The Sino-U.S. Relation and Its Structural Clash

Ni Lexiong

The anti-war, anti-hegemony tradition based upon the principles of “benevolence” and “humanism” has been deeply imprinted in Chinese national character. This tradition will profoundly affect China’s foreign policy. On the other hand, Western scholars such as John Mersheimer of the University of Chicago often tend to view China’s rise through a Euro-centric colored glass. These Western scholars, who are incapable of reading China’s ancient classics, base their understanding on the thousand year old history of competition for supremacy in the Mediterranean civilization, second guessing, with much imagination, China’s pursuit for world supremacy and the methods with which China intends to use for such supremacy. They ignore or are unable to know the factor of cultural heritage in China’s foreign policy.

Factors that Breed Conflicts

John Mersheimer is the representative for this aggressive realism. He believes that within the international community, the main causes for war lie in the structure of international system, most important of which is the number of big nations and how much power each big nation can control. Mersheimer further concludes that with the four types of international structures, the most dangerous power distribution is an imbalanced multipolarity, which is the structure most likely to cause wars.

The current international structure is just like what has been described by Mersheimer as the most dangerous. There exists a multi-layered imbalanced power structure with a potential overlord. From this perspective, the future of the Sino-U.S. relationship is very pessimistic, despite the opposite views held by many Chinese or non-Chinese scholars. However, the future of the Sino-U.S. relationship is indeed a myth, and we should not rush to any conclusions. But the methodology used by Mersheimer to stress international structure and power distribution in relation to war and peace is worth borrowing.

There indeed exist structural conflicts in the Sino-U.S. relationship. First among them is the clash of ideologies, and the differing, even opposite, understanding of a series of cultural values such as freedom, human rights, equality and justice. The national behaviors guided by these values are also different. The question is, to what extent does this clash of ideologies contribute to mutual hostility? As an ancient saying goes, “if you are not one among my people, you must think differently.” The root of this “differing thinking” lies in culture and ideologies. This ancient saying contains condensed historical experience, demonstrating that differences in ideologies inevitably create suspicion and insecurity, which, if stimulated under certain conditions, further develops into enmity and causes confrontations.

From the perspective of historical development, the Sino-U.S. relationship also embodies an interaction between a potential strong power and an existing strong power. The logic of history is that potential strong powers will eventually challenge the existing strong powers in all htmects of life including politics, economy and military. The history of ancient Rome and that of modern and contemporary Europe have repeatedly proven this point. Therefore, American conservative scholars such as Aaron Friedberger and John Mersheimer have insisted that the confrontation between China and the United States is inevitable.

Looking back in history, wars are most likely to break out among nations when there are clashes of both ideologies and fundamental national interests. Under what condition can nations temporarily put aside their ideological differences? The answer is that ideology often becomes a secondary consideration when a nation’s survival is at stake. Therefore, the bourgeois England during the Napoleonic War could put aside ideological difference with the feudal monarchies in continental Europe and forged an alliance with them to fight France. Similarly, during World War I, bourgeois nations such as England, France and the United States were willing to form an alliance with the rather feudal monarchy of Russia. During World War II, the socialist Soviet Union and the Chinese Communist Party also followed the same principle to form an anti-Fascist alliance with the United States, England and France. In the 1970s, China had split with the Soviet Union that shared the same ideology and improved its relationship with the “American imperialists.”

Yet when a nation’ ideology and its national survival are not in conflict, this nation’s confrontation with its opponent will be doubly uncompromising. The Russian historian Yevtally writes, “To the rulers in Europe, the red headscarf that Marat used to wrap his head was more lethal than Napoleon’s golden Crown. In 1815 they believed Napoleon was going to wage a general war by ‘reviving Marat.’ Yet, in fact, Napoleon not only never intended to do so, he also was most afraid of doing so. But Vienna, London, Berlin and St Petersburg all believed he would do so, thus further increasing their irreconcilable hostility toward the French conqueror.”

