EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, PETITIONER V. COMMERCIAL OFFICE PRODUCTS COMPANY No. 86-1696 In The Supreme Court of the United States October Term, 1987 On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Brief for the Petitioner TABLE OF CONTENTS Question Presented Opinions below Jurisdiction Statutory provisions involved Statement Summary of argument A state or local fair employment practice agency's decision to waive its right initially to process a charge of discrimination "terminates" its "proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c) of Title VII, so as to allow the EEOC to assert immediate jurisdiction over the charge A. The language of Section 706(c) does not require that a state agency completely and forever surrender its jurisdiction over a charge to allow the charge immediately to be filed with the EEOC B. The legislative history supports the reasonableness of the EEOC'S view that a charge may be filed with the EEOC under Section 706(c) once a state agency waives its right initially to process a charge and seeks immediate EEOC jurisdiction C. Other provisions of Title VII support the EEOC'S view that the state agency's waiver of processing "terminates" its "proceedings" for purposes of Section 706(c) Conclusion OPINIONS BELOW The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 1a-20a) is reported at 803 F.2d 581. The order of dismissal of the district court (Pet App. 23a) is unreported. JURISDICTION The judgement of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 21a) was entered on October 15, 1986. A petition for rehearing was denied on December 23, 1986 (Pet. App. 22a). By order dated March 16, 1987, Justice White extended the time for filing a petition for a writ of certiorari to and including April 22, 1987. The petition for a writ of certiorari, which was filed on April 22, 1987, was granted on June 15, 1987 (J.A. 21). The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked under 28 U.S.C. 1254 (1). STATUTORY PROVISIONS INVOLVED Section 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c), provides in pertinent part: In the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State, which has a State or local law prohibiting the unlawful employment practice alleged and establishing or authorizing a State or local authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, no charge may be filed under subsection (a) of this section by the person aggrieved before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated * * *. Section 706(e) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), provides in pertinent part: A charge under this section shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred * * * except that in a case of an unlawful employment practice with respect to which the person aggrieved has initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief from such practice or to institute criminal proceedings with respect thereto upon receiving notice thereof, such charge shall be filed by or on behalf of the person aggrieved within three hundred days after the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred, or within thirty days after receiving notice that the State or local agency has terminated the proceedings under the State or local law, whichever is earlier * * * . QUESTION PRESENTED Whether a state agency's routine decision to defer initial processing of a discrimination charge to the Equal Eqployment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), pursuant to a worksharing agreement, constitutes a "terminat(ion)" of state proceedings within the meaning of Section 706(c) of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c), so that the EEOC may immediately deem the charge as filed, rather than being required to wait until sixty days after the commencement of state proceedings. STATEMENT 1. In Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e et seq., Congress attempted to coordinate federal and state efforts to resolve charges of employment discrimination over which both the EEOC (under Title VII) and a state or local fair employment practice agency (under state or local law) have jurisdiction. Under Section 706(e) of Title VII, 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e), a complainant must file charges with the EEOC within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, except that if a complainant has "initially instituted proceedings with a State or local agency with authority to grant or seek relief," the complainant may file charges within 300 days of the alleged discrimination, or within 30 days after receiving notice of the termination of those state or local proceedings, whichever is earlier. When there exists concurrent jurisdiction in a state or local agency and the EEOC, moreover, Section 706(c), 42 U.S.C. 2000e5 (c), provides that a charge is not deemed to be "filed" with the EEOC "before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." /1/ Hence, when there is a state or local agency with concurrent jurisdiction, a charge is always timely filed with the EEOC if, follwing its receipt by the EEOC, state or local proceedings are commenced within 240 days of the discriminatory act, while a charge received by the EEOC after 240 days will be timely filed only if the state or local agency "terminate(s)" those proceedings by the 300th day. Mohasco Corp. v Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 817 (1980). Congress also authorized the EEOC to cooperate with state and local agencies by entering into "written agreements" with those agencies in order to promote "effective enforcement" of Title VII. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-8(b); see also 42 U.S.C. 2000e-4 (g)(1). Accordingly, the EEOC has entered into "worksharing agreements" with approximately 81 of the 109 designated state and local fair employment practice deferral agencies that enforce state and local employment discrimination laws. These agreements typically provide that the stae agency will initally process certain categories of charges and that the EEOC will initially process others, with the state waiving its right to the 60-day exclusive processing period in the latter instance. See 29 C.F.R. 1601.13(c). In either instance, the deferring agency normally reserves the right to review the initial processing agency's findings of fact, which the EEOC must accord "substantial weight" (see 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(b)), and if appropriate, also to investigate a charge further after the initial processing agency has completed its proceedings. 2. On March 26, 1984, the complainant, Suanne Leerssen, submitted a charge to the EEOC, alleging that on June 10, 1983 - 290 days earlier - respondent, Commercial Office Products Company, had discharged her because of her sex (Pet. App. 2a, 27a). On March 30th, the EEOC transmitted a copy to the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD), which had concurrent jurisdiction over the charge (ibid). Attached was a transmittal form indicating that, pursuant to a worksharing agreemeet between the EEOC and the CCRD, the charge was to be initially processed by the EEOC (id. at 26a). /2/ On April 4, 1984, the CCRD indicated on the transmittal form, which it sent back to the EEOC, /3/ its "intention not to initially process the charge" (id. at 27a). On the same day, the CCRD sent a letter to the complainant, which advised her that "(t)o avoid duplication of effort, the * * * Division will take no action on your charge until the (EEOC) terminates its proceedings" (id.at 2a, 28a-29a). The EEOC proceeded to investigate the complainant's charge. Pursuant to its investigative authority, the EEOC issued a subpoena for production of information that respondent had declined to provide (Pet. App. 2a, 30a-32a). Respondent refused to comply with the subpoena, and the EEOC initiated this action for judicial enforcement of the subpoena (id. at 2a, 33a-37a). 