Isn't that when Vance went out there?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. I don't think the Soviets are anxious to get involved to the extent that they would have to supply forces. My guess is they would provide a lot of political support. There are, as you probably know, a number of communist elements in Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, are you leaning to the good offices of the UN or the U.S.?

Mr. Sisco: I'm leaning first to the UN, mainly because they have a new Secretary General and because there are a lot of lumps to be taken. I think we should lean in the direction of the UN, but I also think we should keep open the option of our providing good offices—if all three parties want us to play a role. We have prepared a cable—and I will send it to you for clearance in an hour or so—giving a brief analysis of the situation and asking the Embassies for their views.⁹

Dr. Kissinger: Who is the cable for?

Mr. Sisco: Our Ambassadors in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. If you want, we can add some guidance for Tasca to use in his meeting with Papadopoulos tomorrow morning. I think Tasca can simply use tomorrow's meeting as a listening exercise.

Dr. Kissinger: Leaving aside for the moment who should undertake the role of good offices, we should decide (1) whether it is in our interest to get involved and (2) if it is in our interest to get involved, when should we do so? Should we do it now, or should we wait to see other reactions? Suppose your predictions come true and Makarios

⁹ Document 399.

goes to the UN after he rejects the ultimatum. Then we would not have to yell at Greece and Turkey. If he does go to the UN, I assume our stance would be not to egg him on.

Mr. Sisco: That's right. I suggest we follow for the moment a waiting strategy. In the meantime, we should establish a dialogue with our Embassies. Tasca is not doing anything. When we first heard about the problem, we told him to do nothing.

Dr. Kissinger: Who are our Ambassadors in Turkey and Cyprus?

Mr. Sisco: Handley is in Turkey and Popper is in Cyprus. All three Ambassadors are very competent.

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, they are. But Tasca gets excited.

Mr. Sisco: I suggest that we listen to Papadopoulos tomorrow. Maybe Greece is right. Maybe they can pull off a fait accompli.

Dr. Kissinger: Can we keep the Ambassadors calm?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Mr. Karamessines: It's possible Greece may react quickly to Makarios' rejection and send in its forces.

Dr. Kissinger: So what?

Mr. Karamessines: Nothing. I just mention it because I think we ought to take it into account.

Mr. Sisco: We do need some indicators from CIA because the intelligence I have says that the Turks could intervene—with paratroopers—within 24 hours. In order to send troops over by ship, they would need 72 hours. I think Tom should supply us with the latest military indicators.

Dr. Kissinger: What are we trying to prevent? Is it in the U.S. interest to take action to prevent a quick solution to a problem—even though we don't like the solution? Is it in the U.S. interest to prevent a long drawn out situation from developing and which may involve other countries? I think the answer to the latter question is yes. The mere fact that Greece and Turkey agree on the solution is not in itself conclusive, although I think we should discuss it. We don't want a protracted civil war, with outside forces involved. That would be a repetition of the India-Pakistan problem in Cyprus.

Mr. Nutter: If Greece and Turkey are working together, how long will it take them to get a military solution?

Mr. Karamessines: The Czech arms just arrived, and Turkey said it would stand by. Therefore, the Greeks can take over promptly if they want. Popular support, though, would be an iffy thing. A fair percentage of the people—about half—are committed to Makarios. After the initial shooting is over, these people might constitute a large base for guerrilla war. This is something we shouldn't ignore.

Dr. Kissinger: Therefore?

Mr. Karamessines: I was just trying to point out that the Greek forces would probably have no great difficulty in taking over once they decide to make the move.

Dr. Kissinger: I think Joe's proposal is reasonable. (to Mr. Sisco) Can we see the cable?

Mr. Sisco: Sure. Do you agree that Tasca should just listen to Papadopoulos tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: Yes, if he can do it. Is there anything else we have to consider?

Mr. Boyatt: Even if Greek forces can take over in 24 hours, Makarios could still go the Security Council and start a debate.

Dr. Kissinger: Why is the U.S. protecting Makarios against Greece and Turkey at such an early stage of the game? I have nothing for or against Makarios, but the implication of everything you are all saying is that we should be protecting him. Why?

Mr. Saunders: We have to think about what we would do if the issue is taken to the Security Council.

Dr. Kissinger: What do the British think about this whole thing?

Mr. Sisco: We talked to them, and they made the same points to the Greeks that we did—mainly that the Greeks were making a "dangerous" move.

Mr. Herz: We will have a bad time at the UN getting the seven blocking votes we would need to prevent a vote of condemnation against Greece.

Dr. Kissinger: How do we know that's what we want to do?

Mr. Irwin: I suggested that we not do anything during the next 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: If Makarios is overthrown it will be a different situation in the Security Council than if he is still in power. The question is do we want to get involved now?

Mr. Sisco: I wouldn't put the question in terms of getting involved now. I would say that we should proceed with caution. I don't know if we want to get involved at all.

Dr. Kissinger: I agree.

Adm. Moorer: It seems to me that for the first time Greece and Turkey are working together—and now we are unhappy about that.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) I remember, Joe, last spring you were saying if we could only get Greece and Turkey to work together at the UN. That's been done—and the two of them are now working against Makarios. Does everyone agree that the first thing we have to do is get the information from our Embassies?

All Agreed.

Mr. Irwin: We should also wait to see what happens during the next 24 hours.

Dr. Kissinger: That's right. The situation may not play out at all the way we expect it to.

Mr. Irwin: Will we have a meeting tomorrow?

Dr. Kissinger: We may. In any case, I want to talk to the President. (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, you will send over the cable?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: Okay. We are tilting towards sending out the cable.

399. Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassies in Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey, and the Mission to the United Nations¹

Washington, February 12, 1972, 2307Z.

Tosec 23/25316. Please pass Secretary Rogers at Key Biscayne. For Ambassadors Tasca, Handley, Popper and Phillips.

1. We have reviewed the situation once again and will continue to do so on a day-to-day basis.

2. We share fully GOG/GOT concern at Czech arms importations and support them in the move already made by them to the UN to get arms under effective UN control.

3. Thus far, we have pointed out to our Greek friends the dangers in the present course and the need to exhaust peaceful remedies. We welcome GOG assurance peaceful remedies will be exhausted. A peaceful settlement of the situation to mutual satisfaction of Greece and Turkey would constitute positive achievement in terms of strengthening the cohesiveness of the southern flank of NATO as well as the American position in the Eastern Mediterranean. Whether Greeks can achieve that objective, it is difficult to judge, particularly since there seems to be a difference of assessment as to whether Makarios can whip up public support on his own behalf or whether GOG assessment that

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 632, Country Files—Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Immediate; Nodis. Drafted and approved by Sisco, cleared by Kissinger, Davies, Boyatt, Saunders, C.H. Thomas (S/S-O), and Armitage (IO/UNP). Repeated immediate to the White House, London, and Moscow.

it will have broad support is correct one. Significance of action by Clerides urging Makarios in effect to agree to Greek demands to form government of national unity is difficult to assess. At minimum, Makarios' delay in surfacing this matter publicly indicates that he is sufficiently concerned to try to find some peaceful way out.

4. In these circumstances, we wish all of you, pending further developments, to maintain a posture of cautious, watchful waiting and a low silhouette. These should be no assumption that US intends to play a leading good offices role since this time, unlike the previous two crises, this is not a matter in which a war seems likely between our two NATO allies—Greece and Turkey. This means being readily available to talk to your governments and in the case of Phillips to be available to talk to Waldheim, but at this juncture avoiding any US initiatives. If there are attempts to involve US directly, we will wish to weigh on their merits individual requests, such as passing along messages or similar role.

5. If Veniamen or Makarios takes the initiative with US to suggest that a deal would be possible on the basis of the Czech arms being taken over by the UN in exchange for Grivas' leaving, Popper should in first instance urge GOC to convey this proposal directly to GOG. He should not offer to pass on message, and, if asked to do so, should not give encouragement but seek instructions.

6. With respect to the UN, we note report that GOT and GOG have gone to UN asking it to take steps to put Czech arms under UNFICYP custody.² Without taking the initiative and only if Waldheim asks US views, USUN should make clear that if UN can get this done, it would be a constructive contribution in current situation. If GOG and GOT have doubts on this score and raise the issue, Tasca and Handley should make clear our position, but should take no initiative to raise subject.

7. We will, of course, watch closely indications of possible Soviet involvement and generally share Moscow's assessment of possible Soviet position as described in Moscow 1282.³

8. If addressees have any comments on this message, thoughts or suggestions, please send them along in Nodis category.

Irwin

² For documentation, see *Secretary General's Special Report*, March 16, 1972, UN doc. S/10564 and Add. 1, 2.

³ National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 717, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Vol. 19 Feb. 1972.

400. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, February 13, 1972, 1147Z.

313. For the Secretary From Popper. Ref: Athens 793.²

1. I am glad Henry Tasca invited Nicosia comment on Athens 793, substance of which he and I discussed when I passed through Athens yesterday Feb 12.

2. All of us agree on importance of strong NATO southern flank and of Greek-Turkish cooperation as regards Cyprus and other potentially disruptive issues. We would agree, too, that a Cyprus settlement acceptable to Greece and Turkey would bolster US position in Eastern Mediterranean against Soviets and generally.

3. I think Henry oversimplifies the picture when he suggests that because Makarios is intransigent and thus stands in the way of such a settlement, he should be brushed aside. If we look at the matter solely in this way, we are taking a very big gamble. We are writing off the possibility that Makarios may dig in and resist; that a civil war may be started among the Greeks of Cyprus; that it may very well spill over to involve Turks; and that the Soviet Union will move in.

4. Moscow Radio (FBIS Kyrenis of M122012) is already setting the stage for possible action. It is saying that the strings of the plot against the lawful government of Makarios originate in the US and NATO and pass through Athens. GOG activity is described as intervention in internal affairs of an independent member of the UN in order to replace Makarios with a Cyprus Govt obedient to US and NATO, with the island to become a US and NATO base. The USSR continues to oppose such moves on principle.

5. While distorted though all this is, it points up the basic question we need to face. It is perfectly legitimate to look at the Cyprus problem in balance of power terms, but we had better be sure we have thought through the risks of a Greek power play directed against Makarios. If Makarios digs in and the Greeks roll over him, is it our estimate that the USSR will simply rant publicly and grumble privately and let another NATO foothold be established in an area it now claims is within its security zone? Will this be helpful in the talks the President will be having in Moscow in May? Can we just write off the

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Immediate; Nodis.

² Dated February 11, it made suggestions regarding a U.S. response to the crisis in relations between Makarios and the Greek Government. (Ibid., Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73)

UN reaction, and its exploitation by the Communists, so soon after we went to bat in the UN for the independence and territorial integrity of Pakistan?

6. What I am suggesting is that there are more facets to the problem than reftel indicates. There are enough difficulties involved in simply ratifying the Greek plan of action as it unfolds (except for Amb Panayotacos here, they apparently did not even hint at it to us) for US to be justified in at least trying to hold the Greek Govt down a bit. There is still a good chance to work this problem out by diplomacy, and I think we can play a part. This entails risks for US, too, but I hope that both sides of the equation will be fully weighed in the next few days.³

7. Dept please repeat as desired.

Popper

³ In telegram 312 from Nicosia, February 12, 1005Z, Popper reported that Makarios appeared to be looking to the United States for assistance in the crisis and requested authorization to schedule a meeting with him. (Ibid.) In telegram 25339 to Nicosia, February 13, 2153Z, drafted by Sisco, the Department of State responded to both telegrams 312 and 313 from Nicosia: "1. You can be assured that the factors cited in your para 5 of Nicosia's 313 are and will continue to be weighed as our day-by-day review continues. 2. If you receive a direct or indirect request from Makarios, you should attempt to delay the meeting as long as possible, hopefully at least until February 15. If meeting unavoidable, you should listen and report. We should avoid any indication of possible U.S. role." (Ibid.)

**401. Memorandum From Richard Kennedy and Harold Saunders
of the National Security Council Staff to the President's
Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)¹**

Washington, February 13, 1972.

SUBJECT

WSAG Meeting on Cyprus—February 14

The *latest sitrep* is immediately attached.²

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-085, WSAG Meeting Cyprus 2/14/72. Secret.

² Dated February 13, as of 1200 EST; attached but not printed.

The Issues

There are two issues which provide the framework for the discussion:

—The basic one is whether we are prepared to acquiesce in a Greek-Turk solution to the Cyprus problem whatever it may be or whether we have a sufficient interest in avoiding the worst consequences of that course to try now to promote a negotiated solution. A negotiated solution would be one in which the Cypriot Government might change, but Cyprus would remain an independent nation.

—The secondary question is: If we are prepared to keep our hands off and to let events take their course, how long can we do this without being forced into a position of apparent collusion with Greece and Turkey with the Soviet Union taking the side of Cyprus, perhaps even with a show of naval forces?

As you can perceive, the debate is beginning to shape up this way:

—One view is that the US has an interest in heading off a Greek-Turk solution which could end in the partitioning of Cyprus. Two sentences in a draft cable Saturday (not cleared)³ capture this concern: "The US is publicly committed to the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus. The US cannot afford to associate itself as a matter of principle with a move that extinguished the independence existence of Cyprus."

—Another view is that we would be prepared to acquiesce in whatever solution Greece and Turkey work out, although we would take a public posture opposing any solution that threatened Cyprus' existence.

