

Some aspects risk analysis

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
10 + years - “mixed results”

- 1991 - 1993
 - Investigations and feasibility studies
- 1993 - 1997 - parallel paths
 - 1993 - 1997
 - 10 “Simplified” quantitative trial examples
 - 1995 - 1997
 - 2 limited “Detailed” quantitative trial examples
- 1997 -
 - Replace “simplified quantitative” with risk index
 - “Detailed quantitative informs difficult decisions

Now

- Dam Safety program based on risk management principles
 - Risk index used
 - to manage risks across portfolio
 - quarterly reports to the Board of Directors
 - annual reports to the Board and Regulator
- Risk index provides a “proxy” for probability of failure x consequences

Risk index profile



The Risk Problem

Probability of failure

$$P_f = P[Z \leq 0] = \int_{z \leq 0} f_x(x) dx$$


$$P_f = \int_{z \leq 0} f_x(x) dx = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} f_R(r) f_S(s) dr ds$$

$$F_X(x) = P[X \leq x] = \int_{-\infty}^x f_X(y) dy$$



$$P_f = P[R - S \leq 0] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} F_R(y) f_S(y) dy$$

$$P_f = P[R - S \leq 0] = \int_{-\infty}^{\infty} F_R(y) \{1 - F_S(y)\} dy$$


Probability of Hazard





Probability of Failure given Hazard




Probability of Failure




Probability of Failure



Consequences of Failure



Risks to Individuals



Societal Risk

All very fine - theoretically

- For details see
 - *ICOLD Bulletin on Risk Assessment*
 - *Risk and Uncertainty in Dam Safety*
- Too complex for day-to-day management
 - arguably not generally possible, at present.
- Need a simplified approach!
 - begin with a realistic representation of a complete risk model
 - introduce simplifications but retain the most essential characteristics

An aerial photograph of a large dam and hydroelectric power plant. The dam is a long, curved structure with a spillway on the right side. The power plant is located at the base of the dam, featuring several large buildings and a complex network of pipes and conduits. The surrounding landscape is hilly and forested, with snow-capped mountains in the background. The sky is clear and blue.

Simplified Characterisation of Dam Safety Risks

Risk Index

"RISK" INDEX

Numerical Index

Extreme = 4

Very High = 3

High = 2


Low = 1

Very Low = 0


CONSEQUENCE
COEFFICIENT

INDEX OF
VULNERABILITY

Index of Vulnerability




Magnitude of “the Gap”



Failure Modes Analysis

Functional model


- Create a model of how the dam is designed to function
 - Define failure modes in terms of “*failure to function as designed*”
- Transform the functional model into a “failure to function” model
 - Identify Potential Failure Modes
 - Define “Magnitude of Gap” in terms of the difference between “actual capacity” and “desired capacity”




Failure Modes & Hazards Matrix

GLOBAL FAILURE MODES		FUNCTIONAL FAILURE CHARACTERISTICS	EXTERNAL HAZARDS			INTERNAL HAZARDS (Design, Construction, Maintenance, Operation)			
			Seismic	Meteorological	Human Attack	Water Barrier	Hydraulic Struct.	Mech/Elec	Human Actions
DAM OVERTOPPING	All water barriers	Hydraulic adequacy (discharge capacity)							
		Discharge reliability (e.g. Failure to open)							
		Operational adequacy (e.g. rules/ followed)							
		Facility performance (e.g. debris & other fns.)							
		Overtopping waves (landslides, u/s dams)							
		Management systems (hydraulic operations)							
DAM COLLAPSE (INTERNAL STRUCTURAL WEAKENING AND AGEING)	Fills and foundations	Management systems (for dam performance)							
		Internal erosion (dam/abutments./foundns)							
		Deformations (deprssions/mass mvrmt)							
		Liquefaction (static/seismic)							
	Concrete and steel	Structural weakening (AAR/strength loss)							
		Structural anchors (relaxation/strength loss)							
		Water stops/interfaces (unintended ingress)							
		Mech/elec stability (uplift pressure control)							


Decomposition of Functional model




Functional failure of external hydraulic control systems



Alternative functional failure model



Failure mode description and means of identification



Influence Diagram for the “decomposed” system

