Docs 205-220
November-December 1961:
Discussions Among the Four Western Allies on Negotiations With the Soviet Union
205. Memorandum Prepared in the Department of State/1/
Washington, November 9, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-961. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but it was attached to a letter from Stoessel to Kohler, November 9, which states that it is an account based on what Norstad told Stoessel about his conversation with the President on November 7. According to a shorter account of the meeting, drafted by Taylor, only Norstad, Taylor, McNamara, and the President attended the meeting. (National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 37, 109 Norstad) Attached to Taylor's account are brief summaries of meetings that Norstad attended at the Pentagon on November 6 and 7.
The following subjects were discussed in a conversation at the White House on November 8 [7] between the President and General Norstad. Secretary McNamara and General Taylor were also present.
1. The President raised the problem of General Clay. He said everyone was well aware of the nature of the problem and of the difficulties it caused General Norstad. The President asked General Norstad if he thought he had control of his military forces in Berlin. General Norstad answered affirmatively, but commented that he was not sure that he was in control of situations which might develop which could lead up to the use of military force and, in effect, make it impossible to avoid the use of such force.
The President expressed considerable concern about recent newspaper articles and radio reports emanating from Berlin indicating General Clay's dissatisfaction with our Berlin policy. General Norstad thought that the situation with regard to General Clay was quieter than it had been and that the newspaper reports probably were about two weeks behind the times.
The President said he hoped and thought General Clay would not make a dramatic resignation. General Norstad said he certainly would do nothing to provoke such action and thought the situation could be handled. Mr. McNamara commented that he had seen the various exchanges of messages between Clay and Norstad and that he felt General Norstad's restraint under the circumstances had been remarkable.
2. The President raised the question of US action in the event the Friedrichstrasse gate is closed and the crossing point is removed to another point, perhaps a gate in the British sector. General Norstad said that, since we have accepted restriction to one gate and have felt that maintenance of this one gate fulfilled our right of access, could we reasonably resort to force if this particular gate were closed but we were given another gate instead? Although he did not specifically say that we should not contest with force a transfer from Friedrichstrasse to another crossing point, this was the thrust of his comments. The President appeared to accept this point of view, although he did not say so categorically.
General Norstad went on to say that, as the President was aware, his present instructions called for use of force in the event the Friedrichstrasse gate is sealed off and no other crossing point is offered. He also told the President that he had extended these instructions somewhat and had requested General Watson to be ready to knock down four or five other gates in addition to the Friedrichstrasse gate. The President made no comment but did not indicate any disagreement.
3. With regard to the question of US personnel showing identification, General Norstad said this whole matter should be clarified and discrepancies which presently exist not only between Allies but in our own practices as regards persons crossing by foot or in vehicles should be studied and harmonized. He deplored the fact that we had not moved faster on the original recommendation from Berlin sometime ago that US personnel in civilian clothes should show identification to the Vopos in the same manner as the British. The time which had been spent in considering this recommendation was over long and eventually we were caught in the disagreeable situation of being on the verge of using force to enforce a practice with which no one was really in sympathy.
The President commented that he had appreciated General Norstad's recommendation regarding a possible compromise solution of the identification problem. Parts of it had been put into effect although it had not proved possible to implement all of it.
General Norstad said that there were a number of steps which the Communists might be expected to take in connection with the sector crossing question and he urged that we should be prepared, not only with a list of what the Communists might do, but with positive proposals on what our reaction might be to such actions.
4. [7 lines of source text not declassified]
General Norstad mentioned Adenauer's forthcoming visit and said he thought it was important that Strauss be included in the German party. He thought Adenauer's star had faded and that Strauss would be a leading figure, if not the leading figure in the new German administration. He mentioned that Strauss seemed to feel that "some people" in Washington wanted to prevent Strauss from seeing the President.
The President said he knew nothing of this and that he would be glad to see Strauss. He had not heard of Norstad's recommendations that Strauss be included in the Adenauer party and he asked General Taylor to see that the State Department looked into this suggestion on an urgent basis.
The President wondered if it might not be well for General Norstad to come to Washington when Adenauer made his visit. General Norstad thought this would not be advisable since it would cast him in too much of a national role. The President agreed.
The President asked if General Norstad thought the Germans would agree to the plan of action outlined in the enclosure to the President's letter to General Norstad of October 20./2/ General Norstad said he did not think they would agree and that they would want no part of it. They are worried about losing Hamburg in a quick Soviet thrust and they would see this danger implicit in the course of action set forth in the enclosure.
/2/Document 185.
5. On the subject of the President's letter of October 20, General Norstad said he wished to speak very frankly. With specific reference to the enclosure to the letter, he said that it was replete with clichés and jargon which were probably clear to people in Washington but which were not clear to him. He thought the enclosure was poorly drafted, ambiguous, and contradictory. It needed to be clarified and simplified. In its present form, he could not use the enclosure as a basis for instruction to his planners.
General Norstad said he planned to send a brief letter to the President which would transmit three enclosures./3/ Two of these enclosures would deal with the questions raised by the President in his letter of October 20 on command and control procedures for "selective nuclear attacks" and "limited tactical employment of nuclear weapons". The third enclosure would be a paper which would set forth the guidance given by General Norstad to his planners to develop courses of action. General Norstad thought that this guidance would be in accord with the spirit of the President's letter of October 20. Also, this guidance would contemplate a plan of action which in General Norstad's firm opinion would be acceptable to the North Atlantic Council. General Norstad thought that the present course of action as set forth in the enclosure to the October 20 letter would not be acceptable.
/3/In an interim reply on November 2, Norstad had apologized for not being able to answer the President's letter in a more timely fashion and stated that he would be in Washington on November 6 and 7 to report on what had been accomplished up to that time. (Department of State, Central Files, 375/11-261) No other reply has been found.
(Note: General Norstad did not raise with the President his point regarding the propriety of transmitting instructions to SACEUR. However, he discussed this at length with Mr. McNamara earlier in the day and Mr. McNamara said that he understood the problem.)
6. There was considerable discussion of the course of action set forth in the enclosure to the October 20 letter. At several points, General Norstad noted the dangers of placing undue reliance on the idea of a graduated sequence of steps. He said we should plan for these things, but we cannot plan on them.
The President asked General Norstad what we should do if our access to Berlin is blocked on the autobahn. General Norstad replied that our reaction must be positive, direct, related to Berlin, and probably taken on the autobahn itself.
He would first move in one of the small probes foreseen under Live Oak planning as might seem appropriate under the circumstances. He said it would be important for him in issuing instructions to the commanders of the probe to know what the objective of the effort was to be; i.e., what is its political purpose? Obviously, we do not want the probe to lead directly to world war; we do not wish to force greater military involvement. In General Norstad's opinion, the object of the first probe should be to establish clearly the fact that we are being denied an established right of access by force. If possible, we should so act that this denial is exercised by the other side's use of military force. After the initial probe and clear denial of access, we could then go to the UN for a limited period. We should take care not to get bogged down in the UN, but consideration in the UN could be useful if it would reveal clearly that we had been denied access.
The President commented that the UN wouldn't do anything. Why should we go to the UN? Mr. McNamara said that a delay caused by consideration in the UN would give us time to build up our military reserves in Europe for the next step. General Norstad questioned the latter remark. He asked if it was intended that we wait 30 days or so in order to get one or two additional divisions to Europe. He did not see what difference the addition of such forces would make in the actual situation. General Norstad thought that we should hold in the UN until we reach a critical point on the political curve. Then the next step should be taken. There is need for much political planning as to what steps might be undertaken. The President asked what he had in mind. General Norstad said that, for example, if we were getting nowhere in the UN and the Russians were still encroaching on our rights, the President might issue a public appeal to Khrushchev to meet him in Berlin on a specific day. The President could say that he would be in Berlin at 10 am on a certain day and that if Khrushchev were interested in peace, he would be there to meet him. The President should then go to Berlin.
General Norstad said this was simply one idea which might be considered; doubtless there were many other things which might be done, but all should be studied and plans should be readied to meet a series of successive objectives. The President asked General Taylor to make note of General Norstad's comments and to see that the State Department considers them.
General Norstad referred briefly to mention in the enclosure to the President's letter of economic embargo and naval blockade. He thought these were clearly steps which might be useful as collateral to other reactions; however, he did not feel they should be regarded as separate alternatives in themselves. The President seemed to agree.
The President said it would be very useful to him if General Norstad's reply to the October 20 letter could be received before Adenauer visits Washington November 20. Norstad said that it would be submitted before that date.
7. The President said he wanted General Norstad to know that he appreciated the latter's attitude about sending more divisions to Europe. The President knew that the easiest thing for Norstad to do would be to request these divisions; however, Norstad saw other factors in the situation and had not done so. The President said he was appreciative of this.
(Note: General Norstad's impression is that the President has not yet taken a firm decision on sending additional divisions to Europe. Prepositioning of equipment for two divisions will go ahead, but the decision to send the men remains to be made.)
8. In closing, the President reminded General Norstad that he had asked him to communicate directly with him on any subject whenever General Norstad thought it would be useful to do so. He again urged General Norstad to do this at any time.
206. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 7, 1961./2/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret. Drafted by Sweeney, initialed by Kohler, and approved in B and S on November 21.
/2/Although the source text is dated November 8, the reference to the President's press conference in the second paragraph indicates that the conversation took place on November 7. On November 6 Lord Hood had held a similar conversation with Kohler. A memorandum of this conversation is ibid., 762.00/11-661.
SUBJECT
Berlin: Next Step with the Soviets
PARTICIPANTS
Sir David Ormsby Gore, British Ambassador
The Secretary
Assistant Secretary Foy D. Kohler
Joseph Sweeney--BNA
Sir David Ormsby Gore opened the discussion by pointing out that his Foreign Minister thought it was becoming rather dangerous to wait much longer before continuing the probe with the Soviets. It was dangerous in the British view to wait until the Adenauer visit had been completed. It was doubted whether we should wait on the conclusion of the Friedrichstrasse difficulty. The British did not feel that we should wait until we received a reply from the Soviets.
The Secretary observed that we are not sure we will get one. Mr. Kohler pointed out that we think we might, and in any event they owe us a reply. Mr. Kohler said the President might do a little probing on his own on this aspect at his press conference tomorrow./3/
/3/For a transcript of the President's press conference on November 8, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 701-709.
Sir David asked whether we wanted a reply. Mr. Kohler explained that with our present stance we just about had to have a reply. Sir David relayed the impression that British Ambassador Sir Frank Roberts had received following a lunch with Sobolev to the effect that the Russians might become impatient. The Secretary asked if this was the case why didn't the Soviets ask some questions of us?
Sir David observed that he understood Ambassador Thompson feels debarred from discussing this matter at the moment. It was his impression that Ambassador Thompson felt he should stick to Friedrichstrasse at the moment and get that out of the way first. Mr. Kohler confirmed that was the way he was instructed. Sir David reported that Lord Home wondered whether perhaps Thompson should not be instructed to go ahead and have talks with the Russians. If this were done Ambassador Roberts could follow up with talks and this would hold the position until at least late November and Adenauer would have been here and we would know the Western position.
The Secretary said it was risky to allow delay but also risky to go too fast until we see the color of the eyes of the French and Germans and have determined the negotiating posture of the West. Sir David suggested that our present stance will look fairly strange to the Russians. We have, as he put it, bounced them off the 31st of December deadline and he wondered what they would think of this delay. The Secretary asked if he did not think the line we took on the Adenauer visit as an obvious reason requiring delay would hold them off. Sir David answered that perhaps this would, but he feared the Soviets might take the line that the Americans always do what Adenauer wants them to do.
Sir David then suggested there was a danger that the Friedrichstrasse problem will prove larger than we had thought. The Secretary pointed out that he had told Gromyko there should be no unilateral action. Furthermore, the Secretary pointed out, the Friedrichstrasse problem with the aspect of civilians and identification-showing so undermines the position the U.S. and the U.K. had taken that this was a source of worry to the allies, and he suggested the Soviet action may have been taken for just that purpose. What better action could the Soviets take with the French and Germans than to say we told you so?
The Secretary asked Sir David if he had heard the Humphrey discussion of Berlin on TV./4/ Sir David said no but he had read the account. The Secretary explained this stand seemed to be growing in our country: namely that we should not be the "fall guy" for people who do not want to get hurt. The Secretary smilingly suggested that perhaps we should not use the expression, "fall guy", but Sir David could translate that before sending it to London. The Secretary informed Sir David that there was some force in the point he had made and we would take it under consideration and would let him know.
/4/For a summary of Senator Humphrey's remarks on November 6, see The New York Times, November 7, 1961.
Sir David added that Lord Home was rather nervous because he felt that the real point was not the date of Friedrichstrasse but the date of the probe and he feels that nothing is happening. The Secretary observed that all that has happened during the past two or three weeks does not encourage us to probe too far. Mr. Kohler said that for every Sobolev lunch, and he didn't know how well informed he was, there were many other indications that the Soviets were not exerting pressure. Sir David suggested that their national celebrations on at this time might be a factor in not exerting pressure, but we might expect pressure after these celebrations and he observed that there was a suggestion of pressure in Khrushchev's wind-up statement about "not stringing us along". The Secretary reiterated that we will take a quick and thorough look and Sir David would hear from us within the next day or so.
207. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, November 8, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.
1469. Eyes only Ambassadors. At Kremlin reception last night just before concert began Gromyko told me rather casually that he did not plan to reply to Secretary's message on Berlin situation. He said situation in Berlin seemed to have calmed down and he had already made Soviet Govt's position clear in his earlier conversation with me/2/ and therefore thought matter could be considered as stand-off. I said I was astonished at this and pointed out that reason situation in Berlin was quiet was that we had stopped our civilians from going into East Berlin in order to allow period of calm in order to resolve problem. Gromyko then said our military had behaved very badly and that it had been extremely dangerous and provocative action for us to have brought up tanks and to have sent armed men into East Berlin. I pointed out that it was East Germans who had initiated affair and we could not be expected to let our position be eroded in this way. As concert began at this moment I concluded by saying I would inform Secretary of his statement./3/
/2/See Document 194.
/3/In telegram 978 Lightner commented that Gromyko's casual "brushoff" of the U.S. approach was intolerable. He suggested that the United States should demand a reply, and if no satisfactory reply was received, bar Soviet civilians from access into West Berlin. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-961)
Thompson
208. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, November 8, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861. Secret; Limit Distribution. Also sent to Bonn and repeated to Moscow.
969. Re Moscow's 1442 Dept, 217 Bonn, 165 Berlin./2/ State frontier of GDR was extended thru city Berlin Aug 13 and has been gradually consolidated in intervening time. Finishing touches, which may end in affecting entrance Allied military to East Berlin and in requiring visas for civilians, are now being put on frontier.
/2/Telegram 1442 from Moscow, November 3, stated that it was better to have a showdown on Berlin over the issue of access to West Berlin from West Germany than over the question of circulation within greater Berlin. (Ibid., 762.00/11-361)
Wall and extension GDR frontier control into Berlin has created major change in status quo and is especially serious because it was done unilaterally by GDR. Occupying powers cannot hide fact GDR with Sov backing has confronted them with direct challenge.