The *arguments made for the first approach* are that a Greek-Turk solution would give the USSR an opportunity to pose as protector of Cyprus and to face the US down unless the US were prepared to back Greece and Turkey firmly. US backing for them would put the US in collusion with what might become a blatant outside effort to change the nature of the Cypriot state.

The *arguments made for the second approach* are that there can be no real stability between Greece and Turkey until there is a Cyprus solution that meets the concerns of both. They are much closer to the situation, and we should stand aside for the time being and take whatever risks are involved from standing aside rather than risk aborting a move that might improve chances for stability.

Your *talking points*⁴ cover these issues and the ramifications they open up as well as the operational issue that arises from Ambassador Popper's concern that he will have to see Makarios soon.

³ Not further identified.

⁴ Attached but not printed.

402. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 14, 1972, 11:36 a.m.–12:12 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

John N. Irwin

Joseph Sisco

DOD

Armistead Selden

James H. Noyes

JCS

Adm. Thomas H. Moorer

CIA

Thomas Karamessines

John Waller

NSC Staff

Brig. Gen. Alexander M. Haig

Col. Richard T. Kennedy

Mr. Harold Saunders

Mr. Mark Wandler

SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS

It was agreed that:

—Dr. Kissinger will discuss the Clerides report² with the President and obtain his guidance.

—Agency spokesmen will respond to questions by saying that we are “following developments.”

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Karamessines) Can you give us a brief run-down on the current situation?

Mr. Karamessines read the attached intelligence briefing.³ When Mr. Karamessines read “the Soviets doubtless see in the latest flareup on Cyprus an opportunity to pose as a defender of small nations against

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-085, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

² Clerides reported that the Greeks were planning to move against Makarios that night. See footnote 6 below.

³ Attached but not printed.

efforts to extinguish the sovereignty of any UN member," Dr. Kissinger asked him: "How do we know that?" Mr. Karamessines answered that it was just speculation.

Mr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think?

Mr. Sisco: I think that as long as there is hope of any kind of negotiation between Greece and Cyprus, with Clerides in the middle, it is obviously in our favor. I also think that any time they come to us, we should try to encourage them to seek a peaceful solution to the problem. This is the line we have adopted, and we should try to maintain it as long as possible. This, of course, is the immediate problem, as I see it. We will also have to address some long-term questions.

Mr. Kissinger: What kinds of questions?

Mr. Sisco: For one thing, we have to consider what we would do if the impasse continues. Interestingly enough, we learn something new from each of these crises. They rarely develop from the same set of circumstances as the previous crisis.

Mr. Kissinger: But they are all in your area.

Mr. Sisco: That may be. You know, I get no pleasure from working Saturdays and Sundays. With all of you going to China in a couple of days, it is important to get some answers to the questions I was talking about before. I don't have the answers. First, are we still committed to the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus? Second, is it in our interest to stick as close as possible to Greece and Turkey, our NATO allies? How far will we go in giving them our support?

Personally, I draw the line in disassociating ourselves from military intervention on the part of Greece and Turkey in carving up Cyprus. It is possible that Greece could pull off a solution of the arms issue and come up with a new government which would be more responsive to Athens. Assuming the current negotiations result in a solution which preserves the political independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, from our point of view, this would be satisfactory. But can this be done, and what is our role? I think the question Popper raises in paragraph 5 of his telegram [Nicosia 313, 13 February]⁴ gets to the guts of the thing.

As Henry puts it so often, we have to ask ourselves where we want to come out and what are we going to do to see that we come out where we want?

I have one other point. Makarios has not yet pulled out his Soviet card. I tend to think that the Soviet card will be more limited than it

⁴ Document 400. Brackets in the original.

has been in the past because Greece and Turkey are together now. If, procedurally speaking, we play a minimum role—for example, support the UN effort—this will give Makarios a choice, and he may decide to pull out the Soviet card.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you mean by Soviet card?

Mr. Sisco: It will be political support, largely in the UN. I don't mean that the Soviets would intervene militarily in Cyprus.

Mr. Kissinger: I think that [Soviet military intervention]⁵ is out of the question.

Mr. Sisco: There are many things they could do which would have an effect on the President's trip and our overall relations. Therefore, I think we must take this into account.

Mr. Kissinger: The Soviets have to take it into account, too.

Mr. Sisco: Sure they do.

Mr. Kissinger: I appreciate the thoughts Popper gives us in paragraph 5 about the balance of power. We have to remember, though, that the Soviets have the same problem we do.

Mr. Karamessines: We have had reports that the Greek forces in Cyprus can move at a moment's notice. They just need the word to start moving.

Mr. Kissinger: Are we interested in the territorial integrity of Cyprus? The answer to that question is not "no." But if the answer is "yes," so what? What conclusions can we draw? We have no evidence of an impending attack.

Mr. Sisco: In the short-run I don't think we should be associated with any action which will result in the dismemberment of Cyprus. And in the long-run, I don't think we should be associated with the use of force which will result in enosis.

Mr. Kissinger: We are talking right now about Greek and Turkish forces landing on Cyprus. We're not talking about actions the Cypriot National Guard may take.

Mr. Sisco: That's right. But if there is a civil war, you have to consider what actions the various elements would take. The right-wing elements would be under Gen. Grivas. The National Guard has about 9,000 men, commanded by 600 Greek officers. In my judgment, Makarios cannot rely on the National Guard. Because of this situation, Makarios has taken in Czech arms, for his own personal Guard. If a civil war breaks out, he will probably give these arms to his own people and to left-wing sympathizers and communists. In a civil war, the communists would support Makarios, hoping, of course, to exploit the situa-

⁵ Brackets in the original.

tion for their own good. Objectively speaking, the way the National Guard goes will determine the need of Greece and Turkey to intervene militarily. They could do this with contingents they already have on the island or with the deployment of contingents from their home bases.

Mr. Kissinger: What do we do if we assume there is a real threat to the territorial integrity of Cyprus? There is no evidence that this is the case yet, except for the theory that this is something they could do.

Mr. Sisco: We don't have hard evidence yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Then what kind of evidence do we have?

Mr. Sisco: The evidence comes from a close examination of all the cables. Greece says it will pull out its Ambassador if Makarios doesn't offer any concessions. The implication is that this could lead to civil war. And to me, at least, there is an implication that other actions could be taken, as well.

Mr. Kissinger: All it means is that the Greeks are applying pressure.

Mr. Sisco: Yes, but I was not referring to the immediate issue.

Mr. Irwin: When Clerides says "the Greeks are planning to move tonight," is he referring to Greek forces or the National Guard? [This is a reference to Nicosia 319, 14 February.]⁶

Mr. Kissinger: I think Clerides is just trying to get us involved. He wants us to act as if we think a Greek move is underway.

Mr. Karamessines: We have nothing [*less than 1 line not declassified*] indicating that the Greeks are planning to move tonight.

Mr. Kissinger: Have we asked [*less than 1 line not declassified*]?

Mr. Karamessines: We have, but there is no answer yet.

Mr. Kissinger: I would like to talk to the President about this when I see him at 1:00 p.m. It's already 7:00 p.m. in Cyprus. If they are planning a move, it will be very soon. Suppose we do go to Clerides and ask him to give us the evidence he has about a Greek move. If he gives us his evidence, what do we do? We have asked for all the intelligence information—and that is perfectly right under the circumstances. What else could Clerides give us?

Mr. Sisco: Don't you think it is a good idea to ask him what evidence he has?

Mr. Kissinger: Why? If he gives us the evidence, what would we do?

⁶ Brackets in the original. Telegram 319 transmitted Clerides's report. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 69–June 30, 1974). In telegram 25489 to Nicosia, February 14, the Department instructed Popper to inform Clerides that it had no information confirming an imminent Greek move. (Ibid.)

Mr. Sisco: They have come to us and told us they have evidence of a Greek move. Do we disregard them entirely? Frankly, I don't believe the report. I was just looking for a way to temporize.

Mr. Kissinger: I don't believe this report either. Why don't we wait for our intelligence reports to come in? Then, if there is evidence, we can go to Clerides. If there is no evidence, why should we go to him and stir the pot?

Mr. Sisco: I don't think we would be stirring the pot if we went to him.

Mr. Irwin: How much evidence can there be? Tom [Karamessines]⁷ says the Greeks can move as soon as they are given the word.

Mr. Kissinger: Suppose we go to Clerides and he says they can move in ten minutes. What would we do? What is the next step?

Mr. Sisco: I don't know, Henry. This whole situation is in a delicate balance. We want to stay as close as possible with our Allies, yet we don't want to give the impression that we are in collusion with them.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom would we be in collusion? We haven't done anything.

Mr. Sisco: It's a question of what kind of contacts we maintain.

Mr. Karamessines: For whatever it's worth, the Russians have already put out a little squib, linking us with the Greeks.

Mr. Kissinger: They would do that anyway.

Mr. Sisco: I think that if we could give some low-key indications of sympathy, this would contribute—in the context of the Cyprus picture—to not having Makarios come to the conclusion that we were playing any kind of role in what was happening. It would also help prevent him from saying that the only way to save his skin—or Cyprus' skin, because the two things are different—would be to turn to the Soviets for help.

Mr. Kissinger: What do you mean? What kind of help?

Mr. Sisco: Basically, political operations—and support in the UN. Makarios may, however, also ask for additional arms.

Mr. Kissinger: I can't believe that he would ask them for help, unless he thought he was in real trouble. Let's assume that is his state of mind. If we can't protect him, and he thinks the Soviets can, he will turn to them. He strikes me as being a shrewd, tough customer. We can't play games with him. His decision to go to the Soviets for help will be based on his assessment of what the Soviets can do for him. I'm bringing all these things up because I'm just trying to understand our analysis of the situation.

⁷ Brackets in the original.

Mr. Sisco: We are not yet in the position to make a judgment about when we will do more, as against the Soviet option. We just haven't reached that juncture yet.

Mr. Kissinger: Against what options? What are we trying to prevent?

Mr. Sisco: We would be satisfied if Greece and Turkey could achieve a settlement which would put the arms issue away and which would come up with a framework for a unified government more responsive to Athens. We can't associate ourselves with anything beyond that.

Mr. Kissinger: No one is arguing that point.

Mr. Sisco: I know. We have a very delicate balance here. We can't appear to be undermining the territorial integrity of Cyprus by giving support to our Allies.

Mr. Irwin: Joe is saying that we have to be concerned with appearance. It's not that we did anything, or that we are going to do anything, or that Greece might do something quickly. Joe is just saying that we should avoid giving the impression that we are helping Greece—or that we did nothing when we had information about Greece's plans.

Mr. Kissinger: I know of no law that says we have to do something in every instance. Many times, in fact, we have information about something, but do nothing.

Mr. Sisco: I am simply suggesting that at some point we have to face the choices about what kind of supporting role we will play.

Mr. Kissinger: What kind of support are you talking about?

Mr. Sisco: Support for a peaceful resolution of the problem, along the lines I have already described. I'm talking about the possibility of an American role, as compared to leaving the situation open for violence and leaving it open for the Russians to make some political capital.

Mr. Kissinger: How do we translate that into operational terms? If we indicate to Makarios that we will support him, it will not necessarily settle anything else. We want to see what evidence our own intelligence turns up, and Tom is trying to get it. This is perfectly right. In the meantime, is it in our interest to give Cyprus the idea that we will get involved?

Mr. Sisco: We have not done that. We are trying to stay as uninvolved as possible.

Mr. Karamessines: What Joe is driving at, I think, is that we might be put into a difficult propaganda position.

Mr. Kissinger: With whom?

Mr. Karamessines: With the world at large—for not preventing two allies from dismembering Cyprus.

Mr. Sisco: I think I am clear about our objectives.

Mr. Kissinger: That's right. The statement of objectives is clear to all of us.

Mr. Sisco: Fine. It is also my judgment that we should go to Clerides and ask him to pass on to us any intelligence he has. If we disregard him, they would wonder what our silence means. They would wonder what we are up to.

Mr. Kissinger: I will see the President at 1:00 p.m., and I'll discuss this with him.

Mr. Sisco: I agree with you, Henry, that the report [of Greek intervention tonight]⁸ is not true. I don't think the Greeks are ready to move.

Mr. Irwin: I read the cable as Clerides asking us to take action.

Mr. Sisco: Exactly. He's doing this to get us involved.

Mr. Kissinger: He's doing it because he wants a response. He sees how nervous we are.

Mr. Sisco: If we do as Popper suggests, Clerides will take it as a cautious reaction on our part.

Mr. Kissinger: I've done all this probing, Joe, because I wanted to get to the heart of your recommendation. I talked to the President yesterday about your cable, and I will talk to him again on the matter we are discussing now. I think we're all in agreement on what we should try to do. (to Mr. Sisco) I will call you at 1:30 p.m.

Mr. Irwin: Henry, how would you phrase what we are trying to achieve?

Mr. Kissinger: I would say that if the outcome is a broad-based government and a resolution of the arms issues, this would be satisfactory to us. If there is an attack, though, and if Makarios goes to the UN, we will have no choice; we would try to use our good offices.

I met Waldheim at a cocktail party last night. He claims there are 10,000 crates of ammunition on the island. He said the UN may get involved, but that he didn't think there was much for it to do yet. I didn't tell him what our thinking was.

Mr. Sisco: Phillips is going to a lunch today, and Waldheim will also be there. I told Phillips not to give any information whatsoever. I told him not to probe or volunteer any information.

