Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

Unit IX-A 

COURSE TITLE Building Design for Homeland Security TIME 150 minutes 

UNIT TITLE Site and Layout Design Guidance 

OBJECTIVES 1. Identify site planning concerns that can create, reduce, or eliminate 
vulnerabilities and understand the concept of “Layers of Defense”. 

2. 
Recognize protective issues for suburban site planning. 
3. 
Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation measures that 
increase stand-off or promote the need for hardening of buildings at 
risks. 
4. 
Understand the need for keeping up with the growing demand for 
security design. 
5. 
Understand the benefits that can be derived from appropriate 
security design. 
6. 
Understand the benefits of adopting a creative process to face 
current design challenges. 
7. 
Understand the benefits of including aesthetic elements compatible 
with security and architecture characteristics of building and 
surrounding environment. 
8. 
Apply these concepts to an existing site or building and identify 
mitigation measures needed to reduce vulnerabilities 


SCOPE The following topics will be covered in this unit: 

1. 
Land use considerations both outside and inside the property line 
2. 
Site planning issues to include site design, layout and form, 
vehicular and pedestrian circulation, and landscape and urban design 
3. 
Creating stand-off distance using perimeter controls, non-exclusive 
zones, and exclusive zones along with the design concepts and 
technology to consider 
4. 
Design considerations and mitigation measures for site security 



Unit IX-A 

REFERENCES 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings, Chapter 2; Checklist at end of Chapter 1 

2. 
FEMA 430, Primer for Incorporating Building Security Components 
in Architectural Design 
3. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings, pages 5-1 to 5-16 
4. 
Case Study – Appendix A: Suburban, Hazardville Information 
5. 
Student Manual, Unit IX-A 
6. 
Unit IX-A visuals 


REQUIREMENTS 1. FEMA 426, Reference Manual to Mitigate Potential Terrorist 
Attacks Against Buildings 

2. 
FEMA 452, Risk Assessment: A How-To Guide to Mitigate 
Potential Terrorist Attacks Against Buildings 
3. 
Instructor Guide, Unit IX-A 
4. 
Student Manual, Unit IX-A 
5. 
Overhead projector or computer display unit 
6. 
Unit IX-A visuals 
7. 
Threat Matrices poster and dry-erase markers (one per team) 
8. 
Chart paper, easel, and markers 


UNIT IX-A OUTLINE Time Page 

IX-A. Site and Layout Design Guidance and Student Activity 150 minutes IG IX-A-5 
[56 slides about 1.5 minutes per slide for 90 minutes] 

1. 
Introduction and Unit Objectives 10.5 IG IX-A-5 
Layers of Defense minutes 
2. 
First Layer, Survey Surroundings 1.5 minutes IG-IX-A-11 
3. 
First Layer, Access Points 3 minutes IG-IX-A-11 
4. 
Second Layer, Layout/Site Considerations 6 minutes IG IX-A-13 
5. 
First/Second Layer, Barriers/Bollards/Fencing 21 minutes IG IX-A-16 
6. 
First/Second Layer, Gatehouses/Screening 1.5 minutes IG IX-A-23 
7. 
First Second Layer, Sidewalks/Curbs 3 minutes IG-IX-A-24 
8. 
First/Second Layer, Street Furniture 4.5 minutes IG-IX-A-25 



Unit IX-A 

9. 
Second Layer, Yards and Plazas 7.5 minutes IG-IX-A-26 
10. 
Second Layer, Roadways 1.5 minutes IG-IX-A-29 
11. 
Second Layer, Parking 9 minutes IG-IX-A-29 
12. 
Second Layer, Signage 1.5 minutes IG-IX-A-33 
13. 
First/Second Layer, Security Lighting 1.5 minutes IG-IX-A-34 
14. 
First Layer, Sensors/CCTV 1.5 minutes IG-IX-A-34 
15. 
Second Layer, Site Utilities 4.5 minutes IG-IX-A-35 
16. 
Best Practices 4.5 minutes IG-IX-A-38 
17. 
Activity: Site and Layout Design Guidance 60 minutes IG IX-A-40 
[45 minutes for students, 15 minutes for instructor review] 


PREPARING TO TEACH THIS UNIT 

• 
Tailoring Content to the Local Area: Review the Instructor Guides to identify topics that 
should focus on the local area. Plan how you will use the generic content, and prepare for a 
locally oriented discussion. The locally oriented discussion should be in conjunction with the 
version of the case study selected as the student activity used during the course offering. 
• 
Optional Activity: There are three versions of the student activity available for use during 
this course -- Suburban, Urban, or Continuity of Operations Planning (COOP). 
Group Roundtable / Plenary / Discussion session can occur after Unit IX with regular 
student activity for Unit IX being combined with Unit X at end of Unit X. In certain 
course offerings the experience of well-qualified students can enhance learning through 
cross pollination of lessons learned, impediments, successes, etc. Students may consider 
doing some parts of Unit IX student activity for homework. [Hidden slide at end of 
Visuals IX-A cover this and replaces existing last slide.] 


• 
Activity: The students will continue the familiarization with the Case Study materials. The 
Case Study is a complete risk assessment and analysis of mitigation options and strategies for 
a typical commercial office building located in a mixed urban-suburban environment 
business park (suburban), a 50-story high-rise office building located in a downtown urban 
environment (urban), or an alternate facility to be assessed for potential COOP use (based 
upon the suburban building). The assessment will use the DoD Antiterrorism Standards and 
the GSA Interagency Security Criteria to determine Levels of Protection and identify specific 



Unit IX-A 

vulnerabilities. Mitigation options and strategies will use the concepts provided in FEMA 
426 and other FEMA publications related to emergency planning and disaster recovery. 

• 
Refer students to their Student Manuals for worksheets and activities. 
• 
Direct students to the appropriate page in the Student Manual. 
• 
Read the activity instructions found in the Student Manual. 
• 
Describe how the selected case study appendix in the Student Manual is used to obtain the 
data needed for the building assessment. 
• 
“Walk through” the pages of the activity with the students, describing the steps followed to 
obtain the answers in the completed examples, and what is expected of the groups for this 
activity. 
• 
If applicable to this activity, explain what information is to be transferred to the Risk Matrix 
poster. For this activity, the assessment of the building in greater depth may result in the 
groups adjusting the Risk Matrix scores for vulnerability rating, with resultant changes to risk 
rating. 
• 
Tell students how long they have to work on the requirements. 
• 
While students are working, all instructors should closely observe the groups’ process and 
progress. If any groups are struggling, immediately assist them by clarifying the assignment 
and providing as much help as is necessary for the groups to complete the requirement in the 
allotted time. Also, monitor each group for full participation of all members. For example, 
ask any student who is not fully engaged a question that requires his/her viewpoint to be 
presented to the group. 
• 
At the end of the working period, reconvene the class. 
• 
Ask a representative from one group to provide the answer to the first requirement. Then 
simply ask if anyone disagrees. If the answer is correct and no one disagrees, state that the 
answer is correct and move on to the next requirement. If there is disagreement, provide the 
“school solution” and move on. 
• 
If time is short, simply provide the “school solution” and ask for questions. Do not end the 
activity without ensuring that students know if their answers are correct or at least on the 
right track. Note, there are no right or wrong answers, but all answers must be justified with 
rationale. 
• 
Ask for and answer questions. 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-1 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 

Unit IX-A
Site and Layout Design 
Guidance



Unit IX-A-2 

Unit Objectives 

Identify site planning concerns that can create, 
reduce, or eliminate vulnerabilities and 
understand the concept of “Layers of Defense.” 

Recognize protective issues for suburban site 
planning. 

Compare the pros and cons of barrier mitigation 
measures that increase stand-off or promote the 
need for hardening of buildings at risks. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-2 

Introduction and Unit Overview 

This is Unit IX, Site and Layout Design 
Guidance. This lecture will examine site level 
considerations and concepts for integrating 
land use planning, landscape, architecture, site 
planning, and other strategies to mitigate the 
design basis threats. The students will gain an 
understanding of the myriad options available 
to enhance site design taking into account 
many environmental challenges. 

Unit Objectives 

At the end of this unit, the students should be 
able to: 

1. 
Explain the concerns of basic land use 
planning that affect vulnerabilities to 
threats and hazards due to terrorism and 
technological accidents. 
2. 
Understand the concept of “Layers of 
Defense” which will be applied throughout 
this instruction unit and the next. 
3. 
Recognize protective issues for suburban 
site planning so as to aid in selecting 
appropriate mitigation measures. 
4. 
Compare the pros and cons of barrier 
mitigation measures that increase stand-off 
and the need for hardening buildings at 
risk. 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-3 

Unit Objectives 

Understand the following critical 
issues: 

. 
Keeping up with growing 
demand for security design 
. 
Understanding benefits that can 
be derived from appropriate 
security design 


References 

FEMA Building 
Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist, 
Chapter 1, page 1-46, 
FEMA 426 

Site and Layout Design 
Guidance,Chapter 2, 
FEMA 426 

FEMA 430, Primer for 
Incorporating Building 
Security Components in 
Architectural Design 

Unit Objectives (cont.) 

5. 
Understand the benefits in keeping up with 
the growing demand for security design 
issues. The technology and manufacturing 
continues to improve. 
6. 
Understand the benefits that can be derived 
from appropriate security design. Meeting 
security design can satisfy other 
requirements at the same time. 


FEMA 426 and FEMA 430 contain 
architectural and site planning considerations 
for new design or renovation of existing. 

Unit Objectives (cont.) 

7. 
Understand that there are benefits to 
adopting a creative process to face current 
design challenges. While many criteria are 
prescriptive, there are many techniques to 
meet the spirit, intent, purpose, and 
performance sought. 
8. 
Understand that design can include 
aesthetic elements that are compatible with 
security and architectural characteristics of 
the building and surrounding environment. 
Blending security so that it does not look 
like security so that buildings feel open and 
friendly should be a goal. 



Unit IX-A-4 

Unit Objectives 

Understand the following critical 
issues (continued): 

. 
Adopting a creative process to 
face current design challenges 
. 
Including aesthetic elements 
compatible with security and 
architecture characteristics of 
building and surrounding 
environment 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-3 

References 

FEMA Building 
Vulnerability 
Assessment Checklist, 
Chapter 1, page 1-46, 
FEMA 426 

Site and Layout Design 
Guidance,Chapter 2, 
FEMA 426 

FEMA 430, Primer for 
Incorporating Building 
Security Components in 
Architectural Design 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-4 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-5 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-5 
Layers of Defense 
FEMA 452, Figure 2-2: Layers of Defense, p. 2-3 
From FEMA 452 

The layers of defense is a traditional 
approach in security engineering and use 
concentric circles extending out from an area 
or site to the building or asset that requires 
protection. They can be seen as demarcation 
points for different security strategies. 
Identifying the layers of defense early in the 
assessment process will help you to 
understand better the assets that require 
protection and determine your mitigation 
options. Figure 2-2 shows the layers of 
defense described below. 

First Layer of Defense. This involves 
understanding the characteristics of the 
surrounding area, including construction 
type, occupancies, and the nature and 
intensity of adjacent activities. It is 
specifically concerned with buildings, 
installations, and infrastructure outside the 
site perimeter. For urban areas, it also 
includes the curb lane and surrounding 
streets. The building owner has little or no 
control outside of working with the city or 
municipality. The first layer of defense 
should be designed to prevent large bombs 
or weapons into the site and control access 

Layers of Defense 

There should always be multiple layers of 
defense in order to deter and detect potential 
threat elements that attempt to access critical 
assets to their benefit and everyone else’s 
detriment. There may be an additional layer 
applied around a building when a site is large 
or one or more additional layers inside a 
building when a building has functions at 
various levels of security. The intent is to deter 
first, then detect sufficiently quickly to have a 
response force engage the potential threat 
elements prior to reaching the next layer. 

The first layer is the demarcation between 
control and no control. Outside the first layer 
the local, regional, and national police and 
intelligence forces work to track, detain, and 
arrest the potential threat elements before they 
can initiate an incident. This should be a 
controlled perimeter whose intent is to keep 
large threats outside by deterrence or detect 
them at this point and prevent entry. If the 
weapon activates at this layer the effectiveness 
is reduced if sufficient stand-off exists. 