In the early 16th century, Ottoman Turkey and Venice were confronting each other not only in the arena of commercial interests but also in an ideological battle between Islam and Christianity. Finally, they fought a major naval battle in 1517, which resulted in Turkey’s defeat. Turkey began to decline ever since. In 1588, before the naval battle that destroyed the Spanish Armada, Spain and England not only had clashes over overseas trade but also had irreconcilable ideological battle. Spain stood for the old Roman Catholic Church and England for the Protestantism. The defeat of the Spanish Armada made England a strong naval power. After the 1789 French Revolution, Prussia and France became archenemies due to territorial disputes and ideological confrontation. The two nations have since fought the Franco-Prussian War, World War I and World War II.

The European Union has nuclear weapons, and enjoys a strong comprehensive national power. Various EU nations share similar ideologies, governmental systems, and cultural values, which has created among them a psychological identification and affinity. The United States has issues with the EU, but does not have enmity against it. This reveals how important ideology is in deciding the level of hostility among nations. The Napoleonic Wars became extraordinarily fierce because the two sides of the wars both shared a convergence of national interest for survival and ideologies. (England was an exception and its diplomatic value system dictates that national interests overshadow ideological concerns.)

The American civilization originated in Europe. It seems to have inherited the European tradition of emphasizing ideology. Furthermore, due to its strong comprehensive national power, the United States has even surpassed Europe in expanding the role of ideologies. Eric Hobsbawn, the British leftist historian, believes that “Europeans tend not to insist on unity, but the Americans dream about unity, wherein lies the danger, especially to a global empire such as the United States.”

The unique conditions of the United States have made the democratic political system in the U.S. more advanced than that in many countries. Based upon concerns for its own security, the United States wants the entire world to enter democratic political systems. Although such goal cannot be criticized, the Unites States arbitrarily insists that democracy should be the criterion by which to decide whether a nation is a friend or an enemy. This has brought insecurity to other nations, even causing fear. That North Korea always maintains that it wants to sign a non-aggression treaty is a good example in this regard. The U.S. insistence on ideology has not only made many enemies in the world, but also in reality brought turmoil and insecurity to the international community. Similarly, it has caused difficulties to the Sino-U.S. relationship.

Once two experienced nations develop mutual hostility, they would soon turn to mutual fear. Once this happens, they would subconsciously fill the space created by fear with their grievances and sufferings, thus imagining their uncertain fears in the future as what they have already suffered in the past, causing serious misunderstandings between the two sides. What is ironic here is that the confrontations caused by this kind of misunderstandings would further prove and validate their previous fears and misunderstanding. In this sense, some wars in history could have been avoided. China uses the cases of Japanese invasion and a serious of humiliating unequal treaties in its modern history as the backdrop to imagine the U.S. threat; the United States, on the other hand, uses the two world wars that were caused by the rise of Germany and Japan as the historical backdrop to imagine the rise of China as a new threat. Such a way of thinking can easily lead to confrontation. The so-called “pre-emptive strikes” and “preventive wars” are the direct results of such thinking.

Factors that Resolve Conflicts:

While there are factors that could breed conflicts, there are also factors that could prevent Sino-U.S. conflicts. Conditioned by its national character, China would normally not confront its nemesis when China is in a weaker position, always resorting to tolerance and compromise. In a similar vein, unless the situation has reached a point of being intolerabel, as for example when China could no longer tolerate the Huns in the early Han Dynasty, China, when in a strong position, would not compete for regional hegemony with equally strong opponents. In fact, China has always sought to avoid conflicts, as when the Kangxi Emperor of the Qing Dynasty dealt with Russia during the time of the czar Peter the Great. Furthermore, when China is strong, it would not normally bully the small nations, as in the case of the Ming emperor’s dying wish of not invading more than a dozen neighboring nations. Of course, in China’s history, there occasionally existed figures such as the Sui Yang Emperor of the Sui Dynasty and the Taizhong Emperor of the Tang Dynast who vaingloriously invaded Korea. Yet they were condemned by the traditional Confucians in the years to come. Overall, the value system of the Chinese civilization has always been at odds with such expansionist behavior and has been steadfastly in disapproval for such actions.

