

The following is a translation of the documentary, "Cold War: 1-14."

TRANSLATION BEGINS HERE

[Opening Music]

[Voiceover]

The term "Cold War" was first coined in 1947 by Bernard Baruch, senior advisor to Harry Truman, the 33rd president of the United States, in reference to the frequently occurring and exacerbating crises between the United States and the former Soviet Union, despite having fought side-by-side against Nazi Germany in the Second World War.

Tensions and crises between Moscow and Washington during the Cold War years, from 1945 to 1991, at times came close to a military confrontation, but did not ever end in war. Political analysts consider this the most important aspect of the Cold War.

Prior to the breakout of the First World War in 1914, there were 12 million fully armed soldiers ready for combat at both frontlines of power in Europe. Given that Europe had enjoyed relative stability since the Congress of Vienna in 1815 and that the continent's countries had not witnessed a general war for an entire century, no one anticipated the crisis at the Balkans between the Russian and Austria-Hungary empires to turn into a major conflict or that such a war would endure for so long.

Nevertheless, the First World War, which began in August 1914, lasted more than four years, during which the four empires of Russia, Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Ottoman were overthrown, leaving 9.8 million civilian and non-civilian casualties as well as 20 million wounded. The scope and length of mankind's bloodiest war in history caused World War I to be known as "The Great War."

Twenty-one years later on September 1, 1939, World War II broke out with Nazi Germany's invasion of Poland. Nine days prior to this attack, Molotov and Ribbentrop, the foreign ministers of the Soviet Union and Germany, had signed a pact whose confidential clauses determined the two countries' division of influence in Eastern Europe. This pact was the clearest indication of the imminence of a world-scale war in Europe, as the former

Soviet Union, with its communist ideology, and Nazi Germany, with an ideology of fascism, were sworn enemies.

Hitler's reason for signing this pact was to concentrate the majority of German forces in order to defeat Britain and France in the war which broke out a few days later with the attack on Poland. Stalin's objective in agreeing to the pact was to buy time to complete the Red Army's preparation for the fight against German armed forces.

Following the onset of World War II, with lightning-quick attacks, Adolf Hitler conquered France and isolated Great Britain. The Nazi forces attacked the Soviets in the Barbarossa military strike on June 22, 1941, exactly 129 years after the army of Napoleon Bonaparte had invaded Russian soil.

The day after the Second World War came to an end, three principle geopolitical factors were manifested, which are collectively considered the foundation of postwar developments. Firstly, the defeat of Nazi Germany allowed Soviet forces to advance into the heart of Europe. Secondly, the severe damages inflicted on France and Britain were so devastating that although these two countries figured as victors in the war, they were quite weakened, and therefore the balance of power in Europe was undermined to the disadvantage of the West. Thirdly, the United States, which had not been hurt by the war, was the only country that could restore the balance among great powers against the former Soviet Union.

These three factors, coupled with the ideological conflict between capitalism and communism, placed the US and USSR in a face-off position after the Second World War. World War I ended after four years with 20 million casualties. World War II, lasting four years with a death toll of 22 million soldiers and 62 million civilians from both sides and widespread devastation spanning three continents- Europe, Asia, and northern Africa- finally ended in the summer of 1945 with the unconditional surrender of Germany and Japan.

Numerous postwar geopolitical and ideological disagreements prepared the grounds for all-out warfare between the US and USSR. Nevertheless, although the tension created by the ideological differences and the conflict of worldwide interests between the two superpowers were much deeper and more extensive than those of the belligerents of the two World Wars,

the invention of nuclear weapons, and the mass destruction that would arise from its possible use, was the main reason for the lack of military action between the two superpowers.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

The entry of nuclear weapons into the sphere of international relations created a doctrine called “rationalist decision-making in power.” In its simplest sense, this indicates the relation that a statesman or military head defines between the means and the end.

Before the invention of nuclear weapons, there were effectively no limits to statesmen’s rationalizing their means for an end. Heavy devastation and the 20 million casualties of World War I did not prevent Nazi Germany leader Adolf Hitler from starting World War II and causing the deaths of 62 million more men.

The nuclear age of international relations began in August 1945 with the detonation of the atomic bomb on the two Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, with the aim of bringing about a quick resolution to the conflict in Far East Asia.

Although most politicians and military officials of the time did not consider the atomic bomb to be anything but a more powerful weapon, others learned that they were facing a phenomenon stronger than merely a more powerful weapon. It was clear that using the bomb, especially considering its rapidly escalating explosive capability, posed a serious threat to the survival of human life, beyond utter devastation and countless human casualties.

For this reason, the invention of the atomic bomb suddenly rendered the use of this so-called “new weapon” completely irrational from the perspective of a politician or a military general. The reason for this was that no aim or victory, be it large or small, over ground or air, could justify the massive and irreparable destruction and damage resulting from utilizing this weapon.

Dr. Georgy Arbatov, principle advisor to Soviet leadership in foreign affairs, says, "You cannot really wage nuclear war. It means mutual destruction, and possibly the destruction of the whole globe."

The United States' atomic bomb was produced in the course of World War II and within the framework of a top-secret program known as "The Manhattan Project," with the objective of surpassing Nazi Germany, which was conducting similar activity. The project directors tested the first atomic bomb in the summer of 1945 at the Alamogordo airbase in New Mexico.

American theoretical physicist Dr. Edward Teller says that Dr. Robert Oppenheimer, director of the Manhattan Project, following the first test explosion, famously referred to the bomb in a quote derived from Hindu Sanskrit scripture: "Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds."

[Dr. Edward Teller]

I have become the destroyer of the world. That is what Oppenheimer said, minutes after the first explosion.