Allies not prepared go the limit on this issue but we have been trying to prevent further unilateral changes prior to commencement of negotiations by showing resolute determination to resist such changes.
None of short term lines of action that have recently been discussed as way to meet challenge is really designed to solve anything. At present we are trying to decide which course has fewer disadvantages: reciprocal showing of documents under pressure or self denial of entry East Berlin.
Acquiescence in unilateral changes will only encourage Sovs/GDR to make further unilateral changes. Denying ourselves entry seems preferable to us as it means we maintain our principle (even if we can't enforce it), and we do not accept precedent of Vopo control within Berlin that could embarrass us if applied on Autobahn. Also, we maintain element of uncertainty re our reaction to introduction Vopo controls on Autobahn; this in turn may put Sovs/GDR on notice that even though we cannot effectively resist salami tactics in East Berlin, we will resist them where our vital interests are concerned. Furthermore, if accompanied by certain reprisals, this course of self denial would be less damaging to Berlin morale than would be our acquiescence in showing documents. Initial reaction to our introduction of Western controls over CD/CC vehicles showed great sensitivity of Berliners to even hint that we might be contemplating submitting to Vopo controls.
We realize disadvantage this policy self denial has in implying further sealing division of city but as Dept aware we believe time has come to face squarely the anomalies of continued adherence to 4-power status which with every passing day has less and less relation to reality. We urge most careful consideration be given to Amb Thompson's suggestion (Moscow's 1388 Dept, 502 Bonn, 155 Berlin)/3/ as the "only adequate answer" to Sov/GDR challenge. General Clay and Mission have also pointed out (Berlin's 250, 454 and 787)/4/ that closer legal ties between West Berlin and FedRep would be logical answer to incorporation East Berlin into GDR.
/3/Telegram 1388 from Moscow, October 28, suggested that if the Soviets persisted in treating the sector border as the East German frontier, the West should consider itself free to remove the restrictions on West Berlin's political relations with West Germany. (Ibid., 762.00/10-2861)
/4/Dated August 18, September 9, and October 28, respectively. (Ibid., 762.00/8-1861, 762.00/9-861, and 762.00/10-2861)
Aside from problem of selling idea to Allies, main consideration really is whether it serves our interests now to alter quadripartite basis our policy. This is complicated problem we realize, but there are strong arguments for such new status. We have long felt legal side our Berlin rights less important than fact of our presence here and determination to maintain freedom of 2.2 million Berliners. Negative aspects outlined Dept's 585/5/ Berlin replying to General Clay's message are very real but we believe outweighed by arguments in favor. Overriding reason is great need to do something to restore our bargaining position and in light of tactics of other side we see advantage in doing this as fait accompli rather than as something to be negotiated. Believe occupation could continue through some form of occupation statute which would safeguard basis of Allied rights. Continuing adherence to goal of ultimate reunification could preserve long term goal of one Germany.
/5/Dated October 24. (Ibid., 762.00/10-2061)
We believe this matter might profitably be explored in informal way with high-ranking members new German Govt. If there is any possibility of pursuing this idea, suggest every effort be made to keep it quiet in order to face other side with fait accompli. Early announcement of intention to withdraw Allied reservation to Berlin's incorporation into FedRep would provoke outcry and all sorts of arguments against it--not only from Communists--and net result would be confusion compounded.
Lightner
209. Letter From Chairman Khrushchev to President Kennedy/1/
Moscow, November 9, 1961.
/1/Source: Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 77 D 163. No classification marking. The letter was delivered to Salinger at the White House at 12:15 p.m. on November 11 by Georgi Bolshakov, editor of USSR magazine. (Memorandum for the President, November 11; ibid.)
Dear Mr. President: I have read your letter of October 16/2/ with great attention. It is good that you had an opportunity to write it in a quiet atmosphere, in your family circle, far from the turmoil of the capital. I received your letter on the very eve of the opening of the 22nd Congress of our Party, at a time when Moscow, and in fact all our country--was living an especially elated and exciting life.
/2/Document 179.
You have had probably an opportunity to get acquainted with the published reports on the proceedings of the Congress and you can imagine how much energy, time and attention on my part and on the part of my colleagues that work required. The Congress has adopted a program of material and spiritual development of the Soviet peoples' life--a program unprecedented in its scale.
However joyful it was to work out concrete plans for building communism in our country we could not but think of today since it is vitally important for us that these plans are carried out in the conditions of peace. That is why so much attention was given at the Congress to international problems and, first of all, to the security of peaceful coexistence of countries with different social and political systems which has now been included as a corner stone in the program of our Party. Our present struggle against the consequences of the cult of personality, is, if you wish, at the same time a struggle for a consistent realization of the principles of peaceful coexistence.
However I am not going to dwell especially on the importance of our Party's Congress. We may, of course, have a different point of view on this matter. It would seem to be more difficult for us to come to a common view on this point than on the German problem.
Now the Congress is over and my friends and I believe that it was quite a success. Now I am able to reply to your letter and express my views on the points you raised in it.
You ask what advantages the West would get if it agrees to the changes resulting from the solution of the German problem. In your letter you even gave a comparison asserting that the Soviet Union wants to trade an apple for an orchard. I do not intend to argue that--such a comparison might be good by its picturesqueness, but in this case, I think, it is absolutely out of place.
What is the orchard which we are allegedly seeking, what is meant by that and what is the apple which, as you say, we are suggesting to trade? Let us consider it.
Let us look first at the proposals of the Soviet Union. The proposals, as you know, are--to conclude a German peace treaty and on this basis to transform West Berlin into a free city. Does the realization of these proposals require any concessions on the part of the Western powers? No, and, once again, no. The Soviet draft peace treaty is based only on the necessity to consolidate and legalize the situation created as a result of the war, to consolidate and legalize the German borders. Have another look at this draft and you will see that we suggest to consolidate by this treaty what had already been sanctified by the signatures which the leaders of our states put in their time under the Potsdam agreement. We demand no changes in these agreements.
This means that nobody gives anything and nobody takes anything from anyone, and that the only point is to fulfill the obligations which the four powers solemnly took upon themselves in Yalta and Potsdam.
Now, what is the position of the Western powers. If there is anyone who wants to get the whole orchard giving nothing in return--that is you and your allies. Let me show this with the facts.
It was stated in the Potsdam agreements that Germany should not be armed, that an end should be put forever to German militarism and revanchism. In spite of that the United States, Britain and France have made West Germany their ally, are arming it--and arming it rather intensively.
One cannot find a single line in the allied agreements which would allow to regard West Berlin and West Germany as one entity. In reality the Western powers as early as in 1948 introduced in West Berlin the West German mark and even made attempts to spread the FRG laws on this city. Together with the FRG the Western powers are now actively using West Berlin against the Soviet Union, the German Democratic Republic and other socialist countries.
These facts alone show that the Western powers in their present demands are stepping aside from the allied agreements and are seeking for themselves such advantages which would have been unthinkable 16 years ago. But the list of such facts does not end at this.
In 1945 the four powers pledged to do their utmost in order that Germany would never be able to threaten its neighbours and the world peace. But now West Germany with your assistance has acquired such strength that it is openly encroaching on the territory of neighbouring countries and starting to grasp its NATO allies by arms and feet.
It is not an exaggeration to say that the FRG hinders also the US Government in the free conduct of the policy which the latter believes to be reasonable and which corresponds to the interests of your country as well as other countries. You and I have agreed to establish and maintain contacts in order to search jointly for mutually acceptable solutions to the German problem. But actually that has not been accomplished yet. And we understand quite clearly that it is first of all Adenauer who resists it, being zealously supported by French President de Gaulle.
It seems to me, that de Gaulle's position is rather accurately described by an allegory which is well known among our people. Once a peasant, so the story goes, boasted that he would go to the forest and catch a bear; he was warned that it was a dangerous undertaking, that bear is a strong beast. Never mind, I'll handle him--said the peasant, and went to the forest. Some time has passed but the peasant still has not come back. The people started looking for him. Where are you?--they cried. The peasant cried back: I am here, I have caught a bear.
--Well, bring him here.
--He won't go.
--Come here yourself.
--But he won't let me go.
More or less the same has happened to France. De Gaulle embraced Adenauer to lean on West Germany and to increase with its help the weight of France in European affairs and, may be, even to try to conduct the events in the whole world. It is an open secret that de Gaulle considers himself to be the most qualified person to determine the political destiny of Europe and not only Europe. Actually it has turned out that West Germany has so squeezed de Gaulle in her arms that he is not able any longer to escape from the embrace. In fact France has been forced to follow in the wake of the policy which is being carried on by Chancellor Adenauer.
That is why de Gaulle is saying now not the things which are helpful for ensuring peace and, consequently, helpful for France and other nations, but whatever pleases Chancellor Adenauer.
There seems to be no need to go back to the question of how and why it has happened that the Potsdam agreements remained to a considerable degree unfulfilled and what effect this fact had on the situation in Germany and in Europe as a whole. This has been stated more than once before. And life itself demands that we should look forward, not backward. It is important now to single out what brings us closer, what will help us to restore the spirit of cooperation and goodwill which was characteristic of the relations between the USSR and the USA during the hard years of war. In our opinion this can be easier and better achieved by a mutually agreed solution of the problem of a German peace treaty. The Western powers not only would not have to sacrifice in any way their interests, they would gain and, indeed, not less than the other states.
To use your comparison, it can be said that by the conclusion of a German peace treaty we would have planted an orchard the fruits of which would be enjoyed by all the states, all the peoples.
It is true that we have to settle this problem in a rather unusual way. At the time when the Potsdam agreement was being signed nobody could have foreseen that two independent states, with different ways of life, would emerge on the territory of Germany. However, it has happened. What can we do? Should we use force so that Germany will again become united? But nobody seems to be anxious to fight for this. President de Gaulle told us frankly that France was not interested in reunification of Germany. And one can understand his position since he fears and, evidently, not without a reason, that a united Germany--if one has in mind the basis for its unification which is advocated by Adenauer--would be a militarist state with all its widely known distinctive habits.
The world public opinion has obviously no sympathy with the idea of reunification of Germany. Such opinion prevails in France, Britain, in wide enough circles of the USA and even in West Germany itself.
The situation existing in Germany is recognized everywhere in the West, but many persons prefer to keep silent. They do so, naturally, not because of a desire to help the reunification of Germany, but because of dislike for the way of life established in the German Democratic Republic. They do not like, of course, the social and political system not only in the G.D.R., but in other socialist countries as well, including, naturally, the Soviet Union. However just as we are not free to establish our systems in capitalist countries, the Western powers have no right to impose one or another way of development on the socialist countries.
I fully agree with you that it would be useless to argue about the advantages of our social systems. We will not find a common language here. That is why the Soviet Government proceeds from the necessity of recognition of what exists in reality; two German states and two systems in the world--capitalist and socialist. Any other approach would inevitably lead us to collision, to war.
We have got an impression that you also want to achieve a mutually acceptable solution of the German problem which would not lead to the deepening of the differences and, eventually, to collision between our countries.
In my opinion we have already passed the stage of sounding out each other's positions. We should now start solving problems, otherwise contacts and negotiations will lead to nothing but marking time.
When I sent you my latest letter/3/ I hoped that we would use this line of communication for concrete discussion of still unsettled issues and, first of all, of the German peace treaty as the most complex and urgent one. If both of us departed from concrete discussion and confine ourselves to repeating generalities our confidential correspondence could have been substantially depreciated.
/3/Document 162.
In my recent letter I tried to set forth in detail our position on concrete questions and, I will not conceal, I expected you to do the same. There were, it seemed to me, some grounds for that in the light of the discussions which our Foreign Minister had had in New York and in Washington with you, Mr. President, and with the US Secretary of State. We understand, of course, that you needed some time to study and think over all that had been said. That is why, having found no concrete suggestions in your letter, we expected that Ambassador Thompson would state them on your instructions. So far this has not happened, either.
A certain apprehension is caused by an obvious dissonance between realistic notes which we hear while talking with American statesmen on questions of Germany, and conservative, extremely negative comments on these talks, which are published on the pages of influential newspapers in the United States.
I will not go back to a detailed statement of our position, and will dwell only on the main points. When we talked with you in Vienna you said that the question of Germany should be solved in such a way that the prestige of any of our counties was not hurt. I agreed with you then and I agree with you now. Indeed, the Soviet Union and the USA are great powers and the matter of prestige is important to them. We understand it.
But how the interests of the parties can be taken fully into account when the goal is to draw a line under the past war? It is clear--by the conclusion of a peace treaty on an agreed basis. The conclusion of a peace treaty is a natural way of the completion of war which is accepted by both--civilized and uncivilized peoples. Such a treaty makes it possible to juridically secure the cessation of the state of war and, at the same time, to legalize the changes which resulted from the war. It is in complete agreement with considerations of prestige.
The signing of a German peace treaty would help to liquidate the state of "cold war", to create better conditions for cooperation between our countries, for the development of trade, for the exchange of scientific achievements etc. On the basis of the peace treaty the question of West Berlin will be solved.
It was said that the time, suggested by us, for the conclusion of a peace treaty sounds like an ultimatum and this hurts the prestige of our partners in negotiations. We have, of course, made no ultimatum. But in order to create the best possible conditions for the achievement of an agreed settlement the Soviet Government has decided not to insist that the peace treaty be signed till the end of this year.
We do not dictate any firm terms for the solution of the German question and you probably know it well. The best way, in our opinion, would be the signing of a peace treaty between all countries which fought against Germany and the two German states which have appeared on the ruins of the Hitlerite Reich and the normalization of the situation in West Berlin on this basis. But it is also possible to sign two peace treaties--with West and East Germany, and the texts of these treaties should not necessarily be identical.
There is also a third possibility which I mentioned to Mr. Spaak--to agree before signing a peace treaty with the GDR by the Soviet Union and other powers on a status of West Berlin and on the indispensable solution of certain important questions of the post-war settlement in Europe.
What could constitute a special agreement on West Berlin which would then be annexed to a peace treaty and thus would acquire the full juridical force? There can be, certainly, only one thing in it--again the status of a free demilitarized city, in other words West Berlin must become independent politically, live in accordance with its internal laws, freely without any external interference, with the most widely developed ties with any state of any continent.
The situation which has developed in that city is absolutely abnormal. You yourself spoke about it as of a heavy heritage. Consequently it is necessary to liquidate this "heritage" lest it--as an abscess--spoil the relations between our countries and cause inflammation on a healthy body.
You do not need West Berlin if, of course, it is not considered as a base for subversive activities against the socialist countries. And even in this capacity it hardly justifies the hopes of those who would like to preserve the vestiges of World War II in the center of Europe and to thoroughly drive a wedge between great powers. Those who think that it is possible to weaken the socialist countries by organizing subversive activities from West Berlin against them are deceiving themselves. West Berlin does not fit for that under present circumstances--it is a rotten basis. The preservation of the situation which exists there can only generate conflicts and cause anxiety in the world.
Recently, through Mr. Robert Kennedy,/4/ you yourself let me know of your concern with regard to the situation in Berlin. I must say we were also grieved by the incidents which took place on the border between West and East Berlin during the last ten days of October and caused the tension that nobody wanted.