The second layer keeps any smaller weapons 
that may slip past the first layer from getting 
close enough to the critical asset to cause 
damage. This layer should mitigate the 
effectiveness of tactics, reduce the impact due 
to insider action, and controls the stand-off 
from the building for the smaller weapons that 
may get through. 

The first and second layers are primarily the 
venue for site and layout design, the basis for 
this unit. 

The third layer (usually 3 layers are the 
minimum found) is the building envelope 
which also deters and detects, but if an incident 
occurs this layer is the only one that provides 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

of personnel. 

Second Layer of Defense. This refers to the 
space that exists between the site perimeter 
and the assets requiring protection. It 
involves the placement of buildings and 
forms in a particular site and understanding 
which natural or physical resources can 
provide protection. It entails the design of 
access points, parking, roadways, pedestrian 
walkways, natural barriers, security lighting, 
and signage. For urban areas, it refers 
specifically to the building yard. The 
building owner has control of this layer. 
The second layer controls stand-off from 
the building which provides protection 
from weapons that may slip through the 
first layer of defense. 

Third Layer of Defense. This deals with the 
protection of the asset itself. It proposes to 
harden the structures and systems, 
incorporate effective HVAC systems and 
surveillance equipment, and wisely design 
and locate utilities and mechanical systems. 
Note that, of all blast mitigation measures, 
distance is the most effective measure 
because other measures vary in effectiveness 
and can be more costly. However, often it is 
not possible to provide adequate stand-off 
distance. For example, sidewalks in many 
urban areas may be less than 10 meters (33 
feet), while appropriate stand-off may require 
a minimum of 25 meters (82 feet). The 
building owner has control of this layer 
and its main mitigation measures are 
hardening against blast and security 
sensors/CCTV as final access control. 

any level of protection during the tactic and 
weapon release. The third layer is the venue 
for building design which will be found in the 
next instruction unit. 

It is important to remember that the nature of 
any threat is always changing. Consideration 
should be given to accommodating enhanced 
protection measures in response to future 
threats that may emerge. Asset protection must 
be balanced with other design objectives, such 
as the efficient use of land and resources, and 
must also take into account existing physical, 
programmatic, and fiscal constraints. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-6 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-6 
Layers of Defense 
First Layer of Defense 
High Security Building 
Third, Second, and First 
Layers of Defense 
Second Layer of Defense 
The layers of defense are not predetermined and 
they may vary from site to site and from building 
to building. If a particular building requiring 
protection is part of a campus or located in a 
rural, semi-rural, or urban area, a similar analysis 
may be applicable for all cases when determining 
the importance of the asset. However, the security 
elements necessary to protect the building can be 
entirely different, depending on its location. The 
approach suggests establishing different 
demarcation points in order to identify sound 
security strategies. The layers of defense 
concept proposes that each designer study a 
particular site and determine critical assets 
that need to be protected and how protection 
should take place. 

Note: Layers of Defense will be during this 
and the next two instruction units to illustrate 
the elements: 

• 
Deter 
• 
Detect 
• 
Deny 
• 
Devalue 


Layers of Defense 

The layers of defense convey the idea of using 
concentric circles extending out from an area or site 
to the building that requires protection. They are 
used as demarcation points for different security 
strategies. The objective of layers of defense is to 
create succeeding more difficult layers to security 
to penetrate, provide additional warning and 
response time, and allow building occupants to 
more into defensive positions or designated Safe 
Haven protection. 

The layers of defense defines sites and projects 
as follows (While the previous slide is a 
generic explanation, this slide shows the 
campus or suburban situation where there are 
more options to the layers of defense): 

• 
The first layer addresses the characteristics 
of the surrounding area and the public 
realm. It starts at the site perimeter and 
outward. The building owner has very 
limited or no control to implement 
mitigation measures. 
• 
Although a controlled access zone is one of 
the best methods of ensuring stand-off, 
issues as the size of site, site limitations, 
building siting within the parcel, and 
property line restrictions do not always 
allow this zone to be created. 
• 
The second layer is concerned with the 
space and physical barriers at the perimeter 
of the site to keep explosives at a distance 
to protect buildings. It comprises the space 
between the site perimeter and building. 
The building owner has the authority and 
control to implement mitigation measures. 
• 
The third deals with the protection integral 
to the building itself. The building owner 
has certain level of control to implement 
mitigation measures. Incorporating the 
protection in initial design, whether blast 
hardening or security, is the least expensive 
approach. Retrofitting after the building 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 


Instructors may want to relate to a castle – 
First layer of defense is clearing all trees and 
vegetation out to the effective range of 
arrows and crossbows. Second layer of 
defense is moat and initial castle wall. Third 
layer of defense is the castle keep where the 
last defensive position exists with its 
additional walls. 

Unit IX-A-7 

Layers of Defense 
has been constructed can cost up to 30% of 
the original construction, if the retrofitting 
can be done. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-7 
Third Layer 
Second Layer 
First Layer 
Survey SurroundingsAccess PointsLayout / Site ConsiderationsBarriers / Bollards / FencingGatehouses / ScreeningSidewalks and CurbsStreet FurnitureYards and PlazasRoadwaysParkingSignageSecurity LightingSensors / CCTVSite Utilities 
Layers of 
Defense 
Layers of Defense 

There are many mitigation techniques available 
that can be used at one or more layers of 
defense. This instruction unit concentrates on 
site and layout design, thus it looks primarily at 
the first and second layers of defense and 
emphasizes the predominant layer of defense 
considered. 

Here are general mitigation considerations for 
the suburban environment and this presentation 
will follow the flow of these measures from left 
to right – starting with Survey Surroundings on 
the left and ending with Site Utilities on the 
right. 

The flow also follows the general assessment 
approach of looking from outside to inside and 
going from general information to specific 
information. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-8 

First Layer of Defense 

Survey Surroundings / DataCollection 

. 
Use GIS and local authorities 
to understand yoursurroundings 
. 
Buildings 
. 
Infrastructure 
. 
Geographic/topographic
elements
. 
Overhead and underground 
utilities 


. 
360 degrees -all directions 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-1: Example of Using GIS to Identify 
Adjacent Hazards, p. 2-5 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-8 

Unit IX-A-9 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-9 
First Layer of Defense 
Access Points 
. Have commercial vehicle 
gates if possible 
. Provide traffic calming 
. Avoid high speed approaches 
. Control angles of approach 
. Prevent unauthorized access 
. Avoid traffic queuing 
. Have equal security capacity 
for exit 
Survey Surroundings – Data Collection 

In a suburban environment, this action 
normally follows the points on a compass -- in 
the horizontal plane. 

However, understanding the surroundings 
includes any structures above and under the 
building and site of interest as to their impact 
on design or assessment. GIS applications are 
excellent resources that enable designers and 
building owners to analyze various 
demographic, hazardous areas, transportation 
networks, access control points, etc., in order to 
identify potential threats, hazards, and 
vulnerabilities. These applications may depict a 
truer picture of the surrounding situation, 
allowing decision-makers to take proactive 
measures to mitigate potential vulnerabilities. 

Geographic and topographic concerns include 
terrain that limits access of vehicles – natural 
barriers, like water, slope, vegetation, etc. 

Access Points 

Entry control and vehicular access should: 

• 
Prevent unauthorized access 
• 
Avoid traffic queuing (queues become 
potential targets) 
• 
Have commercial vehicle gates if possible – 
keep larger vehicles further away and 
barriers increased in capability to handle. 
Have an Alternate Plan B if a suspected 
vehicle closes down one or the other vehicle 
gates 
• 
Provide traffic calming 
• 
Avoid high speed approaches 
• 
Have equal security capacity for exit 


Traffic calming strategies seek to use design 
measures to cue drivers as to the acceptable 
speed for an area. These include raised 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-10 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-10 
Access Points 
. Reject vehicles 
before final 
barrier 
. Inspection area 
blast effects 
. Pressure 
. Fragments 
. Reaction time 
to activate 
barriers 
First Layer of Defense 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-15: Combined Multi-User Gate, p. 2-37 
Location selection for vehicular access and 
entry control for a building starts with an 
evaluation of the anticipated demand for 
access to the controlled site. An analysis of 
traffic origin and destination, and an analysis 
of the capability of the surrounding 
connecting road network, including its 
capacity to handle additional traffic, should 
then be performed. Expansion capacity 
crosswalks, speed humps and speed tables, 
pavement treatments, build outs, and traffic 
circles. Additionally, by controlling the angle 
of approach, requiring turns or providing 
curves, vehicles must slow down. 

The arrival sequence design to and through a 
site contribute to the project’s identity, 
including the visitor’s orientation to the site 
and route to reach their destination. The 
circulation routes, signage, checkpoints, 
control of site lines (screening or emphasizing 
views of certain areas), and topography all 
contribute to the arrival process and legibility 
of the site. The establishment of circulation 
and access points may differentiate between 
entries and routes for pedestrians, staff, 
visitors, deliveries and service, each with 
differing security requirements to be satisfied. 

Access Points 

Gatehouses, lobbies, and guard posts should be 
provided with clear views of approaching 
traffic -- pedestrian and vehicular. Screening 
areas and entries may be located to offer more 
privacy and protection. 

It is advisable to design circulation to separate 
different types of traffic and provide separate 
routes for staff, for visitors, and for deliveries. 
With the separation of vehicle types, security 
can more easily address differing needs for 
screening, observation, and potential threat 
mitigation. 

Roadway network design that uses straight-line 
approaches to buildings may give approaching 
vehicles the opportunity to gather the necessary 
speed to ram protective barriers and crash into 
buildings. Possible solution: design 
approaches to be parallel to the façade, with 
berms, high curbs, trees, and other measures 
used to prevent vehicles from departing the 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

should also be considered. The analysis 
should be coordinated with the state and local 
departments of transportation. 

Two security measures that are overlooked 
are: First, allowing the vehicle to enter the 
site so that it can turn around and leave. A 
proper entry control point would never allow 
the vehicle to enter the site if it were not 
authorized. Second, there are multiple 
reaction times that must be added – guard 
recognition that vehicle is avoiding security, 
guard reaction to activate final barriers, and 
activation time from closed to open for the 
final barriers. The time delay from 
recognition to deployment must be less than 
the speed of the vehicle between the 
recognition point and the final barrier. 

Unit IX-A-11 

Second Layer of Defense 

The following considerations can have an impact in the 
layout site design: 

. 
Clustered versus dispersed facilities/functions 
. 
Orientation 
. 
Siting and view relationships 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-11 

roadway. 

The existing terrain can have a significant 
impact on the suitability of a potential entry 
control point site. Flat terrain with no thick 
vegetation is generally preferred. A gentle rise 
in elevation up to the entry control guard 
building allows for a clear view of arriving 
vehicles. Consider how existing natural 
features such as bodies of water or dense tree 
stands may enhance perimeter security and 
vehicle containment, without restricting 
observation capability or allowing easier 
surveillance of the building by potential threat 
elements. Entry control spatial requirements 
vary, depending on the type, the traffic 
demand, and the necessary security measures. 

Second Layer of Defense 

The following aspects of the building program 
and layout impact the site design and 
assessment: 

. 
Overall size and number of structures 
placed on site with high-risk buildings 
clustered together for increased security or 
stand-off or dispersed to devalue as a 
target. 
. 
Orientation of buildings to reduce damage 
from bomb blast and prevent direct 
approaches by high speed vehicles. 
. 
Increase views of approaches to the 
building, but screen views from outside 
surveillance. 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-12 
Second Layer of Defense 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-2: Clustered versus Dispersed Site Layouts, p. 2-8 
Layout/Site Considerations 
Unit IX-A-12 

Unit IX-A-13 

Layout / Site Considerations – Clustered 
versus Dispersed Facilities 

Depending on the site characteristics, the 
occupancy requirements, and other factors, 
buildings may be clustered tightly in one area, 
or dispersed across the site. Both patterns have 
compelling strengths and weaknesses. 