[Voiceover]

The invention of the atomic bomb, followed a few years later by the invention of the horrific hydrogen bomb, meant that for the first time in history, avoiding engagement, not victory in war, became the main political-military strategic goal. Analysts refer to this as the doctrine of "deterrence."

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

In the course of World War II, the German V2 rocket with a range of 300 kilometers was the world's only ballistic missile, and the Germans killed 20,000 people by firing 4,000 of these rockets. The atomic bomb, however, which was dropped on Hiroshima on August 6, 1945, for the purposes of ending World War II in the Far East, had an explosive power equivalent to 16 tons of TNT. This bomb leveled Hiroshima, killing 80,000 residents of the city in an instant.

During the Cold War, the average explosive power of each atomic and hydrogen bomb approximately equaled 100,000 tons of TNT, which was eight times the destructive power of the Hiroshima bomb. According to current US Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, who was the director of

CIA in the early 1990's, the US and USSR military arsenals housed the majority of the 60,000 available atomic and hydrogen warheads in the world during the Cold War. Henry Kissinger, the secretary of state from 1973 to 1977, also says...

[Henry Kissinger]

One of the problems today is that there is no collective memory of the Cold War and the effects of the atomic bomb on the relationship between the two superpowers in Moscow and Washington.

[Voiceover]

Roland Timerbaev, one of the senior arms control negotiators of the former Soviet Union, talks about the unacceptable level of casualties and destruction resulting from using atomic weapons.

[Roland Timerbaev]

Some in the Soviet military, for the sake of keeping their ideological purity, contended that in an atomic war communism would triumph over capitalism. This was nothing more than political propaganda; the serious military staff knew the use of atomic weapons meant the end of human race.

[Voiceover]

This new destructive weapon has yet another important difference from conventional arms. It is not difficult to present one's military capabilities in conventional or non-atomic weapons. Politicians could easily show their military and mobilization capabilities of the conventional forces under their control by arranging them at various points and using this to gain advantage in political negotiations against other countries. Missiles carrying atomic and hydrogen warheads, however, are kept either at underground silos or mounted on submarines or carried as bombs on long-range bombers.

The collection of these so-called chariots carrying deadly atomic weapons is called the strategic tripod. In comparison to conventional weapons, except for their occasional display at parades as massive soulless cylinders, there is no way to show their deadly capabilities in order to take advantage of them in political negotiations.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

As with the terms “supply and demand” in the science of economics, “first strike” and “second strike” are two terms frequently used in the strategy of deterrence. In this two-way relationship, “first strike” points to a full scale atomic attack on the opposing side, while “second strike” refers to the capacity to strike back with a force deemed intolerable by the enemy. Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson says...

[Robert McNamara]

The leaders of Moscow and Washington both went through the same thought process, believing that the aim of the other side was gaining “first strike” capability. So they tried to develop the means for a second strike in which the destruction and carnage was intolerable to the opposing side. This strategy was called “mutually assured destruction.”

[Voiceover]

After the October 1917 revolution in Russia, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov, known as Lenin, established the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with the aim of expanding the communist revolution throughout the world. But when Joseph Vissarionovich Dzhugashvili, known as Stalin, came to power, he prioritized the idea of solidifying communism in the soviet republics. Georgy Arbatov, the principal foreign affairs advisor to the leadership of the former Soviet Union, says, “Stalin was a cruel and heartless man. He respected no principles when it came to achieving his goals; he killed all of his friends in the Party as well as many of his family relatives.”

Despite early defeats in World War II, the conflict gave Stalin the best opportunity for expanding his influence over the Soviet Union, as well as gaining access to Western technology. Roland Timerbaev, the senior Soviet negotiator in arms control talks says, “Klaus Fuchs, who was the number one provider of intelligence information to Russians, was the physicist who escaped to Britain from Nazi Germany in 1941. He personally went to the Soviet embassy in London and gave his information to Moscow without receiving any money.”

[Voiceover]

At the end of World War II in the summer of 1945, the Soviet Union was among the victors in the conflict despite having suffered 27 million deaths.

At the end of this international conflict, the Red Army was only 100 kilometers west of Berlin. Concerning this issue, Georgy Arbatov says...

[Georgy Arbatov]

After the end of World War II, Moscow tried to create “barrier countries” between the West and Russia through the use of satellite states and even tried repeating this in countries such as Greece, Turkey, and Iran. These security measures by the Soviet Union were interpreted by the West to be the Soviets’ policy of expansion.

[Voiceover]

To demonstrate Stalin’s expansionist desires, Peter Swires, the advisor to Averell Harriman, the American ambassador to the former Soviet Union from 1943 to 1946, says, “During the conference of the Allied leaders held at Potsdam in August 1945, Averell Harriman congratulated Stalin on the advances of the Russian Armies to Nazi Germany’s capital. Stalin responded by mentioning one of the 19th century Czars, saying, “Czar Alexander advanced all the way to Paris.””

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

President Franklin Delano Roosevelt, the 32nd US president, died a month prior to the end of the European portion of World War II and his vice president, Harry Truman, replaced him as the president of the United States.

The European portion of the conflict ended on the 9th of May, 1945, and the Allied leaders’ conference with Truman, Stalin, and Churchill was held from the 17th of July until August 2nd of the same year in the city of Potsdam in Germany, a gathering held only one week prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the beginning of the nuclear age. The differences between Moscow and Washington, which were already surfacing on occasion in the final days of the Second World War, became readily apparent after dropping the atomic bomb on Japan.

