Honorable
members of the United States Commission on International Religious Freedom, and
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I
would like to thank you for providing me with this opportunity to share my
thoughts with you on the current situation in Bangladesh.
On 12 January 2007 as the
military-backed caretaker government took power in Bangladesh concerns were voiced
over the likely consequences of the military's political intervention. Many
analysts expressed apprehension that this may be the beginning of a long
‘military rule' akin to the 1975-90 period. It was feared that in the long-term,
the intervention of the military in politics might prove terminal to Bangladeshi
democracy. The Economist, in April
2007, for example, speculated that either the army might remain in politics by
forming its own party, or worse, it might ‘not
bother with such niceties and declare outright martial law' (‘No going back', The Economist, 19 April 2007). On the
other hand, the caretaker government's promises of sweeping reforms to the
political system and building institutions necessary for sustainable democracy
were welcomed by a large segment of the country's citizens. The vast scale of
the corruption that has plagued Bangladeshi politics over the last decade and a
half, the acrimonious relationship between the two political parties which made
the parliament dysfunctional, the proliferation of Islamist militancy that
shook the nation in August 2005, and the violence that preceded the declaration
of emergency made citizens worried about the future direction of the country. Indeed,
the attitude of many was captured by the Economist
which described developments as ‘not uniformly bad' and praised the army for
having intervened ‘sensibly' in a ‘failing democracy' (‘Not uniformly bad', The Economist, 8 February 2007).
Much has happened since then. The country is now heading
for an election. In
general, the euphoria of change and hope for a corruption-free politics has
almost disappeared. Despite some achievements of the caretaker government, the
great expectations of the Bangladeshis (and observers) who saw this as an
unprecedented opportunity to bring about qualitative changes in Bangladeshi
politics have remained unfulfilled. Due to the absence of major, substantive
institutional and structural changes in administration and politics, the return
of acrimonious, opaque, dynastic and corrupt political practices, considered
impossible after 11 January 2007, now looms large. As the country is about to
accomplish two crucial elements of formal democracy, an election participated
in by all political parties and a peaceful transfer of power to an elected
civilian government, the nation deserves heartfelt congratulations. But, a note
of caution should also be sounded in that the problems that prompted the events
of 11 January 2007 have not been addressed adequately and thus their recurrence
in the future is not unlikely.
Against
this backdrop, I would like to address three issues: Has the absence of an
elected civilian regime in the past two years benefited the Islamists? Is Bangladesh
out of danger from Islamist militancy? What are the challenges the next
government and the international community face in regard to the growing
strengths of the Islamists in general and particularly the militants?.
Did the Islamists gain strength?
It is often argued
that periods of military rule or military-backed civilian rule, in Pakistan and Bangladesh, have been attended by a
growing process of Islamization. In order to bolster their legitimacy,
primarily due to the absence of democratic legality, successive military
governments have looked to Islamist forces. The history of Bangladesh,
between 1975 and 1990, testifies to this trend. But it is also true that the
Islamists in Bangladesh
gained political legitimacy and have emerged as the ‘Kingmaker' during the
period of elected civilian governance between 1991 and 2006. The democratic
hiatus of the past two years has not been different in this regard; Islamists
have remained a very critical force.
But
the remarkable difference is the political environment within which the
Islamists have maintained their influence, particularly after being a coalition
partner of the previous regime which was engaged in unbridled corruption for
five years. The relentless campaign against two former Prime Ministers (Khaleda
Zia and Sheikh Hasina) and the two major political parties (the Bangladesh
Nationalist Party - BNP, and the Awami League - AL) provided an enormous
advantage to the Islamists, particularly the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI). The central
leaders of the JI were largely spared in the regime's anti-corruption drive.
The arrest of JI chief Matiur Rahman Nizami on charges of corruption almost a
year after the drive began did not result in his imprisonment for any
significant length of time. He was the first among the high-profile political
leaders who secured bail from the court. This was followed by the drama
surrounding the government's effort to arrest the JI Secretary General Ali
Ahsan Mujahid. Although an arrest warrant was issued and police reported him as
‘absconding', he attended a meeting with the chief adviser for official talks
representing the JI.
