UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON SECURITY AND COOPERATION IN EUROPE
(HELSINKI
COMMISSION) HOLDS HEARING:
HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S.-RUSSIAN RELATIONS:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
JULY 27, 2006
COMMISSIONERS:
U.S. SENATOR SAM BROWNBACK (R-KS)
CHAIRMAN
U.S. SENATOR GORDON H. SMITH (R-OR)
U.S. SENATOR SAXBY CHAMBLISS (R-GA)
U.S. SENATOR RICHARD BURR
(R-NC)
U.S. SENATOR DAVID VITTER (R-LA)
U.S.
SENATOR CHRISTOPHER J. DODD (D-CT)
U.S. SENATOR RUSSELL D.
FEINGOLD (D-WI)
U.S. SENATOR HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON (D-NY)
VACANT
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH (R-NJ)
CO-CHAIRMAN
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FRANK R. WOLF
(R-VA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE JOSEPH R. PITTS (R-PA)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ROBERT B. ADERHOLT (R-AL)
U.S.
REPRESENTATIVE MIKE PENCE (R-IN)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE BENJAMIN L.
CARDIN (D-MD)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE LOUISE MCINTOSH SLAUGHTER
(D-NY)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE ALCEE L. HASTINGS (D-FL)
U.S. REPRESENTATIVE MIKE MCINTYRE (D-NC)
WITNESSES/PANELISTS:
CARL GERSHMAN,
PRESIDENT,
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY
TOM
MELIA,
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
FREEDOM HOUSE
FRITZ ERMARTH,
FORMER CHAIRMAN,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL,
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE
OFFICER,
USSR AND EAST EUROPE,
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
NIKOLAS
GVOSDEV,
EDITOR,
THE NATIONAL INTEREST
The hearing was
held at 1:10 p.m. in Room 562 Dirksen Senate Office Building,
Washington,
D.C., Senator Sam Brownback, chairman, Helsinki Commission, moderating.
[*]
BROWNBACK: Good afternoon. The hearing will come to order. Thank you
all for joining us.
Apologies for being a little late on getting this
going.
I want to welcome everybody today to Helsinki Commission hearing on
"Human Rights in Russia:
Bilateral Relations and Implications for the
Future." We will discuss the extent to which the U.S.
can effectively
promote human rights and democratic governance in Russia, while assessing the
prospects for working cooperatively on issues of importance to both our nations
and the limits to
such cooperation when our interests diverge.
To be
sure, there are many countries in the world where the human rights situation is
much
worse than in Russia. But those countries do not currently hold the
presidencies of the Council of
Europe and the G-8.
What are we to make
of President Putin's hosting of President Karimov of Uzbekistan on the
one
year anniversary of the massacre at Andijan? Or Moscow's indifference to human
rights violations
in Chechnya? Or recent attempts to intimidate political
opposition and human rights activists?
Clearly, it is not in the interest of
the United States to ignore or attempt to isolate
Russia. We should be open
to working with Russia when and where beneficial, such as the war on
international terrorism, eradication of weapons of mass destruction, health and
environmental issues
and energy supplies.
The challenge for the U.S.,
then, is to be true to our broad mission of promoting human
rights and
democratic governance in Russia, while at the same time attempting to maintain a
productive and mutually beneficial relationship. This is a difficult task.
Our experts today are uniquely qualified to address these questions, and I
look forward to
hearing their testimony. Be pleased to add also to the
hearing record a statement by Joseph
Grieboski, president of the Institute
on Religion and Public Policy, for his testimony.
Our first panel is Ms.
Felice Gaer, chair of the Commission on International Religious
Freedom.
She's also vice president of the International League for Human Rights, a member
of the
board of directors of the Sakharov Foundation and a member of the
advisory committee on Human Rights
Watch, Europe and Central Asia division.
I would also note, for those watching or present, that most of the witnesses
attended the G-8
or the pre-G-8 conferences, so they'd have some direct
experiences to discuss.
I'm also like to note for those here or watching
that we issued a press release recently
between and with Senator Clinton and
myself on the Senate-passed resolution on "Forbes" journalist
Klebnikov.
And I want to thank my colleague, Senator Clinton, who is also a member of this
Helsinki
Commission, for her work on this important topic.
With that,
Ms. Gaer, thank you very much for being here with us today. It's been a
pleasure
to work with you. And I appreciate greatly your work and your
contribution.
The floor is yours.
GAER: Thank you, senator, and thank
you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of the
United States Commission
on International Religious Freedom.
I'll summarize the commission's
testimony in my oral remarks, but I do request that the full
testimony be
included for the record.
BROWNBACK: Without objection.
GAER: And
before beginning on this, the 30th anniversary of the establishment of the
Helsinki Commission, I wanted, on behalf of our commission, to express
appreciation to you and each
of the members of the commission and its expert
staff for the excellent advocacy of human rights in
the countries that have
made up Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.
Throughout the
past 30 years, commissioners on the Helsinki Commission and their staff have
worked effectively to ensure and maintain a focus on the human rights agenda in
the context of this
important international organization. And as Andrei
Sakharov said at the time, it has changed the
international climate.
BROWNBACK: It really has.
GAER: So, I thank you.
BROWNBACK: Would you
please pull that microphone a bit closer to you? I don't think it's
picking
up as well. Thank you.
GAER: Senator, as you know, a delegation from the
U.S. Commission on International Religious
Freedom -- an independent,
bipartisan commission -- traveled to Russia just this last month. We
visited Moscow, St. Petersburg and Kazan, the capital of Tatarstan.
We had
many meetings with government officials, religious figures, nongovernmental
organization representatives, legal advocates, and the like. As a result of the
visit to Russia, the
commission delegation found five major areas of
concern.
First, the rise in xenophobia and ethnic and religious intolerance
in Russia, resulting in
increasingly violent attacks and other hate crimes,
and the government's failure adequately to
address this problem.
Secondly, the Russian government's challenging of international human rights
institutions and
its persistent claim that foreign funding of human rights
organizations constitutes illegitimate
interference in Russia's internal
affairs -- familiar words we thought we wouldn't hear again.
Third, our
commission found that official actions related to countering terrorism have
resulted in harassment of individual Muslims and Muslim communities.
Fourth,
that new amendments to the law on non-commercial organizations -- or
nongovernmental
organizations, which include religious organizations -- that
these amendments that may be used to
restrict severely their ability to
function.
And fifth and finally, we found continuing restrictions by Russian
authorities on the
exercise of freedom of religion or belief, particularly
at the local or regional level.
To elaborate on these problems, the
commission is very concerned about the Russian
government's failure
adequately to investigate and prosecute hate crimes. Russia reportedly has 12
million migrants.
Many Russian human rights groups have concluded that
crimes based on ethnic or religious
hatred have become more and more
violent, as demonstrated by the killings of African students and
Tajik
migrants in St. Petersburg just this year, as well as the knife attack in
January in a Moscow
synagogue that injured nine Jewish worshippers.
Although many of these attacks are motivated by ethnic hatred, some attacks
against Muslim,
Jewish, Protestant and other religious communities are
explicitly motivated by religious factors.
This is fueled in part by the
perception that Russian identity is currently threatened due to
a mounting
demographic crisis stemming from a declining birth rate and a high mortality
rate among
ethnic Russians.
Hostile articles in the de facto
state-controlled Russian media contribute to this atmosphere
of intolerance,
as do statements of some public officials and religious leaders.
Persons who
have investigated or been publicly critical of hate crimes in Russia themselves
have been subject to harassment or violent attacks, including the famous case
that both of our
commissions have addressed, of Nikolai Girenko, a St.
Petersburg expert who testified in court
numerous times and who was gunned
down at his door in June of 2004.
The failure to investigate properly such
incidents is one that the commission is greatly
concerned about. Judges, in
some cases, have received death threats, and so forth.
Many Russian
officials continue to label crimes targeting ethnic or religious communities
simply as hooliganism. Officials from the Leningrad oblast declined to meet
with our commission on
our visit, because, in their words -- and I quote --
there was no government official responsible for
monitoring or prosecuting
xenophobia or hate crimes because they did not have these problems.
More can
and should be done to ensure that law enforcement agencies recognize such crimes
for
what they are. Hate crimes are human rights abuses. And more should be
done to ensure that they
prevent and punish such hate crimes.
While
vigorously promoting freedom of expression, Russian public officials, as well as
leaders of religious communities, should take steps to discourage rhetoric
that promotes xenophobia
or intolerance.
The new mechanisms to address
intolerance and related human rights issues, recently
established by the
OSCE, are directly relevant in this context. Due, in part, to the persistent
and
effective efforts of the Helsinki Commission and our religious freedom
commission and the State
Department, the OSCE has taken decisions in recent
years obligating all member states to develop and
implement policies against
ethnic and religious intolerance in their societies.
Member states --
including Russia -- are required to report to the OSCE on the specific
measures they have undertaken to address hate crimes, including such measures as
maintaining
statistics on hate crimes, strengthening legislative initiatives
to combat them, and establishing
training programs for law enforcement and
judicial officials to deal more effectively with them.
Fulfilling such
obligations will do a great deal to advance the current status of Russia's
efforts to
battle hate crimes and other intolerance.
Secondly, the
commission is very seriously concerned about the Russian government's attempts
to challenge international human rights institutions and norms, and to
undermine Russia's own
domestic human rights advocacy.