Henry, I also wrote that statement on political independence that went out in the cable over the weekend because I want the record to be absolutely clear if this eventually becomes public.

Mr. Kissinger: That's all right. I was worried about how your Ambassadors feel.

⁸ Brackets in the original.

Mr. Sisco: We are all in line now. I have one other thing. Fred Hoffman has an article [AP 9, 14 February]⁹ out stating that U.S. officials are worried about the arms deal. I told the Department spokesman that he should not give out any information—not even factual information. He should only say that we are following developments.

Mr. Kissinger: That's absolutely right. We should do that in the Pentagon, too. (to Mr. Selden) Can you see to it?

Mr. Selden: Yes.

Mr. Kissinger: We should keep the lowest possible profile on this issue. We will have one more meeting before we all go away. In the meantime, Joe, I think you have it in good shape.

⁹ Brackets in the original.

403. Intelligence Information Cable¹

TDCS DB 315/01303-72

Washington, February 14, 1972.

COUNTRY

Cyprus/Greece

DOI

12-13 February 1972

SUBJECT

Appraisal of Present Situation and Likely Developments

ACQ

[1 line not declassified]

SOURCE

[1 line not declassified]

Summary. President Makarios now intends to delay for some time his reply to the note of the Greek Government (GOG), delivered to him by former Ambassador Constantinos Panayiotakos. The President feels that the GOG has worked itself into an extremely difficult and delicate

¹ Source: Central Intelligence Agency, Records of the Directorate for Intelligence, Intelligence Information Cables. Secret; Priority; No Foreign Dissem; Controlled Dissem; No Dissem Abroad. Prepared in the CIA and sent to members of the Intelligence Community.

position. Makarios does not intend to allow the GOG to extricate itself from this position until he feels confident that he has successfully reversed the situation to his favor. Makarios feels that the GOG has acted foolishly in making its intentions a matter of international record, for by doing so the GOG has assured victory for Makarios in this round. *End Summary.*

1. President Makarios believes that the GOG has made a series of blunders in its handling of its efforts to effect changes within Cyprus. He feels also that the GOC has been reacting effectively and has already won the battle on the international level. Thus, Makarios does not intend to hurry his reply to the note of the GOG which called on him to change his government, to turn in to the National Guard the arms which he purchased from Czechoslovakia, and to recognize the right of the GOG to assume the leadership in future negotiations concerning the Cyprus problem. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* The President feels that international support is with him. His case is simple; as the duly elected President of a sovereign state he feels he has every right to conduct state business and to take appropriate measures to insure a continuation of peace and tranquility in his country.) Makarios recalls that when the return to Cyprus of General Georgios Grivas was first reported in September 1971, he had called on Athens to bring the General under control and, if he was present in Cyprus, to effect his removal. At that time, the GOG replied that the presence of Grivas in Cyprus was an internal-Cyprus problem, pointing out that General Grivas had been retired from GOG military service and was no longer under GOG control. The President made public this reply of the GOG, noting his acceptance of the GOG position, and his appreciation of the GOG's acceptance of Grivas' return as being an internal-Cyprus matter. Makarios followed this exchange with a public request to Grivas that he appear publically and state his reason for returning to Cyprus. Makarios offered to take Grivas into his government, and noted that if Grivas wanted more, Makarios was prepared to stand against Grivas in open election. Grivas did not reply. The importation of Czech arms had a serious effect on the plans of the Grivas plotters, and forced the issue. The reaction of the GOG brought the whole affair to international attention. The note, forwarded to Makarios via Panayiotakos, greatly angered Makarios but he remained cool. The content of the GOG note was leaked to the Cypriot press, and was reported as an ultimatum. The reply of the GOG to the press account was delivered by Panayiotakos on 12 February to representatives of the press. Panayiotakos stated that the note which he brought from Athens was simply a communication from the "national center," and should not be construed as an ultimatum. Panayiotakos continued, however, that the communiqué urged the formation of a National Front Government, stating also that Grivas has a right to be interested in internal Cyprus

affairs and that therefore his followers must be represented in the government. It is on this press conference of Panayiotakos that Makarios now centers his program. If, as Panayiotakos stated publically, the GOG note was not an ultimatum, Makarios is free to answer the note in his good time. If, as the GOG stated in late 1971, the presence of Grivas in Cyprus is an internal matter, how is it now that the GOG feels it can interfere. Since Grivas has not seen fit to reply to Makarios' public offers and challenges, as the elected representative and Ethnarch of his people, Makarios will continue to discharge his responsibilities, confident that his position in the current situation demands the support of the international audience. He has stated that he will not give the Czech arms to the National Guard until Grivas is returned to Athens. He does not intend to abrogate to the GOG his right and duty to determine the future of the country of Cyprus. He is perfectly willing to work with the GOG on a common approach to an eventual settlement and, where differences of opinion occur, to attempt to work them out on individual basis and on individual merits.

2. Although Makarios feels relatively confident that he has won this round of the battle, he does not think the fight is over. He has instructed his advisors that he expects the next move will be a direct attempt on his life. Head of the Cyprus Information (Intelligence) Service (CIS) Georgios Tombazos, has instructed his officers guarding the President and other key Cypriot officials, to be particularly careful in the coming days. (*[less than 1 line not declassified]*) *Comment:* Although recent CIS reports indicate that Makarios' support within the country has grown since the receipt of the GOG's note, these reports also indicate that Grivas' followers are continuing preparations for a coup.)

3. [*1½ lines not declassified*]

404. Diplomatic Note From the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Government to the United States Government¹

Washington, undated.

In Moscow there is a serious concern over the new complication of the situation around Cyprus.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 493, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1972, Vol. 9. No classification marking. A notation on the note reads: "Delivered by Mr. Sokolov to Gen. Haig, 5:30 p.m., 2/15/1972."

The matter concerns the unpermissible interference by the Greek Government into the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus and the attempts of that Government to force the Cyprus Government to give up independent policy.

The demands made by the Greek side February 11 on the Government of Makarios, including the demand that the Government of Cyprus be reorganized by way of including into it the supporters of the so-called "enozis," are nothing but an overt ultimatum, an attempt to impose on the people of Cyprus decisions running counter to their lawful national interests. The Soviet Government which consistently comes out in support of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus, deemed it necessary to warn Athens against interference into the internal affairs of Cyprus. It also addressed the Government of Turkey on this question.

It should be emphasized that the Soviet side cannot remain indifferent toward such a development of events which may still further aggravate the situation in Eastern Mediterranean where the situation is already complicated enough. In the belief that this would not serve the interests of the United States either, it has been decided in Moscow to address President Nixon on this question. We proceed from the fact that the U.S. has possibilities to exert a restraining influence on the Government of Greece in order to prevent a crisis situation around Cyprus.²

² A reply to this note, delivered by Haig to Sokolov at 11:15 a.m., February 17, reads: "The President wishes to assure the Soviet leaders that the United States opposes any actions that would aggravate the situation in Cyprus or in that general region of the world. The efforts of the United States are designed to bring about a restoration of calm and a normalization of the situation. To this end it has endeavored to use its influence to urge restraint on all the parties concerned and will continue to do so." (Ibid.)

405. Minutes of the Washington Special Actions Group Meeting¹

Washington, February 16, 1972, 3:15–4:04 p.m.

SUBJECT

Cyprus

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, NSC Institutional Files (H-Files), Box H-116, WSAG Minutes, Originals, 1972. Secret. The meeting took place in the White House Situation Room.

PARTICIPANTS

Chairman—Henry A. Kissinger

State

Mr. John N. Irwin, II

Mr. Joseph Sisco

DOD

Mr. G. Warren Nutter

Mr. James H. Noyes

JCS

Lt. Gen. John W. Vogt

CIA

Mr. Thomas Karamessines

Mr. John Waller

NSC

Gen. Alexander M. Haig

Mr. Richard Kennedy

Mr. Harold Saunders

Mr. Mark Wandler

It was agreed that:

—Mr. Sisco would prepare a cable,² giving guidance to our Embassies in Cyprus and Greece.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Karamessines) Let's start with your briefing.

Mr. Karamessines read the attached intelligence briefing.³

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Sisco) Joe, what do you think?

Mr. Sisco: I think we should continue to play out the same string we have been playing.

Dr. Kissinger: Does that go for Popper, too? [referring to Nicosia 358, February 16]⁴

Mr. Sisco: Yes. If it's all right with you, though, I will get to this a little later.

² Apparently a reference to telegram 27708 to Athens and Nicosia, February 17, in which the Department suggested keeping a "low profile" and avoiding "any implication of possible US role" and requested Tasca's assessment of Greek objectives in Cyprus in light of Makarios's reaction to their ultimatum. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 1 GREECE)

³ Attached but not printed.

⁴ All brackets in the original. Telegram 358 from Nicosia reads: "With lapse of time and temporary decrease of tension, I think it is important that Embassy begin to read itself back into local thinking re situation. Unless Dept objects I plan to seek appointments with Clerides, Denktash and other sources before weekend, though I will not ask for appointment with Archbishop until things become a bit clearer. Staff will similarly begin to loosen up." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969-June 30, 1974)

Dr. Kissinger: It seems to me that he is planning to do exactly what we told him not to do on Monday.⁵

Mr. Sisco: I would like to discuss this in a little while. In the meantime, let me review what we have done. First, we told the Greeks they were doing something risky. Second, we told them that if they published the note, it would make the diplomatic process of seeking a peaceful solution even more difficult. Third, we have made it clear to Waldheim that we would support a UN effort to gain control of the Czech arms. Our Ambassadors have been told to play this whole situation in a low-key way.

Dr. Kissinger: What can Waldheim do about the arms?

Mr. Sisco: He has two basic ways in which to handle the situation. The first is for the UN to actually take control of the arms. That, of course, would be the action most favored by Greece and Turkey. The second is to follow the pattern which has been used during the last year—periodic inspection of the arms.

Dr. Kissinger: How has that worked out?

Mr. Sisco: It has been quite effective. I should point out, Henry, that we have not discussed details with Waldheim. We just told him that anything he can do would be good, and he has told the Greeks and Cypriots that he is ready to do whatever is necessary. I think we should temporize because the play is still between the Greeks and the Cypriots at the present time.

Dr. Kissinger: Joe, can you tell me what you think the Greeks are doing? What do they think they are doing?

Mr. Sisco: Let me try. First, though, I want to say that Tasca has not gone in—and I think we are playing it right. The Greeks evidently assumed they had the mass support for their actions. But as the crisis continues, the Greeks assume Makarios is taking steps to bring public support to his side. I also think the Greek objectives are more tailored now than they appeared to be when the note was delivered. You can see this, in part, from the latest comments they—especially Ambassador Panayotakis—have made.

Dr. Kissinger: The objectives are more tailored to what—to control of the arms?

Mr. Sisco: Possibly. There might also be some element of bringing about a face-saving situation with regard to the make-up of a new government.

Dr. Kissinger: Why have the Greeks done all of this—and why has nothing happened?

⁵ Monday, February 14. Apparent reference to telegram 25339 to Nicosia, February 13, 2153Z; see footnote 3, Document 400.

Mr. Irwin: We don't really know, Henry. We have to figure out now what we do next week when all of you are away. What are your feelings? I think we should still hold off. If the Greeks move, they will probably move fast. But even if Makarios is overthrown, we should not get involved. What if the Greeks bungled a coup attempt? A civil war could follow, and Greek mainland forces might intervene. What would the Turks do then? The UN is seized of the desirability of resuming the talks and of controlling the arms—but it will not get into the question of bargaining with Gen. Grivas. Considering all of this, is there anything the U.S. can do to encourage a more active UN role, or—if there are military operations—should we take any steps vis-à-vis Greece?

Dr. Kissinger: And now the Soviets have entered the picture, too, with their expression of support for Makarios.⁶

Mr. Irwin: That's right. Sadat also said something. We may have reached the point where it is in our interest to ask the UN to take a more active role.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Cypriot National Guard moves, will it be seen as foreign intervention in Cyprus?

Mr. Sisco: Not primarily. I have to hedge a bit here, but I think it would be seen substantially in internal terms. It is well-known that the Guard is commanded by 600 Greek officers who owe their primary loyalty to Athens. The line between internal action and international intervention would be the direct involvement of the Greek troops on the island. Under the terms of the London-Zurich accords, as you probably know, Greece and Turkey have certain rights if the status quo is upset.

Dr. Kissinger: Does that include military activity?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. They can quell "civil strife."

Mr. Karamessines: They can take actions to restore the provisions of the agreement if those provisions have been upset.

Dr. Kissinger: Greece and Turkey would have better grounds for intervention, then, if they say they want to solve the arms problem than if they say they want to replace Makarios.

Mr. Sisco: Absolutely.

Mr. Irwin: Under the Treaty of Guarantees, Greece, Turkey and Great Britain can move to restore the constitutional status quo.

Mr. Sisco: That's why the Greeks argue that the arms alter the delicate balance on the island. It gives the Greeks some semblance of legality under the London-Zurich accords.

⁶ See Document 404.

Mr. Irwin: From the world point of view, a National Guard move would be seen as a Greek move, largely because there are Greek forces stationed with the Guard.

Mr. Sisco: Plus the ultimatum the Greek Government gave Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: What would it all mean? What would happen in the UN?

Mr. Sisco: In the UN, it would almost certainly mean a 100+ vote for the territorial integrity of Cyprus.

