

Statement package for Michael DeKort

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Statement

Good afternoon Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I deeply appreciate your taking the time to hear testimony on the C4ISR problems relating to the Deepwater effort. While I will be highlighting the C4ISR issues, I am sure you realize they are only examples of the systemic engineering and management problems associated with this effort. The problems I will be describing are not simply mistakes. They were informed deliberate acts. As I will show, I have been trying to resolve these problems for almost 4 years. After not being able to convince every level of management of every relevant organization in Lockheed Martin through the CEO, Board of Directors and Integrated Coast Guard Systems (ICGS), I turned to the appropriate government agencies, public officials, whistleblower organizations, and when all else failed the internet and the press, for help. What needs to be understood here is that every one of these problems was easily resolved with off the shelf products - well before any of the assets were delivered. Additionally, as the contract mandates system commonality, every one of these problems is a candidate for inclusion on every other maritime asset that ICGS delivers for the lifetime of the contract. This plan, if allowed to come to fruition, will literally cripple the entire maritime fleet of the US Coast Guard for decades.

Before delving in to the issues I would like tell you a little about my background.

I was an electronics technician in the US Navy for 6 years. I specialized in communication systems. After my enlistment ended I spent a brief time in the private sector before I joined the US State Department as a communications engineer for

embassy and consular duties as well for the counter terrorism group. After leaving that organization, I became a systems engineer in Lockheed Martin. Through the years I was promoted to project, program and engineering manager. During my last 5 years I was the software project manager for Aegis Baseline 6/3, the lead systems engineer of C4ISR for Deepwater and the software engineering manager for the NORAD efforts. It is the period where I held the C4ISR lead systems engineer position that is the focus of this testimony.

At the point I joined the effort – in the summer of 2003 – the final design review had been completed and most of the equipment had been purchased for the first several boats. In addition to creating a master schedule, I was tasked with identifying the final deliverable requirements and planning the integration of the first boats. It was during this period that several critical safety and security issues came to my attention.

The first problem was the fact that we had purchased non-weatherproof radios for the Short Range Prosecutors or SRPs. The boats are small open air craft that are constantly exposed to the environment. Upon first hearing about this issue, I have to admit, I found it too incredible to believe. Who would put a non-weatherproof radio, the primary means of communication for the crew, on a boat with no protection from the elements? The individual who brought this to my attention strongly suggested I look in to it no matter how incredible it sounded. I called the supplier of the radio who informed me it was true. We had purchased 4 radios – for the first 4 SRPs – and they were not weatherproof. As a matter of fact, the vendor asked me not to use the radios on any of the SRPs – which would eventually total 91 in all. Upon informing Lockheed management that the radios need to be replaced, I was told there was a “design of record” – this meant the customer had accepted our designs at the conclusion of the critical design review – and that we would make no changes that would cause cost or schedule impacts. As a matter of fact, we ordered 5 more radios after I went to management about the problem in order to prepare for the next set of boats we were contracted to modify. I tried for several months to get the radios replaced. Just before delivery of the first 123 and its associated SRP, the customer asked to test the system. Coincidentally, it rained on test day. During the testing several radios shorted out. It should be noted that had we not tested the boats in the rain on that day we would have delivered that system and it would have failed the first time it was used. After this, I was told we would go back to the radio that originally came with the SRPs. I believe that this example, more than any other,

demonstrates the lengths the ICGS parties were willing to go to hold schedule and budget while sacrificing the safety and security of the crew.

The next problem uncovered involved the video surveillance system. The Coast Guard wanted a system that would permit watching the boats, when in a Coast Guard port, without someone having to be physically on the boats. Our solution was to provide a video surveillance system that had significant blind spots leaving the bridge vulnerable to penetration. The most frustrating part about this issue was that the simple purchase and installation of a fifth camera would have resolved the problem. Bear in mind we knew about the need for the extra camera several months before the first 123 was delivered.

Another problem we discovered involved low smoke cables. There was a requirement to install low smoke cables so that in case of a fire flames do not spread quickly, equipment is not overly exposed to corrosive smoke, and the crew is not exposed to a large amount of toxic fumes. In a recent report the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security confirmed that over 80 of these cables are the wrong type and that the waiver the Coast Guard gave to the contractor so they could avoid having to provide these cables was invalid.

The next issue involved communications security and the standards necessary to ensure those communications are safeguarded from eavesdropping or inadvertent transmission of crosstalk. These standards are known as TEMPEST. We installed non-shielded cables – 101 in total – on all of the 123s; cables that did not meet standard TEMPEST safety and security requirements – as born out by their failing of the visual inspection which was carried out by the appropriate testing authority. This situation could lead to a serious compromise of secure communications not only for the Coast Guard but for other government organizations such as DoD, the FBI and the DEA. I was informed that we had not included these cables in the design because we had not bid the TEMPEST requirements and as such had decided we did not have the money to include them.

The final significant problem was that of the survivability of the externally mounted equipment. I saved this one for last because of how serious the repercussions

are for the Coast Guard and the nation, the fact that the DHS IG agreed completely with my allegations relative to this issue, the incredible position Lockheed Martin has taken on this issue, and the fact that the Coast Guard seems to be allowing them to get away with it. Shortly before the first 123 was delivered we finally received the environmental requirements. During the late review of the equipment for compliance, well after the design review and purchase of the equipment, we found the very first item we looked in to would not meet the environmental requirements. Given this failure we feared the rest of the equipment may not meet the environmental requirements. Let me state this in simple terms. This meant the Coast Guard ships that utilized this equipment would not operate in conditions that could include heavy rain, heavy seas, high winds and extreme temperatures. When I brought this information to Lockheed management, they directed me and my team to stop looking in to whether or not the rest of the equipment met these requirements. This meant that all of the externally mounted equipment being used for critical communication, command and control and navigation systems might fail in harsh environments. Since that time we have learned through the DHS IG report on the 123s that 30 items on the 123s, and at least a dozen items installed on the SRPs did meet environmental requirements. In addition to their technical and contractual findings, the IG also made some of Lockheed Martin's responses on this issue known in the report. Incredibly the IG states that Lockheed Martin incorrectly stated in their self-certification documents that there were no applicable requirements stipulating what the environmental requirements were in regard to weather and they actually stated that they viewed the certification of those requirements as "not really beneficial". In addition, the IG states that the Coast Guard did not know the boats were non-compliant until July of 2005 – 1.5 years after the first 123 was delivered. The report also states that none of these problems were fixed. Not on any of the delivered 8 boats. That along with the issue not being called out in the DD-250 acceptance documents supports my supposition that Lockheed Martin purposefully withheld this information from the Coast Guard. Finally, the IG states that Lockheed's position on them passing the self-certification without testing these items was the right thing to do because they thought the tests would be "time consuming, expensive and of limited value". Bear in mind that the contractors have stated time and time again in front of this and other oversight committees that they do not practice self-certification.

Where does this situation leave us? Had the hulls not cracked or the cracks not appeared for some time, ICGS would have delivered 49 123s and 91 SRPs with the problems I describe. In addition to that, the Deepwater project is a “System of Systems” effort. What this means is that the contractor is directed to deliver solutions that would provide common equipment sets for all C4ISR systems. Said differently, all the equipments for like systems need to match unless there is an overwhelming reason not to. This means that every faulty system I have described here will be installed on every other maritime asset delivered over the lifetime of the effort. This includes the FRCs, the OPCs and the NSCs. If we don’t stop this from happening ICGS will deliver assets with these and other problems. I believe this could cripple the effectiveness of the Coast Guard and their ability to perform their missions for decades to come.

How have the ICGS parties reacted to the totality of these allegations? At first Lockheed and the US Coast Guard, as stated by the ICGS organization, responded to my allegations by saying they were baseless, had no merit, or that all of the issues were handled contractually. That evolved after the IG report came out to them stating that the requirements had grey areas and later by actually deciding, after the system were accepted and problems were found, that in some cases the Coast Guard exaggerated their needs – as was their comment regarding the environmental survivability problems.

Up until the announcement yesterday I had heard a lot of discussion about changing the ICGS contract structure, fixing the requirements, reorganizing the Coast Guard, and adding more oversight. While all of those things are beneficial, they in no way solve the root problem. Had the ICGS listened to the Engineering Logistics Center (ELC) and my recommendations, there would be no problems on these boats. We wouldn’t be talking about more oversight or making sweeping changes. Instead, we would be discussing what a model program Deepwater is. I guarantee you that had the changes that were made up until yesterday’s announcement been made 4 or 5 years ago, it wouldn’t have mattered. Even with the incestuous ICGS arrangement, the less than perfect requirements, and minimal oversight, there was plenty of structure in place and information available to do the right thing. It is not practical to think one can provide an iron clad set of requirements and an associated contract that will avoid all problems. All that was needed were leaders who were competent and ethical in any one of the key contractor or Coast Guard positions. Any one of dozens of people could have simply

done the right thing on this effort and changed the course of events that followed. It is because of this that I strongly suggest your focus shift to one of accountability in an effort to provide a deterrent. No matter what structure these parties put in place. No matter what spin they come up with, or promises they make, no matter how many people you spend tax payer dollars to employ to provide more oversight, it still comes down to people. We wouldn't need more oversight if the ICGS parties would have done as promised when they bid this effort. They told the Coast Guard we know you have a lack of personnel with the right skills. Let us help you. Let us be your trusted agent. Let us help write the requirements so we can provide you cutting edge solutions. Let us write the test procedures and self-certify so we can meet the challenges we all face in a post 9/11 world. In the end, people have to do the right thing and know that when they don't the consequences will be swift and appropriate. I strongly believe that, especially in a time of war, the conduct of these organizations has been appalling. As such, I would hope that this committee, and any other relevant agency with jurisdiction, will do the right thing and hold people and these organizations accountable. All defense contractors and employees of the government need to know that high ethical standards are not matters of convenience. If you do not hold these people and organizations accountable, you will simply be repackaging the same problems, and have no way of ensuring the problems don't happen again on this or any other effort.

In closing I am offering to help in any way I can to remedy these issues. As I told the Commandant Allen's staff and Lockheed Martin before my employment was terminated, I want to be part of the fix. With the right people in place, in the right positions, this project can be put back on track rapidly.

I believe it at this time that we will be putting up for display the timeline of events relative to my notifications of the appropriate leadership within Lockheed Martin. Before I start that final part of my presentation, I would like to thank you again for the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering your questions.

LM Notification Timeline

Date	Person Notified	Position	Data	Title
10/13/2003	Larry Finnegan	Mgr SW PM-functional manager	Informed Larry that the program was in a chaotic state - deliverable requirements not known/accepted for Inc 0, layering partial solutions on top of each other, were rushing toward install on the Matagorda and we purchased non-waterproof radios for SRP. Also informed Larry that I had raised the issues with Tom Rodgers	123 Headed Down the Wrong Road
12/16/2003	Jay Hansen	Acting Tech Director	Asked for a meeting to discuss the issues	Requesting a private one-on-one
1/7/2004	PJ Messer	Surface Asset Lead	Asked for reassignment to another effort if management was not going to do the right thing - technically and ethically. Issues mentioned were - Cameras - Low Smoke cables - TEMPEST and Non-Waterproof Radio Note-Ext Equipment Survivability Issue had not been raised yet	Requesting Reassignment
	Larry Finnegan	Mgr SW PM-functional manager		
	Jack Ryan	Director SW Org - Larry's manager		
	Joe Villani	DW Chief Eng		
	Jay Hansen	Acting Dir Tech Ops		
	Brian McLaverty	123 DW PM		
	Patrick Ewing	DW Dep PM Director		
	Tom Rodgers	DW PM Director		
	Doug Wilhelm	DW PM		
	Dave Ponticello	DW Former Chief Eng		
2/5/2004	Larry Finnegan	Mgr SW PM-functional manager	Informed Larry that DW management was not keeping it's deal to fix the problems (preferred) or let me provide comments for the DD-250s before delivery of the Matagorda.	123- BT Complete/DD-250before issues resolved

2/9/2004	Joe Cappello	DW QA Lead	Asked for a meeting with Michael Cerrone - QA Director - this eventually lead to QA VP Yvonne Hodge getting involved and calling the org VP Carl Bannar on 2/12/2004 - I told Carl I wanted to give Jay Hansen one more shot before I went to see him	DW Engineering Concerns
2/11/2004	Larry Finnegan	Mgr SW PM-functional manager	Still no resolution on issues. Email with associated document called DW Issues	Still No Commitment from PMO on Issues
2/18/2004	Carl Bannar	VP	Requested a meeting with Carl to ask for issues to be fixed. Carl promised issues would be addressed either through fixes or on DD-250. Said he would direct Chief Eng Joe Villani to meet with me Chief Eng Joe Villani asking to meet with me after Carl Bannar directed him to (Note that Villani says he has heard about the issues but wants to hear from me directly. Villani had refused every attempt for me to meet with him on these issues prior to this. That included several in person requests and telephone calls over at least a months period)	Request Meeting
2/24/2004	Joe Villani	DW Chief Eng		Issues to be resolved on 123
2/24/2004	PJ Messer	Surface Asset Lead	Ext Equipment Environmental issue show up for the first time. Mentioned those issues as well as my opposition to gaming the requirements document to hide the problems	123-Environmental/Physical spec inconsistencies - testing
2/24/2004	Joe Cappello	DW QA	Asked QA to include Camera, TEMPEST, Ext Equipment and Radio issue on DD-250 as Open Items	123-Open Items DD-250
2/24/2004	PJ Messer	Surface Asset Lead	Thread on my risks being deleted - without my permission- from the official risk system (Problem Sheets) - which ICGS and the CG had access to. Of a dozen or so risks entered only the risks associated with the critical issues I raised were deleted. After some effort I am told they were put back.	123-Several critical Risks/Action Items missing from IDE

Note- removed from DW program end of February 2004. Moved to work NORAD program in Colorado August 2004. Went to see new Tech Ops director Robert Sledgemilch before I left MS2 to discuss issues with him. He turned the issues over to HR who turned them over to John Shelton - Ethics Director for MS2. Investigation started October 2004

9/20/2004	John Shelton	Ethics Director MS2	Setting up meeting in Colorado to start investigation. Investigation ended 4 months later with a response of - "no merit - all allegations are baseless" would not provide any explanation for the results. Said I had no need to know.	DeKort- conference room for discussions
2/7/2005	Gail Allen	Ethics investigator- Corporate	After Shelton left me not knowing if the issues were fixed or letting me see the DD-250 text that showed the CG was notified about every issue and accepted the boat. I raised the issues to corporate	DeKort-Deepwater ethics issue
4/12/2005	Fred Moosally	President MS2 org	Wanted to discuss the issue with the MS2 President before I went to the CEO. Have an email response receipt showing he received the message. He never responded. Note- former CO of USS IOWA during 16in gun mishap	Outlook-DW ethics during IS&S
4/28/2005	Robert Stevens	CEO Lockheed Martin	Contacted Mr. Stevens after 2nd ethics investigation completed . Decided too many 123s were being delivered with these problems for me to have to continue to grind through this process	Project Deepwater - issues of Concern
5/4/2005	Maryanne Lavan	Corporate VP of Ethics	Wrote the CEO Bob Stevens after my final meeting with Gail Allen and getting same response from Allen as I did Shelton. He in turn contacted Lavan.	Email to Robert Stevens
1/17/2006	Robert Stevens	CEO Lockheed Martin	Contacted Mr. Stevens again after 3rd ethics investigation ended with an official response of "no merit - baseless". I was told the CG was made aware of every issue and had accepted the boat. They would not show me proof or tell me how each issue was handled.	Deepwater ethics issue please read

After Mr. Stevens asked his corporate council to look in to this and he supported those below him I began contacting organizations outside of Lockheed Martin. Those included - ICGS, GAO, USN, NSA, several senators and congressmen, several whistleblowing organizations and the DHS IG

3/1/2006	Scott MacKay	LM Corp Council	Mr. MacKay responded to my second letter to the CEO. Partial quote from letter - ". . .I have concluded that; (1) the corporation has thoroughly and exhaustively investigated you allegations; (2) I concur with the conclusions reached by prior investigations that your allegations were unsubstantiated; and (3) the corporation considered the matter closed except to the extent it is asked to respond to the Coast guard or other government agencies regarding those allegations..."
4/4/2006	LM Board of Directors		Sent a letter to the Board asking for help on the issues. It included the information I had sent the CEO Robert Stevens
6/26/2006	LM Board of Directors		Received their response. Quote - "The Board considers the issues addressed in your letter and determined that the Corporation's responses to those issues, beginning in October 2004 and continuing to the present, were appropriate and no further action is warranted. Each of the issues has been disclosed to the Coast Guard and the resolution of each issue was coordinated with and was or is being resolved to the satisfaction of the Coast Guard customer."