3. The district court dismissed the EEOC's subpoena enforcement action (Pet. App. 2a, 23a; J.A. 12-20), holding that the EEOC lacked authority over the charge, and, hence, could not subpoena respondent for production of information. The district court reasoned that under Section 706(c) of Title VII the complainant's charge could not be filed with the EEOC until 60 days after it was received by the CCRD, which was beyond the 300-day limitations period established by Section 706(e). Relying on Klausner v. Southern Oil Co., 533 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.N.Y. 1982), the court held that a state agency's waiver of its right to an exclusive period for initial processing of a charge did not constitute a "terminat(ion)" of state proceedings, within the meaning of Section 706(c), with the result that the charge could not be deemed filed with the EEOC and processing by that agency could not begin until expiration of the full 60-day statutory period. /4/ 4. The court of appeals affirmed (Pet. App. 1a-20a). The court first held (id. at 5a-6a) that the 300-day limitations period was applicable because proceedings before the CCRD had been "initially instituted," within the meaning of Section 706(e). The court of appeals rejected (Pet. App. 6a) respondent's contention that the extended 300-day period was inapplicable because the complainant had filed her charge with the CCRD after the state's 180-day limitations period had run. The court of appeals, however, agreed with the district court that the complainant's charge was not filed within 300 days and that the EEOC therefore lacked authority to issue the subpoena (id. at 7a-16a). /5/ The court of appeals' decision rested on its conclusion (Pet. App. 9a) that a state agency "terminates" its "proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c), only when it "completely surrenders its jurisdiction over a charge." The court of appeals contended (Pet. App. 11a-12a (emphasis omitted)) that the EEOC's contrary construction of Title VII is inconsistent with congressional intent "that the state would act during its period of exclusive jurisdiction, and that the federal authorities would begin proceedings only if state proceedings failed to resolve the dispute." The court concluded (id. at 13a) that the EEOC'S reliance on the terms of worksharing agreements entered into by the EEOC and state or local agencies was misplaced because "(w)orksharing agreements cannot serve as a substitute for deferral." Examining the circumstances of this case, the court of appeals concluded (Pet. App. 12a-15a) that the CCRD had not "terminated" its "proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c). /6/ The court stressed (Pet. App. 15a (footnote omitted)) that although the CCRD did waive its right to process the charge initially, it also retained jurisdiction-reserving the right to act after the EEOC terminated its proceedings - and, hence, "did not finally and unequivocally terminate its authority over (the) * * * charge." Accordingly, the court found (id. at 16a), the complainant's charge was not formally filed with the EEOC until 60 days after the charge was first filed with the CCRD which was beyond the 300 - day limitations period (the charge was not filed with the CCRD until at least 290 days after the alleged discrimination (see id. at 2a)). /7/ For this reason, the court ruled (ibid.), the EEOC also lacked authority to issue the subpoena. Judge McKay dissented (Pet. App. 17a-20a). He contended that the meaning of "terminated" in Section 706(c) is ambiguous and that the court should therefore defer to the EEOC's reasonable interpretation, which is consistent with congressional intent to resolve doubts in favor of claimants and which has been upheld by every other court (except one district court) that has addressed the issue, including the First Circuit. 5. The EEOC filed a petition for rehearing and suggestion for rehearing en banc, which the court of appeals denied (Pet. App. 22a). Judge McKay, Logan, and Seymour voted in favor of rehearing en banc. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT Section 706(c) provides that an employment discrimination charge may not be "filed" with the EEOC before the expiration of 60 days after commencement of any state or local proceedings under state or local law concerning the same allegations, "unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated." 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5 (c). Section 706(c) therefore extends to states and localities that have enacted equal employment legislation the right to attempt resolution of discrimination claims arising within their boundaries for a period of up to 60 days before the federal government intervenes. Section 706(c), however, also explicitly contemplates that the state or local agency may "terminate()" its "proceedings" prior to the expiration of the sixty day period, and thereby allow the EEOC immediately to process the charge (if timely). In this case, there is no dispute that the opportunity for an initial exclusive period of processing was extended to the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD) and that the CCRD, with the expectation that the EEOC would "immediate(ly)" process the charge (see Pet. App. 49a), voluntarily waived its right initially to process the complainant's charge. The question raised in this case is whether the CCRD's waiver of initial processing fulfilled the deferral requirement of Section 706(c) and - because it occurred within the 300-day charge filing period provided in Section 706(e), 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(e) - thereby permitted the EEOC to accept the charge as timely filed and, hence, immediately to process the charge. It is our view - which is the interpretation of the agency (the EEOC) primarily responsible for implementation and enforcement of Title VII - that a charge may be deemed filed and, if timely, may be processed by the EEOC, once the state agency notifies the EEOC that it is declining to process the charge any further at present and wishes the EEOC immediately to process the charge instead. Contrary to the view shared by both the court of appeals (Pet. App. 15a) and respondent (Br. in Opp. 8-9), we do not believe that the EEOC was barred from acting for 60 days by the mere fact that the state agency in this case reserved the option to act after the EEOC processed the charge. The language of Section 706(c) is ambiguous, and neither contradicts our view nor compels the construction given by the court of appeals. At the very least, the EEOC's interpretation represents a plausible reading of the statutory language. Moreover, related provisions of Title VII and the statute's legislative history refute the court of appeals' view and fully support the EEOC's consistent construction of the statute. They demonstrate that Congress included the state agency deferral requirement to provide state agencies with the "opportunity" to have an exclusive period for processing an employment discrimination charge. They suggest, moreover, that Congress did not intend to deprive a state agency of the option of allowing the EEOC to process a charge immediately without the state agency first formally relinquishing forever its jurisdiction over the charge. Finally, they show that Congress sought expeditious processing of charges and the