STAKEHOLDER GROUPS/NEEDS/INSTITUTIONAL PERFORMANCE

Stakeholder	Basic Needs – Perceived Denied	
Identity	(Security, Identity, Recognition)	Institutional Performance
Group	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	
Tamils	Security (physical and other) Disappearances (by GoSL) Regular "roundups" (by GoSL) Militia conscriptions (by LTTE) Retribution from LTTE (for moderation) Cross-fire Livelihood No access to sea Land tenure insecure	 Government is dominated by Sinhalese Corruption within government is extensive Historical state repression of Tamil language 1948 law: Sinhalese only Exclusion of Tamil-speakers from public service jobs Recent: Pay incentives for bureaucrats to learn Tamil Disregard of 1988 Constitutional amendment adding Tamil a official language Historical state-sanctioned marginalization of Tamils 1948: Tamil plantation workers from India denied citizenship
	Restricted access to social services Identity Pre-1988 laws: Sinhalese official language Public service jobs limited requires Sinhalese Access to higher education limited based on ethnicity Fear of Sinhalization	 1948: Tamil plantation workers from India denied citizenship Buddhism is the official state religion Tsunami displaced many Tamils and Muslims Reconstruction by international NGOs favored Muslims over Tamils
	Recognition	Many Tamils precluded from voting in 2004: there were no polling places
Muslims	 Access to justice frustrated Few qualified teachers in Tamil areas Limited access: information/communication Disappearances (by GoSL) Regular "roundups" (by GoSL) Retribution from LTTE (for informing) Cross-fire Livelihood Livelihood Land tenure insecure Religious discrimination & provocation (by GoSL) Tamils attempt to co-opt Muslim interests Exclusion from peace process Disproportionately negatively impacted by 2006 Tsunami LTTE "tax" Muslims in the east 	 Tamils must score better marks than Sinhalese to gain entrance to university Tamils excluded from military Members of military often unable to communicate with Tamils Recent: introduction of incentives for military to learn Tamil Tamils excluded from police force Police officers cannot communicate with Tamils Recent: lowered standards to bring more Tamils into police force Reduced delivery of services by Government in east Severe shortage of Tamil-speaking school teachers Parallel school system for Tamils/Sinhalese
Sinhalese	 Fear life in conflict zone Livelihood Land tenure insecure 	 International community deliver most services Tsunami displaced many Tamils and Muslims Government has not reconstructed the area

Fear Tamil control Don't want to lose their country	 Reconstruction done by international NGOs who intentionally or inadvertently provided better resources to Muslims than Tamils Government restricts freedom of movement in the east Military and government supported militias use deadly force to keep LTTE out of the east (often killing civilians) Government believes LTTE benefits from NGO activity Tamils harassed/detained by military at checkpoints Government supported militias "disappear" Tamils Military bomb Tamil IDP camps Tamil evacuees unable to return to coast for fishing Government's high security zones keep Tamils from occupying and using their land State sponsored religious discrimination Recent: Buddhas erected in Trincomalee (provoked Tamil and
	State sponsored religious discrimination
	Recent: Buddhas erected in Trincomalee (provoked Tamil and Muslim residents)
	• LTTE (political/military wings?)
	Claims to be sole voice of Tamil community
	 Dispenses retribution against Tamils who denounce it
	Conscripts Tamil youth
	Tamil Muslim relationships
	One-third of Muslims are Tamils
	 Arab descendent-Muslims consider themselves ethnically separate from Tamils
	Muslims have been excluded from peace process