LM notification supporting text

Text From emails delineated in Notification Timeline

Text from email titled – 123 – Headed Down the Wrong Road – 10/13/2003

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From: Michael DeKort

To: Larry Finnegan

I wanted to make you aware of some problems on the 123. Due to schedule concerns we, in my opinion, are being herded down the wrong road.

We are layering partial solutions on top of each other - all the while our base, the requirements set, is not on solid ground.

Please find a slide set I made for Tom Rodgers.

Some highlights:

We are slipping again. Today was supposed to be test start - we are weeks away. One day after we made a "recovery plan" I find out our design is still very suspect - our installation techs found we called out the wrong connectors on almost half of our cables. We were using the new "QA" data.

We picked a non-marine grade radio, and antennas, for our critical comm suite in the SRP. The SRP is the small rescue boat. This small boat will be inundated with water. It is used to rescue people - it should have environmentally sound communications.

We have told the CG that we do not meet most of the environmental and physical hardware requirements in INC 0. We have no plan/design to ever meet those requirements. No one is working this with the CG.

I believe someone needs to get a hold of this effort before someone else does it for us. I believe we have strayed from our principles - both in quality and engineering discipline. If we continue down the same road we will wind up with even greater schedule slips, customer dissatisfaction and potential safety, ethical and legal problems.

Text from email thread titled – Requesting a private one on one – 12/16/2003

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From: Jay Hansen

To: Michael DeKort

Mike -

I'd be glad to meet with you. Please call Mary Kay to schedule. She will put it down as a private meeting on my calendar so it will remain confidential.

Jay

J. T. Hansen
Director, Systems Engineering and Equipment Engineering
Lockheed Martin, MS2 - Moorestown
(856)722-2730

From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Tuesday, December 16, 2003 10:00 AM
To: Hansen, Jay T
Subject: Requesting a private one on one

I have some concerns about the Deepwater effort that I would like to discuss with you.

I would appreciate it if you would keep this request and the meeting private.

Michael De Kort

[From email thread titled – Request Reassignment – 1/7/2004](#)

-----Original Message-----

From: Hansen, Jay T
Sent: Thursday, January 08, 2004 10:44 AM
To: Messer, Paul J; Finnegan III, Laurence P; Ryan, John E; Villani, Joseph A; Dekort, Michael
Cc: Clifford, Michael F; Ewing, Patrick; McLaverty, Brian; Rodgers, Thomas M; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Ponticello, David D; Haimowitz, Jay S
Subject: RE: Request Reassignment

Mike -

You'll need to firm this up with your immediate functional management and tech ops technical leadership on IDS but my understanding is that we will accommodate your request with the appropriate overlap period. In light of the risk tracking system's status, please make sure that Jay Haimowitz receives a complete write-up on each of these risks for processing through the programs risk/opportunity process. By inserting them into the process they will receive the appropriate technical and programmatic evaluations to produce appropriate mitigation plans.

Jay
J. T. Hansen
Director, Systems Engineering and Equipment Engineering
Lockheed Martin, MS2 - Moorestown
(856)722-2730

From: Dekort, Michael
Sent: Wednesday, January 7, 2004 11:53 AM
To: Messer, Paul J; Finnegan III, Laurence P; Ryan, John E; Villani, Joseph A; Hansen, Jay T
Cc: Clifford, Michael F; Ewing, Patrick; McLaverty, Brian; Rodgers, Thomas M; Wilhelm, Douglas G; Ponticello, David D
Subject: Request Reassignment

Gentlemen

Over the past few months I have become increasingly frustrated with the direction the Deepwater project is following. Based on the examples below I believe we have continually sacrificed MS2's hard earned and well founded engineering and customer focused principles in order to meet the needs of non-realistic schedules. While meeting schedules is a paramount concern I do not believe being herded, by an unrealistic schedule, to the delivery of a substandard product is in our best interest. I strongly believe that this path will lead to, at best, the delivery of a sub-standard product that will harm our reputation and at worst the delivery of a product that hamper our customer's ability to successfully carry out their mission.

As the lead systems engineer for the 123 my primary responsibility is to ensure the integrity of the design and that we meet the customers needs, requirements and fulfill the actual and implied intent of the contract. While I do not expect to convince tech ops or program management that my point of view is correct on every issue I do not expect to be overruled on the greater majority of those issues – especially when they involve safety, security, and the mission success of our customer. As the mission of the customer, the U.S. Coast Guard, is to ensure our nation's security, I take this responsibility very seriously. I truly believe that the decisions we have made and are making will hinder our customer's ability to do their job and by doing so puts them and the general public at risk. I have worked on military projects most of my career – from the U.S. Navy, through the counter terrorism group at the U.S. State Department, through flight simulation for the U.S. Air Force Special Ops and through Aegis Baseline 6. On each and every project that I have worked I have been proud of my contribution and the product we produced. I am sorry to say that I am personally and professionally embarrassed by the product we are producing on this effort. I feel that as an organization we have abandon our principles, let down our processes and besmirched the reputation MS2 has worked so long to establish. I believe MS2 and I are better than this.

Below I have listed some of the most important examples. Each case was and is avoidable. Most of the issues and solutions were known about months ago. As we have chosen not remedy these issues previously there is now a cost and schedule risk to do so. A cost and schedule risk that I believe is worth taking and the right short and long term course.

- SRP VHF Radio
 - We are putting a non-marine grade radio on a craft that will be exposed to the harshest of environments. As such the customer, and civilians aboard the craft could be left without their primary long distance communications system in harsh conditions
 - This is a safety risk
 - Even though there is an option to remedy the situation with a \$300 microphone – we have no plans to augment the current design for the first 3 cutters
- Surveillance Cameras
 - We have placed 4 fixed mounted cameras on the deck house that do not provide full field of view (there are 2 dead spots), the ability to pan or zoom.
 - As such we have degraded the customers existing capabilities. (Current ships and the planned design by Northrop on the NSC provide 2 mast mounted cameras that permit panning and zoom)
 - This is a security and safety risk
 - There is no plan to remedy this situation on any cutter
- Tempest
 - We have not provided an adequate Tempest solution for the secret crypto installed aboard the ship. As such our shielding and grounding solution does not meet the minimum Tempest standards
 - We have, in most cases, ignored an internal study conducted in February, on ways to remedy the situation.
 - This is a security risk
 - There is no plan to remedy this situation for any cutter
- Low Smoke Cables
 - We are headed down a path of not providing a low smoke variant of some cabling aboard ship.
 - The customer has pointed out cases where we may have missed the opportunity to provide such cables.
 - I have been informed that we do not have time to look in to or remedy the situation for the first ship.
 - This is a safety risk

It is for the reasons stated above that with great regret I request to be reassigned to another effort. As I have been unsuccessful at changing the direction of the Deepwater effort I have no other choice than to change my own direction. As I cannot rectify my personal ethical standards with the direction we are taking I feel I am left with no choice other than to request to be reassigned. However, if the opportunity should arise I would eagerly and aggressively attack each of these issues should we decide on a change in program direction.

Michael De Kort

From email titled – 123-BT Complete/DD-250 before issues resolved – 2/5/2004
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From: Larry Finnegan
To: Michael DeKort

Mike,

I have raised your concern thru Jack to Tom... more to come.

Larry

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Thursday, February 05, 2004 7:13 AM

To: Finnegan III, Laurence P

Subject: 123- BT complete/DD-250 before issues resolved?

Larry

I am concerned that BT ends next week, Tom Rodgers has schedule an internal DD-250 meeting Tuesday (to which I am invited) – and we still have not met on the camera, Tempest, SRP radio or Flir Video cable issues. As a matter of fact it is almost a week now since I was told we would open discussions on these items and there hasn't been a meeting even scheduled.

I believe these items should be discussed before sell off and that any time lost is crucial – especially if we seek to find an arrangement to fix this items before the 3/1 delivery.

If we are unable to meet and discuss these items before the DD-250 meeting Tuesday I plan on raising these issues then.

Michael De Kort
Project Manager

From email titled – DW Engineering Concerns – 2/9/2004
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From: Joe Cappello
To: Michael DeKort

We will meet in Mike Cerrone's office on Thursday at 10:00, Mike's office is located in 105 building .

*Joe Cappello
Deepwater Quality Manager
mail stop: 13000-E204
tel; 856-638-7465
fax: 856-638-4301
pager: 1-888-894-5276*

From email titled – 123 - Still no commitment from PMO -2/11/2004
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Larry Finnegan
To: Michael DeKort

PJ has informed me that he is working the issues but that they are not a priority.

I asked him if PMO has made a commitment to address the issues and work with the CG on them. He told me he doesn't know what that commitment is.

I am looking for PMO and our organization to commit to solutions and address those with the customer. What are we doing, in what time frame and on what boats? I do not feel comfortable with pursuing a resolution until after we deliver the first boat (with boat 2 over 50% done with cable/hardware installations we are well on our way to a point of no return on that boat as well).

As such I am preparing to take the issue to the next level on Friday by scheduling an appointment with Carl.

As I have stated before I would greatly prefer that we settle this “in house” – between DW PMO, tech ops and the CG before ship 1 is delivered and/or I am no longer working the effort. With only 2 weeks until delivery and my replacement about to be decided on I feel the issue needs to be resolved before next Friday.

Please find the attachment with the draft text of the email I will be sending tomorrow if we are unable to get any more traction on this issue.

Michael De Kort
Project Manager
123 Lead Systems Engineer
856-359-1439
Cell 609-923-6234

Associated document – title- DW Issues

Good Morning

Since my last correspondence on January 7, 2003, I have been unable to find closure involving several design aspects of the 123 effort. Although discussions on the issues have picked up lately I do not yet feel comfortable with where we are. Before I leave the project or the Matagorda delivers I would like to see PMO make some acceptable commitments to the organization and the customer concerning the issues I have brought forward. I have been trying for several months now to keep the issues in house and would greatly prefer to continue to do so. Unfortunately the issues are still open, these commitments have not yet been made and the Matagorda is 2 weeks away from delivery. As such I feel it is necessary for me to seek higher authority for assistance in resolving these issues.

Essentially my position breaks down in to several key points:

- The Coast Guard's fleet is the second oldest in the world. To respond to that need, as well as the new challenges imposed by 9/11, we have been selected a prime contractors, for the C4ISR effort. As such we have been entrusted by our customer with the responsibility to ensure we field the best designs and outfit the Coast Guard fleet accordingly.
 - a. In supporting that effort I believe it is incumbent upon us to ensure the product we field can meet the customer's mission requirements for decades to come.
 - b. We not only have an obligation to our customer but to the nation as a whole. The Homeland Security mission of our Coast Guard should be our paramount concern.
 - c. As such we should be fielding 49, 123 class ships, with fully capable systems and equipment.
 - d. The rush to deliver at all costs has caused us to forgo some of our corporate values and has put the company, customer and general public at risk.
 - e. The answer that all of the issues I have raised are currently not planning to be changed because they are the "design of record" is unacceptable.
- Issues
 - a. Cameras/Surveillance
 - Less than 360 coverage. This is a security risk.
 - b. Tempest SRP VHF Radio
 - The COTS radio we selected is not meant for outdoor use. As the SRP is uncovered and required to operate at sea state the radio will fail at some point and prohibit the crew from communicating when VHF comms are needed. This is a safety risk.
 - c. Misc Cabling Issues
 - There are still open items concerning several Low Smoke cables and a Flir video cable. This is a possible safety risk

From email titled – 123 - Still no commitment from PMO -2/11/2004

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From: Michael DeKort

To: Carl Bannar

Carl,

I am requesting an opportunity to meet with you on several important issues relating to the Deepwater effort. I assure you the issues are extremely important and that I have exhausted all inter-departmental and project avenues to find a resolution.

Michael De Kort
Project Manager

From email titled – Issues to be resolved on 123s – 2/24/2004

-----Original Message-----

From: Villani, Joseph A

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 6:12 AM

To: Dekort, Michael

Subject: Issues to be resolved on 123

Mike,

When can we get together so you can fill me in on your concerns with the Matagorda. I am aware of them but would like to hear from you directly. Please bring reference material to help me understand the problems. Specifically the requirements that need to be fulfilled, the design problems you are aware of and your suggestions for correction. I can be available of Wednesday if this works for you.

Thanks

Joe

From email titled – 123 - Still no commitment from PMO -2/24/2004

Pasted from outlook – no header

From: Michael DeKort

To: PJ Messer

The perfect world thing is a red herring

We are where we are because bad decisions continue to be made

This will bite us

You can't pull specs from the 3.1 and leave them in the CCM. This will lead to an inconsistency that we will get caught on.

I guess I should look on the bright side though – I never agreed with pulling anything to begin with. I wanted the INC 0 matrix we delivered to stand. The powers that be changed their mind after we delivered that matrix. Now the 3.1 has no environmental/physical specs – so we don't test them – the CCM keeps those specs but we want to change the data and not test those.

In both docs the EXACT text exists for temp and humidity. This is sophomoric at best – we look like out of control amateurs - this will backfire.

Has anyone informed the CG that we are restricting their missions by tightening the temp requirements? Maybe we should ask for forgiveness the day we try to sign the DD-250?

I plan on making the camera, Tempest, Ross radio and temperature issues open items on the DD-250 unless we get requirements relief relief.

-----Original Message-----

From: Messer, Paul J

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 8:55 AM

To: Dekort, Michael

Subject: RE: 123- Environmental/Physical spec inconsistencies - testing

Mike - the as built spec is what it is. noone likes it but its there. not approved but we're not proposing to change it now. we all need to move on.

in a perfect world all the CCM reqs would be in the C005, but they aren't. again we need to move on.

the best we can do is see where we are against the CCM reqs, and write ECP with what we know.