Concentrating people, property, and operations 
in one place creates a target-rich environment, 
and the mere proximity of any one building to 
any other may increase the risk of collateral 
impacts. Additionally, the potential exists for 
the establishment of more single-point 
vulnerabilities in a clustered design than would 
exist in a more dispersed pattern. However, 
grouping high risk activities, concentrations of 
personnel, and critical functions into a cluster 
can help maximize stand-off from the 
perimeter and create a “defensible space.” 

Layout / Site Considerations -- Orientation 

Orientation is the building’s spatial relationship 
to the site, its orientation relative to the sun, 
and its vertical or horizontal aspect relative to 
the ground. 

• How many times have you seen aluminum 
foil on windows because the afternoon 
summer sun overcomes the air-conditioning 
capacity along that side of a building? 

The physical positioning of a building relative 
to its surroundings may seem subtle, but can be 
a greater determinant of security. 

Good site design, orientation, and building 
placement should allow building occupants to 
look out of the facility while minimizing views 
into the building. 

The proximity of a vulnerable façade to a 
parking area, street, adjacent site, or other area 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-13 
Second Layer of Defense 
Layout/Site Considerations 
• Significant impact on makingbuilding visible or hidden to 
aggressors 
• Enhance surveillance 
opportunities of approaches 
and parking 
• Minimize views into building 
• Reduce blast effects 
Orientation 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-3: Clustering to Enhance Surveillance Opportunities 
While Minimizing Views into Buildings, p. 2-8 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-14 
that is accessible to vehicles and/or difficult to 
observe can greatly contribute to its 
vulnerability. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-14 
Second Layer of Defense 
Siting and View Relationships 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-5: Blocking of Site Lines, p. 2-20 
Layout/Site Considerations 
Layout / Site Considerations – Siting and 
View Relationships 

Landscape and urban design inherently define 
the “line of sight” in a space. Operational 
security is not a traditional element of master 
planning, but managing the threat of hostile 
surveillance is a significant consideration in 
protecting people, property, and operations. 
With careful selection, placement, and 
maintenance, landscape elements can provide 
visual screening that protects sensitive 
operations, gathering areas, and other activities 
from surveillance without creating concealment 
for covert activity. 

These techniques seek to deny aggressors a 
“line of sight” to a potential target, either from 
on or off site. This increases the protection of 
sensitive information and inhibits operation of 
stand-off weapons. In addition to the use of 
various screening options, anti-surveillance 
measures (e.g., building orientation, 
landscaping, screening, and landforms) can 
also be used to block sight lines. 

The design should maximize opportunities for 
internal surveillance of site perimeters and 
screening of internal areas from external 
observation. Topography, relative elevation, 
walls, and fences are design elements that can 
open and close views. Vegetation can open, 
close, or block views, not only for security 
purposes but also to provide beauty and to 
support wayfinding. As a rule of thumb, 
vegetation should be very high or very low, to 
keep views open. Vegetation at the base of 
buildings and structures should be designed 
and maintained to prevent explosives from 
being hidden from view – easily see a briefcase 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-15 
or a backpack. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-15 
Second Layer of Defense 
Barriers/Bollards/Fencing 
FEMA 426, Figure 2-11: Application of Perimeter Barrier Elements, p. 2-28 
Landforms can have a direct bearing on the 
security of a facility. They can be either 
beneficial (e.g., an elevated site that may 
enhance the surveillance of the surrounding 
area), or detrimental to anti-surveillance. 

Generally speaking: 

• For security purposes, buildings should not 
be sited immediately adjacent to higher 
surrounding terrain or buildings if at all 
possible. 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing 

A number of elements may be used to create a 
physical barrier, some natural and some 
manmade. Natural barrier elements include 
rivers, lakes, waterways, steep terrain, 
mountains, barren areas, plants, soft sand, and 
other terrain features that are difficult to 
traverse. Manmade elements include fencing, 
walls, buildings, bollards, planters, concrete 
barriers, and fountains. Selection of elements 
must consider the level of security desired and 
the type of threat most likely to occur. 

When placing bollards, make sure you adhere 
to ADA (Americans with Disabilities Act) 
compliance. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-16 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-16 
First/Second Layer of DefenseBarriers/Bollards/Fencing -Passive 
From US Army Field Manual 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, 1992 
Discuss the mass (vehicle size) and vehicle 
speed in the chart. Note that since speed is 
squared (K.E. = ½ * mass * speed * speed), 
controlling speed is a primary concern. 

Unit IX-A-17 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-17 
First/Second Layer of DefenseBarriers/Bollards/Fencing -Passive 
Source: Yodock Wall Company 
Source: Yodock Wall Company 
Barriers / Bollards /Fencing – Passive 
Barriers 

It is one thing to provide a passive barrier, it is 
another to ensure the barrier will provide the 
protection level sought. We have talked about 
controlling vehicle speed approaching access 
points and buildings. Essentially, any barrier 
will stop a given level of kinetic energy which 
is ½ mass * velocity squared. Thus, the bigger 
the vehicle and the higher its speed the stronger 
the barrier must be as shown by this chart. 

The greater the barrier mass and reinforcement 
and the deeper it is connected to the earth, the 
higher its rating. 

Notice the jersey barrier has the rating listed 
only if there are four rebar pinning the barrier 
at least 18 inches into pavement. Alternately, a 
1-inch steel cable linking the jersey barriers 
would be an alternate technique, but with some 
penetration. 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing – Water 
Barriers 

Water-filled barriers are another approach as 
they are lightweight and easy to deploy. The 
left photo shows the stopping power and the 
right photo shows water barriers that support a 
fence. Filling the barriers with sand make 
them less portable. 

As with jersey barriers, linking the barriers 
with 1-inch steel cable improves their 
performance, but with additional penetration 
(less mass). Also, these barriers must be 
checked periodically for leaks, especially if 
allowed to freeze when filled with water. 
Without water or sand these would lack critical 
needed mass. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-18 
First/Second Layer of DefenseBarriers/Bollards/Fencing -Active 
From US Army Field Manual 5-114, Engineer Operations Short of War, 1992 
Source: Delta Scientific Corporation 
Unit IX-A-18 

Unit IX-A-19 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing – Active 
Barriers 

As with passive barriers, active barriers also 
have different levels of kinetic energy stopping 
power, based upon mass and connection to the 
earth. 

The advantage of active barriers is that access 
points and building access to loading docks or 
for maintenance can allow vehicles to pass or 
not based upon authorization. 

One company is marketing a turntable that 
allows the fixed bollards to be turned 90 
degrees to the vehicle path, then rotated back to 
block vehicle traffic. 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing – Active 
Barriers 

These photos show retractable bollards 
stopping a substantial truck with very little 
penetration. 

An active barrier can be activated in seconds (1 
to 3) and should be either always up (sally port 
concept) or deployed upon identification that 
the gate is being crashed (taking into 
consideration response time, maximum vehicle 
speed and activation speed. 

Pop-up barriers can create serious damage to 
vehicles, especially if deployed when a vehicle 
is above the barrier. Consider manual 
activation to avoid unnecessary damage (avoid 
magnetic vehicle loops to redeploy a barrier 
that will catch a tailgating vehicle). 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-19 
First/Second Layer of DefenseBarriers/Bollards/Fencing -Active 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-20 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-20 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Rotating Drum, Drop Arm, and Rotating Plate Vehicle Barriers 
Barriers and Street Closure 

In alleys and typical urban streets adequate 
stand-off distance is an impossibility without 
street closure. This is generally undesirable 
because of the disruption caused to traffic 
patterns. 

The top and left photos show permanently 
installed barriers, while the bottom right photo 
shows temporary barriers that can be rapidly 
deployed and moved into position to control 
site and parking access, control traffic flow, 
and provide stand-off distance for buildings. 

Improvised closures tend to destroy the 
attractiveness of the street with a combination 
of security personnel and ugly temporary 
barriers. Configuration for access, queuing, 
and inspection shout be planned in any case to 
reduce potential problems by reducing 
circulation and aggregated space in a city. 

Full closure is often impossible because of the 
need for service entry. Temporary closure can 
be achieved by active or manual barriers, 
combined with public works and security 
personnel. 

Consider the “Ring of Steel” being installed in 
a core area of London, England. It acts as a 
first layer of defense, inspecting, restricting, 
and documenting all vehicles that enter the 
core area to keep larger weapons out. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-21 

First/Second Layer of Defense 

Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 

Department of State periodically issues list of manufacturers and 
model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing criteria 
(March 2003) 

Rating Vehicle Weight 
(lbs.) 
Vehicle Speed 
(mph) 
Distance Past 
Barrier (ft) 
K4 15,000 30 <= 3.3 
K8 15,000 40 <= 3.3 
K12 15,000 50 <= 3.3 

Check site utilities, water runoff, and other subterranean 
Conditions when installing bollards and barriers 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-21 

Unit IX-A-22 

First/Second Layer of Defense 

Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 

Department of Defense periodically issues list of manufacturers 
and model numbers certified in meeting prescribed testing 
criteria (August 2003) 

Vehicle Weight 
(lbs.) 
Vehicle 
Speed (mph) 
Distance Past Barrier 
(ft) 
15,000 30 <=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1) 
15,000 40 <=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1) 
15,000 50 <=3(L3)/20(L2)/50(L1) 
10,000 50 0 to 50 
10,000 15 50 to 100 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-22 

Unit IX-A-23 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-23 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 
• Fixed bollards 
• Retractable bollards 
•Planters 
Fixed bollards 
Department of State Barrier Ratings 

Department of State barrier ratings are 
probably more suitable to an urban 
environment where stand-off is limited -- the 

3.3 feet distance allowed past the barrier is for 
the leading edge of the cargo area of the truck 
(where the bomb is most likely being carried). 

Also, Department of State has found that diesel 
trucks have greater penetration capability, so 
their tests now require the use of diesel trucks 
vice gasoline powered trucks. 

Department of Defense Barrier Ratings 

Department of Defense barrier ratings use the 
old Department of State criterion that allows 
the front of the vehicle to penetrate a given 
distance past the barrier. This would be more 
suitable in a suburban environment where there 
is greater distance between the barrier and the 
nearest building than in the urban environment. 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing – Bollards and 
Planters 

Sidewalks serve as the common space for 
pedestrian interaction, movements, and 
activity. 

Extending barriers into sidewalks, streets or 
parking lanes may provide additional stand off 
distance. While this is technically possible, this 
approach often creates negative impacts within 
the public realm, which may make this an 
unfeasible solution. Be sure that introduced 
security measures are effective. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-24 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-24 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 
Retractable 
CONFIRM REFERENCES?? 

Unit IX-A-25 
Bollards and other barriers are ideally the first 
layer of defense in the urban environment so as 
to obtain the most stand-off possible. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-25 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
• If well designed, planters can be an element of beautification 
• Ensure barriers are properly anchored to stop vehicles and 
configured to reduce fragmentation 
Planters 
Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 
Barriers / Bollards /Fencing -- Retractable 
Bollards 

Retractable bollards are an excellent (though 
expensive) solution when the use of security 
elements is critical and the width of the street 
does nor allow their permanent placement. 

Effective bollards must be carefully engineered 
with deep foundations and the additional depth 
required for retractability may cause problems 
with underground utilities and services, 
building basements extending under sidewalks 
in urban areas, and other structures that may 
exists under sidewalks that affect retractable 
bollard performance. 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing -- Planters 

Bollards and planters can help create an 
appealing streetscape depending upon their 
design and the current environment in which 
they are installed. 

When placed, make sure that they accomplish 
their function and distance between them is 
appropriate. The distance must allow free flow 
of pedestrians, but restrict flow of vehicles. 