After the end of hostilities in the continent of Europe, the USSR, by utilizing its three million-man force called the Red Army, focused its attention to spreading communism to countries such as Greece, Iran, and China. After the end of conflicts in Europe, a large portion of American forces

immediately left the continent, leaving a very sensible power vacuum in the region. According to General Brent Scowcroft, the national security adviser to President Ford and President Bush Senior, the crisis surrounding Berlin in 1948 and 1949, coupled with the Korean War from 1950 to 1953, clearly showed the necessity for America's return to the international scene to contain the spread of communism and to create an international balance of power.

In the early months of the Cold War, Washington simply interpreted these maneuvers as Moscow's insatiable appetite for expansion. George Kennan, who was the chief secretary of the US embassy in Moscow from 1944 to 1946, by sending a report known as the "Long Telegraph," played a key role in placing "containment" on the US foreign policy agenda.

Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state, mentions George Kennan's Long Telegraph to the State Department as the theoretical foundation for America's strategic policy of containment of the former Soviet Union, a strategy that was finally formed after announcing the Truman Doctrine in June of 1947 for a 400 million dollar aid package to Greece and Turkey.

The same year, George Marshall, the secretary of state at the time, announced a plan for the reconstruction of Europe. Stalin, however, called the Marshall Plan a tool for expanding America's influence and forbade Eastern European countries from joining the Marshall Plan. After the end of World War II, Berlin, the capital of Nazi Germany, was run jointly by the US, the USSR, Great Britain, and France. In June of 1948, Moscow closed all ground and water paths leading to Berlin under the pretext of disagreeing with the financial reforms. In the next 14 months, the US and the UK provided over two million tons of food for over 2.5 million residents of Berlin by creating an aerial bridge by flying over 300,000 flights over the city.

General Russell Dougherty, the former commander-in-chief of Strategic Air Command in early 1990's, says, "I don't want to take anything away from the magnificent operation we call the Berlin Airlift, but this was out of necessity because the Russians had five times as many soldiers as we did in Europe at that time and we were outgunned 20 to one."

The Berlin Wall increased the rate of producing nuclear bombs in the US to one bomb a day. By 1952 there were 1,600 nuclear bombs in American nuclear arsenals. On the other hand, with China becoming communist under Mao's leadership and the Soviets gaining access to a nuclear bomb, which took place by 1950, the global position of the communist camp became stronger.

In another development in the final days of the Second World War, the Korean peninsula was divided on the 38th parallel, with two separate governments, one in the north and one in the south. The objective was to ease the surrender of Japanese soldiers.

On June 25, 1950, the forces of North Korea, in a surprise move, attacked their neighbor to the south. Two days later, President Truman described the events in the Korean peninsula as critical for the American people and the people of the free world. "Korea is a small country, thousands of miles away. But what is happening there is important to every American."

Following the approval of a US proposal to the United Nations, American troops, along with troops from 16 other countries, rushed to the aid of South Korea. The Korean War lasted three years, resulting in the death of 36,000 Americans, 500,000 North Korean soldiers, an unknown number of troops from communist China, and three million Koreans.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

In November of 1952, the US tested its first hydrogen bomb, with the potency of 10 mega tons. The explosive power of this bomb was 450 times more than the atomic bomb dropped on Japan's Nagasaki in 1945. The death of Stalin, the leader of the former Soviet Union, in 1953 and the presidency of Eisenhower in the US brought America's policy of containment of Soviet expansion to a new phase. General Andrew Goodpaster, the national security adviser to President Eisenhower, says, "According to the policy of containment, there was a line drawn for the Russians. In the event of transgression, they would have been dealt with full force."

After Stalin's death, in September of 1953 Nikita Khrushchev became the first secretary of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union. A month or two later, Moscow, too, tested its first hydrogen bomb.

The bomb's frightening power of destruction, coupled with advancements made in intercontinental missile technology, reduced the atomic power and vulnerability of both sides from hours to only minutes, creating a policy of deterrence as the dominant military strategy of both super powers. Since all evidence showed Soviet supremacy in missile technology, President Eisenhower, the US president at the time, prioritized the expansion of American missile capability over all other military programs.

In the political arena, Khrushchev's secret speech in the 20th congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union on February 25, 1956, and his disclosing of Stalin's atrocities shattered the God-like image of Stalin for most communists. According to Georgy Arbatov, principal adviser to the leadership of the former Soviet Union, Khrushchev's speech directly resulted in the uprising of the people of Hungary in November of 1956 against the puppet regime of that country. On November 4th of the same year, the Soviet Red Army, under the Warsaw Pact, crushed the popular rebellion of the Hungarian people, during the course of which 4,000 Hungarians and 700 Red Army soldiers were killed.

In spite of this, western governments refrained from military intervention in Hungary and only provided propagandistic support and a safe haven for Hungarian refugees. This event illustrated the limits of the containment policy and deterrence.

On October 4, 1957, the USSR launched the first man-made satellite named Sputnik into space. In Washington, Moscow's missile power for placing a 100-kilogram object in space was considered a direct threat to the US. In response to this threat, the US placed 15 mid-range Jupiter missiles on a military base near Izmir, Turkey by the end of 1957 and put large Soviet cities like Moscow and Kiev in direct reach of these missiles. In these same years, American intelligence agencies began utilizing 48 new light aircraft equipped with very powerful cameras called U2. These single-engine planes flew from bases in Japan, Pakistan, and Turkey. These planes, which provided 12 hours of patrol over Soviet soil and took photographs from an altitude of 70,000 feet, were safe from being targeted by the Soviet anti-aircraft systems.

Kremlin's interpretation of these flights was that the US was preparing for a surprise nuclear strike against the USSR. Thus, the US's threatening interpretation of Soviet missile technology, coupled with Kremlin leaders' fear of a US surprise nuclear strike, seriously intensified US-Soviet relations by the end of 1950's.