/4/Presumably Khrushchev is referring to a conversation that Attorney General Kennedy had with Bolshakov on November 7; its substance was communicated directly to Moscow. (Schlesinger, Robert Kennedy and His Times, p. 521) No record of a conversation between Robert Kennedy and Khrushchev has been found.
I would not like to go into polemics with you and, judging by your message, you do not pursue this aim either. I think, however, that the latest incidents could not have taken place if the American military authorities in West Berlin would have shown more desire to act with due regard to the real situation.
I cannot but agree with you that a period of relative moderation and calmness is particularly necessary now. We regard with understanding such a sober approach which will allow to concentrate on the solution of the problems related to the German peace settlement and not to turn away our attention to the settlement of--frankly speaking--secondary questions.
Your letter of October 16 can be understood in such a way that West Berlin is the very orchard which the Soviet Union wants to get for itself. But for us it is not an orchard, rather it is a weed of burr and nettle. We do not want to walk into this weed, we have no business there. We do not need West Berlin. Let West Berlin live and develop in the way its population wants. We are ready to do everything to this end.
If Western powers have no hidden aims with regard to West Berlin, why can we not agree, then, on transforming it into a free city? International character could be given to the status of West Berlin as a free city by registering it at the UN. Such a solution would not be detrimental to any side since it would be based on the recognition of the existing social and political conditions in West Berlin. The balance of power which has developed between the two world systems after the war would not be changed as a result of the transformation of West Berlin into a free city, and the watershed between them would remain in the same place.
We could explain this decision to everybody and any sober-minded person would understand it because he would realize that our countries really want to liquidate the vestiges of World War II and clear the way for peaceful cooperation among all nations.
But what do Western powers suggest to us? There is only one thing behind all their statements about the adherence to the cause of freedom of West Berlin--the desire to preserve the regime of occupation there at any price. They insist that this regime should be preserved even after the signing of a peace treaty. I am not a diplomat and can be completely frank: if it means only to get a confirmation of occupation rights, then it will be difficult to expect not only agreement but even negotiations themselves, since there will be nothing to talk about. You have to understand that the Soviet Union cannot agree to preserve and recognize the regime of occupation in West Berlin, i.e. by its own hands to help Western powers violate after the conclusion of a peace treaty the sovereignty of the German Democratic Republic, its ally.
In essence, the present position of the Western powers reflects the same selfish line which they followed in signing the peace treaty with Japan. At that time the Western powers considered it possible to neglect the interests of the Soviet Union and to conclude the peace treaty without it. Now they "allow" us condescendingly to sign a peace treaty with the GDR provided, however, that the regime of occupation in West Berlin remains intact. To agree to this would be not only the loss of our prestige but the complete surrender.
We would prefer to conclude a German peace treaty together with the USA and other participants of the anti-Hitlerite coalition. It is our ardent desire. But if our efforts to make the positions of the sides closer do not reach the goal, all the same we will sign a peace treaty and will do it certainly not with the purpose of securing the occupation rights of Western powers.
It would be the greatest fallacy to expect that these rights could be saved by threats, that under the pressure the Soviet Union will eventually agree to play the part of a permanent sentry guarding these rights. Despite all the threats on the part of Western powers the Soviet Union will in no case retreat from its principal position.
Certainly, if Western powers adopt unreasonable decisions, the consequences will be extremely sad. I think that not only myself but you also wish that mankind will never taste such a bitter lot. In any case these consequences, if they were caused, would not be graver for the Soviet Union than for the USA. For the allies of the USA, which are comparatively small countries, they will be especially tragic. Besides the voice of these countries can be heard in fact only until the guns start talking. When it comes to direct collision they will be even deprived of physical ability to influence in any way the course of events, which will take place in case the fatal line is crossed.
Let us throw away arguments of force and rely exclusively on the arguments of reason. The threats are of no use to us, and I agree with you that we should not talk the language of "cold war". Such language only prevents us from estimating the situation in the world soberly and seeking the solution of questions which are equally disturbing to both of our peoples. Let us solve these questions in such a way that dealing with them today we would know for sure that the relations between our countries will become better tomorrow and still better the day after tomorrow. This is what is expected from us, you and me--the men invested with great trust and great powers--by all peoples who value peace higher than anything else.
You ask me, who would guarantee that the rights and interests of West Berlin will not be violated and propose that reliable international guarantees should be given to the city. You, Mr. President, and your predecessors have repeatedly made such statements and, naturally, you have bound yourself by those statements before the American and West German public opinion as well as before the public opinion of other countries. But we also are not against guarantees. The Soviet Union and the GDR have no secret plans with regard to West Berlin, and therefore we ourselves propose that guarantees--and the most effective ones--should be given to it.
Thus, we seem to agree with you that there should be guarantees for West Berlin. And here again there are two possibilities. I have already told Mr. Spaak and you about that. The Soviet position is known to you and the Secretary of State also from what was said by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR. I want to give you a short summary of our point of view: if the USA is interested in our guaranteeing the status of West Berlin together, the Soviet Union is ready to assume such obligation upon itself. But it must be recognized that the Soviet Union will have equal rights and equal responsibility which other powers--guarantors will have.
I have already written to you that the most realistic way out is that of placing some symbolic contingents of troops of four great powers in West Berlin. And if the troops of four powers are stationed there, the Soviet Union, naturally, will bear the responsibility with regard to guarantees equal to that of Western powers. Such measure will be understandable to both--the allies of the USA and the allies of the Soviet Union. It will not hurt the prestige of any power concerned. But if you want to have your troops in West Berlin while there will be no [of] our troops there, that will not be equal terms. You want us to be guarantors on some other terms which are different from those of others, of yours, but this is not realistic.
I know that in the West attempts are being made to interpret our proposal on guarantees as an expression of a desire to penetrate into West Berlin and to gain a foothold there. Believe me, Mr. President, we are not intruding into West Berlin. Why should we have our troops there? I think that your troops too are not needed in West Berlin. They are guarding themselves, and somebody's shadow.
I will not, probably, make a mistake if I say that in the question of keeping troops in West Berlin prestige considerations are the main ones. Since you believe it so important to keep the troops in West Berlin we are prepared to make a concession. It is a definite concession on our part since the occupation rights cease to exist upon signing a peace treaty and discontinuing the state of war. But in order that this concession is not interpreted as a retreat of the USSR under the pressure of the USA--and not under the pressure of reason and expedience--our token troops should be also stationed in West Berlin. What kind of troops, of what size? It is not very important. It might be that the number of our troops will be substantially less but under an agreement the Soviet Union must be in an equal position with the USA. The Soviet Government wishes to take into account the prestige of the USA, but we would like you also, Mr. President, to display an understanding with regard to our prestige. We must mutually spare each other's prestige. For how long should the token troops remain in West Berlin? At present some people are not quite sure as to how a free city would feel and whether its relations with other countries will run smoothly. But if all the fears that are now being expressed allay, if it turns out that there are no grounds, and we are sure that it is so, for concern about the fate of West Berlin? [sic] Really, it would not be quite clear why it is necessary to keep these token troops in the city forever. And so we propose that an agreement on stationing token contingents of troops of the four powers in West Berlin be concluded for a definite period of time.
If our proposal on stationing the token contingents of troops of the four powers in West Berlin is not acceptable and if you believe that it is really necessary for guaranteeing purposes to keep the troops in West Berlin, well, let them be the United Nations troops. Such a solution should not do any damage to you or to us, France and Britain. The UN troops will see to it that the order as defined by the status of the free city is strictly observed. This would seem to be even better than to keep the troops of the four powers in West Berlin.
I repeat: neither the troops of the four powers nor the United Nations troops should perform any occupation functions. The situation has changed and so another regime corresponding to the conditions of peace time is needed.
I know you are concerned with the question of access to West Berlin. Moreover, you, it seems to me, are inclined to consider it as one of the most important and hard to solve questions. I do not know whether I will be able to dispel the uncertainties but I would like to emphasize with all clarity that neither the Soviet Government nor the Government of the GDR intend to impose any restrictions on the ties of West Berlin with the outside world or on the access to that city of these or those states by land, sea and air.
If we propose that the order of maintaining these ties and of using all kinds of communications going through the territory of the sovereign state--the German Democratic Republic--should be the same as accepted everywhere both in the socialist and in the capitalist countries, then, you will agree we do not demand anything special, any limitations or concessions. If some other order is established it would precisely mean creating a special discriminatory regime with regard to the GDR.
Those who cling to the occupation regime in West Berlin would like, evidently, the Soviet Union to assume the responsibilities of a traffic policeman securing continuous and uncontrolled transportation of military goods of the Western powers into West Berlin. Generally speaking no one objects to an access to West Berlin, but naturally, this access should be exercised with the consent of the country through whose territory the communications of West Berlin run. And if the Western powers still want the Soviet Union to perform the functions of a traffic policeman, then, they need it in order not to have simply an access to West Berlin but the access which rests on the occupation regime.
I will permit myself to give an example. At present the USA seems to intend to recognize the Mongolian People's Republic. How, one may ask, an American Ambassador is going to reach this Republic if he does not obtain our or the Chinese People's Republic's consent to go through the Soviet or Chinese territory? Is the USA going in this case also to disregard the generally accepted international norms and threatening with force to demand for itself exclusive privileges?
You will say, of course, look we do not demand it. It is true, the USA does not demand it. But why, then, do you use a different approach with regard to the GDR?
It seems to me that the US Government does not want to sign a peace treaty precisely because it feels its wrongness in the questions of the order of access to West Berlin. It prefers, it seems, to retain for the future such a position: we are not participants of the peace treaty, we have not signed this treaty and therefore we retain with regard to West Berlin all our rights resulting from the surrender of Germany and the establishment of the occupation regime in West Berlin. But it will be clear to the entire world that the Western powers are in the wrong here. The fact alone that 16 years have passed since the war makes groundless all the talks about further maintenance of occupation regime in West Berlin. Whatever turn the events might take, further uncontrolled use of the territory of the GDR will become impossible. And the point here is, naturally, not the observance of appearances but the real respect for the sovereign rights of states.
At the present time most of the passenger traffic and the overwhelming part of commercial freightage between West Berlin and the capitalist countries are carried out on the basis of agreements with the GDR. It does not create any difficulties or interruptions of the ties of West Berlin with the outside world. Therefore it is difficult, frankly speaking, to find reasons which would justify the belief that the situation may change for the worse after a peace treaty is concluded and a free city is created. Rather, everything speaks in favor of the opposite.
In the interests of clarity I would like to point out that in solving the question of access as well as other questions with regard to West Berlin we cannot agree that the FRG be placed in a special privileged position, and we will never agree to it. The Federal Republic of Germany should enjoy no worse and no better conditions than other states.
At present the FRG authorities are openly, without any disguise using West Berlin for subversive activities against the GDR and other socialist countries. It is first of all these illegal and dangerous intrigues that forced the socialist countries to take defensive measures. And it goes without saying that we will object to the continuation of such a hostile activity when the question of normalizing the situation in West Berlin on the basis of conclusion of a German peace treaty is being solved.
Incidentally, sometimes voices are heard--could not East Berlin be separated from the GDR. I would like to note that this kind of talk is simply not serious. The social and political system in the German Democratic Republic and in East Berlin is one and the same. East Berlin is the capital of the GDR, the seat of the government of the Republic. Therefore, when they talk about a separation of the capital of the GDR it is not even a preservation of status quo, but a change, a breaking of the political and social order. No one will allow that the established state organism existing and developing on the same social and political basis be destroyed. And one should think that this unreasonable proposal is being made not in the interests of achieving an agreement.
It seems that some aspects of the access will have to be settled anew. Whatever is said the allies have never concluded any agreements on commercial and civil air transportation into Berlin and out of Berlin. Due to our oversight such a transportation was put into effect arbitrarily. With the conclusion of a peace treaty that will have to be corrected. Airlines interested in maintaining traffic with West Berlin will have to have a permission of the GDR to fly over its territory.
On the other hand, there are difficulties of a technical nature. How is the air traffic with West Berlin going now? To land or to take off from the airfields in West Berlin planes fly over the city. It is dangerous both for the passengers and, especially, for the population over whose houses planes fly to land and take off. And it is not without reason that airfields are located outside city limits in all countries of the world. Such a practice is prescribed by safety reasons. And if the old outdated practice is still in effect in West Berlin this is explained only by specific conditions which developed as a result of the war.
The government of the GDR is prepared to permit planes flying to West Berlin to land and take off on its airfields located nearby which cannot be considered as worsening of the conditions of access to West Berlin. This is not a far-fetched but quite an actual task if one is to bear in mind that the intensity of air traffic will apparently be increasing year in and year out.
If the token troops of the four powers are stationed in West Berlin, then, the USA and other Western powers will probably insist on the right of free access to maintain communications and to supply their contingents. I think that if it meant flights of a small number of planes defined in an agreement of the four powers to satisfy the needs of the token contingents of troops then the GDR government could agree to that. Apparently these troops would retain those airfields which exist now.
It goes without saying that the German Democratic Republic should be given guarantees to the effect that the air traffic will not be used against its interests. An agreement could be reached that the four powers which would have token troops in West Berlin would exercise mutual control on the border over their transportation into and out of the city. The same control on a mutual basis could be established also for all other military transportation including those for the token contingents of the Soviet Union which would be stationed in West Berlin as guarantors. The GDR would, probably, be satisfied with it. Being its ally we would perform in a sense the functions of the government of the German Democratic Republic, seeing to it that the communications with West Berlin related to the stationing there of the contingents of troops of the four powers should not be used in a way harmful to it.
Such a procedure, as I see it, could not do moral damage to any of the parties concerned.
I am setting forth these considerations in a preliminary strictly confidential order and I hope that they will be met with understanding on your part.
Dear Mr. President, I am writing not to argue with you or to try to play better the next fall-back position as diplomats call it. I have stated to you the first, second and third possibilities. To any of them which you would consider suitable, we are ready to agree. If you have something else to propose--also on the basis of a peaceful settlement--we would willingly exchange opinions with you. But if you insist on the preservation of inviolability of your occupation rights I do not see any prospect. You have to understand, I have no ground to retreat further, there is a precipice behind.
As an optimist, and they say an incurable one, I hope for the better and believe that eventually the solution can be found or, as you write, reconciliation of our interests is possible. And not only possible, it is necessary, for the alternative is a quarrel between the two most powerful nations.
The letter has come out a bit more extensive than I thought originally. But what can one do--the question is complicated and important. You start writing about one thing but some other thing has to be mentioned too.
I have already consumed much of your time therefore, probably, it would be better if I write you another letter on other questions which you raised in your letter.
I will allow myself to express again the hope that our frank, confidential correspondence will help to overcome difficulties however complicated it might seem now.
Sincerely,
N. Khrushchev/3/
/3/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature.
210. Editorial Note
West German Ambassador Kroll discussed Berlin with Chairman Khrushchev on November 11, 1961. After stressing that he was giving his own ideas on the question, Kroll proposed the following: 1) a four-power agreement on Berlin to provide for freedom, viability, and access to the city and the continued presence of the Allies; 2) an agreement between the Soviet Union and East Germany to respect agreements reached with the Western Allies; 3) an agreement between Berlin and the West as well as with the German Democratic Republic to cover technical matters; 4) an agreement between the four powers to set up committees on disarmament and for negotiating a peace treaty; 5) at the time of a Berlin agreement another understanding would be signed by the interested powers to stop provocative propaganda; and 6) that the arrangements suggested in the first five points would allow a general improvement in Soviet-West German relations.