Fragmentation is always a concern with any 
barrier system, whether caused by bomb blast 
or vehicle impact. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-26 

First/Second Layer of Defense 

Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 

Avoid designing barriers 
that impair access by first 
responders: 

. 
Intersection with
driveways and gates
. 
Crossing of pedestrian
paths and 
handicapped ramps
. 
Fire hydrants 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-26 

Unit IX-A-27 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-27 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Barriers, Bollards, and Fencing 
Long expanses of bollards should 
be carefully designed and sited 
to avoid monotony 
Bollard spacing should ensure 
no vehicles can get through 
Pay attention to how bollards or 
fences turn the corner, 
intersect with driveways and 
gates, and cross pedestrian 
paths and handicapped ramps 
Barriers / Bollards /Fencing -- Jersey 
Barriers 

Least desirable of barrier types 

• 
Difficult to place and move 
• 
No vehicle stopping capability unless tied 
to pavement with at least 4 pieces of #4 
(1/2-inch diameter) rebar into pavement 
about 18 inches deep and/or tied together 
with steel cable (3/4 to 1-inch) 
• 
Can cause sidewalk failure due to 
concentrated load and fact that sidewalk 
may be hollow underneath for storage or 
utilities 
• 
Adds to fragmentation (barrier shatters) if 
vehicle bomb explodes next to barrier 
• 
They impede access – pedestrians and first 
responders 
-Utilities (if placed on top of manholes) 
-Emergency access (fire trucks, 


ambulance, police) 
-ADA (Americans with Disabilities 
Act) access – crosswalks and ramps 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing -- Bollards 

When placed, make sure that they accomplish 
their barrier function with an appropriate 
distance of not less than 4 feet-between them. 

Bollards placed in long unbroken rows present 
a monotonous appearance and may appear as a 
wall from some angles. 

Pay attention to how bollards or fences: 

. 
Turn the corner 
. 
Intersect with driveways and gates 
. 
Cross pedestrian paths and 
handicapped ramps 


In an urban environment, bollards and barriers 
are ideally the first layer of defense to obtain 
the most stand-off possible. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-28 
First/Second Layer of DefenseBarriers, Bollards, and Fencing 
Fencing 
• Delineates layer of defense 
• Demarcates stand-off required 
• Provides access control 
• Augments existing security 
• Channels vehicle/pedestrian 
traffic 
• Enhances electronic security 
Unit IX-A-28 

Unit IX-A-29 

Barriers / Bollards /Fencing -- Fencing 

Fencing can be limited to channeling law-
abiding people (pedestrians and vehicles) to 
massive with the intent of controlling malicious 
people and vehicles. 

As a basic it provides access control for 
pedestrians and vehicles (with the help of other 
barriers). Fencing in each layer of defense is 
enhanced with electronic security – sensors and 
CCTV, be it the first layer or a restricted area 
around a building. 

Gatehouses / Screening 

Gatehouses are to assist the screening of 
vehicles and pedestrians to ensure they have 
proper authorization for access. This can be at 
the first layer of defense (normally) or at any 
restricted perimeter 

• 
Depending on the threat the gatehouse 
should be hardened, but at the very least 
PPE (personal protective equipment, like 
bullet-resistant vests) should be worn 
• 
The elements – wind, rain, heat, cold make 
this job difficult enough that the gatehouse 
should provide a refuge with water, heat, 
and air conditioning, including a rest room 
• 
Proper placement so that the guard can 
interact with drivers without having to cross 
the traffic lane and adequate throughput so 
that queues will not form waiting for access. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-29 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Gatehouses/Screening 
Access control with 
human intervention 
• Hardened as 
determined by threat 
• Protection from 
elements 
• Located to minimize 
queuing 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-30 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Sidewalks and Curbs 
. Creating stand-off in lieu of 
hardening is usually less 
expensive 
. High curbs can keep vehicles 
from departing roadway 
. Do not remove curbside 
parking unless additional 
stand-off absolutely required 
Unit IX-A-30 

Unit IX-A-31 

Sidewalks and Curbs 

Sidewalks serve as the common space for 
pedestrian interaction, movements, and 
activity. Sidewalks should be open and 
accessible to pedestrians to the greatest extent 
possible and security elements should not 
interfere with circulation particularly in 
crowded locations 

Curbside parking should not be removed unless 
additional stand-off distance is absolutely 
necessary for high-risk buildings. Prohibiting 
on street parking or closing lanes should only 
be used as a temporary measure during times of 
increased alert. 

High curbs and other measures may be 
installed to keep vehicles from departing the 
roadway (especially if curb height is at the axle 
height) in an effort to avoid other security 
counter measures. In one instance, an armored 
car firm was asked to park their vehicles 
around a building that had received credible 
threats to act as barriers and increase stand-off. 

Sidewalks and Curbs 

Another unobtrusive approach for providing a 
vehicle barrier is combining collapsible 
sidewalk with a small wall that will catch a 
vehicle bumper. The sidewalk is made of low-
strength concrete that takes pedestrian weight 
but not vehicle weight. 

These graphics are of the Rock Twelve 
Security Architecture Tiger Trap TM and their 
product literature information: 

• Designed to reduce the impact of 
security on public space, this innovative 
vehicle arrest system utilizes a subgrade 
compressible material that lowers the 
elevation of an attacking vehicle and a 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-31 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
An alternate to visible 
barriers/bollards/fencing iscollapsible sidewalks usinglow-strength concrete 
Sidewalks and Curbs 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-32 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Street Furniture 
NCPC Streetscape Catalogue 
Streetscape can be used to 
increase security. Hardened 
elements that become security 
elements 
. Parking meters 
. Streetlights 
. Benches 
. Planters 
. Trash receptacles 
Unit IX-A-32 

Unit IX-A-33 
low wall that then halts the lowered 

vehicle. 

• 
The subgrade compressible material 
allows the rear wall to be as low as a 
bench or even completely below grade. 
• 
The compressible material combined 
with a decorative covering surface 
supports pedestrian loads, but fails under 
the weight of a vehicle. 


Street Furniture 

At the site perimeter, walls and fences may be 
hardened (strengthened) to resist the impact of 
a weapon-laden vehicle. However, planters, 
bollards or decorative boulders can accomplish 
the same objective in a much more 
aesthetically pleasing manner. 

The streetscape can included hardened versions 
of parking meters, street lights, benches, 
planters and trash receptacles that act as 
barriers to moving vehicles. 

The National Capital Planning Commission 
(NCPC) provides a catalog that shows several 
examples of hardened streetscape furniture. 

Street Furniture 

The scale of the streetscape should be 
appropriate to its primary users and it can be 
manipulated to increase the comfort level of 
desired users while creating a less inviting 
atmosphere for users with malicious intent. 

It is critical to maintain important functions 
such as adequate space for pedestrian 
circulation and appropriate distances between 
vehicles and security barriers. The 
recommended distance to place streetscape 
security components is at least 24 inches from 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-33 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Street Furniture 
Place streetscape security 
components at least 24 
inches from edge of curb 
. Allow for opening car 
doors 
. Allow for pedestrian 
movement from car to 
sidewalk 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-34 
• Treatment of security 
elements should be 
compatible with existing 
elements 
• Perimeter barriers can go 
hand-in-hand with streetscape 
improvements and plantings 
• Appropriate design can blend 
security into existing 
streetscape; serving as 
amenities for tenants and 
neighbors 
First/Second Layer of Defense 
Street furniture 
Unit IX-A-34 

Unit IX-A-35 
the edge of the curb to allow for the opening of 
car doors and pedestrian movement from car to 
sidewalk. 

Well planned barriers can also assist in clearly 
defining areas of public and private space and 
in protecting pedestrians from traffic. 

Street Furniture 

Numerous urban design elements present 
opportunities to provide security. Even at the 
pedestrian scale, certain operational 
requirements must be accommodated. For 
example, although efficient pedestrian and 
vehicle circulation systems are important for 
day-to-day living, they are also critical for 
emergency response, evacuation, and egress. 
Furthermore, despite an emphasis on 
downsizing the scale of the streetscape, it is 
critical to maintain the maximum stand-off 
distance possible between vehicles and 
structures. 

Yards and Plazas 

Three generic site types will be found in the 
central business district of any large city. 

• 
Buildings with zero setback and alleys. 
The building face is on the property line. 
An alley is a narrow street that divides a 
city block and provides service access to 
the side or rear of the building. 
• 
Buildings with front yards. The building 
is set back from its property line and the 
space is usually landscaped. The building 
yard includes pedestrian entries and 
loading docks. 
• 
Building with plazas. The building is 
placed within an open space that is 
publicly accessible. 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-35 
Second Layer of Defense 
. Buildings with 
front yards 
. Buildings with 
plazas 
YARD 
PLAZA 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-36 
Small yard with wide pavement that 
provide some useful stand-off 
Narrow yard incorporating low 
stone wall and metal fence 
. Generally small 
. Usually provided for 
governmental & institutional 
buildings 
Building Yard 
Second Layer of Defense 
Unit IX-A-36 

Unit IX-A-37 

Building Yard 

Some buildings have a “yard” between the 
building face and the sidewalk. The yard is 
within the property line and typically consists 
of a grassy or planted area adjacent to the 
building. 

Yards are typical, narrow, of the order of 10 to 
20 feet, providing some stand-off distance. 

The yard may be flush or raised above the level 
of the sidewalk. A raised yard can provide a 
barrier to vehicles. 

Major public buildings may have wide yards 
that are more of a landscaped forecourt that can 
offer reasonable stand-off distance. Yards are 
usually provided for governmental or 
institutional buildings in which coverage of the 
entire property may not be economically 
critical as is the case for private development. 

Sometimes small yards (within the property 
line) are matched with a wide sidewalk 
provided by the city. 

Building Yard 

A typical raised, low planter that can act as a 
bench (or plinth wall that holds back soil or 
rock), as shown in the left photo, presents a 
significant barrier to small and medium-sized 
vehicles. The high stepped yard in the right 
photo, which is along the side of the building, 
is a significant barrier and could also act as a 
deflector of blast from a curbside vehicle. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-37 
Low planting makes a 
moderate barrier 
High stepped yard on sloping 
site make a strong barrier 
Second Layer of Defense 
Building Yard 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-38 
Second Layer of Defense 
Building Yard 
Monumental yards make 
excellent barriers and 
elements of beautification 
Unit IX-A-38 

Unit IX-A-39 

Building Yard 

Security elements within the building yard 
should complement the building architecture 
and landscaping and should be designed so as 
to appear as well designed landscape objects 
rather than expressing security. The security 
elements should be located near the outer edge 
of the yard to maximize stand-off. 

Good examples of this are shown in these 
photos. 

Plaza 

Extensive business district development with 
very large buildings began after World War II. 
The straight tower with no setbacks became 
fashionable, but new ordinances permitted 
building developers to construct taller 
buildings, with greater floor area, if a public 
plaza was incorporated. In fact, in Tokyo, new 
high-rises must ensure they do not completely 
block the sun from surrounding buildings. 

In effect, the plaza became an expanded 
building yard. It was moved outside the 
controlled access space of the building and 
became public space provided by the 
developer. 

The additional space provided by plazas 
enables a more effective second layer of 
defense to be achieved. Often an acceptable 
stand-off distance can be created on one or 
more faces of the building depending on the 
plaza /building layout. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-39 
Plaza 
. An expanded building yard 
. Moved out from the 
controlled building access 
. A developer provided 
public space 
. A well designed plaza can 
provide visual interest at 
same time providing good 
stand-off 
Second Layer of Defense 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-40 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-40 
Second Layer of Defense 
Roadways 
• Minimize 
interruption or 
closure of street 
• Ensure minimal 
conflict between 
pedestrian and 
traffic flow 
Unit IX-A-41 

Second Layer of Defense 

Parking 

. 
Restrict parking from
the interior of a group
of buildings and away
from restricted area
. 
Locate parking within
view of occupied
buildings
. 
If possible, design the 
parking lot with one-
way circulation 



Adapted from FEMA 452, Figure 2-4: Layers of Defense, p. 2-5 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-41 

Roadways 

Given that the energy transferred when one 
object strikes another is a function of its mass 
and its velocity, a bollard that can stop a 
15,000-pound truck moving at 35 miles per 
hour may not be able to stop the same truck 
moving at 55 miles per hour. In developing a 
system of street alignments with protection in 
mind, the designer cannot determine the size or 
weight of a vehicle that will travel along the 
road, because that is a management decision. 
However, the designer can propose a roadway 
system to minimize vehicle velocity, thus using 
the roadway itself as a protective measure. 

Minimizing street closure and disrupting 
vehicle and pedestrian patterns should always 
be a goal. But at higher threats, it may be one 
of the few available mitigation options. 

Parking 

Building placement on the site must balance 
stand-off distances; relationship to adjacent 
streets and buildings; siting of utilities, parking 
areas, and driveways; as well as access to 
parking and loading areas. 