Even
before these events, the JI leaders had demonstrated that they can make
controversial statements with impunity. In December 2007, the leaders of the JI
openly belittled the freedom fighters of the Bangladesh movement for
independence. Despite demands from the civil society, the government has not
moved to file cases against the JI leaders for their roles in 1971 when they
sided with Pakistan
against the Bangladeshi freedom war.
The
JI was not the only Islamist party that took advantage of the situation; other
Islamists went further and organized street agitations without any serious
repercussions. The row over the publication of a cartoon in a Bengali daily in
September 2007 is a case in point. The activists of the Hizb-ut Tahrir, an
Islamist group which calls for the establishment of a global Caliphate and is
banned in several parts of the world, went on the rampage in Dhaka.
No member of the HT was prosecuted while the cartoonist was arrested and the
government forced the newspaper editor to apologize. The government had dealt with street agitation organized by
a section of University students in August 2007 with a firm hand, but the activists
of the Hizbut Tahrir enjoyed considerable latitude.
The
most humiliating defeat of the government in the face of Islamist opposition
was on the National Women Development Policy early in 2008. The policy insisted
on the equal rights of women in inheritance and equal pay. A few Islamist
parties began staging demonstrations immediately after the chief adviser
announced the policy on March 8. By late-March the government was forced to
appoint a 20-member committee comprised of ulema to identify inconsistencies between
Islamic laws and the policy and recommend changes. On 18 April 2008 the ulema
committee submitted its report to the government strongly opposing equal rights
for women, recommending deletion of six sections of the policy and amending 15
others which, they argued, "clashed" with the provisions of the Quran
and Sunnah. The JI supported the view that the policy was contrary to Islamic
law and called upon the government to scrap it. The government finally gave in
and made no effort to implement these polices. As a matter of fact, the members
of the caretaker government have never mentioned the policy since then.
Since
October of this year, two events have dramatically demonstrated that the
Islamists are flexing their muscles. In both instances, they targeted sculptures
erected in public places. The first incident occurred on 16 October. Islamists objected to a sculpture of five bauls (a group of mystic minstrels), symbolizing the
exuberance of Bengali culture, which had been commissioned by the Dhaka City
Corporation as part of a city beautification program and was then
still under construction. The Islamists issued a 24-hour ultimatum calling for
its removal, and then attempted to take down the monument which is located near
the International Airport in Dhaka, arguing
that it was un-Islamic and objectionable in its siting near the hajj camp (pilgrimage camp, where pilgrims report before they
travel to Makkah for the annual hajj). After the removal of the sculpture, the
committee demanded that a Hajj Minar be constructed at the roundabout where the
five statues used to be, and Fazlul Huq Aminee declared that all sculptures
built during the AL
regime (1996-2001) would soon be demolished. The most disturbing aspect of this
event was the Islamists' claim that the Army Chief of Staff having been
informed of their displeasure, expressed his agreement, and that the sculptures
were removed at his initiative. The second incident took place on the night of
29 November. Activists of the Ulama Anjuman-e Al-Bayiniat, a small radical
Islamist group, attempted to take down a sculpture located in downtown Dhaka. They claimed that they had warned the government
to remove all sculptures of the country.
These events and the patterns of behavior of the
Islamists in the past two years indicate that the absence of political
activities has not weakened their organizations or diminished their strength.
The BNP-led 4-party alliance which includes the JI and the Islami Oikya Jote
(IOJ) remains intact and little remorse has been shown by the party leaders for
the misdeeds during their rule.
The caretaker government's preoccupation with the two
major political parties in its move to reform the political landscape has
enabled Islamists of various shades escape similar convictions. The anti-corruption
drive and the reform initiatives have brought an end to the political careers
of some the BNP and the AL
leaders, whilst the JI and other Islamists have been remarkably unscathed. If
the BNP and its allies are unwilling to learn from their past mistakes and
continue to pursue their policies of 2001-2006, there is no reason to hope for
a different political scenario than that seen prior to 11 January 2007.
Is Islamist Militancy Over?