elimination of wasteful duplication of federal and state efforts. The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is consistent with all of these expressions of congressional intent, which provide no meaningful support for the claim that a state must completely surrender its jurisdiction forever in order to "terminate()" its "proceedings" within the meaning of that provision. The court of appeals' reading of the law, on the other hand, is inconsistent with congressional intent, in that it would disregard state and local agency preferences, invite needless delay, and prevent the consideration of numerous charges for no reason. The decision of that court therefore should be reversed. ARGUMENT A STATE OR LOCAL FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE AGENCY'S DECISION TO WAIVE ITS RIGHT INITIALLY TO PROCESS A CHARGE OF DISCRIMINATION "TERMINATE(S)" ITS "PROCEEDINGS," WITHIN THE MEANING OF SECTION 706(c) OF TITLE VII, SO AS TO ALLOW THE EEOC TO ASSERT IMMEDIATE JURISDICTION OVER THE CHARGE The decision of the court of appeals misconstrues a statutory provision intended to allow state and local agencies the opportunity of an exclusive period for processing charges of unlawful employment discrimination. Under the court of appeals' (and respondent's) view, the EEOC must defer processing a discrimination charge even when the state or local agency has agreed that the EEOC agreed that the EEOC should process immediately, and even when the charge will otherwise be barred by the applicable federal statute of limitations. /8/ That decision frustrates Congress's clear intent "to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination" (Mohasco Corp. v Silver, 447 U.S. 807 825 (1980)), turns on its head congressional intent to defer to state and local agency concerns, and needlessly prevents consideration of some charges. There is no meaningful support in the legislative history for the court of appeals' assumption that a state and local agency cannot "terminate()" its "proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c), without completely and forever reliquishing its jurisdiction over a charge. /9/ A. The Language Of Section 706(c) Does Not Require That A State Agency Completely and Forever Surrender Its Jurisdiction Over A Charge To Allow The Charge Immediately To Be Filed With The EEOC While a court must surely "give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress," Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-843 (1984) (footnote omitted), in this case the language of Section 706(c) does not "unambiguously express()" congressional intent. Section 706(c) provedes that "(i)n the case of an alleged unlawful employment practice occurring in a State, or political subdivision of a State (with concurrent jurisdiction) * * *, no charge may be filed (with the EEOC) * * * before the expiration of sixty days after proceedings have been commenced under the State or local law, unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated * * *" (42 U.S.C. 200 e-5(c) (emphasis added)). Contrary to the decision of the court of appeals (Pet. App. 8a-9a, 13a n.13 (emphasis in original)) the statutory phrase "unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated" does not unambiguously express congressional intent that a state agency must "completely surrender its jurisdiction over such a charge" and thereby "completely relinquish its authority to act on the charge at that point or in the future." First, the plain meaning of "proceedings" in Section 706(c) is not the legal equivalent of "jurisdiction" or "authority." The term "proceedings" is ambiguous and its meaning, as this Court has noted in other circumstances, depends upon its statutory context. Compare North Carolina Department of Transportation v. Crest Street Community Council, Inc., No. 85-767 (Nov. 4, 1986), slip op. 5-9 with New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. 54, 60-66 (1980). Congress's use of the term "proceedings" in Section 706(c), moreover, is consistent with the EEOC's reading of that provision. "(P)roceedings" may plausibly refer to only those initial proceedings commenced under state or local law. Section 706(c) provides that the full 60-day deferral period shall apply "unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated" (emphasis added). The modifier "such" refers back to those proceedings already "commenced" under state or local law. The statutory language makes no explicit reference to those proceedings that the state agency might choose to intiiate following the EEOC's determination. Contrary to the reasoning of the court of appeals, the language of Section 706(c) never specifically addresses the wholly distinct issue whether a state or local agency may have any continuing "jurisdiction" or "authority" over a charge once it has terminated its initial "proceedings." The word "terminated" likewise does not unambiguously express Congress's intent that state or local agency jurisdiction must be forever abandoned. "Terminated" may plausibly refer to a "cessation in time"; it does not necessarily contemplate a cessation for all time. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary 2359 (Merriam-Webster ed. 1976) ("to bring to an ending or cessation in time, sequence, or continuity"). /10/ See also Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d 817, 821 (1st Cir. 1985) (emphasis omitted)("'Terminated' in section 706(c) could * * * mean a temporaty cessation, or an ending of a defined segment of action."). The plain meaning of the relevant statutory language therefore does not resolve this case. The language of Section 706(c) neither plainly and unmistakably endorses the EEOC's construction nor does it preclude that construction. At the very least, the statutory requirement that state or local "proceedings" be "terminated" may plausibly be read as being satisfied when, as in this case, the state agency has halted its investigation of a charge, deferred the matter to the EEOC for immediate processing, yet reserved the option of asserting its jurisdiction following the EEOC's determination. /11/ B. The Legislative History Supports The Reasonableness Of The EEOC'S View That A Charge May Be Filed With The EEOC Under Section 706(c) Once A State Agency Waives Its Right Initially To Rocess A Charge And Seeks Immediate EEOC Jurisdiction Because the meaning of Section 706(c) is not compelled by the plain meaning of its language, examination of the relevant legislative history is warranted. That history may shed further light on "the objects and policy of the law" and, accordingly, on the meaning of the particular words chosen by Congress in the statute. Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 650 (1974) (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How). 183, 194 (1857); see United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., No. 84-701 (Dec. 4, 1985), slip op. 10; Chemical Manufacturers Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 126 (1985); Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S. 259, 266 (1981); Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1976). In this case, examination of the legislative history shows that the EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is reasonable because it is true to the policy and objectives that prompted Congress to adopt that provision's deferral requirement. 