Although Russia
has ratified all the international human rights treaties, Russian officials
and other influential figures have challenged international human rights
institutions, as well as the
validity of their advocacy of human rights in
Russia, charging that they are foreign-funded and being
used for political
purposes.
These officials complain of double standards, selectivity and
politicization whenever there
is an inquiry into Russia's human rights
practices. In the OSCE, for example, the Russian government
has led efforts
critical of the organization's election monitoring efforts and human rights
scrutiny
of Russia and neighboring countries.
It has become clear to our
commission as a result of our visit, that the problem of rising
ethnic and
religious intolerance has been exacerbated by the repeated efforts of such
Russian
government officials to label foreign funding of nongovernmental
organizations as meddling in
Russia's internal affairs.
Moreover, the
official branding of human rights organizations as foreign has increased the
vulnerability of these very same human rights advocates in Russia, and those
that they defend.
The commission heard these and similar views expressed not
only by government officials, but
also by Metropolitan Kirill of the Russian
Orthodox Church. And we believe this is a particular
cause of concern,
given the increasingly prominent role provided to the Russian Orthodox Church in
Russian state and public affairs today.
The third point the commission
is concerned about are the increasing reports of official
government actions
against Muslims in Russia. The commission acknowledges, and is concerned, that
the Russian government faces significant challenges as it addresses genuine
threats of religious
extremism and terrorism with a religious linkage in
Russia.
One challenge involves protecting freedom of religion, even as
counterterrorist efforts are
undertaken, and protecting the human rights of
all persons in such circumstances.
Russian human rights defenders provided
evidence of many cases in which Muslims were
prosecuted for extremism or
terrorism, despite no apparent relationship to such activities. In some
cases, it was possessing religious literature, such as the Koran. In several
regions, mosques have
been closed by Russian government officials.
These
developments, according to Russian human rights advocates, are of special
concern in
the way that they are implemented. And of course, they're of
concern, because Muslims are Russia's
second-largest religious community,
and any arbitrary actions, such as those described to us, could,
in fact,
increase instability and extremism and radicalism among the Muslim community in
Russia.
Fourth, the commission is concerned that the new restrictive NGO law
will have a negative
effect on religious groups. And although one member of
the Presidential Administration Liaison told
our delegation that the new law
would have little impact on religious organizations, another -- the
director
of the Federal Registration Service -- confirmed quite clearly that some of the
law's most
intrusive provisions will certainly apply to religious
organizations and to the charitable and
educational entities set up by
religious organizations, as well as to groups defending human rights.
If
violations are found of this law, the Federal Registration Service can call for
court
proceedings against the group, possibly resulting in liquidation of
the groups. The agency's
regulations on the use of its new powers have not
yet been finalized.
The fifth and final concern of the commission is that
the -- while religion, per se, has
flourished, and the ability to profess
and practice religion has grown, minority religious groups
continue to face
restrictions on religious activities at the regional and local level.
We
were eager to keep within your time limits, Mr. Chairman, and so I'll hold
comments on
those specific kinds of restrictions, just to go directly to our
recommendations.
The commission recommends that the president and secretary
of state should work to encourage
other G-8 countries to speak out more
actively and with one voice on the whole, this whole set of
matters, and
that the president and other U.S. officials should be prepared -- and genuinely
prepared
-- to counter the persistent claims by Russian leaders that U.S.
and U.N. efforts to advance human
rights concerns constitute foreign
meddling or are aimed at harming the Russian Federation.
We believe the U.S.
government needs to more vigorously encourage the Russian government to
take
the following actions. And by vigorously, we mean including through public
states.
First, to affirm publicly that all religious communities in Russia
are equal under the law
and entitled to equal treatment.
Secondly, to
speak out frequently and specifically to the citizens of Russia, to condemn
specific acts of xenophobia, anti-Semitism and hate crimes, and to avoid taking
steps that could
exacerbate religious extremism.
Third, to take, at a
minimum, with regard to the new law on NGOs, to develop regulations that
clarify and will sharply limit the state's discretion to interfere with the
activities of NGOs,
including religious groups.
That they implement the
many specific recommendations made by Russia's own Presidential
Council on
Human Rights -- Russia's own official human rights ombudsman's office, and the
Council of
Europe's European Commission Against Racism and Intolerance, on
which a Russian citizen serves.
And the issues that they could address
regarding xenophobia and hate crimes would include a
complete review of the
residence registration system, a full implementation by local and regional law
enforcement personnel of the criminal code provisions on incitement and
violence motivated by ethnic
or religious hatred, and the establishment of
national and local mechanisms to collect and publish
official statistics on
such crimes, and to establish dedicated units of local law enforcement on hate
crimes that will work to prevent and prosecute them.
To conclude, the
commission is continuing to examine options for U.S. policy to advance
freedom of religion and related human rights in Russia. We plan to issue a
further report on our
review and our visit this fall.
And as always, we
look forward to continuing to work with you and the members of the Helsinki
Commission on the situation in Russia and other OSCE member states. Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Thank you very much, as well. Appreciate that and I appreciate
the succinct and
pointed testimony.
Have there been a series of -- you
note hostile articles at the opening of your testimony --
have there been a
series of hostile articles in the quasi-official press on xenophobia, on
religious
minorities' expansion in Russia?
GAER: There have been a
series of continued remarks, criticisms and derogatory comments made
about
-- essentially about minorities, about strange and non-Russian groups. And that
is the angle
that is taken.
The argument is that Orthodoxy is Russia's
true religion. And therefore, everything else --
all these strange, other
people -- are not only strange and other, but they are harming Russia's true
essence.
And there is - this is part of a broader anti-Western trend, and
it's part of -- I mean,
anti-Americanism has grown, as well. And yes, it's
in the media, as well as in ordinary discourse.
BROWNBACK: What's the --
what are the officials at the Orthodox -- in the Russian Orthodox
Church
saying about this? What are their public statements?
GAER: Well, their
public statements are really quite troubling in this regard.
They have --
they portray human rights advocates as political actors paid for by foreigners.
BROWNBACK: This is the Orthodox Church statements.
GAER: Yes, yes.
They are -- they portray them as people who identify with the interests of
those "who do not love Russia." And they suggest that only if they change will
they be acceptable.
I'm looking for a direct quote for you. But what we...
BROWNBACK: Did you meet with officials of the Orthodox Church to query them
about these
statements?
GAER: We had an extended discussion. We also
met with the religious council -- the members
of the four, so-called
"traditional" religions, as well.
We were, I would say quite candidly,
senator, shocked by this line of argumentation.
We were told human rights
groups don't represent Russia; they represent foreign ideas.
We were told
that human rights...
BROWNBACK: By the Orthodox Church?
GAER: ...
cannot be used to defame things that are holy. And the example we were given
were
the Danish cartoons, or the cartoons that were shown in -- not the
cartoons -- the exhibit that was
shown in Moscow at the Sakharov Center,
dealing with the commercialization of religion.
We were told that religion
could not be used to defame peoples, and it couldn't be used to
somehow work
against the interests of the Russian people. And we were told it couldn't be
used for
immoral -- to advocate immoral acts.
We were really quite
surprised by the language, because what we heard were that human rights
is
selective and politicized, foreign-funded and not impartial.
And this is the
language that I, as somebody who has spent a lot of time at the United
Nations with U.S. delegations, at the OSCE with U.S. delegations -- I'm familiar
with such language,
but I'm not familiar with it since the demise of the
demise of the Soviet Union, coming from people
from Russia.
BROWNBACK:
It just seems like an odd stance for the official church to take. Those
comments
just seem to be one that would -- you could expect, maybe, out of a
government, but not out of the
official -- or not out of the Russian
Orthodox Church. This seems to be at odds.
When you presented counter
arguments to them, those were apparently then not well received,
or not
considered as useful or germane? They were, again, seen as a foreign influence?
GAER: They weren't -- there was no climb-down. But, for example, I raised
the point that by
calling human rights defenders foreigners -- foreign and
foreign-funded -- one was recreating the
enemy specter that one could take
back to Stalin's day, or any other such period.
This is an argument that's
used around the world to target and, in fact, often results in the
killing
of human rights defenders around the world.
And I queried why such language
was being used and what its implications were. And other
members of the
commission did, as well. And we were told that there was no intention to bring
harm
to these people, that they were courageous.
And I drew attention to
the fact that these very same people were the ones who helped the
Russian --
Andrei Sakharov, for example -- the very same people who helped the Russian
Orthodox
Church fight its fight against Soviet power. And that's well
acknowledged.
The argument is over what's being worked on, what specific
issues are being addressed. And
we were told that -- we were told that
Russian human rights defenders don't work to help old people
get housing and
social benefits, and things of that sort -- which, of course, they do.
But a
dichotomization was created, which I think is very troubling and is repeated.
We found
quotes by Putin, by Lavrov, by church officials, as well, with this
mantra about foreign-funded,
representing the interests of foreigners and
those who do not love Russia.
BROWNBACK: Is -- what's the root of this?
You usually have some rootedness -- they do have
some root somewhere. Is it
a fear of the demise of Russian influence in Russia? Or the expansion of
minority faiths?
What's at the root of this?
GAER: There are many
factors at the root of it. One -- a simple one is the whole effort in
Russian society to establish so-called order, to deal with the problems of
Chechnya -- which, of
course, the human rights groups have, as a whole,
addressed frontally -- the Russian abuses and the
failure to investigate and
punish those responsible.
Part of it is the changing demographics. It's
useful to have an enemy when you're trying to
pull people together around
concepts that you may not have been able to bring them together on in the
past.