From email titled – 123 – Open items for DD-250 – 2/24/2004

Pasted from outlook – no header

From: Michael DeKort

To: Joe Cappello

Joe

Unless we get requirements relief please add the following issues as open items on the DD-250 – in addition to any open problem sheets and risk database items

Surveillance cameras – 360 deg viewing restricted by 2 blockage zones

Tempest – Do not meet minimum tempest requirements called out in spec or internal LM report on tempest solutions. Failed several SPAWAR Visual inspection items

SRP VHF radio – radio provided does not meet environmental requirements. Specifically humidity and Sea State 5

123 external temperature/humidity – several C4 equipments do not meet the CG temperature and humidity requirements. Temp -40 to +125 and Humidity 0 to 100%

Michael De Kort
Project Manager

From email thread titled – 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE? -2/24/2004

-----Original Message-----

From: Messer, Paul J

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:43 PM

To: Dekort, Michael

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

ok - please re-enter with details (updated if necessary - some of them you may not know about - TEMPEST for ex.)

and mitigation plans - like the Ross radio replacement

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:41 PM

To: Messer, Paul J

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

I never got the email. I found out third hand from Cappello

I will re-enter the risks

-----Original Message-----

From: Messer, Paul J

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:37 PM

To: Dekort, Michael

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

do you have the email that kicked it back ?? I dont - I would like to see them if you have them. the process is supposed to be that you get notified

also not attending the weekly 300 pm Surface Risk mtgs has slowed this down

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:35 PM

To: Messer, Paul J

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

Never happened

It's real important we do this right. A lot could depend on it.

-----Original Message-----

From: Messer, Paul J

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:34 PM

To: Dekort, Michael

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

I wasnt at the mtg that kicked back the risks

the kick back was supposed to tell you that they were rejected for lack of detail / mitigation - seriously

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:32 PM

To: Messer, Paul J

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

Then I want to know what data I am missing and I will re-enter the risks with mitigation plans.

Why weren't all my risks deleted? I believe I supplied no mitigation - to be honest I didn't see that I needed to when first entered. I thought they went from preliminary to accepted and then I did that.

Also – why wasn't I given a shot at correcting the situation?

-----Original Message-----

From: Messer, Paul J

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:26 PM

To: Dekort, Michael

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

you needed to provide the mitigation plans.....and I thought they did notify you that they were rejected

bottom line is that just saying we have a problem is not enough.....we have to come up with a reasonable fix / mitigation plan

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:23 PM

To: Messer, Paul J

Cc: Wilhelm, Douglas G; McLaverty, Brian; Cappello Jr, Joseph M; Cerrone, John D

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

What lack of data? Was I supposed to provide mitigation plans or the board saw none possible?

Why was I never informed and/or given a chance to provide data or respond?

Why is it that all of the issues I raised to Carl were the bulk of the deleted items?

-----Original Message-----

From: Messer, Paul J

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 2:16 PM

To: Dekort, Michael

Cc: Wilhelm, Douglas G; McLaverty, Brian

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

I believe the risks were kicked back by the collective risk board due to lack of data and really, no mitigation plans.

and then we had subsequent risk boards without full representation to address any new issues.

if there are valid risks - with updated status and mitigation plans - then we should ensure the data is complete and get them entered as risks via the formal process

PJM

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 1:34 PM

To: Cappello Jr, Joseph M; Wallace, James M; Messer, Paul J; McLaverty, Brian; Wilhelm, Douglas G

Cc: Cerrone, Michael G; Dunn, Richard A; Hodge, Yvonne O

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

Importance: High

The items deleted were done so without notice to me or my permission

Only half of the total risks were deleted – they all had the same level of supporting data – as such the reasoning for deletion is inconsistent and suspect.

The only notification I had of an issue was 2 months or so ago. I was told there was no supporting data. I inadvertently sent the wrong supporting spreadsheet. I corrected the situation, notified Jim that I did so and heard nothing back. As of a week or so ago they were still there.

All of the issues I have raised through the organization are missing. Tempest, Cameras and the Ross Radio issue/risks are missing.

I suggest these risks be entered back in to the system immediately. If there is insufficient data I would like to be told exactly what is missing – I will immediately supply the data.

-----Original Message-----

From: Cappello Jr, Joseph M

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 1:27 PM

To: Dekort, Michael; Wallace, James M

Cc: Messer, Paul J; McLaverty, Brian; Cerrone, Michael G; Dunn, Richard A

Subject: RE: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

I was told that they were not submitted due to insufficient details. This was the response I received when I asked the same question. Jim Wallace is no longer with LM. We have a meeting at 2:00 to discuss the open issues for the Matagorda. Some of these issues we need to address.

-----Original Message-----

From: Dekort, Michael

Sent: Tuesday, February 24, 2004 1:19 PM

To: Wallace, James M; Cappello Jr, Joseph M

Cc: Messer, Paul J; McLaverty, Brian; Cerrone, Michael G

Subject: 123- Several critical Risk/Action items missing from IDE?

Importance: High

I just did a search in IDE to see the status of the risks I have entered. Several did not show up. Several of these – like the camera 360deg, tempest and Ross radio issue are critical issues, still open and should not be removed.

Could you look to see what, if anything, happened to them?

Subjects missing

Tempest

Cameras

Ross radio

Racks/internal equip not meet environmental req

Flir cable
Future ship schedule/test period shrink
ILS staffing for lifecycle
Pre-Arrival Check
Ship 2/3 replace equip
Problem Report priority scheme

Michael De Kort
Project Manager

From email titled – DeKort- conference room for discussions – 9/20/2004
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: John Shelton
To: Michael DeKort

Mike,
Thanks, I will see you on Thursday and have time on Friday, available also.
Would you meet me at the main visitor's entrance at 9:00 am and escort me
to the area where we can meet. Is there a web-site where I can get driving
directions/locations and facility information?
Thanks again,
John Shelton

From email titled – DeKort- Deepwater ethics issue – 2/7/2005
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Gail Allen
To: Michael DeKort

Mike,
At this time, I do not have access to the files that you reference. John Shelton is going to
forward the investigative report which I expect to have before we talk. I believe we are in the
same time zone. Can we go with 3 pm as I will be changing hotels after the Sr. Mgmt meeting
ends on Wednesday. I'll call you if that's okay.
Gail

-----Original Message-----
From: DeKort, Michael
Sent: Monday, February 07, 2005 3:24 PM
To: Allen, Gail
Subject: RE: DeKort- Deepwater Ethics issue

How about 2:30 my time Wed?

Did John Shelton forward you the data package I gave him as well as his investigation package?

Michael De Kort
ISC2 Software Engineering Manager
IS&S Colorado Springs
719-277-4257
719-896-0760 cell

-----Original Message-----

From: Allen, Gail
Sent: Monday, February 07, 2005 1:19 PM
To: DeKort, Michael
Subject: Re: DeKort- Deepwater Ethics issue

Michael,
I am in receipt of your email. I am on travel through Thursday. The earliest that I would be able to speak with you is Wednesday afternoon while in Phoenix. Is your time availability flexible for Wednesday pm?

Gail Allen

Sent from my BlackBerry Handheld.

-----Original Message-----

From: DeKort, Michael <michael.dekort@lmco.com>
To: Allen, Gail <gail.allen@lmco.com>
Sent: Fri Feb 04 14:52:33 2005
Subject: DeKort- Deepwater Ethics issue

Good afternoon,

John Shelton informed me on Monday that he has passed the case on to you. He informed me that he told you that I was unsatisfied with the results of the MS2 investigation as well as my suggestions to remedy the situation. I am standing by ready to discuss this matter as soon as you are available.

I would like you to know that I originally intended to contact Bob Stevens about the matter on Monday and that I promised John I would stand down on taking that action until we talk. The reason for my wishing to contact Mr. Stevens is that I feel the matter is critical enough to involve him. I believe that in the 1.5 years this issue has gone on we have delivered several systems with critical safety, security and reliability issues to Homeland Security (the Coast Guard) and with each month that situation grows worse as we continue deliveries and approve designs leveraged against the issues I have raised. I believe that not only are the Coast Guard crew members in jeopardy but so is the general public they serve as well as the overall mission of the US Coast Guard/Homeland Defense.

I look forward to beginning our discussions on these issues.

Michael De Kort
ISC2 Software Engineering Manager

Email delivered receipt to Fred Moosally – 4/12/2005

Your message

To: Moosally, Fred P
Subject: Deepwater Ethics Issue
Sent: 4/12/2005 12:57 PM

was delivered to the following recipient(s):

Moosally, Fred P on 4/12/2005 12:57 PM

From email titled – Project Deepwater- Issues of Concern – 4/28/2005

Pasted from outlook – no header

From: Michael DeKort

To: Robert Stevens

Good Afternoon

My name is Michael De Kort. Currently I am the software engineering manager for ISC2/IS&S. Previously, when I was part of the MS2 company I was the lead systems engineer, on the 123 project, for the Deepwater effort. During my assignment to the project I surfaced several significant security and safety issues. Over the past one and a half years I have been trying to rectify those issues through the chain of command. I have been through the MS2 engineering and program management chains, MS2 quality assurance, ethics and finally corporate ethics. While all the parties mentioned believe and have stated that the issues I raised have been closed satisfactorily, I do not believe they have been. As such I am submitting this correspondence of record to you so I may apprise you of the situation and am seeking your help in to rectifying the issues described. In taking this action I will be satisfying my own personal and professional ethical and moral responsibilities. I strongly believe that some of the decisions we have made on the Deepwater project have severally compromised the mission of the US Coast Guard, the Department of Homeland Security and as a result Lockheed Martin. I believe our approach and decisions have put the Coast Guard in a position of accepting a product that will result in severe degradation of their mission capabilities.

As I understand your time is valuable I have included the details in a separate document. That attached document summarizes the issues, history as I have witnessed it, some of my opinions on the matter and my background.

In closing I would like to assure you that the issues I have raised are significant in nature and are important enough to be reviewed and scrutinized at the highest levels. Given the change in the world post 9-11 I think it is imperative that we ensure that even though there may be significant program pressures we ensure that the most rudimentary ethical and professional standards not be compromised.

If there is anything else I can provide or anything I can do to be of any assistance please let me know.

Thank you for your time and consideration.

[Associated document – Deepwater Complete 2 .doc](#)

The purpose of this document is to enter in to record a complete account (not day by day) record of my concerns, issues and opinions relative to the Deepwater ethics complaints I have filed. I want to ensure that the majority of the pertinent information has been provided so that there are no misunderstandings and to ensure that all the relevant parties had a complete accounting of my case.

Summary

For the past 1.5 years I have been involved in trying to correct/remedy certain technical problems relative to the 123 class of ships for the U.S. Coast Guard. (As this effort leverages a systems of systems design concept many of these issues would be leveraged in other efforts as well – such as the MSC -Maritime Security Cutter.) These issues involve several key security and safety requirements. The proper resolution of these requirements are imperative as not doing so will endanger the lives of the crew, as well as the general public, and compromise the secure communications capability of the USG as well as that of all of DoD. (As the CG has a requirement to interface/communicate with DoD any communications compromise would affect all of these organizations).

In my pursuit to resolve these issues I have worked through every level of my chain of command - through several iterations.

At the end of the day I would like to ensure the product meets or exceeds all the USCG/Homeland Security mission needs, the MS2 organization properly deals with an organizational pattern of behavior problem and policies are changed so no other employee, or their family, should have to go through what we did.

Issues

1. SRP/Zodiac VHF Radio
 - a. We had the C4ISR requirement to provide a VHF radio for the SRP/Zodiac boat
 - b. This craft is used, primarily, for rescues and to board other vessels.
 - c. We had a sea state 5 environmental requirement. This requirement means the equipment needed to function properly in very rough seas and weather conditions.
 - d. The vessel has no interior. Other than a small area for storage under the deck – everything was exposed to the elements.
 - e. The radio we chose to satisfy the requirements was not meant to be used outdoors. (per the vendor)
 - f. This is a significant safety risk. Without this radio the Zodiac has no other method of communicating beyond a certain range.
 - g. We purchased 9 radios upfront. (For the first 9 boats)
 - h. We told the USG we would not use the radio that came with the Zodiac because it did not meet all technical criteria (Which is true. However the ghosting capability was not nearly as crucial as weather survivability)
 - i. I asked to have the radios replaced and was told we would not do that because it was the “design of record”.

- j. After several months of trying to get it replaced I convinced management to let me add a ‘raincoat’ and swap the microphone out for a weather proof one. I said this was only a temporary measure and did not mean the requirement was satisfied. It simply allowed the radio to operate longer before shorting out. I settled to keep the crew as safe as I could for as long as I could. (If management believed the radio met the environmental requirements why would they agree to the raincoat and weather proof microphone solutions? I believe the answer is that they knew they were wrong but didn’t want to admit making such a large mistake. The raincoat and microphone we viewed as added protection – going above and beyond)
- k. Several months later, the same week I elevated the issues to the VP of QA and the VP of MS2 the USCG asked us to test the radios in the rain without the “raincoat’ (which they found understandably annoying to use)
- l. We shorted out 4 radios in the rain. The CG witnessed all 4 radios failing in the rain.
- m. Had the customer not tested the radio in the rain we would have delivered the boat with that radio and it would have failed the first time in use. This would have put the crew and personnel being rescued in harms way.
- n. I consider the decision to keep the Ross radio, before the USCG testing failures, to be negligent on the part of our technical and program management who knowingly and willfully directed we put an unsafe radio on that boat (keep in mind the Zodiac goes on all 49 123s and all of the WSCs). Again – if it were not for the customer testing the radios in the rain just before delivery we would have delivered these radios.
- o. See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination

2. Camera Surveillance system

- a. Northrop had a requirement to provide 2 mast mounted cameras that could pan, tilt and zoom
- b. While the requirement did not specify specific coverage capabilities it does state these are surveillance cameras used to monitor the boat remotely when in port
- c. I believe that requirement means we have to provide 360deg coverage. (At the time the USCG had this exact solution implemented on some its older vessels and they had 360 deg coverage. Additionally NG planned on that same implementation on the WSC in the future)
- d. Due to a less than productive and cooperative working relationship with NG we argued over who would provide the cameras for several months. As we were supposed to provide all the signaling and control cables I suggested we take the initiative to buy the cameras to make schedule
- e. Management agreed and wanted to put them on the mast. NG pushed back and said that would mean a late design change and new center of gravity study. At that point I suggested we tell NG we tried to help them do their job and if they wanted to play that game they could supply the cameras on their own.
- f. It turns out that we decided to continue taking the risk and find another way out. Later I found out this because we made another design mistake and did not supply all the control circuitry for the cameras. This meant the cameras would be fixed position.
- g. The design we came up with was to mount 4 cameras on the pilot house – 20ft lower than the standard installation. This would, in theory provide them the same viewing capability without having to move the cameras (I actually liked this idea because with moving cameras one can tell where a moving camera is viewing and avoid being seen). My only stipulation was that we have ship’s integration do a plot to make sure there were no obstructions or dead zones
- h. The study came back and showed 2 dead zones – about 5 deg each- directly over the pilot house at 10 and 2 o’clock. These dead zones were about 10ft wide on the boat and projected to the horizon were hundreds of yards wide. These dead zones would enable someone to board the ship and enter the pilot house without being seen

i. I immediately told the chief engineer and program management that this was a security issue and needed to be remedied by adding another camera and circuitry. They refused and said we would not alter the “design of record”.