1. The relationship between the EEOC and state and local fair employment practice agencies under Title VII was an improtant topic of discussion and compromise in the legislative enactment of Title VII. The numerous civil rights bills initially proposed, including the version that passed the House (H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 2d Sess., 110 Cong. Rec. 2511-2512, 12598 (1964)), did not include a state or local agency deferral requirement. The House-passed version instead "contained a 6-month limitations provision for the filing of charges with the EEOC, and directed the EEOC to enter into agreements with state agencies providing for suspension of federal enforcement" (Mohasco, 447 U.S. at 819 (footnote omitted)). Under that proposal, the EEOC was directed to "rescind any such agreement when it determines (the state) agency no longer has (power to eliminate and prohibit discrimination in employment), or is no longer effectively exercising such power" (H.R. 7152, supra, 708(b), 110 Cong. Rec. 2511-2512 (1964). The House bill was criticized by Senator Dirksen, among others, /12/ for allowing the exclusive jurisdiction of the state agency to hinge on the EEOC's judgment whether the state agency's authority was "effective()." 110 Cong. Rec. 6449 (1964). According to Senator Dirksen (ibid.), "such language (is not) appropriate. The people of the State should have the right to determine the effectiveness of their agencies, consistent with the expressed purposes of this section." See also id. at 7784 (remarks of Sen. Smathers) (criticizes bill for its failure "to defer any Federal action until the State has had an opportunity to apply its own laws"). Proponents of the bill in the Senate at first opposed efforts to amend Title VII to address this concern. /13/ They later agreed, however, to revise the language once it became apparent that some compromise would be necessary to overcome a filibuster that was jeopardizing the bill's passage. See 110 Cong. Rec. 12593-12595 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Clark); id at 12580 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. at 818-819. The aim of ensuing negotiations, which were led by Senators Mansfield and Dirksen, was "a practical solution for the problem which is involved where State and Federal jurisdictions are concerned" (110 Cong. Rec. 8192 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)). As described by Senator Dirksen (id. at 8193), they sought, inter alia, to "develop language which will assure the States on" the problem "of the steady and deeper intrusion of the Federal power." The negotiations produced a bipartisan compromise substitute, known as the "Dirksen-Mansfield substitute," which ultimately became part of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. See 110 Cong. Rec. 11926- 11935 (1964). The substitute proposed, among other things, adoption in Section 706(b) of the relevant language at issue in this case, which is currently set forth in Section 706(c). /14/ The debate surrounding the merits of this new language reveals the legislative purpose and policy that lay behind it. As described by this Court, "(t)he history identifies only one reason for treating workers in deferral States differently from workers in other States: to give state agencies an opportunity to redress the evil at which the federal legislation was aimed, and to avoid federal intervention unless its need was demonstrated." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. at 821 (footnote omitted; emphasis added). /15/ See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 12688 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall) ("preserving the opportunity and authority of the State and local governments to work out their own problems if they are willing to do so"); id. at 12708 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("Provisions have been inserted in * * * (T)itle()(VII) to give States which have * * *fair employment practices laws * * * (the) reasonable opportunity to act under State law before the commencement of any Federal proceedings * * * ."); id. at 12721 (remarks of Sen Humphrey) ("(T)he individual complainant cannot file his charge with the (EEOC) until the State or local agency has been given an opportunity to handle the problem under State or local law."); id. at 13091 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("to give the States the first opportunity"); id. at 14313 (remarks of Sen. Miller) ("(T)his bill gives the States the opportunity to carry out their responsibilities first * * *"); see also id. at 12724-12725 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Senator Humphrey accordingly explained that the deferral provisions were added to make the substitute package a "States rights bill." 110 Cong. Rec. 12724-12725 (1964). Senator Dirksen stated that "instead of confusion and a waste of time, the result (of the substitute) would be time economy and the expeditious handling of cases" (id. at 9790; see id. at 8193 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) ("assure individual complainants that they will have fair and expeditious consideration of their grievances")). Deference to the states and expeditious, nonwasteful processing of charges therefore were the principal motivating factors behind Congress's adoption of Section 706(c)'s deferral requirement. /16/ 2. The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is consistent with those expressions of congressional intent. To permit the EEOC to assert immediate jurisdiction when the state declines initially to process a charge "serves the primary purpose of the statute - to give states the chance to go first in processing employment discrimination claims - while furthering the broad policy of Title VII to provide relief from such discrimination as quickly as possible." Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d at 826. Cf. Love v. Pullamn Co., 404 U.S. at 526 ("The procedure complies with the purpose both of 706(c), to give state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints, and of 706((e)), to ensure expedition in the filing and handling of those complaints."). The state and local agencies are provided with the "opportunity" to have a 60-day exclusive period for processing the charge, yet they may choose to waive that right and not act. Deference to State and local agencies therefore is maintained under the EEOC's reading of Section 706(c)'s deferral requirement. At the same time, Congress recognized that states would not always "choose to exercise (the) opportunit(y)" to resolve discrimination complaints and suggested that, in instances where the state is "unable or unwilling" to provide relief, "the Federal Government must have the authority to act." 110 Cong. Rec. 12725 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey). Only "if there is possible reason to believe that a State agency will deal with the matter, * * * will (it) have 60 days in which to deal with it, before the Federal agency can be call in * * *" (id. at 13090 (remarks of Sen. Case)). This principle - that the federal government has the authority to act when the state declines. to exercise its deferral opportunity - is applicable regardless of the reason for the state's inaction. Cf. Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. at 761 ("Individuals should not be penalized if States decline, for whatever reason, to take advantage of the(ir) (deferral) opportunities.") 