So, there is a -- there are issues of convenience and there are issues
of practicality. And
then there, of course, are cultural and historical
factors that can be used to rally people. These
are not unknown in the last
six or seven years in Russia.
BROWNBACK: And how is the rest of the G-8
doing on speaking out regarding human rights and
some of these disturbing
trends against human rights in Russia?
GAER: The G-8 is not speaking with a
single voice, as we would like to see it. I think
probably...
BROWNBACK: Why not?
GAER: Well, there are different points of view about
whether speaking out makes sense.
There are economic interests. There are
political interests.
We have a huge concern over Russia's role right now as
the arbiter with Iran. There is a --
there are lots of issues that have
stilled the public voice on these issues.
The question is: can communicating
these concerns privately be enough? And our view is that
it can't be.
And senator, I just wanted to mention, when you asked me about the Russian
Orthodox Church, I
may not have mentioned in my oral remarks that we met
with Metropolitan Kirill, who is the head of
external affairs for the Moscow
Patriarchate. So, this was not just a random conversation with a
random
cleric.
BROWNBACK: Well, thank you very much. Thank you for your continued
work in this very
important field.
And it's important that we keep
getting information brought forward and continue to advocate
for these human
rights for everybody, every where in the world. Thank you very much.
The
second panel will be a series of experts on Russia and what's been taking place
recently.
As I noted earlier, many of these witnesses attended the G-8 or
the pre-G-8 conferences, so they've
got some updated information to present.
Mr. Carl Gershman is a longtime friend of this committee, and myself
personally. He's
president of the National Endowment for Democracy. He's
just returned from Moscow where he attended
the Other Russia Conference
during the run-up to the G-8 summit.
Mr. Thomas Melia, deputy executive
director of Freedom House. He's held senior posts at the
National
Democratic Institute for International Affairs and was associate director of the
Free Trade
Union Institute of AFL-CIO. Has been -- served six years with
one of my favorite former colleagues,
U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan,
who unfortunately has deceased.
Mr. Fritz Ermarth, retired October of '98 as
a member of the Senior Intelligence Service of
the CIA. He has worked over
40 years in national security affairs and government, academia and
commercial institutions specializing in Soviet strategic and regional conflict
issues, and currently
consults with several organizations working on
national security, including nuclear weapons policy
and intelligence reform,
U.S.-Russian relations and regional security.
And Nikolas Gvosdev, editor of
"The National Interest," and a senior fellow at the -- for
strategic studies
at the Nixon Center. He's a frequent commenter on U.S.-Russian relations,
Russian
and Eurasian affairs.
We will put all of your testimony into the
record. So, I would appreciate a summary so we
can have as much time as
possible for questions. And I hope you can get at the direct pointedness of
your comments, so we can discuss those as much as possible.
Mr. Gershman,
let's start with you.
GERSHMAN: Well, thank you very much, Senator
Brownback. And I'm grateful for this
opportunity to testify before the
commission in the aftermath of the G-8 summit.
As you noted, I and others
from the NED and its associated institutes were among the
international
participants at the Other Russia Conference that was convened in Moscow by the
All-Russia Civil Congress on July 11th and 12th -- four days before the
opening of the G-8.
The Other Russia Conference was organized with two goals
in mind. First, to declare to the
world that there was, in fact, a
different, more pluralist and democratically committed Russia than
the
bureaucratic nomenklatura that would be on display later in the week in St.
Petersburg.
And second, to rally and bring together a broad coalition of
NGOs and opposition political
forces to fight, as the conveners said, for
human rights and for the democratic principle of
organizing government and
society, and against bigotry and xenophobia and a culture of bureaucratic
theft. Those are quotes taken from the convening document.
I'm pleased to
report that the conference achieved its objectives, and more. It received
enormous attention in the international media, thereby enabling the Other Russia
to have its message
heard.
And more importantly, it provided a forum
where Russians representing widely different points
of view and areas of
engagement were able to overcome a history of internal strife and mutual
reproach and unite around a common vision for a new democratic state of Russia
under the rule of law.
Significantly, a permanent council was established at
the conference that will convene in
September, and it plans to meet
regularly thereafter to exchange information and opinions.
Not surprisingly,
the official Russia did not take kindly to this meeting. Police and
unidentified assailants physically assaulted dozens of activists en route to the
conference, forcibly
removing them from trains and reportedly planting drugs
and bullets on them.
At the conference itself, police arbitrarily arrested
four young activists, assaulting a
German reporter for "FOCUS" magazine, and
confiscating his camera as he tried to film them being
forced into a police
van.
A state Duma deputy was also knocked unconscious on his way to deliver
a speech at the
closing day's events.
In addition, attempts were made to
prevent official participation in the conference, with an
aide to President
Putin warning foreign diplomats that attendance at the Other Russia meeting
would
be treated by the Kremlin as an unfriendly gesture.
I'm pleased to
report, however, that assistant secretaries Dan Fried and Barry Lowenkron
attended the gathering, along with other G-7 representatives.
I'm also
pleased to note that SEC chairman Chris Cox, who is also a member of the NED
board,
delivered an important video message to the conference, in which he
explained why freedom to say,
write, publish, broadcast and think the truth
as one understands it, without fear of persecution, is
essential to a free
capital market.
His implicit message to the Russian leaders was that they
cannot hope to achieve sustained
economic growth and full integration into
the global economy if they continue to drive Russia
backwards toward
authoritarianism.
The holding of the other G-8 conference side by side with
the G-8 summit graphically
illustrates the hybrid, semi-authoritarian nature
of the current Russian polity.
As the conference agenda emphasized, there
are two Russias in conflict with one another -- a
Russia of bureaucrats that
is trying to hold on to power by closing off all independent avenues of
political participation and expression, and a Russia of citizens that is
pressing to reverse the
return of authoritarianism and build a normal
democracy.
As I pointed out in my own remarks to the Other Russia
Conference, a hybrid system is
inherently unstable, for the simple reason
that Abraham Lincoln explained almost 150 years ago when
he said that a
government cannot permanently endure half-slave and half-free. It will have to
become
all one thing or all the other.
Its capacity for effective
governance is also severely constrained by the absence of normal
channels of
participation and communication that give a government feedback from society.
As one Russian specialist said to me in his critic of "over-managed democracy,"
it is a
little like trying to drive a car without adequate visibility --
something the Kremlin discovered in
January of last year with the unrest
over benefits reform.
And as the Bulgarian, Ivan Krastev explained in his
own remarks to the Other Russia
Conference, such a system also feeds
paranoia, since leaders who don't know what people think will
assume that
everyone is against them. Such paranoia was certainly on display in the way
official
Russia treated the Other Russia meeting.
The Russian leaders
speak of establishing a sovereign democracy, by which they presumably
mean a
Russia that is not beholden to foreign powers.
But as the closing statement
of the Other Russia Conference pointedly noted, quoting from the
elegant
words of Article III of the Russian constitution, the multinational people of
the Russian
Federation shall be the vehicle of sovereignty.
And the only
source of power in the Russian Federation, the so-called sovereign democracy of
official Russia is an increasingly hollow Potemkin democracy that bears
little resemblance to the
real thing.
The United States should continue
to deal with the two Russias, as it did earlier this month,
by participating
in both the Other Russia Conference and the G-8 summit. No one who supports
democracy in Russia and desires the best for the Russian people should want to
return to the enmity
of the old days.
But effective relations with
official Russia will not be possible if we do not demonstrate
strong support
for the Other Russia, which is especially threatened today by the harsh new NGO
law.
The $180,000 tax just levied on the International Protection Center,
which helps Russians take cases
to the European Court of Human Rights in
Strasburg, is an example of how the new law can be used
punitively to
silence independent NGOs.
The Russian government justifies this and other
repressive measures -- and I think this
speaks to the question you raised
earlier about root causes -- by claiming that they are a necessary
defense
against foreign enemies, chiefly the United States.
We should respond, in my
view, by showing our clear and unambiguous solidarity with those who
are
fighting for a free Russia under the rule of law. Supporting the aspirations of
Russian
democrats will not only refute the argument that we are against
Russia, it will also make clear to
the Russian people that we have no
illusions about the direction the current leadership is taking the
country.
The Other Russia has taken an important step toward building a new, unified,
democratic
movement. This is a significant development that we need to
understand and support -- one that holds
promise for Russia and U.S.-Russia
relations and for the cause of democracy in the world.
Thank you.
BROWNBACK: Thank you very much. Mr. Gershman, I look forward to talking with
you some more
about this issue overall.
Mr. Melia, thank you for joining
us very much today.
MELIA: It's good to be back, senator.
Freedom House
appreciates this opportunity to testify about the situation in Russia today,
its implications for the future and the American response.
It's important to
note that we gather today, not only in the immediate aftermath of the G-8
summit in St. Petersburg, but in what one might call the opening days of the
campaign that will
culminate with critical parliamentary elections next year
in the Russian Federation.
Having spent a week in Russia last month, I can
offer some personal observations, as well as
reflect the analysis presented
in our institution's reports.
We went to Russia last month in the run-up to
the G-8 meeting, precisely in order to engage
with a broad range of
Russians, inside and outside of government -- journalists, human rights groups,
scholars and NGOSs -- including some people sympathetic to Vladimir Putin's
administration.
While there, we released our most recent report on Russia
from the survey, "Nations in
Transit," at a well attended press conference
on June 14th. And so, these findings were conveyed to
at least some
Russians through the dwindling array of still-independent newspapers and radio
stations
in Moscow.