One of the defining features of Bangladesh politics during the last
elected government (2001-2006) was the dramatic proliferation of Islamist
militant groups. It is important to note that these organizations did not
emerge during this period. Instead these organizations, particularly the
fountainhead of the militant groups, the Harkat-ul Jihad al Islami Bangladesh
(HuJIB) emerged in the late 1990s. But the Awami League regime (1996-2001) paid
little attention to the growing strengths of the militant groups, failed to take
note of these developments or understand their long-term implications, and did
not act decisively. The government disregarded the early signs of the emerging
network and intelligence reports have not been given due consideration. The
militants, on the other hand, intensified their activities, primarily because
of their opposition to the ruling party which they considered a secular party.
The victory of the 4-party alliance, comprising the Bangladesh Nationalist
Party (BNP), the Jamaat-i-Islami (JI) and the Islami Oikya Jote (IOJ), in the
general elections of 2001 provided a hospitable environment for these groups.
A combination of factors such as political
expediency, desire for short-term gains, infiltration of Islamists within the
civil administration, inefficiency of bureaucracy, lack of intelligence capabilities,
a favorable political environment and funding from some dubious charitable
organizations helped them thrive. The state's meek or non-response at the
initial stage weakened its ability to halt their proliferation. Nevertheless,
under intense international pressure the reluctant coalition government led by
the Bangladesh Nationalist Party and the Jammat-i-Islami (JI) (2001-2006) took
some steps in 2005, when three militant organizations including the HuJIB were
banned. In late 2006 the government began arresting and trying key militant
leaders. On 29 March 2007, not long after the country witnessed a change in
government, six militant leaders were executed after all legal processes had
been exhausted by them.
Although the arrests, the executions, an intense
security campaign and growing public awareness dealt a serious blow to the
militant groups; developments over the past year and a half demonstrate that
they have not disappeared. Instead, militants have regrouped and seem to be
steadily gaining strength. One of the first signs of the regrouping of the
militants came in April 2007 when advocate Hyder Hossain, the public prosecutor
and chief counsel of the case which resulted in the death sentence meted out to
the six key leaders of the Jamaat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh, was assassinated.
Sporadic incidents of attacks occurred from the middle of 2007. For example, on
1 May 2007, a previously unknown group called Jadid al-Qaeda Bangladesh
detonated three near-simultaneous bombs in three divisional railway stations in
Dhaka, Chittagong and Sylhet. On 25 November 2007, five militants of
the banned JMB made a bid to escape from Comilla Jail, reportedly with help
from the outside and from some jail employees. In February 2008, the Rapid
Action Battalion seized 46 live grenades from Satkhira, after the arrest of
Mufti Moinuddin alias Abu Zandal, a key accomplice of the HuJIB leader Mufti
Abdul Hannan. There were several other
instances when grenades were recovered from various parts of the country. On 13
April a bomb exploded in a shop in Brahmanbaria and five arrested later
confessed they have received training from the HuJIB at a local madrassah.
Among the arrested militants was a retired army private.
On 17 November 2008, the Rapid Action Battalion
(RAB) seized 70kg of explosives, 40kg of nitric acid, 150 cases of improvised
grenades, and a large quantity of bomb-making materials and equipment in
several houses in the capital Dhaka. This came following the confessional
statement of a full time member the military wing of the Jama'atul Mujahideen
Bangladesh (JMB). Arrested militants have confided to the RAB officials that
the JMB is recruiting new members and that the fugitives are now holding secret
meetings under a new leadership. The regrouping efforts are primarily taking
place in the northern region of the country (The Daily Star, 28 October 2008). These and other similar incidents
reveal that the networks of these militant organizations have remained intact,
that financial support for maintaining the networks has not dried up, and that
the flow of weapons has not been disrupted.
The efforts of law enforcing agencies to seize
weapons are commendable; these confiscations will delay the next rounds of
attacks, and save many lives. But unfortunately these efforts are not
sufficient to mitigate militancy; identifying the sources of weapons of the
militants and breaking these networks is imperative to defeat the militants.
The
connections between the external militant organizations and Bangladeshi groups
are no longer one-way; instead members of some of the Bangladeshi militant
groups have been found to have been engaged in activities in India. For
example, the HuJiB is reported to have developed close connections with
militants in Pakistan and India.