j. When I pushed back they said show me the requirement to have 360 deg coverage. My response was:

i. It's common sense

ii. Currently the existing USCG ships with cameras had 360 deg coverage

iii. The current spec was written by us. As such we made a mistake, should have included it and it is, at the very least, it was a derived requirement.

k. PMO and the Chief Eng still refused to make the change. However, after several weeks of pushing they agreed to let me talk it over with the CG tech rep. Several weeks later that tech rep came back and said he would approve the dead zones because the windows of the pilot house could be locked and we could tell someone had entered because the locks or glass would be broken. I thought this was an incorrect and reckless decision. However we followed with a contracts letter requesting permission to have less than 360 deg coverage. As of March of 04 the CG had yet to grant permission. Based on this course of action, even though I vehemently disagreed, I knew I wouldn't be able to fight this one further.

l. In December of 03 the security inspector for the CG performed an inspection of our boat and said, in his report, that he noticed the implementation, with 4 fixed cameras, was different than he was used to seeing, but it looked like he had 360 deg coverage. I felt this open the issue back up.

m. I immediately went to management and suggested we tell that inspector that we had less than 360 deg coverage and see what he wanted to do.

n. I was then told, in a room with witnesses, that if he thought he had 360 deg we weren't going to tell him otherwise and that it was his fault he made a mistake and ran a faulty test. I told the group I thought that approach was unethical and put the USCG and LM at risk.

o. See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination

3. Tempest cabling

a. In the summer of 03 the environmental/security requirements were finally flowed down to us (as I mentioned before this was several months after the design review and during our supposed installation period). These requirements levied certain tempest requirements on us. (I was aware that requirements of this type would normally exist. I had previously asked for them and spent months trying to get them)

b. In doing my research on the effort I dug up an internal report, from 2/03, that ship's integration created to guide engineering on what to do - specifically relative to tempest issues, cabling, equipment separation, grounding etc. (I should mention here that I have an extensive Tempest background)

c. I later learned that the proposal never costed or scheduled that work and as such engineering had no money to do most of the most basic of tempest designs or buy what needed to be bought. Specifically the chief engineer directed that no shielded cables were to be designed in or purchased. Shielded cabling is the foundation for the most rudimentary Tempest design. Not having those shielded cables compromises the entire secure system and the associated crypto. Since the USCG had a requirement to communicate with all DoD forces this meant that any compromise we had would be a compromise to all of DoD. A compromise here would mean that classified messages could easily be read by someone who should not be reading them. This is a serious security issue.

d. My next move was to change the design and get the Tempest requirements satisfied (now it should be noted that not all tempest requirements can be satisfied on a small vessel. Normally these can be handled by waiver. Not having shield cables is never waived)

- e. Management responded to my request by going back to ship's integration and employing a Tempest expert. (Interestingly enough the original report was done with out this gentlemen's help. The people who wrote the report had no background in the area, sought his help, but were not permitted to use him).
- f. The expert wrote a report specifying what should be done and what could be waived. He found major discrepancies. One of which was not having shielded cables.
- g. Management then said the "design of record" stands and that we would wait until the visual and electronic inspections to see where we failed.
- h. The visual inspection came with a list of failures. Of which the cables were included.
- i. Management then decided to not fix any visual failures until the electrical test confirmed those failures.
- j. It was at about this time that I had, unfortunately, made my way up to the VP (Carl Bannar). The VP agreed that we should fix all the visual/electrical issues (short of items that should be waived)
- k. See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination

4. External equipment survivability

- a. With the receipt of the late environmental requirements we were notified that we have temperature survivability requirements to satisfy (as I said before I had been asking for this data from the beginning)
- b. These requirements said we had to meet external temperature requirements of -40 to +125 deg.
- c. I immediately tasked my Sensors tech to research our equipments ability to meet these requirements. The first system he checked was the FLIR (Forward looking Infra Red). He told me it would only survive to -5. This would mean that a crucial navigation system would not function in cold areas where the CG needed to sail. This would pose a safety risk and cause the CG to alter its mission capability for all 49 of these boats. I told the engineer to keep researching and told management about the issue. They proceeded to tell the engineer to stop performing the research I asked him to do and told me we would not fix a thing – we would not alter the "design of record".
- d. When I took this issue to VP he agreed that the issue needed to be remedied. He said the chief engineer would handle this. The chief engineer told me it would be handled by telling the CG there were various requirements issues to address. I said this was not specific enough and should be handled by meeting or changing the requirement. I also said we should not be suggesting to the customer that they change their mission requirements because we didn't do our job. He said he would handle it.
- e. I believe that those ships will be incapacitated, in extreme hot and cold weather, because several sensor or communications systems will fail. This could result in loss of life.
- f. See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination

5. PCA issues

- a. LM had the responsibility of verifying the C4ISR HW/cable installations against the drawings.
- b. When LM sent out a group from QA to check cables – QA did a sample of about 100 cables and found over ½ to be incorrect.
- c. This situation was caused by us giving inaccurate information to BSI during the first round of cable designs.
- d. Based on the sample several hundred cables were improperly labeled.

- e. This situation could lead to improper connecting of cables in the future – specifically during maintenance. This situation could lead to equipment/system malfunction, ship unavailability and possible harm to the technician.
- f. My suggestion was to fix the cables and drawings. (Doing so would also ensure the problems were not implemented on future ships)
- g. PMO decided it was NG’s responsibility to run the actual PCA for the ship. So we would wait and see what they caught.
- h. I told management I believed that to be dishonest and unethical.
- i. See corporate ethics out brief section below for final LM determination

6. Issues with future designs/ships

- a. Shortly after leaving the DW effort, while still in MS2, I received messages from personnel still on the DW effort. They informed me that we are perpetuating our poor design philosophy on future efforts. For example I am told that the wind sensor on the WSC will not survive the elements. I cannot confirm the accuracy of the report. However given the chain of events described here and the pattern of performance exhibited by program management and engineering I believe this issue has merit and that a complete review of all designs and requirements is warranted.

Resolutions expected/requested

- 1. A complete programmatic and engineering review of the requirements and engineering solutions factored against what is in the best interest of our customer. I would like each issue, along with all the associated data, to be reviewed in this context. (To date a thorough review of this nature has not been accomplished in my presence). This review should be conducted by an entity outside of MS2 and consists of engineering team members experienced in C4ISR.
- 2. A complete management assessment of the performance of every technical and program management lead involved in this effort – including me. We need to know if all the proper policies/processes were adhered to and to address any situations where these processes were not followed, ethics violations were introduced and anyone was handled or dealt with unprofessionally. Anyone who is found to have acted improperly or unprofessionally should be dealt with accordingly. As I believe there was an ongoing effort to withhold information and deceive I believe there are some individuals who should, at the very least, be removed from the DW effort.
- 3. Given all the technical missteps on this program I believe it is incumbent upon us to see whether or not we need to bring in some external help – specifically C4ISR subject matter experts.
- 4. I would like a review of my last appraisal as well as the retaliation I believe I experienced. As a result of this retaliation I and my family were forced to move from the NJ area and to Colorado. For a time this put a significant strain on my family.

History

I entered the program in July of 03. Originally my effort consisted of trying to put together and integrated schedule for the 123 effort. As time went on it became apparent to the DW management team that my background and leadership capabilities lent themselves well to my taking on the role of lead systems engineer for the effort. I accepted this position.

During this period (7/03 through 12/03) several threads were becoming apparent:

- 1. There were no documented/accepted requirements for the Increment 0 effort. As the original requirement was for an Increment 1 there was nothing in place to document the subset of requirements we had agreed to deliver, at an accelerated pace, in Increment 0.

2. The proposal effort severely underestimated the task at hand. Large groups of engineering tasks, such as cable designs, were not costed. These drove the schedule far to the right. As such design reviews were shortchanged and we found ourselves in the summer of 04 expecting to be in the middle of install while we were still figuring out requirements and starting some critical design phases.
3. During this phase the critical items I mention below came to light.
4. We had not adequately prepared for site installation. Until I arrived there was no plan for utilizing trailers on site and no plan detailing the installation steps. Keep in mind we were already supposed to be installing when these issues were brought forward.
5. The culmination of these issues snowballed. It was obvious that in order to remedy the situation we would need to push the schedule several months, incur a significant cost over run and find ourselves in an embarrassing situation.
6. Management seemed to be more worried about our perceived engineering capabilities and reputation and not providing information that Northrop Grumman could use against us than satisfying the requirements to the degree necessary to ensure the USCG/Homeland Security mission. (At the time our relationship was extremely contentious. On several occasions management referred to us “playing chicken” until someone blinked. This meant that we would hold off on announcing publicizing or fixing a problem until NG announced a problem. Wherever possible we would link our issues to them.). As such the mantra used to defend all of their reasons for not addressing the situation was that we had a “design of record” and under no circumstance would we change. They maintained this posture even when the issues involved safety and/or security degradation. Every attempt I made, within the DW chain of command, to fix the problems was met with the same answer – we will not change the design of record. I pressed for several months within the team before I decided to utilize my engineering chain of command. As such it took me several more months to work through that effort. I went up and down the chain – several times over. At each step I proved my points technically but was unable to enlist support. One manager even told me I was doing the right thing, that it would come back to bite me and said ‘good luck” in my efforts to do the right thing. At no point did anyone offer a credible program or technical counter to any of my arguments.

Several of the risks I had entered in the risk management system were purposefully deleted. When I questioned why I was told they did not meet certain data criteria. When I asked them why only the risks associated with the critical issue were deleted – they had no answer. When I asked them why I was given no heads up – I was given no answer. Only after I complained to my director about the situation did the risks show back up in the database.

During the installation period, in the late summer of 03, the environmental and security requirements were finally flowed down from the internal Systems of System group (several months after the design review). For the first time we were able to see if the systems/equipment we bought and designed met requirements. (Keep in mind this is very late in the process and that equipment had been purchased for several ships at that point.)

After this I went to see the QA organization. We went through all of my data and my allegations. They agreed that the issues needed to be addressed. They forwarded the data to the VP of QA who promptly called Carl Banner and told him he should see me. He immediately called me and asked that we meet. I told him I wanted to see the acting tech director one more time before I came to see him. I told him I wanted to do this by the book. He said he understood and that his door was open.

After not receiving the assistance I was looking for I went to see Carl Bannar – VP of MS2. He was the first level of management who actually listened to what I had to say and who didn't dismiss me with management hyperbole. In each of the cases he agreed with my recommended course of action – including letting me see proof of those resolutions before we delivered the first ship. Unfortunately that promise was not kept. The chief engineer of DW actually went so far as to suggest of was mischarging for pushing the issue 2 months after the ship delivered (A couple months later my SW engineering director did sit me down and show me some of the data I had asked for. This was weeks after the ship had been delivered. At that time, after having been removed from the effort against my will, receiving a low appraisal and being assigned to work far beneath my capability, I acquiesced. I told him the data was not sufficient, that I didn't trust it – but that I was getting weary of the fight and retaliation)

After be exposed to what I believe is retaliatory behavior I applied for other jobs. I was offered a position of senior program manager with IS&S and accepted it.

On my way out of the organization I went to the MS2 director of tech ops to tell him the entire story. As he was new to the organization I felt there was a chance he would get involved, look in to the situation, fix what need to be fixed and ensure this kind of thing never happened again. He took no action (at the time) that I know of other than contacting HR who in turn contacted ethics.

MS2 conducted an investigation.

- The MS2 ethics manager came to my location and interviewed me
- The result of that investigation was to find my claims could not be supported. I was not permitted to know where my accusations fell short or were inaccurate and was not permitted to know where the information was not supported. I do not know if the history was found to be in error, if the actual claims were in error or the resultant delivery did not line up with my claims. I stipulated at the time, and maintain now, that I should be permitted to see all contractual and/or engineering data that disputes my claims or information. I believe it is in the company's best interest to do so. If the final results are in keeping with the contractual requirements I should be able to see proof that we met our obligations.
- At no point did anyone ever contact me asking for more detail, to refute some information or to discuss any of my data. Given the importance and complexity of the data as well as the fact that the finding were that none of my claims were substantiated I find this to be very questionable.

Corporate investigation.

- This investigation began a short time after the MS2 ethics investigation conclusion. I had requested an independent engineering review of the situation. That request was granted, at first as a single engineer then as a team. After several weeks had gone by without by being interviewed I requested status. I was told the investigation was almost over and that I would be given a report soon.
 - Gail Allen, Carol Boser (the engineer assigned to perform the review) and I have a meeting scheduled for 4/11.
 - Gail Allen requested that I provide all copies of the data that I have in my possession. As that data proves each and every one of my allegations to be true I am reluctant to give it up until I am sure the issues have been resolved satisfactorily.
 - Outcome of debrief- 5/14
 - a. Cameras - CG accepted the camera blind spots
- i.I believe this puts the CG in a severely compromised position. The original intent of the cameras was to provide the CG the capability to monitor the boat remotely when in a CG port. This would mean no one would need to be on board to monitor the boat. I believe we have put the

CG in the position of now having to man the boat – as the dead spots would permit someone to easily get on board and enter the pilot house without being detected. No other ships, which have cameras, put the CG in this position. We were already adding 2 cameras – adding a 3rd would have been no problem. Additionally – the fact that there are dead spots, and all associated data, should become classified information.

b. Radio – replaced with correct radio

i. What should be looked in to here is the chain of events that lead to this change. I tried for 6 months to get this change. It wasn't until we shorted out 4 radios, in front of the CG, during testing that we replaced these radios. I strongly believe it was our intent to deliver the original radios – which would have resulted in failure the first time used.

c. Temp ext equip – fixed FLIR and agreed to check in to compatibility of all the other equip and get back to me. Chances are most of the other equipment will not pass requirements thereby forcing the CG to change its mission destinations. Carol Boser (and sub sequentially MS2 legal) said no problems have occurred yet on the 5 fields 123s. I asked if any have sailed in extreme environments and she said she didn't know. She said if we find a problem – we will fix it. How is this satisfactory?

d. Tempest – CG passed instrumented tests even though proper cables not used and the original visual A Tempest inspection failed. I doubt that this system actually passed the standard electrical Tempest checks. If this system is not up to standards all the CG and DoD classified communications will be compromised when the CG is involved, even during simple monitoring, of communications.

i. We knew we ordered the wrong cables before we asked Bollinger to run them on the ship. We should have ordered the correct cables and worked the cost issues with the CG.

e. PCA – agreed to fix

f. Pattern of performance by Deepwater program management and engineering leadership

i. Excused performance due to schedule/budget pressures and poor processes

ii. Excused things people said – “people say stupid things”

1. When PJ Messer said “it wasn't our fault the customer didn't catch our camera blind spots” – is this something we dismiss that easily?

g. Retaliation – Carol informed me that there was no data to support. As my appraisals reflect that sometimes I push too hard on issues she didn't see a problem.

h. Overall – Carol Boser – engineer on investigation – told me that management was under tight schedule and budget constraints and were working in an environment that had poor processes. As such she thought their actions were understandable and acceptable. She did not think management's behavior displayed any patterns of poor judgment or ethical breeches. Carol did mention that if any problems are found down the road they would be fixed.

i. Response

i. Bad process, tight schedules and budget issues are not a get out of jail free cards. Suggesting such- in light of the issues described here – is ridiculous. None of these is enough of an excuse to excuse us from the most basic ethical considerations. I knew these things were wrong and could be fixed – why wouldn't the same standard be applied to program managers and chief engineers? Are my standards too high? Are they too high for homeland Security and the nation?

ii. Why would we put CG in such a difficult and compromising position? They should never have been asked to accept any of this.

iii. All of these issues could have been solved before the first boat delivered with minimal schedule risk. We knew these issues existed 6 months before delivery and weeks before installation began. We created this crisis by making bad decisions and then forcing ourselves and the customer in to a box.

iv. I have been told, in many forums, that Lockheed Martin has an “unyielding” ethics policy. How is the scenario unfolding here not yielding? Are they merely policies of convenience?