And that report documents the continuing decline of
freedom in Russia during the past year.
We have copies of that to be
submitted to the record, as well.
That report focuses on several specific
developments that have been prominent in the last
year: the resurgence of
corruption in the growing state-owned economy; the development of the NGO
law, that further curtails civic activity and obstructs international efforts to
assist; and the
adoption of election laws that will make it even more
difficult for opposition parties to win seats
in the Duma next year and
virtually impossible for independent monitors to observe the electoral
process.
But there's a larger, even more important story to be told, when
one looks at the accumulated
series of reports on Russia over these last
number of years in the series, "Nations in Transit."
Scores for Russia's
democratic performance have been declining in every year since 1997.
The
deterioration is -- or, I was going to say, the deterioration of democracy,
although it's
probably the dissolution of that country's democratic
potential -- has been a serious, deliberate and
long-term project. It's not
something that has just happened on President Bush's watch, nor even
since
Vladimir Putin became president of Russia.
The recent, much publicized
effort to hamstring the civic sector in Russia comes on the heals
of
previous, successful efforts to eviscerate political parties and render hollow
the electoral
process, to concentrate power in the hands of the Kremlin by
altering the constitution to allow the
president to appoint governors who
had previously been elected, efforts to cow the business community
through
strong arm tactics by the Putin administration, abetted by the courts that have
led to the
re-nationalization of major corporate assets that had been
privatized in the '90s, and the campaign
to intimidate business leaders to
desist from supporting political parties and candidates they might
prefer
through a selective prosecution epitomized by the incarceration of Mikhail
Khodorkovsky, who
was previously the principal financial backer of several
rivals to Vladimir Putin's United Russia.
There's also -- we've also
witnessed the effort to control the national media, quite
explicitly in the
case of television and most radio, which are now under government control once
again, and indirectly in the case of the print media, which one by one are
being bought out by
interests sympathetic to the Kremlin, after the
independent minded publications find their
advertisers being discouraged by
the Putin administration and friends, until they become financially
untenable as businesses and are sold to people who the government finds more to
their liking.
Russia is not yet a consolidated dictatorship. It may well be
what Carl Gershman describes
as a semi-authoritarian polity.
But it is
an autocracy. It is an authoritarian polity with nuclear weapons, fast
accumulating wealth through its oil and gas reserves, increasingly assertive and
self-confident in
its work on the international stage, and more importantly,
perhaps, one governed by a community that
is convinced that the United
States wishes to see Russia fail as a state.
This paranoia about what our
motives are comes through in private conversations and public
statements
alike, and needs to be acknowledged in any serious conversation about Russia.
BROWNBACK: Can I -- let me ask you about that.
MELIA: Sure.
BROWNBACK: That just makes no sense to me. Why on earth would people think we
want Russia
to fail as a state? And what is it going to be replaced by? I
mean, it's not going to be
ungoverned.
MELIA: Well, that's -- that's
the question.
Why do they hear us in a different way than we think we're
speaking?
They hear us -- when we talk about democracy and human rights,
they hear us uttering
anti-Russian statements. This is the community around
the Kremlin. This is the elite that now
governs Russia.
When we talk
about human rights and democracy, and they take that as a challenge to the state
they're trying to build. So, they think we're being anti-Russian, when we
think we're trying to be
pro-Russian. We think we're trying to advocate for
the interests of the Russian citizen.
BROWNBACK: And they honestly believe
we're trying to be anti-Russian?
MELIA: They do.
BROWNBACK: We're
still in the Cold War?
MELIA: They think that we're in a confrontation with
them, and that this is a battlefield
that we're engaged on, in support for
civil society and for democratic practices. They see that as
something
that's hostile to their interests.
And so, yes, it is seen as something
that's done by us in response to the rising power of the
Russian state under
Putin and with this growing oil wealth.
They think that we're discomforted
by their growing strength. And that that is the
motivation for our
discussion about democracy.
BROWNBACK: Please proceed. I'm sorry.
MELIA: And they point -- directly in this context -- they point to the
enthusiasm that many
of us in the West showed for Boris Yeltsin's
governments in the '90s, when many Russians now believe
Russia collapsed,
lost its great power status and fell into disarray at home and abroad.
While
we thought we were embracing an admittedly chaotic situation that would sooner
or later
get through its convulsions and onto a path towards stable
democracy, many Russians came to believe
that we actually sought the chaos
and insecurity and impoverishment that was so widespread during
that period.
And this view is reinforced in the minds of some Russians by what they
perceive as a
selective policy of democracy promotion by the United States.
Many Russian democrats took heart from the bold speech delivered by Vice
President Cheney in
Vilnius in May. But the wonder why it wasn't delivered
in Russia itself, or by President Bush
himself, and why it was so
conspicuously undermined by the president's warm welcome of Azerbaijan's
President Aliyev to the White House in May, and by the vice president's
subsequent visit to
Kazakhstan and his embrace there of a leader who governs
the country that Russians know is less free
even than Russia, in Kazakhstan.
So, I will skip forward to offer a few concluding observations as a basis
for discussion.
I think it matters to Russia's democrats that we in the
outside world continue to call them
as we see them. The reports that we've
issued and that others do -- the Commission on Religious
Freedom, the
Helsinki Commission, the State Department's reports, statements by members of
Congress
-- these are paid a great deal of attention to by Russians, in and
out of government.
And it's important that we continue to be straightforward
and public in our analysis and
commentary. It matters to Russia's democrats
that the major governments -- and most conspicuously,
the United States --
maintain credibility in the democracy discourse.
I've talked about the
seeming contradictions in our treatment of Russia versus Kazakhstan and
Azerbaijan.
But keep in mind that every inconsistency in our dealings is
publicized broadly in Russia by
the official media -- often with a smirk, an
editorial smirk. Every misstep and mistake in Iraq is
sell publicized
throughout Russia as an illustration to the Russian public of what we really
mean by
democratization.
Every time a Ukrainian or a Georgian official
takes issues with Russian policy, it confirms
that the real reason for our
support for democratic reform in those countries was about installing
anti-Russian governments.
If our democracy promotion policy is seen in the
world as a weapon to be used mainly against
unfriendly governments, rather
than a goal pursued more broadly and consistently, then we will have
lost
credibility and alienated those in places like Russia who could be our allies
and who are our
natural allies, in some cases.
If Russians become
convinced that our goal is not a truly democratic Russia, but instead a
weak, impoverished or divided Russia, then our promotion of democracy will come
across as punitive
and insincere. And it's not clear that our message now
is getting through to very many Russians.
The third and related point is
that it's important, therefore, that we not permit Russia to
be further
isolated from the international community. This is exactly what some in the
Kremlin are
seeking to do with the new punitive legislation regarding NGOs.
Carl mentioned the hefty tax bill, suddenly presented this week to one of the
important NGOs,
the Center for Assistance in International Defense.
According to the NGO, Memorial, several smaller
NGOs in Russia's regions are
being overwhelmed by paperwork from the tax service, in order to comply
with
the new NGO law, and are considering shutting their doors, because they can't
keep up with the
bureaucratic obligations being imposed on them.
Russia's autocrats want to isolate Russian democrats, civic activists and human
rights
defenders from their natural support networks in the international
community.
So, we need to think about how to overcome that isolation. This
means that Russia needs to
be a major topic of discussion with European and
other allies, so that a principled and consistent
engagement with Russia is
a high priority for the West generally.
We need to think again about the
current U.S. investment in democracy promotion in the
country. For the size
of the country and the nature of the issues, a rather modest investment of
about $40 million is being made by the State Department and AID. And it's
slated to decline to about
one-third of that -- or by one-third -- by next
year.
This does not convey the message that we're serious about investing in
Russia's democrats who
want to work with us.
And perhaps most urgently,
Congress ought to reexamine the budget proposal that proposes
elimination of
Voice of America's Russian language radio, leaving it to RFE and Radio Liberty
alone
to serve the Russian-speaking radio audiences.
There are Russians
who want to listen to American radio. Let's not cut them off.
Another point
would be that more members of Congress -- you personally and institutionally --
ought to engage more often with more Russians. To the extent you can, I
would urge you and the
commission and other bodies in the Congress to visit
Russia more often, engage with a broader range
of Russians -- in and out of
government, not just with the human rights defenders and activists that
are
most keen to work with us, although we should not overlook them.
Interestingly, and unlike what is the case in some other countries, Russians
want to engage
with their American counterparts. They usually don't seek
our approval, but they want our respect.
And they're eager to engage with
Americans to determine how to win that respect.
So, we need to all of us be
engaged more often and more seriously with Russians -- listening
to them, as
well as talking at them.
And finally, I would just say, we need to take a
serious interest in the way that Russia is
prosecuting its wars in the North
Caucasus. A Reuters report this week said that the Russian
ministry of
interior has just sent a letter to NGOs working in Chechnya, to require them to
report on
the movements of their staff members, to obtain permission from
the FSB in advance for trips into
Chechnya, to report on their trips when
they return to Moscow from Chechnya.
The process could be holding up much
needed humanitarian aid and services to people in the
North Caucasus. Just
on Monday, a U.N. convoy was turned back from a trip to Chechnya, when
checkpoint guards told the convoy that they didn't have the right paperwork.
These are foreboding signals for Chechens, who view the traveling back and forth
of NGOs and
the U.N. as their lifelines to the outside world. And just as
Russians are trying to isolate Russia
from the world, they're also trying to
isolate Chechnya from the rest of Russia.