There are three primary types of parking 
facilities, all of which present security tradeoffs. 


• 
Surface lots can be designed to keep 
vehicles away from buildings, but they 
consume large amounts of land and, if 
constructed of impervious materials, can 
contribute greatly to stormwater runoff 
volume. They can also be hazardous for 
pedestrians if dedicated pedestrian pathways 
are not provided. 
• 
In contrast, non-street parking is often 
convenient for users and a source of revenue 
for local governments, but this type of 
parking may provide little or no setback. 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-42 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-42 
Second Layer of Defense 
Parking 
• Finally, garage structures provide revenue 
and can be convenient for users, but they 
may require structural measures to ensure 
blast resistance as well as crime prevention 
measures to prevent street crime. 

Although the cost of land suggests that the 
construction of a garage below a building 
(either underground or aboveground) may be 
the most economically viable approach for 
many developments, they can be highly 
vulnerable to vehicle-borne weapons, 
endangering the building above. If garages 
must be used, human security procedures (e.g., 
vehicle searches) and electronic systems (e.g., 
closed circuit television) may be necessary. 

Parking structures open to the public should be 
sited and evaluated with concern for stand-off 
from other buildings, screening from critical 
operations and sensitive areas that might be 
observed from within the parking structure, and 
as a point of access or staging for use of 
weapons or explosives. Progressive collapse 
can become a concern in parking structures. 

If stand-off distance is needed between a 
building and a First Layer controlled perimeter, 
placing parking in this area is an excellent use 
of the available space, as shown in this graphic. 

Parking 

Parking layout and circulation is often one of 
the largest program elements in site design. 
Public street parking, parking lots, free 
standing structured parking buildings, and 
underground parking have different 
characteristics to be considered. 

Note the limited physical barriers that are in 
place to prevent unauthorized vehicles from 
parking underneath this building as shown in 
the slide. Also note the limited stand-off and 
the parking proximity to columns supporting 


INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-43 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-43 
Second Layer of Defense 
Parking 
• Avoid parking too close to the 
building 
• Design of good parking away 
from the building can avoid the 
need to harden the building 
• Screening of vehicles and 
pedestrians at building may be 
necessary 
Unit IX-A-44 

Second Layer of Defense 

Parking 

. 
Restrict parking and access between buildings 
. 
Consider one-way circulation in parking lots 
. 
Locate parking within view of occupied buildings 
. 
Restrict parking underneath buildings 
. 
Well-lit, with security presence, emergency 
communications, and/or CCTV
. 
Apply progressive collapse hardening to columnswhen parking garage is in the building 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-44 

the exterior wall of the building. 

Parking 

Avoid parking too close to the building, 
especially large vehicles. 

Good parking design can prevent the need to 
harden the building. 

Parking 

When designing parking, the following should 
be taken into consideration: 

• 
Maintain stand-off distance from building 
• 
Restrict parking from the interior of a group 
of buildings and away from any restricted 
area 
• 
Avoid having parking near, within or 
underneath buildings – Consider hardening 
against progressive collapse if parking 
garage is in the building. 
• 
Locate parking within view of occupied 
buildings 
• 
If possible, design the parking lot with one-
way circulation that restricts straight-on 
high-speed approaches to buildings 
• 
Provide signage to clearly mark separate 
entrances for different parking lots 
• 
Keep parking areas well lit; use emergency 
communications, and/or CCTV 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-45 

Second Layer of Defense 

Parking -Loading Docks 

. 
Avoid trucks parking into or
underneath of the buildings
. 
Keep dumpsters away from
buildings
. 
Separate loading docks from
building critical functions
. 
Design to prevent progressive 
collapse



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-45 

Significant structural damage to the walls and 
ceiling of the loading dock may be 
acceptable; however, the areas adjacent to the 
loading dock should not experience severe 
structural damage or collapse. 

This photo is a good example of a loading 
dock that is not underneath the building. 
This will be covered in more detail in the 
next instruction unit. 

Unit IX-A-46 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-46 
Second Layer of Defense 
Parking -Loading Docks 
• Ensure separation from criticalsystems, functions, and utility 
service entrances 
• Provide sufficient area for 
screening vehicles and 
packages 
Parking – Loading Docks 

Loading docks and service access areas are 
commonly required for a building and are 
typically desired to be kept as invisible as 
possible. 

• 
Locate loading docks so that vehicles will 
not be allowed underneath the building or 
too close to the building at the curb lane. If 
this is not possible, the dock area should be 
hardened for blast. 
• 
Design to prevent progressive collapse, 
especially if loading dock is under the 
building. 
• 
Separate (by at least 50 feet) loading docks 
and shipping and receiving areas in any 
direction from utility rooms, utility mains, 
and service entrances, including electrical, 
telephone/data, fire detection/alarm systems, 
fire suppression water mains, cooling and 
heating mains, etc. 
• 
Siting and layout of loading areas should be 
secured and accommodate sufficient area for 
screening vehicle and packages. 
• 
Trash dumpsters should be relocated away 
from the building. (Explosive devices can be 
tossed in the dumpster creating a blast 
effect.) 


Parking – Loading Docks 

Loading dock on-site accommodation is 
essential. Security issues relating to loading 
docks must be examined on a site by site basis, 
possibly involving the cooperation of civic 
authorities, especially in an urban environment. 

For increased threat levels, you may coordinate 
local policy to screen vehicles before 
approaching the loading dock. In any case, the 
vehicles need an inspection area established for 
normal operations at lower threat levels in 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-47 

All Layers of Defense 

Signage 

. 
Unless required, do not identify sensitive areas 
. 
Minimize signs identifying critical utilities 
. 
Warnings signs limiting access to control areas should be 
posted at all entrances 
. 
Signpost may be hardened and included as part of the 
perimeter barrier
. 
The lighting of signage should enhance nighttime safety 
. 
Warning signs should be posted in languages commonly 
spoken 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-47 

Whatever the strategy for signage, it is 
important that signage be developed in 
concert with other site design elements, be 
included in the site design palette, and 
designed and placed in coordination with all 
other materials. To reduce the potential of 
clutter, signage should be integrated with 
other streetscape elements and architectural 
elements. Access, maintenance, and 
adaptability should be considered in selection 
of signage systems. Periodically changes are 
required to signage content. A 
comprehensive signage plan should be 
tailored to the mission of the facility 
accompanying the FEMA 426 guidelines. 

order to protect the building. 

Signage 

Building owners should determine how visible 
the project should be and corresponding 
implications for site signage. For some 
projects, a degree of anonymity may be part of 
the security strategy. 

• 
Unless required, signs should not identify 
sensitive areas. 
• 
Minimize signs identifying critical utility 
complexes, such as power plants and water 
treatment plants. 
• 
Warning signs should be posted at all 
entrances to limited, controlled, and 
exclusion areas. 
• 
The wording on the signs should denote 
warning of a restricted area. 
• 
Signs should be posted at intervals of no 
more than 100 feet and should not be 
mounted on fences equipped with 
intrusion-detection equipment. 
• 
Signage may be mounted on other 
elements, such as fences and walls to 
reduce the number of posts along the street 
or perimeter. 
• 
Signposts may be hardened and included as 
part of the perimeter barrier. 
• 
The lighting of signage may also enhance 
nighttime safety to those who come to the 
site during evening or early morning hours. 
• 
Locate variable message signs, which give 
information on site/organization special 
events and visitors, so that they are not 
observable from site perimeters (first layer) 
• 
Warning signs must use languages 
commonly spoken. 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-48 

First/Second Layer of Defense 

Security Lighting 

High-mast lighting at entry control points 
Continuous lighting 

. 
Glare projection 
. 
Controlled lighting (avoid glare) 
. 
Closed circuit television (CCTV) 
Standby lighting 
Movable lighting 



Emergency lighting 
BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-48 

Unit IX-A-49 

First Layer of Defense 

Sensors / CCTV 

. 
When stand-off and hardening are not possible, securitymust rely upon sensors and CCTV 
. 
Look for suspicious vehicles and people, especiallythose that seem to be profiling your building 
. 
Monitor access to utilities serving the building 
. 
Currently high tech monitoring systems need to beselected and placed by experts 



BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-49 

Security Lighting 

Security lighting should be provided for overall 
site and building illumination and along the 
perimeter to allow security personnel to 
maintain visual assessment during darkness. 
Lighting is desirable around areas such as 
piers, fence lines, loading docks, storage areas, 
and parking lots. At entry points, a 
recommended minimum surface lighting 
average of 4 horizontal foot candles will help 
ensure adequate lighting. 

Security lighting has different purposes – to 
blind, to allow vehicle inspection, to identify 
credentials, to support CCTV capabilities, etc. 
Thus, security lighting must be coordinated for 
all purposes. 

Sensors / CCTV 

Manned and electronic security increases 
deterrence and detection with attendant 
reduction in risk. It is the fastest technology to 
add and upgrade when selected, installed, and 
used properly. 

It should cover vehicle, pedestrian, and utility 
entrances as all of these are potential 
approaches for terrorist tactics. 

This will be covered in more detail under 
Electronic Security Systems later. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-50 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-50 
Second Layer of Defense 
Site Utilities 
A thorough walk-through of the site property 
should be conducted and proper protection 
devices should be applied to exposed utilities. 
The electrical substation shown can be easily 
damaged from outside the fenceline by 
projectiles or short circuiting actions. The 
structure on the right only has fencing on 
three sides. 

Unit IX-A-51 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-51 
Second Layer of Defense 
Site Utilities 
. Concealed versus exposed 
. Underground versus overhead 
. Protect/secure versus accessible 
. Surveillance if possible 
Site Utilities 

Utility systems can suffer significant damage 
when subjected to the shock of an explosion. 
Some of these utilities may be critical for 
safely evacuating people from the building. 
Their destruction could cause damage that is 
disproportionate to other building damage 
resulting from an explosion. 

Loss of a utility because access was readily 
available to a potential threat element is one 
reason for assessing site utilities to ensure 
physical security measures are in place to limit 
access to authorized personnel only. 

Site Utilities 

• 
Top Right – Open Gate allowing access to 
Critical Cooling Unit for Computer Center 
• 
Lower Right – Exposed air conditioning 
systems 
• 
Middle – antenna system for Emergency 
Operations Center accessible from the 
ground 
• 
Lower Left – Exposed generator and 
natural gas regulators 


Concealed or underground utilities are easier to 
protect than exposed or aboveground 
constructions. 

Access to utilities should be protected or 
secure, allowing only authorized personnel 
access to perform maintenance and repair. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-52 
If physical security measures cannot limit 
access, then add sensors/CCTV to provide 
added protection. 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-52 
Second Layer of Defense 
Control access to tanks of 
critical supplies on site 
Place public address 
system/call boxes in 
parking lots and gathering 
areas to improve 
communications with 
security personnel 
Site Utilities 
The location and accessibility of site utilities 
directly impacts the vulnerability of systems to 
disruption and failure. 

Incoming utility systems should have two entry 
points to the site for redundancy as required by 
criticality. 

Looped versus radial distribution of utilities on 
site allows for higher system reliability and 
faster repair by avoiding utility loss by a single 
incident. 

When selecting locations for utilities, be aware 
of possible conflicts and spacing requirements 
both horizontally and vertically. In addition 
there can be demand for underground zones for 
planting beds and foundations for hardened 
street furniture. 

Site Utilities 

The U.S. utility infrastructure is highly 
concentrated, utilizing the same rights-of-way, 
tunnels, underground conduits, and other 
service points. Examine where the utilities 
intersect (manholes, poles, city blocks, etc.) to 
find critical nodes. 

Even if the utility is underground, manholes 
that provide access to the system should be 
physically secured. 

Install fencing and if possible, remote 
monitoring capability at key electrical 
substations, pumping plants, and 
communications vaults. 


Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-53 
Best Practices Appropriate design can blend security into 
the existing streetscape and serve as 
amenities for tenants and neighbors 
Perimeter barriers can be hand-in-
hand with streetscape 
improvements and street planting 
Treatment of the security 
elements should be 
compatible existing elements 
Unit IX-A-53 

Unit IX-A-54 

Best Practices 

Best practices include but are not restricted to 
the following: 

• 
Appropriate design can blend security into 
the existing streetscape and serve as 
amenities for tenants and neighbors -- 
• 
Treatment of the security elements should be 
compatible existing elements – so that they 
do not look like security elements 
• 
Perimeter barriers can be hand-in-hand with 
streetscape improvements and street planting 
• 
Careful design should be paid to how 
bollards or fences turn the corner, intersect 
with driveways and gates, cross pedestrian 
paths and handicapped ramps 
• 
Avoid street closure and removal of parking 
as the only solution of establishing stand-off 
distance 
• 
Landscaping can provide visual interest and 
at the same time provide good stand-off 


Best Practices 

Good examples to follow and bad examples to 
avoid: 

• 
Avoid introducing inappropriate security 
elements that will make tenants and 
neighbors feel more vulnerable and can 
detract from surrounding architecture and 
streetscape – jersey barrier at entrance steps 
– also ineffective as placed directly on 
pavement 


• 
Signage and way-finding should be carefully 
designed to increase security 
• 
Long expanses of bollards should be 
carefully designed and sited to avoid 
monotony – as can be seen in the lower 
photo 
• 
Use perimeter barriers to define pedestrian 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-54 
Best Practices 
Avoid introducing inappropriate security 
elements that will make tenants and 
neighbors feel more vulnerable and can 
detract from surrounding architecture 
and streetscape 
Signage and way-finding 
should be carefully 
designed to increase 
security 

Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Unit IX-A-55 

Best Practices 

Eliminate potential hiding places near 
facility, provide an unobstructed view Locate facility 
around facility away from 

Eliminate parking 
beneath facilities


Locate trash bins 

as far from facility 

as possible 

natural or man-
made vantage 
points 
Minimize exterior 
signage or other 
indications of asset Secure access 


locations to power/heat 
plants, gas 
mains, water 

Locate parking to obtain supplies, and 
stand-off from facility electrical 

Illuminate building exteriors or Minimize Eliminate lines of service 
located 
sites where exposed assets are vehicle approach perpendicular 
access to the building 
points 

Figure 2-16, Summary of Site Mitigation Measures, p. 2-53 

BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-55 


Page 2-52 of FEMA 426 provides a 
comprehensive list of security/protection 
measures that can be taken – increasing in 
protection, cost, and level of effort – that 
complements this graphic on Site Mitigation 
Measures. 

Unit IX-A-56 

Unit IX Case Study Activity 

Site and Layout Design Guidance 

Background 

FEMA 426, Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist: 
screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability 
assessment 

Requirements: Vulnerability Rating Approach

Assign sections of the checklist to qualified group members 

Refer to Case Study and GIS portfolio, and answerworksheet questions 


BUILDING DESIGN FOR HOMELAND SECURITY Unit IX-A-56 

Review results to identify site and layout vulnerabilities and 
possible mitigation measures 

Refer participants to FEMA 426, the Unit IX 
Case Study activity in the Student Manual. 

zones and increase the safety of pedestrian 

by separating them from vehicular traffic 

• Avoid designing perimeter barriers that 
impair access by first responders 

Best Practices 

To summarize: 

• 
A broad spectrum of mitigation actions can 
be taken – with a wide range of cost, 
protection provided, and level of effort 
required by the asset owner. 
• 
The nominal ranking of mitigation measures 
on Page 2-52 provides a framework for the 
identification of short-term and long-term 
measures that can be taken. 
• 
This is a great summary slide and can be 
found in FEMA 426 and the Air Force 
Installation Force Protection Guide on your 
Student Reference CD. 


Student Activity 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment 
Checklist in FEMA 426 can be used as a 
screening tool for preliminary design 
vulnerability assessment or for assessing an 
existing site. The checklist includes questions 
that determine if critical systems will continue 
to function to enhance deterrence, detection, 
denial, and damage limitation, and if 
emergency systems will function during a 
threat or hazard situation. 

Activity Requirements 

• 
Continue working in small groups. 
• 
Assign sections of the checklist to the 



Unit IX-A: Site and Layout Design Guidance 

INSTRUCTOR NOTES CONTENT/ACTIVITY 

Members of the instructor staff should be 
available to answer questions and assist 
groups as needed. 

There are 38 questions to answer by the team 
and then confer. With an average of 7 team 
members this means each member answers 
about 6 questions or about 5 minutes per 
question during their 30 minutes of research. 

group member who is most knowledgeable 
and qualified to perform an assessment of 
the assigned area. 

• 
Refer to the Case Study to determine 
answers to the worksheet questions. 
• 
Then review results to identify 
vulnerabilities and possible mitigation 
measures. 


Take 45 minutes to complete this activity 
broken down as 30 minutes of research and 15 
minutes of group interaction to compare 
information and discuss mitigation measures. 
Solutions will be reviewed in plenary group, 
taking about 15 minutes to ensure no group is 
drastically off track. 

Transition 

Unit X will cover Building Design Guidance. 


UNIT IX-A -- CASE STUDY ACTIVITY: 
SITE AND LAYOUT DESIGN GUIDANCE 
(Suburban Version) 

The Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist in FEMA 426 (Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 
1-93) can be used as a screening tool for preliminary design vulnerability assessment of the site 
where the building is located and the layout of the building on that site. The checklist includes 
questions that determine if critical systems will continue to function to enhance deterrence, 
detection, denial, and damage limitation, and emergency systems function during a threat or 
hazard situation. 

Requirements 

Assign sections of the checklist to the group members who are most knowledgeable and 
qualified to perform an assessment of the assigned area. Refer to the Case Study to determine 
answers to the questions. Then review results as a team to identify vulnerabilities and possible 
mitigation measures. 