3. The legislative history also demonstrates the unreasonableness of respondents' and the court of appeals' proffered construction of Section 706(c). Indeed, their construction turns on its head the very purpose of Title VII'S deferral requirement: deference to State fair employment practice agencies. In this case, for instance, the Colorado Civil Rights Division (CCRD) has affirmatively stated that it does not want to process the complainant's charge initially and that it instead wants the EEOC to process the charge immediately. /17/ Respondent and the court of the circumstances of this case to require either the EEOC to delay its own action until 60-day period has run or for the State agency to relinquish completely and forever its jurisdiction over the charge. Either option frustrates important congressional policies expressed in the legislative history. First, a 60-day delay /18/ before processing by the EEOC "would serve no purpose." Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d at 825. During that period, the state agency would be unwilling to act and the EEOC would be unable to act. /19/ Such a needless hiatus would thwart Congress's clear intent "to encourage the prompt processing of all charges of employment discrimination." Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. at 825 (footnote omitted); see S. Rep. 92-415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 24 (1971); 110 Cong. Rec. 8193 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) ("assure individual complainants that they will have fair and expeditious consideration of their grievances"); see also Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. at 525-526. /20/ The harm caused by such a requirement is not confined, moreover, to needless delay. As illustrated by the circumstances of this case, the position urged by respondent and accepted by the court below could needlessly render untimely thousands of pending Title VII employment discrimination charges that were received first by the EEOC more than 240 days after the alleged discriminatory act. /21/ In such a situation, a charge submitted to the EEOC is therefore too early until it is too late, notwithstanding the state agency's desire for immediate EEOC processing. The alternative option - for the state or local agency to "completely surrender its jurisdiciton over a charge" (Pet. App. 9a) likewise finds no support in the legislative history. Congress was concerned with safeguarding states' rights and providing states with a limited prior "opportunity" to act. The legislators evinced no intent to require state and local agencies to relinquish their jurisdiction forever in order to allow the EEOC immediately to process a charge. Rather, the wording of the deferral requirement, which received "meticulous attention" (110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen)), /22/ Suggests that whether a state or local agency retains some modicum of jurisdiction was not a matter of concern to Congress. In particular, Congress's choice of the term "proceedings" suggests that Congress was concerned with simultaneous federal and state (or local) agency investigations and hearings. Most likely, Congress hoped to render more meaningful any state or local proceedings initially instituted by barring the instigation of any simultaneous federal proceedings for at least 60 days. The problem of this case, the state agency allows the EEOC initially to process the charge and the state agency merely retains jurisdiction over the charge so that it might act following termination of the EEOC proceedings. There are also legitimate, noncontroversial reasons why a state agency might prefer not to relinquish quthority over a charge for all time. The EEOC does not relinquish its authority under federal law when a state agency is processing a charge and a state agency may prefer to maintain an equivalent and symmetrical relationship with the EEOC when, pursuant to a worksharing agreement with the state agency, the EEOC is initially processing the charge. The state may simply prefer to avoid the appearance of state abdication of state authority or there may be very concrete reasons why it is unwilling to relinquish completely its jurisdiction. Where, for example, the state employment discrimination statute provides broader coverage than does Title VII, the EEOC's initial investigation might subsequently reveal that the Commission lacks jurisdiction under Title VII because the employer does not have 15 employees or because the employer is a bona fide private mebership club (see 42 U.S.C. 2000e(b)). In such a case, where state law applies to an employer with fewer than 15 employees or to a bona fide private membership club, the complainant's sole administrative remedy would be with the state agency under state law. If the state or local agency had "completely surrendered its jurisdiction," however, the individual complainant would be without a remedy. /23/ Hence, the second option would flout the preferences of those very state and local agencies to which Congress so plainly intended in Title VII to defer. The state and local agencies have registered in their worksharing agreements with the EEOC their preference for retaining some residual jurisdicition over a charge even while allowing the EEOC initially to process the charge in their stead. /24/ The legislative history nowhere suggests that Congress intended to deny the agencies that option. It instead expresses a general intent to accommodate their desires. Respondent's invitation to restrict the ability of state and local agencies to terminate their proceedings under Section 706(c) therefore should be declined. C. Other Provisions Of Title VII Support the EEOC's View That The State Agency's Waiver Of Initial Processing "Terminates" Its "Proceedings" For Purposes Of Section 706(c) The reasonableness of the EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is also supported by expressions of congressional policy and purpose manifested elsewhere in other, related, parts of Title VII. See Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. at 650 (quoting Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) at 194) ("When 'interpreting a statute, the court will not look merely to a particular clause in which general words may be used, but will take in connection with it the whole statute * * * and the objects and policy of the law, as indicated by its various provisions' * * * ."). These provisions reflect a congressional commitment to respect a state or local agency request, not coupled with a total relinquishment of its jurisdiction, that the EEOC immediately assert jurisdiction over a charge. They also show that Congress favored the type of federal-state cooperative efforts attacked by respondent in this case. 1. Section 706(d) of Title VII provides that when a charge is filed by a member of the EEOC alleging an unlawful employment practice occurring in a state or locality with concurrent jurisdiction, "the Commission shall, before taking any action with respect to such charge, notify the appropriate State or local officials and, upon request, afford them a reasonable time, but not less than sixty days * * *, unless a shorter period is requested, to act" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(d) (emphasis added)). Congress thus expressly provided that a state agency could, for whatever reason, appropriately notify the EEOC that it should proceed immediately to process a charge filed by a member of the EEOC. There is no requirement that the state agency completely and forever surrender its jurisdiction over the charge. Nor must the EEOC needlessly delay its efforts for the full 60-day period once the state agency has notified the EEOC that it should proceed without futher delay. It is reasonable to assume that Congress intended the same result for those charges within the scope of Section 706(c). The variation in wording between Section 706(c) (60 days "unless such proceedings have been earlier terminated") and (d) (60 days "unless a shorter period is requested") does not suggest otherwise. As this Court has previously remarked in a different context, the "difference in wording between 706(b) (now (c)) and 706(c) (now(d)) seems to be only a reflection of the different persons who initiate the charge." Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526-527 n.6 (1972) (citing Developments in the Law, Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 Harv L. Rev. 1109, 1214 n.117 (1971)). Moreover, there are repeated statements in the legislative history that Congress intended the "same" time limitations to apply in Section 706(c) and (d). See 110 Cong. Rec. 12690 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall); id. at 15896 (remarks of Rep. Celler); see also Staff of the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., Legislative History of the Equal Employment Opportuniity Act of 1972, at 1771 (Comm. Print 1972) (remarks of Sen. Williams). 2. The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is also supported by those provisions of Title VII in which Congress sought to promote federal-state cooperative efforts. The prospect of federal-state cooperative efforts in redressing employment discrimination was widely applauded by all sides during the formulation of the equal employment legislation and during the subsequent legislative debates on Title VII, /25/ and Section 705(g)(1) of Title VII accordingly authorizes the EEOC "to cooperate with and, with their consent, utilize regional, State, local, and other agencies * * *" (42 U.S.C. 2000e-4(g)(1)). Section 709(b) more specifically provides that "(i)n furtherance of such cooperative efforts, the Commission may enter into written agreements with such State or local agencies * * *." 42 U.S.C. 200 e-8(b). Pursuant to those provisions, the EEOC has entered into worksharing agreements with 43 states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands, and approximately 35 local agencies. These worksharing agreements seek to maximize the efficiency of both state and federal efforts and to minimize the burden on employers by avoiding simultaneous state and federal proceedings. They are predicated upon a "division of labor" of charge processing; under these agreements, the state or local agency agrees to waive initial processing rights over some charges to permit expeditious federal processing and to allow the state or local agency to focus its resources on cases that the EEOC is not simultaneously processing. The EEOC is not simultaneously processing. The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c), which provides that such a waiver "terminate(s)" state or local "proceedings" so as to permit the EEOC immediately to process a charge (see 29 C.F.R. 1601.13(a)(5)(ii)(A); 52 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1987)), is therefore necessary to the present operation of these worksharing agreements. It allows the agencies and the EEOC to work harmoniously towards and expeditious and fair resolution of discrimination charges, without wasteful delay or duplication of effort and also without requiring either sovereign to abdicate their statutory responsibilities. /26/ Worksharing agreements therefore are not, as the court of appeals claims (Pet. App. 13a), simply "a means of circumventing the clear statutory framework and Congressional intent requiring deferral to state agencies." Nor, contrary to respondent's suggestion (Br. in Opp. 12), do they constitute a "sleight-of-han, paper shuffling procedure" to evade the requirements of Title VII. Those agreements are a "method of cooperation which has evolved as the practical solution to the concurrent jurisdiction given by Title VII." Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d at 824. They represent precisely the the sort of cooperative federalism Congress hoped to encourage in Title VII when it included Section 706(c)'s deferral requirement. Cf. New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at 64 n.4 (approving worksharing agreements as a means to "facilitate the processing of complaints"). Respondent's proposed construction of Section 706(c) would jeopardize the operation of these agreements. /27/ CONCLUSION The judgment of the court of appeals should be reversed. Respectfully submitted, CHARLES FRIED Solicitor General DONALD B. AYER Deputy Solicitor General RICHARD F. LAZARUS Assistant to the Solicitor General CHARLES A. SHANOR General Counsel GWENDOLYN YOUNGREAMS Associate General Counsel VELLA M. FINK Assistant General Counsel DONNA J. BRUSOSKI Attorney Equal Employment Opportunity Commission AUGUST 1987 /1/ In order to ensure compliance with Section 706(c)'s deferral requirement, the EEOC accepts charges of discrimination from individuals who have not previously filed claims under state law, and then transmits a copy of the charge to the appropriate state or local agency. See Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 525-526 (1972). /2/ The worksharing agreement then in effect provided, inter alia, that each agency would take "primary responsibility" for processing the charges first submitted to it (see Pet. App. 48a). /3/ Respondent suggests (Br. in Opp. 3) that the EEOC never received the charge transmittal form completed by the CCRD (see Pet. App. 27a). The EEOC disputed this same suggestion in the courts below. See Brief for Appellant EEOC 3. According to the EEOC, the CCRD maintains that it sent the form to the EEOC, as is contemplated by 1 EEOC Compliance Manual Section 5.3 (1987), and additionally contacted the EEOC by telephone to transmit the agency's waiver orally. See Pet. App. 38a-39a. While the district court never made a formal factual finding on the issue, the court of appeals stated that the completed form had been sent back to the EEOC and the court no doubt presumed that the completed form had been received by the EEOC. See Pet App. 2a ("The CCRD returned the charge transmittal form to the EEOC and indicated that the CCRD waived its right to initially process the charge."). In all events, neither court based its ruling on respondent's suggestion. /4/ On June 14, 1985, following the district court's decision, the CCRD wrote the complainant a leter stating that the Division had never had jurisdiction over her charge because it had not been filed with the Division within the limitations period provided by state law (180 days) (Pet. App. 55a-56a; see Reply Memo 4 n.2). /5/ The court of appeals declined (Pet. App. 2a-3a) to rule on the question whether a subpoena enforcement proceeding is the appropriate stage at which to raise the timeliness of a Title VII charge as a defense, because that argument was not raised in the district court (ibid.). The EEOC does not challenge that aspect of the court of appeals' decision in this Court. /6/ The court expressly disagreed (Pet. App. 8a-9a & nn.6-7) with the First Circuit's decision in Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d 817 (1985), which upheld the EEOC's view that a state agency's decision to waive initial processing constitutes a "terminat(ion)" of its "proceedings," within the meaning of Section 706(c). The court of appeals also distinguished (Pet. App. 13a n.13) its decision in this case from its previous decision in Barela v. United Nuclear Corp., 462 F.2d 149 (10th Cir. 1972), where the court had upheld the timeliness of an employment discrimination charge referred by a state agency to the EEOC. The court noted (Pet. App. 13a n.13 (emphasis in original)) that in Barela, unlike in this case, "the state agency * * * made a decision to completely relinquish its authority to act on the charge at that point or in the future." /7/ The court also rejected (Pet. App. 15a n.14) the suggestion that the CCRD had terminated its proceedings