HuJiB operatives arrested in India
in 2006 and 2008 have confessed that they received training and funds from
Jaish-i-Muhammad and Lasker-i-Tayeba of Pakistan (Daily Prothom Alo, 16 May 2008).
Militants
in Bangladesh have been trained to engage in subversive activities in India, as
three operatives arrested there informed the Delhi police. These confessional
statements indicate that militant leaders from Pakistan
had travelled to Bangladesh
to recruit, organize training and disburse funds. One of the arrested JMB
leaders told a reporter while attending a court proceeding that about 200 JMB
members have fled to Pakistan and Afghanistan since 2005 (Daily Prothom Alo, 9 May 2008).
During
the last civilian regime led by the BNP, the line
between the underground and the state was blurred in an unprecedented way. This
state patronage explains the half-hearted crackdown on militant activities. But
there are signs that the militants are now trying to institutionalize the
relationship between the mainstream and the underground. The most telling
indication of this is their decision to launch a political party to operate
within mainstream politics. On 29 September 2008, leaders of the HuJIB floated
a new party called the Islamic Democratic Party (IDP), with, its leaders claimed,
government permission. It was also stated that intelligence agencies had
cleared them of having any relationship with terrorist organizations.
Organizers of the party further claimed that Dr. Richard L Benkin, a
Chicago-based "Independent Scholar" has helped to set up the new party. Dr.
Benkin has confirmed the veracity of the claim.
The
present interim government of Bangladesh
has recognized the importance of dealing with militancy as a matter of concern,
but it seems to be remaining one step behind the militants. One can argue that
the steps taken hitherto to combat militancy have been inadequate, and that
some necessary steps have not been taken yet. For example, the total number of
individuals arrested for their alleged involvement with militant activities is
less than eight hundred - a number too small to organize the synchronized bomb
blasts of 17 August 2005, let alone other operations. Those who had joined the
Afghan war have played key roles in organizing these groups; yet not all have
been traced and questioned, let alone apprehended.
The
government has probed very little, if at all, into the suspected training sites
used by militants. The possible political connection between certain members of
the BNP and the militants has not been examined at length. There is enough
evidence to show that the connections between the Jammat-i-Islami (JI) are more
than accidental, and that these relationships are neither limited to
individuals, nor to one or two units of the party.
Official
records and press reports show that during the 4-party coalition government
(2001-2006) a number of militant leaders were arrested, but released by the
local authorities. To my knowledge no investigations, either public or
administrative, have been conducted to identify the individuals concerned and
the reasons behind the leniency displayed toward the militants.
What needs be done?
By
January 2009, Bangladesh
will have an elected civilian government, save dramatic political developments
or an unforeseen situation. The newly elected government will have many
challenges, on political and economic fronts. The fate of the anticorruption
drive and the reform measures initiated by the caretaker government will be
decided by the upcoming election. It will also decide the future trajectories
of Islamism in Bangladesh.
The domestic political environment of the past two decades allowed the
Islamists to consolidate their position; consequently it opened the way for
transnational Islamic groups to operate with state support. If the situation
remains unchanged, the scope for militant activities will be further widened.
The
importance and influence of the Islamists in general, particularly those which
represent Islam as a transnational political ideology, will depend on the
domestic political environment as much as global political developments. If
global politics encourages the strengthening of the sense of Muslim victimhood,
due to the role of western countries, particularly the United States, their appeal to the common masses
in Bangladesh
is likely to become stronger. Events of recent years have no doubt alerted
western policy makers to a number of issues that have a seeming ability to
unite Muslims of diverse backgrounds and from disparate regions, and which
nurture a collective sense of discrimination and aggrievement. Top of the
agenda is the thorny issue of Israel/Palestine and the lopsided support of the United States
to the former.