Khrushchev said he wanted to study these ideas, but in principle could accept them. He told Kroll that economic and financial ties between the Federal Republic and Berlin were acceptable, but not political or administrative. Kroll then stated that the wall would have to come down, and Khrushchev indicated that it had been built on Soviet orders and, if there were a satisfactory agreement on Berlin, it would come down. For the Ambassador's account of this conversation, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 524-527. For the German interpreter's account, see Ehlert, Grosse Grusinsche Nr. 17, pages 319 ff.
On the following day Thompson reported that Kroll had briefed him and his British and French counterparts along these lines. (Telegram 1491 from Moscow; Department of State, Central Files, 661.62A/11-1061) On November 11 Grewe briefed the Ambassadorial Group in Washington, and Thompson was informed that this briefing coincided with that given by Kroll. (Telegram 1260 to Moscow, November 11; ibid.) Grewe also reported that the German Government disapproved the line taken by Kroll and did not identify itself with it. Grewe concluded by saying that he was being recalled to Bonn to discuss Kroll's initiative. For Kroll's account of the discussions at Bonn, see Lebenserinnerungen eines Botschafters, pages 527-535; for Grewe's account, see Ruckblenden, pages 516-518.
211. Telegram From the Embassy in the Soviet Union to the Department of State/1/
Moscow, November 9, 1961, 6 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-961. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated to London, Paris, Bonn, and Berlin.
1485. Position taken by Gromyko (my tel 1469)/2/ faces US with extremely serious situation and I find it difficult to suggest what appropriate response should be. Following would appear to be principal alternatives:
/2/Document 207.
1) Simply to maintain situation as it exists at present time, continuing self-denial of civilian entry in military cars, coupled perhaps with stern warning to Soviets that we will not tolerate any further encroachments upon our rights in Berlin. This might be effective in preventing further steps by East Germans such as demanding identification military personnel but would of course involve considerable loss of face for US.
2) Some retaliatory action in Berlin such as barring Soviets from West Berlin coupled with refusal to continue preparations for negotiations on broader question. In my opinion this course of action could lead to even more serious difficulties. We would presumably gain French support but would probably lose British. British Amb tells me his govt and particularly Macmillan are already restive at current inaction in moving toward negotiations and that Hood has received instructions to press ahead. If we take public stand against continuation preparations for negotiations I suspect likely result would be another Macmillan visit to Moscow and further strain on Alliance. Judging from NAC discussion number of our Allies are likely to support British. I think it can be excluded that Soviets would simply back down in face of such a stand on our part. Once we took military moves such as calling alerts, bringing up tanks, probes into East Berlin, etc, we so engaged Sov military prestige that simple reversal of East German police action became out of question. Most we could hope for in my opinion from such stand would be Sov willingness to discuss situation and possibly agree on some compromise settlement but I think this unlikely. A more likely reaction would be for Soviets to proceed with their separate treaty and we would have to face supreme test with our Alliance in complete disarray. Before embarking upon such policy would seem important that we know exactly where our Allies and particularly West Germans would stand. In any event I do not believe we should continue exploratory talks here until after Adenauer visit to US.
3) We could take some retaliatory action with object of trying to bring Soviets to discuss situation and perhaps arrive at a compromise solution. Probably most extreme action would be steps toward incorporation West Berlin into FedRep discussed in Berlin's 625./3/ Would probably be better to threaten such action than actually carry it out without warning but there are great dangers in such action and it could precipitate real crisis including Sov signature of separate treaty.
/3/Dated November 8. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-861)
4) Secretary could send further message to Gromyko stating that we could not simply accept continuance of present situation. Perhaps we could at same time broaden problem and state that we consider present situation in Berlin to be explosive one and that in order to get on with negotiations we should take steps to diminish tension there. We could suggest that Commandants be instructed to get together to attempt agree on measures to reduce tension. Soviets may of course maintain position that this is question for GDR and will not like emphasis on four power aspect of having Commandants deal with problem. In this case our proposals might have to be put to Gromyko. In present circumstances difficult suggest what proposals we could put forward if Soviets agreed to any such approach. If we should put forward two points mentioned in Deptel 1146/4/ we would virtually have lost our right to object to showing documents to Vopos on basis of principle since we would have agreed to exchange willingness do so for unrelated concession. In broader context of reducing tension however suggest opening of additional crossing points might be put forward in connection with agreement for civilians to show documents to Vopos whenever they had reason to believe use of military vehicles was being abused but not to check all vehicles containing civilians. There might be other concessions on both sides although I am not in position to judge what possibilities are. I should think we might suggest reciprocal efforts of East and West Berlin authorities to enable families to be united.
/4/See footnote 3, Document 194.
Thompson
212. Memorandum From Colonel Lawrence J. Legere to the President's Military Representative (Taylor)/1/
Washington, November 11, 1961.
/1/Source: National Defense University, Taylor Papers, Box 38, 510 Partition of Berlin. Secret.
SUBJECT
Deptel 1360 to Bonn (attached)/2/ on Documentation Within Berlin
/2/Dated November 9. (Department of State, Central Files, 862.181/11-961) Not attached to the source text.
1. Department telegram 1360 to Bonn (and other appropriate posts) is attached. The originators of the policy proposed in this message apparently believe that its logic rests on two pillars of support:
a. Our acceptance of the Wall meant de facto recognition of the end of free circulation in Berlin. Access to the Eastern Sector is not a vital interest; we will not shoot our way into East Berlin because, inter alia, it wouldn't win the argument for us even if we did.
b. To practice self-denial is nobler than submitting to VOPO demands that our military personnel in uniform produce identification; besides, it salvages a little of the free circulation principle.
2. I question the logical sequence here. In fact, we may be failing to follow our reasoning through to its logical conclusion. If free circulation has been all but killed by the Soviets/GDR, why do we not administer the coup de grace ourselves by immediately declaring East Berlin "Off Limits" to all official US personnel? This move would have the following major advantages:
a. Assumption of the initiative, instead of holding our saliva until the Soviets/GDR ring the next change of bells.
b. Logical consistency.
c. Preclusion of inflammatory incidents.
d. Avoidance of the humiliation, sure to be recorded in technicolor, of having US uniformed soldiers submit even once to VOPO turnback.
e. Dignified reservation for the conference table of our legal claim to the right of free circulation.
[1 paragraph (4 lines of source text) not declassified]
3. In my opinion General Clay would support the above move, although the record is not absolutely clear in so demonstrating. During October he favored armed escorts rather than permitting civilian officials to show identification, and he has several times spoken favorably of "self-denial" as a proud principle (e.g., Berlin 864 and 927)./3/ He has, however, said that "if the demand is made for military personnel to show identification, I would recommend that we deny ourselves entry . . . ." (Berlin 920. Underlining supplied.)/4/ This latter sentence does not necessarily envision a VOPO-US-military confrontation at the checkpoint, but it is at least ambiguous.
/3/Dated October 28 and November 11, respectively. (Ibid., 762.0221/10-2861 and 762.0221/11-361)
/4/Telegram 920 is printed as Document 202. The underlined text is printed here as italics; the ellipsis is in the source text.
LGL
213. Telegram From the Mission at Berlin to the Department of State/1/
Berlin, November 13, 1961, 3 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.0221/11-1361. Top Secret; Priority; Eyes Only; No Distribution.
994. From Clay for Rusk only. Before coming back,/2/ I send herewith my conclusions from this viewpoint.
/2/Clay was returning to Washington to participate in talks with Chancellor Adenauer.
It is interesting to find even in our own reports that situation here has stabilized since tanks faced each other at Friedrichstrasse, a most unlikely fighting posture, to withdraw to a much more likely fighting posture about three thousand yards apart. The truth is there is no real change in situation here. It is equally interesting to find newspaper speculation that Khrushchev is retreating because he does not object violently to presentations from the West German Ambassador. I suspect no real change here either.
I have thought for some time that he does want to negotiate and he may believe now that he cannot do so on his own terms. He will not go to war over Berlin and if war comes, it will be because he is prepared to use force now if necessary to destroy move toward Western European unity. If this is objective, USSR will continue pressures here as part of its campaign of intimidation and to probe depth of Allied determination. Thus Berlin, while only incidental to Soviet objective, continues to have high symbolic value. More likely, USSR had as its purpose consolidation of Communist power in Eastern Europe which it may consider accomplished now. If so, this is why he is ready, perhaps anxious, to negotiate now.
Unfortunately, I no longer believe it possible within the framework of a united Allied front for us to have a firm, decisive policy governing its actions and relations with the Soviet Government and its representatives here.
It is clear to me that if a crisis does develop here short of direct military attack, we will have to move unilaterally to save West Berlin although I would expect many of our Allies to follow us even though they would not agree in advance. I have complete respect for the President's pledge to use force to prevent closure of highway open to Allied forces and to prevent interference to air traffic. It will not be this simple. Slowly, but surely, other highways, railways and waterways will cease to be available to serve this great industrial center. A single highway may keep the city alive but not healthy and its economy will die. No single action to this end will seem to warrant the risk of war and our Allies will so insist. Each action will lower the confidence of West Berlin which will rapidly wither on the vine. If and when this happens there will be consternation in Western Europe. Hence, any agreement must clearly define and guarantee the free access to West Berlin essential to its life as a great city.
Western Europe must know that USSR can destroy its cities and towns and much of its population. It has no power of its own to resist. It believes America will use its strength in retaliation which will be too late. Thus, many if not most have reached the stage where they are unwilling to make any real stand.
Thus, save France and FRG, they urge negotiations on which they will also urge almost any concession to avoid war. Pressed by our Allies, we continue to push for united Allied agreement to negotiate even under duress and before we have an agreed Allied negotiating position. Under the alternatives I have seen, we demand nothing we do not now have although we are trying to set a limit as to what we would give up.
In any event, to pursue negotiations before we have established an Allied position which we can accept seems most risky. Moreover, we must not let our own position become so weakened in obtaining Allied unity as to be ineffective. If this happens, it would be better to avoid negotiations or to negotiate unilaterally with such support as we can develop among our Allies.
Today, we have the nuclear strength to assure victory at awful cost. It no longer suffices to consider our strength as a deterrent only and to plan to use it only in retaliation. No ground probes on the highway which would use force should or could be undertaken unless we are prepared instantly to follow them with a nuclear strike. It is certain that within two or more years retaliatory power will be useless as whoever strikes first will strike last.
Meanwhile, seeking Allied unity obtainable at the lowest common denominator is actually moving us rapidly back on the road to Fortress America which, if it happens, would be at an even more awful cost.
Again, I do not believe USSR wants or is willing to risk war now although we cannot exclude the possibility that it has chosen this time for a test of strength. I think, rather, they can be stopped now before it is too late if we are ready for the challenge of wills which today we have the strength to support.
I realize full well that the answers to our problem are not just black or white. Perhaps there is a gray answer. Still, I cannot see where any lesser course now would do more than defer the challenge to a time when our relative strength would be less. If this is our course, there can still be flexibility in defining specific positions although it will be much simpler to set the limits in each instance.
Lightner
214. Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 20, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Top Secret. The source text bears no drafting information, but another copy shows that it was drafted by Day on November 16. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2061) The November 8 memorandum is not printed. (Ibid., 762.00/11-861) Norstad made this suggestion at a meeting with the President on November 7; see numbered paragraph 6, Document 205.
SUBJECT
Possible Meeting with Khrushchev in Berlin
In your memorandum of November 8 you asked for my comments on a suggestion made by General Norstad that you might summon Khrushchev to a meeting in Berlin at some stage in the Berlin crisis.
We must distinguish, of course, between the sort of meeting General Norstad suggests, which would be a response to a particular and critical contingency, and the sort that could occur in the course of negotiations on a Berlin settlement. The latter might have occurred prior to a contingency of this gravity, and the meeting in question would then be a second meeting.
In our planning for the Berlin situation we have always had in mind that at some point, in a situation of this nature, a meeting at the highest level with the Soviet Union might be desirable. We have not discussed this extensively with our Allies, but we have included a proposal which could involve such a meeting in our quadripartite planning for the contingency that Allied or German land access to Berlin is blocked. The meeting would be consistent with our planning for other contingencies as well, and there is nothing in existing contingency plans which would be incompatible with the holding of such a meeting.
It is difficult to say this far in advance whether a bilateral meeting would be preferable to one at which other Western statesmen would be present. Our quadripartite contingency planning would normally envisage a Four-Power summit meeting. However, I think it would be well to plan privately for a possible bilateral meeting in the event that this should appear in the circumstances to be the most promising.
With respect to location, Berlin would certainly provide a dramatic site for such an event. A number of considerations must be weighed in the final choice, however, among them the possibility that our Allies would feel that a bilateral meeting would be particularly inappropriate in Berlin, give the Four-Power character of the city. Also, the likelihood of the meeting proving successful would have to be considered, since lack of success in Berlin might have a particularly depressing effect on the Berlin population.
In summary, the idea of a bilateral meeting certainly merits our further consideration. The Department will prepare more detailed plans, of a unilateral US nature, regarding it. This planning will include consideration of site and composition, but the final determination on these points will likely have to be made at a stage closer to the actual contingency.
Dean Rusk
215. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 20, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
THE NEED FOR NEGOTIATIONS
Kissinger believes that the Germans really do not want--though they expect--negotiations and I am inclined to think he is right. That makes it more important than ever to persuade them of our determination on this point and the reasons for it, as follows:
1. We believe that without negotiations a whole series of bad things will happen:
A. A separate peace treaty with substantial sympathy for it among neutrals and sectors of our own opinion.
B. Salami tactics, which may be fast or slow, on the access routes.
C. Further decline in morale and hope of West Berlin.
D. Evident division among allies over countermeasures.
E. Increasing nationalism and militarism in Germany and the United States.
F. Higher tensions throughout Europe.
G. Possible war, conventional or nuclear--and in all of these eventualities a wide-spread belief that we never tested the possibility of a peaceful settlement.
2. Moreover, we believe that these negotiations must be so framed that our position has the strongest possible support both internationally and among our own people. Therefore, we cannot agree to a simple restatement of earlier positions and have urged somewhat different policies on which we hope for discussion Tuesday morning.
3. It is folly for the allies to approach negotiations in divided disarray and therefore we think it of a high importance to have
A. The support of the Chancellor;
B. His help in persuading de Gaulle.
4. We should leave the Chancellor in no doubt that the decision to move toward negotiations has been taken by you and is firm. Kissinger shares the widespread view of the German experts I have seen that your own definite and affirmative leadership is the key to winning and holding the Chancellor's confidence. For this reason Kissinger does not think we should show too much curiosity about the Kroll visit. It is on the whole advantageous to us, insofar as it is not some sort of special separate ploy, and we do not want the Chancellor to think we are worried about his little games. (Bohlen agrees on this.)
McG. B.
216. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 20, 1961, 4 p.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 27. In an unedited draft of the memorandum, the President and the Chancellor initially discussed leading political figures in each country. These 3 pages were not included in the source text. (Ibid.)