1. 
Complete the following components of the Building Vulnerability Assessment Checklist 
(FEMA 426, Table 1-22, pages 1-46 to 1-93), which address site and layout. Note: 
Vulnerability Questions that cannot be answered with the case study information provided 
have not been included in this student exercise. 
2. 
Upon completion of these portions of the checklist, refer back to the vulnerability ratings 
determined in the Unit IV Case Study Activity and, based on this more detailed analysis, 
decide if any vulnerability rating needs adjustment. Adjust the Threat Matrix chart 
accordingly. 
3. 
Select mitigation measures to reduce vulnerability and associated risk from the site and 
layout perspective. 
4. 
Estimate the new risk ratings for high-risk asset-threat pairs (as adjusted in step 2 above) 
based on the recommended mitigation measures. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1 Site 
1.1 What major structures 
surround the facility (site 
or building(s))? 
What critical 
infrastructure, 
government, military, or 
recreation facilities are 
Critical infrastructure to 
consider includes: 
Telecommunications 
infrastructure 
Facilities for broadcast TV, cable 
TV; cellular networks; newspaper 
offices, production, and 
distribution; radio stations; 
satellite base stations; telephone 
There are two Critical 
Hazard Facilities within 2 
miles of the HIC 
Headquarters, one to the 
north and the other to the 
southwest. In addition, there 
are more than a dozen Tier 
II HAZMAT Facilities within 
3 miles of the building (in all 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
in the local area that 
impact transportation, 
utilities, and collateral 
damage (attack at this 
facility impacting the 
other major structures or 
attack on the major 
structures impacting this 
facility)? 
trunking and switching stations, 
including critical cable routes and 
major rights-of-way 
Electric power systems 
Power plants, especially nuclear 
facilities; transmission and 
distribution system components; 
fuel distribution, delivery, and 
storage 
Gas and oil facilities 
Hazardous material facilities, 
oil/gas pipelines, and storage 
facilities 
Banking and finance institutions 
Financial institutions (banks, 
credit unions) and the business 
district; note schedule 
business/financial district may 
follow; armored car services 
Transportation networks 
Airports: carriers, flight paths, and 
airport layout; location of air 
traffic control towers, runways, 
passenger terminals, and parking 
areas 
Bus Stations 
Pipelines: oil; gas 
Trains/Subways: rails and lines, 
railheads/rail yards, interchanges, 
tunnels, and cargo/passenger 
terminals; note hazardous material 
transported 
Traffic: interstate 
highways/roads/tunnels/ bridges 
carrying large volumes; points of 
congestion; note time of day and 
day of week 
Trucking: hazardous materials 
cargo loading/unloading facilities; 
truck terminals, weigh stations, 
and rest areas 
Waterways: dams; levees; berths 
and ports for cruise ships, ferries, 
roll-on/roll-off cargo vessels, and 
container ships; international 
(foreign) flagged vessels (and 
cargo) 
Water supply systems 
Pipelines and process/treatment 
facilities, dams for water 
collection; wastewater treatment 
Government services 
Federal/state/local government 
directions). 
A major interstate highway 
is located within ¼ mile of 
the HIC Headquarters. 
CSX Transportation and 
Norfolk-Southern Railway 
maintain a transportation 
corridor about ½ mile from 
HIC. There appear to be no 
restrictions on the material 
carried along these rail 
lines. 
A leg of the Piedmont 
Petroleum Pipeline (PPP) 
runs underneath the office 
park in the vicinity of HIC 
Headquarters. Part of 
Piedmont’s regional 
network, this portion of the 
pipeline normally carries a 
variety of refined products, 
including commercial and 
military jet fuels, diesel and 
three grades of gasoline, 
home heating fuels, etc. Four 
buried pipes carry 
approximately 20 million 
gallons per day. 
Connected to the pipeline, 
less than 1 mile from HIC, is 
a 20-million gallon capacity 
fuel farm. Operated by the 
Shellexxico Company, this 
tank farm stores a variety of 
petroleum products, 
primarily gasoline. 
Two airports are in the 
vicinity of HIC. One is a 
major international airport 
approximately 8 miles away. 
The other is a small, but 
busy general aviation airport 
approximately 2 miles away. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
offices – post offices, law 
enforcement stations, fire/rescue, 
town/city hall, local 
mayor’s/governor’s residences, 
judicial offices and courts, 
military installations (include 
type-active, Reserves, National 
Guard) 
Emergency services 
Backup facilities, communications 
centers, Emergency Operations 
Centers (EOCs), fire/Emergency 
Medical Service (EMS) facilities, 
Emergency Medical Centers 
(EMCs), law enforcement 
facilities 
The following are not critical 
infrastructure, but have 
collateral damage potential to 
consider: 
Agricultural facilities: chemical 
distribution, storage, and 
application sites; crop spraying 
services; farms and ranches; food 
processing, storage, and 
distribution facilities 
Commercial/manufacturing/industrial facilities: apartment 
buildings; business/corporate 
centers; chemical plants 
(especially those with Section 302 
Extremely Hazardous 
Substances); factories; fuel 
production, distribution, and 
storage facilities; hotels and 
convention centers; industrial 
plants; raw material production, 
distribution, and storage facilities; 
research facilities and laboratories; 
shipping, warehousing, transfer, 
and logistical centers 
Events and attractions: festivals 
and celebrations; open-air 
markets; parades; rallies, 
demonstrations, and marches; 
religious services; scenic tours; 
theme parks 
Health care system components: 
family planning clinics; health 
department offices; hospitals; 
radiological material and medical 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
waste transportation, storage, and 
disposal; research facilities and 
laboratories, walk-in clinics 
Political or symbolically 
significant sites: embassies, 
consulates, landmarks, 
monuments, political party and 
special interest groups offices, 
religious sites 
Public/private institutions: 
academic institutions, cultural 
centers, libraries, museums, 
research facilities and laboratories, 
schools 
Recreation facilities: 
auditoriums, casinos, concert halls 
and pavilions, parks, restaurants 
and clubs (frequented by potential 
target populations), sports arenas, 
stadiums, theaters, malls, and 
special interest group facilities; 
note congestion dates and times 
for shopping centers 
References: FEMA 386-7, FEMA 
SLG 101, DOJ NCJ181200 
1.2 Does the terrain place 
the building in a 
depression or low area? 
Depressions or low areas can trap 
heavy vapors, inhibit natural 
decontamination by prevailing 
winds, and reduce the 
effectiveness of in-place 
sheltering. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
Based on terrain elevation 
data, the ground level of the 
tank farm is 49 feet higher 
than the ground level at HIC. 
Only some of the fuel tanks 
are bermed, but leaking fuel 
is not likely to reach HIC’s 
office park. The interstate 
highway between the two is 
16 feet lower than the tank 
farm and slightly lower than 
the office park. 
The rear parking area behind 
HIC slopes steeply away 
from the building to a stream 
which allows winds to pass 
over the structure 
unhindered. 
Thus, HIC is not in a 
depression or low area. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1.3 In dense, urban areas, 
does curb lane parking 
place uncontrolled 
parked vehicles 
unacceptably close to a 
building in public rights-
of-way? 
Where distance from the building 
to the nearest curb provides 
insufficient setback, restrict 
parking in the curb lane. For 
typical city streets, this may 
require negotiating to close the 
curb lane. Setback is common 
terminology for the distance 
between a building and its 
associated roadway or parking. It 
is analogous to stand-off between 
a vehicle bomb and the building. 
The benefit per foot of increased 
stand-off between a potential 
vehicle bomb and a building is 
very high when close to a building 
and decreases rapidly as the 
distance increases. Note that the 
July 1, 1994, Americans with 
Disabilities Act Standards for 
Accessible Design states that 
required handicapped parking 
shall be located on the shortest 
accessible route of travel from 
adjacent parking to an accessible 
entrance. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
With a loading dock on the 
west side, it is possible for 
vehicles to park right next to 
the building. Normal parking 
for employees is in front; the 
closest parking slot is 44 feet 
from the front door. 
1.4 Is a perimeter fence or 
other types of barrier 
controls in place? 
The intent is to channel pedestrian 
traffic onto a site with multiple 
buildings through known access 
control points. For a single 
building, the intent is to have a 
single visitor entrance. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
There is no fence or other 
type of barrier on the site’s 
perimeter. The only fence is 
a short 4-foot high fence for 
life safety to keep anyone 
from falling down the steep 
embankment in the rear of 
the building. 
1.5 What are the site access 
points to the site or 
building? 
The goal is to have at least two 
access points – one for passenger 
vehicles and one for delivery 
trucks due to the different 
procedures needed for each. 
Having two access points also 
helps if one of the access points 
becomes unusable, then traffic can 
be routed through the other access 
point. 
Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 
There are three vehicle 
access points into the 
parking lot spread along the 
main road. 
Access to the HIC building 
includes the loading dock on 
the west side (rear) of the 
building and front entrance 
with an 8-foot overhang. 
There are three exits from 
the mezzanine and four 
additional exits from the 
building. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1.6 Is vehicle traffic 
separated from 
pedestrian traffic on the 
site? 
Pedestrian access should not be 
endangered by car traffic. 
Pedestrian access, especially from 
public transportation, should not 
cross vehicle traffic if possible. 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
Sidewalks at the front of the 
building allow access to the 
site without pedestrian/ 
vehicle interface. However, 
pedestrians must negotiate 
the parking lot to access the 
sidewalk. 
1.7 Is there vehicle and 
pedestrian access control 
at the perimeter of the 
site? 
Vehicle and pedestrian access 
control and inspection should 
occur as far from facilities as 
possible (preferably at the site 
perimeter) with the ability to 
regulate the flow of people and 
vehicles one at a time. 
Control on-site parking with 
identification checks, security 
personnel, and access control 
systems. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
There is no access control to 
the site; however, security 
personnel monitor parking 
areas, and rear parking areas 
are well lit and monitored by 
CCTV cameras. Front 
parking areas are lit only. 
Area proximity card prevent 
access to HIC building by 
unauthorized personnel. 
1.8 Is there space for 
inspection at the curb 
line or outside the 
protected perimeter? 
What is the minimum 
distance from the 
inspection location to the 
building? 
Design features for the vehicular 
inspection point include: vehicle 
arrest devices that prevent 
vehicles from leaving the 
vehicular inspection area and 
prevent tailgating. 
If screening space cannot be 
provided, consider other design 
features such as: hardening and 
alternative location for vehicle 
search/ inspection. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The building has no 
protected perimeter; 
however, there is adequate 
space for an inspection area 
at the southern-most parking 
lot access. This area is 125 
feet away from the nearest 
building and 500 feet away 
from HIC. The added 
advantage of this location is 
that the vehicle inspections 
are adjacent to an 
embankment and the 
building is on top of the 
embankment. The 
embankment catches 
fragmentation and blast is 
directed upward. 
If this area is used to search 
visitor vehicles, then once 
access is given, the visitor 
must drive all the way 
around the office park to get 
access to the front parking 
lot. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
1.13 Does site circulation 
prevent high-speed 
approaches by vehicles? 
The intent is to use site circulation 
to minimize vehicle speeds and 
eliminate direct approaches to 
structures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No, entering at the center 
access point from the main 
road, turning left, and then 
turning right to proceed in 
front of the southern-most 
building, a car could easily 
reach 75 mph when striking 
the HIC building. 
1.14 Are there offsetting 
vehicle entrances from 
the direction of a 
vehicle’s approach to 
force a reduction of 
speed? 
Single or double 90-degree turns 
effectively reduce vehicle 
approach speed. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
There are three long 
straightaways approaching 
the building, with only one 
straight enough to achieve a 
high speed approach to the 
HIC building. 
Using speed bumps, 
especially angled speed 
bumps would be one way to 
reduce speed. Using barriers 
to direct traffic so there is no 
long straightaway is another 
approach, but an “S” route 
entrance may be frustrating 
for visitors, but would 
significantly reduce the 
maximum speed capability 
of any vehicle approach to 
the buildings. As a 
minimum, closing off the 
last openings near each 
building should be 
considered as a minimum. 
1.15 Is there a minimum 
setback distance between 
the building and parked 
vehicles? 
Adjacent public parking should be 
directed to more distant or better-
protected areas, segregated from 
employee parking and away from 
the building. Some publications 
use the term setback in lieu of the 
term stand-off. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
It is possible for vehicles to 
park right next to the 
building near the loading 
dock. Normal parking for 
employees is in front; the 
closest parking slot is 44 feet 
from the building. 
1.16 Does adjacent surface 
parking on site maintain 
a minimum stand-off 
distance? 
The specific stand-off distance 
needed is based upon the design 
basis threat bomb size and the 
building construction. For initial 
screening, consider using 25 
meters (82 feet) as a minimum 
with more distance needed for 
unreinforced masonry or wooden 
walls. 
Adjacent parking is that 
parking associated with the 
next building or site that is 
not under the control of the 
owners of the building being 
assessed. 
There is no adjacent parking 
per se as it is one office park, 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
but there is one parking lot 
or area that any tenant or 
visitor to the office park can 
use. Stand-off distance to the 
front parking lot is less than 
82 feet. Cars or trucks can 
drive up to the loading dock 
in the rear. 
1.17 Do standalone, 
aboveground parking 
garages provide adequate 
visibility across as well 
as into and out of the 
parking garage? 
Pedestrian paths should be 
planned to concentrate activity to 
the extent possible. 
Limiting vehicular entry/exits to a 
minimum number of locations is 
beneficial. 
Stair tower and elevator lobby 
design shall be as open as code 
permits. Stair and/or elevator 
waiting areas should be as open to 
the exterior and/or the parking 
areas as possible and well lighted. 
Impact-resistant, laminated glass 
for stair towers and elevators is a 
way to provide visual openness. 
Potential hiding places below 
stairs should be closed off; nooks 
and crannies should be avoided, 
and dead-end parking areas 
should be eliminated. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
No aboveground parking 
garages exist on site. 
However the open, ground-
level parking provides 
adequate visibility across the 
lot. 
1.19 Do site landscaping and 
street furniture provide 
hiding places? 
Minimize concealment 
opportunities by keeping 
landscape plantings (hedges, 
shrubbery, and large plants with 
heavy ground cover) and street 
furniture (bus shelters, benches, 
trash receptacles, mailboxes, 
newspaper vending machines) 
away from the building to permit 
observation of intruders and 
prevent hiding of packages. 
If mail or express boxes are used, 
the size of the openings should be 
restricted to prohibit the insertion 
of packages. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
There is no street furniture 
shown for this building. 
The landscaping shown is 
grass and trees are mature/tall 
enough so that a package 
cannot be hidden at the base. 
The hedge along the building 
drip line may conceal a 
package, if allowed to get 
taller or denser. 
There is no mail or express 
box and there is no slot in the 
glass main entrance door. 
Due to the size of the 
building columns, a package 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
could be overlooked. 

Is the site lighting 
adequate from a security 
perspective in roadway 
access and parking 
areas? 

Security protection can be 
successfully addressed through 
adequate lighting. The type and 
design of lighting, including 
illumination levels, is critical. 
Illuminating Engineering Society 
of North America (IESNA) 
guidelines can be used. The site 
lighting should be coordinated 
with the CCTV system. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

Both rear and front parking 
areas are well lit. Rear areas 
are also monitored by CCTV 
cameras. 

Are line-of-sight 
perspectives from 
outside the secured 
boundary to the building 
and on the property 
along pedestrian and 
vehicle routes integrated 
with landscaping and 
green space? 

The goal is to prevent the 
observation of critical assets by 
persons outside the secure 
boundary of the site. For 
individual buildings in an urban 
environment, this could mean 
appropriate window treatments or 
no windows for portions of the 
building. 

Once on the site, the concern is to 
ensure observation by a general 
workforce aware of any 
pedestrians and vehicles outside 
normal circulation routes or 
attempting to approach the 
building unobserved. 

Reference: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide 

No, lines of sight are not 
integrated with landscaping 
and green space. There are 
clear, approximately 300foot, 
lines of sight in all 
directions from off the office 
park to buildings in this 
office park. 

Do signs provide control 
of vehicles and people? 

The signage should be simple and 
have the necessary level of 
clarity. However, signs that 
identify sensitive areas should 
generally not be provided. 

Reference: GSA PBS-P100 

There are no parking lot 
signs. 

Are all existing fire 
hydrants on the site 
accessible? 

Just as vehicle access points to 
the site must be able to transit 
emergency vehicles, so too must 
the emergency vehicles have 
access to the buildings and, in the 
case of fire trucks, the fire 
hydrants. Thus, security 
considerations must 
accommodate emergency 
Yes, fire hydrants in the 
office park are accessible and 
the hydrant nearest to HIC is 
200 feet away. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
response requirements. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
2 Architectural 
2.1 Does the site and 
architectural design 
incorporate strategies 
from a Crime Prevention 
Through Environmental 
Design (CPTED) 
perspective? 
The focus of CPTED is on 
creating defensible space by 
employing: 
1. Natural access controls: 
-Design streets, sidewalks, and 
building entrances to clearly 
indicate public routes and direct 
people away from 
private/restricted areas 
-Discourage access to private 
areas with structural elements and 
limit access (no cut-through 
streets) 
Loading 
zones should be 
separate from public parking 
2. Natural surveillance: 
Design 
that maximizes 
visibility of people, parking areas, 
and building entrances: doors and 
windows that look out on to 
streets and parking areas 
Shrubbery 
under 2 feet in 
height for visibility 
-Lower branches of existing 
trees kept at least 10 feet off the 
ground 
Pedestrian-
friendly sidewalks 
and streets to control pedestrian 
and vehicle circulation 
-Adequate nighttime lighting, 
especially at exterior doorways 
3. Territorial reinforcement: 
-Design that defines property 
lines 
Design 
that distinguishes 
private/restricted spaces from 
public spaces using separation, 
landscape plantings; pavement 
designs (pathway and roadway 
placement); gateway treatments at 
lobbies, corridors, and door 
placement; walls, barriers, 
signage, lighting, and “CPTED" 
fences 
-“Traffic-calming” devices for 
vehicle speed control 
4. Target hardening: 
Site design has some features 
of Crime Prevention Through 
Environmental Design 
strategies. 
The site clearly directs 
visitors to the front of the 
building and to clearly 
marked entrances. 
Loading areas are separate 
from public parking. 
Natural surveillance is 
maximized towards the 
building front with many 
occupied windows having a 
clear view of the central 
parking lot. 
There is adequate lighting at 
night in front and back 
parking areas. 
There is electronic access 
control to gain entrance to 
buildings in the office park. 
Where people cannot observe 
from windows, CCTV 
cameras provide coverage. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
-Prohibit entry or access: 
window locks, dead bolts for 
doors, interior door hinges 
-Access control (building and 
employee/visitor parking) and 
intrusion detection systems 
5. Closed circuit television 
cameras: 
- Prevent crime and influence 
positive behavior, while 
enhancing the intended uses of 
space. In other words, design that 
eliminates or reduces criminal 
behavior and at the same time 
encourages people to "keep an 
eye out" for each other. 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
2.2 Is it a mixed-tenant 
building? 
Separate high-risk tenants from 
low-risk tenants and from 
publicly accessible areas. Mixed 
uses may be accommodated 
through such means as separating 
entryways, controlling access, and 
hardening shared partitions, as 
well as through special security 
operational countermeasures. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
The building is a multiple-
tenant facility and there are 
multiple buildings in the 
office park with multiple 
tenants. 
HIC has neighbors on one 
side in its building and a 
different neighbor in the 
adjacent building. 
2.3 Are pedestrian paths 
planned to concentrate 
activity to aid in 
detection? 
Site planning and landscape 
design can provide natural 
surveillance by concentrating 
pedestrian activity, limiting 
entrances/exits, and eliminating 
concealment opportunities. Also, 
prevent pedestrian access to 
parking areas other than via 
established entrances. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Each tenant facility has its 
own entrance, spreading 
pedestrian activity across the 
front of the buildings within 
easy observation of each 
entrance to aid in detection. 
Loading docks are likewise 
spread out across the rear of 
the buildings. HIC uses a 
CCTV camera on the 
building rear to aid in 
detection of personnel 
approaching the rear 
entrance. 
2.4 Are there trash 
receptacles and 
mailboxes in close 
proximity to the building 
The size of the trash receptacles 
and mailbox openings should be 
restricted to prohibit insertion of 
packages. Street furniture, such as 
newspaper vending machines, 
There is no indication that 
there are trash receptacles 
and mailboxes in close 
proximity to the building. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
that can be used to hide 
explosive devices? 