And I hope we can find ways to
overcome these efforts.
Thank you. I look forward to the conversation.
BROWNBACK: Thank you very much.
Mr. Ermarth, delighted to have you here
today, and thank you for joining us and your long
years of service. Look
forward to your testimony.
ERMARTH: Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for
the opportunity to address the commission on
such a very important subject,
this balancing of the pursuit of democracy, promotion of democracy and
human
rights in Russia, and striking or pursuing a relationship that allows us to
safeguard a
security agenda on both sides.
We have this problem
elsewhere in the world -- our relations with China and our relations
with
the complex worlds of Islam.
It's gotten more difficult in the Russian case
for reasons other witnesses have already
addressed.
Most commentary
about Russia lately in our relationship has been gloomy. Kremlin
authoritarianism is creeping forward. Russian foreign policy displays a
defensiveness bordering on
paranoia, and an assertiveness bordering on
pugnacity.
"Russia is back," say many pundits with foreboding and many
Russian authorities with pride.
One might say old Russia is back, for the
attitudes and reflexes on display have deep roots in
Russian history.
The recent history is important. Putin, Putinism and the behavior of the Putin
regime are
very much a product of, as a backlash to, Russian developments in
the late '80s and '90s -- political
disorder, loss of empire and
international standing, and especially the economic collapse,
accompanied by
rampant criminality and corruption, and the impoverishment of most Russians.
To be fair to the Russians and to the history we're talking about here, we have
to recognize
our role in this. Some of our actions were good and necessary,
but they inevitably caused
resentment.
Expanding NATO into a zone that
caused two world wars, as a cause of encouraging the
Westernization, the
democratization of the peoples of East and Central Europe, getting out of the
ABM
treaty -- good and necessary, given the world we face -- and the ease of
constructing ballistic
missiles; expanding our influence into the former
Soviet republics -- good and necessary decisions,
but they inevitably caused
resentment on the part of Russian elites and Russian people.
We also have to
recognize the complicity in the '90s of U.S. and Western governments and
businesses in the plundering privatization and bandit capitalism that robbed the
state, pauperized
the people and produced a hated new class of oligarchs.
Although exaggerated in Russian minds, this role was real. It was neither good
nor, in my
view, necessary.
Different behavior on our part in that
period might not have produced different results in
Russia, but they would
not have produced the resentments, the deep resentments we now see in the
Russian public.
I mean, it is a tragedy that, in the early '90s, no country
in the world was more respected
and admired by Russians than the United
States. Within a half a decade that had begun to disappear,
and is largely,
not wholly, gone today.
This whole sordid history of the '90s and
privatization -- the Russian word for privatization
is "privatizatsia." But
the proper word for it in Russian has a good Russian root, "prikhvatatsia
(ph)," which means plundering or stealing or seizing.
All this ought to
someday be thoroughly explored. Congressman Cox did a good job in 2000,
but
it was incomplete.
On the foreign policy and security fronts, given the
landscape of Russian attitudes, the
interests that history, contemporary and
ancient, have produced, I believe the Bush administration is
not actually --
is not doing too badly. And the Putin regime is showing some constructive
realism
and occasionally initiative.
On the basis of public information,
I believe this judgment holds on the very important areas
of cooperation in
counter-proliferation and counterterrorism.
Now, I know there are negatives
there. And had I the kind of access I had through most of my
career, I
probably would know more about them. But the public picture is pretty
encouraging.
On other fronts, like energy and economic relations, like WTO,
I'll recuse myself for lack of
expertise. But I want to make a point or
raise a question about the energy front.
Russia wants to make itself a great
energy power. There's an old Russian expression that
says, Russia has only
two loyal allies, her army and her navy. Now the pundits say it's her oil and
her gas.
The question is, does the Kremlin want to use oil and gas the way
it once used armies and
navies for coercion, intimidation, pressure,
dominance? Some of their rhetoric and actions, like
behavior toward Ukraine
at the beginning of the year, suggest that they do.
But one needs to ask
whether oil and gas, like other forms of economic leverage, could be
used
that way. If market prevail, over the long run they can't. Economic leverage
requires
cooperation, mutual respect for wellbeing and certainly survival
among customers and suppliers.
So, it's an open question, but a hopefully
open one, whether the pursuit of energy power will
exercise a moderating and
-- if I can say so without saying sounding patronizing -- civilizing
influence on Russian foreign policy.
On many security fronts, Russian
attitudes and behavior, resentment of the U.S., a desire to
counter our
superpower, at least make trouble for us here and there, official secrecy --
they pose
big problems for us.
But Russia has rationally perceived
authentic national interests which we must understand if
we are to deal with
realistically, even if we don't defer to them.
On Iran, for example, Russia
has manifold political, geopolitical, economic interests there.
Moreover,
Russian leaders suspect that were they to follow the U.S. in lock step on Iran,
it would
not materially change Iranian behavior -- and I think they're
probably right on this -- but only
increase the likelihood of a conflict and
regional instability, of which they are the more likely
victim than we, if
it escalates.
I recently convened a workshop of Russian hands that are much
more expert than I. And they
emphasized the need to understand, if not
necessarily defer to, these kinds of interests.
Let me note in this context
before turning to the main agenda, that there's been a recent
development of
great importance in U.S.-Russian relations on security cooperation, that has
strangely
been ignored by the American press and largely so by the Russian
press.
Late last month, our undersecretary of state for arms control, Robert
Joseph, and his Russian
counterpart, Sergei Kislyak, reached an agreement to
revive an official diplomatic dialogue on
strategic nuclear arms issues, one
task of which is reportedly already begun -- to craft a successor
to the
START I arms control agreement, which expires in 2009.
Now, unless
superseded by a similar agreement, the provisions of START I on declaration,
verification and inspection of strategic nuclear forces will also lapse. The
revival of official
negotiations of this kind between the U.S. and Russia is
very good news, which should not be hidden
under a bushel.
Successful
management of the world's nuclear problem will require a sustained, frank and
constructive dialogue between the world's original nuclear weapons powers about
controlling and
reducing their own weapons.
After all -- if I don't
sound too cute about this -- survival is also a human right.
Now, let's turn
to the all-important topic of human rights and democratic self-government. I
just want to make a few basic points from my career perspective, really.
We
-- point one -- and by that I mean the U.S. government and all concerned people
and
institutions, organizations, NGOs -- must make the best effort to
understand what is really going on
inside Russia. This is difficult.
Counting my years as a student along with a professional lifetime thereafter,
I've been
trying to understand that country for nearly half a century.
Despite -- and in some ways because of -- the abundance of open information, it
is more
difficult than ever to determine what is true, what is false, what
is important and what is trivial,
and what dubious assertions by authorities
are sincerely meant or made cynically for political show,
including "Russia
is back."
Are they merely proclaiming that and knowing how weak that
proposition is? Or do they really
sincerely believe it?
These puzzles
litter the landscape, from economic statistics to who set off the bombs that
got Putin elected, or how the Chechen warlord, Basayev, really died.
Still,
there are very important truths that -- big truths, if nuanced ones -- that can
be
appreciated.
Russia has an authoritarian regime, and if anything,
getting more authoritarian. But it is a
weak authoritarian regime. It is
strongest at monopolizing political power and suppressing or
marginalizing
serious competition -- political competition.
It is not strong enough to
effectively tackle Russia's real problems -- the demographic
crisis, the
decaying infrastructure, the backwardness of the economy outside the energy
sector -- and
even inside the energy sector, when you talk about, you know,
fields, pipelines, infrastructure --
and pervasive corruption.
And there
are important divisions and factions within the regime itself.
Russia needs,
but does not have, a strong state. It has a huge, bloated, flabby state that
is as much an assembly of avaricious clans and bureaucracies as a state.
A
truly strong state can be built by Russians. It could be built on the -- and
only by
Russians.
It could be built on the basis of strong
authoritarianism -- strong authoritarianism. But
that would require
charismatic leadership, a charismatic militant ideology beyond just Russian
nationalism, and probably large-scale repressions.
This cannot be ruled out
for the future, but happily, does not seem likely.
Or the Russians can build
a strong state on the basis of true democracy, which is what we and
a lot of
Russians -- alas, too few for now -- are trying to promote.
Russia needs,
but does not have, a free media environment for information and ideas. The
media of broadest reach and influence, especially television, are dominated and
largely controlled by
the Kremlin.
Still, there are significant degrees
of freedom in the print media and on the Internet.
People can think and say
what they please, and propagate what they think, more freely than throughout
most of Russian --and especially Soviet -- history over decades and centuries.
Still, the combination of political power, limited though it may be, to
squelch genuine
political competition and opposition, and Kremlin dominance
of the media -- mass media, the media of
broadest influence -- call into
serious question the meaning of upcoming parliamentary and
presidential
elections, even if there's no falsification or vote fraud in the usual sense.
As of today, Putin's weak authoritarianism has broad political public support,
because it has
brought a sense of order, a sense of pride and, thanks to
energy revenues, increased economic
wellbeing for many. The question is how
long this will last.
Part of the reason for Putin's public support is that,
for much of the population, as I noted
earlier, democracy and market
capitalism -- meaning the experience of the '90s -- which offered too
little
of either democracy or capitalism. Beyond the regime and elites, we have to
find ways to
address the broad population that harbors these resentments.
Point two, we need to clarify and codify for the Russian audience -- and, for
that matter,
for many other audiences in the world -- our doctrine of
democracy in its fullest sense.