SUBJECT
Meeting between President Kennedy and Chancellor Adenauer in the President's Office
PARTICIPANTS
Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Heinz Weber (Interpreter)
United States
President Kennedy
Mrs. Lejins (Interpreter)
The Chancellor recalled the recent incident involving German Ambassador Kroll. Khrushchev had called Mr. Kroll to come to see him to tell him how Ambassador Kroll envisaged further developments in the international situation./2/ The Chancellor had carefully investigated what transpired and had asked Ambassador Kroll to come to see him. He now felt fully convinced that Ambassador Kroll could not have acted differently and could not have avoided the conversations with Khrushchev. There had for some time been a rather close relationship between Khrushchev and Kroll. Mr. Khrushchev had invited the latter repeatedly, even to his summer home, to discuss matters with him and it was therefore no surprise that he called Kroll on this occasion. The problem was that Kroll had not been fully informed of everything that had transpired in Washington in the meantime and, therefore, he had given some different versions of what developments might be. To be sure, he had done so purely as his personal opinion and much more had been made of this incident than was warranted. Following his discussion with Khrushchev, Ambassador Kroll had, that very same day, informed Ambassador Thompson and the other Western Ambassadors and had made no statement to the press himself. Shortly thereafter certain information leaked out in the press and the question was where the leaks had come from. From Russia? Or from one of the other three Western Allies? In any event, Mr. Adenauer felt that much more ado had been made about this than was justified.
/2/See Document 210.
The President stated that Ambassador Thompson was convinced that the leak had come from the Soviets themselves./3/ The President felt that an advantage of the meeting between him and the Chancellor would be that the next time Ambassador Kroll was called by Khrushchev to be questioned on what the position of the West or of Germany or of the US would be, Ambassador Kroll's task would be easy since he would know exactly what answer to make. Therefore, a concerted stand should be worked out in these meetings. Under the circumstances, the President said that Ambassador Kroll had done the best he could. For this reason, he felt that his meeting with the Chancellor and the latter's subsequent meetings with General de Gaulle and Prime Minister Macmillan should result in a firming up of a joint Western position so that there would be no doubt what Ambassador Kroll or Ambassador Thompson or any other Western Ambassador should answer if Khrushchev should question him in this matter.
/3/Thompson had transmitted his views in telegram 1517 from Moscow, November 13. (Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-1361)
The Chancellor fully agreed and stated that he felt obliged to admit, for the sake of the truth, that the German Foreign Office was not blameless in the matter, since it had not kept Ambassador Kroll fully informed on developments with reference to the Working Group in Washington. Ambassador Kroll speaks Russian fluently, which makes it on the whole rather easy for him to maintain good relations with the Soviets. However, Ambassador Kroll has strict orders never to speak with Khrushchev without any interpreter, so that the Foreign Office will have at all times a full transcript of everything that has been said based on the interpreter's notes. The Chancellor was sure that he would have a visit by Ambassador Smirnov soon after his own Washington visit. Smirnov would no doubt come to sound him out on future developments. Smirnov had come to see him before the elections by order of Khrushchev, as he had told him. He had discussed many matters, and the Chancellor had a transcript of everything that was said. Smirnov had said nothing about Berlin, however. The Chancellor had then asked him about the Berlin wall, and Smirnov had evaded a reply. After the Chancellor repeated his inquiry and expressed his interest in this matter, Smirnov had said that he would be back after the elections. Therefore, the Chancellor expected that he would have a call soon. He then added that he recalled Ambassador Kroll telling him that Khrushchev had told the latter that the Berlin wall was his (Khrushchev's) idea. Ulbricht's shoulders were much too narrow for that kind of a burden. Khrushchev admitted that the wall was an ugly thing but he felt he had had to do it. The President, at this point said, yes, he supposed to cut off the stream of refugees. Adenauer replied that is the impression you have here, that the wall was put up to cut off the stream of refugees. But that is not the true reason. The stream of refugees increased to sizeable numbers only about two weeks before the wall was put up. Actually, shortly before any measure [was] put into effect by the Soviet Union the stream of refugees suddenly increased. This was the best indication that something was about to happen. Somewhere, somehow, the people get wind of some new oppressive measure and that is what sets off the stream of refugees. This, the Chancellor felt, brought him to the topic of Berlin, which is of such great concern to both the US and Western Germany. In this connection, he wished to state his frank opinion on a number of points which might be on the agenda at tomorrow's meeting involving a military briefing. He would not care to express these opinions in a larger circle. The Russian Note regarding Berlin had been delivered in November of 1958,/4/ in other words, about three years ago. Since Mr. Khrushchev did not really insist on a solution of the problem within any very short period of time, the West had been inclined to believe that Khrushchev did not consider the Berlin question a very important one, otherwise he would not have left it pending for three years. This was a completely wrong assumption, however, since Mr. Khrushchev had made good use of the time to build up his conventional arms. Furthermore, when Khrushchev now speaks of no need for discussions this year or for some time to come, he is simply being very clever and sly.
/4/For text of the November 27, 1958, Soviet note, see Pravda, November 28, 1958; for an English translation, see Department of State Bulletin, January 19, 1959, pp. 81-89.
[Here follow five pages of discussion of the future of the Soviet Union, NATO, Soviet-Finnish relations, and Austria.]
The President thanked the Chancellor for his views. He reminded the Chancellor that ever since 1945, and especially during the past ten years, the US had been very much concerned with strengthening Western Europe and cooperating ever more closely with the European community. The Chancellor had done more than anyone else toward solidifying Western Europe, and the US was now planning to pursue the type of economic policies and trade policies that would bring the US closer together with Europe. The present problem however, was to decide what to do vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and what to do with regard to negotiation. The President was of the opinion that the US and NATO were stronger from the nuclear standpoint now than they would be in another two to three years. This did not, he felt, apply to conventional weapons, but the ultimate type of weapon. Therefore, he felt, we might do as well or better in negotiating now than later. At the same time, the President was not overly optimistic concerning the success of the negotiations concerning Berlin; as a matter of fact he felt that the chances were rather against our achieving success by these means. Nevertheless he felt that we must try to negotiate. Not only is there the problem of bringing our Allies along with us in the matter of Berlin, since they are not as committed to Berlin as we are, but we have our own nationals to deal with too. At the same time we cannot permit Khrushchev to go about voicing his desire for a peaceful settlement by way of negotiations without responding to it. Our task at the present time, as the President sees it, is first to decide whether to negotiate; secondly, how to associate the British and the French with these negotiations; thirdly, what to negotiate about; and fourthly, under what conditions to negotiate.
The Chancellor at this point made reference to the exploratory discussions carried on so far and indicated that they represented a fine attempt, the further usefulness of which was doubtful, however. He did not feel that there was much more room for additional discussions of this nature. He did not remember who originated the idea, but he had heard the suggestion that the Three Western Foreign Ministers meet with the German Foreign Minister in Paris in December to discuss the Western stand. He felt that this was a good idea and a step which must be taken. The Chancellor does not believe that Khrushchev wants war. He has so many troops deployed that he feels strong in case of a conventional war. At the same time, the Chancellor does not feel that Khrushchev wishes a nuclear war, since he knows that this would lay waste the Soviet Union and this he does not want to do. Khrushchev has emerged from the 22nd Party Congress at the height of his power within the Soviet Union, and there is an element of vanity in what he does because of his fabulous rise. The Chancellor felt that one must neither show fear to Khrushchev nor be impolite to him. He hopes that there can be negotiations on Berlin and he feels confident that such negotiations can be brought to a conclusion which will justify the expectations of the West by maintaining the freedom of Berlin, upholding Allied access to Berlin, and maintaining Western Germany's economic, financial and other ties with Berlin. The Chancellor feels that this is possible.
The President then asked whether the Chancellor was of the opinion that if the Three Western Foreign Ministers met with the German Foreign Minister in Paris and completed the development of a Western position, that the time was then ripe for the Foreign Ministers to meet with the Soviets for further discussions. The Chancellor answered yes. The President indicated that he agreed with the Chancellor's views on the limitations of further exploratory talks. He felt that these preparatory talks were not altogether satisfactory and must now move to a new forum. General de Gaulle had so far been unwilling to take part in any meetings for the purpose of working out a concerted Western position and talks with the Soviet Union since he maintained that all this was taking place under duress, to which he refused to yield. Since the deadline had now been removed the President felt the element of duress should be considered less at the present time, even though certain tensions continued. The President believed that the military briefings tomorrow (Tuesday, November 21) would convince the Chancellor that we would not need to talk from a position of military inferiority. But it was important to persuade General de Gaulle to take part in formulating a concerted stand, or the Alliance would be at odds and pulling in different directions. The only one who could really help us influence the General was, the President stated, the Chancellor.
The Chancellor promised to try and he hoped that he would succeed.
The President indicated that it would be disastrous if the West were to be divided. If General de Gaulle would not wish to go along with the West then the others might have to go on without him, and this was an unsatisfactory solution. Or else, the Western Allies would come to a complete standstill and that would give the initiative to the Soviet Union. The President was of the opinion that General de Gaulle was not opposed to negotiations with the Soviet Union as such, but he was afraid that such negotiations might not sufficiently take into account the interests of Western Germany and that consequently such negotiations might weaken the ties of the European Community and of the Atlantic Community. The President was of the opinion, first, that we should not enter into any negotiations which might threaten to weaken the ties between the Federal Republic and the West. He agreed with General de Gaulle that such negotiations would only help Khrushchev and not us. But he did not feel that we needed to enter into that kind of negotiations, since our military situation was not a critical one and therefore he felt we did not need to make concessions on that score. Secondly, while de Gaulle appears to feel that the mere will to negotiate is a confession of weakness, the President feels that this is not so. Moreover he feels that no advantage can be gained from a refusal to negotiate. He does not feel that the situation regarding Berlin will be improved by permitting it to continue for another year or two. The status quo in Berlin is not a happy one and it lays the population of Berlin open to further and continued harassment. This in itself is bad. We must negotiate in order to improve the lot of the Berlin population.
The Chancellor strongly agreed, stating that, unless the lot of the Berlin population is improved, their hopes will go down, capital will leave Berlin, and the situation will further deteriorate. The Chancellor intends to discuss these implications with the General and hopes to convince him that matters cannot be permitted to continue in this manner.
The President expressed his opinion that further inaction on the part of the -West gives Khrushchev further psychological advantages. Mr. Spaak visited the President only today and at one point expressed the opinion that France would have to be isolated if de Gaulle held to his views./5/ But France, in the President's opinion, is the key to Europe and therefore every effort must be made to persuade de Gaulle.
/5/A memorandum of Spaak's conversation with the President at 10 a.m. is in Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2061.
The Chancellor was emphatic in stating that it would be wrong to isolate de Gaulle and France, and that, instead, both must be won over to the views of the other Western Allies.
The President agreed with this, stating that Spaak had expressed this opinion only in the event that such efforts were unsuccessful, but agreed that every effort must be made to win de Gaulle over. Again the President reiterated that the chief hope for winning over de Gaulle is the Chancellor. The General experienced some difficulties during World War II which have created certain reservations in him vis-à-vis the Anglo-Saxon world. De Gaulle is primarily a European.
In explanation of de Gaulle's attitude, the Chancellor asked the President whether he knew the former Prime Minister of Luxembourg, Mr. Bech. Mr. Bech had told Adenauer about his experiences interpreting during the war for Churchill, de Gaulle, Roosevelt and even General Eisenhower. He indicated that de Gaulle was very badly treated by these gentlemen, and de Gaulle had confirmed this to the Chancellor. De Gaulle will never forget this. Moreover, the Chancellor reminded the President that the hostility existing between Britain and France is centuries old, much older, in fact than the enmity between France and Germany.
The Chancellor was very gratified to note that a real feeling of friendship and mutual appreciation has been created between the French and the German peoples./6/
/6/The unedited draft of this memorandum of conversation concludes with the following three paragraphs:
"The Chancellor stated that he wished to say only one more thing before joining the others in the Cabinet Room, but he wished the President to know that he felt very seriously about this. If it came to any clash between the West and the Soviet Union, then the West, including the US, could be stronger than the Soviet Union only if nuclear weapons were used from the very beginning. Otherwise, the West could not succeed.
"President Kennedy replied by stating that the US position is that we will use nuclear weapons only if there were indications that they would be used against us, or it were apparent that conventional forces were defeating our conventional forces. This included the type of seizure of territory that the Chancellor had had reference to. Under the above circumstances the US was prepared to use nuclear weapons. That was the reason why we had so many nuclear weapons in Western Germany. They were for tactical as well as strategic purposes. The President continued by saying that even though we might have an agreement on the use of nuclear forces, we must continue to strengthen our conventional forces, if only to give more credibility to the strength and existence of our nuclear power. If Khrushchev does not see evidence of any conventional weapons of any consequence in our possession, then he will not believe that we have any nuclear weapons or intent to use them. For this reason the additional six billion dollars appropriated for military purposes since January have been spent one half on nuclear weapons and one half on conventional weapons.
"The Chancellor expressed the hope that during his present visit he might have the chance to discuss nuclear weapons further. The President indicated that this might be particularly profitable after the military briefings."
At the conclusion of their private meeting the President and the Chancellor met with their senior advisers and reviewed the main points of their own discussion. The Chancellor suggested that he write immediately to President de Gaulle summarizing his conversation with the President and indicating his desire to discuss Berlin with him. The President thought this was a good idea. (Memorandum of conversation; ibid., Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994)
217. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 21, 1961, 9 a.m.
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 762.00/11-2161. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and approved in S on November 26. The meeting was held in the Secretary's Conference Room at the Department of State.
SUBJECT
Negotiations on Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
American
Secretary
Mr. Ball, Mr. Kohler, Mr. McNamara, Ambassador Dowling,
Mr. Bohlen, Mr. Nitze, Mr. Hillenbrand
German
Foreign Minister Schroeder, Defense Minister Strauss,
Under Secretary Carstens, Ambassador Grewe, Mr. Krapf,
Mr. Schnippenkoetter, General Schnez, Mr. Simon,
Mr. Hille
Starting with the status of Berlin, the Secretary said he did not know whether the variance in legal interpretation between us and the Germans would make much difference in respect to what we said to the Soviets. He supposed we might try at the outset to get some sort of all-Berlin arrangement and try to bring down the wall. There was no reason to think this would succeed. We might then insist on the status quo, maintaining our rights or moving towards some sort of independent city of West Berlin free to make its own arrangements with the rest of the world. We would not contemplate anything which would weaken its ties with the Federal Republic.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said the Germans thought it would be best to maintain the occupation rights as the source of rights. There was no reason to change the position of the three occupying powers, as the Soviets demanded, since there was no legal basis for the Communist claim that this would take place. On the basis of the maintenance of occupation rights the relationship between Berlin and the Federal Republic could be built.
The Secretary asked whether the Foreign Minister could comment on how he saw this working out in actual discussions with the Soviets. If the Soviets said that there was nothing to be discussed in regard to East Berlin, then the harder we would presumably stress the point that they would have correspondingly less right to have a voice in the affairs of West Berlin.