Dr. Kissinger: Wouldn't the vote depend to some degree on what the National Guard did? If you extinguish a state, that's one thing, but if you install a new government—one which is broadly based—that's another thing. What would the Soviets do?

Mr. Sisco: They would surely make loud noises in the Security Council.

Dr. Kissinger: Why don't they do that now?

Mr. Sisco: I don't think they are doing that now because Makarios is taking this whole situation very seriously—since Greece and Turkey are together. I have a news item here which says the "Makarios government received expressions of support today from the Soviet Union and Poland." The Soviet Ambassador probably called on Makarios.

Dr. Kissinger: How do you think the situation will develop? How long can the situation continue in the present course?

Mr. Karamessines: The present course can continue for the next several days. Makarios will try to string it out. Each passing day, though, puts the Greeks in a more uncomfortable and embarrassing position.

Mr. Sisco: We surmise that—there is no evidence for it.

Mr. Irwin: If the present situation drags on, there is no problem for us. But if it drags on—and if the Greeks make a move—then the question arises about what we should do. Would it be better to wait and see what happens, or would it be better to do what we can—probably through the UN—to try to defuse the issue? If the arms issue can be settled, it may be possible to force Grivas off the island.

Mr. Nutter: What will happen if the Greeks back down?

Mr. Irwin: Then I think it would become a question of what Turkey would do—because the arms issue would still have to be settled.

Mr. Sisco: That's right. The main thing is to get the arms under UN control. I can't conceive of the Greeks backing down without seeing the arms issue settled.

Mr. Karamessines: Turkey undoubtedly feels the same way.

Mr. Sisco: They do.

Mr. Irwin: I lean to trying to get the UN to work out something between the Greeks and the Cypriots rather than riding the whole thing out and hoping for a good solution. No progress has been made so far.

Mr. Karamessines: Maybe we should have Tasca go to the Greeks and ask them if they are really sincere in claiming that their only objective is to bring the arms under control. If they say that is their only objective, we could ask if they want us to use our good offices to help settle the issue.

Dr. Kissinger: But they have already stated they have additional objectives.

Mr. Sisco: You're right. They said in their ultimatum that they wanted a new government on Cyprus. I think Tom's [Karamessines] proposal goes too far right now. The Greeks won't come to us.

Dr. Kissinger: I get the impression the Greeks either know very well what they are doing or they are colossally inept.

Mr. Sisco: In the two previous crises,⁷ they started out with thunderous moves, and then they collapsed.

Mr. Irwin: That may be true, but it is different now—because the Turks are there to bolster them.

Mr. Sisco: That is a big difference.

Mr. Noyes: Is it likely there may be a joint Greek-Turk operation?

Mr. Sisco: I think if one side moves, the other side will also move.

Mr. Karamessines: I agree.

Mr. Nutter: We haven't encouraged them.

Mr. Irwin: Turkey and Greece both know we haven't interfered. From the brief cable we sent out the other day [State 025489],⁸ Makarios knows we had no information about a Greek move. He may even have thought we were instrumental in stopping the Greeks. We played it just right.

Dr. Kissinger: That depends on what we want. If this is a game of chicken and if we want Makarios to cave in, it should be done quickly. We may have encouraged him to hang on. I am just speaking hypothetically.

Mr. Sisco: It is a game—and he is a good poker player.

Dr. Kissinger: There are a number of things we could do to make life easier for Popper and his staff, but that may not be our objective. If our objective is to bring about control of the arms, I think we can steer things in that direction.

⁷ See footnote 2, Document 343.

⁸ To Nicosia, February 14; see footnote 6, Document 402.

Mr. Irwin: My impression of Makarios is that he will not give in. Maybe the Greeks will give in.

Dr. Kissinger: Makarios is a good poker player, as you say. But why should he give in now. If he were going to give in, he would wait till the last moment and not tell us now.

Mr. Irwin: He is also a stubborn man.

Dr. Kissinger: But he never had the Greeks and the Turks against him before. I don't know how he will act.

Mr. Karamessines: February 23 is a key date. That's when the new Turkish contingent moves into position on the island. They may bring in heavy guns with them.

Mr. Sisco: Tom is right. The 23rd could be the next crisis point. The Greeks said they would move in heavy guns if the Turks did.

Dr. Kissinger: This could put some pressure on Makarios.

Mr. Irwin: To do what?

Dr. Kissinger: To yield the minimum he would judge necessary in order to prevent that from happening.

Mr. Irwin: Do you mean giving up the arms?

Mr. Sisco: He could do that, and he could also insist that Grivas get off the island. And a short time after this immediate problem blows over, he could announce a change in the cabinet. I think he can save face by making some government change.

Mr. Karamessines: Makarios was reportedly planning to make a change, anyway. But he said the crisis made it impossible to do it now.

Mr. Sisco: Henry, I'd like to get your reactions to a couple of things. If the Greeks come to us and say they want us to go to the UN, there is no problem. Suppose, though, that they tell us they are willing to make some kind of a deal. They ask us to carry a message to the Cypriots, which we do. Then the Cypriots ask us to carry a message back to the Greeks. We would be right in the middle before we know it. What is your instinct to us getting involved in something like that?

Dr. Kissinger: My instinct is to avoid getting involved and to see if the UN can do it. Suppose the Greeks say they would be glad to see the UN step in. What would we do?

Mr. Sisco: They won't say that.

Dr. Kissinger: The consequence of our message-carrying will be that we are drawn into a substantive position.

Mr. Sisco: That's exactly why I raised the point, Henry. If Makarios comes to us, Popper should tell him that this issue should be settled between the Greeks and Cypriots. But what do we do if both our allies come to us?

Dr. Kissinger: If that happens, we would be forced to carry messages—and to take sides. And if Makarios reads into this that we are simply acting as an errand boy, it wouldn't make Greece or Turkey happy. I can talk to the President about all of this. But as I just said, my instinct is not to get involved.

Mr. Irwin: The question is whether we should encourage Waldheim to take a more active role.

Mr. Sisco: Waldheim can play a more active role on the arms control issue. But Greece and Turkey came to us because the other element in the note—the element about a new government—is something Waldheim can't touch. It is not in his mandate, and I don't think he would touch it with a ten-foot pole.

Mr. Irwin: He can't touch the Grivas issue, either.

Mr. Sisco: That's right.

Dr. Kissinger: If the Greeks come to us and tell us to relax because they are not planning any drastic actions, can we help them come up with a face-saving solution?

Mr. Sisco: Yes, I think so, if they are prepared to cooperate on the arms issue and on getting Grivas off the island. They may even insist on our helping them.

Dr. Kissinger: Can they do that? My instinct is to stay out of the whole thing as long as we possibly can. Otherwise, we will get nothing but grief from Greece and Turkey (who may accuse us of a stab in the back) and Cyprus and the Soviet Union. However, if outside forces intervene and if the problem goes to the Security Council, we will have to part company with Greece and Turkey.

Mr. Irwin: If, as the situation develops, we feel we can avoid the use of force by bringing it to the UN, we should support such a move.

Dr. Kissinger: Joe says, though, that the Greeks don't want the UN.

Mr. Sisco: That's right. They may throw in a hooker, too. They may tell us that unless we do something, they and the Turks might have to use force. It's a possibility, you know.

Mr. Irwin: The UN has already talked about resuming the inter-communal talks and about the arms issue.

Dr. Kissinger: What have we told Waldheim?

Mr. Sisco: We told him that we know the Greeks and Turks have come to him. We said we would welcome anything he could do on the arms problem. We haven't gone beyond that, and we haven't said anything about the other part of the note.

Dr. Kissinger: (to Mr. Irwin) On the one hand, the UN may be able to prevent the situation from deteriorating. On the other hand, the whole problem could become worse if the negotiations fail, and the use of force may be hastened.

Mr. Sisco: Even if the Security Council is in session, the Chinese may temper their public position because you are there, but I think the Soviet Union and China will have parallel positions.

Dr. Kissinger: That's true. One thing the Chinese are allergic to is a piece of territory being split off from a country.

Mr. Sisco: And from the Soviet point of view, intervention would be viewed as NATO aggression against a neutral country.

Dr. Kissinger: What would be the issue in the Security Council if there is no military intervention on the part of Greece or Turkey?

Mr. Sisco: For one thing, there would be a condemnation of Greece for the note. There would also be a reaffirmation of the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus. There would not be any mention of the Czech arms. In effect, it would be an effort to mobilize the Security Council in support of the status quo.

Dr. Kissinger: Why hasn't this been done yet?

Mr. Sisco: Because Makarios is afraid of Greece and Turkey working together. Also, he thinks that the Security Council action may push the button on military intervention. If it goes to the Security Council, the Greeks may feel they have nothing to lose, and they may make their move.

Dr. Kissinger: You are saying that the situation may become worse if it goes to the UN.

Mr. Sisco: Yes. Don't forget, either, that the Turks have the same feeling about the UN as the Israelis do.

Dr. Kissinger: If all this happens, what would we do?

Mr. Sisco: Send a cable to Peking. In the first instance, we should tell them that they should try to work it out themselves. Second, we can try to move it to the UN. If that doesn't work, we would have to see what kind of role we could play ourselves—although I hope it wouldn't come to that point.

Dr. Kissinger: Who would we send out there?

Mr. Sisco: We haven't gone that far yet.

Dr. Kissinger: If we send you, everyone would think you had an undercover role in regard to the Egyptian-Israeli talks.

Mr. Sisco: If I got within 200 miles of Cairo, Sadat would send someone to talk to me. We could go to the Greeks and ask them if they don't really want the UN to handle the situation. Then Waldheim could quietly get involved. This would be much better than having Cyprus bring it up at the Security Council.

Gen. Vogt: I, for one, am worried about Makarios distributing the arms.

Mr. Sisco: We are, too, and we're watching the situation.

Dr. Kissinger: If he does distribute the arms, could Greece and Turkey intervene?

Mr. Sisco: If he did that, the fat would be in the fire. Greece would probably unleash the National Guard, which is basically loyal to Athens.

Dr. Kissinger: What about the point Tom [Karamessines] made earlier? Would it be possible for Tasca to ask the Greeks if control of the Czech arms is their principal objective?

Mr. Sisco: I don't think we should be that specific. We could send a message to Tasca, asking him if he detects any changes in Greek objectives. We can tell him to talk to Palamas and try to feel out the current situation. We shouldn't go beyond that point, though.

Dr. Kissinger: That sounds okay to me. Will you send a cable over here for clearance?

Mr. Sisco: Yes.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Popper? Can we calm him down?

Mr. Sisco: Yes. We can send him a cable telling him not to see Makarios. We can authorize him to see Clerides, to get a current reading of the situation. We should tell him not to take any initiatives to see anyone else. If he receives any initiatives, though, he should ask us for instructions.

Dr. Kissinger: I have the impression he will make sure that Clerides takes the initiative.

Mr. Sisco: No. That wouldn't happen. Popper is an activist, and he is very intelligent. He also follows orders.

Dr. Kissinger: I'm not saying he would disobey orders. He would just see that the initiative came from Clerides.

Mr. Sisco: Popper is playing it straight.

Dr. Kissinger: What about his staff? Can it be restrained?

Mr. Sisco: Sure.

Dr. Kissinger: The Embassy personnel always want to be well-liked by the people they are accredited to—and this is only normal.

Mr. Sisco: Henry, this has always been an effective and efficient Embassy. When something has occurred, they have always found out about it and let us know. Popper's worry is that the Embassy's pattern of reaction in this crisis has evolved differently from the way it has in other crises. He is worried that Makarios will read something into that. I think we can tell him to see Clerides and to use the meeting as a listening exercise to find out where the talks stand. Popper can live with instructions like that.

Dr. Kissinger: It makes sense to me.

Mr. Sisco: I can put it all in one cable for you.

Dr. Kissinger: What about Turkey?

Mr. Sisco: Handley is alright. Turkey is off to one side, anyway. Also, their Ambassador came in to see me yesterday.⁹

Dr. Kissinger: I will go along with you. If you think Turkey is not the principal mover, you don't have to include Handley in the cable.

Mr. Sisco: It doesn't really matter. Handley will give me some indicators next week, if we need any.

Dr. Kissinger: Next week will be a happy week—with this crisis, and Vietnam, among others. At any rate, the food should be good.

Mr. Sisco: We have a delicate situation here. We will do the best we can.

[Omitted here is a discussion on Bangladesh, Jordan, and Iran.]

⁹ No record of this meeting was found.

406. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, February 18, 1972, 1614Z.

971. Subj: Cyprus: Present GOG Objectives on Cyprus. Ref: State 027708.²

1. *Summary:* Papadopoulos has staked a good bit of his prestige on his Cyprus initiative. His past history has shown him to be patient and careful. We believe he has other cards to play. After events of past week alternatives now available to GOG not particularly attractive. Those involving force or threat of force might have been successful last weekend but timing now bad. Makarios seems in fairly strong position against other forms of pressure. Greeks might be wise try to shift issue to that of immediate resumption of intercommunal talks. Possible compromise would be UN control of Czech arms and Greek guarantee that Grivas' forces will not disturb peace, followed by some personnel changes on Greek Cypriot side and Greek-Turkish agreement to move for immediate resumption intercommunal talks. Question is

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III. Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Ankara, and USUN.