CORE GRIEVANCES and SOCIAL AND INSTITUTIONAL RESILIENCE

	Core Grievances	Social and Institutional Resilience
Sinhalese	 Perceive Tamils as a threat to their need for: Physical security because they identify them with the LTTE, whom Sinhalese consider responsible for continuance of the armed conflict (including bombs, mines, sinking of naval ships and attacks against civilians) Identity which many Sinhalese equate with Sri Lankan nationalism as it exists as well as the Sinhalese language and Buddhist religion 	 1984 Constitution decrees Sinhalese and Tamil official languages Standards for military service relaxed to allow Tamil service Police training expanded to allow Tamil trainees
Tamils	 Perceive Sinhalese as a threat to their need for: Physical security because, Sinhalese continue armed fighting against the LTTE creating a conflict zone, they bomb IDP camps killing non-combatants, and are blamed for abductions and disappearances of civilian Tamils Livelihood security because they are prevented from accessing their lands and there is no land tenure insecurity and because the High Security Zone restrictions severely restrict their movements and prevent their having access to the sea to fish Recognition because as Tamil-speakers and Hindus who live in the east, they: are ineligible for public service employment must achieve a higher score for acceptance into university have difficulty communicating with the Military and police suffer a shortage of qualified school teachers in the east suffer religious provocation and discrimination were unable to vote in the 2004 elections (there were no polling places) Perceive LTTE as a threat to their need for: Physical security because of the retributive murders against Tamils who speak out against violence, their conscription of Tamil children into the LTTE, the planting of mines and the continuation of the war Identity because LTTE punishes attempts to define Tamil identity other than as that described by the violently expressed refusal of Sinhalese nationalism Perceive the Muslims as a threat to their need for: Recognition because following the Tsunami, international NGOs provided 	Moderate Tamils are becoming weary of war A few Tamils serve as Ministers in GoSL
	Muslims with better quality reconstruction of housing Perceive the Tamils as a threat to their need for:	
Muslims	 Physical Security because of the LTTE's continuation of the war and the creation of a conflict zone in the east (including mines, killing of civilians) Livelihood security because the High Security Zones limits their mobility and access to their land and the sea Identity because the Tamils co-opt the Muslim identity 	

KEY ACTORS': MOTIVATIONS AND MEANS

Stakeholder Identity	Key Actor (Leader or Group)	What Influence Exert (Political, Social, Security Economic)	How Exert Influence
Group	(======================================	(= ====================================	
Tamils	Ken Balendra	(Economic) Voted most effective business leader in 2003; (Political) Has access to and can influence broad spectrum of political leaders in SL; (Social) Opinion leader for moderate Tamils	Well-respected business leader; Chair of Brandix Lanka Ltd (leading apparel manufacturer) & Ceylon Tobacco Co., former chair of John Keells Holdings (largest SL co.)
	R. Rajamahendran	(Economic) Extremely successful businessman; (Political) Maintains connections in GoSL and opposition; promoting the presenter of Tamil "Minnel" program; (Social) staff not necessarily loyal	1 of 2 brothers who created media giant Maharaja Organization; Will play down political controversies at the request of powerful politicians
	Velupillai Prabhakaran	(Security) Leader of Tamil Tigers, his influence with forces remains high; (Social) Has ardent supporters in Tamil civilians and diaspora;	Charismatic and persuasive; LTTE cadres follow his every word; He takes policy recommendations from New York-based immigration lawyer/activist Rudrakumaran
	"Pillaiyan"	(Social) Civilians in east dread and fear him; (Security) Security forces promote him as new leader of TMVP; (Political) Enjoys patronage of Gothabaya and Army Commander Sarath Fonseka	Former protégé of Karuna; trained by Karuna to commit horrendous acts of violence since childhood; STF police helped his forces to storm Karuna offices
	Ceylon Workers Congress (CWC)		
	V. Prabhakaran (LTTE)		
	B. Nadesan (political wing LTTE)		
	Douglas Devananda (EPDP)		
	Thamil Makkal Viduthalai Puligal (TMVP) Pillayan faction	Influence political decisions	Kidnapping, violence
Muslims	Faiz Mustapha	(Political) President's Counsel, former SL High Commissioner to UK, chair SL HR Commission; (Social) Influential with Muslim community and civil society in general because of HR record	Highly respected member of the legal profession; Public appointments made by SLFP; has access to most senior levels of government
	T.K. Azoor	(Social) Well-respected Muslim "gentleman" of the south, popular religious leader; (Political) Pioneer member of SL Muslim Congress, Represented SLMC in the Colombo Municipal Council; (Security) Canvassed for peace among all communities	Attorney; President of Zahira Colege Colombo (oldest Muslim school in Colombo) and delivers anti-war messages to school children, their parents and the Muslim community w/o bias to political parties
	Ferial Ashraff	(Political) Member of Parliament representing eastern	Was a permanent member of GoSL delegation