Democracy can come in many different
flavors, informed by culture, tradition, rational choice
among alternative
institutional arrangements and procedures.
But the ingredients or
requirements are the same: rule of fair and reasonable law established
by
legitimate representatives, chosen through authentic public participation in
authentically
competitive electoral processes, enacted by transparent
parliamentary procedures, surrounded by the
free exchange of ideas and
information, and enforced by independent courts and nonpartisan police.
Democracy requires a strong state, effective in performing the proper tasks as
defined by
law, but limited to them, such as defense, public order,
regulating commerce, supporting the
deserving disadvantaged.
This
doctrine is more complicated than just voting or freedom for NGOs or freedom of
the
press. But it's not all that complicated.
And we've got to be
better -- we've got to get better -- at conveying the tapestry of real
democracy to get at some of these prejudices about, well, you're promoting the
American model, or
Western-style democracy.
BROWNBACK: Chairman
Ermarth, let's see if we could get this wrapped up, because I want to
get to
some questions here, if we can.
ERMARTH: OK. Let me turn to the question
of how to promote democracy. Let me make just two
points.
We need to
impress upon Russian leaders, including Putin and his successor, that our
interest
in -- our concern as a government, as a country, as a people -- in
the democracy agenda is serious
and in harmony with our security agenda.
Now, this requires style as well as persistence. Somebody who had both was
Ronald Reagan,
and I saw him apply this, personally. Very impressive.
Russian leaders aren't necessarily going to be moved by our protestations and
our pleas, but
they will take -- they will -- it's important to impress upon
them that we're serious about it.
As I said earlier, the biggest -- and
barring a far more authoritarian regime -- the most
enduring obstacle to the
democratization of Russia is a population that is somewhat hostile by --
made by the recent past, and largely indifferent, because of a mildly
authoritarian regime that has
brought a measure of stability and security
for them.
How do we reach that and educate that audience more effectively?
We need to recognize that
as a priority.
How do we reach the broad
audience at the level of technique and technology?
My experience is way out
of date, in the Cold War -- shortwave radio, book shops for foreign
travelers. You know, with the end of the Cold War -- globalization, satellite
broadcasting,
Internet, the information age -- we have all kinds of new
opportunities and avenues for communication
about which others are far more
expert than I.
But I will add, note in closing, that a lot of these experts
on communications are Russians.
They know and share our agenda. They know
how to act on it. They are programmatically,
operationally, if you will,
technically expert on how to do this. They're enthusiastic. They're
determined. They're daring.
They don't need education on democracy or the
ills of their country. They need our support.
BROWNBACK: Thank you very
much. Very interesting thoughts and comments.
Mr. Gvosdev, thanks for
joining us.
GVOSDEV: Thank you for inviting me.
I don't need to
reiterate what you've already heard from every previous speaker about the
very real problems for human rights and democratic governance in Russia. I
don't need to repeat and
enhance, that I think we've gotten a very clear
picture. And it's not a pretty picture.
If this were solely a hearing about
human rights in Russia, stop. We could end the
discussion. But now, we've
been asked also to say, how does this fit into the larger U.S.-Russia
relationship and the conduct of diplomacy?
And I think we have to be very
upfront to recognize that we may have to choose between a
number of less
than wonderful options.
I have been concerned that sometimes people in this
discourse present very glib solutions, as
if only we do X, Y and Z, within a
matters of months the situation will change and be wonderful.
It's clear
that these problems that we're seeing are endemic, they are sustained. They are
not going to be overturned or changed simply by an act of will or an act of
faith.
It's going to take engagement, and it is going to have to take
setting of priorities, both
short term and long term, for how we want the
U.S.-Russia relationship to evolve and how we think is
the most effective
way in the long term to promote a Russian society that is governed by the rule
of
law and that is democratic.
I think when we're looking at the
problems we're hearing today, we have to first of all
recognize what I call
the democracy paradox in Russia, which is that the growing authoritarianism of
the Putin administration enjoys broad-based support within the population.
We can look at opinion polls, not only those conducted by Russian entities, but
by those that
are connected to Gallup and elsewhere, and assess that the
Putin administration enjoys anywhere from
50 to 70 percent approval rating,
even now.
This support for the regime is also linked by, in the minds of
many Russians, that they are
free enough. And the World Value Surveys and
others confirm this -- a high number of Russians
believing that they do
enjoy a reasonable amount of personal autonomy.
We can disagree with those
assessments, and certainly, I think what we're seeing is that, if
you're on
the margins of Russian society -- you belong to a minority religion, you want to
be more
politically active -- you come much more into conflict with the
state.
But for many ordinary Russians, they feel that their lives are better
now than they've been
at any point in the past, and certainly better than
what their parents or grandparents have.
Paradoxically, if we look at the
polling data, Putin enjoys his highest level of support from
the youngest
post-Soviet generation. If you look at his approval ratings, his approval
ratings are
lowest among the 55-and-older crowd in Russia, and his approval
ratings are highest among 18- to
24-year-olds.
This is because, as Fritz
pointed out, the experience of the 1990s, for many people the sense
that the
'90s represented economic loss, degradation, so on and so forth, and that with
the Putin
authoritarian shift, this has opened up ways for opportunity.
And particularly the younger and more educated generation is also one that is
able to travel.
It has higher disposable income. It is more connected into
the global information superhighway,
particularly the Internet.
So,
again, the perception that the state is closing in is less for some of them,
because, if
they feel that they can travel, they can study abroad, they can
log on to any Internet site for news
that they wish, if they have satellite
TV which broadcasts all the international channels, then the
perception that
society is closing in on you is less.
And I think that we have to
acknowledge that for many people, right now their priority -- and
the
opinion polls, again, reflect this -- is short-term stability, short-term
prosperity. How do I
get my family's income and livelihood in order? And
then, over time, how do I expand this zone of
personal autonomy?
I think
it's important, because if we look at -- not based on hope -- but we look at
simply
assessing various factors on the ground, prior to the Velvet
Revolution in Serbia, prior to the
Orange Revolution in Ukraine, there were
a number of factors that were in play, that enabled those
revolutions to
succeed.
Right now, as of 2006 -- and this is not because I think this is
great, but just this is my
assessment of what's happening on the ground -- I
don't see those conditions in Russia. I don't see
the conditions that led
to those kinds of revolutions in other societies prior to their elections.
That could change in the next several years.
My sense is that this kind of
clash between a state that's closing in and a rising middle
class with its
sense of personal autonomy, that those trend lines probably aren't going to
intersect,
really, until the next decade -- maybe 2010 to 2015 -- rather
than occurring between 2006 and 2008.
People talk about the oil price being
the magic solution for Russia, and it certainly has.
But even if the oil
price dropped below $30 a barrel, the Russian economy would still be growing at
about three to five percent a year, so it would still be providing a certain
degree of prosperity.
But I certainly don't see the oil price within the
next two years going anywhere below $55 a barrel.
So, the Russian government
will certainly have a lot of walking-around money at its disposal
prior to
the 2007 parliamentary elections and the 2008 presidential election.
And I
think it's important for us to be understanding. If you're a Russian member of
the
middle class who lost their savings twice in the 1990s -- first in the
hyperinflation of '92, second
when the banks collapsed in 1998 -- it might
be understanding that in this decade you might put a
greater, higher
priority on securing your economic standard of living first, as your first
sense.
Certainly, there's a lot of discontent in Russia about corruption,
arbitrariness,
bureaucracy. Again, I don't see that this is leading a lot
of people to conclude that they want a
revolutionary change of government in
the next several years.
And so, I think that we have to keep this in mind
when we're looking at the Russian
situation. It's not simply that there's a
small clique at the top that we have to deal with, that
only if it changed
we would see radical changes.
I would estimate 30 to 40 percent of the
current Russian population feels that it is
economically invested in the
survival of the current regime, which gives it a certain degree of
staying
power.
It also means why, if we look at elections, elections are flawed in
Russia, to be sure. But
if we look at the Moscow elections last year,
liberal democratic forces didn't do that well in terms
of winning elections,
putting their candidates forward.
And if in Moscow, the wealthiest, most
educated, liberal city, a city that in 1990,
democratic forces swept when
they had to deal with the Communist Party, it does indicate that there's
a
problem of message, that it's not -- the message about that democracy leads to
prosperity, leads to
long-term stability is not yet resonating with many
people, particularly if the 1990s is their sense
of experience.
My
colleague, Ian Bremmer, is coming out with a very interesting study called "The
J Curve,"
which addresses this, which is that short term, more authoritarian
governments can produce a certain
level of prosperity and stability. To get
to democracy in the long run means you have to go down the
curve.
Russia
sort of went down the curve, decided it didn't like where it was going, and it's
going
back up this authoritarian side of the curve.
And for us to simply
say, well, if you're more democratic, you'll get to this long-term
vision of
greater peace and prosperity, we have to be able to explain how you can minimize
the
impacts of going through that kind of disruption.
We didn't really
do a good job of it in the 1990s, and we're seeing some of this today.
Let
me just touch on several other issues briefly, since they're included in the
written
testimony.
With regard to foreign policy, one of the elements
that I'm suspicious about is this notion
that much of Russia's current
foreign policy difficulties with the U.S. stems solely or largely from
a
more authoritarian Putin government, and that if the government were more
democratic, it would be
more in line with U.S. foreign policy objectives.