² See footnote 2, Document 405.

how GOT would react to various Greek options. Next danger point may be Turkish contingent rotation. *End summary.*

2. Papadopoulos has staked a good bit of his prestige and that of his regime on achieving a drastic resolution of the Cyprus issue, which was launched with fanfare and trumpets. I can hardly believe he will stop there. Although in Byzantium anything is possible, everything which occurs does not always mean what it should mean. The Prime Minister's game plan is, therefore, probably not played out.

3. In judging what GOG will do next, we should keep several things in mind. First of all, Papadopoulos has a bit of patience and knows how to wait. The highlights of his career prove this. His method is to plan, wait, observe carefully, and if possible let the situation itself develop in his direction. He is also a man who prefers to avoid violence and solutions involving force. He prefers what appear to be agreed solutions and usually makes every effort to respect his opponent's *philotimo* in struggle of this kind, and takes appropriate measures to this end.

4. Thus I believe that Prime Minister will develop his tactics to meet current situation. It is hard to be convinced that Prime Minister put all his eggs in one basket, i.e., Panayotakos' appraisal of Greek Cypriot reaction. Papadopoulos simply not trained by his life experience to act in this way. Makarios could make a mistake by putting on large demonstrations of public support against Athens. If he continues to do this, *pari passu*, Prime Minister will be encouraged to sharpen his tactics to defend his own posture and objectives. We recognize, however, that Makarios is a master poker player, and while maneuvering to save his own position never neglects opportunity to take offensive.

5. Although Papadopolous will, we believe, make further moves, most of alternatives available to GOG at this point do not appear particularly attractive. Note was delivered to Makarios a week ago today. By avoiding an answer and demonstrating certain amount of international and local support, Makarios has left Greeks in position of having to take additional steps that will either escalate situation or lower the temperature. If Greece decides not to press its demands on disposition of Czech arms and formation of new government on Cyprus, Papadopoulos and GOG will have suffered serious loss of face that could have consequences here. It is our opinion, however, that GOG having finally thrown down gauntlet to Makarios is not likely to let matter rest there. Perhaps Papadopoulos now expects the Turks to increase pressure on Makarios.

6. GOG built up expectations of a spontaneous rallying of Greek Cypriots to Greek cause and intimated that major political figures in Cyprus would desert Makarios. So far this has not happened, and GOG is now tactically and legally on far shakier grounds in trying to force issue of Makarios government than in attacking problem of Czech

arms. We assume therefore that whatever next step Greeks take will more likely involve arms. We see following among the options available to Greece.

A. Quarantine of arms. As Palamas has said this would be “awkward.” Archbishopal Palace under heavy guard. If National Guard (which it must be remembered manned by Cypriots even though officered by Greeks) surrounded Palace, possibilities of violence considerable. Makarios’ forces could also possibly wait this one out for lengthy period. Greeks cannot even be sure what proportion of Czech arms are in Palace. Moreover, simple quarantine, with Greeks guarding Greeks, may not satisfy Turks.

B. Provoke incidents by Grivas supporters as pretext for National Guard takeover. This alternative would have made some sense last weekend, when Czech arms issue was fresh. Now such tactic would appear blatant attempt to take over Cyprus Government, particularly if Makarios had entered into discussions with UN on disposition of arms. Any Grivas action following some other action threatening Greek Cypriots, such as Turkish introduction of both troops and arms, would of course be a different matter.

C. Instigate Turkish threat to ship arms or men into Cyprus as pretext for National Guard takeover. Threat already exists and no response of this kind in sight. Moreover, objection here is that it difficult to believe, unless there is a firm GOG–GOT agreement, that at this point Turks are going to let themselves be pushed out in front.

D. Play religious card. While Holy Synod may be anti-Makarios, GOG would be moving into an arena in which Makarios is the acknowledged all-time champion.

C. Play Hellenism card with Cypriot people. Makarios can play this game, too, and in fact by holding out for ultimate enosis he promises Greeks the whole pie of Cyprus.

E. Alienate Greek Cypriot political leadership from Makarios. We cannot be sure of state of play, but it seems that Greece may have missed whatever chance it had. Clerides growing increasingly cautious.

G. Press Makarios to broaden government. Makarios can spin this one out and eventually refuse. Nevertheless, this an objective which GOG undoubtedly will continue to pursue. Link to internal Communist problem and Soviet influence on the island will serve to keep this issue alive.

H. Retreat, claiming success on arms question by involving UN. This would eventually be seen as defeat for Greece.

I. Remove Makarios from scene physically. This would not be naked intervention, which could provoke strong reactions. Extremely risky.

J. Use Turkish rotation to provoke incident allowing National Guard to take over or declare martial law. Same objections as to (C), but not be excluded. If Turks decide to use rotation to put steam behind question of Czech arms, this could provide Papadopoulos with immediate next step.

K. Shift gears and make immediate resumption of intercommunal talks, with strong role for Greece and Turkey, the main issue. By changing the game Greeks just might be able both to save face and put Makarios on the defensive, particularly if UN involvement in arms question had partially neutralized that problem.

7. A vital factor, of course, which we are not in best position to judge from here is how Turkey would react to various Greek initiatives or failure of Greece to act. We share view in Nicosia's excellent 370³ that Turkish contingent rotation potentially dangerous in this connection. In any case, if Czech arms not soon removed from Makarios' control Turkey may supply Turkish Cypriots with further weapons, possibly by air drop. If Greece and Makarios had at that point been unable to reach some compromise as outlined above, it might be necessary to accept introduction of Turkish arms as part of new situation. Supply of Turkish arms would be seen as element in achieving new equilibrium, which however would present greater risk to maintenance of peace on island.

8. We believe that option (K) above not only offers opportunities for defusing situation along lines we suggested in our original analysis (Athens 800),⁴ but would also be desirable from point of view of protecting U.S. interests. Events of past week have demonstrated to all parties how close we are to serious blow-up on Cyprus, and steam which has built up could possibly be used to generate some positive results from present crisis.

9. A possible compromise at this point might be for Makarios to enter into negotiations with UN for UNFICYP control of Czech arms. Greece would not attempt to remove Grivas from island but would agree to use National Guard to prevent Grivas supporters from disrupting peace. Next step would be for Makarios to make limited personnel changes, perhaps replacing Kyprianou, and certainly reducing influence of Lyssarides. Combined with firm commitment for an

³ Dated February 17, it noted a "small but distinct possibility" that the Greek or Turkish Governments might use the imminent Turkish troop rotation to stage an "incident" that would permit intervention against Makarios's government. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970-73, POL 27-4 CYP/UN)

⁴ Dated February 12, it expressed the Embassy's view that Makarios held the key to a peaceful settlement of the crisis. (Ibid., POL 27 CYP)

early resumption of revised intercommunal talks this approach holds some promise.

10. Finally, it would be necessary for Greece and Turkey to work closely together on getting intercommunal talks under way quickly. Makarios would have to accept significant role for GOG and GOT in these talks. Right of intervention under London-Zurich agreements would thus be brought out from the backroom into the shade, but visible, and might serve to induce greater realism on Makarios' part.

Tasca

407. Information Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers¹

Washington, March 2, 1972.

Cyprus: Bishops Demand Makarios'
Resignation as President

The Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus met today. At the conclusion of the meeting the three Bishops issued a proclamation calling for Archbishop Makarios to resign from the presidency.

In the continuing power struggle between Makarios and the Athens regime it appears that the three Bishops have sided with the Colonels. The Bishops are all classical Hellenists, political conservatives, and personal opponents of the Archbishop. They have also been directly in touch with the Government of Greece.

It is difficult to predict how this situation will unfold, apart from saying that the action of the Bishops will certainly increase tension and enhance the chances for violence. The Bishops' declaration is a challenge to the demonstrated popular support for Makarios. I think we can anticipate additional public manifestations in favor of the Archbishop and against the Bishops. On the other hand I believe that this internal challenge is in some senses more serious for Makarios than the challenge of Greece in its February 11 note. The Bishops are, after all,

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 15–1 CYP. Secret. Drafted by Boyatt and cleared by Davies.

Cypriots and, after Makarios, they are the leaders of the Church, an institution which is 1500 years old.

There is an outside chance Makarios might resign and leave public life; I am not confident any successor could contain the situation. Resignation, however, would not be in character for the Archbishop. I tend to think that after the smoke clears Makarios will remain in control of the situation. He may be "persuaded" by popular acclamation to remain as President. He might resign, call for an election, and challenge Grivas and the right-wing to come into the open in a presidential contest. He might sit tight, ignore the Bishops and continue to negotiate with the UN to resolve the Czech arms question.

408. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, March 3, 1972, 1622Z.

1231. Subj: Cyprus: Hellenism, Papadopoulos and Makarios.

1. An important characteristic of present Cypriot crisis is that it is primarily Greeks that are involved on both sides. It would be a mistake, therefore, to deal with the issue as involving Cyprus and a foreign state. Makarios and Papadopoulos both represent different views, or perhaps more accurately are competitively seeking to speak as defenders of Hellenism in Cyprus. Both have shown that they regard relations among Greeks as special in character as clearly reflected by original GOG approach and Makarios' reaction to date.

2. As Greeks they will be motivated by value standards appropriate to Hellenism, which has roots dating back to the pre-Christian era. There is much mysticism, myth and history wrapped up in this, one of the most ancient and persistent of ethnic motivations. Thus, the thought that Makarios might go to the UN to request any specific action against Greece must be viewed in this context. With Czech arms the original symbol of the confrontation, any recourse to the UN invokes memories of the bloody and costly war of the Greek people against the efforts of the Stalinist-directed Greek Communists to take

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, and USUN. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP.

over Greece. Moreover, the demand for action against the Communists will also inspire a keenly sympathetic note on the part of the generally conservative clergy of the Orthodox Church. Grivas, a Cypriot, is still a hero to many in this context. Greek reaction in Cyprus and here could be that Makarios would be considered by some as less than loyal to Greek Hellenism. Some might feel he also not sufficiently Christian in his approach. In addition, there would be others, particularly among the military, who would frown upon the importation of Communist arms in a struggle against Papadopoulos—the avowed exponent of God, country and family (underlining added).² This thinking, backed by likely tremendous psychological impact on the morale of Greeks in Cyprus of any possibility that Athens would “wash its hands” of Cypriot situation in event it is unable to realize its objectives of normalization of the Cypriot question, will cause Cypriot Greeks to listen carefully with both their hearts and their minds to the call from Athens for unity of Hellenism at this time.

3. The most positive element I find is that Hellenism’s leadership in Athens wishes to enlist the support of the Greek people but oriented towards making possible at long last the establishment of deep and special relations with Turkey. The negative element is that both Ankara and Athens are now military-backed regimes without a democratic basis. Will Makarios grasp the significance of the present movement? If he does not, it will be another excerpt in the long and dreary history of how the spirit of division among the Greek people has caused them to pay dearly in security and well being. Moreover, he could act in a way which would preserve the basic freedoms of the Cypriot people as well as the principle of election as the basis of power. But, I believe we are approaching the spirit which animated Atatürk and Venizelos to seek deep and permanent reconciliation in the thirties after the monumental disaster of the twenties. This offers exciting prospects indeed for the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean taken within the context of our vital security interests in the cohesiveness of this flank.

Tasca

² No underlining in the original.

409. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 8, 1972, 0845Z.

556. Subject: Cyprus: Czech Arms. Ref: Nicosia 539 (Notal).²

1. *Summary:* Czech arms to be placed under UN inspection. Greeks helped prepare original arms list. They could now effectively control the arms.

2. UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall, as well as Ambassadors of Austria and Spain and Canadian High Commissioner, saw Makarios March 8.

3. Osorio tells me Makarios confirmed that GOC willing to place Czech arms under UNFICYP inspection as a first step. Osorio now negotiating with FonMin Kyprianou to determine how and when this commitment should be formalized. Cypriots are resisting a formal agreement, but Osorio wants at least an exchange of notes detailing UNFICYP right and obligation to carry out periodic inspection.

4. In course of discussion with Archbishop Osorio asked how UN could be sure arms to be inspected represented entire quantity of arms imported. Makarios said this was simple matter. GOC would give UNFICYP list contained in original contract. It could be checked with Greek National Guard Commander Gen. Haralambopoulos, with whom list had been worked out by Cypriots.

5. *Comment:* Osorio speculates, rightly we believe, that Haralambopoulos was originally under impression arms would be given to National Guard. At some point, probably after arrival of Grivas, the signals were evidently changed. If this version of events becomes public and goes unchallenged, GOG case on the arms will lose some of its force. GOG will not be able to maintain that Cyprus Govt erred in secretly and independently ordering arms, which on arrival have impaired Cyprus stability and prospects for intercommunal settlement. It will logically be compelled, we would think, to limiting its protest to fact that Makarios has kept arms out of mainland Greek control—quite a different point and one which would be much less reassuring to Turks.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP.

² Dated March 7, it reported the willingness of the Cyprus Government to let the UN take control of the Czech arms. (*Ibid.*)

5. In actuality, Greeks are able to assume effective control of arms since they are now located in Athalassa compound, headquarters of both police and National Guard. A raiding forces battalion of National Guard has just been moved from Bellapais to Athalassa.

Popper

410. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, March 10, 1972, 1515Z.

593. Subject: Cyprus: End of Round Two.

1. *Summary:* We think round two in Greek Govt's confrontation with Makarios has effectively come to an end. Round three could, though it need not necessarily, involve violence.

