PRINCIPLES OF "ABSOLUTE  WAR" 103
to ask of any nation at grips with a powerful enemy, and, if Chinese rifles go off by themselves when the struggle on land begins, European diplomacy, feeble, vain, and secretive, will alone be to blame, and must be held responsible for all the consequences.
By limiting her ambitions and the scope of her operations Japan secures a double benefit: first, the continued sympathy of the world, which is the best trump in her hand ; secondly, security from exhaustion, which is the greatest danger any Power has to face that challenges Russia on land. The acceptance of Chinese aid must inevitably tend to deprive Japan of the world's sympathy, and the immediate military advantages to be gained by the alliance are insufficient to make amends for the loss. Successful war alone can save Japan from extinction as an independent Power, and permit her to return to the happier paths of peace and progress. How can this success be best secured ?
There are some who, drawing their inspirations from the principles of what they call " absolute war," contend that the enemy's main army must be sought and defeated, and that a decisive defeat of the Russians at Kharbin will settle the campaign, and make it impracticable for Russia to renew the conflict with hope of success. It is the master error of Napoleon, who calculated in precisely similar fashion that after his Borodino and the occupation of Moscow—which was " absolute war " with a vengeance—Russia would make peace. Russia, however, did nothing of the kind, and in a moment all this great conception fell to the ground with a crash, burying the Grand Army in its ruins. It is certainly of the first importance for Japan to crush the enemy's field army should it offer the opportunity desired, and if those who would prompt Japan to penetrate into the heart of Asia are prepared to tell us that Russia has lost her tenacity and her courage, and will sign an ignominious peace after the loss of a single army and before her vitals are so much as touched, then no one could have any military objection to urge to a march on Kharbin with all its