By the end of 1950's, the former USSR had made progress in intercontinental ballistic missile technology. The launch of the first man-made satellite by Moscow, named Sputnik, into orbit in 1957 forced America to gain as much knowledge as possible about the Soviet missile industry and its intercontinental missile launch pads by any means, including the use of U2 spy planes. On the other hand, the Kremlin was under the assumption that the most important reason for U2 flights over Soviet air space was acquiring information for a surprise strike by the United States.

Georgy Arbatov, the former principal foreign policy adviser in the Kremlin, says, "Khrushchev was afraid of an American military attack and for this reason exaggerated the USSR's ability to produce missiles with the same speed it produces sausages. But I personally know that Khrushchev had ordered the building of fake missile sites at various locations in the Soviet Union to distract American spy planes."

In late 1950's, the missile gap to the disadvantage of the United States had become a hot topic of debate in that country. A Soviet anti-aircraft missile shot down a U2 spy plane on May 1, 1961, near the town of Sverdlovsk located on the eastern side of the Ural Mountains in central Russia. This plane had taken off from an air base in Badabar, near the city of Peshawar in Pakistan, and the Russians captured the pilot Francis Gary Power alive.

This incident, which occurred near the end of General Eisenhower's presidency, created an unsuitable condition for relations between Moscow and Washington. John F. Kennedy was elected president in 1961 and he was the youngest president in US history. Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense in the cabinets of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, says this about the nuclear balance of power between the two superpowers in the early 1960's, "The missile gap between the US and the former USSR was one of the important issues of the 1960 presidential election. In reality, however, the Moscow was not ahead of the Washington in the number of

missiles or their capability, but the Soviet's advances in space had created fear in Americans about Soviet capabilities.”

On August 13, 1961, eight months after the election of President Kennedy, soldiers of East Germany began the construction of the Berlin Wall and its watch towers, which aimed to prevent the fleeing of East German residents to the western half of the city. This wall stood for 28 years, symbolizing the division between the East and West and the Cold War. During this time, while thousands fled the communistic dictatorship of East Germany and fled to the West either on their own or with the help of family and friends, East German border agents killed 125 people trying to escape the East.

The U2 spy plane crash over Soviet territory and an event called the Bay of Pigs, both of which occurred in early 1960's, caused much humiliation for American statesmen and created the psychological background for the Cuban Missile Crisis. In the first incident, the Soviet air defense system shot down an American U2 spy plane over its territory on May 1, 1960 and captured its pilot Francis Power alive.

In April of the next year, in an incident know as the Bay of Pigs, a group of armed dissident Cuban exiles organized by the CIA tried to overthrow the regime of Castro. This attempt failed, however, due to President Kennedy's decision not to provide them with air cover. These two incidents left a bad image in the minds of leaders in Moscow about their counterparts in Washington.

Kremlin leaders believed that an atmosphere of inexperience and indecisiveness prevailed in the White House. This caused the Soviet leadership, in a dangerous move in 1962, to secretly transfer some mid-range missiles to Cuba, an island-country only 150 kilometers away from American east shores. This move caused the most critical nuclear showdown between the two superpowers during the Cold War, a crisis known as the Cuban Missile Crisis. On October 14 of that year, by studying pictures taken by American spy planes, it was revealed that the USSR and Cuba were building mid-range nuclear missile launch sites on Cuban soil. Although by 1962 American nuclear warheads outnumbered the Soviets eight to one, American statesmen believed that the existence of Soviet nuclear missiles on Cuban soil would have a grave psychological impact on the American people.

After secretly consulting with a close circle of advisers, President Kennedy announced the naval quarantine of Cuba in order to prevent it from receiving new Soviet nuclear missiles and urged the Soviets to withdraw their missiles from Cuba.

[President Kennedy]

... shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the western hemisphere as an attack by the Soviet Union on the United States.

[Voiceover]

Concerning this missile crisis, Georgy Arbatov, the principal foreign policy adviser to Kremlin leadership, says, "So he decided to send missiles to Cuba, which was one of the biggest mistakes he made because Cuba was only 150 kilometers away from the US and the Cuban crisis was the most dangerous event of the Cold War, for the two nations faced total annihilation.

Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense under President Kennedy, sheds more light on the Cuban Missile Crisis. "We did not know half of what we should have known. Years later, we found out how little we knew about this situation. We believed that Russian missiles on Cuban soil lacked nuclear warheads and for this reason, most of President Kennedy's senior advisers during the most critical period of the crisis, Saturday the 27th of October, 1962, supported air strikes against Cuba in order to destroy the nuclear missile sites. Only 29 years later at a meeting with Castro I found out 162 nuclear warheads were present on Cuban soil during the crisis."

McNamara points out the importance of this event in shaping the foreign policy of the two superpowers and says that with the information that surfaced three decades later, the gravity of the crisis became 100 times greater than what was perceived at the time. Eventually, the Cuban Missile Crisis that had begun on October 14, 1962 ended after 13 fateful days with an agreement between Khrushchev and President Kennedy. On October 28, 1962, Khrushchev agreed to withdraw its missiles from Cuba in return for the withdrawal of 150 obsolete American Jupiter missiles from Turkey and the United States guaranteeing not to invade Cuba.

Although the Cuban Missile Crisis showed the deadly threat of the possibility of using nuclear weapons to even the most hardliner war hawks

in the leadership of both superpowers, the two powers continued utilizing these weapons as political tools, which served as an important element of the arms race between the two countries in the ensuing years. The Cuban Missile Crisis showed leaders of both countries the vulnerability of the nuclear balance of power between Washington and Moscow. The most important strategic outcome of this event is known to be the creation and continuation of the policy of détente.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

From the day after the end of confrontations between Kennedy and Khrushchev in early 1960's until the conclusion of relationships between Reagan and Gorbachev in late 1990's, the priority of Moscow and Washington was the continuation of the policy of détente, a strategy which covered the Soviet containment policy like an umbrella, as well as the policy of nuclear deterrence. The main goal in détente was to minimize the possibility of a military confrontation between the two superpowers.