prior to the 300th day because, as stated in its June 14, 1985, leter to the complainant (see note 4, supra), the charge was filed after the state limitations period had run and therefore the agency "at no time had jurisdiction over (the) charge." The court found that the state limitations period was not self-executing and that therefore the Colorado agency did possess jurisdiction at least until it wrote the letter to the complainant on June 14th, which was after the federal limitations period had run. /8/ The court of appeals agreed (Pet. App. 5a-6a) with the EEOC that the 300-day limitations period provided for by Section 706(e) is applicable in this case. In Dixon v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 787 F.2d 943 (1986), petition for cert. pending, No. 86-181, the Fourth Circuit concluded that the 300-day charge filing period, made available under Section 706(e) when the complainant "initially institute(s) proceedings" with a state or local agency, does not apply where (as in both Dixon and in this case) the state agency has entered into a worksharing agreement determining that the EEOC rather than the state will initially process the complainant's charge. /9/ The numerous lower courts which have addressed the issue presented in this case are virtually unanimous in upholding the EEOC'S construction of 'section 760(c). See Isaac v. Harvard University, supra; Hamel v. Prudential Insurance Co., 640 F. Supp. 103, 107 n.2 (D. Mass. 1986); Hatzopoulou v. American Steel Foundries, 39 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 372 (N.D. Ill. 1985); EEOC v. Ocean City Police Dep't, 617 F. Supp. 1133, 1140-1141 (D. Md. 1985), aff'd on other grounds, 787 F.2d 955 (1986), rev'd on reh'g, 820 F.2d 1378 (4th Cir. 1987) (en banc); Thompson v. International Ass'n of Machinists, 580 F. Supp. 662, 665-667 (D.D.C. 1984); Yeung v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., 504 F. Supp. 422, 424 (N.D. Cal. 1980); Cattell v. Bob Frensley Ford, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 617, 618-619 (M.D. Tenn 1980); Lombardi v. Margolis Wines & Spirits, Inc., 465 F. Supp. 99, 101-102 (E.D. Pa. 1979); see also Steissberger v. Rockwell International Corp., 29 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1273, 1274 (E.D. Wash. 1982); Morgan v. Sharon Pennsylvania Bd. of Education, 445 F. Supp. 142, 145 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Greenlow v. California Dep't of Benefit Payments, 413 F. Supp. 420, 424 (E.D. Cal. 1976); EEOC v. Rinella & Rinella, 401 F. Supp. 175, 184 (N.D.Ill. 1975); but see Klausner v. Southern Oil Co., 533 F. Supp. 1335 (N.D.N.Y. 1982). /10/ "Cessation" is defined as "a temporary or final ceasing or discontinuance (as of action)" Webster's Third New International Dictionary, supra, at 367. /11/ The EEOC's construction of Section 706(c) is entitled to "great deference" and, if reasonable, should be upheld because the EEOC is the agency primarily responsible for implementation and enforcement of Title VII. See Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 761 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-434 (1971); see also Clarke v. Securities Industry Ass'n, No. 85-971 (Jan. 14, 1987), slip op 14-15; Young v. Community Nutrition Institute, No. 85-664 (June 17, 1986), slip op. 5-7; Connecticut Dep't of Income Maintenance v. Heckler, 471 U.S. 524 (1985). /12/ See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 5820 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Stennis)("T)he Federal Commission would be the sole judge of whether a State agency is effective. * * * (T)his Federal Commission may - without consent or review from anyone - completely disregard the State agency and assume full authority on equal employment matters in the States.") /13/ See 110 Cong. Rec. 6550 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey) ("It has been suggested that this direction to the (EEOC to enter into agreement with State agencies) is not enough, that there should be some provision automatically providing for exclusive State jurisdiction where adequate State remedies for discrimination in employment exist. Such a proposal is unworkable. Congress cannot determine nor can we devise a formula for determining which State laws and procedures are adequate. * * * The Commission must have authority to determine in which States and in which classes of cases it will refrain from exercising its jurisdiction."); id. at 7214-7216 (Interpretative Memorandum submitted by floor managers Sens. Clark and Case in response to Sen. Dirksen's criticisms) ("Title VII leaves state and local (employment discrimination) laws untouched. * * * (I)t does not repeal nay consistent State or local laws.") /14/ A 1972 amendment to Title VII added a new subsection (a) to Section 706. Section 706(b) and (d) in the 1964 version accordingly became Section 706(c) and (e) in the 1972 amended version. See Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 820 n.31 (1980). References to those provisions in this brief are, unless otherwise indicated, based on the current (post - 1972) version. The 1972 enactment also lengthened the limitations periods for the filing of charges with the EEOC from 90 to 180 days in nondeferral states and from 210 to 300 days in deferral states. See id. at 822. /15/ This Court has made this point repeatedly. Se, e.g., Love v. Pullman Co., 404 U.S. 522, 526 (1972) (emphasis added) (Section 706(c) (then Section 706(b)) "give(s) state agencies a prior opportunity to consider discrimination complaints"); New York Gaslight Club, Inc. v. Carey, 447 U.S. at 63 (quoting Oscar Mayer & Co. v. Evans, 441 U.S. 750, 755 (1979) (emphasis added)) ("Title VII establishes a comprehensive enforcement scheme in which state agencies are given 'a limited opportunity to resolve problems of employment discrimination and thereby to make unnecessary, resort to federal relief by victims of the discrimination.'"); Mohasco Corp. v. Silver, 447 U.S. 807, 810 (1980) (emphasis added) (Section 706(c) "prohibits the filing of a () * * * charge with * * * (EEOC) until after a state fair employment practice agency has had an opportunity to consider it"); EEOC v. Shell Oil Co., 466 U.S. 54, 63 n.12 (1984) (emphasis added) ("the Commission may not initiate its own investigation until the appropriate state agency has been afforded an opportunity to investigate and resolve the matter"). /16/ See 110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen) ("a measure at once practical, workable, equitable, and fair, and one which had a proper regard for what the States had done * * * "); id. at 13081 (remarks of Sen. Case) ("more concern or more deference could not be given to the rights of the States"); id. at 14329 (remarks of Sen. Brewster) ("The legislation that we are about to enact is moderate, and defers to State action and local solution."). /17/ See Pet. App. 27a, 49a ("In order to avoid delay * * *, CCRC hereby waives its exclusive right to process those charges for 60 days * * * so that EEOC can take immediate action on such charges.") /18/ A delay of 120 days would be required in actions to enforce state anti-discrimination laws which have been in effect for less than one year. See 42 U.S.C. 2000e-5(c). /19/ The court of appeals suggested (Pet. App. 11a-12a (emphasis in original)) that a state's decision to defer to the EEOC does not terminate the state's proceedings for purposes of Section 706(c) because such a construction conflicts with "the unmistakable intention of Congress * * * that the state would act during its period of exclusive jurisdiction and that the federal authorities would begin proceedings only if state proceedings failed to resolve the dispute." As explained by the First Circuit in Isaac v. Harvard University, 769 F.2d at 821, however, "the statute plainly allows the EEOC to proceed in 60 days no matter what the state agency has done, so there is no rigid requirement that the state complete all of its business before the EEOC can act." Furthermore, the statute contains no requirement that states with equal employment opportunity laws take action on complaints within 60 days. If Congress had intended to impose such a requirement, it could have done so expressly. Finally, the court of appeals' reliance (Pet. App. 10a n.10) on two comments by Senator Humphrey regarding the states' "responsibilities" under the statute is misplaced. As the court of appeals itself recognized (id. at 10a), Congress sought only "to encourage the states and the local communities to take a greater share of the responsibility" in guaranteeing equal rights. 