Schroeder observed that the Soviets accept the fact of the Western presence in Berlin on the basis of the right of conquest. There was no reason to eliminate this. The relations of the Federal Republic to Berlin had to be associated with this right of conquest. If the existing status were changed, then the West would be starting from a zero point and all relationships with Berlin would have to be established from the beginning. The West should, therefore, start with what it had now in any negotiations.
The Secretary indicated we could agree that in negotiations we should start with occupation rights. Any fresh arrangement would be superimposed on occupation rights which would remain in the background to be called upon if required. Schroeder agreed this was the German view. In dealing with the Soviets, the Secretary continued, we may find that agreed practical arrangements may turn out to rest upon different theories. For example, in agreeing on an independent city, the Soviets could claim their view while we would maintain occupation rights in the background. Schroeder pointed out that, from the aspect of international law, the West must emphasize legal occupation rights because this was the most convincing public argument open to it. The Secretary said he did not see how we could agree to a de facto incorporation of West Berlin into the Federal Republic and at the same time find a solid basis for access to West Berlin. Schroeder commented that there were mixed views in Germany on complete incorporation of West Berlin in the Federal Republic. His government took the view that, at least for the time being, there could be no full incorporation for the reason indicated. The Western source of access rights was linked directly to occupation rights and the Germans had no share of those rights.
The Secretary observed that we did not want to make too much a point of this, but he might mention that there was no question but that West Berlin was now our specific responsibility. The American people understood this. If West Berlin were incorporated into the Federal Republic, then we would in a sense become gendarmes for the Federal Republic. This would not be easy for the American public to understand. Schroeder said he fully agreed. Allied rights must overshadow the rights of the Federal Republic which must remain in the background. The Secretary wondered if we could not agree that what we are saying with respect to the status of West Berlin is essentially for ourselves. What we may say to the Soviets may go beyond this. For example, we might propose an all-Berlin solution, or we might say that, if you claim East Berlin is gone, then West Berlin is gone for you. We will strive very hard to protect the full freedom of action of West Berlin to maintain ties with the Federal Republic.
Schroeder indicated that the question of a plebiscite might arise in negotiations with the Soviets. If it did, it should first be proposed for all of Berlin, and only later for West Berlin.
The Secretary said he wondered if it made any difference to the Federal Republic if these relationships which were under discussion took the form of contractual arrangements or agreements. Schroeder commented that this, in fact, did create a problem because of the West German constitution. If relationships were put on a contractual basis then an amendment of the constitution might be necessary and this would be difficult in an internal constitutional sense. The Berliners and the West Germans would consider it the "status quo minus." The problem was essentially a psychological one. The answer also depended partly on whether any great improvement of access could be achieved. If so, this would perhaps make handling of the constitutional problem somewhat easier. The Secretary asked if there could not be an understanding between West Berlin and the Federal Republic introduced by the statement that pending reunification or full implementation of the constitution, the Federal Republic and West Berlin would establish the following relationships. Schroeder said he believed the decision of the Supreme Constitutional Court was that Berlin was a Land of the Federal Republic, apart from certain Allied reservations. The Secretary's question could not be answered without further study. If, in a complete arrangement on Berlin, access thereto were improved, the status question would lose importance. This might be a means of bringing pressure on the Soviets. These legal questions were not so important from the viewpoint of the Federal Republic, but the Berliners' feeling of security depended on (a) the Allied guarantee, and (b) maintenance of vital ties with the Federal Republic. The Berliners were especially sensitive regarding the latter, and the psychological factor was, therefore, more important than the purely legal. There were many Federal offices in Berlin--some eighty in all. From the viewpoint of the Federal Republic these were perhaps not so important, but from the viewpoint of West Berlin the departure of any of them would be interpreted as the beginning of a general exodus. Removal of the Federal coat of arms from a building would be taken as a signal of withdrawal by the Berlin population. Mr. Kohler commented that we agreed the ties would stay as they are. The question was how to do this. The Ministers might even find independent status for the city consistent with our legal position, but this was obviously related to the improvements we could get. The question should be further studied.
Dr. Carstens asked whether the Soviets would not, in talks, say that the Berliners should decide their economic and cultural relations, but would strongly object to the maintenance of political ties. He, therefore, questioned whether this whole approach was useful. If we discussed relationships, the Soviets would try to impose all sorts of conditions on their agreement. The Secretary commented that if the Soviets insisted that East Berlin could not be discussed, then we would say that West Berlin could not be discussed. We cannot accept the claim that what's mine is mine and what's yours is negotiable as a basis for discussion. But we may need some formula so that the Soviets could say that this is what they were talking about.
With respect to access, the Secretary stated that, in his talks with Gromyko, he had emphasized that there could be no diminution in our access to West Berlin. We have the impression that the Soviets will try to apply pressure to uncontrolled forms of access, especially air. We have taken the view that both military and civilian access is a part of our occupation rights. We have taken the position that civilian access is important. We would not accept East German censorship on air access; they would use this to suffocate the city. We have also taken the position that our access rights are not subject to negotiation between the Soviets and the GDR. The Soviets cannot give away something they do not have. If we could improve or reinforce our rights, so much the better, but it seems that the West Germans want to add to our rights by specific coverage of civilian access. Schroeder said the Federal Republic would like to see the agreement specifically cover civilian rights of access. He could see that there is a difference in view. The Federal Republic says that civilian rights depended on Allied rights. This was recognized in the Jessup-Malik agreement of 1949./2/ The IZT agreement of 1960, which was the first to link the trade agreement to Berlin access, used very vague language to the effect that any concern that traffic might be disturbed or impaired by either of the participating parties was completely unfounded. A permanent solution to the civilian access problem could only be reached if this were blanketed into occupation access rights.
/2/For text of this agreement, see Foreign Relations, 1949, vol. III, p. 751.
The Secretary observed that our position was that the right of the occupying powers is that Berlin have free access. Any mention in the IZT of civilian access was in addition thereto. The Secretary asked whether the Germans could see any practical effect in covering German access in an agreement. Dr. Carstens said an agreement should include civilian access. After some discussion it was agreed that the term "civilian access" rather than "German access" should be used for purposes of clarity.
Mr. Kohler observed that the problem seemed to be more a semantic one than a substantive one. What we want is at least one uncontrolled means of access. If this can be obtained on the Autobahn so much the better, but at least it should be uncontrolled in the air. But we can never establish this as a formal right in an agreement at the present time. As in the period of the air lift, under crisis conditions we would assimilate civilian access into military access. Ambassador Grewe commented that the crucial problem is in the wording of the access guarantee. We cannot refer only to Allied personnel. German civilian traffic must be covered as well. The Federal Republic was not seeking express guarantees or a formula seeking new rights. Mr. Kohler made the point that the longer civilian traffic could be covered by the IZT the better. We do not want the present practical arrangements for civilian access to be disturbed. If after the peace treaty the East Germans want to deal with the Federal Republic on a government-to-government level regarding trade, they would have to consider the question before throwing the responsibility for access to the Allies. Schroeder said that the Federal Republic had no agreement on access with the East Germans outside of the IZT. It could not be assumed that this would suffice in the long run. Civilian access had to be covered by the Allied mantle to avoid pressure in the years to come.
The Secretary said that if you and we are clear that we will not accept any dimunition in our access rights and these include both military and civilian access, and at least one important means of access must be beyond East German control, then it did not seem necessary to go beyond this. He asked Dr. Carstens and Mr. Kohler to try to arrive at an agreed formulation of the discussion.
With respect to "dealings" with the GDR, Foreign Minister Schroeder said here was a subject on which the Federal Republic had considerable skepticism. One overestimated the capacity of the Federal Republic if one imagined that anything reasonable could come out of negotiations between the West Germans, acting on behalf of the Western powers, and the East Germans. The Federal Republic has no real means of exercising pressure on the GDR. The Allies must therefore keep matters in their own hands without regard to how unpleasant this might be in terms of dealing with the GDR. He cited his own experience as Minister of the Interior to show how the GDR could bring pressure on the Federal Republic with respect to Berlin access. The Federal Republic was not able to tighten border controls directed against the GDR because it feared reprisals against Berlin access. This weakness arose from the pure facts of geography. If the GDR deliberately disturbed Allied access, the Federal Republic could not do very much. It was ready to help on technical difficulties. The Secretary commented that we have said to the Soviets that we will not negotiate with the GDR on access. We have said such negotiations must be between the three Allied powers and the Soviets. Under the circumstances such an understanding might be superimposed on the Soviet-GDR peace treaty. This could clarify the access problem, but the sanction behind access would still be our presence in West Berlin as well as the Federal Republic's trade with the GDR. What we are concerned about is the situation which would result if there is a peace treaty and the Soviets simply leave the access checkpoints. No one will then be there except East German officials. We had assumed that the Federal Republic would prefer to handle technical arrangements with the East Germans through West Germans.
Schroeder commented that the GDR would respect the Allies more than the Federal Republic. It would be a difficult situation if the Federal Republic were to discuss procedures and formalities with the GDR and then arrived at agreements which affected the Allies. He could understand the Allied principle that the Western powers did not speak with the GDR. The solution, therefore, was to set forth the arrangements so clearly in an agreement with the Soviets that everything thereafter would be automatic and no further discussions would be necessary. The Secretary observed that perhaps some measure of misunderstanding arose out of a different view as to the kind of dealings we had in mind. These would not involve the question of our rights but such matters as traffic control. If our rights were established, we had thought the Federal Republic would prefer to do that sort of thing rather than have us do it directly. Schroeder said he could understand how the US could say that it is in the interests of the Federal Republic to deal with the GDR rather than the Allies. But the other side was full of tricks. If you have an agreement on access the GDR will want to codify this. It will make additional demands which are not acceptable to the West. The Federal Republic could not reduce these demands and the Western powers would have to intervene. This would put the Federal Republic in an impotent and laughable position. He referred particularly here to such matters as inspection, documentation, etc. Ambassador Grewe said the Federal Republic would always be willing to talk to the East Germans as far as controls applying to civilian traffic were concerned. Allied traffic was now being discussed. If the Soviets disappeared, a problem would be to whom the Allies might talk. The difficulty was that Federal Republic discussions with the GDR on control procedures at the checkpoints, documentation, stamps, inspections left the Federal Republic in a weak position because these matters were too intimately connected with Allied access rights.
The Secretary said that we needed to make our understanding with the Soviets sufficiently clear. We would hold them responsible under the agreement. If differences arose and no satisfaction was obtainable, then we would complain to the Soviets. Indeed if the West Germans made an unacceptable agreement for us, we would say we did not like it. The point really was whether, with respect to the some 5% of total traffic involved, the Germans would prefer that we make the arrangements at the checkpoints or the Federal Republic would prefer to do this as a part of the total picture. Schroeder commented that he thought it would be better for the Allies to do it despite the unpleasant implications for recognition. This was more consistent with the German position on civil traffic which they wished to have protected under the Allied umbrella. In this instance the legal point on non-recognition was less important than effective maintenance of access. Dr. Carstens observed that if there were physical interference, for example, damage to a bridge, this could be taken care of by the Federal Republic. If, however, it were a question of checkpoint procedures, control of luggage, identification of personnel, etc., there was no purpose in having West Germans talk to East Germans about this. This was the very issue to be discussed with the Soviets. The principle was that the Federal Republic would talk to the East Germans so far as it could. For the rest, the Western powers should talk to the Soviets. The Secretary noted that talking in Moscow would not help much when a practical problem arose at the checkpoints. Dr. Carstens observed that if the East Germans made trouble it would only be with Soviet approval. The Secretary said we may be using "talk" in a different sense. We would not negotiate with the GDR regarding our rights of access, but if a car breaks down and needs help or there are traffic questions that would be something different. Dr. Carstens said he thought this point required more study. It was necessary to distinguish between the different types of cases which might arise.
The Secretary suggested that perhaps UN assistance on the access routes might help solve some of these problems. International civil servants might serve a useful function in this connection. Dr. Carstens commented that they would also add to the difficulties of the situation. If an International Access Authority were obtained that would solve the problem. Even without such an Authority, the Secretary observed, international officials at the key points might provide the answer. Schroeder said he saw no trouble in this. Dr. Carstens, however, indicated he did not have much confidence in such a solution. The Foreign Minister maintained his view that, if this point arose in discussions, the Federal Republic could not object. The Secretary said the Soviets might claim that this would interfere with GDR sovereignty. He said an agreement might attempt to specify a little more in detail the kinds of arrangements now in effect with the Soviets at the checkpoints. In any case there could be no negotiations with respect to Allied rights of access.
218. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 21, 1961, 11 a.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Hillenbrand and Lejins and approved in S on November 26 and in the White House on November 29. The meeting was held in the Cabinet Room at the White House. Prior to this conversation with the President, Adenauer talked with Dean Acheson. A 2-page report on their meeting is ibid.
SUBJECT
Negotiations on Berlin
PARTICIPANTS
Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Foreign Minister Schroeder
Defense Minister Strauss
Under Secretary Carstens
Mr. Franz Krapf
Mr. von Eckhardt
Mr. Schnippenkoetter
Ambassador Grewe
Heinz Weber (interpreter)
United States
President Kennedy
Secretary Rusk
Secretary McNamara
Under Secretary Ball
Mr. Kohler
Mr. Bohlen
Ambassador Dowling
General Clay
Mr. Bundy
Mr. Nitze
Mr. Hillenbrand
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)
Secretary Rusk said that he had met earlier this morning for over an hour with Foreign Minister Schroeder and other members of the German delegation to discuss some of the questions on the present agenda./2/ As usual, when Ministers do the talking, the experts must tidy up matters afterwards. One of the matters discussed was the legal position of West Berlin, on which there is a difference of opinion between the U.S. and Germany. While Germany considers West Berlin to be a German "Land," with a certain suspension of its status on the basis of the 1949 action of the Military Governors, the U.S. does not consider West Berlin a "Land." Whether this difference in view would have any serious effect on the projected negotiations with the Soviets is not quite clear at this point. Both Germany and the U.S. agree that the ultimate aim of both the U.S. and the Federal Republic is to retain the freedom of West Berlin to establish its own relations and other ties with the Federal Republic, which ties are vital to the maintenance of Berlin's existence and prosperity. The U.S. recognizes the importance of the psychological aspects of the situation, since Berlin feels its existence closely tied to Allied rights; at the same time West Berlin has intimate ties with the Federal Republic. The U.S. may have to take the view that the German Basic Law is inoperative for Berlin and that Berlin can make its own contractual arrangements for its ties with the Federal Republic. If the negotiations which the U.S. envisages with the Soviet Union will assure improved access conditions, then the Federal Republic might be willing to put into the background the constitutional aspects of this matter. It is hoped that something more definite can be written up on this subject before the end of these present meetings. The Secretary wondered whether the German Foreign Minister might like to make some comment on his summary of the discussion of this point. The German Foreign Minister had nothing to add.
/2/See Document 217.
The Secretary continued that not all aspects of access to Berlin had of course been covered, but only certain ones on which there might be a difference between the U.S. and Germany. Germany was extremely anxious to see that everything was done to guarantee German access to West Berlin. The U.S. took the stand that free access to Berlin was an essential requirement, and that our right to access included both military and civilian access on the basis of our Occupation rights. The West Berliners are entitled to exercise such access, as well as those with whom West Berlin wants to communicate, including the West Germans. Thus, there should be no real difficulties between us and Germany if any arrangement which we might enter into with the Soviets makes it clear that we are talking about full access, which includes both military and civilian access; and, of course, we encompass German access in our understanding of civilian access.
