UNION PACIFIC TRAIN ACCIDENTS
UNION PACIFIC
TRAIN ACCIDENTS
| CHI 97 FR 004 Derailment Union Pacific Railroad Wellington, Kansas February 13, 1997 |
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On February 13, 1997, a track crew headquartered in Caldwell, Kansas, worked on the track structure north of Wellington, Kansas, milepost (MP) 271. The track crew’s normal work hours were from 7:00 a.m., central standard time, to 3:30 p.m. The track crew consisted of a track foreman and two machine operators. Their equipment consist included a crew truck, a tamping machine and a ballast regulator machine. Their assignment was to "surface" the track profile and "dress" the ballast between MP 262.45, MP 269.0, and MP 270.5.
At about 3:00 p.m. the tamper was parked on a siding track in Wellington. The tamper operator stated that he spiked the south end switch point for main track movement and placed an out-of-service tag on the switch lock. He stated that the foreman took care of the north end switch. The foreman gave the tamper operator a ride to his personal vehicle while the ballast regulator was still in operation.
The foreman returned to where the ballast regulator operator was working and instructed him to take the ballast regulator to Wellington and tie-up for the day. The foreman informed him that he was notified by the train dispatcher that a spring frog at MP 267.8 needed repair. The foreman drove the crew truck to Wellington and lined the switch for the siding track and removed the derail. The ballast regulator was operated into the siding track and parked just north of the tamper. The ballast regulator operator stated that when he entered the siding track the foreman was sitting in the truck. The ballast regulator operator stated that when he was filling out his paper work and shutting down the equipment he observed the foreman in his rear view mirror at the switch. However, he did not observe the foreman line the switch back for main track movement.
The ballast regulator operator stated that after he completed his work on the ballast regulator, he placed the derail back on the track and locked it in the derail position. He stated that he observed the track foreman working at the spring frog where the wing rail was stuck open. He assisted the foreman close the wing rail and put the siding track out-of-service with the train dispatcher while he drove the truck to MP 267.8. The communication with the train dispatcher was completed by 1607 CST. The foreman and ballast regulator completed their assignment at MP 267.8, and returned to Caldwell at about 5:30 p.m.
The track foreman stated that he lined the north switch for the main line and placed a spike along the switch point and stepped on it with his foot. He also placed an out-of-service tag on the switch lock and locked the switch stand.
The first train to travel over the track after the work authority was canceled was train WTFW-13 south. As the train approached the north switch at about 40 mph both train crew members observed the target on the switch stand signaling a siding track movement. The train was about a half mile from the switch when the engineer made an emergency brake application. At about 5:15 p.m., the train continued into the siding track, derailed at the derail, unearthed and broke an anhydrous ammonia line, struck and destroyed the ballast regulator, damaged the tamper, and struck and ruptured two grain elevator silos. The four locomotive units derailed and sustained damage. Seven of the eight freight cars that derailed were destroyed.
Postaccident investigation revealed that the switch point was lined for the siding track with the out-of-service tag on the switch lock. A spike was lying on the tie near the switch point. The derail was locked on the rail. The south switch was lined, spiked, and locked with and out-of-service tag on the lock for main track movement.
The traincrew did not sustain any injuries. The traincrew were not toxicologically tested for drugs or alcohol. The track foreman was toxicologically tested for drugs and alcohol.
INJURY TABLE
| Injury
Type |
Train Crew on
WTFW-13 |
Others | TOTAL |
| FATAL | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| SERIOUS | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| MINOR | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| TOTAL | 0 | 0 | 0 |
According to the UP, railroad damages were estimated at:
The potential major safety issue emerging from the investigation of this accident is:
• Proper oversight of work and "lock-out" procedures by foremen.
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