110 Cong. Rec. 11936 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); see also Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. Pt. 2, at 960 (1962) (testimony of John B. Swainson, Governor of Michigan). Congress sought to "give() the States an opportunity to carry out their responsibilities first; and then, if they do not do so, the Federal Government steps in" (110 Cong. Rec. 14313 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Miller)). There is no indication that Congress intended to require the EEOC to refuse to honor a state agency's decision to place initial responsibility for processing a charge in federal hands after the state agency has expressly relinquished its opportunity to process that particular charge further in the first instance. /20/ The 60-day delay would, of course, apply to all charges that the state agency defers to the EEOC, and not only to those charges filed more than 240 days after the alleged discriminatory event. During the period of time covering fiscal year 1986 and 1987 (October 1, 1985 to June 30, 1987), the EEOC itself initially received approximately 93,450 Title VII charges within 240 days of the alleged violation. /21/ For example, between October 1, 1985 and June 30, 1987, the EEOC received approximately 10,554 Title VII charges beyond 240 days. /22/ The drafters were "mindful of every word, of every comma, and of the shading of every phrase" (110 Cong. Rec. 11935 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); see also 110 Cong. Rec. 12688 (1964) (remarks of Sen. Saltonstall)). /23/ There are also many sound reasons why a state may want to waive initial investigation of a charge. For example, it may have insufficient resources to process all charges efficiently or adequately, or it may believe that the EEOC will be better able to investigate or conciliate certain charges. As the First Circuit in Isaac explained (769 F.2d at 825-826), "(a) state which seeks to waive initial processing because of inadequate finances or heavy workload would be unable to secure the quick attention to its citizens' claims offered by the worksharing agreements * * *." /24/ With the possible exception of Oklahoma and Tennessee, none of the numerous worksharing agreements entered into between the EEOC and the various state and local fair employment practice agencies appears to contemplate a complete relinquishment of agency jurisdiction upon waiver of the right to a period of exclusive processing. /25/ See, e.g., 110 Cong. Rec. 1521 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Celler) ("Through cooperative efforts with State and local agencies, title VII envisions an effective and harmonious mobilization of Federal, State, and local authorities in attacking this national problem."); Equal Employment Opportunity: Hearings Before the Special Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. Pt. 1, at 6 (1961) (testimony of Rep. Roosevelt) ("W)e want to be able to put into any proposed legislation, the kind of language which would assure full cooperation and preclude any possibility of interference."). See also 110 Cong. Rec. 2602 (1964) (remarks of Rep. Dent); id. at 7205 (remarks of Sen. Clark); id. at 8193 (remarks of Sen. Dirksen); id. at 11848, 13091 (remarks of Sen Dirksen); id. at 11848, 13091 (remarks of Sen. Humphrey); id. at 12617 (remarks of Sen. Muskie). /26/ Because the CCRD informed the EEOC within the 300-day limitations period that it did not intend to process the charge initially, this case does not raise the issue whether such formal notice is necessary where, as in this case, the state agecny has previously announced to the EEOC in a worksharing agreement the agency's intention to waive its right initially to process a certain type of charge. Pursuant to its procedural regulations, the EEOC forwards copies of charges to the state or local agency even where the state agency has previously waived initial processing under a worksharing agreement (29 C.F.R. 1601.13(a)(4)(iii); see 52 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1987)). For the purpose of meeting federal filing deadlines, the EEOC's procedural regulations provide that "(w)here the document on its face constitutes a charge within a category of charges over which the (state) (a)gency has waived its rights to the period of exclusive processing referred to in paragraph (a)(4)(iii) of this section, the charge is deemed to be filed with the Commission upon receipt of the document. Such filing is timely if the charge is received within 300 days from the date of the alleged violation" (29 C.F.R. 1601.13(a)(5)(ii)(A); see 52 Fed. Reg. 10224 (1987)). /27/ This Court's treatment of somewhat analogous issues lends further support to the EEOC's position in this case. In Idlewild Liquor Corp. v. Epstein, 370 U.S. 713 (1962) (per curiam), this Court considered the finality, for the purposes of appeal under 28 U.S.C. 1291, of a district court decision not to convene a three-judge court in a federal suit challenging the constitutionality of a state statute. The district court had instead stayed the federal action pending state court proceedings, pursuant to Pullman abstention (Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941)). This Court held that the order was a final decision, within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. 1291, because the "'(a)ppellant was effectively out of court'" (370 U.S. at 715 n.2 (quoting Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp. v. Rohan, 289 F.2d 426, 428) (2d Cir. 1961)). As more recently described by this Court, that "(a) district court stay pursuant to Pullman abstention is entered with the expectation that the federal litigation will resume in the event that the plaintiff does not obtain relief in state court on state-law grounds" does not negate the finality of that district court stay and the appropriateness of immediate appea. See Moses H. Cone Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 10 (1983) (footnote omitted). Indeed, this Court characterized (id. at 11 n.11, 12)the deferral in Idlewild as a "surrender (of) jurisdiction," even though the district court retained jurisdiction over the case. The complainant in this case is similarly "'effectively out of' (the state forum)" (460 U.S. at 11 n.11 (citation omitted)). By analogy, therefore, that the state agency, like the federal court in Idlewild, formally retained some residual jurisdiction to act following the EEOC's determination should neither negate the finality of the state agency's determination - for the purpose of determining whether its "proceedings" are thereby "terminated" - nor cast doubt on the appropriateness of the EEOC immediately processing the charge.