If
the new regime has the political will to stem the tide of militancy, two
immediate actions will be necessary on its part: first, to address the
inadequacies in existing laws that are allowing the militants to emerge
unscathed through the legal process; secondly, to identify and apprehend the
patrons of the militant groups. Patrons of the militants - individuals and
organizations, domestic and foreign - have escaped justice altogether. This was
one of the main topics of discussion immediately after the series of bombings,
but over time it disappeared even from public discourse. Let me reiterate the
point I made elsewhere, "The importance of identifying, apprehending and trying
the patrons of militancy cannot be overstated. Efforts to dismantle the
networks of militants without bringing the patrons - political and financial -
to book are bound to fail" (Islamist
Militancy in Bangladesh: A Complex Web, London/NY: Routledge, 2008).
The
international community has a significant role to play as well. The Islamists
in Bangladesh
present the classic dilemma to western policy-makers: should western
governments engage in a dialogue with the Islamists? If they do, who should be
the partners in the dialogue? What should be the goal of these engagements?
While it is necessary to be cognizant of the Islamists' presence in the
political arena, the policies of western nations should not undermine the
secularist forces representing the majority of the population. More
importantly, the local traditional Islamic traits which encourage
pietist practices and the separation of faith and politics should be
highlighted and strengthened.
While
the menace of Islamist militancy in Bangladesh may appear to be a domestic
issue, in essence it is not. The phenomenon has not grown exclusively from
domestic politics; neither can domestic policies alone stem the tide. Both
regional and international forces will have to play important roles if they are
sincere in helping Bangladesh
in its quest for a sustainable democratic political system and in seeking to
prevent further instability in South Asia. The
threat to global security from militant groups in the region around Bangladesh,
Islamists (such as the HuJIB, the ARNO) and non-Islamists (such as the ULFA,
the NSCN), may not be direct or imminent, but instability in a region peppered
with insurgencies cannot be a welcome development to the international
community. They can only ignore this at their own peril.
The
policies of the international community must be comprehensive and two-pronged.
What we mean by comprehensive is that it cannot be only military. Often the
sources of security threats are embedded in the socio-political-economic
environment. It is crucial that the international community examines the causes
of and conditions for the appeal of radical forces. The most positive aspect to
date is that the appeal of radicalism is limited and these groups have very
little popular support. But this should not make any one complacent. If this
problem remains unaddressed, these groups will reach out to ever larger segments
of the society. This is particularly of concern because of the fractious nature
of mainstream domestic politics and the connections between mainstream parties
and clandestine groups. The international community in their bilateral and
multilateral dealings with Bangladesh must be made aware of the complex nature
of the phenomenon.
The
international community cannot be oblivious to issues such as education,
balanced social and economic development, and human rights and demand that
radicalism and extremism be addressed vigorously. Sustained economic growth and
reduction of economic disparity are perhaps the best antidotes to radicalism.
Often poverty and disparity serve as the cause behind the appeals of the
militants. The recruitment strategies used by these militant groups provide a
clue as to which segments of the society are more vulnerable to their call. The
international community should extend support to the Bangladeshi authorities in
addressing these issues. It is a welcome development that the international
community does not view Bangladesh
through the 1970s prism which portrays the country as an aid-dependent nation;
the country has come of age and deserves to be treated accordingly. Considering
it as a partner, rather than a recipient of handouts, is important.
As
for the counter-terrorism strategy, the international community must take into
consideration the regional and extra-regional dynamics of Islamist militancy in
Bangladesh. Therefore, it is necessary
that the international community, particularly the United States, influence regional
and extra-regional actors to be more constructive in fighting militancy there.
As a small country with few resources and no clout in global politics, Bangladesh is not equipped to influence India and Pakistan to desist from using the
country as a proxy battleground. Without the help of these two countries, and a
coordinated effort from the international community, there is little hope of
making headway. As long as the channels of weapons supply remain intact, the
flow of arms to the country will continue.
Finally,
in a globalized world where information flows instantaneously, global politics
is bound to have an impact on Bangladesh as anywhere else. The actions of the
western nations, particularly their only super power the United States, will influence the
perception of the Bangladeshis towards the global political system. US policies in
general, and particularly towards Muslim communities, shape the worldview of
the Bangladeshis as much as local politics does. This aspect should not be
ignored by the US
policy-makers.
Thank
you again for this opportunity to speak to you about Bangladesh at a very
critical time of the history of the nation.