	Alawi Maulana	provinces, leader of NUA (constituent of UPFA); (Social) Widow of former leader of SLMC; (Security) Believes the LTTE must be weakened militarily before peace talks; (Political) Governor of Western Province, simply	conducting negotiations with LTTE in Geneva in 2006; Control of patronage in SL's wealthiest province
		conveys message of President to the public; (Security) Believes GoSL should completely eradicate LTTE; (Social) Muslim leader in the south, but little following among Muslims outside his constituency, esp. weak in the east	
	Rauf Hakeem (SLMC)		Political influence
Sinhalese	Suresh de Mel	(Economic) Involves business community in peacebuilding efforts; (Social) Hires and encourages hiring of multi-ethnic staff; (Political) Works with SCOPP	As member of Hamantota Dist. C of C and Chair of BPA represents many owners of SME with multi-ethnic staff, these SMEs also conduct peacebuilding activities; BPA has collaborated with SCOPP and other CSOs
	A.T. Ariyaratne	(Social) Using principles of non-violence his NGO works throughout the country; (Political) courted by Sinhalese political parties because of extensive network	Moral high-ground accepted by Hindus and Buddhists; Sarvodaya (his NGO) present in more than 10,000 villages
	Champika Ranawaka	(Political) member of Parliament, JHU; (Social) conducts protest rallies against CFA;	Blocks moves by government to re-establish lines of communication with LTTE; publicly encourages Sinhalese nationalist ideology
	Guthabaya Rajapaksa	(Political) Discourages "doves" within GoSLs to reinstitute peace negotiations; (Security) Controls all aspects of war against LTTE; (Social) belongs to politically powerful family	Influential political appointment: Secretary of Defense; Influential personal relationship: brother of the President; holds US citizenship
	Mahinda Rajapaksa (Pres.)		Controls GoSL decision-making State run TV station
	Basil Rajapaksa (portfolio for east)		
	Ratnasiri Wickremanayake (PM)		
	Ranil Wickramasinghe (UNP)	Political opposition leader with support of Tamils in East & North	
	Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (Karuna)		
	Jatika Hela Urumaya (JHU)	Sinhalese chauvinist; Natural Resources Minister	Moral authority
	Special Task Force (STF)		Weapons
	Sri Lanka Peace Secretariat (SCOPP)		Excludes Muslims

DRIVERS OF CONFLICT AND MITIGATING FACTORS

Drivers of Conflict	Mitigating Factors
Top leaders of Tamil (Velupillai Prabhakaran) and GoSL (Guthabaya	Successful business leaders for Tamils (K. Balendra) and Sinhalese (Suresh de
Rajapaksa) forces as well as Muslim leaders (Ferial Ashraff) use their	Mel) engage the business and political sectors and encourage the support of
charisma, political influence and violence against citizens to work against	change through political influence with government and opposition leaders,
political solution to the war	interethnic staffing of businesses and working with SCOPP
The GoSL establishes high security zones to keep LTTE from connecting with	Relying on religious and international human rights principals, Sinhalese (A.T.
external suppliers; this displaces more than 1 million people, mostly Tamil	Ariyarantne) and Muslim (Faiz Mustapha) encourage politicians, communities
farmers and fishers, with a tradition n land use; IDP camps lack GoSL services;	and CSO organizations to promote non-violence and respect for human needs
IDPs look to the LTTE for security and service provision	in GoSL policies and social interaction
LTTE attack moderate or non-LTTE Tamils and GoSL provides them no	GoSL taking some steps to include Tamils in SL military (Guthabaya
security against the attacks, so few moderate voices arise to challenge LTTE	Rajapaksa) and provide pay incentives for police and other bureaucratic
approach to challenging GoSL marginalization of Tamils	officers to learn Tamil
Diaspora provide arms and money to LTTE; GoSL establishes high security	Tamils with access to media outlets (R. Rajamahendran), Muslim school
zones to prevent illegal arms and funding from entering the country; high	president (T.K. Azoor) and Sinhalese NGO present in 10,000 villages
security zones preclude Tamils from accessing the sea and their traditional	(Sarvodaya) support or do not oppose anti-war communications to large
farm lands increasing their reliance on LTTE for security and service	numbers of people
provision.	
GoSL corruption and Sinhalese chauvinism minimize opportunities for	
meaningful input by non-Sinhalese into GoSL decision-making	
Special Task Force (STF) reports to Police Chief in East, Police Chief reports	
to Minister of Defense; Minister of Defense also provides funding and arms for	
paramilitary which is the greatest source of insecurity in east	