2. For analytical purposes, Cyprus events since presentation of Greek demands to Makarios on Feb 11 can be considered to fall into phases. First began with presentation of Greek note, and was characterized by Makarios' adoption of posture of bland immobility in face of Greek demands, coupled with assiduous cultivation of popular support against Athens. Second round was introduced by March 2 action of Holy Synod, instigated by Athens, requesting Archbishop's resignation. This was followed, on March 3, by GOG's demand, submitted to Makarios by Greek Chargé through Clerides that Makarios immediately accept and implement Greece's Feb 11 conditions.

3. As of March 10, our feeling is that round two is now essentially over. We know, and can only assume that Greeks do as well, that Makarios' written reply to Feb 11 demands, when it is delivered, will show him unyielding on essentials relating to sovereignty of Cyprus and prerogatives of his office. We expect that within next day or two Makarios and UNFICYP will have concluded and published a reasonably satisfactory agreement on Czech arms—not going as far as to provide for UNFICYP custody but nonetheless an improved and tighter version of

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Repeated to Athens, Ankara, London, USNATO, EUCOM, USDOCOSOUTH, and USUN. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH-CYP.

1967 arrangement for inspection. (Septel.)² Revelation through news media that GOG Rep Gen Haralambopoulos conspired with Cypriots to import arms and then deny knowledge of deal is telling blow at confidence of Turkish Govt in Greece.

4. Archbishop's probable tactic in dealing with Holy Synod's request is also now coming into focus. His approach likely be two-fold. With request itself, he will temporize acknowledging that there may, in canon law, be grounds for debate on propriety of holding a presidential as well as ecclesiastic office, but that for him to resign as "suggested" after twice being duly elected would be to throw Cyprus into chaos. Other prong of his approach seems likely to be maneuver to unseat Yennadhio, Bishop of Paphos, and win acceptance of thesis that three septuagenarian bishops are not the Church of Cyprus, which is Cypriot people and priesthood in totality.

5. Unless GOG is much less well informed or more self-deceiving than we think, we judge that it is reading events about as we are. We consider that sudden return to Athens of Greek Chargé Zaphiriou morning of March 10 is relevant.

6. What of round three? Again, it is Papadopoulos' move. Cards he played on Feb 11 and March 2 have not produced the desired results. We have no way of knowing whether he will seize opportunity of Archbishop's reply, which we are sure will be drafted with an eye to leaving Greece some graceful exits, to reduce confrontation and seek compromise, or whether he will escalate using violence. Some Cypriots fear that being a military man and frustrated by seeming failure of his first two moves, he will resort to preplanned violence using, in first instance, Grivas. In this regard, interesting article in GOG controlled *Misimvriini* March 9 (FBIS M092018) could be construed as telegraphing the punch. Article says Grivas getting ready to strike because he cannot tolerate Cyprus slipping further toward Communist anarchy and enslavement . . . Grivas supporters adequately armed and ready to move . . . Makarios must go . . . timing of the impending strike is up to Grivas.

7. On his side, Makarios is acting as if he almost welcomes a sharpening of confrontation brought on by his refusal to bend. He can even be seen in some respects to be goading Greece on. In past couple days the Makarios controlled press in Cyprus has begun intensive needling of GOG, suggesting splits within the military elements of Athens regime, discreditation of Palamas and Panayotakos, Grivas' alleged refusal lend himself to Greece's traitorous, anti-enosis objectives, etc.

² The terms of the agreement were reported in telegram 599 from Nicosia, March 11. (Ibid.)

Kanellopoulos, Mavros, Zigidhis, et al, are being cited as the true voices of Greek people. And in another jab, Papadopoulos is challenged to let anyone who doubts this go to the polls.

8. In sum, it seems to us that we are moving into third round—round in which likelihood of violence is substantially increased. Compromise is still possible, but odds in favor of it seem smaller. We wonder whether Embassy Athens would share this assessment.³

Popper

³ In telegram 1450 from Athens, March 14, the Embassy reiterated the analysis made in telegram 971 from Athens, February 18 (Document 406) and warned that the Greek Government would ultimately be ready to use violence to secure its ends. The Embassy lobbied for a policy of U.S. non-involvement in the Cyprus crisis. (National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, DEF 19–6 CZECH–CYP)

411. Telegram From the Embassy in Greece to the Department of State¹

Athens, March 17, 1972, 1546Z.

1519. Subj: Cyprus and U.S. Interests.

1. We think it might be useful at this point, particularly in view of upcoming Erim visit to Washington, briefly to summarize this Embassy's assessment of current Cyprus situation. Basically, we see situation as follows:

2. Makarios has scored a number of points. However, rather than easing crisis, Archbishop's apparent tactical victories have made it even more likely that Greece will pursue aims set forth in its February 11 note.²

3. Turkish Government has made it quite clear that its security interests and those of Turkish community on island will be protected. At same time, GOT has taken stance that has encouraged Greek Government in its attempt to get Makarios to meet its demands. At this point much good will exists between our two NATO allies. (We note from

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 594, Country Files—Middle East, Greece, Vol. III Jan 72–Oct 73. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to Nicosia, Ankara, London, USNATO, and USUN. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP.

² See footnote 4, Document 396.

Ankara 1890³ that Turks seem to be mellowing somewhat even on questions of ecumenical patriarchate and minorities.) However, this good will could be quickly dissipated if GOG is unable to deal constructively with Cyprus issues important to Turks.

4. Our fundamental interest in this situation is in maintaining and strengthening friendly relations between Greece and Turkey. If Makarios can sit tight and continue to score propaganda points, thus frustrating both Greek and Turkish aims, it is not likely that our interests will be well served.

5. Most immediate problem is Czech arms. If arrangement agreed on between Makarios and UN not satisfactory to Turks, GOT may put strong pressure on Greek Government to settle this question. GOG then might issue ultimatum to Makarios that arms must be handed over to National Guard or UN. If, however, Turks accept present arrangement, or if they do not and Makarios subsequently agrees to improved arrangement, we may surmount immediate problem. Crisis would then enter new phase.

6. As we suggested at time current crisis began (Athens 971),⁴ best solution from our point of view may be for entire argument to return to arena of intercommunal talks (and this also probably best way of preventing eventual outbreak of violence). If arms question settled, best next development might be concerted effort by Greece and Turkey to get intercommunal talks immediately under way. If this could be accomplished we would assume, after what has taken place in past month, that Greece and Turkey would be able to play strong and constructive role in developing compromise solution.

7. We cannot predict what direction events will actually take. We should continue to avoid direct involvement, allowing our NATO allies, Greece, Turkey and U.K., to carry most of the burden. Nevertheless, to extent we can quietly influence events it should be in direction of getting intercommunal talks going—if and when arms question satisfactorily resolved.

Tasca

³ Dated March 16, it reported that Turkey expected Bishop Meleton to succeed the Patriarch. (Ibid., POL GREECE-TUR)

⁴ Document 406.

412. Intelligence Information Cable

Washington, March 27, 1972.

[Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; No Foreign Dissem; No Dissem Abroad; Controlled Dissem. 8 pages not declassified.]

413. Telegram From the Embassy in Turkey to the Department of State¹

Ankara, April 27, 1972, 1525Z.

3080. Subj: Meeting with Foreign Minister: Cyprus Intercommunal Talks.

Summary: While Government of Turkey in principle favors intercommunal talks, Bayulken says circumstances make it politically impossible for GOT agree resumption at present moment. These circumstances include (1) unsatisfactory settlement of Czech arms question (Bayulken credited UN SYG Waldheim with “great effort” and “step forward,” but not enough); (2) continuing bickering and disarray in Athens-Makaros relations which create feelings of insecurity in Turkish Cypriot community; (3) role of Grivas, in particular his reiteration, in concert with Makarios, of enosis as sole goal.

Bayulken said these conditions would make it political suicide for any Turkish Government to agree to resumption intercommunal talks at present. He said Turks were in process of making proposals to Waldheim aimed at eliminating these impediments. Proposals would be simultaneously made known to governments in Washington and London. While Bayulken did not spell out nature of proposals, appears Turks will seek great power (“U.S., U.K. and others”) backing of some kind. *End summary.*

1. During my meeting with Turkish Foreign Minister Bayulken on April 26, I asked him what he had to say about the current status of the Cyprus intercommunal talks question.

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 633, Country Files, Middle East, Turkey, Vol. III Jan 72–Dec 73. Secret; Immediate; Exdis. Repeated immediate to Nicosia, Athens, London, USNATO, and USUN. Another copy is *ibid.*, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP.

2. Bayulken began lengthy reply by observing that question was now at very difficult stage. Difficulties involve three major elements:

A. Czech arms. UN SYG Waldheim had made "great effort," but his approach was limited by his need to treat Greek Cypriot administration (i.e. Makarios government) as full government. Turkey considers it "government in quotes." Either Cypriot constitution exists or does not exist. Turkey had sought full UN custody or export of arms from island. Waldheim's solution was step forward but not far enough. Bayulken repeated that Waldheim had made "good effort."

B. Continuing disarray in Athens-Makarios relations created sense of insecurity among Turkish Cypriot community. This was intensified when Greek Cypriot press announced that Czech arms were for use against the Turks. Position of Athens itself was confused. Were they or were they not seeking Makarios' departure? Well-being of Turkish community was at stake.

C. Third element rendering current situation unsuitable for resumption of talks from Turkish vantage point was role of Grivas, Bayulken continued. It had been clear all along that his sudden flight from Greece to Cyprus must have been connived at by GOG. Grivas had surfaced several days ago and met Makarios, then announced last weekend in his public message to Makarios that bonds between himself and Makarios had been strengthened. Grivas also made clear that the two were in full accord on enosis as sole goal.

3. Bayulken then described history of earlier efforts to arrange intercommunal talks. He stressed two points. First, major consideration for GOT was to carry along Turkish Cypriot community. This was not easy. Second, Greeks had played games with Turks. Bayulken illustrated this with instance in which Olcay, after approach by Palamas, had agreed on how two governments would present proposals on modalities of intercommunal talks to UN, only to have Greeks back off subsequently from their jointly agreed position.

4. Bayulken painted picture of heavy domestic political pressure in Turkey, particularly on arms issue. Parliament and elements of Turkish military were accusing Government of softness and asking why GOT had not shipped arms to Turkish community, thereby forcing UN to deal with arms of both sides, not just one. He concluded that any government agreeing to resumption of talks under current circumstances would be toppled.

5. Bayulken said Ministry would on April 27 instruct Turkish Mission UN approach Waldheim with suggestions aimed at clearing atmosphere so that intercommunal talks could take place. These proposals would at same time be communicated to USG and HMG in Washington and London. Their adoption would make Turkish acceptance resumption intercommunal talks defensible before Parliament and

Turkish community Cyprus. GOT hoped great powers, U.S., U.K. and others, would support Turkish proposals and “give assurances” that would enable talks to resume. In a few weeks Turkey would have a government and Waldheim would have had opportunity to move forward with Turkish proposals. What was needed now was a cooling-off period and action by Waldheim “with your help.”

6. Throughout his comments, Bayulken expressed great impatience with Government of Greece, which he said constantly shifted position and had deplorable tendency leak key developments to press. As to Makarios, at one point Bayulken remarked with sly smile that Turks knew him well and had private channels of communication with him.² Difficulty was that what he said through private channels was not reflected in his public statements.

7. I confined myself to noting that as Bayulken had observed in Washington, U.S. favored intercommunal talks, and that it was my personal view that Waldheim formula on Czech arms had been a major step in literally defusing problem.

Handley

² In telegram 3130 from Ankara, April 28, the Embassy reported more fully Bayulken’s comments on Makarios, Denktash, and Grivas. (Ibid.)

414. Memorandum From Harold Saunders of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig)¹

Washington, May 5, 1972.

SUBJECT

Cyprus Situation

I understand that you asked Sam about the attached cable² reporting that Ambassador Bush, at Joe Sisco’s apparent instigation, had

¹ Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974. Secret; Exdis. Sent for action. Kissinger crossed out Haig’s name as recipient of the memorandum and wrote his own initials above it.

² Telegram 76361 to USUN, May 2. Attached but not printed.

told Waldheim we do not support Turkey's "tougher line" on the Cypriot-Czech arms and resumption of the intercommunal talks. I understand the concern that State may be edging instinctively toward unconsidered involvement in the Cyprus situation, and we need to keep a hand on that. We also have an interest in not souring our relationship with Turkey, especially after the Prime Minister's successful visit. Those concerns stand alongside our general interest in avoiding a confrontation over Cyprus and since some of the elements in the situation seem to have changed in recent days, it may be worth putting the present problem in perspective.

Background

Early last week the UN finally got Makarios to agree to an arrangement for its control over the Czech arms which also satisfied the Greeks.³ It goes considerably further than a simple UN "inspection" arrangement worked out in a similar situation in 1966, and the UN representative in Cyprus felt that it should satisfy Turkish requirements and clear the way for resumption of the intercommunal talks.

With the Czech arms issue presumably resolved, Waldheim then issued an appeal for resumption of the intercommunal talks⁴ according to the format agreed upon before the recent crisis broke last February. That format, you will remember, called for participation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, mainland Greek and Turk representatives and a UN representative. Waldheim was especially concerned to get the intercommunal talks restarted before the semi-annual Security Council meeting next month for renewal of the UN peace-keeping mandate on Cyprus. He is particularly worried that some of the governments that contribute troops to the peace-keeping force will begin withdrawing them if there seems to be no effort to move toward a settlement. The Canadians, who supply one of the most effective units, are talking about pulling out this summer.