Again, if you look at some of the opinion poll data about when Russians are
asked about
questions like involvement with Iran, involvement with Iraq,
other things like that, it's difficult
to see that there would be a more
democratically accountable government, would of necessity bring its
foreign
policy closer in line with that of the U.S.
What we might get -- and what
would, of course, be a more desirable objective -- is a more
transparent
understanding of how Russian foreign policy takes place. And we certainly
didn't have
much of that with regard to decisions about Ukraine and gas.
But to assume that a more democratic Russian government automatically will track
towards the
U.S. in foreign policy, again, is not something that I think
automatically occurs from the data.
With regard to this question of
selective engagement, which has been put forward, that we can
somehow have a
back-and-forth on this, my impression from Russia, having been there during the
time
of both of these meetings -- the alternative, the Drugaya Rossiya, and
the G-8 itself -- is that, in
the end, there was dissatisfaction on both
sides.
The Kremlin was dissatisfied there was an American presence, and it
felt that there was a
kind of -- as some of them put it to us on the side --
of an attitude that made it difficult to reach
consensus with the U.S. And
a number of the people associated with Drugaya Rossiya felt that the
U.S.
presence was anemic.
Kasparov appeared two days ago on the "Charlie Rose"
program to complain that, why didn't the
assistant secretaries of state, who
attended, actually play much more of an active role. And he
cited
disagreement -- or that the British ambassador was willing to make a speech, and
the U.S.
delegation simply attended.
So, there's this sense of -- what
I'm concerned about is that selective engagement often can
result in -- as I
have cited the proverb about chasing two rabbits at the same time -- you end up
catching neither.
You neither develop a better working relationship with
the Kremlin, if you want, on the
security issues. And at the same time, the
opposition doesn't feel that you've been doing much
beyond providing some
rhetorical support.
So I think that, in the end, one of the recommendations
I would have is for us -- for the
Congress, for the administration -- to
really develop a better calculus of the U.S.-Russia
relationship.
Are
these human rights abuses -- does it mean -- is this a Russia we can still do
business
with, or that we can't? And if so, how we answer that question
should then inform our policy.
But I think an attempt to try to say, well,
we can do business with the Kremlin while at the
same time be seen or be
perceived as trying to undermine it or undermine the current government, I
can't see that that leads to a solution where either you find a cooperation with
us on things that
affect our foreign policy interests, and at the same time
not doing much to really advance our sense
of values and democratic
governance.
So, I would think that in the end with all of this, is we have
to -- we'll have to come up
with some degree of how we're going to
prioritize. Which of these things matter? What linkage are
we prepared to
offer on any one of these given issues?
I don't think necessarily for me to
suggest that. But I think it has to be done much more,
both within the
Congress and the administration, rather than sort of asserting that we can have
it
all simultaneously at the same time.
I think we're going to have to
decide if a more authoritarian Russia is a government we can
do business
with. Can we live with some of these problems? If not, are we prepared, then,
to
diminish cooperation with Russia and to have those consequences?
And
to at least have an understanding of how we can make what are going to be very
difficult
choices, because I don't think that we're going to have a magic
solution, that in the next year all
of this is resolved and we enter 2008
without having this issue in front of us.
BROWNBACK: Let me pursue right
off of that, because that seems to me to be the real question
and the real
issue here and the real art of this -- not science, but the real art of this --
which
is, how do you engage Russia and at the same time push Russia?
I've wrestled with this myself a great deal, particularly in the work that I've
done in the
Central Asian countries -- Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan --
less recently and more previously.
But how do you engage them and yet push
them? Because we want to engage. We want to
encourage. And I believe
strongly that you need to build the relationship to have any credibility,
and that they have to believe you're (ph) there (ph) in their best interests.
But at the same time, we are not satisfied with their status. We believe
people deserve to
be free. We believe it's a universal right. We believe
it's a God-given right.
And we're not -- the old statement, to feel fully
free ourselves until (ph) everybody's
chains are off and they're free.
So, how do you do that? What's the -- is there a formula you can look at? Or
did we ever
get this right in any time in previous U.S. history, that we
could look back to that model and say,
OK, here's how you model and do that?
GVOSDEV: I think -- and, Fritz, perhaps you'll address more the historical
side, based on
your experience.
But I think right now, one of the things
that's critically important is capacity building,
and that includes more
exchanges, more students, things going back and forth -- really having a
long-term vision, though.
BROWNBACK: OK. I'll give you that.
GVOSDEV:
This is not going to happen...
BROWNBACK: I agree with that.
GVOSDEV:
I think that we need a situation where we need to be consistent in what we say
and
what consequences are. I think one of the problems that...
BROWNBACK: Now, let me probe you on that, because I -- because that's -- I
agree with that.
GVOSDEV: Take, for example, Jackson-Vanik. Let me give
that as an example.
If a particular piece of legislation has specific
conditions attached to it, and the
conditions are fulfilled, then you move
on.
If there's a sense, though -- this is the complaint, both at the
U.S.-Russia dialogue in
February, and then afterwards in the G-8 -- is the
sense that there's a Christmas tree approach, that
if Russia -- if a Russian
official makes a movement on a particular area, then people will say, well
that's great. You moved on this particular area (ph), but now we have these
other complaints, as
well. And therefore, there's -- the idea that there's
workable linkage, that movement on something
produces a concrete response
from our side.
I think there's a growing sense, particularly among the
younger people in the presidential
administration -- this is what one of
them told me -- it's just not worth it to deal with the
Americans. You
don't -- they won't -- you won't -- you won't reward movement.
And, I mean,
that to me seems to be one of the issues here, that there's no reason to -- that
there's no benefit now to be gained in the presidential administration for
advocating, maybe we
should listen to the U.S. on these concerns, because
the perception is it's talk.
And Putin himself went in the other way when he
said, well, they bring up these -- you know,
when he said in February, you
know -- they bring up these concerns and we sort of shrug them off.
His
famous phrase, you know -- the dogs bark and the caravan keeps moving.
So...
BROWNBACK: Mr. Gershman, answer my question, would you?
GERSHMAN: I'd
be happy to.
Let me start by just saying that I'm a little bit uneasy with
the way Mr. Gvosdev has spoken
about the problems of selective -- what he
called selective engagement.
I mean, because if what he's pushing for, of
course, is engagement, it means, you know, that
really we should do less of
the support for human rights and democracy. I think he's saying one way
or
the other.
And I don't think it's ever going to be so simple. And I don't
think there's ever simple
formula.
The U.S., first of all, is always
going to be divided in how it approaches these issues. And
the more
autocratic a country is, the more divided we're going to become.
There'll be
people who are pushing for engagement, people who are pushing more for human
rights. The administration will always, probably be out front on -- more out
front -- on engagement
issues. The Congress is a voice for human rights.
There'll be different -- I'm just making a point -- there'll be different
pressures here, and
I think that's perfectly appropriate.
I don't think
the United States -- as I said in my testimony -- can walk away from the
relationship with Russia. But what I at least would like to see is that we
don't approach it with
any illusions, that we're honest, and that we send
clear messages to people in Russia who are our
friends, that we're going to
be standing with them and that we're going to be doing everything we can
to
try to support them when they're undergoing a great deal of stress today,
because of the new laws
and the -- which is really an attempt to close off
the last remaining area of independent activity,
which is civil society.
And I think this is something that we can do. I think it's going to be long
term. I have no
disagreement that.
I think it's going to come from
within Russia. I think the importance of what I saw was that
something
emerged from within Russia. But we were associated with it, and I think
properly so, at
the request of the Russians.
They make the call on
whether they want the Americans or other Westerners, or people from
outside
to come in and to give them support. They wanted it and they deserve it, but of
course it's
going to have to come from within Russia.
I think, frankly,
the schedule that was enunciated by Mr. Gvosdev is actually a rather
optimistic schedule. I think we have to be prepared for a long-term process
here, where we're going
to be engaged, and we're also going to be supporting
a clear democracy agenda.
And one more point. I think one of the reasons
we, as the National Endowment for Democracy,
were taken out of the
government and made an independent entity, is so we can continue to pursue
these types of issues as our government, you know, is engaged. I don't think
there's a contradiction
there.
BROWNBACK: It seems like to me that the
situation that you want to try to do is be fully
engaged, and yet always
maintaining tension on the democracy-human rights agenda, until it's to a
Western standard, recognizing that it's never, ever perfect in any country.
And, for instance, we just had a signing ceremony I was at today on the Voting
Rights Act,
the VRA, which 40 years ago there were substantial places in the
United States. If you were of a
certain racial group, it was pretty tough
to vote. You couldn't vote.
And so, there's always that. But that we
should be engaged yet always maintaining the pull,
to move people forward...
GERSHMAN: It was Wendell Phillips who, in 1858 -- the Abolitionist -- who
said that the
price of liberty is eternal vigilance.
BROWNBACK: Or
eternal tension maybe would be...
GERSHMAN: Well, both.
BROWNBACK: ...
could use that, too.
Mr. Ermarth, I know, I'd like -- I want to just make a
statement to you, because I want to go
to another point here.
I've been
-- I've watched the Soviet Union for a number of years, even growing up watched
it,
because they were a great marketplace for our wheat at that time.
Communism is a terrible producer
of goods and services, but that makes great
market advantage for some others.
What amazing change that that country has
gone through in the years that I have observed --
the Soviet Union to Russia
and the various countries. It's really breathtaking, and remarkable
things
that have happened.