Due to the moral character of the Chinese civilization, ancient China, when strong and expansionist, preferred to use moral persuasion to influence peoples along its borders. Morality and justice are not only means of power expansion, but also the ultimate goal of power expansion. To use force to secure national interests is condemned by Chinese traditional culture. The Confucian giant Mencius once mercilessly blasts the militaristic view that “to wage war for territory is to kill everywhere; to wage war to take cities is to kill everywhere,” as he famously states, “the best warriors ought to receive the maximum punishment.” This is an anti-war and anti-hegemony tradition based upon “benevolence” and “humanism” which has deeply been imprinted in the national character of the Chinese nation, and will profoundly influence China’s foreign policy. However, Western scholars, such as Mersheimer, often look at China through their colored spectrum of the Mediterranean history of competition for hegemony and European culture, and fantasize a future strong China, its pursuit of global power and the way with which China might use to pursue such global power. Ignorance of and inability to understand the cultural tradition in China’s diplomacy, and their lack of capability to read Chinese ancient classics are the mistakes Western scholars frequently make while studying China.

One point needs further explanation here-- Westerners seem to have a point when arguing that ancient China seeking imperial suzerainty through moral force is the same as seeking “hegemony” through moral force. However, the Westerners are wrong. “To use moral force to subdue others” is based upon economic power and military strength, i.e. it is to “spread morality” through a powerful military. This is not the same as “imposition of one’s own will upon others” under the threat of powerful military—which is what the United States has done to export democratic political system to Iraq through powerful military.

History has proven that peace built upon goodwill, mutual trust and self-regulation is not reliable. The experience of the Cold War tells us that long and stable peace can only be maintained through “Mutually Assured Destruction,” by which neither side of the hostility could resort to war even if their mutual enmity is extremely deep. We may even surmise that the birth of nuclear weapons may be the price we had to pay for a lasting peace, even though this was a “peace through fear.” Therefore, both China and the United States each needs to possess deterrent nuclear weaponry strong enough to eliminate the other, in addition to endeavoring to maintain a nice relationship. Only then can a double insurance mechanism be obtained to avoid a future Sino-U.S. war.

Those scholars who insist that the world has not walked outside the “rule of the jungle” tend to view the Sino-U.S. conflict as inevitable. They are pessimists on Sino-U.S. relationship. Those who believe humankind has already to a large extent walked outside of the “rule of the jungle” are optimists. Even though we have listed many factors and condition that might lead to Sino-U.S. conflicts, and have also found out various countervailing factors and conditions, Sino-U.S. conflicts only exist in the logic of history, in the area of historical experience; after all, they are not happening in today’s real world yet.

In today’s real world, the two nations are involved in an unprecedented cooperation on a wide array of topics ranging from international anti-terrorism to talks on North Korea. There are two interpretations for this cooperation. Pessimists believe this is only the brief pleasant weather before a storm of confrontations. Optimists believe that the world has already gotten rid of the “rule of the jungle” or the “rule of the jungle” has greatly faded away, which is causing the Sino-U.S. relationship to move away from the big power game, a vicious cycle of containment and counter-containment, directed by the “rule of the jungle.”

Future history will prove which is correct, but for now, we will not know for sure. At present, the desire coming from both China and the United States to avoid conflict is genuine, and their efforts to avoid such conflict are pronounced. However, facing the powerful logic of history, both China and the United States must also have the same suspicion: “if I am genuine, the other side is not genuine and is only practicing expediency, what should I do?” Human psychology is hard to figure out; human nature is indeed mysterious. The military thinker Fuller once states that “today the biggest menace to mankind still comes from mankind itself.” Because deep inside a human mind resides both God and the devil; suspicion, distrust, and the search for absolute security all play important roles. In fact, what really frustrates the Sino-U.S. relationship is not theTaiwan problem; rather, it is precisely the impossible-to-get-rid-of human dilemma deeply hidden behind the Taiwan problem, i.e., whether humankind can completely disentangle himself from the devil and devote his pure heart entirely to God.

[Ni Lexiong is professor at the Research Institute of War and Culture at Eastern China Science and Engineering University]

[Source: The Global Time (huanqiu)

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