- v. As these issues were brought up over 6 months before the delivery of the first boat and installation had not yet begun we could and should have rectified these issues before delivery. There would have been cost and schedule impacts but they would have been justified and far cheaper to fix then than now.
- vi. Waiting until problems are found later - (per Carol Boser) this meant we would wait until actual system failure. Most likely this would occur during a mission. Is this acceptable?
- vii. I believe that the product we are delivering will result in injury to crew members and/or the general public and major security/communications compromises down the road. It is very unfortunate that the customer was put in a position to have to accept this situation. I believe that LM and the CG need to revisit the situation and find a way to rectify it. If we do not there will be severe fallout which both of us will have to answer for.
- viii. I believe we have only converted 5 out of 49 123's. We should ensure that future boats are delivered to the originally intended spec and figure out a way to back fit the others.

Opinions/Suggestions/Observations

The information below has been provided so I can put forth an explanation for how and why things occurred. I understand fully that most of these are only my opinions but I believe they are consistent with the facts. I believe it is important to convey these opinions as they might help us understand the depth and root causes of the problem so we can go forward and correct them.

- From the beginning I believe this project suffered from an extensive lack of technical expertise. As such the proposal was recklessly under bid (I say recklessly because it far exceeded any realistic chance of success – far beyond normal proposal challenges we take to be competitive)
 - I believe this lack of expertise stemmed from an organizational arrogance that led to a severe underestimation of the work at hand. What we did was leverage our Aegis success. While this is an excellent strategy we went too far and assumed that since the DW effort was considerably less complicated than Aegis – that it would be easy to do. While I believe it is true that the effort is less technically challenging than the Aegis effort one still needs to know what to do. We did not bring an adequate level of C4ISR expertise on to the job.
 - Additionally I believe these leaders lost their way. I believe that Aegis has a culture that expects/demands the highest ethical standards. That culture makes it virtually impossible to stray. When left on their own these leaders became lost and found they had to think on their own. They made the wrong choices.
- If the organization had chosen to fix all these issues when presented in the summer/fall of 04 we would have been able to do so on the first boat and leverage those fixes forward. Those changes would have caused a cost/schedule impact but those impacts are far less than we would have to experience now because we have fielded several 123's and have completed CDR for the WCS. Additionally we could have been seen as being proactive – now we will be seen as not only making a crucial sophomoric mistake but we were late. Additionally we could be accused of hiding information or misrepresenting the facts.
- I believe the organization compromised its ethical standards in order to save face. I believe that in doing so we put the USCG/Homeland Defense and the general public at risk
- I believe that my management chain, at the time, should have supported me once I made my case technically and/or contractually. I believe it was incumbent upon them to assist me in doing the right thing for the project instead of informing me that I was doing the right thing, wishing me luck and standing on the sideline.
- On several occasions individual contributors as well as program management and tech leads told me they felt I was doing the right thing but they would not get involved out of fear of retribution. One PM, who was just coming on the job during these events, actually told me he thought we were making “stupid” mistakes by taking the course of action we were on and

promised me he would look in to the situation. Two days later, after meeting with senior PM, he told me we would stick with the “design of record” and told me he could no longer help me.

- During the winter of 03 I tried, on several occasions to see the DW chief engineer on these issues. He refused to return 3 phone calls and several emails requesting a meeting. It was not until I got to Carl Bannar and he was directed to see me that he did. When asked why he wouldn’t see me he said that he assigned that to another engineer who apparently didn’t do his job well. I said that was fine in the beginning but that it was incumbent upon him to see me when he knew I was going to see Mr. Bannar because I was not satisfied with the responses I was getting. I told him I thought he purposefully avoided me and that that was unprofessional and contributed to the problem. He had no response (this is the same chief engineer that refused to send me the data he promised and then insinuated I was mischarging when I kept pushing)
- I believe that the legal and ethics organizations are not acting in the best interest of the company in these matters. I believe that each level of management simply trusts the one below them and that ethics and legal are falling in to the same pattern by defending them. I believe that MS2/Deepwater program and engineering management, MS2 and corporate ethics and legal would be better served by looking for what the right long term solution is and not looking to defend the positions of those who made the decisions they got us where we are. It cannot and should not be in the best interest of LM to continue down the path we are going.
- I believe I have been dealt with unfairly and unethically. I believe I suffered organizational retaliation and that this process – being 1.5 years since the problems came to light, has taken entirely too long.

Background

- Relevant experience
 - US Navy - 6 years as a communications electronics technician. Specialized in the ASW communications area. This involved going through the navy’s longest and most extensive ‘C’ school. The system involved complete C3 systems. Certified in 3 cryptos and Tempest. I then went on to work at the Guam and Diego Garcia communications stations and earned several awards and medals for doing so
 - US State Department – 1.5 years as a Communications Engineer. Spent 6 months of that time as the communications engineer for the counter terrorism group
 - Lockheed Martin
 - Systems Engineer – worked classified LAN/WAN projects as well as aircraft simulation efforts and A/V training suite design. Last SE responsibility was as SE leads for the DW 123 effort
 - Project Lead – lead several aircraft simulator upgrade efforts as well as being the SW project Lead for Aegis baseline 6 Phase III. (For which I earned several Aegis Excellence and business Excellence Awards. Most notably was for successfully completing the baseline 6 Phase III Incentive effort)
 - Currently SW engineering manager for IS&S/ISC2 (predominantly NORAD efforts). Previously I was SW project lead for the NORAD CS2 effort.

In closing I would like to reiterate my commitment to see that the right thing is done for our customer and shareholders and I will pursue every means available to me to ensure that happens. Post 9/11 I believe the mission of the U.S. Coast Guard and Homeland Security has become our nation’s highest priority. As such Lockheed Martin should ensure that the products we provide ensure that mission succeeds now and well in to the future.

From email titled – Email to Robert Stevens – 5/4/2005
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From: Maryann Lavan
To: Michael DeKort

Mr. De Kort:

Your e:mail to Mr. Stevens of April 28, 2005 was referred to me for review and handling. I appreciate that you have devoted much time and effort in pursuing your concerns about the Deepwater Program. I would like to meet with you in person to hear and respond to your concerns. Are you available for a meeting in Bethesda, Maryland at Lockheed Martin Corporate Headquarters on Tuesday, May 10th, from 11:30-12:30?

Sincerely,

Maryanne R. Lavan
Vice President-Ethics and Business Conduct

From email titled – Deepwater Ethics Issue – Please Read – 1/17/2006
Pasted from outlook – no header
From: Michael DeKort
To: Robert Stevens

Mr. Stevens

First let me say that this will be the last unsolicited correspondence I send you pertaining to Deepwater matters. Given your position and constraints on your time I know I am asking quite a lot of you to indulge me by reading this correspondence. I also realize this letter is long. I wanted to make sure that should you decide to read it you are fully informed. I have been struggling for some time on how I should formulate this letter. I am fully aware that the odds are stacked very heavily against me. We have 2.5 years of investigations, your VP of Ethics and the MS2 Deepwater organization telling you all is well. Having said that I will endeavor to convince you otherwise by laying out the issues and a brief synopsis on how we got here. What we have here is the questionable competence at the lowest levels and a chain of command which simply wanted to trust the judgment of those below them. In this case that was an incredibly bad decision. This entire episode has snowballed and with every day we lose valuable time needed to turn this around. My background as a communications technician for the US Navy, a communications engineer for the US State Department (embassy/consulate communications and the leading engineer for the counter terrorism group) and as a systems engineer/project manager for Lockheed Martin tell me we have put our company, our customer and the general public at risk by leading our customer in to accepting these systems as designed. There are several critical safety and security issues involved which will lead to severe consequences for Lockheed Martin, Homeland Security, the US Coast Guard and the general public down the road.

Technical issues summary – Deepwater 123 effort

- Exterior equipment survivability – There is a risk that the majority of the equipment will not survive the environmental temperature extremes. Several Nav, Sensor and Communications systems will fail. This will cause serious safety issues.
- Tempest – Shielded Cables – The proper cables were not installed in the secure communication circuits. This will cause serious security issues
- Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video surveillance system with two significant blind spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will cause significant security and safety problems
- FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue

Issues Detail

Exterior equipment survivability – The majority of the exterior mounted equipment will not survive the environmental temperature extremes

- Late in the project, months after the design was approved and equipment purchased, we received our environmental and Tempest requirements (this in itself is very troubling). One of the requirements was to ensure that all the equipment and cabling we installed on the exterior of the vessel could survive Sea State 5 and temperatures from -40 to +125 deg (f).
- Upon receiving these requirements I immediately asked my IPT Leads to double check all the equipment to see if we had any issues. They were directed to look at all Sensor, Nav and Comm equipment.
- The very first device we looked at – the FLIR – would not survive below -5 deg.
- Management was then informed about the situation senior management directed me and my people to stop looking in to whether or not the rest of the equipment would survive the elements. They also directed that the FLIR design would stand as is. As the “Design of Record”.
- After 2.5 years – the organization decided to fix the FLIR. However details were not provided on whether the rest of the equipment met specs or if we convinced the CG to lower the requirement.
- I believe that we either lessened the requirements or gun decked the solution. This could mean that the Sensor, Nav and Communication systems are at risk. (Especially when these boats deploy to Alaska or warm regions such as Guam or even the Persian Gulf area)
- All of the systems the CG currently have met these requirements. We will be severely degrading the performance of these vessels
- Note – The engineer your ethics office assigned to this case, along with your legal department, sent me a letter stating there are no long term issues because several of the boats have been doing fine during their sea trials. Sea trials conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. I hope this gives you serious pause. The Gulf of Mexico is about 80 deg all year around. It never sees any of the extremes called out by the specs. This is exactly the kind of reckless engineering the Deepwater team utilized to get us in the predicament we are in now. The first time these boats get to cold waters and there is significant sea spray – the majority of the systems will fail.
- This situation exists not only for several boats that are modified but for the 41 or so that we haven’t even started on yet. (I believe we are not yet on contract for boats 6-49.)

Tempest – Shielded Cables – The proper cables were not installed in the secure communication circuits. This will cause serious security issues

- Again – well after the design review and the equipment was purchased – we received our Tempest requirements. Those requirements called for the standard set of military sea going requirements – shielding, grounding, bonding, separation of equipment etc.
- The Chief Engineer on the effort had directed months before that we not buy shielded cables because they were too expensive. The requirements were never changed.

- Until this point we had not involved anyone who had a Tempest background on the project even though they worked in the organization.
- Note – Ship’s Integration had prepared a report on what our Tempest solutions should be. They did an excellent job given the engineer had never worked Tempest before (The Tempest engineer they had on staff was not asked to participate). The report stated shielded cables must be used.
- I have a Tempest background – in the Navy and Department of State – as well as 4 crypto designations. The report made sense to me. Standard ops.
- Management was informed that we needed to buy shielded cables or change requirements (something that I have never seen or heard of being done) they informed me that the design of record would stand.
- Sometime later we brought on the Tempest engineer from Ships Integration to perform a site inspection. He failed us in several areas including shielded cables.
- Management decided to wait until the instrumented test to see if we could pass. No effort was made to buy or install shielded cables based on the visual test failure.
- 2.5 years later. Again I have been given none of the technical details I was promised. However I was able to independently ascertain that shielded cables have not been installed.
- Recently I have contacted several Tempest inspectors around the country. All of them told me the chances of passing a test were extremely unlikely without these cables.
- I believe LM and the USCG have either gun decked the tests or lowered the requirements. (Check every other CG or Navy ship in the fleet now and see if they have shielded cables in their secure comm systems. I guarantee you they do. We took shielded cables off these boats when we installed the non-shielded cables.)
- As the USCG now has a requirement to be able to communicate with DoD and several other agencies this puts all of those agencies at severe risk. Any foreign government monitoring these boats – from shore or from ”fishing boats” will be able to pick up all the communications from these boats. Since we have no shielded cables these boats will emanate like an antennae. The communications heard will be in the clear and easily understood. This means that those listening will pick up any and all communications DoD or any other organization has even if these ships are simply monitoring those circuits.
- The CG not only accepted this for the current boats but did so for the 41 boats we haven’t touched yet or procured cables for.

Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video surveillance system with two significant blind spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will cause significant security and safety problems.

- LM and ICGS received requirements to install 2 mast mounted movable cameras. (an implementation used for quite some time in the USCG)
- Originally ICGS was supposed to procure the cameras and install them and LM was to provide the video and control circuitry – as well as the shore connection box
- The cameras purpose was to permit remote monitoring of the boat when in a USCG port. No watch standers would be required
- Arguments ensued between us and ICGS on who would buy the cameras.
- I requested that LM to take over this effort to stay on schedule
- A decision was made to install 4 fixed cameras on the pilot house. While I like this idea, as one could not ‘sneak’ around a moving camera, I knew that management was assuming each camera had a 90 deg field of view. I asked Ships Integration to utilize the camera specs and ships design to plot the views. They came back and said that the cameras did not afford a 90deg field of view and as such there would be blind spots. These blinds spots were are 11 and 2 o’clock – directly over the pilot house/bridge windows. The blind spots were over 10ft wide on

the deck and hundreds of yards wide to the horizon. I told management we needed to install 1 more camera and shift the existing forward camera over to cover the blind spots. Management said the “Design of Record” was 4 cameras. (No cameras had been purchased or installed yet)

- Management responded by telling me there was no 360 deg requirement. My response was that it was common sense and that the USCG currently had ships with 2 masts mounted moving cameras that supplied 360 deg of view.
- Management stuck to their position. But did permit me to talk to the USCG tech rep.
- The CG Tech Rep – feeling the same schedule pressure – relented and said the blind spots would be acceptable because the pilot house/bridge windows could be locked. I told him someone could plant a charge on the boat undetected – for which he had no answer- or get in to the pilot house by breaking a window. The rep said we would detect the broken glass on the floor and perform an inspection.
- Again keep in mind that one more camera would have solved this – at an expense of under \$1000. (If you asked for a video surveillance system for your house – would you want a blind spot over your front door?)
- Some time after this the CG security inspector inspected the boat. His report stated the boat didn’t have the standard 2 camera mast solution but that he had 4 fixed cameras and it looked like the boat had 360 deg views. (This established that 360 deg view was a requirement)
- After reading this report I informed management that the 360 deg requirement was indeed valid and that we had an obligation to tell that inspector we had 2 blind spots
- Management said it was not our fault the inspector missed the blind spots or that they wrote and conducted a faulty test
- This situation puts the crew of that boat in harms way. Especially if they decide to stick with their original plan of not having a watch stander on board (Ethics told me they might decide to add a watch stander due to this problem. Why would LM permit the USCG to lessen the original requirement? Again – they have 360 deg solutions on other boats. We are severely degrading existing capability)
- 2.5 years later. The CG has accepted the design. All 49 boats will have the blind spots. Even the 41 boats we haven’t touched yet or procured equipment for.

FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue

- Forward looking Infrared – used for foul weather navigation
- We installed a cable that is not meant for outdoor use.
- The direction from senior leadership was that this was the “Design of Record”
- I asked that we swap it out for one meant to survive the elements.
- Management refused to swap out the cable and said we would replace it when it fails.
- This cable is going to fail when the crew needs it most
- All 49 boats are planned to use this cable.

Summary of Issues

Individually each of these problems can, and I believe will, cause serious safety and security problems for the USCG (given that 49 or more of these boats will have one or more of these issues the odds are pretty good there will be a catastrophic failure). Each of these issues could have been solved before the first boat was completed. I do not believe this is what Lockheed Martin is or should be about. It is easy to say we observe the highest ethical standards – but apparently not as easy to do so. It is not a matter if these things happen but when. (The worse part is that we have the talent in the company to do this right and most of the solutions are COTS and not that difficult to engineer.) Ethics’ response that the USCG has accepted each one

of these problems is a very weak argument and a cop out in my opinion. I believe the lower level officers of the CG accepted this because we put them in a position of being late or being over budget if they did not do so and thereby put them in a difficult position with their seniors. The USCG and by proxy the public has secured our services to supply a product that ensures the mission of the USCG is paramount. Our actions have put that mission at risk.

How we got here

- LM decided to leverage our Aegis reputation to win this effort. Therefore a decision was made not to have other orgs, who had C4ISR backgrounds, bid this job as prime. While I understand leveraging LM's well deserved Aegis reputation I think this decision laid the groundwork for the problems I described. I believe management thought that as this effort was far easier to engineer than Aegis – we made the mistake of thinking it was so easy we didn't need subject matter experts. As such none of our PM or Senior Technical Leadership team had C4ISR experience (nor did most of our IPT engineering leadership)
- Very early on the team realized they had schedule and budget issues.
- The 123 effort was the first. The design review was held on schedule – but prematurely. Most of the requirements had never been flowed to the design team by Systems of Systems.
- In spite of this the design was completed and equipment purchased. All of the problems described above (as well as several others, with lesser severity, I did not brief you about) were now set in to motion.
- I was brought on board just before install. As I have a C4ISR background and some success at resurrecting red efforts I was made the lead SE for the 123 effort.
- The management team refused to fix the issues described above to stay on schedule, ensure costs would not rise and to make sure Northrop didn't have anything to use against us (this was stated several times by senior management)
- As such everything snowballed. Leadership on the project had no intention of fixing these problems because announcing they existed would demonstrate their questionable competence and the fact that they were ethically challenged. Now they would not only have to explain that they missed some “easy” design decisions but that were late and putting the customer at risk.
- After several years and investigations I am now writing you. I believe we are where we are because management is supposed to be able to trust those below them. You trust your ethics officer to do the right thing and she trusts those below her – and so on. The Deepwater leadership made some very bad decisions. There were pressures put on those people to make schedule. They did not have the background to do the job and had no interests in anyone finding that out. When mistakes were made at the lower levels their management supported them. Then upper management supported them – and so on. Where does that leave us now? Given the severity of the issues and the embarrassment that would ensue due to our incompetence anyone who stepped forward now believes they would be doing so risking their careers and their senior's careers. (I know several members of leadership on that team who have admitted to me we have done the wrong thing). I am fully aware that on the face my accusations – given the opposition and the absurdity of some of the claims – seem preposterous. What are the odds that one guy is right and everyone else is wrong? As I stated before playing the odds in this case is a very big mistake. (Again – these designs are now planned to be used on all 49 of the 123's. Additionally I believe some of them are being used on other vessels as well. This would mean the majority of the new CG fleet will have severe mission capability degradation)
- Lastly – at no point in this process has anyone demonstrated that my position on the original requirements or my suggested solutions is not technically accurate or is not the best option for the customer or Lockheed Martin. Each and every solution I recommend is in keeping with the

original requirements and/or DoD norms. The pushback has centered on the schedule, costs or what the customer would or could accept.

- Case in point
- Let me give you one more example of the teams questionable technical competence, desperation and ethical fortitude
- Issue – VHF radios for the SRP (Zodiac boats)
- The 123 had a requirement to lengthen from the previous 110' to accommodate a Zodiac boat. These are pontoon type diving boats, with no overhead protection, meant to be used by boarding crews and for rescues
- They had the same Sea State 5 and temperature requirements as the 123. (Given your background I am sure you realize these boats go out in very tough conditions and get soaked)
- Our “Design of Record” was to use a Ross VHF radio for their primary communications. Their reason – the CG liked the radio on the 270' boats. Keep in mind that is inside that boat – on the bridge – and not exposed to the elements.
- When I came on board an engineer told me the radio could not be used out of doors. I verified this with the vendor – who told me the radio could not be used outside at all
- When challenged on this management responded by stipulating it was the “Design of Record”.
- I pushed on this issue for 6 months. I went through every level of my chain – multiple times – no one would help me (Even though most of my leadership said I was doing the right thing)
- The very week I was scheduled to talk to the MS VP the USCG asked us to test the radios in bad weather. We shorted 4 radios out in front of the customer.
- After that test the decision was made to scrap the radio and use the one that originally came with the Zodiac. This means we had convinced the CG to remove a radio that was meant for foul weather and for them to purchase a new one (In fairness the Ross radio did have one feature the CG wanted. However it was not more important than survivability)
- If it had not been raining that management team would have delivered that boat with the Ross radio. That radio would have failed the first time the CG was using it in the rain or in heavy sea states (sea spray). This could have put the CG and public at risk.
- This episode is a clear example of what the Deepwater management team was all about. They didn't care about the safety or security of the crew; they put their own self interests above that of the CG and general public.

Recommendations

I hope, after reading this, you are asking yourself if it's possible I am correct and if so I hope you then ask yourself - what the hell are we doing?

I am asking you to play against the odds and look in to everything I have stated here. I am asking you to assign someone with an actual C4ISR background to look in to these issues. The question here is not whether we are contractually or legally covered – it is whether or not we are doing the right thing. In the court of public opinion or if reviewed by experts in the industry or under the scrutiny of a federal investigation would it be viewed that we met our moral, ethical and professional obligations? I believe the right course of action here is to work with the USCG fix the current vessels and ensure that the designs for the future vessels are sound. As the CG will be using these vessels for decades performing thousands of missions I believe we have no other choice. Additionally we need to look at each and every position on these teams and see if we have the right individuals in the leadership and technical positions. The Deepwater leadership team took advantage of the system and manipulated the entire program and these investigations

in an effort to cover up their mistakes and shortcomings. They went so far as to convince the customer that these compromises were in no way harmful to their mission – unfortunately the customer went along with this scenario.

I realize these are severe charges and I should and expect to be held accountable for all of them. I believe your ethics team, your engineer, the MS2 ethics director (whose finding after 5 months of investigation was that none of my charges had merit) and the leadership of MS2 all tried very hard and found ways to defend the decisions of those made below them. Everyone was playing the odds and relying on those below them to be competent and ethically sound. This is the essence of how this snowball was created. I am asking you to stop its journey before it becomes an avalanche.

Michael De Kort
ISC2 Software Engineering Manager

Letter from Scott MacKay LM corporate council – 3/1/2006

Retyped and only partial quote

“ . . . I have concluded that; (1) the corporation has thoroughly and exhaustively investigated your allegations; (2) I concur with the conclusions reached by prior investigations that your allegations were unsubstantiated; and (3) the corporation considered the matter closed except to the extent it is asked to respond to the Coast guard or other government agencies regarding those allegations...”

Letter to Board of Directors – 4/4/2006

Included material given to Robert Stevens earlier – will not include again here

Michael DeKort
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Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee
Lockheed Martin Corporation
6801 Rockledge Drive, MP 200-10
Bethesda, MD 20817

To whom it may concern,

I am writing you looking for your assistance in clearing up several critical safety and security issues on the MS2 Deepwater Program. Enclosed is text from one of the emails I have written to Mr. Stevens on the topic. All of the details are enclosed in that email. I should tell you upfront that Lockheed's position to date has been that all of my allegations and assertions are baseless. However, the Inspector General for the Department of Homeland Security is looking in to the matter, at my request, and has recently informed me that they believe, after questioning the Coast Guard and inspecting one of the boats, that all of my allegations and assertions are accurate. In addition to this I have been contacted by the officers who are now in charge of the Deepwater Surface Assets division and they have informed me that they are cooperating fully with the IG, that several of my allegations have merit and that they are very concerned. I am telling you this to avoid your dismissal of my allegations out of hand. As such I ask, for the good of the company, the stockholders and the customer, that you look in to the matter independently and work with the USCG and DHS IG to discover the facts and get Lockheed Martin back on the right track before the IG takes the case to the US senate, as their process dictates, hearings begin and this issue becomes public knowledge.

The text below is from an email I sent to Robert Stevens. This is the same text I sent to the DHS IG, the GAO, the Commandant of the USCG, the Commanding Officer of the 8 boats in question and the congressmen and senators responsible for the relevant appropriations committees. Both the IG and GAO have contacted me and are investigating the issue. If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact me.

Response from Board of Directors – 6/26/2006
Scanned – portion retyped here

Dear Mr. DeKort

This responds to your undated letter to the Nominating and Corporate Governance Committee of the Lockheed Martin Corporation Board of Directors, which was received by the Corporate Secretary's office on April 21, 2006.

The Board considers the issues addressed in your letter and determined that the Corporation's responses to those issues, beginning in October 2004 and continuing to the present, were appropriate and no further action is warranted. Each of the issues has been disclosed to the Coast guard and the resolution of each issue was coordinated with and was or is being resolved to the satisfaction of the Coast Guard customer.

Sincerely,

James B. Comey

Response to DHS IG 123 C4ISR Report

My response to the IG findings - notes

Overall

- The IG agreed with all of my points technically and contractually on two of them
- In the past LM and the CG have said that my issues “had no merit”, “were baseless” and that the CG had closed all the matters contractually.
- The report states that LM self-certified a known faulty C4ISR system - one that would cause safety and security issues which would put the CG and nation at risk
- The report states that the CG was unaware of some issues and their ramifications as late as 2006. This is incorrect. LM and the CG were notified about every one of these issues by me in 2003. They were notified through official briefings and the shared ICGS problem reporting system.
- I was told by LM before being removed from the program and the Matagorda was accepted that all of my issues would be clearly identified on the acceptance documents – the DD-250s. Given the outcome of the report it appears they did not do so.
- I contend that the ICGS parties conspired to not only deliver all 49 123s and all 91 SRPs in this condition but were, or are, headed down the path of making the same systems match on all of the other sea going assets like the NSC and FRC (dictated contractually by the Systems of Systems approach). I believe they did this knowingly and willfully.
- To this day – as the report states – none of the issues had been fixed on any of the 123s. While the parties concerned may say this is due to the hull cracks and the ships being taken out of service – they did not know this until after the first two (or more) boats were delivered. (The IG supports this by stating that the parties had no knowledge at the time I raised these issues and they were delivering them on their first couple boats that the hulls would crack and all 8 123s would go to Key West)

Specific report points

Low Smoke

- I submitted the issue to the IG but didn't push it in the video etc because I thought it was going to be waived. Apparently the IG doesn't think it should be- which I agree with.
- The IG agrees with my allegations regarding this issue and believes the waiver should not be approved. There are 80 some of these incorrect cables on the 123s. They are a safety problem.

Ext Equipment

- The IG says that 30 items on each 123 and 12 on each SRP do not meet requirements
- The report states that the requirements for the boats to survive and operate in extreme weather are "not really beneficial". I believe this statement demonstrates their incompetence and willingness to put the CG in harms way in order to further their corporate goals. They made this statement because the first 8 123s went to the Keys where the weather is not as extreme as other places. The IG debunks this by saying the boats were not originally destined for the Keys until hull problems popped up – which was after the first few boats were delivered.

- When I brought this issue up in LM by telling them the first system we looked at, the FLIR, did not meet requirements LM directed me and my IPTs to stop looking in to whether or not the equipment met specs. It was not until over a year later – during the third internal ethics investigation looking in to the matter that LM started looking in to it. (There were three ethics investigations because I kept pushing up the chain after each lower level investigation said none of my issue had merit. I stopped at three because the corporate VP of ethics ran that investigation. Upon receiving the same answer after that investigation I went to the CEO and Board of Directors. Neither of which was satisfactory either) I believe this led to the notification to the CG that a problem may exist (but wasn't important or contractually stipulated according to them) in 2006.
- At the time of the second ethics investigation the LM engineer and council assigned told me in writing that the problem was not severe because the boats were in the Keys. Again – All of the 123s and most of the boats sent to the Keys were not meant to go there. My comment to them at the time was that I never said the boats wouldn't survive in "bath water" and that there suggestion that because of this there was no problem demonstrated their incompetence.
- The report says that the CG did not know about the problem until July 05. This is incorrect. I told them in the winter of 03. Proof - I have an official problem report logged in a system they used as well as LM.
- The IG states that LM incorrectly stated that the entire set of requirements did not exist when they self-certified. LM also states that certifying was a waste of money and time.
- The report says that had the CG read the LM self-certification documents the fact that there were issues would not have escaped their attention. Again- the CG was informed in late 03 and I can prove it

TEMPEST

- The report states that while the cables I suggested are the best option the contractor is not bound to use them and that the cables they did use passed the Instrumented Testing even though the Visual Tests showed they were wrong
- I have been told that the Instrumented Tests mentioned may have been falsified or never completed
- I have been told by several TEMPEST experts that there is no precedence for this type of cable being used in a TEMPEST environment nor for it to pass the tests
- Compare the cables to what is used in DoD and State Department systems of the same type. I worked in both organizations and know that in the same systems they use the braided shielded cable (or other measure to accommodate other cable types).
- I was told by the IG this summer that the CG refused to honor the IGs request to rerun the tests with them as witnesses
- I was told that LM used the correct cable on the 270' boats effort. I was told we did not use the right cables on the 123s because they were not bid.
- Over 100 of the wrong cables were used on the 123s
- The requirements specifically call out TEMPEST requirements from 1972. There have been dozens of updates since. Why use such an old version?
- I notified LM about this problem months before the first boat delivered. They were clearly informed of the risks as well.
- The WPB-123 OAA Final Report from the Navy COMOPTEVFOR Test Group Sept 29 2004 clearly shows the TEMPEST tests had not passed as of Sept 04 – months after the first 2 boats delivered. Months after LM told me they Instrumented Test had passed (in spite of failing the Visual Test). I believe this clearly demonstrates my allegations were correct. (A Latter addendum showed they passed – based on what?)

- If the TEMPEST environment is not correct these ships will broadcast classified information – which is clearly understandable without crypto equipment – for thousands of miles over HF radio circuits, around the globe on satellite and through the entire internet due to SIPRNET. Every government org who uses these systems – DoD, NSA, CIA, State, FBI, DEA, DHS etc will have their communications compromised. (This will happen because of bleed over between cables. Something the shielding prevents.)
- The Matagorda had shielded cables on the boats before the upgrade began for some of the secure circuits. We put those systems back on the boat with the non-shielded cable. This means we knowingly degraded those existing systems

Cameras.