The Greek Cypriots and Greece have both indicated their interest in starting the new intercommunal talks. But—to the UN's surprise—the Turks have shifted now to a much tougher posture which threatens the whole concept. To begin with, the Turks say that the UN-Makarios agreement on control of the Czech arms does not go far enough and is not satisfactory. Then in a reversal of their agreement last fall, the Turks are demanding that Waldheim obtain advance assurances from Makarios that (1) the Greek and Turk Cypriots negotiate on the basis of full

³ As reported in telegram 887 from Nicosia, April 20. (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)

⁴ Waldheim reported to the Security Council on June 15 that the appeal had been made on May 18.

equality; (2) the intercommunal talks be predicated on the understanding that the outcome will be an independent Cypriot state in which the two communities are “partners”; (3) enosis as an eventual solution be explicitly excluded; (4) the agenda focus on Turk interests (constitutional compromise) only. These Turkish preconditions are probably more than Makarios, or even the mainland Greeks, can accept. They actually amount to getting advance substantive commitments which the UN assiduously avoided in arranging the five-party format last fall and winter.

The toughening of the Turkish position results in part from the change of government in Turkey.⁵ There is, in effect, no government right now, and none of the caretakers wants to shoulder responsibility for beginning talks on a basis that would make them look soft on the Cyprus issue.

It was under these circumstances that Sisco and Bush decided—without asking us—to inform Waldheim that we do not support the tougher Turkish line. Sisco has laid down the principle that we do not want to get out in front and therefore want Waldheim to carry the ball. However, he has taken the line with the Turks—again without checking with us—that we thought the UN-Makarios agreement on the Czech arms was sufficient and that we felt the intercommunal talks were the best hope for progress. He has also pointed out the desirability of Turkey’s avoiding the appearance before the Security Council debate of being the party that killed the intercommunal talks.

Conclusions

The problem is how to keep the Turkish position from isolating Turkey, damaging Greek-Turkish harmony and creating a renewed sense of crisis on Cyprus. Whereas in February the Turks stood back with some confidence that the Greeks would not double-cross them, the present situation re-introduces the old aspect of Greek-Turkish confrontation. The Turks seem disillusioned with Greek handling of the Cyprus issue in the last two months and suspect that Athens, Makarios and Grivas may all be secretly lining up behind enosis. The fact that Turkey is without a government means that no one is available with the courage to put down those suspicions.

State is naturally concerned to see a new impasse in the way of talks, but the issue is how far we go in making this an issue in US-Turkish relations. State has started out taking the position that the Turkish stand is too rigid and has suggested to the Turks that they not get

⁵ Erim resigned on April 17 over opposition to the expansion of government powers to combat terrorism.

themselves in a box. Ambassador Handley in Ankara notes, however, that the prospects of successful *démarches* at this time are “very dismal.”⁶ To begin with the government crisis immobilizes them for the moment. Moreover, they appear determined not to see the Cypriot intercommunal talks restarted just for the sake of reducing immediate tension but want them to deal constructively with the Cypriot problem. Until now the Greeks have been doing Turkey’s work of softening up Makarios, but now the Greeks seem to have backed off and the Turks apparently may be moving to apply pressure themselves—if one can ascribe any strategy to their moves at all in the current political crisis.

The danger in State’s approach is that if we oppose the Turks too obviously, it will appear that we are ganging up with the Greeks and Makarios against them. So the art is not to encourage them on their present course but to avoid confrontation with them.

As I deduce your position, it would be that:

—we should let Waldheim carry the main brunt of the argument with the Turks now;

—we should not give the Turks the impression we are ganging up against them;

—we could talk to the Turks when the new government gets its feet on the ground about avoiding isolation when the Security Council debate nears;

—we can take a straightforward position, as we have for some time, of favoring intercommunal talks as long as we can do so in a low-key way without putting ourselves in open opposition to the Turks.

Is this a fair statement of the position?⁷

Recommendation: If you have not already done so, that you call Sisco and make sure he understands that we want a crack at any additional moves he is considering concerning Cyprus. Unless he gets this word from the right level he is likely to keep moving us into a position that challenges Turkey.⁸

⁶ In telegram 3231 from Ankara, May 3. (Ibid.)

⁷ Kissinger initialed the “Yes” option and added the handwritten note: “But above all I want the firmist possible *démarches* and I want *all* of them cleared here.”

⁸ In telegram 2871 from Athens, May 22, the Embassy reported that it had been informed by Greek officials that Turkey had dropped its preconditions to the resumption of intercommunal talks. (Ibid., RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP)

415. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, June 12, 1972, 1300Z.

1214. Subject: Cyprus: Estimate re Future Developments. Ref: State 102582.²

1. Following views are keyed to questions in reftel and are based on most recent info available to Embassy and [*less than 1 line not declassified*].

(A) By his letter of June 10 to Bishops (septel)³ Makarios has as expected defied Synod in a manner which conveys his disdain. Various courses now open to Bishops are described at some length in a separate message. Politically significant factors here are that Makarios has decided not to be bothered by anything Bishops can throw at him, and that there is, therefore, no chance of their succeeding in forcing his resignation from presidency. In fact, our understanding is that if they continue to press and annoy him, Archbishop considering going on offensive to remove Bishop of Paphos and charge the two others with various infractions of canon law. Archbishop has reportedly received word from Palamas that GOG, while not admitting contact with Bishops, will nevertheless work in appropriate ways to try to have them ease their stand.

(B) Announcement re formation of new cabinet expected June 15. Apparently Greece has signified its approval of principal appointments.

(C) Public support for Grivas since his return to Cyprus last fall has never been large and what support he had at first has been steadily eroding as Cypriots, by nature opportunistic, conclude Grivas not likely be a winner in this, his third Cyprus reincarnation. Nevertheless it is assumed Grivas has a hard core of gunmen and some strike by him at any time remains a possibility. We understand Makarios has no specific game plan as regards Grivas. His intention is to wait Grivas out, playing for time in an awareness that Grivas' support is steadily slipping away.

(D) Atmosphere in which expanded intercommunal talks getting under way is not good or conducive to fresh thinking. We do not think Makarios is much interested in compromise. To him, resumed talks are a convenient device to paper over his conflict with Greece, distract at-

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority.

² Dated June 9. (Ibid., POL 1 CYP)

³ Not further identified.

tention from Bishops and keep him at center stage in a continuing world problem. His posture of ostensibly earnest cooperation in new negotiation process has already won him one handsome dividend, a visit by UNSYG.⁴ We doubt Makarios' postural forthcomingness will prove translatable into accommodations of substance.

Clerides and UN are understandably annoyed at GOT and Denktash for having violated agreed terms of reference for June 8 inaugural meeting by heavy-handed injection of substance. Turks seem to be approaching coming negotiation with hard-nosed stand, emphasizing their insistence on separateness of Turkish-Cypriot administration. In short, present situation is not auspicious.

Left to their own devices, parties would probably do little this summer (Clerides is planning one-month vacation in August) and progress would be negligible. However, UNSYG Special Rep Osorio-Tafall will be anxious to produce movement. Understandings resulting from Bonn meetings of Greek and Turkish FonMins⁵ may be helpful. Particularly if Osorio has behind-the-scenes backing of USG he can keep parties' noses to the grindstone and perhaps achieve progress.

(E) As noted, Grivas is the main short-term threat to stability. GOG intentions remain obscure [garble] GOG is seen by many here as ultimately determined to remove Makarios by one means or another. Next rotation of Turkish contingent is expected in August and such rotations invariably add to tensions. However, weight of evidence is that Greece and Turkey presently disposed use their considerable influence for calm. This is very much a plus factor both as regards rotation and possibility of incidents (created by Grivas or otherwise) escalating. Beyond the 3-6 months period specified, a new phenomenon will bear watching. That results from a possible interaction between a resident ChiCom diplomatic mission and hitherto largely dormant left-wingers in Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities who are dissatisfied with conservatism of their elders, e.g. Maoists in AKEL and unemployed Turkish Cypriot university graduates. However, ChiComs will need some time to familiarize themselves and can be expected move cautiously.

2. As indicated para "D," we believe USG role can be quite important in determining whether enlarged intercommunal talks, for which everyone has worked so hard, succeed or fail. We would hope to see USG influence used discreetly but strongly in direction of a positive outcome.

Crawford

⁴ Waldheim visited June 6-8 during a June 6-9 trip to Greece, Cyprus, and Turkey.

⁵ They met May 30-31 during the NATO Ministerial meeting.

416. Record of Department of State Roundtable Discussion¹

Washington, June 13, 1972.

DISCUSSION OF CYPRUS PROBLEM

PARTICIPANTS

Ambassador Popper
Deputy Assistant Secretary Davies
Deputy Assistant Secretary Herz
Mr. Armitage, IO/UNP
Mr. Churchill, NEA/GRK
Mr. Boyatt, NEA/CYP
Mr. Dillon, NEA/TUR
Mr. Stoddard, INR/RNA/NE
Mr. Kimball, IO/UNP
Mr. Silva, NEA/GRK
Mr. Austrian, Embassy Nicosia
Mr. Rotklein, INR/RNA/NE
Mr. Long, NEA/CYP
Miss Vunovic, IO/UNP

Summary

The meeting was set up more to air views than to make policy decisions. The consensus of the meeting was the following:

- (1) A constitutional settlement is not in sight.
- (2) A modus vivendi or status quo settlement will probably be more realistic, but first the parties must go through the motions of trying for a constitutional settlement.
- (3) US influence is limited and should be reserved for the moment, awaiting a moment when the parties would be most receptive.
- (4) There may be a real argument in favor of reducing UNFICYP now.
- (5) We should be prepared to live with basically the present situation for a long time.

Discussion

Boyatt: The Greco-Turk dialogue contains dangers, especially since the massive withdrawal of mainland Greek forces in 1967, because Greece can't deliver on agreements with or promises to Turkey. The dialogue increases Turk expectations and makes the chances of Greece getting reckless more likely. The Bonn Greco-Turk agreement is not acceptable to Makarios. The USG would be better advised to

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Nodis. Drafted by Long, approved by Davies on July 3, and distributed to the participants.

encourage a GOC/GOT dialogue, as they are the only real players in the game.

There is a tendency for people to think that all that is needed in the talks is for Makarios to compromise. He has already made some compromises, and while he may be the major obstacle to a settlement, he is by no means the only one. The Turks and Turk Cypriots must also compromise.

I don't think a constitutional solution is coming, as neither seem prepared to compromise enough. As a result, the USG should not engage its diplomatic capital on such a settlement unless the parties appear very near to agreement and need only a final push. We would be better advised to work for a *modus vivendi* settlement. I suggest a return to London-Zurich with demilitarization save police forces. This would be a real victory for Turkey in public opinion terms, wouldn't change the status quo against the Turks, and would give Makarios the plus of wiping out the politico/military borders of the enclaves.

(*Note:* At this point it was decided to discuss three major topics: (a) The role of Greece, (b) Makarios as obstacle, and (c) when and how to expend US diplomatic capital.)

THE ROLE OF GREECE

Churchill: Beyond the certainty of Papadopoulos desiring better relations with Turkey, everything is very murky.

Davies: Greece has lost its assets in Nicosia, but the threat of a Greco-Turk move to double enosis remains as a threat in Makarios' mind, thus giving Greece some influence with him. We should also bear in mind that Greece might well receive Western support if it imposes a Cyprus solution.

Popper: The lesson of the latest crisis is that Greece is not a monolith. As a result, Greece might make a move in Cyprus, but I doubt that it would be as a result of a real scenario. In order to really move, Greece and Turkey must first agree on what they want done, and they don't seem to have so agreed.

Austrian: The military strength of Greece on the Island should not be underestimated.

Boyatt: I agree the National Guard can take all key points, but then what?

Popper: Let's agree to disagree.

Herz: We should bear in mind that the White House in the event of a Greek move would probably "let nature take its course" without either helping or hindering. We would simply be forced to then take our lumps in the UN, etc.

Popper: I doubt if we could maintain a “hands off” policy as a crisis proceeded, particularly in light of the Moscow meeting atmosphere.² The White House might now be more sympathetic toward discouraging a dynamic solution.

Dillon: Since the latest crisis Turkey is fairly discouraged with the Greek ability to deliver. I would have problems with us saying this to Turkey, however. I also agree that Turkey should talk with the GOC, but I don’t know how to achieve this.

Popper: How much initiative on Cyprus can we expect from the Melen Government?³

Dillon: None; they are not that interested in Cyprus.

Popper: But they are sending considerable funds to Cyprus, making belligerent statements, etc.

Stoddard: This is reactive.

Boyatt: (Referring to Herz comment above), the assumption behind such a White House attitude is that a dynamic move would go surgically, cleanly. It won’t; instead there will be a long messy period which would elicit some Soviet reaction.

Popper: The longer it takes, the worse it will get.

Herz: Please understand I was not advocating a “hands off” policy.

Boyatt: We should in fact expend capital to avoid the kind of dynamic move that would put us in such a situation.

MAKARIOS AS OBSTACLE

Popper: How much do we need Makarios to achieve a settlement? How stable would the GOC be without him? Could the GOC negotiate and agree on a settlement without him?