In exchange, the two pursued their global interests by interfering in regional conflicts and supporting their allies and friends. America's intervention in Vietnam was in fact intended to prevent the spread of communism. Robert McNamara, the secretary of defense under President Kennedy, says, "Vietnam was viewed by the administrations of Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson as an example of the domino policy. Ho Chi Minh and his supporters were in fact nationalists and were after the unification of Vietnam. But we in Washington mistakenly interpreted a civil war in Vietnam as Moscow and Beijing's way of expanding communism to Southeast Asia."

[President Johnson]

Renewed hostile actions against the United States' ships on the High Seas and the Gulf of [inaudible] have today required me to order the military forces of the United States to take action in reply.

[Voiceover]

Georgy Arbatov, senior advisor to the former Soviet leadership, has this to say concerning the Vietnam War, "Of course, we supported North Vietnam and the Vietcong, but aside from selling and delivering weapons we did not interfere."

In 1968, at the peak of the Vietnam War and the domestic problems resulting from it for the American government, Moscow was suddenly faced with a liberalist movement in the Eastern camp led by Alexander Dubcek, the prime minister of Czechoslovakia at the time. Like the popular uprising in Hungary 12 years before, this incident gravely endangered Soviet dominance of Eastern European countries. Thus, at 11:00 P.M. on the night of August 20, 1968, 250,000 to 300,000 soldiers of the Red Army invaded Czechoslovakia under the Warsaw Pact; their number reached 600,000 by late August. In many places, including the former Soviet Union itself, demonstrations took place against the suppression of the Prague uprising, but just like the Hungarian crisis in 1956, the West, led by the USA, refrained from military intervention in the Czechoslovakian events.

Henry Kissinger, former US Secretary of State, has this to say about the international balance of power in the late 1960's, "When Nixon was elected president in 1969, the Vietnam War was at its most intense condition, and no negotiations had taken place yet with North Vietnam. The Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia and the unexpected victory of Israel over the Arabs in the 1967 War had caused more unrest in two important regions of the world. The division of Berlin still presented itself as a tumor in the center of Europe. Finally, the conventional wisdom held that the strategic balance between the US and the former USSR had gotten Washington into a stalemate in Vietnam.

This perception was especially important since at the end of the 1960's, 1,710 Soviet nuclear missiles were aimed at the United States, while 1,694 US missiles had the industrial and population centers of the communist superpower within their range.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

While the Vietnam War was at its bloodiest stages, the high number of American soldiers dying in a remote country in southeastern Asia put a great deal of pressure on the US executive branch and spawned widespread anti-war demonstrations challenging US foreign and domestic policy to that date, protests by its own citizens which questioned the legitimacy of the most basic principles underlying the US political system.

In 1968, Richard Nixon was elected the 37th president of the United States. On July 25, 1969, he announced his doctrine on Guam Island, an overseas territory of the US in the Pacific Ocean. This was a strategic doctrine that was primarily designed to withdraw US troops from Vietnam. Those most familiar with international affairs considered this to be the beginning of the largest change in the international role of the United States since the Second World War.

According to the Nixon doctrine, from that point on, while the living up to its international security obligations, the United States would not intervene directly in regional wars with American soldiers, especially in Asia, and would instead provide economic and military support to regional powers supportive of Washington. This was considered the best way to protect US interests and influence.

President Nixon and Henry Kissinger, his national security advisor at the time, viewed establishing relations with communist China as the best way out of Vietnam. In addition, the wise policy of establishing political relations with China would put the US at the head of the Washington-Moscow-Beijing triangle, allowing the US to take advantage of the differences between the two communist giants in the best possible way. Dr. Kissinger describes this as follows, "Aside from Nixon's intention to pull out of Vietnam in a respectable way, the intervention of the Warsaw Pact in Czechoslovakia to suppress the country's liberal movement in 1968 and the bloody conflict between Chinese and Russian soldiers at their borders displayed the outlook of a policy of *détente* in the relationship between the US and the two communist giants."

Dr. Alexander Bessmertnykh, foreign minister of the Soviet Union in 1991, has this to say about the establishing of relations between China and the US, "Nixon's trip to Beijing was a great shock to the leaders of the Kremlin and caused the Soviet authorities to put more emphasis on improving their relations with the US and China."

The strategic balance of power between the two superpowers in the late 1960's laid the foundation for a policy of *détente*. In other words, the abundance of nuclear weapons and weapons of mass destruction in both camps had made the complete destruction of both sides possible. Having gone through dangerous tensions such as the Berlin crisis and the Cuban Missile Crisis, the circumstances were such that the two superpowers could

now come closer under a policy of détente. President Nixon's trip to China on February 21, 1972 and his meeting with the Soviet leaders on May 22 of the same year were considered the first official visits by a US president to the two communist giants. The SALT I treaty to limit strategic offensive and defensive weapons was signed during Nixon's visit to Moscow. Dr. Kissinger has this to say about the way this was viewed by the White House, "Nixon and I believed that the SALT discussions were a channel to work on issues that were endangering the existence of the two Western and Eastern superpowers."

Fifteen months later, Richard Nixon had to resign because of the Watergate scandal and Gerald Ford assumed power. According to Georgy Arbatov, the Kremlin leaders, unaware of the intricacies of the Watergate scandal, for a long time regarded this resignation as a coup d'état against the negotiations for limiting nuclear weapons.