- The IG agreed there is less than 360 coverage but say 360 degree coverage isn't mandated. They say that 360 deg isn't in the contract nor is the number of cameras. This is factually incorrect. NGs contract calls out 2 cameras that were to mast mounted, remotely controllable and pan-tilt and zoom. Maybe the OIG missed it thinking it was a LM requirement since LM provided the cameras? The CG told me it was written that way to duplicate the exact system already in use on other boats. Those boats had 360 deg coverage with that implementation and Lockheed knew that
- From an LM contract letter to ICGS Paragraph 3.3.7.1 of the 123 Surface Asset Performance Specifications contains a requirement for the cutter to receive, distribute and display video and that the video cameras shall be remotely viewable and controllable from multiple locations. The work share with respect to this requirement is as follows. Lockheed Martin must include within the C4ISR infrastructure the capability to receive, distribute and display video. The shipyard is required to provide the cameras.

During the proposal, Lockheed Martin understood that the shipyard planned to provide up to four (4) remotely controllable video cameras and included this capability in the proposal documentation. However, in meetings with Lockheed Martin personnel that occurred during the third and fourth quarter of 2003, the shipyard advised that it intended to provide two (2) fixed cameras. In an effort to meet its contractual scope, Lockheed Martin proceeded with a C4ISR infrastructure design that included the capability to accommodate four (4) remotely controllable cameras. At the 123 WPB CDR in December 2003, Lockheed Martin was directed by the USCG to change the design to accommodate two (2) fixed cameras

- The OIG says that it is disturbing that LM would knowingly install a system with blind spots and that the CG would accept it. They mention being concerned about other assets/boats in this area. It also says that the CG should change the contract for future boats. The comments in my doc I sent to you still apply here.
- I have a PowerPoint slide that shows that LM thought that the less than 360 deg implementation was a problem and reported it as such. If there was no requirement why report to the CG there was a problem?
- The security inspector for the CG inspected the system and said we had 360 deg coverage. I have that email. If 360 deg isn't a requirement why was he looking for it and reporting on it? (At that point LM directed me not to tell them he was wrong. After I pushed they allowed me to see the Tech Rep Joe Michel. He said that the blind spots were acceptable because we could lock the windows of the pilot house below the blind spots. He said if anyone gained access we would see broken glass. I challenged that by saying that someone could simply

attach a charge to the side and never go on the boat. He agreed and said LM would need a waiver. If 360 deg wasn't a requirement why would he ask for a waiver?)

- I have the official program trouble reports that were written to document the problems less than 360 deg would cover. If there was no requirement to have 360 deg why was I permitted to write a problem report on that?

- History – why did we go to 4 cameras? When we decided to help NG by buying the cameras we asked to have them install them on the mast. They refused (even though it was their requirement) and said that if we forced them to do so it would require a new center of gravity study for the mast and that would slip schedule and cost money - which Lockheed would be responsible for. After this LM decided to try to find another way instead of simply tell NG to satisfy their own requirement. Why did we do that? We actually neglected to design and install the equipment to control the cameras - we only installed the video circuits. They wanted to hide that fact. At this point LM management decided on installing 4 cameras. Why 4? Because they knew we had a 360 deg requirement and they assumed that 4 cameras – with a 90 deg field of view – would add to 360 deg. (Again – someone needs to ask them why they went with more than 2 and decided on 4). At that point I told them their assumption may not be correct because the field of view on each camera may not be 90 deg and given everything on the pilot house there may not be a place to install all 4 cameras without blockages. I asked them for a week to look in to it. At that point they decided to tell the CG 4 cameras would work. If a fifth camera were purchased and installed there would be no blind spots.

- As Deepwater is a System of Systems design (SoS) are we saying that every ship they build – every FRC, NSC etc – can delivered with a camera surveillance system that has blind spots over the most critical part of the boat – the bridge? Remember the 123 would set a precedent for design and implementation. Every asset is required to have implementations match unless there is an overriding reason not to. The 123s set the precedent for many systems. (I also believe they would repeat the same design/implementation to avoid getting caught. A change would mean violation to SoS which would require explanation and therefore discovery and validation of the problem).

Non-weather proof VHF radios for the SRPs. Not mentioned.

- We bought 9 radios for the first 9 boats and 5 of them after I told them they weren't waterproof and that doing so would put the SRP crews at risk. This issue more than any other demonstrates how far LM intended to go with covering up the issues and knowingly putting the crew at risk in doing so. (I am sure the reason the IG didn't mention this is because we actually didn't deliver the radios. This was due to a coincidental act of god just before the Matagorda delivered. It rained during testing and we shorted 4 of them out. At that point we had to change. Had it not rained I assure you we would have delivered and they would have failed during the first bad weather mission)

- Background

- When I came on board an engineer told me the radio could not be used out of doors. I verified this with the vendor – who told me the radio could not be used outside at all

- When challenged on this management responded by stipulating it was the “Design of Record”.

- I pushed on this issue for 6 months. I went through every level of my chain – multiple times – no one would help me (Even though most of my leadership said I was doing the right thing)

- The very week I was scheduled to talk to the MS VP the USCG asked us to test the radios in bad weather. We shorted 4 radios out in front of the customer.

- After that test the decision was made to scrap the radio and use the one that originally came with the Zodiac. This means we had convinced the CG to remove a radio that was meant

for foul weather and for them to purchase a new one (In fairness the Ross radio did have one feature the CG wanted. However it was not more important than survivability)

- If it had not been raining that management team would have delivered that boat with the Ross radio. That radio would have failed the first time the CG was using it in the rain or in heavy sea states (sea spray-waves). This could have put the CG and public at risk.

DD-250s

- These are critical documents that are supposed to show deficiencies in the product at delivery. LM told me every one of my issues would be documented in there. If they were that would demonstrate that LM knew I was correct about the requirements. One would not document deficiencies against non-binding requirements. On the other side if none of these issues showed up that would mean LM hid information.

ICGS cooperation

- While the report states that the parties cooperated fully I do not believe this occurred until after the press stories about my video were released or they are not being completely forthcoming here. The IG told me in June of 06 that the CG and LM were not cooperating, that they could not get the data asked for nor could they get access to the boats to rerun the Instrumented TEMPEST tests.

While I agree with some of the overall findings and the Low-Smoke and External Equipment Survivability issues I believe they are factually incorrect in some of their assessment of the TEMPEST and Video Surveillance issues. Additionally I believe they did not show – and should have – the level to which the contractor and the CG colluded to deliver systems with known safety and security issues and to cover that fact up. The C4ISR problems are examples of systemic problems on the program. The ICGS parties involved have demonstrated themselves to be incompetent and ethically, technically and professionally bankrupt. Also – the IG told me very clearly that the CG and LM were not cooperating with their investigation. They could not get data they asked for or run re-tests they asked for. I think they may have simply done the best with what they had. Additionally the IG did not investigate the systems on other assets such as the NSC. As this is a SoS design – all like systems need to be common. As such there are probably design flaws with the FRCs, OPCs and NSCs.

Project Notes

Running Notes

Technical issues summary – Deepwater 123 effort

- Exterior equipment survivability – There is a risk that the majority of the equipment will not survive the environmental temperature extremes. Several Nav, Sensor and Communications systems will fail. This will cause serious safety issues.
- TEMPEST – Shielded Cables – The proper cables were not installed in the secure communication circuits. This will cause serious security issues
 - SIPRNET
- Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video surveillance system with two significant blind spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will cause significant security and safety problems
- FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue
- Low Smoke cables – none were used. Safety risk. Poisoning of crew during fire
- PCA – 80% of cables mislabeled on ship 1. Will cause maintenance and repair problems. Could result in equipment failure.

Issues Detail

Exterior equipment survivability – The majority of the exterior mounted equipment will not survive the environmental temperature extremes

- Late in the project, months after the design was approved and equipment purchased, we received our environmental and TEMPEST requirements (this in itself is very troubling). One of the requirements was to ensure that all the equipment and cabling we installed on the exterior of the vessel could survive Sea State 5 and temperatures from -40 to +125 deg (f).
- Upon receiving these requirements I immediately asked my IPT Leads to double check all the equipment to see if we had any issues. They were directed to look at all Sensor, Nav and Comm equipment.
- The very first device we looked at – the FLIR – would not survive below -5 deg.(Later fixed?)
- Management was then informed about the situation senior management directed me and my people to stop looking in to whether or not the rest of the equipment would survive the elements. They also directed that the FLIR design would stand as is. As the “Design of Record”. This means we do not know if any of the other equipment have any environmental survivability issues (temp, humidity, shock/vibe etc)
- Third ethics investigation – VP of Ethics admitted there was a FLIR problem (even though final report said unsubstantiated). Agreed to fix it and look in to all other equipment. Agreed to provide me specifics on all equipment that failed. Later recanted that agreement. Due to this I did not trust that the FLIR or anything else would be fixed.
- I believe that we either lessened the requirements or gun decked the solution. This could mean that the Sensor, Nav and Communication systems are at risk.
- All of the systems the CG currently have on the 110s met these requirements. We will be severely degrading the performance of these vessels
- Engineer assigned by ethics office, along with the legal department, sent me a letter stating there are no long term issues because several of the boats have been doing fine during their sea trials. Sea trials conducted in the Gulf of Mexico. The Gulf of Mexico is about 80 deg all year around. It never sees any of the extremes called out by the specs. This is exactly the

kind of reckless engineering the Deepwater team utilized to get us in the predicament we are in now. The first time these boats get to cold waters and there is significant sea spray – the majority of the systems will fail.

- This situation exists not only for several boats that are modified but for the 41 or so that we haven't even started on yet.
- Reqs specifically call out Sea States, shock/vibe standards, humidity and temp range.
- I was informed by NG and the IG in 2006 that the FLIR was fixed and that a “top side study” was being on the rest of the externally mounted equipment.
- What did the NSC do? What is the FRCs design?
- IG report backed up my technical and contractual allegations
- Fraud ?
- LM knew before Matagorda delivered
- LM said it would be in DD-250
- Not in DD-250
- IG said CG didn't know until 7/2005 – 1.5 years after Matagorda delivery
- 3rd ethics investigation said-verbal- that there was an issue and a topside study would be done. NG told me confidentially the study was done
- FLIR fixed?
- Comments LM made about cert not needed – requirement exaggerated

TEMPEST – SIPRNET - Shielded Cables – The proper cables were not installed in the secure communication circuits. This will cause serious security issues for all government organization who use them

- Again – well after the design review and the equipment was purchased – we received our TEMPEST requirements. Those requirements called for the standard set of military sea going requirements – shielding, grounding, bonding, separation of equipment etc.
- The Chief Engineer on the effort had directed months before that we not buy shielded cables because they were too expensive (not bid). The requirements were never changed.
- Until this point we had not involved anyone who had a TEMPEST background on the project even though they worked in the organization.
- Note – Ship's Integration had prepared a report on what our TEMPEST solutions should be. They did an excellent job given the engineer had never worked TEMPEST before (The TEMPEST engineer they had on staff was not asked to participate). The report stated shielded cables must be used.
- I have a TEMPEST background – in the Navy and Department of State – as well as 4 crypto designations. The report made sense to me. Standard ops.
- Management was informed that we needed to buy shielded cables or change requirements (something that I have never seen or heard of being done) they informed me that the design of record would stand.
- Sometime later we brought on the TEMPEST engineer from Ships Integration to perform a site inspection. He failed us in several areas including shielded cables.
- At first management agreed to fix the visual failures. He asked us to do an impact and resolution document. The result was that most of the fixes would add significant cost and schedule. Upon hearing this management decided to wait until the instrumented test to see if we could pass. No effort was made to buy or install shielded cables based on the visual test failure.
- 2.5 years later. Again I have been given none of the technical details I was promised. However I was able to independently ascertain that shielded cables have not been installed.

- I have contacted several TEMPEST inspectors around the country. All of them told me the chances of passing a test were extremely unlikely without these cables.
- I believe LM and the USCG have either gun decked the tests or lowered the requirements.
- We took shielded cables off these boats when we installed the non-shielded cables.
- As the USCG now has a requirement to be able to communicate with DoD and several other agencies this puts all of those agencies at severe risk. Any foreign government monitoring these boats – from shore or from "fishing boats" will be able to pick up all the communications from these boats. Since we have no shielded cables these boats will emanate like an antennae. Additionally – we could retransmit clear bleed over information from other circuits. The communications heard will be in the clear and easily understood. The CG not only accepted this for the current boats but did so for the 41 boats we haven't touched yet or procured cables for.
- I have learned recently that the test results may have been falsified by the test branch of the USCG. They walked away from the cabling until the required reading was obtained. Instead of taking the readings near the cables – they were taken from the pier.
- SIPRNET – DHS IG report states the contractor admitted there were issues but that they could not be fixed without rendering the system inoperable. LM said the system could function or be secure – but not both
- The SIPRNET certification organization, in April 2006 – well after the boats became operational – gave ICGS 45 days to correct the problems or the accreditation would be pulled. I do not believe all the problems have been fixed yet.
- IG told me they asked for an independent test 6/06. CG refused. Did not know at the time the boats were unusable due to cracks. Why not let IG run test?
- Aluminum/Mylar? No precedence for use in TEMPEST
- What did the NSC/FRC do?
- IG said shielded would have been better. No req for shielded? What about all cables failing visual? Instrumented test rigged?

Surveillance Cameras – We installed a video surveillance system with two significant blind spots over the pilot house/bridge. This will cause significant security and safety problems.

- LM and ICGS received requirements to install 2 mast mounted movable cameras. (an implementation used for quite some time in the USCG)
- Originally ICGS was supposed to procure the cameras and install them and LM was to provide the video and control circuitry – as well as the shore connection box
- The cameras purpose was to permit remote monitoring of the boat when in a USCG port. No watch standers would be required
- Arguments ensued between us and ICGS on who would buy the cameras.
- I requested that LM to take over this effort to stay on schedule
- A decision was made to install 4 fixed cameras on the pilot house. While I like the idea of fixed cameras, as one could not 'sneak' around a moving camera, I knew that management was assuming each camera had a 90 deg field of view. (I later learned we went for fixed cameras because LM did not include the control circuitry). I asked Ships Integration to utilize the camera specs and ships design to plot the views. They came back and said that the cameras did not afford a 90deg field of view and mounting in favorable locations would be an issue due other items installed on the pilot house. I was told there would be blind spots. These blind spots were are 10 and 2 o'clock – directly over the pilot house/bridge windows. The blind spots were over 10ft wide on the deck and hundreds of yards wide to the horizon. I told management we needed to install 1 more camera and shift the existing forward camera over to cover the blind spots.