The President understood on the basis of this presentation that there existed no real substantive difference between the U.S. and Germany on the matter of access to Berlin, but that the problem was essentially one of formulation.
The Secretary indicated that the Germans feared that when we talk to the Soviets of Allied access we might refer only to Allied access or infer that this did not include German access. West Berlin cannot live without full access. As a footnote, the Secretary wished to add that there might perhaps be an advantage in having some kind of a new agreement or arrangement with the Soviets on the matter of access. Such an agreement would not destroy our Occupation rights but rather would be superimposed on them. The Occupation rights would remain in the background and could be called upon if needed. Thus the new contractual agreement could spell out in detail what the rights of access were, but they would be based on our Occupation rights. In this manner the Soviets could then concentrate on the new agreement as such, while we could move confidently because all this was based on our Occupation rights, pending a peace treaty with Germany as a whole.
The question of possible dealings with the GDR on matters of access needed to be worked on further, the Secretary indicated. We supposed that first of all it would be necessary to clarify the right of access with the Soviets. We would have to make sure that these rights would in no way be diminished. We would point out that we expected the Soviets to guarantee these rights, and that the Soviets would have to ensure that East Germany would comply with whatever was agreed upon. We, the U.S., would not enter into any negotiations on access rights with the GDR itself.
The problem before us was what might happen after the Soviet Union enters into a separate peace treaty with the GDR. What will happen if the Soviets should subsequently disappear from the checkpoints and withdraw from administrative arrangements with reference to access? Who in that case should take over dealing with the GDR on the implementation of access rights? In order to minimize the international aspects of the GDR, we have suggested to the West Germans that they undertake to maintain the necessary contacts in technical matters. Apparently there has been some misunderstanding on what we mean when we speak about "talking" to the GDR. We do not mean negotiations, but only practical day-by-day dealings, such as might be involved in clearing up traffic jams, doing certain repair work, or getting a barge through a canal. The question of the access rights themselves, or any indicated deliberate political obstruction of access, is something entirely different. Then, we would look to the Soviet Union for satisfaction and neither we nor the Federal Republic will negotiate on such matters with the GDR. At this point the Federal Republic is considering whether it would prefer the Western powers to take over practical dealings with the GDR or whether they themselves should assume this responsibility.
The German Foreign Minister stated that this is a problem which does not involve the matter of recognition of the GDR, but that Germany is concerned about the safeguarding of civilian access. The Federal Republic fears chicanery on the part of East Germany, which may demand unreasonable controls, inspections and institute other forms of harassment. This type of thing will be much more difficult for Germany to deal with than for the Allied powers. It is a purely practical matter for Germany.
The Secretary of State voiced the opinion that on the basis of what has transpired in the conversations of this morning, it would appear that it might be necessary to prepare a detailed description of what the present exercise of the right of access consists of, so that we can insist vis-à-vis the Soviet Union that East Germany must permit the exercise of access at least on the level described in this document. This would require a great deal of detail in order to avoid new access formulae by East Germany. This description of the exact character of the access to be exercised should be included in whatever agreement we reach with the Soviets.
The President indicated that in his discussions with the German Ambassador, he had learned that talks of the nature now discussed had already been taking place between East and West Germans on a number of technical matters.
The Secretary of State then pointed out that the real problem left now was how to handle the 5% of traffic which was the military part of the total. He did not anticipate too much of a problem with the civilian traffic.
The President pointed out that it was very important that every detail of this be worked out.
The Secretary of State then recalled that at one point in the morning's discussions, the possibility of a certain amount of UN participation in this matter had been brought up. He felt that there might be a certain advantage to having international civil servants enter the access-control picture. They would be individuals on the spot, without political implications, to whom either side could talk. Such UN participation might prove to be a barrier to bad faith.
The German Foreign Minister then indicated that, if the UN were brought into the picture in this manner, the occasion would certainly arise where the Secretary General of the UN would have the authority and the need to talk to the GDR. The Foreign Minister felt that this constituted an element of recognition of the GDR which, to him, represented a much greater danger and was less desirable than direct talks between the Allied Powers and the GDR.
The Secretary added that would be no such complication, of course, if there were an International Autobahn [Access] Authority. The Secretary of State then pointed out that the morning's discussion had not gotten around to the stationing of UN troops in West Berlin. To be sure, the Soviets had offered Soviet forces to be placed in West Berlin as guarantors of the freedom of the city. We opposed the stationing of Soviet troops in West Berlin. We were strong enough to safeguard and defend West Berlin ourselves. Moreover, we did not feel that the Soviets had any experience in safeguarding democratic freedom in any area. He felt sure, however, that the question of stationing a UN contingent in Berlin might well arise. He did not feel that the UN was inclined to assume additional expenses and responsibilities such as would be involved in stationing a contingent of troops in Berlin. He also knew that West Germans were skeptical about such a contingent.
The German Foreign Minister confirmed the Secretary of State's statement, indicating that the Federal Republic much preferred to see their share of UN troops in the form of British, French or American troops. Germany was truly skeptical, however, about UN forces as such.
The Secretary of State stated that we did not assume, by any means, that such UN forces would replace the forces of the Three Western Allies. Nor--as the President interjected--assume our responsibility.
The Secretary of State continued that the stationing of a UN contingent would make it much more difficult for the Soviets to resume their pressure on Berlin. Moreover, if UN organizations and activity were brought into West Berlin, the significance of the city would be greatly increased and this measure might put a stop to further harassment by the Soviets. It was no guarantee, however.
The German Foreign Minister pointed out that if it were possible to bring UN authorities and activity into West Berlin this would be highly desirable, but he would first see whether this is really possible before he would consider placing a UN contingent there. The stationing of a UN contingent in Berlin would really be contrary to the usual UN practice. Usually, the host country is expected to guarantee the safety of the UN activity in a given locality. In this case, it would appear as though the UN itself were having to protect its own organization. Thus, he would prefer that the matter of stationing UN activities in Berlin be taken up first, and the UN contingent left for later eventualities.
The Chancellor interjected at this point that he considered the establishment of UN activities in West Berlin extremely important, especially as a psychological measure, since it would convince the Berlin population that there was no intention of ever sacrificing them to the Soviet Union. UN soldiers, on the other hand, did not constitute such a guarantee.
The Secretary of State indicated that this was not a matter which the U.S. felt we should press. It remained to be seen whether some UN contingent might be advantageous, but it was a question to be left open.
The President then asked whether the Chancellor would like to comment on the points thus far covered.
The Chancellor indicated that the first point, i.e., the constitutional status of Berlin, is what he considers most important of all. While Western Germany is ready to do everything in its power for the benefit of the Berlin population, he feels that what is right is right and must be upheld. He himself was the chairman of the Constitutional Committee that drafted the Basic Law. He was, therefore, well acquainted with what had happened in connection with the suspension provisions concerning Berlin's status. He realized that certain things had happened subsequently, which were not quite in accord with these provisions, but the Allies had not objected, since they had not considered these matters particularly serious. Only in one instance had they vetoed a measure thus undertaken. But, from the standpoint of international law, the Chancellor felt, the status of Berlin was very clear and had to be upheld--including the suspension provisions.
The Secretary of State pointed out that there had been general agreement in the earlier morning meeting to do everything possible to uphold West Berlin's freedom of action and its right to maintain its ties with Western Germany, since these were fundamental to Berlin's well-being.
The German Foreign Minister recalled a discussion carried on during the earlier morning meeting about the existence of about 80 Federal German Agencies in West Berlin. While the Federal Republic did not consider many of these particularly important, it felt nevertheless that as long as they were there, their removal would be a psychological blow to the Berlin population, who were very sensitive on such matters. Thus, if the Federal German coat of arms were to be taken down in even one of these offices, it would be interpreted by the Berlin population as a sign of retreat and withdrawal. Thus, the Foreign Minister reiterated this matter was a psychological rather than a constitutional one.
The Chancellor on his part reiterated that he considered this a purely psychological problem, and he wanted to hear no further talk about the removal of coats of arms. He felt certain that in their talks with the Soviet Union the US would be called upon to make certain concessions. If this were so, the US could insist on the introduction of UN activities in Berlin as a sort of replacement, and this would help the situation.
The President confirmed that we should start negotiating on the basis of a position, such as outlined by the Secretary of State, which would insist on the complete freedom of Berlin to maintain its relations with West Germany and with whomever it pleases. He had understood that Ambassador Kroll told Khrushchev that the ties between West Germany and West Berlin were not negotiable. Nevertheless, before we were through negotiating, there might of necessity develop some limitations on the freedom of Berlin.
The German Foreign Minister reiterated what he had said in the earlier morning meeting; namely, that if the negotiations with the Soviets would result in greatly improved and more secure access this might ease many of the other Berlin problems, which would then be viewed in a somewhat different light.
The President then stated he understood that point five had not been covered in the earlier meeting and he proposed that he and the Chancellor withdraw to his office for a private conversation, while the remaining members of the two delegations went over the unresolved points of the agenda./3/
/3/See Document 219.
At this point (11:45 a.m.) the President and the Chancellor withdrew to the President's office.
The Secretary noted that, in his discussions with Gromyko he had the impression that the latter was not only talking about the external boundaries of Germany but also about the internal demarcation line. It is clear that we are not going to recognize this demarcation line as an international frontier nor are we going to recognize the GDR. As to the external boundary, we see no way of changing the Oder-Neisse line in the foreseeable future. Admittedly this point should not be given away free, but we should have it in the background as a possibility for discussion if something valuable could be gained thereby. The Secretary did not see how in this country we could keep open the question of moving the frontier further to the East. We recognize of course that in the past the Federal Republic has renounced the use of force in this context and is willing to repeat this assurance. We on our side are prepared to consider postponing any formal recognition until reunification and the Peace Treaty can be worked out but support of revision of this line to a point further east is not our policy.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said that the Federal Republic was prepared to consider repeating to the Soviet Union its undertaking never to have recourse to force to modify the boundary of Germany or to achieve reunification. It is prepared to accept a guarantee of this by the three Western Powers. However, if it were to go beyond this it would be giving up the last thing which could play a role in East-West negotiations. Something which could be used for profit would be abandoned without profit in unfavorable psychological circumstances. Moreover, he did not believe we could get much from the Soviets for acknowledgment of the Oder-Neisse boundary. He was aware that, in 1946, Secretary of State Byrnes had stated that the United States would support a revision of German frontiers in Poland's favor. However, the extent of the area to be ceded to Poland was to be determined only in the final peace settlement. This left open the question of how far any border rectifications had to go. In summary then, Schroeder continued, the Federal Republic was opposed to going beyond renunciation of the use of force. It was opposed to narrowing down the field of future maneuver at the time of a peace settlement without benefit at the present time.
The Secretary said he was not at all sure that this was a point which gave us great bargaining value. The Soviets know that, in general, the Western countries are not prepared to support a movement of the line to the East. There has been the de Gaulle statement, and public opinion in most Western countries would agree with it. Therefore we could probably not get much for a final definition of the boundary in any event. If, however, the impression were left that despite its declaration of renunciation of force the Federal Republic intended to pursue an active policy with respect to its Eastern boundary, this would become an element of instability in Central Europe. It would enable the Soviets to keep Central Europe stirred up regarding German long range intentions. He believed it correct to say that Germany's reconciliation with the West after World War II was of utmost importance in historical terms. The Eastern countries regarded this process in a different light. They did not believe in the purely defensive purposes of the Alliance or the peacefulness of German intentions.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said he understood the points the Secretary had made. If we were now at the stage of an East-West détente, then we could discuss frontier questions quite intensively. But today Germany is divided and the Eastern boundary of the country is within the GDR. The East German regime has solemnly recognized this boundary. The subject of discussion with the Soviets at the present time is Berlin--a question which the Soviets unnecessarily and artificially raised. To discuss the boundary question in this context would be to discuss it in the wrong context. It would create serious political difficulties within the Federal Republic. It would effect a boundary settlement unaccompanied by any other normal aspects of a peace settlement. To sum up, Schroeder concluded, this was the wrong time, place and context for resolution of the Oder-Neisse question.
Defense Minister Strauss asked facetiously whether it would not be a violation of GDR sovereignty if the Western Powers attempted to guarantee one of its borders.
The Secretary commented that, as far as we are concerned, we have emphasized to the Soviets the problem of buying the same horse over again. The President had put it in terms of their attempting to sell an apple for an orchard. We do not believe we should once again be called upon to purchase our basic rights in Berlin. The Soviets will, however, surely raise the boundary question, and he did not believe that the American people were interested in any change in the Oder-Neisse line.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said he could accept what the Secretary said. If the Soviets were really prepared to make a satisfactory Berlin arrangement, then the question would arise whether the matter of peace treaty negotiations were [would] not become pertinent, but outside of the forum of Berlin discussions. If, however, the West gave up in advance, all questions related to the peace treaty, then the Federal Republic would have nothing to gain from a peace treaty. This would destroy the theory we have, which is that a Germany unified on a basis of self-determination is in the best position to negotiate a peace treaty. Although it is true that many people in the world consider the Oder-Neisse line settled, certain facts also remain on the other side of the argument. He could also agree that the longer the West waited on this the weaker its position became, but he had grave reservations relative to settling the Oder-Neisse question within the Berlin context.
The Secretary asked the Foreign Minister whether he would be willing to present his thoughts as to how he saw the future of reunification. We on our side believed it important to sustain the principle of unification and self-determination in Germany. He wondered how Foreign Minister Schroeder saw movement coming in this direction. How could a solution be advanced?
Schroeder said that the basis for reunification is a free Germany and a piece of this free Germany is our battle over Berlin. If the Federal Republic could "radiate" its influence this would prevent a further decline of the GDR into total communism. Maintenance of psychological connections was important. To reiterate, the Foreign Minister continued, it was necessary to increase possible contacts with the GDR. It was clear, of course, that a totalitarian system such as that in the GDR could only be eliminated from the outside, but the West could not contemplate forceful intervention in the GDR. A difficult historical process was involved, for which no schedule could be set. But, Schroeder continued, we have experienced an acceleration of historical developments in the past because of a shift in the basic forces involved. In 1953, he recalled, Defense Minister Strauss and he had come to Washington, and the main subject of discussion then had been the Saar problem. This seemed beyond solution at the time. Yet 8 years afterwards no one even mentions the subject. Certainly the Saar question is more simple than the present problem, but it was nevertheless a complicated problem in its own right with deep and difficult historical roots. Schroeder referred to the fact that he had used the word "contacts", but he wanted to point out that he meant it in a somewhat different sense than that normally attributed to it by the US. He did not believe you could overcome a system such as that in the GDR by administrative contacts, if the system was not already shattered internally. The Federal Republic was however, prepared to increase its economic and cultural contacts, even if it did not believe these would bring on reunification. Such a program was not entirely lacking in danger. If such contacts tended to make GDR leaders seem socially acceptable, then the people of the GDR would hold responsible those who contributed to this. In addition to the factors he had already mentioned, Schroeder concluded, a long term program for reunification also required maintenance of Western strength and unity.