[Georgy Arbatov]

So people were astonished, saying, "Why do Americans make such a fuss about it! After all, it was done by the president! Why couldn't he do it? All of it is because he has concluded a treaty with the Soviet Union?"

[Voiceover]

Although the signing of the Vietnam peace treaty in 1973 led to the final withdrawal of US forces from the country, it did not put an end to the war in the peninsula and the neighboring countries of Laos and Cambodia. Eventually, with over 54,000 US troops and over two million Vietnamese dead, the Vietnam War finally ended with the fall of Saigon by North Vietnamese forces and the Vietcong on April 15, 1975, unifying the two divided parts of the country.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

The negotiations on strategic arms limitations gradually turned into the main channel of relations between Moscow and Washington. According to General Brent Scowcroft, national security advisor to President Ford and President Bush Senior, it reduced the chances of a political crisis turning into a nuclear war between the two countries.

In the 1970's, negotiations over strategic arms limitations and the meetings of the leaders of Moscow and Washington transformed into a foundation for relations between the two superpowers. But as Robert Gates, current US Secretary of Defense says...

[Robert Gates]

Not everyone was enthusiastic about the meetings. Staff people, including the secretaries of state, hate summit meetings, and hate having the heads of state or heads of government go off by themselves, because there is no telling what these damn fools might do. My personal experience shows that almost all of the great heads of state have no expertise in the intricacies of arms negotiations.

Despite the signing of SALT I by Moscow and Washington in 1972, the arms race between the two sides continued in various ways. The number of atomic and hydrogen warheads in the strategic arsenals of the two sides reached 13,000 in 1980. A decade later, at the end of the Cold War, this number reached over 18,000 warheads of mass destruction.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, or ABM, limited the number of anti-missiles of each side to 100 and permitted their manufacture for the sole purpose of protection of the two cities of Washington and Moscow. According to the SALT I treaty, the number of nuclear missiles with one warhead was limited to 1,700 for each superpower. But the Kremlin and Washington could not reach any agreement on limiting the production or the number of multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles, known as MIRVs. Therefore, until the end of the Cold War in late 1990's, both sides added one nuclear or hydrogen warhead to their arsenals each day.

In other words and according to Ronald Timerbaev, the chief Soviet negotiator in negotiations for limiting nuclear weapons, the arms race between Moscow and Washington was almost out of the control of the leaders of both countries. In mid 1970's, Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn, a dissident writer in the Soviet Union, became the lively and outspoken symbol of human rights violations in countries of the Eastern Bloc. With the increasing military power of the Soviet Union and its allies in Vietnam, eastern Europe, Africa, and Latin America, the leaders of the Kremlin showed their eagerness to improve the public image of the Soviet Union internationally by signing the Helsinki agreement in 1975, which was regarding solidifying land divisions in Europe after World War II, and

especially the necessity of observing certain human rights principles in communist countries.

President Gerald Ford, the 38th US president, considered the importance of this agreement on par with the Marshall Plan for the reconstruction of Europe and the formation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Dr. Alexander Bessmertnykh, the Soviet foreign minister in 1991, also affirms the psychological impact of the treaty on the leader of that country. He asserts, "Although Soviet leaders were satisfied with the results of the Helsinki Conference regarding solidification of post-World War II borders in eastern Europe, the human rights measures had a considerable psychological impact on them."

Aside from using Cuban soldiers to intervene on behalf of the USSR in regional conflicts such as in Angola and Somalia, and the victory of the Sandinistas in overthrowing the brutal and thieving dictatorship of Anastasio Somoza Debayle in Nicaragua, the year 1979 witnessed three important events in the history of the Cold War.

The Iranian Revolution on February 11, 1979, overthrew the regime of the Shah, who was considered to be the most notable and the most powerful ally of the US in the region after Israel. On November 13 of the same year, a number of employees and diplomats serving at the US embassy in Tehran were taken hostage by radicals known as Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line. Forty days later, in the final days of December 1979, divisions composed of 50,000 soldiers of the Soviet Red Army invaded Afghanistan.

After Mohammad Dawood Khan's coup against Mohammad Zahir Shah, the Republic of Afghanistan came into existence in June of 1973 and General Mohammad Dawood Khan became the first president of that country. Four years later, in April of 1978, following a military coup by elements of the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, Mohammad Dawood Khan and members of his immediate family were killed, and Nur Muhammad Taraki, the leader of the responsible party, took charge as the head of the Revolutionary Council in the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan.

The People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan was composed of two rival factions known as Khalq and Parcham. While Khalq was a radical party

bearing resemblance to the Bolsheviks in the Russian Communist Party, prior to the October Revolution of 1917, Parcham followed a combination of nationalistic Afghan and communist ideologies. When Taraki was killed in September of 1978, Hafizullah Amin, the leader of the radical wing in the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan, came to power, and a Marxist and radical regime took power in Kabul and placed radical social changes like those of the Soviet Communist Party on its agenda. The radical elements in the Afghan society reacted to these changes; this resulted in the formation of Mujahedin groups in the country.

Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev was the first secretary of the Communist Party of the former Soviet Union from 1964 to 1982. In the country's 74-year history, he ruled over that communist empire longer than any other Soviet leader save Joseph Stalin. According to the Brezhnev Doctrine, which was announced on November 13, 1968, preventing anti-socialist movements from achieving their goals in countries with socialist ideologies became one of Moscow's goals and responsibilities. This is how the country's leaders justified the Warsaw Pact's military intervention in Czechoslovakia on August 21, 1968, crushing the freedom movement known as the "Prague Spring," an action which was repeated by Soviet leaders when invading Afghanistan on December 25, 1979.