Management said the “Design of Record” was 4 cameras. (No cameras had been purchased or installed yet)

- Management responded by telling me there was no 360 deg requirement. My response was that it was common sense and that the USCG currently had ships with 2 masts mounted moving cameras that supplied 360 deg of view.
- Management stuck to their position. But did permit me to talk to the USCG tech rep.
- The CG Tech Rep – feeling the same schedule pressure – relented and said the blind spots would be acceptable because the pilot house/bridge windows could be locked. I told him someone could plant a charge on the boat undetected – for which he had no answer- or get in to the pilot house by breaking a window. The rep said we would detect the broken glass on the floor and know someone got on. I then suggested one could attach a charge to the side and not have to be on the boat. He said that was a good point and said we would need a waiver.
- One more camera would have solved this – at an expense of under \$1000. (If you asked for a video surveillance system for your house – would you want a blind spot over your front door?)
- Told other boats had 360 with implementation mentioned in spec
- Some time after this the CG security inspector inspected the boat. His report stated the boat didn’t have the standard 2 camera mast solution but that he had 4 fixed cameras and the boat had 360 deg views. (This established that 360 deg view was a requirement)
- After reading this report I informed management that the 360 deg requirement was indeed valid and that we had an obligation to tell that inspector we had 2 blind spots
- Management said it was not our fault the inspector missed the blind spots or that they wrote and conducted a faulty test
- Have copy of LM contract letter that quotes the NG requirement for 2 cameras
- This situation puts the crew of that boat in harms way. Especially if they decide to stick with their original plan of not having a watch stander on board (Ethics told me they might decide to add a watch stander due to this problem. Why would LM permit the USCG to lessen the original requirement? Again – they have 360 deg solutions on other boats. We are severely degrading existing capability)
- 2.5 years later. The CG has accepted the design. All 49 boats will have the blind spots. Even the 41 boats we haven’t touched yet or procured equipment for.
- What did the NSC do? Plan for FRC?
- IG admonished CG/LM for knowingly installing blind spots. Found no requirement for 2 cameras or 360. IG incorrect see above.

FLIR Cable – We installed the wrong cable type in the FLIR system. The cable was not designed to survive environmental extremes. This is a serious safety issue

- Forward looking Infrared – used for nighttime and foul weather navigation
- We installed a cable that is not meant for outdoor use.
- The direction from senior leadership was that this was the “Design of Record”
- I asked that we swap it out for one meant to survive the elements.
- Management refused to swap out the cable and said we would replace it when it fails.
- This cable is going to fail when the crew needs it most
- All 49 boats are planned to use this cable.

VHF radios for the SRP (Zodiac boats)

- The 123 had a requirement to lengthen from the previous 110' to accommodate a Zodiac boat. These are pontoon type diving boats, with no overhead protection, meant to be used by boarding crews and for rescues
- They had the same Sea State 5 and temperature requirements as the 123. (Given your background I am sure you realize these boats go out in very tough conditions and get soaked)
- Our "Design of Record" was to use a Ross VHF radio for their primary communications. Their reason – the CG liked the radio on the 270' boats. That is inside that boat – on the bridge – and not exposed to the elements.
- When I came on board an engineer told me the radio could not be used out of doors. I verified this with the vendor – who told me the radio could not be used outside at all
- When challenged on this management responded by stipulating it was the "Design of Record".
- I pushed on this issue for 6 months. I went through every level of my chain – multiple times – no one would help me (Even though most of my leadership said I was doing the right thing)
- The very week I was scheduled to talk to the MS VP the USCG asked us to test the radios in bad weather. We shorted 4 radios out in front of the customer.
- After that test the decision was made to scrap the radio and use the one that originally came with the Zodiac. This means we had convinced the CG to remove a radio that was meant for foul weather and for them to purchase a new one (In fairness the Ross radio did have one feature the CG wanted. However it was not more important than survivability)
- If it had not been raining that management team would have delivered that boat with the Ross radio. That radio would have failed the first time the CG was using it in the rain or in heavy sea states (sea spray). This could have put the CG and public at risk.
- This episode is a clear example of what the Deepwater management team was all about. They didn't care about the safety or security of the crew; they put their own self interests above that of the CG and general public.
- IG report did not mention this because it was resolved by going back to the original radio before delivery

PCA

QA sampling demonstrated that 80% of the almost 500 cables were incorrectly labeled. This would cause maintenance and repair problems.

- When notified about this management refused to make corrections. Said it was the shipyards issue even though we gave them the incorrect labels. Management also stated that the problem would only affect LM personnel since we were responsible for depot maintenance and repair.

How we got here

- LM decided to leverage our Aegis reputation to win this effort. Therefore a decision was made not to have other orgs, who had C4ISR backgrounds, bid this job as prime. While I understand leveraging LM's well deserved Aegis reputation I think this decision laid the groundwork for the problems I described. I believe management thought that as this effort was far easier to engineer than Aegis – we made the mistake of thinking it was so easy we didn't need subject matter experts. As such none of our PM or Senior Technical Leadership team had C4ISR experience (nor did most of our IPT engineering leadership)
- Some lower level engineers has experience. Too few – too late. Others worked very hard but deck was stacked against them

- Very early on the team realized they had schedule and budget issues. We under bid drastically
- The 123 effort was the first major effort. The design review was held on schedule – but prematurely. Most of the requirements had never been flowed to the design team by Systems of Systems.
- In spite of this the design was completed and equipment purchased. All of the problems described above (as well as several others, with lesser severity, I did not brief you about) were now set in to motion.
- I was brought on board just before install. As I have a C4 background and some success at resurrecting red efforts I was made the lead SE for the 123 effort.
- The management team refused to fix the issues described above to stay on schedule, ensure costs would not rise and to make sure Northrop didn't have anything to use against us (this was stated several times by senior management)
- As such everything snowballed. Leadership on the project had no intention of fixing these problems because announcing they existed would demonstrate their questionable competence and the fact that they were ethically challenged. Now they would not only have to explain that they missed some “easy” design decisions but that were late and putting the customer at risk.
- I believe we are where we are because management is supposed to be able to trust those below them. You trust your ethics officer to do the right thing and she trusts those below her – and so on. The Deepwater leadership made some very bad decisions. There were pressures put on those people to make schedule. They did not have the background to do the job and had no interests in anyone finding that out. When mistakes were made at the lower levels their management supported them. Then upper management supported them – and so on. Where does that leave us now? Given the severity of the issues and the embarrassment that would ensue due to our incompetence anyone who stepped forward now believes they would be doing so risking their careers and their senior's careers. (I know several members of leadership on that team who have admitted to me we have done the wrong thing).

Overall Timeline

Date	System	Doc Title	Author/Org	Data
12/1/2002	Tempest			Second meeting with government on Tempest- see Sheridan item below 12/9/2003
1/1/2003	Overall			Design review complete - estimated date
1/20/2003	Tempest	Quick Look	Jo Agag	Early assessment on major areas of concern. Calls out shielding as necessary
3/15/2003	Tempest		Stan Ralph	Directed team to move on without shielded cables (from email 1/28/04 from Rabinowitz
3/20/2003	Tempest	Eval Tempest Req	Jo Agag	Report delineates her assessment of Tempest requirements and design suggestions - She had no Tempest background - Persons with Tempest background were not asked to be part of the effort
6/18/2003			DeKort	Joined team - as scheduler - estimated date
7/16/2003	Overall		Ponticello	First day as Lead SE
7/23/2003	Overall	123 Req Matrix	DeKort	Started working INC 1 subset INC 0 requirements set
7/23/2003	Overall	MLOI	DeKort-McLavery	Started sending MLOI out
8/11/2003	Camera Tempest	IDS 123 Status	DeKort-McLavery	First status (that I have) that we briefed to LM/ICGS/CG - Cameras- shows we would delete the cameras/ Tempest- develop cert plan/ PCA Open Issues risk-
8/25/2003	Cameras		DeKort	Started questioning use of only 4 cameras-
8/28/2003	Cameras	IDS 123 Status	DeKort-McLavery	Slides say we were going to provide 360 deg coverage with 4 cameras. Found out that 4 cameras had blind spots. Management then backed off 360deg req- stopped mentioning 360deg and camera issue in next 2 reports
9/8/2003	Cameras	IDS 123 Status	DeKort-McLavery	Matagorda Delivery Date Moved to 15 Dec
9/15/2003	Cameras	IDS 123 Status	DeKort-McLavery	Status mentions Joe Michel sent CG view pictures to get approval for blind spots. CG said it was OK but as of 2/05 they had not signed off
10/24/2003	Radio		DeKort	Notified manager - Larry Finnegan - that there were problems-slipping and radio
12/4/2003	Overall		Haimowitz	LM org change
12/8/2003	Radio Camera		DeKort	Started notifying my matrix chain of command about issues - asking for help- Cameras, Radios
12/9/2003	Tempest		Sheridan	Sheridan's email states- originally only 1 Secret circuit NETVIS then added SIPRNET and COMDEC. Customer told LM not to worry about Tempest (November) - then in December LM told to do Tempest
12/11/2003	Tempest	Tempest Investigation 2	DeKort	My assessment of the situation. Sent out in emails
12/30/2003	Overall- all issues	Risk email	DeKort	Started entering Risks in database for all issues.
1/7/2004	Overall		DeKort	Had notified entire chain of issues several times - went to Tech Ops director (acting) Jay Hansen several times with no success. Now asked org for reassignment
1/12/2004	Radios		DeKort	Notified management that I had informed CG about issue - after they asked me if there were more risks. PMO now allowed me to get raincoat/mic - not new radios
1/15/2004	Tempest	123 Tempest Report	DeKort-Jones	Our response to the CG findings FAILED Visual Test - management decided to wait to see if we pass Instrumented test
1/16/2004	Tempest	Response to Ron Porter	DeKort-Jones	Our response to Ron porter's assessment - he was ICGS
1/20/2004	Tempest	Response to Ron Porter- PM chop	DeKort-Jones	

1/21/2004	FLIR	DeKort	Started email trail on trying to replace cable after PMO said we would replace it when it broke
1/22/2004	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	Tech Ops Director- Jay Hansen- tells Jay Haimowitz to have me enter issues in risk database- informed Jay I had
1/29/2004	Cameras	DeKort	CG inspector declares that he tested the system and has 360deg coverage. Asked management to inform him we do not and that we need to inform him. Management tells me it's their fault they missed it and wrote a bad test
1/30/2004	Cameras	Iaccio	LM test lead tells me there are blind spots and that CG inspector never looked for them
2/5/2004	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	Sent my manager-Larry Finnegan- email stating I think we are going to get DD-250 signed without resolving issues or declaring them as open items
2/5/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke		Finnegan raises issue to my Director (SW) Jack Ryan who then talked to PMO Tom Rogers
2/9/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	Cappello	Confirmed meeting with QA to discuss issues
2/11/2003	Radios	DeKort	Told 123 PM-McLavery that I am not comfortable with raincoat/mic option- explained I settled for compromise instead of getting new radios (Losing battle)
2/11/2003			Boat 2 half way complete with same issues from boat 1
2/11/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	Asked Manager-Finnegan- for help again
2/11/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	PMO Rogers directs PJ Messer, Doug Wilhelm and McLavery to talk to me about finding way to resolve issues before I go to MS2 VP Carl Bannar
2/12/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	Met with QA who called QA VP Yvonne Hodge - who called MS2 VP Carl Bannar and told him we had serious issues. Agreed with me on all issues
2/12/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	Bannar	Carl Bannar called me after Hodge called him. I told him I wanted to give Hansen and 123 leadership until Monday - one more shot
2/13/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	Reported to Finnegan that the 123 leadership group had agreed to my requests - prefer fixing issues but wanted all to be open DD-250 items at very least- agreed to close by 2/16
2/13/2004	Radios		Radios - found out we shorted 4 in the rain while testing with the CG
2/18/2003	Cameras Tempest Radio Low Smoke	DeKort	Requested meeting with Carl Bannar MS2 VP
2/23/2003	Temperature	DeKort	Temp issue for first time - Environmental reqs flowed down - very late - started to question if we met req -40 to + 125 (except radar which had a waiver request-do not know if it was ever accepted)

2/24/2004	Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature	Villani	Joe Villani - DW Chief Engineer sets up appt with me to work issues after Bannar directs him to. In previous 4 months Villani ignored all my emails and phone calls requesting help. Joe agreed to all requests before sell-off DD-250 and agreed to show me closure before sell off. I was removed from the project before sell off and never shown the data
2/24/2004	Risk	DeKort	Found out my critical Risks were deleted from the Risk database
2/14/2004	Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature	DeKort	Added Temp to issues
2/28/2004			Removed from project
3/1/2004			Delivery of the Matagorda - 7 months late
4/1/2004	Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature		Estimated date- was removed from effort and given a lower appraisal than standard and told I would not be given the same types of work I had received before
4/1/2004			Put back on other efforts for a year
5/1/2004	Cameras Tempest Radio Temperature	One year gap	Estimated date - went to new Tech Ops director Robert Sledgemilch about issues and retribution. He filed report with HR/Ethics (based on retribution not the issues)
5/23/2004			Started working in new org - IS&S Colorado Springs
9/13/2004	Ethics	DeKort	Sent Sledge an email asking when HR/Ethics would be getting to me
9/15/2004	Ethics	DeKort	Started sending data to MS2 HR/Ethics - McIntyre HR
9/17/2004	Ethics	DeKort	Began conversations with MS2 Ethics - John Shelton
9/24/2004	Ethics		John Shelton came to site for meeting
10/20/2004	Ethics	DeKort	Second time asking for investigation status - not complete
12/2/2004	Ethics	DeKort	Sent letter to Shelton - frustrated with progress- noted several ships were now delivered with issues
12/22/2004	Ethics	Shelton	Case Closed- coming to site to debrief me
2/1/2005	Ethics	Shelton	Meeting set for debrief
2/4/2005	Ethics	DeKort	Started discussions with corporate ethics (low level). Shelton had told me that he could not substantiate any of my allegations. Would not give me any data. I did not have the need to know Told him that wasn't good enough. He contacted Gail Allen
3/16/2005	Ethics	DeKort	Told Gail Allen I was frustrated by lack of progress and that I had not been contacted by engineer investigating the issues yet (Carol Boser)
4/14/2005			Gail Allen/Carol Boser meeting in Colorado. Directed to turn over all docs at that time. Including copies. Earlier Gail Allen had told me I could retain the data
4/28/2005	Ethics	DeKort	Sent email to LM CEO Robert Stevens after meeting with Gail Allen/Carol Boser. Told him that their finding that my allegations were unfounded was not acceptable- no data given - did not have the need to know
5/4/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Corporate VP for Ethics contacts me and says she will look in to the matter
5/4/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Sets up meeting in Bethesda - directs me to turn over docs (had not done so yet)
5/10/2005			Meeting in Bethesda - Corporate Legal, Ethics and Engineering present. I turn over docs after we agree that a Bates' stamped set will be kept in Colorado. I am promised access to this data - actions promised - -
5/10/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Informed I would be fired if I did not turn over data

6/3/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Debrief - actions to be taken - review all the cables to see why they aren't shielded-- ask the customer if they want 360 deg camera coverage- check every piece of equipment for environmental compliance - including those on other assets- find out what all the lessons learned are and work with the DW team to fix them- promised to give me all data
9/26/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Informed that everything is handled but I would not be given details as promised- "Coast Guard fully informed"- told I no longer had a need to know
10/12/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Informed - after objecting to outcome and lack of data- that there are no safety or security concerns- admitted that some of my concerns had been valid (previous 2 ethics investigations spent a year with each saying none of my allegations had merit). Told "corrective actions were taken" but not told what they were
12/12/2005	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	After pushing for weeks to get details I am informed that the CG does not grant me access
1/12/2006	Ethics	Maryanne Lavan	Responds to me by again saying the case is closed, that there was no retribution, excusing Shelton's actions and giving me permission in writing to seek outside assistance since CG accepted the systems
1/13/2006	Ethics	DeKort	Sent an email to Robert Stevens asking him to get involved and reconsider
1/17/2006	Ethics	DeKort	Trying contacting Robert Stevens again
1/19/2006	Ethics	MacKay	VP Lead Council for LM- looking in to matter