The Secretary commented that he was not at all sure that there was much difference between us when we speak of "contacts". There is some evidence that the people of central and eastern Europe feel themselves part of the tradition of Western civilization. They are attracted to the West. In the case of Poland we feel that the multiplication of our contacts tends to move the Poles in a direction we want to see them move. We have trade with Poland and a lively exchange program. We assume that this great underlying sense of wanting to belong to the West also applies to East Germany. Our effort therefore is to get in to contact with the feelings indicated, even if it involves some official dealings.
Foreign Minister Schroeder said it was sometimes easier for the Federal Republic to do this with foreigners under an ideological system completely different than with the GDR. In other words, were it not for the Oder-Neisse question, the Federal Republic would find it easier to have relations with Poland than with the East German system. There was no doubt of course that 90% of the population of the GDR opposed the regime, but the iron band of the power system in control made all the difference. If the West did anything to encourage an uprising in East Germany, it must be prepared to help the uprising. Otherwise such action would be irresponsible. This consideration set a limit on the kind of activity which the Federal Republic can undertake.
In response to the Secretary's query as to whether the frequently heard statement that there is no alternative to Ulbricht meant that the Soviets could not rely on the bureaucracy or the governmental structure of the GDR, Schroeder indicated that comments on this subject had to be largely based on speculation. People often think of the Ulbricht problem in terms of his special relationship with Moscow as a result of his many years there. He believed that any successor would not conduct policy in a greatly different fashion or basically alter the structure of the government. What would take place would be a pure power struggle. The regime in the GDR was a fairly stable one.
Turning to the subject of European security, the Secretary pointed out that the US is not interested in disengagement. We had had an experience in Korea with disengagement and the results were unhappy. As the Secretary had previously indicated, this would involve an abandonment by the US of its responsibility as a member of NATO. We expect to have a continuing substantive commitment of US power to the NATO Alliance. We were not interested in discrimination against the Federal Republic. In the past the point had been made that, in the essential, confrontation of the East-West power blocs physically occurs in Germany. Attempts to reduce this confrontation were interpreted as aimed at the Federal Republic. This is not what we have in mind. He wondered whether Schroeder saw anything in the disarmament field which might help reduce the scale of Soviet forces in East Germany. Did he see any basis on which the concentration of Soviet forces could be reduced?
Schroeder observed that the Federal Republic considered that the subject of European security could only be discussed in the context of German reunification and should not be raised purely in a Berlin context. The principle is the same as in the case of the Oder-Neisse line. As to the confrontation question, he did not believe that a reduction in Soviet troop strength would change the basic political situation in the GDR, or solve any of its other problems, even if the Soviets were willing.
Defense Minister Strauss said he agreed with Schroeder's general assessment of this question but one aspect was worth further study. Decrease or withdrawal of Soviet forces from the area could be considered if a change of the political situation in the area affected would automatically or gradually be introduced from the outside. Kennan had asked this question. However, he (Strauss) considered it an optimistic speculation that withdrawal of Soviet troops from the area would prevent their speedy return. NATO was not in a position to prevent the re-entry of the Soviet armies because of its basically defensive nature and the grave risks of nuclear war which would be involved. Disengagement is a useful means to reduce tension when both sides are prepared to give self-determination to the people in the area of control. Under current circumstances, however, he did not believe that it would lower tension but would instead create a political vacuum which would bring all sorts of military and political dangers with it. He did not believe that Khrushchev was merely a Russian nationalist interested in securing the frontiers of Russia. He saw Germany as a strategic objective necessary to the further onward march of Communism. Co-existence was merely a methodology to achieve this. If the Soviet Union could pry loose Germany from NATO it would have achieved its next step of marching to the Rhine. As long as the Communists speak of world conquest and act on the basis of that objective the prerequisite of disengagement is lacking. The Communists are not interested in moving their influence back. At this point Strauss produced a map which, he explained, showed that the Western European potential was equal to that of the Soviet bloc up to the Urals. However, 90% of the European potential was concentrated in an area containing only 25% of the Communist potential. Europe could not be backed up any further without suffering mortally. Therefore a firm line of defense was essential.
219. Memorandum of Conversation/1/
Washington, November 21, 1961, 11:30 a.m.-1 p.m.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Adenauer Visit. Secret. Drafted by Lejins and approved in the White House on November 27. The meeting was held in the President's office at the White House. An unedited draft of this memorandum contains paragraphs on John J. McCloy and nuclear testing. (Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994)
SUBJECT
Private Conversations Between the President and Chancellor Adenauer
PARTICIPANTS
Germany
Chancellor Adenauer
Mr. Weber (interpreter)
United States
President Kennedy
Mrs. Lejins (interpreter)
The Chancellor opened the conversation indicating that he felt the most important thing about the agreements to be reached at the present time was that they should be as flexible as possible.
The President agreed. He felt that the question of access to Berlin is the key issue and this matter should be worked out in as much detail as possible. He felt that the experience of the Federal Republic and the people of Berlin should be helpful in working out all the necessary details on this question prior to the meeting of the Foreign Ministers in Paris.
The Chancellor made the statement that the people of Berlin had grown overly sensitive, owing to the tense situation under which they had been living for so long. If the final results of negotiations with the Soviets made for improved living conditions for the people of Berlin, along with maintenance of their freedom, then the U.S. need not fear any difficulties from the German side.
The President then indicated that there was one matter which he would like to discuss with the Chancellor. He made reference to an article by Walter Lippmann in this morning's paper and asked whether the Chancellor had, perchance, read it. The article stated that the German people have come to realize by now that it has become impossible for the West to gain the reunification of Germany in the face of Soviet opposition. The Soviet Union would always attempt to maintain East Germany as a separate entity. This would increase the Soviet power position and, so Lippmann stated, would cause the Soviet Union to exercise and maintain great pressure on the Federal German Government to disassociate itself from the NATO Alliance and to harmonize its policies with those of the Soviet Union for the purpose of regaining reunification thereby. For instance, by following a policy of neutrality for the ultimate purpose of reunification, Germany would help the Soviet Union in the coming decade to alienate her further and further from the West and to draw her closer to the East. This was Lippmann's view and the President wanted the Chancellor's opinion on it.
The Chancellor stated that he had not read the article but that he is familiar with Lippmann. He could recall the days when he used to read Mr. Lippmann's articles and get excited about them. One day he had spoken to Mr. McCloy about this, who was then in Bonn, and the latter had told him not to worry about Lippmann's prophecies because they always proved false. The Chancellor wanted to assure the President that he shared Mr. McCloy's evaluation and felt, moreover, that the article in today's paper was utter nonsense.
The Chancellor replied that he would wager his head that Lippmann's prophecy was false.
The President then tried to get the Chancellor's reaction, quite aside from the Lippmann article, to the possibility of German rapprochement with the Soviet Union for the purpose of reunification and the degree of pull the Soviet Union might be able to exert on Western Germany in this respect.
The Chancellor stated that he was convinced the President need have no fears of any such eventuality or possibility. The 53 million Western Germans did not want to become enslaved nor did they want to join the 16 million East Germans in slavery. They desired freedom. Of this, the Chancellor was absolutely sure.
The President then asked the Chancellor whether this meant that conditions were different now than they had been at the time of the Rapallo Treaty.
The Chancellor stated emphatically that they were completely different. He continued that perhaps shortly after the 1945 collapse there might have been some such thoughts in the minds of some. But the establishment of the Chancellor's party, the biggest party in Germany, had been precisely for the purpose of avoiding Soviet slavery. The Chancellor felt absolutely sure that there was no danger of any pro-Eastern movement in Germany in the years to come. The big decision of whether to join the East or the West had been taken in the Bundestag in November 1949. At that time, the only dissenting element had been Schumacher and his Social Democrats. All others had seen eye to eye with the Chancellor. Even the trade unions had agreed with him. Schumacher was a nationalist, who had wanted a bigger Germany and who had other aspirations along those lines, and he had forced his Party to voice dissent with the decision taken at that time. However, there was now no further chance of such adverse developments. Since 1945, the Chancellor stated, more than 3 million refugees had fled to Western Germany from the Soviet Zone. These refugees were in the best position to spread the word about what conditions in the East Zone were really like.
The President then inquired about the Chancellor's opinion on the desirability of Western Germany continuing to adhere to the declaration that the Federal Republic renounce experimenting with nuclear, biological and chemical weapons/2/--how did the Chancellor feel about this?
/2/or the Final Act of the London Nine-Power Conference, October 3, 1954, which contains this declaration, see Foreign Relations, 1952-1954, vol. V, pp. 1345 ff.
The Chancellor pointed out that he was the one who had made this declaration. He had done so at a conference in London, at which time he had said that Germany renounced the production of ABC weapons. The occasion had been the establishment of the Western European Union. After he had made this statement, Mr. Dulles had come up to him and said that this declaration was of course valid only as long as circumstances remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the Chancellor said, Germany had not undertaken anything in this respect as yet.
The President expressed the opinion that as long as the NATO organization existed as presently constituted, and as long as the US had its weapons stationed in Western Germany with agreement on how and when these were to be used in the defense of Europe and West Germany, he felt that it was highly desirable for conditions to continue as stated in the Chancellor's declaration. He feared that if Western Germany were to begin nuclear experimentation, the danger of war would sharply increase without providing additional security compared to what we have at present.
The Chancellor stated that Germany was not considering any nuclear experimentation.
The President then made reference to a recent speech of his in Ottawa,/3/ in which he had spoken about the US turning over Polaris submarines to NATO. The purpose of this had been to lessen the feeling which he felt existed in Europe that each individual NATO country ought to begin to develop its own nuclear capacity. The President wanted to know the Chancellor's opinion on whether this proposal had been helpful in easing the pressure existing in Europe for the development of unilateral nuclear capacities.
/3/For text of the President's address to the Canadian Parliament, May 17, see Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: John F. Kennedy, 1961, pp. 382-386.
The Chancellor stated that he was convinced that it had achieved its purpose, but there was one question he wished to discuss with the President. It was a purely military one, namely: can the President of the US be reached at any time? This was a point made by General Heusinger, who had indicated how very decisive even one hour could be in nuclear warfare. This concern had resulted in the proposal made by General Norstad to the Eisenhower Administration, but it had not been taken up by the Eisenhower Administration any more. This was, in other words, a purely military concern which the Chancellor was in no position to judge. But he felt that he had to rely on the judgment of his military experts and their evaluation of possible developments along these lines.
The President inquired what proposal the Chancellor had reference to.
The Chancellor answered, the NATO Fire Brigade.
The President then indicated that 50% of SAC is even now on 15 minute alert and some of SAC is in the air 24 hours a day. When he is in the White House, the President can be reached at all times, when he leaves the White House there is two-way radio connection every two minutes, and there is two-way connection from the air. The President's various residences have a direct telephone line to the White House and to SAC. The requirements of our own national defense, the President stated, do not permit him to be further than two minutes away at any time. The President then stated that he does not know what the telephone connection between Bonn and Washington is. In theory at least, there is direct telephone between London and Washington and Paris and Washington. If no such connection exists with Bonn, it would be well if such were established, so that communication can be established within seconds.
(The next few minutes of transcript stricken at President's request.)
In a more serious vein, the President then pointed out that the extraordinary thing about Khrushchev is his compulsion to feel that everything he has is better than everybody else's. No matter what one tells him he comes up with something better. He has a purely compulsive need for recognition. The President didn't know whether this was a personal or national characteristic.
In reply the Chancellor made reference to a book which recently appeared in Germany by a man called Mehnert. The book is entitled The Soviet Man. It shows how by careful processes of control and orientation the Soviet Union has succeeded in forming the mentality and reactions of the people to such an extent that there now is what might be termed a "Soviet man," who believes that everything he has is better than what the others have. The Chancellor pointed out that a similar thing was achieved by the Nazis in their day with reference to a part of the German population. One should not lose sight of the fact that Khrushchev had achieved a fabulous career which, to some extent, had resulted in a degree of megalomania in him. Naturally, one should not believe everything Khrushchev claims. As an example, the Chancellor recalled how Khrushchev told him that the Western world is definitely doomed, and the Chancellor had laughed in his face. To be sure, Khrushchev was a peculiar mixture. The President interjected at this point: a mixture of inferiority and superiority.
Then the President asked for the Chancellor's opinion on how much pressure there is in Germany to change the Chancellor's stand on the manufacture of nuclear weapons.
The Chancellor stated that there was none.
(The next ten minutes or so were stricken from the record at the President's request.)
[1 paragraph (9-1/2 lines of source text) not declassified]
The President promised that he would make sure that Mr. McNamara would tell the Chancellor and Mr. Strauss what was available in Western Germany at the present time and what further intentions there were along these lines.
[2 paragraphs (9 lines of source text) not declassified]
(The rest of the transcript was stricken at the President's request.)
Prior to going to lunch the President invited the Chancellor to come upstairs to meet Mrs. Kennedy./4/
/4/At 4 p.m. Chancellor Adenauer received a briefing on the relative military strengths of the Soviet Union and the NATO Alliance. A copy of the briefing is in Department of State, Conference Files: Lot 65 D 366, CF 1994. A 4-page memorandum of the Chancellor's discussion of the briefing with the President at 5 p.m. is ibid.
220. Memorandum From the President's Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Bundy) to President Kennedy/1/
Washington, November 22, 1961.
/1/Source: Kennedy Library, National Security Files, Germany, Berlin. Secret. The source text bears no drafting information.
CONTINGENCY PLANNING ON BLOCKADE OF MILITARY ACCESS TO EAST BERLIN
I attach a State Department memorandum/2/ on this subject which shows where we now are on this one. It is a complicated paper, but it boils down to this:
/2/Neither the paper, "Allied Access to East Berlin," nor its annexes is printed.
1. The present U.S. position is that uniformed military personnel should refuse to show identification, and should deny themselves access rather than do so. There would be protests in Berlin and Moscow, and then the commandants should be authorized to prevent the entry of all Soviet personnel and vehicles to West Berlin, excepting only those connected with the air control center and the Spandau four-power prison for Nazi criminals. In addition (subject to a final review) we would expect to advocate countermeasures outside Berlin, of a minor sort, as listed on the last page (Annex B) of the State Department paper. The Germans have agreed to all of this. The French and British have agreed to self-denial of access but are still reviewing countermeasures. Our mission in Berlin is now authorized to enforce self-denial for our own military personnel, but retaliation against the Soviets, either inside or outside Berlin, would be a matter for final decision when the occasion arises. Kohler believes we would get agreement on measures inside Berlin, but that British might balk at measures outside Berlin.
2. There is no intention to destroy any barrier by tanks or bulldozers, and Norstad's request for this authority is being refused./3/
/3/Next to this paragraph in the source text is the handwritten notation: "JCS are in favor of urging to get Allied agreement to this. State disagrees."
3. Given the wide spectrum of opinion among the allies, I do not think we can expect complete agreement ahead of time on this. My suggestion is that the State Department be instructed to press strongly, at all levels, its own current preferred course. This seems as sensible as any, and there are advantages in having a clear view ahead of time, and standing by it.
McG. B.
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