It is clear to me that Makarios can deliver a settlement, but that the GOC would negotiate more flexibly without him.

Silva: There are two traps here: First, assuming Greece has a single policy and, second, assuming that if Greece moves against Makarios, it will do so militarily. This is nonsense, since Turkey will prevent a Greek military move. It is much more likely that Greece will launch a conspiracy against Makarios (i.e., assassinate him).

Popper: This is always possible.

Boyatt: I don’t think Clerides could hold power; there are too many Cypriot leaders who are not willing to accept him.

Popper: Without Makarios I would expect Cypriot politics to become as individualistic as Greek politics. With him there is stability.

² Reference is to the Moscow summit May 22–30.

³ Ferit Melen formed a government on May 22.

U.S. ROLE

Popper: A possible return to London–Zurich would be difficult to achieve because it is a difficult system resting on the idea of a joint government. I see few signs of movement in that direction; rather the movement is toward a stable separation.

Boyatt: The latter means the continuance of two armed camps facing each other.

Popper: How about disarming at the same time?

Boyatt: This could be done, but what does Turkey get from that. London–Zurich, on the other hand, gives the Turks a diplomatic victory. Turkey wants too much; under a return to London–Zurich, they would retain the international guarantees and no longer have to pay the \$25 million dole. What they would not retain is the separation of the communities.

Popper: The real problem, however, is the willingness of the Turk Cypriots to give up the separation which they see as their protection.

Dillon: Turkey would like the symbol of London–Zurich, but there are other problems. With the enclaves you do have a certain stability in the sense that with the existence of two armed camps, all must be careful in their dealing with each other. If something happens to the Turk Cypriots when there are no enclaves, there would be more danger of a Turk intervention because Turk public opinion would insist on defense of the then defenseless Turk Cypriots.

Boyatt: Keeping the enclaves raises the risk of an accidental explosion.

Austrian: The Turk Cypriots will not give up the enclaves.

Boyatt: But will Ankara?

Austrian: I believe the Turk Cypriots could sell their point of view in Ankara.

Popper: Denktash says that once trust and confidence is built, you can move forward.

A basic question concerns whether we ought to encourage either a beefed-up local autonomy scheme or a tacit agreement to maintain the status quo.

Davies: At this point perhaps we should discuss Xenia Vunovic's proposal (attached)⁴ which, while maintaining the enclaves and the London-Zurich guarantees, gives the chance to work out problems of co-existence in Nicosia.

⁴ Not attached.

Popper: Cyprus is too small to separate out Nicosia. In addition, Nicosia is too central to the problem.

Vunovic: I chose one city because I felt the Turk Cypriots could not accept a loss of security in villages, many of which are remote. In addition, I felt that bringing the Turk middle class in Nicosia into the economy would be helpful.

Popper: Nicosia is the heart and center of the Turk Cypriot community.

Austrian: I agree. If the Turks were to accept this plan, the whole Cyprus problem would be settled. (Also, most Turk refugees are in Nicosia.)

Popper: What about Limassol?

Stoddard: It would seem odd to do it there.

Herz: An alternative would be to take smaller steps, to creep up to this in stages.

Rotklein: The Turks would object.

Popper: The problem is finding an acceptable trade off.

Herz: In Vienna after the War we had no trouble arranging joint police patrols, and decisions on who should have jurisdiction where. Could we achieve this in Cyprus by getting the GOC to extend economic benefits to the Turks. If this works, we could move onward.

Rotklein: Aren't we overlooking the forest for the trees? We have a bad atmosphere on Cyprus. If we could alleviate this atmosphere by, for example, getting a declaration from Greece that there will be no enosis . . .

Silva: Greece can't do it.

Davies: Could they make such a declaration in terms of Hellenism over-riding physical boundaries?

Rotklein: With the Turks declaring against partition.

Silva: It would have to be more positive in nature.

Dillon: Enosis is not the issue; Turk Cypriot fear of a shot in the back is.

Popper: This kind of declaration would have to be a part of a settlement.

Dillon: How far will Makarios go on local autonomy?

Popper: He is in no hurry.

U.S. POLICY

Popper: What and how much of a role should we play? Our suggestions, which we can easily keep making, have no great weight.

Davies: What capabilities do we have in fact?

Popper: Basically, we will be the last step, when all else has failed.

Stoddard: We could draw up a scheme of our own. We shouldn't be the cushion nor should we work through Greece.

Vunovic: Neither negotiators have any new ideas in mind. What happens if a deadlock now occurs? Either we, the UK, or the UN should do something now.

Popper: It is no problem for us to feed in ideas, to illustrate our continued interest and good will. If there is a deadlock on local autonomy, we should push small steps involving a trade off of economic benefits for the Turk Cypriots and a partial opening up of the enclaves for the GOC; at the same time we should discourage any evidence of a dynamic solution. Finally, we should accept the fact that the situation will continue like this for a long time.

Silva: Isn't there now a stronger threat of the UN putting pressure on Greece and Turkey?

Armitage: Just continuing as we are is dangerous with UNFICYP contributors getting restless, etc. If the talks deadlock shortly, I am not sure the contributors won't say enough is enough.

Popper: UNFICYP will probably decrease in size in the future. Since 1967, it has been proven that the communities can regulate their affairs and that 3,000 UN troops aren't necessary to keep the peace. There's no reason why we can't go to a 500–1,000 man observer force without an interpositionary role.

I don't think decreasing UNFICYP would now be a real source of pressure on the parties to compromise.

Davies: I think we should do a planning exercise on decreasing the force to an observer/dispute-resolving force.

We must continue to support the talks, I see no real change in our action scenario except in the sense of doing some contingency planning.

Vunovic: Will Turkey put up with a continuation of the talks?

Popper: Everyone is afraid of a vacuum. Besides, there is nothing they have to gain from stopping the talks.

Dillon: There would have to be a radical change in the GOT (e.g., a coup by *younger* officers).

417. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, September 16, 1972, 1040Z.

1717. Subject: Arms Delivery to Grivas.

1. *Summary:* Acting Pres Clerides informs us that security situation on island has sharply deteriorated. Grivas has received large clandestine arms import and crystallized his plans to strike against Makarios.

2. Acting Pres Clerides took DCM aside at social event Sep. 15. Said he had kept regular Council of Ministers meeting Sep 14 in session for several hours overtime, partly to brief Ministers on sharp deterioration in security situation on island. Through its penetrations of Grivas' organization, GOC has learned that large clandestine shipment of arms has arrived and been partially distributed to Grivas groups. Negotiations for this shipment, valued at 180,000 Cypriot pounds (US \$468,000) took place with an unidentified party in Lebanon. Shipment was delivered by three caiques to a point on the southeastern coast near Xylophagou River. Arms, believed to be largely but not entirely of Soviet manufacture, are thought to include 500 automatic weapons; heavy machine guns and bazooka-type weapons are believed to have been part of shipment.

3. Clerides stated at least partial distribution of weapons to Grivas supporters is indicated by visit paid to Makarios by small group of Grivas supporters who boasted of their new acquisition. GOC has report that further transaction, to include mines and explosives may be in the mill.

4. According to Clerides GOC intelligence service (CIS) first learned of shipment shortly after arrival through penetrations in Grivas entourage, and immediately informed Makarios and Clerides himself. Knowing that Greek services (KYP) are equally able to monitor Grivas activities, it was decided to keep this affair closely guarded secret and wait to see if KYP would inform GOC of its own accord. In fact, this occurred quite promptly but, in Clerides' view, it is not conclusive one way or the other. Clerides recalled that Greece informed Archbishop of Grivas absence from Athens very promptly after his disappearance from home last fall. At the time Clerides noted, Greek services, to his positive personal knowledge, had known for approximately two months of Grivas' plans to return to Cyprus.

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Secret; Priority; Limdis. Repeated to Ankara, Athens, London, USNATO, USDOCOSOUTH, EU-COM, and USUN.

5. Question in his mind, Clerides told DCM, was whether arms importation had been supported covertly by Greece as a signal that Makarios had better agree to a solution developed in intercommunal talks, or else. If GOG in some way involved and this was its intention, Clerides thought a serious error in calculation was being made. Clerides proceeded to explain why.

6. GOC, Clerides said, now has evidence that Grivas has crystalized his plans for action against Makarios. These are that he will strike to unseat Govt by force if Makarios should, between now and scheduled presidential election in Feb 1973, accept a solution ruling out enosis "as any viable solution must." If a solution has not been reached by Feb and Makarios holds the election and declares his candidacy, Grivas will strike then.

7. This plan, Clerides commented, runs directly counter to GOG's interest in a solution premised on an independent Cyprus and evolved between now and the end of the year in expanded intercommunal talks. If negotiators agree on a package proposal (Clerides discussion on this point is included in septel)² and Makarios decides to resist, he and Grivas will become natural allies.

8. Clerides stated that, ideally, Greece should cease to think of Grivas as potential leverage on Makarios, if it does, and use its influence to get him out of Cyprus before a solution is worked out in the talks. Clerides said he had made this point to GOG representatives.

9. Rermarking on other aspects of Grivas' organization and financing, Clerides said GOC believes Grivas thinks he can count on loyalty of 500 to 600 men. Actual number who would stand up and fight, however, is in GOC's opinion considerably less than that. Grivas' forces are by no means homogeneous. They include some committed enosis fanatics, a hard core of personal followers, a large number of Makarios penetrations, and a body of followers of the late Interior Minister Georkadjis. Many of last named retain allegiance to Unified Party (Clerides' own) and would not commit themselves in an effort to upset Govt by force without party approval. (This, Clerides implied but did not explicitly state, would not be forthcoming.)

10. On financing, Clerides stated that Grivas has received 50,000 Cypriot pounds (US \$130,000) from the Bishop of Kyrenia, 10,000 pounds (US \$26,000) from Bishop of Kitium, and a very large personal contribution from a mainland Greek shipping magnate.

11. As an example of the thoroughness of Makarios' penetration of Grivas' organization (belied, we would note, by failure to obtain

² Not further identified.

advance information on arms shipment) Clerides cited recent instruction given by Grivas to a subordinate to prepare report on means of bugging telephones of Pres and other senior Govt officials in such a way as to both eavesdrop on conversations and permit disruption of telephone services at such time as Grivas chose to attack. This request was in hands of Makarios and Clerides in less than 24 hours. Govt has been able to establish identity of individual concerned and has him under surveillance.

12. *Comment:* We are inclined to credit Clerides' report of clandestine arms shipment to Grivas although he has tendency to exaggerate somewhat. We will be seeking confirmation through other channels.

Popper

418. Telegram From the Embassy in Cyprus to the Department of State¹

Nicosia, December 1, 1972, 1530Z.

2181. Subject: General Grivas. Ref: Rome 7306, rptd as State 217750.²

1. Following comment from Cyprus vantage point on King Constantine's remarks re Gen. Grivas may be helpful in assessing info contained reftel.

2. We believe Grivas is as well prepared as he is ever likely to be. While his political front is shrill, poorly organized and unimpressive, his clandestine military force of some hundreds of armed conspirators is now trained, equipped and deployed for action on short notice. At least that is what high Govt officials tell us in their more nervous moments, and other evidence corroborates it.

3. We estimate Grivas forces could carry out isolated acts of violence such as attempts on lives of Govt leaders, seizure of police stations, telecommunications, utilities, and airport; but critical factor for success of any coup would be posture of mainland Greek-officered National Guard and of large Cyprus police force. This remains something

¹ Source: National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 27 CYP. Confidential; Nodis.

² Dated November 30, it reported that King Constantine had stated that he had information that Grivas was "fully financed, fully armed, and ready" to move against Makarios. (Ibid.)

of an enigma, but we tend to believe reports that as long as intercommunal talks are proceeding with prospects of success, Greek Govt and National Guard will keep Grivas under control.

4. Contrary to what King said, Makarios and Grivas have had only one meeting, on March 26, as far as we know. It produced no agreement.

5. King apparently saw FonOff DepDirGen Pelagias while in London. If Pelagias said Cyprus Govt could not move against Grivas because of his "foreign" (evidently Greek) support, he was taking a line in sharp contrast with Makarios. Latter tells us he could move effectively against Grivas if he wished, but states he is holding his hand in order not to provoke Grivas into military response which could upset tranquility, divide Greek Cypriot community, destroy prospect of intercommunal agreement, and perhaps ultimately result in partition of island.

6. Very difficult to estimate when Grivas might make his move. On the one hand, he cannot sit still indefinitely. On other, he does not presently seem to have clear Greek Govt support which would be essential for his purposes. His publicity organs have come out against holding presidential election scheduled for next February, on ground this would confirm Makarios—whom they regard as traitor to Hellenism—in office for five more years. Yet they are unable to present a candidate who would make an impressive showing against Makarios. In this context, we can see King's point that Grivas might feel compelled to strike against Makarios before elections take place. Should he do so, we think it would be a desperate operation, with Greek Govt reaction through National Guard and Cyprus police the crucial factor.

7. From our info we are unable to judge extent to which Constantine or Monarchist elements are involved in Grivas' movement.

8. Dept may wish pass this cable to Athens and Rome.³

Popper

³ In telegram 6975 from Athens, December 6, the Embassy stated that a Greek Government decision on support for Grivas would depend on circumstances at the time he made a move against Makarios. (Ibid., Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 592, Country Files—Middle East, Cyprus, Vol. I Jan 1969–June 30, 1974)