But them looking now to use oil and gas as an economic
leverage point, which I read and I see
in some practice. I can tell you
from practical experience in this country, when you use a commodity
as an
economic leverage, it will ultimately backfire on you, because the people that
are on the other
end of that stick, they figure this out real fast.
And
even if things go back to the way they normally were, they say, we're not going
to be in
that trap again, so we're going to figure another way out.
So,
we now have -- what have we got now -- five ethanol plants being built in Kansas
as I
speak, biodiesel plants going up -- I was figuring out -- cellulosic
ethanol. I think you're going
to see these other places go, yes, we don't
like this thing.
We did it. We tried it as a country ourselves. I remember
this one vividly, too, capturing
the soybean market in the '70s, and with
the Japanese we cancelled soybean contracts so that we could
have more of
the soybeans here.
That really backfired, because then they invested in
Brazil and started the big soybean
industry that was competing against us.
That was a really smart move on our part to do that.
And so, people in
hindsight they go, you don't mess with commodity markets. It's just --
those will ultimately teach your buyer you're not reliable. Not only are you
not reliable, you can
be punitive with this. And they will not succumb to
that.
I think -- I can understand, and the tools do work and can work near
term. They can work on
a short-term basis and produce a real havoc and
produce a real pressure. But ultimately, they
produce their own solution,
too.
And I think that's an unwise way for them to go, even though oil is
certainly a dear
commodity to the world and the global economy at the
present time.
I want to look at -- and this has been a very helpful panel.
I want to thank all of you for
condensing the thought of what's taking place
in Russia.
And I would certainly say, anybody in that country that might
look at any of the things we're
saying here, nobody in the United States
wants a weak Russia. We want a strong, vibrant, democratic
Russia. We want
an open and free Russia. And we want to see the country grow and prosper.
And that is just not in our makeup. And right after the fall of the Soviet
Union, this
country leaned in to help in a big way to try to help see that
transition. Fallout as it may have
been at some points, or the U.S. gaining
-- some private interests gaining financially from that. I
lament that that
happened.
But we want to see a vibrant, strong Russia take place.
One
question I want to ask you, and I was curious about it in the last panel, is the
role of
the Russian Orthodox Church in supporting a move back towards more
authoritarian.
If I understand the prior witness, this is -- the primary
church is supporting that. That
just seems strange to me, is a religious
institution to do that.
Is that, indeed, the case? And should we be
engaging more them pushing towards a more human
rights free society?
GVOSDEV: Senator...
BROWNBACK: Mr. Melia? I don't know -- or is there
somebody? Please.
GVOSDEV: Go ahead.
MELIA: I would just add, first
of all, I'd defer to Felice Gaer and the people on the
commission on many of
the specifics.
But, you know, it's the Russian Orthodox Church. It is part
of the nationalist sort of
identity of Russia. It's part and parcel of the
Russian national identity for many Russians.
It's not unsurprising that the
leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church share this view of
Russia's place in
the world, and this -- paranoia is not too strong a word, maybe a little bit
strong, but it's not overly strong -- this view that they are under assault from
other cultures and
other countries, and that they need to be defensive.
From their point of view, their assertiveness vis-a-vis minorities -- and we see
them as
largely harmless or small communities of believers or missionaries,
or whether that's on the
religious side or, frankly, on the political side,
people talking about different kinds of political
ideas -- they feel
besieged by this.
And I don't say that to excuse it. I say that we need to
understand that, as powerful as
they seem to be as a country -- and they are
in many ways -- they feel like they're coming out of a
period of profound
weakness in these last 15 years, and they're trying to find their sea legs
again,
as a country and as a society.
BROWNBACK: So, here's the anchor
for the sea legs? Here's the solid ground we can stand on?
MELIA: That's
part of it, yes. I don't know the degree of religiosity in Russia. I don't
know how important it is to much Russians, but I think it's part and parcel of
that.
It's not a church in confrontation with the Putin administration.
It's one that I think
shares some of its ambitions.
GVOSDEV: And
senator, I'd like...
MELIA: I'd defer to better experts on that.
GVOSDEV: Just to give you maybe a point of reference, the hierarchy of the
Russian Orthodox
Church, in terms of its theological outlook, in terms of
questions of democracy, human rights, is
very similar to where the Roman
Catholic Church was prior to Vatican II.
They would probably be similar to
the mindset of a Pope Pius XII. You're suspicious, to some
extent, of
pluralism. You're suspicious of things that seem to be eroding traditional
bases of
authority.
Again, the experience of the '90s fed into that.
Also, to the extent that the Russian Orthodox tradition, as it was expressed in
the diaspora,
largely has, in terms of theological movements, which are
largely akin to what occurred at the
Vatican II Council in Russia -- or
sorry, at the Vatican II Council in Rome -- have not as much
permeated
Russia itself, which is the theological underpinnings of human rights and other
things
based upon the notion of the human being as created in the divine
image.
It's present in Russia. It's present in the 2000 social doctrine
that the church issued.
But you can see that when you read the social
doctrine, it's only a backhanded endorsement of
democracy as basically being
better, perhaps, than other alternatives, if it assures the church the
ability to carry out its functions. But it's not quite a ringing endorsement.
So that's why we think maybe it might be useful to think of where the Catholic
Church was
prior to Vatican II, in the 19th century and its questions on
democracy. It's theologically still
working its way through.
At the
local level -- and this goes to the questions of religiosity -- Russia is
largely a
very secular society. You're only looking at about five percent
of Russian citizens, and these are
both ethnic Russians and non-ethnic
Russians who happen to be of Orthodox nationality.
It's only about five
percent attend church on anything that can be described as a regular
basis.
About half of Orthodox believers never attend church, other than to attend
baptisms, weddings
-- you know, hatched, matched, dispatched -- and not even
coming necessarily on Easter or Christmas.
That's where you then get this
nationalist sense, where you have people who don't necessarily
know what the
religion teaches, but say, to be Russian is to be Orthodox. And therefore, if
you're
not Orthodox, you're not Russian.
But I can't really tell you
much about what the theology is, or what it means to be as a
person, or
anything like that. So, you do have this phenomenon. And, of course, not
limited to
Russia, of where religion also becomes a marker of national
identity.
But you do have relatively low levels of religiosity, in terms of
who goes to church on any
given Sunday. And that does...
MELIA: If I
could add -- could I add one diplomatic layer to that very helpful commentary by
Mr. Gvosdev?
There is now underway in international diplomatic circles,
around, for instance, the U.N.
Human Rights Council deliberations, a
discussion in which some governments of Islamic majority
countries are
finding common cause with governments in places like Russia, to talk about
religious
pluralism as a threat to culture. And that religious diversity is
seen as a threat to their
sovereignty and to their national sense of
identity.
And so they, for instance, defend blasphemy laws in some countries
that make it illegal and
punishable by some very harsh means, to advocate
for different religious interpretations, even of
Islam in certain Islamic
countries.
And that instinct to control the debate, to punish people who
have different views, that we
see and can understand in one dimension when
it's on a religious plane, easily spills over into the
political arena.
If you're not allowed to challenge the official view of Islam or of Russian
Orthodoxy in
different countries, because that's blasphemous or, you know,
culturally disrespectful, then you can
be accused of being blasphemous or
culturally insensitive for other things that get beyond sort of
standard
religious discourse, like complaining about laws on family policy or social laws
that have a
religious connection to them.
But this is slippery slope.
And once states, especially, begin to embrace certain religious
perspectives
-- that they have the right view of the world and universe -- and can use the
power of
the state to control religious dialogue, then it also is a
political issue and constricts freedom.
And we see that emerging in this way
in Russia, as we have seen in some other countries.
It's a resurgent,
active discussion. This may well be part of the discussion at the next session
of
the U.N. Human Rights Council in September in Geneva.
There'll be an
effort by the Organization of Islamic Countries to push the envelope on
getting an endorsement for a view that religious pluralism is a threat to their
status in their
cultures.
BROWNBACK: That's an interesting point.
I
have great respect (ph) for Orthodoxy as a faith. I think it's beautiful, and I
have a
great respect for it. It's just -- it just seems to me at odds with
one of the great -- I don't know
-- I guess theological debates.
But a
number of people would assert that one of the most difficult decisions God ever
made
was to give us freedom. So that this is one that is to be so
cherished, because it was such a
difficult thing.
And it's one for us to
protect, and it's one for us to guarantee for others is just freedom.
Freedom to do as we choose -- or nothing -- their (ph) freedom to do nothing.
And that's what -- you know, I look at it and I go, that just seems to be so
central to faith
is the freedom to choose regardless. And then, you may
choose wrong. A lot of us do at many
different times in our life. And
that's why it just seems a bit odd to me.
It also, I think, does outline
that one of the real, key, difficult issues of our day is to
get that
understanding of freedom within a religious context for a global society. I
mean, that this
is a very basic human right. It's the very basic human
freedom, and it needs to be guaranteed for
everybody to choose to do however
they choose to do.
And we need to continue to be really vigilant and
respectful of all faiths, supportive of all
faiths, but also pushing that
the very foundation of this is that you're free to choose whatever, or
to
choose nothing, if you so choose.
Very good.
MELIA: Amen, so to speak.
BROWNBACK: A very interesting panel. I appreciate your outlines, your
thoughts and how we
can continue to move all of this forward.
The
hearing record will remain open, if additional questions need to be supported or
put
forward by members, or if statements that you want to correct for the
record need to be put forward.
I appreciate very much the presenters. The
hearing is adjourned.
[Whereupon the hearing ended at
2:48 p.m.]
END
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