According to Robert Gates, the former director of the CIA between 1991 and 1993, shortly after the Iranian Revolution and six months prior to the invasion of Afghanistan by the USSR, the CIA began its military and financial aid programs to the Mujahedin who were fighting against the central government.

Historical documents and evidence, especially those published after the collapse of the USSR, show that one of the main reasons for the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was that the country's leaders were afraid of a fundamentalist regime coming to power on their southern borders, one that would negatively affect the Muslim population residing in the USSR. The collapse of the Shah's regime, as the most notable supporter of Washington's policies in the region, eased this invasion for the Soviet Union.

Zbigniew Brzezinski, the national security adviser to President Carter, has this to say in this regard, "The day that the Soviets invaded Afghanistan, I

reminded President Carter in a short memo that now we have the opportunity to turn Afghanistan into the Soviets' Vietnam.”

On the other hand, with the elimination of the Shah's regime from political equations of the region and the US's involvement in the hostage crisis, the White House interpreted the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan as the USSR's opportunity to take advantage of the US's weakened position in the region, especially since the Russians had in a single move reduced their distance to the “warm waters” of the Persian Gulf as much as 400 miles. For this reason, Jimmy Carter, the 39th president of the US, in a segment of his State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, clearly called any attempt by an outside power to take over the Persian Gulf region a direct attack on the US's vital interests and emphasized confronting such attempts in any way possible, including the use of the military force.

Years later, the national security adviser of the US at the time, in a speech about the US's role in fighting the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, said, “In a mutual attempt with our allies and the Catholic Church, we made contacts in order to put the Soviets under pressure. We encouraged institutions in the business of selling commodities to the USSR to impose economic sanctions on Moscow. We eventually put the Kremlin in a defensive position.”

Alexander Bessmertnykh, the former Soviet foreign minister in 1991, describes the invasion of Afghanistan as the biggest mistake of Kremlin leaders since the Second World War. Sergei Rogov, the Russian director of the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, says, “It was a brutal war and despite sending hundreds of thousands of soldiers to Afghanistan and the dying of some of those soldiers, with some exceptions, the Soviet public as a whole was kept in the dark about this situation.”

Finally, after nine years of military occupation of Afghanistan, the withdrawal of more than 100,000 Red Army soldiers was completed on February 15, 1989. Robert Gates has this to say concerning the overall performance of President Carter against the Soviet Union, “The irony is that for a guy who ended his term in office being seen as soft on the Soviet Union and characterized that way in the 1980 election, he probably had the most unrelentingly hostile relationship with the Soviet Leadership of any American president in the entire Cold War.”

But in the US, the fall of the Shah of Iran and the negative perception of the American people towards US policies during the course of the hostage crisis were considered to be the biggest incentive for the Russian invasion of Afghanistan. This perception eventually greatly helped Ronald Reagan win the 1980 presidential election.

In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected the 40th president of the United States at age 69, thereby becoming the oldest president in US history. About the same time, three important developments took place in the international strategic system.

First, both superpowers expanded their multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle missile technology programs, known as MIRVs, and for this reason the number of these warheads in the arsenals of both countries went from 3,400 to 13,400 by the end of 1980s. But due to the similar destructive power of these warheads, the strategy of mutually assured destruction and the policy of deterrence remained intact.

Under these conditions, in the event of a first surprise nuclear attack with heavy casualties and severe damage to their countries, Moscow and Washington were both able to retaliate in a devastating nuclear attack, such that the casualties and destruction would be unbearable for the enemy.

Secondly, Moscow and Washington began adding some cruise missiles equipped with nuclear warheads to their nuclear arms, which were very difficult to navigate and guide with the range of 3,200 kilometers.

Third, the USSR manufactured mid-range SS20 missiles. These missiles had a range of 4,800 kilometers and covered all cities of Western Europe. Ronald Reagan, in his first attempt, made an unprecedented increase of the US military budget a top priority, which had begun by the final year of Carter's presidency. As a result of this, 100 multiple independently targetable reentry vehicle missiles, 3,000 airborne cruise missiles, 100 B-1 bombers, a navy composed of 600 warships, and a few warship aircraft carriers and other conventional arms were supposed to be manufactured in order to strengthen America's military might.

Up until this time, Moscow was able to continue the arms race step-by-step with Washington. But according to Sergei Rogov, the Russian director of

the Institute of USA and Canada Studies, the economy of the former Soviet Union was hardly able to respond reciprocally to the sudden increase of American armed forces.

Rogov asserts, "In the 1950's and 60's, general living conditions had improved in the USSR. People were under the impression that Soviets had won against the US. Moscow had launched the Sputnik satellite into space, and not only had the friends and ideological allies of the USSR come to power in newly independent third world countries, but the US had also been defeated in the Vietnam War. In the late 1980's, however, the people of the USSR clearly had lower living standards than the people of the West. In the international arena, too, the USSR was either on the defensive or, as in the case of Afghanistan, it was facing increasing disappointment."

During Reagan's first term in office, in spite of two decades of détente, the relationship between the two superpowers once again experienced the cold tensions of the Cold War. With the establishment of the Solidarity Union in Poland, which was the first non-governmental labor union in the Eastern Bloc, the rapid increase of America's military power, US Congress' refusal to pass the SALT II treaty because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and placing American Pershing and cruise missiles in European countries for countering Soviet SS20 missiles, led to a panic over the possibility of a nuclear war between the two superpowers.