should be kept sufficient distance 
(10 meters or 33 feet) from the 
building, or brought inside to a 
secure area. 

References: USAF Installation 
Force Protection Guide and DoD 
UCF 4-010-01 

The dumpster is 
approximately 50 feet from 
the rear of the building. 

5 
Utility Systems 
5.1 

What is the source of 
domestic water?
(utility, municipal, wells,
lake, river, storage tank) 


Is there a secure alternate 
drinking water supply?


Domestic water is critical for 
continued building operation. 
Although bottled water can 
satisfy requirements for drinking 
water and minimal sanitation, 
domestic water meets many other 
needs – flushing toilets, building 
heating and cooling system 
operation, cooling of emergency 
generators, humidification, etc. 

Reference: FEMA 386-7 
The water to the fire 
protection system within the 
building and the fire hydrants 
in the office park comes from 
the local municipal 
distribution mains which is 
also the source for all water 
uses in the building – rest 
rooms, kitchen/break room, 
HVAC equipment, etc. 
There is only one water 
supply line to the HIC 
building. 

Per request from employees, 
four bottled water dispensers 
are throughout the building, 
with an average of 2 water 
bottles (5 gallons each) in 
reserve at any given time for 
each dispenser. 

Does the building or site 
have storage capacity for 
domestic water? 

How many gallons of 
storage capacity are 
available and how long 
will it allow operations 
to continue? 

Operational facilities will require 
reliance on adequate domestic 
water supply. Storage capacity 
can meet short-term needs and 
use water trucks to replenish for 
extended outages. 

Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities. 

The building currently stores 
drinking water as delivered in 
5-gallon bottles. The site has 
the capacity to have 80 
gallons on hand at the time of 
delivery. The bottled water 
supply would last for a few 
days to one week for 
drinking purposes only. 

There are no storage tanks 
for servicing other water uses 
in the HIC building. 

The fire suppression system water 

The only water source for 

What is the source of 

may be supplied from the 

fire suppression is the 

water for the fire 

domestic water or it may have a 

municipal water mains 

suppression system? 

separate source, separate storage, 

serving the office park. 

(local utility company 

or nonpotable alternate sources. 

lines, storage tanks with 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
utility company backup, 
lake, or river) 
Are there alternate water 
supplies for fire 
suppression? 
For a site with multiple buildings, 
the concern is that the supply 
should be adequate to fight the 
worst case situation according to 
the fire codes. Recent major 
construction may change that 
requirement. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
5.6 Is the fire suppression 
system adequate, code-
compliant, and protected 
(secure location)? 
Standpipes, water supply control 
valves, and other system 
components should be secure or 
supervised. 
Reference: FEMA 386-7 
Yes, the fire suppression 
system is adequate and meets 
all fire codes. 
5.10 What fuel supplies do 
the building rely upon 
for critical operation? 
Typically, natural gas, propane, or 
fuel oil is required for continued 
operation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Heating for the HIC building 
is provided by a combination 
of natural gas and electricity. 
Backup electric generators 
use diesel fuel. 
5.11 How much fuel is stored 
on the site or at the 
building and how long 
can this quantity support 
critical operations? 
How is it stored? 
How is it secured? 
Fuel storage protection is 
essential for continued operation. 
Main fuel storage should be 
located away from loading docks, 
entrances, and parking. Access 
should be restricted and protected 
(e.g., locks on caps and seals). 
References: GSA PBS-P100 and 
Physical Security Assessment for 
the Department of Veterans 
Affairs Facilities 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single diesel 
generator, located in a shed 
in the rear parking lot. The 
generator has a 50-gallon day 
tank, maintained at 80 
percent capacity. A 2,000gallon 
main tank is buried 
under the parking lot, near 
the generator. 
There are no security 
measures for the fuel. 
5.12 Where is the fuel supply 
obtained? 
How is it delivered? 
The supply of fuel is dependent 
on the reliability of the supplier. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Natural gas enters the 
building through two meters 
under the loading dock 
staircase and is supplied from 
the local gas distribution 
company. 
Electric power for the HIC 
office is provided by 
Hazardville Electric Power 
Company through two 
transformers outside the 
building. Two sets of buried 
transmission lines deliver 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
12,470 volt (12.47KV) power 
to two separate transformers 
outside the building from a 
nearby substation. 
Diesel fuel is delivered by 
truck from a local supplier, 
who normally responds the 
day after being called. 
5.13 Are there alternate 
sources of fuel? 
Can alternate fuels be 
used? 
Critical functions may be served 
by alternate methods if normal 
fuel supply is interrupted. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The single electric generator 
powered by diesel fuel is the 
only alternate long-term fuel 
supply to electricity. 
However, batteries to support 
the UPS (Uninterruptible 
Power Supply) are in a small 
room next to the UPS room. 
The UPS provides enough 
electric power for an orderly 
shutdown of the computer. 
5.14 What is the normal 
source of electrical 
service for the site or 
building? 
Utilities are the general source 
unless co-generation or a private 
energy provider is available. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Main power for the HIC 
office is provided by 
Hazardville Electric Power 
Company through two 
transformers outside the 
building. Two sets of buried 
transmission lines deliver 
12,470 volt (12.47KV) power 
to the transformers (one set 
to each) from a nearby 
substation. 
5.15 Is there a redundant 
electrical service source? 
Can the site or buildings 
be fed from more than 
one utility substation? 
The utility may have only one 
source of power from a single 
substation. There may be only 
single feeders from the main 
substation. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
Each transformer with its 
respective feeder can handle 
the complete electrical load 
of HIC. 
However, both feeders come 
from the same substation. 
5.16 How many service entry 
points does the site or 
building have for 
electricity? 
Electrical supply at one location 
creates a vulnerable situation 
unless an alternate source is 
available. 
Ensure disconnecting 
requirements according to NFPA 
70 (National Fire Protection 
There are two service 
entrance points for 
electricity, one feeding the 
Computer Center Bus and the 
other feeding the Support 
Bus as shown in Figure 19 of 
Appendix A. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
Association, National Electric 
Code) are met for multiple service 
entrances. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
5.17 Is the incoming electric 
service to the building 
secure? 
Typically, the service entrance is 
a locked room, inaccessible to the 
public. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The electric service entrance 
comes into the Mechanical 
and Electrical Room from 
underground. The room is 
inside a secured facility and 
the room has a keyed lock to 
limit access to authorized 
personnel. 
5.18 What provisions for 
emergency power exist? 
What systems receive 
emergency power and 
have capacity 
requirements been 
tested? 
Is the emergency power 
collocated with the 
commercial electric 
service? 
Is there an exterior 
connection for 
emergency power? 
Besides installed generators to 
supply emergency power, 
portable generators or rental 
generators available under 
emergency contract can be 
quickly connected to a building 
with an exterior quick disconnect 
already installed. 
Testing under actual loading and 
operational conditions ensures the 
critical systems requiring 
emergency power receive it with 
a high assurance of reliability. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 
Emergency power is 
provided by a single diesel 
generator with a maximum 
capacity of 1250 KW/1563 
KVA. This generator is large 
enough to take the complete 
load of the building. 
The backup diesel generator 
has never had to support 
HIC’s power demands for 
longer than about 2 hours, 
and never with more than one 
chiller operating. It has never 
been tested for an extended 
period under a heavy load. 
The diesel generator is 
configured to automatically 
start upon loss of commercial 
power to the Computer 
Center Bus (CCB). This 
happens about twice a year 
due to electrical storms or 
utility maintenance in the 
neighborhood. 
Batteries to support the UPS 
were tested 2 years ago and 
calculated to provide 60 
minutes of power for orderly 
shutdown of the Computer 
Center. 
At 319 GPH at 1250 KW 
loading, the backup generator 
consumes 0.255 gallons per 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
hour per KW. This is NOT a 
very efficient generator as 
0.07 gallons per hour per KW 
is a DoD design minimum. 
This generator with a 2,000 
gallon tank will carry the 
maximum load for a little 
over 6 hours, which would 
require frequent refilling for 
an extended outage. 
The generator is outside the 
HIC building, but the 
Automatic Transfer Switch 
and commercial power 
service entrances are 
collocated in the Mechanical 
and Electrical Room. 
There is no exterior 
connection for electric power 
(like a fire pumper Siamese 
connection). A backup 
generator to the backup 
would either have to be wired 
to the Automatic Transfer 
Switch or spliced into the 
cables leaving the installed 
generator. 
5.19 By what means do the 
main telephone and data 
communications 
interface the site or 
building? 
Typically communication ducts or 
other conduits are available. 
Overhead service is more 
identifiable and vulnerable. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
HIC has two T1 lines and one 
T3 line connected at the 
demark to ATT’s high 
performance backbone 
network. The ATT fiber 
connectivity provides more 
than enough bandwidth for 
HIC’s current needs and 
planned future expansion. 
The demark is in the Comm 
Center on the opposite side 
of the building from the 
Mechanical and Electrical 
Room. 
As with all other utilities, the 
telephone and data service is 
underground. 


Section Vulnerability Question Guidance Observations 
5.21 Does the fire alarm 
system require 
communication with 
external sources? 
By what method is the 
alarm signal sent to the 
responding agency: 
telephone, radio, etc.? 
Is there an intermediary 
alarm monitoring center? 
Typically, the local fire 
department responds to an alarm 
that sounds at the station or is 
transmitted over phone lines by 
an auto dialer. 
An intermediary control center 
for fire, security, and/or building 
system alarms may receive the 
initial notification at an on-site or 
off-site location. This center may 
then determine the necessary 
response and inform the 
responding agency. 
Reference: Physical Security 
Assessment for the Department of 
Veterans Affairs Facilities 
The Security Officer has a 
key to the building that has 
the main fire panel. The main 
fire panel is located in the 
lobby area, which is open to 
unrestricted access during 
normal business hours. In 
the event of a fire, the panel 
alerts the local fire 
department and the security 
company using dedicated 
telephone lines. 
There is no intermediary 
alarm monitoring center, but 
the security company acts as 
a backup to ensure the fire 
department is alerted. 
5.22 Are utility lifelines 
aboveground, 
underground, or direct 
buried? 
Utility lifelines (water, power, 
communications, etc.) can be 
protected by concealing, burying, 
or encasing. 
Reference: GSA PBS-P100 and 
FEMA 386-7 
Utility lines are buried at this 
location. 


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