In one of his speeches, President Reagan called the former Soviet Union an "Evil Empire," and on March 23, 1983, he announced his new innovative strategic defense system, an innovation which became known as Star Wars. The goal of this plan was to create a missile system composed of land-based and space-based missiles in order to fight a possible Soviet missile strike. In the innovative strategic defense, instead of emphasizing the improvement in nuclear retaliatory capabilities against the USSR in the event of an attack by that country or mutually assured destruction, the focus was changed to destroying Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles before hitting US soil. The tools used in the strategic defense system were supposed to destroy Soviet nuclear missiles shortly after being fired and launched from missile silos from Soviet soil, or in the space above the atmosphere, or while exiting the atmosphere and descending towards the target.

Sergei Rogov, the director of the Russian Institute of USA and Canada Studies, has this to say about the strategic defense system, which immediately became known as Star Wars, "One of the reasons that the Soviet economy reached a stalemate was the continuation of the arms race, which from the point of view of Soviet citizens did nothing but suck their blood."

On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev was selected to be the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party and announced new policies which later became known as "perestroika," or reconstruction, and "glasnost," or opening up the political atmosphere.

Leonid Brezhnev, the secretary general of the former USSR, died on November 10, 1982 at age 76. In the 28-month period between the death of Brezhnev and the coming to power of the last leader of the USSR, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko each held the post of first secretary of the Soviet Communist Party for a brief period. On March 11, 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became the secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party at age 54, and he introduced a new policy known as uskoreniye, which in the Russian language means "accelerating social changes." These changes later became known as "perestroika," or reconstruction, and "glasnost," or opening up the political atmosphere.

Six months after Gorbachev came to power, he and President Reagan announced their desire to reduce their nuclear arsenals by half in the first conference between the two leaders in October 1985. A year later, however, their meeting in Reykjavik, the capital of Iceland, was not successful. According to Robert Gates, the current US secretary of defense, "In the private meeting, which was held only with the presence of interpreters, many issues were discussed, but in the end Reagan was not willing to give up the innovative strategic defense system."

Despite the failure of negotiations at the Reykjavik conference, President Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev did not give up on their mutual efforts to reduce tensions and signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty in December 1987 in Washington. This treaty not only nullified the entire nuclear defense systems of both superpowers in Europe, but more importantly, for the first time changed the topic of arms discussion between the two sides from arms control to arms reduction.

Gorbachev's coming to power as the last leader of the former USSR and his moderate policies caused an upheaval in the Eastern camp. On his trip to Berlin in June 1987, President Ronald Reagan, the US president at the time, clearly asked for the removal of the Berlin Wall.

[President Ronald Reagan]

There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable. Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate. Tear down this wall.

[Voiceover]

During the Cold War, the Berlin Wall served as the most important symbol of the division of the world into the two camps of capitalism and communism. In his visit to Berlin on June 26, 1963, at the height of the Cold War, President John F. Kennedy called himself "a citizen of Berlin" in order to emphasize the significance of that city.

[President John F. Kennedy]

All free men, wherever they may live, are citizens of Berlin, and therefore, as a free man, I take pride in the words "Ich bin ein Berliner."

[Voiceover]

The construction of the Berlin Wall began on August 13, 1961 under the supervision of Erich Honecker, one of the most radical leaders of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. The East German government called this wall, which was 155 meters long and 4 meters high with 302 watchtowers, an "anti-fascist defense barricade." The main reason for constructing this concrete wall, however, was preventing the increasing escape attempts by East Berliners to West Berlin, which threatened East Germany with a serious loss of its active population. This wall stood for 28 years, in the course of which 125 citizens of East Berlin lost their lives while trying to cross from the east half to the west half of Berlin.

In October 1989, Erich Honecker, who had served as chairman of the Council of State of the German Democratic Republic from 1971, was forced to resign following severe protests from the people of East Germany.

Finally, after growing public demonstrations in Eastern Bloc countries, on November 9, 1989 it was announced that citizens of East Germany would be permitted to cross from East Berlin to the western half of the city. But the multitude of East Berliners who immediately flooded the border and

their celebratory greeting by West Berliners astounded the armed border guards, thus causing the wall to fall on this date.

In honor of the falling of the Berlin Wall, which was considered the most significant sign of the beginning of the end of the Cold War, on December 25, 1989 American composer and conductor Leonard Bernstein gave the city a performance of a new version of Beethoven's 9th symphony "Ode to Joy," which was a musical expression of the hidden and overt terror of the Cold War, as well as the joy of ending that 46-year period.

In 1988, George Herbert Walker Bush was elected the 41st president of the United States. The crackdown on student protestors in Beijing's Tiananmen Square protests in June 1989, the 100,000-strong demonstrations staged by East Germans against their government in October of that year, the freeing of countries of the Eastern Bloc from the grip of communism in November 1989, and finally, the collapse of the Soviet empire on December 12, 1991, all occurred during his presidency.

Georgy Arbatov, principal advisor to Soviet leadership in foreign affairs, has this to say concerning the collapse of the first and last communist empire...

[Georgy Arbatov]

Of course, I didn't expect some things to crumble so quickly, but I know that the main reason for the fall of the Soviet Union was inconsistencies and controversies, the seeds of destructions which were inside, and which were not taken care of in time.

[Voiceover]

The collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics into 15 independent states not only dethroned Moscow as a superpower from the stage of international politics, but also eliminated communist ideology from international controversies, thereby bringing an end to 46 years of the Cold War.

[Interlude]

[Voiceover]

"O Mio Babbino Caro," which means "Oh my beloved father," is the story of a girl who has fallen in love with a sublimely beautiful and charming young man and wishes to buy a ring for him. The heroine, while telling the story

of her rapturous love for this youth, confesses to her father that in the case of her lover's infidelity, or the father's disapproval of this union, she would be unable to withstand the pain of suffering and would rather drown herself in a river.

TRANSLATION ENDS HERE